schiavon paradiplomacia en méxico

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Sub-State Diplomacy in Mexico

Jorge A. SchiavonDepartment of International Studies, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas (CIDE),

Carretera Mxico-oluca 3655, Lomas de Santa Fe, lvaro Obregn, Mxico D.F. 01210, [email protected]

Received: 30 April 2009; revised: 16 October 2009; accepted: 5 November 2009

SummaryTis article analyses the international relations of Mexican sub-state governments. It aims to answer fourquestions: 1) What explains the recent and dramatic increase in their international activities?; 2) Do thesefederal units have an independent foreign policy?; 3) What are their levels or degrees of sub-state diplo-macy?; and 4) Which variables explain the variation in their degree of sub-state diplomacy?Te first section argues that the growth in international activities is generated by the combination of twosets of variables: a) the growing interdependence and globalization of the international system; and b) thedemocratization, decentralization and structural reform processes in the domestic arena. Te second section

sustains that Mexican sub-national units do not have a foreign policy of their own. Te third section showsthat there is a wide variation in the states degree of international participation. In order to characterize thisvariation, a typology is constructed and the 32 Mexican federal units are classified in two moments in time(2004 and 2009) and a comparative analysis between these two periods is presented. Te fourth sectionargues that the degree of sub-state diplomacy depends on three variables: economic (gross state product);political (juxtaposed government); and geographic (border location). Each of these variables is tested todetermine its impact, providing evidence to sustain the relevance of the economic variable, arguing thatjuxtaposed government functions as a trigger variable for initiating or increasing external activities, and thatthe border is a necessary, but not suffi cient, variable to explain the degree of international projection.

Keywords

sub-state diplomacy, paradiplomacy, local diplomacy, federal diplomacy, Mexico

Introduction

Historically, foreign policy has been controlled exclusively by nation-states, andits main objective has been to protect their sovereignty, independence and territo-rial integrity.1Te bureaucracy in charge of international affairs the ministryof foreign affairs is responsible for defining and conducting this policy, in

order to maximize the national interest, reduce the costs and increase the benefitsof the states participation in the international system.2

1) G.R. Berridge and Alan James,A Dictionary of Diplomacy(New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 94.2) James N. Rosenau, Comparing Foreign Policies: Teories, Findings and Methods(New York: John Wey &Sons, 1974), p. 4.

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o attain this goal, states have to maintain a unified position towards the exte-rior. As a result, foreign policy implementation has been a prerogative of the

central government, generally the federal executive, even in federal systems.3Summing up this arrangement, Swiss statesman Alfred Escher famously quipped:external unity, internal diversity.4As a matter of fact, Article 7.2.a. of the ViennaConvention on the Law of reaties establishes that heads of state or governmentand the ministers of foreign affairs are considered as representing their statesand, therefore, conducting foreign policy. However, in the last two to threedecades, the tradition of deference to the federal executive branch has beenincreasingly challenged. In Mexico, the number of internal actors that participatein international issues has increased considerably, even though the presidentmaintains the constitutional power to direct foreign policy and conclude interna-tional treaties.5

Tese challenges to federal authority have taken effect through four impor-tant developments. First, ministries or offi ces of the federal executive other thanthe Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Secretara de Relaciones Exteriores, orSRE) have direct relations with their bureaucratic or administrative counterpartsabroad this can be referred to as administrative diplomacy. Currently, practi-cally all of the federal ministries in Mexico have a Director-General of Interna-

tional Affairs, whose main objective is to coordinate these activities. Second, otherbranches of the federal government, particularly both houses of the legislature(Representatives and Senate), and occasionally the judicial branch, have substan-tially increased their contact with their international counterparts this canbe called parliamentary diplomacy. In Mexico, the participation of the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate in international affairs is circumscribed to therevision of the foreign policy conducted by the executive, the domestic approvalof treaties and the ratification of consul-general and ambassador appointments.However, they also have their own international activities in the areas and issues

in which they have attributions.Tird, sub-national governments, both at state and local levels, have signifi-

cantly increased their international relations. Tese external activities have beendenominated as sub-state diplomacy, local diplomacy, federative diplomacy or

3) Riker defines federalism as a political organization where the governmental powers are divided betweencentral and regional governments, in such a way that each government order has certain areas of compe-tence where it has the faculty of the final decision; see William H. Riker, Federalism, in Fred I. Green-

stein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science, 5: Governmental Institutions and Processes(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 101.4) Cited by Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Rudolf Hrbek, Giorgio Malinverni and Daniel Trer, Federalism andForeign Relations, in Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller (eds), Federalism in a Changing World:Learning from Each Other(Montreal and Kingston: McGill and Queens University Press, 2003), p. 53.5) Mexico, Laws, Constitucin Poltica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico City: Porra, 2007),Article 89.X.

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paradiplomacy,6and will be the main focus of analysis in this article, specificallyat the state level. Finally, non-state actors such as multinational corporations,

non-governmental organizations and diverse interest groups (academia, businessassociations, unions and political parties, among many others) have also increasedtheir participation and incidence in external affairs.

According to the Mexican Organic Law of Federal Public Administration(LOAPF), the SRE has the attribution and responsibility to promote, facilitateand guarantee the coordination of all foreign actions of all the ministries andagencies of the Federal Public Administration, and without limiting their attribu-tions, conducting foreign policy.7As such, the SRE is, within the Mexican gov-ernment, the bureaucratic agency in charge of conducting foreign policy. In orderto do so, it must serve two essential functions: both coordinating and represent-ing the diverse interests of all of the actors with interests or incidence in externalaffairs described above. Tese actors can have very diverse interests in inter-national politics and require being effective and effi ciently represented in theinternational arena. Tus, the main challenge that SRE faces is to coordinate thegrowing number of interests, some of which it may oppose, in order to conducta foreign policy that is unified and coherent towards the exterior, but that is rep-resentative of the aggregation of the different interests of domestic actors in the

legislature, sub-state governments, ministries and agencies of the federal executiveand, if possible, the most important interest groups within the country.Te central objective of this article is to provide systematic information in

order to analyse and better understand the recent and growing international rela-tions of Mexican sub-state governments. It aims to answer four questions: 1) Whatexplains the recent and dramatic increase in the international activities of Mexi-can sub-state actors?; 2) Do federal units have an independent foreign policy inMexico?; 3) What are the levels or degrees of Mexican sub-state diplomacy?; and4) Which variables explain the variation in the degree of sub-state diplomacy in

the country? Each of these questions will be addressed in the following sections.Te first section argues that the growth in international activities of sub-state

governments is generated by the combination of two sets of variables: 1) thegrowing interdependence and globalization of the system in the internationalarena; and 2) the democratization, decentralization and structural reform pro-cesses in the domestic system. Te articles second section sustains that, in strictlegal terms, Mexican sub-national units do not have a foreign policy of their own,

6)

Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating, Paradiplomacia: Las Relaciones Internacionales de las Regiones(Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000); Hans J. Michelmann, and Panayotis Soldatos (eds), Federalism and Inter-national Relations: Te Role of Subnational Units(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Brian Hocking, Local-izing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy(London: Macmillan, 1993);and John Kincaid, Te American Governors in International Affairs, Publius, vol. 14, no. 4, 1984,pp. 95-114.7) Mexico, Laws, Ley Orgnica de la Administracin Pblica Federal(Mexico City: Porra, 2004), Article 28.I.

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given the legal limitations that specify that foreign policy is an exclusive faculty ofthe federal executive. Te third section defends the idea that there is wide varia-

tion in the degree of international participation of sub-state governments. Inorder to characterize this variation, a typology of four levels of international rela-tions (low, medium, high and very high) is constructed. Based on this typology,the 32 Mexican federal units are classified in two moments in time 2004 and2009 and a comparative analysis between these two periods is presented. Tefourth section argues that the degree of sub-state diplomacy of Mexican federalunits depends on three variables: economic (gross state product); political (juxta-posed government); and geographic (border location). Each of these variables isanalysed to determine its impact on the federal units international relations.Finally, the conclusions summarize the articles main findings.

Te International and Domestic Factors

Growing globalization defined as the multiplication of international interac-tions as a result of the growing flows of information, goods, services, capital andpersons made possible by the reduction in transaction costs of information, cur-rency exchange, movement and transportation has significantly increased the

costs of isolation for states in the international system. It has also reduced thestates control over its territory and population, eroding the traditional concept ofsovereignty.8Tis process has generated a substantial increase in the number andnature of actors with interests in international affairs.

On the other hand, the increasing number of international institutions createdin recent decades has favoured a substantial boost in interdependence and inter-national cooperation.9Tis fact runs parallel to the growth in the number anddepth of issues addressed by them; these issues no longer concentrate exclusivelyon security matters, the highest priority of states in an anarchic internationalsystem, but also on the economic arena and the topics of the new internationalagenda.10 As a result, globalization is more intense and the costs for states toremain isolated are therefore much higher. New actors with international inci-dence have decreasing costs of participation in external affairs, generating incen-tives for non-state players to participate more actively in international issues.11

8) Jorge A. Schiavon, Daniela Spenser and Mario Vzquez Olivera (eds), En Busca de una Nacin Sober-ana: Relaciones Internacionales de Mxico, SiglosXIXy XX(Mexico City: -, 2006). 9) Guadalupe Gonzlez Gonzlez, Las Estrategias de Poltica Exterior de Mxico en la Era de la Globaliza-

cin, Foro Internacional, vol. 41, no. 4, 2001, pp. 619-671.10) Jorge G. Castaeda, Los Ejes de la Poltica Exterior de Mxico, Nexos, vol. 23, no. 288, 2001, pp. 66-75.11) It is interesting to note that sub-state diplomacy in the United States predates the era of globalization.Tis relatively early activity can be a result of the US being the leading superpower in the capitalist world,the growing level of internationalization after the Vietnam War, American federalism, and the growinginternational interests of its federal units in terms of exports and foreign investment. See Kincaid, TeAmerican Governors in International Affairs.

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Specifically for Mexico, the last three decades have witnessed a remarkableinternationalization of the country. For example, as a result of the incentives gen-

erated by globalization and interdependence, Mexico changed its economic modeland the development strategy from a closed economy with strong state interven-tion and an import substitution industrialization model (ISI), into an openeconomy that promotes economic development through the integration of theinternational market and the promotion of exports.12From 1993 to 2008, thesum of imports and exports increased from representing 30 per cent to 65 percent of GDP.13Economic liberalization generated incentives for greater competi-tion between sub-national units in the global market, to place their exports andattract foreign direct investment to their territories. Facing a more open andcompetitive global market, the international activity of sub-state governmentsincreased in order to find markets for their exports and sources of foreign invest-ment to boost local development.

Parallel to the globalization and interdependence of the international system,in the last 30 years there has been a wave of democratization and decentralizationaround the globe. Te return to democracy in the developing world and thegrowing decentralization of powers have provided incentives for sub-state govern-ments to participate in areas that used to be monopolized by the central govern-

ment, including international affairs. Democratization opened the political spacefor a more ample and diverse representation of local governments, while admin-istrative decentralization gave these actors the powers and resources to conductpublic policies that are closer to local preferences.

Te Mexican Constitution establishes that Mexico is a presidential and federalsystem, with strong bicameralism (two symmetric and incongruent Houses ofCongress). Tus, in terms of the institutional division of power, it is a system withthe strongest possible formal level of separation. However, for more than 70 years(from 1929 to 2000) of hegemony of the offi cial party, the Partido Revolucionario

Institucional (PRI), Mexico functioned as one of the worlds most centralizedpolitical systems. Te extremely powerful federal executive in Mexico can beunderstood by analysing the relationship between two central political actors inthe system: the president, who is head of state and government; and the offi cialparty. Presidential power depends on: 1) the constitutional powers of the execu-tive; 2) the legislative strength of the presidents party; 3) the degree of disciplineexercised by leaders over party members; and 4) the competition that the presi-dent faces from rivals within his own party.14

12) Ninfa Fuentes and Jorge A. Schiavon, Structural Reform and Regional Integration in the Americas,in Michle Rioux (ed.), Building the Americas(Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), pp. 51-53.13) World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1990-2008.14) Jeffrey A. Weldon, Te Political Sources of Presidentialism in Mexico, in Scott Mainwaring andMatthew S. Shugart (eds), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1997).

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70 .

Because of the authoritarian system and the non-competitive nature of theelections that sustained it, the PRI had a majority (in some cases of more than

90 per cent of the seats) in both Houses of Congress from 1929 to 1994. Sincethe mid-1930s, the president was the de factoleader of the party. Tis, combinedwith the fact that there has been no congressional or presidential re-election sincethat time, and that the party delegated to the president the power to designate hissuccessor and control key party nominations, generated supremacy of the federalexecutive over Congress and sub-state governments. Te latter was implementedthrough the nomination of party candidates to state and municipal posts, whomost of the time won in uncontested elections. Also, the president could freelyremove governors from power, through constitutional means, via the PRI-con-trolled Senate or negotiated resignations. Even in the last years of the authoritar-ian regime, control over the 32 federal units still existed under PresidentCarlos Salinas (1988-1994), sixteen constitutionally elected governors wereremoved from their post during his administration.15

As the practically undisputed leader of a highly disciplined party that helduninterrupted congressional majorities in both Houses of Congress for over60 years, the federal executive was far from restrained by constitutionally limitedpowers. Te other relevant political actors in the system had incentives to ally

with the executive and to support his policy preferences, because he controlled through the rule of no re-election their career advancement possibilities.16Tus, even if there were several de jureveto points in the Mexican system becauseof the presidential, bicameral and federal institutions, the Mexican president wasable to control de factoall of the political actors in the system. o put it simply, hehad the power to enact his preferred policies once he perceived them as desirable,and then to implement them to a considerable depth.

In terms of foreign policy, the president has always had the power to designatehis ministers, among them the foreign affairs minister, who has traditionally been

very close to the president. During the last four administrations (de la Madrid,Salinas, Zedillo and Fox), the minister of foreign affairs was chosen from outsidethe ranks of the Mexican Foreign Service (Servicio Exterior Mexicano, SEM) except in the last eleven months of the Salinas administration when AmbassadorManuel ello Macas replaced Manuel Camacho, and in the current administra-tion of President Caldern (2006-2012) with Ambassador Patricia Espinoza.

Until 2003, the SEM was the only professional civil service in Mexico wherethe admission and promotion criteria were defined by merit, through periodicalpublic exams. However, because of extreme presidentialism, the SEM has always

been under the direct orders of the president in offi ce. For example, a consider-

15) Peter M. Ward, Victoria E. Rodrguez and Enrique Cabrero, New Federalism and State Government inMexico: Bringing the States Back In(Austin X: Te University of exas at Austin, 1999), pp. 66-67.16) Jeffrey A. Weldon, Te Political Sources of Presidentialism in Mexico, p. 17.

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able number of Mexican ambassadors are not foreign service diplomats, butappointed directly by the president approximately 40 per cent are presidential

designations. Tis situation has not changed with democratization, for the lastPRI government and the Fox administration had 38 per cent and 37 per centpresidential appointees (in 1998 and 2001, respectively). President Calderon hasestablished a distribution of 65:35 per cent as a parameter for the appointment ofcareer versus political ambassadors.

Tese characteristics of the Mexican political system allowed the president toimpose his public policy preferences most of the time, because the other twobranches of government were under his direct control and therefore supported hispreferred policies, particularly in foreign affairs. However, if the offi cial party lostits majority in the Houses of Congress, or the president was no longer the undis-puted leader of his party, or the party became an undisciplined party, the federalexecutive would lose the extra-constitutional powers, keeping only those estab-lished in the Constitution. Te following paragraphs will discuss how this hap-pened with democratization between 1997 and 2000, especially with the electionof an opposition candidate Vicente Fox from centre-right Partido AccinNacional(PAN) in 2000 and the strengthening of the centre-left Partido de laRevolucin Democrtica(PRD).

able 1 was created based on the institutional and party variables of the Mexi-can political system with comparative data from 1982, 2000 and 2006. As can beobserved, the institutional variables (presidentialism, bicameralism and federal-ism) and the foreign policy powers of the president have remained constant afterdemocratization. However, because of the composition of the Houses of Con-gress and the sub-state governments, and decreasing party discipline, foreignpolicy domination by the federal executive has changed to a situation where thepresident can no longer impose his preferred external policy, but has to coordi-nate the international interests and activities of other political actors, particularly

the legislature and sub-state governments.In 1982, the presidents political party, the PRI, controlled 74.8 per cent and

98.4 per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives and the Senate respec-tively, which generated very low party fragmentation in the system (ENP Represen-tatives: 1.720; ENP Senate: 1.032). At the same time, Mexican federalism did notoperate because 100 per cent of state governors were from the PRI, generating themaximum possible degree of unitary government. Party discipline among PRI con-gressmen was also almost absolute, because their future political careers dependeddirectly on the informal PRI leader, the president. Finally, sub-state expenditure

was only 17.8 per cent of total government expenditure. It is not surprising thatthe combination of the previous variables made the division of powers, bicamer-alism and federalism unimportant institutional variables, thus generating a sys-tem without real checks and balances, where foreign policy reflected the preferenceof the federal executive because of the presidents domination over the system.

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72 .

17) Te ENP (Effective Number of Parties) is a measure that weighs the relevance of each party based onthe number of seats that they control in Congress. It is calculated using the following formula: ENP =1/[(p

i2)], wherep

iis the percentage of seats that party i has in the House. See Maarku Laakso and Rein

aagepera, Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe, ComparativePolitical Studies, no. 12, 1979, pp. 3-27.

able 1: Institutions and power distribution in Mxico: 1982, 2000 and 2006

Variable 1982 Change 2000 2006

Constitutionaldivision of

power

Presidential No institutionalchange

Presidential Presidential

Legislativedivision of

power

Strong bicameralism No institutionalchange

Strong bicameralism Strong bicameralism

Federaldivision of

power

Federalism No institutionalchange

Federalism Federalism

Foreign policycoordination

powers

Executive control,with foreign policy

analysis, treaty,ambassador and

consul ratification bySenate and absenceof national territory

by Congress

No institutionalchange



consul ratification bySenate and absenceof national territory

by Congress



consul ratification bySenate and absence ofnational territory by

Congress

PartyFragmentation

Low fragmentationENP17

Representatives:1.720

ENP Senate: 1.032

Increase infragmentation

starting in 1988elections

Mediumfragmentation

ENPRepresentatives:

2.769ENP Senate: 2.786

Medium and growingfragmentation

ENP Representatives:3.520

ENP Senate: 3.596

Division ofpurpose

between federal

powers

Unified governmentExecutive: PRI

Absolute majority in

House ofRepresentatives and

Senate: PRI

PRI losespresidential

election in 2000

Divided governmentExecutive: PAN


House Representa-tives and Senate: No

party

Divided governmentExecutive: PAN


House Representativesand Senate: No party

Division ofpurposebetween

Houses ofLegislature

(first politicalforce)

Unified legislaturePRI in

Representatives:74.8%

PRI in Senate:98.4%

PRI loses absolutemajority in

Representatives in1997, and in

Senate in 2000

Divided legislaturePRI in


PRI in Senate:46.1%

Divided LegislaturePAN in


PAN in Senate:40.6%

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74 .

presence in 2006 without reaching absolute majority (41.4 per cent and 40.6 percent in the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively). Also, juxta-

posed government became a reality, because PAN only controlled 25 per cent ofstate governorships, both in 2000 and 2006. Party discipline started to decline inall three major parties (PRI, PAN and PRD) because of factional struggles withinthem. Finally, sub-state expenditure increased by more than 40 per cent in onedecade, accounting for 25.4 per cent of total government expenditure by 2000,and by almost 100 per cent by 2006, when it reached over 34 per cent. Terefore,because of increasing party fragmentation and sub-state spending, the institu-tional configuration of the system (presidentialism, bicameralism and federalism)has achieved renewed and substantial importance in the Mexican system. Tesefactors directly affect the provision of public policies, including foreign policy,functioning as permissive variables for increasing conflict between branches andorders of government. Te total domination of foreign policy by the federal exec-utive is thus now history.

In sum, the increasing participation of Mexican federal units in the interna-tional arena responds to a combination of domestic (democratization, decentral-ization and liberalization) and international (globalization and interdependence)variables. Democratization of the system, together with economic liberalization

and decentralization, created the spaces and incentives for sub-state governmentsto participate actively in international affairs, with the objective of advancingtheir particular interests and strengthening their local development.

Considering this, it can be argued that, facing an open and competitive globalmarket with the existence of a more plural economic and political system in Mex-ico where the logic of the market prevails, the international activities of Mexicanfederal unities will pursue three main objectives: 1) finding markets for theirexports; 2) attracting foreign direct investment and cooperation for productiveactivities within their territory; and 3) strengthening ties with their emigrant

populations to promote their protection and to encourage the flow of remittancesand productive investment of a proportion of these.

Along with these institutional objectives, there can be other political or per-sonal aims. First, international activism can be used as a mechanism for differen-tiation of the local executives public policies from those of other local authoritiesor the federal executive, particularly when they belong to different political par-ties or defend contrasting ideologies. Second, given the wide publicity givento international activities at the local level, these can be used as a strategy bythe local executive for increasing their visibility at the national and international

levels, in order to promote their political career. Finally, the personal or profes-sional characteristics education, origin and preferences of the local execu-tive can have an impact on the importance given to international affairs in anadministration.

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76 .

Te law does not give the offi ces of the federal, state and municipal public administrations the statusof subjects of international law ius tractate but only the attribution to pact in the name ofMexico, because those institutions cannot contract by themselves commitments that are regulatedby international law since they are not subject of this legal order. As a consequence, if one ofthese ministries or decentralized agencies [. . .] signs an inter-institutional agreement, even if it islimited to the faculties of the ministries or decentralized agencies of the different levels of govern-ment and, for any reason, they cannot comply with it, the international responsibility rests on theMexican state.20

In order to prevent possible legal problems, the SRE published a Guide for theConclusion of reaties and Inter-institutional Agreements, which establishes thecriteria to be followed in the negotiation of these legal instruments. According to

the guide, a treaty must be concluded if at least one of the following conditionsapplies:

a) it is an issue that rests within the powers of the federal legislature; b) it involves the Nation as awhole; c) it affects the national territory; d) it affects the human rights of individuals; e) it extendsor modifies existent legislation; f) it generates financial obligations in which the Nations credit iscompromised; g) the issue convened could be challenged before national courts.21

In cases where the issue is not a matter of a treaty, according to the criteria above,an inter-institutional agreement could be signed by a ministry or agency, at the

federal, state or municipal levels, as long as:

a) the content of the agreement falls within the exclusive faculty of the ministry or agency [. . .];b) the agreement only affects the attributions of the signing ministry or agency; c) the financialobligations can be covered by the ordinary budget of the ministry or agency; d) it does not affect thehuman rights of individuals; and e) it does not modify the existing law.22

Even if the regulations established by this guide are very precise, it is important topoint out that this document is not legally binding. Tis, combined with the fact

that the Law on the Conclusion of reaties is not widely known at the state andlocal levels, has led to the signature of several inter-institutional agreements with-out the knowledge or consent of the SRE, which is authorized to determine thevalidity of the inter-institutional agreements that ministries and agencies of thefederal Public Administration, as well as state and municipal governments, seekto sign (Article 11.X).

Given that the Constitution grants the federal executive the exclusive power toconduct foreign policy, the activities of sub-state governments in internationalaffairs are not part of the national foreign policy from a legal point of view. None

of the federal units has a ministry within its governmental structure exclusively in

20) Jorge Palacios, Tratados: Legislacin y Prctica en Mxico(Mexico City: SRE, 2002), pp. 64-67 [trans-lated by Jorge A. Schiavon].21) Palacios, Tratados, p. 224 [translated by Jorge A. Schiavon].22) Palacios, Tratados, p. 228 [translated by Jorge A. Schiavon].

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- 77

charge of international affairs. Compared to the local issues of the state and itsrelations with the federal government, foreign affairs have had a smaller relative

importance, even in a globalized world. As a consequence, the federal units havenot tried to displace the federal government in foreign policy issues and the rela-tion between the federal and sub-state governments has been complementary.

By keeping the Constitution and other laws on foreign policy practicallyunaltered, current Mexican legislation represents an obstacle to federal statesparticipation in international affairs. As such, foreign policy from a legalperspective is still the responsibility of the federal executive. Even so, the stateshave shown a considerable increase in their level of participation in internationalrelations over the past two decades. Te level of activism, however, is not the samefor all units. Tis is why it is important to classify and explain their varyingdegrees of international participation.

Measuring and Classifying the International Participation of Mexican FederalUnits

In the literature on the international relations of sub-state governments in Mex-ico, measurement and classification of the level of activity of states and munici-

palities in international affairs is very recent.23Tis section will address and discussa typology of the external participation of federal units. Te proposed levels ofsub-state diplomacy, from lesser to greater degrees, are: 1) low; 2) medium; 3) high;and 4) very high.

Te low level is when the unit does not have important relations with the exte-rior, or its participation occurs in a sporadic way or in non-transcendent policyareas. In the medium level, the state grants considerable importance to its eco-nomic relations with the exterior, and deems them an effective strategy for pro-curing local development. In the political scope, the states participation is reducedto actions with a low level of impact on the internal dynamics of the state (suchas signature of agreements on minor issues and courtesy visits) or what could becatalogued a more reactive than proactive nature.

A federal unit carries out international relations of a high level when it grantssuch relations a specific and centralized treatment. It has an offi ce within thegovernment structure that is exclusively dedicated to the coordination of thestates external affairs. Tis offi ce most of the time depends directly on the statesexecutive. It also extends its scope of action to issues such as sustainable dev-

elopment, promotion of democracy, education, and science and technology. Testructure is more or less specialized, reflecting the areas of higher importance tothe state, and the offi ce acts in coordination with other state ministries and offi ces

23) Te first effort in the case of Mexico is by Jorge A. Schiavon, La Proyeccin Internacional de las Enti-dades Federativas: Mxico ante el Mundo(Mexico City: Instituto Matas Romero-SRE, 2006).

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78 .

when these need to establish relations with the exterior. As such, the high levelalso includes activities within the medium level.

Foreign policy is understood as a strategy or planned course of action devel-oped by the decision-makers in the state towards other international actors ororganizations, to reach certain goals defined in terms of national interest.24Tesame source establishes that foreign policy is a dynamic process in which six stepscan be distinguished:

[. . .] translation of the specific objectives and considerations of national interest; determination ofthe domestic and international factors related to the proposed goals; analysis of the States capacitiesin order to reach the desired results; development of a plan or strategy to develop the State capacities

in function of the proposed goals; implementation of the required actions; and periodic evaluationof the progress made towards the desired results.25

Even if none of the Mexican federal units have a foreign policy of their own, thevery high level of participation implies that the state performs all of the economicand political activities on which it has faculties in international affairs. It alsorequires that the state has an administrative structure, directly under the state exec-utive, which coordinates the foreign activities of all state ministries and agencies.

Once the levels or categories proposed have been established, the next step is to

classify the Mexican federal units according to these criteria.26

Kincaid has estab-lished that the most important areas of international activity of the US states areexport promotion, foreign investment attraction, service to their emigrant com-munity abroad and international cooperation.27Michelmann and Soldatos agree,and provide evidence that these areas of interest are valid in different countriesaround the world.28Specifically, in order to achieve these interests, according toDuchaceck,29in the past few decades the increasing international activity of thefederal units worldwide has taken place in at least six areas: 1) establishment ofoffi ces of representation in national capitals or cities of other countries; 2) organ-

ization of highly publicized trips by local executives to other countries; 3) send-ing missions of local offi cers abroad; 4) organization of international events orexhibitions for local products at state and external levels; 5) deepening of therelations with other federal units in the regional scope or on global issues; and

24)Lawrence Ziring, International Relations: A Political Dictionary (Kalamazoo, MI: Western MichiganUniversity, 1995), p. 6.25) Ziring, International Relations, p. 7.26) Te information used to classify the international activities of the states was obtained from the data-

base and files on the SREs inter-institutional agreements, the yearly reports presented by state executivesto their local Congress, reviewing the states web pages, and interviews with federal (SRE) and state (coor-dinators and staff of the External Affairs Offi ces of the states) authorities of over one-third of the federalunits. Tis information was gathered during the first semesters of 2004 and 2009.27) Kincaid, Te American Governors in International Affairs.28) Michelmann and Soldatos, Federalism and International Relations.29) Ivo Duchaceck, Perforated Sovereignties: owards a ypology of New Actors in International Rela-tions, in Michelmann and Soldatos, Federalism and International Relations, pp. 1-33.

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- 79

6) participation by local offi cers in international meetings or organizations. In theMexican case, one more activity should be included: the establishment of offi ces

to provide services to migrant communities abroad, particularly in the UnitedStates.30

Using the above activities identified in the literature, the next step is to measurethe international participation of Mexican federal units (see able 2). Te inter-national activities are aggregated in three areas: institutional structure (I); eco-nomic activity (E); and political activity (P). In order to measure the internationalrelations of Mexican federal units in a quantitative way, a total value of one pointwill be assigned to each of these areas of activity, which will then be dividedequally between the specific international activities aggregated by each area.31

Te institutional structure is divided in two parts: I1 indicates the existence ofa bureaucratic structure for external economic promotion at the level of Directionor Deputy Direction within the state ministry of economics or development; andI2 measures whether there is an offi ce or coordination of the states internationalaffairs that depends directly from the state executive. Each of these variables willbe assigned a value of 0.50, since the maximum value of I is 1.

Te international economic activity is integrated by five variables, each of themreflecting a type of activity that contributes to the promotion of the external eco-

nomic relations of the state. Te order in which the activities are presented (lessto more costly) reflects the amount of financial and human resources that thestate has to assign for their implementation. E1 contemplates activities to pro-mote the state internationally through electronic resources such as web pages orthe existence of programmes, funds and advisory agencies for export promotionand the attraction of foreign investment. E2 refers to international offi cial tripsfor the promotion of trade and investment and/or the participation in interna-tional exhibitions or events for trade promotion. E3 represents the conclusion ofagreements, with trade chambers and/or cooperation agreements in the economic

area with international partners. E4 includes the conclusion of agreements withexternal counterparts to finance local projects or cooperation agreements forregional development. Finally, E5 represents the establishment of offi ces in othercountries for economic promotion. Although the order in which these activitiesare presented implies increasing costs in terms of resources to implement them,each has been granted the same value (0.20), with 1 the maximum value for theeconomic activity area.

Finally, the international political activity is integrated by five activities, each ofthem with a value of 0.20, with 1 being the maximum value for this category. In

30) Schiavon, La Proyeccin Internacional de las Entidades Federativas, pp. 76-77.31) Te most important limitation of this exercise is that it only measures whether a specific activity takesplace or not, without providing information on the frequency or quality of the activities reported. Temeasurement is neutral on the importance of each activity compared to the others, since it weighs all ofthem in equal terms. Because of the limited availability of information on the international activities ofsub-state governments in Mexico, this type of measurement is a relatively acceptable proxy.

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80 .

Table2:LevelofInternationalRelationsofMexicanFederalUnits(Oc

tober2004)

STATE

Abbrev.

I1

I2

G

T

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

ET

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

PT

TOTAL

Aguascalientes

Ags

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.90

BajaCalifornia

BC

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.40

2.00

BajaCaliforniaSu

r

BCS

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.30

Campeche

Camp

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.50

Coahuila

Coah

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.90

Colima

Col

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.10

Chiapas

Chis

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.20

0.0

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.40

2.00

Chihuahua

Chih

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.20

0.0

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.50

DistritoFederal

DF

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.20

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

0.90

Durango

Dgo

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.90

Guanajuato

Gto

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.70

Guerrero

Gro

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.90

Hidalgo

Hgo

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.30

Jalisco

Jal

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.20

0.2

0

0.80

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.80

2.60

EstadodeMxico

EdeM

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.40

1.90

Michoacn

Mich

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.30

Morelos

Mor

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.10

Nayarit

Nay

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.10

NuevoLen

NL

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.90

Oaxaca

Oax

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.00

1.10

Puebla

Pue

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.20

0.2

0

0.80

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.70

Quertaro

Qro

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.90

QuintanaRoo

QRoo

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.40

1.30

SanLuisPotos

SLP

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.90

Sinaloa

Sin

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.10

Sonora

Son

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.0

0

0.80

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.70

Tabasco

Tab

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.40

1.50

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- 81

STATE

Abbrev.

I1

I2

G

T

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

ET

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

PT

TOTAL

Tamaulipas

Tams

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.60

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.40

1.50

Tlaxcala

Tlax

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

1.10

Veracruz

Ver

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.60

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.40

1.50

Yucatn

Yuc

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.20

1.10

Zacatecas

Zac

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.60

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.10

AVERAGE

0.50

0.05

0.55

0.20

0.19

0.03

0.06

0.09

0.57

0.02

0.03

0.12

0.07

0.03

0.27

1.38

Where:

I1:Directionofinternationaleconomicpromotion

withinthestatesministryofeconomicsordevelopment.

I2:InternationalAffairsOfficethatdependsdirectlyonthestatesexecutive.

E1:Promotiono

fthestateusingemailorinternet,

orprogrammes,fundsandagencie

stopromoteexportactivitiesorattractforeigninvestment.

E2:Officialtripstopromotetradeandinvestmentorparticipationininternationalev

entsandfairstopromotestatesexports.

E3:Agreementswithtradechambersabroadorcoo

perationagreementsineconomicissueswithinternationalcounterparts.

E4:Agreementstofinancelocalprojectsorcoopera

tionagreementsforregionaldevelopment.

E5:Representationofficesabroadforeconomicpro

motion.

P1:Courtesyvisitsabroad.

P2:Tripsforthe

attentionofmigrantpopulationso

rofficialactionsabroadonbehalf

ofemigrantpopulation.

P3:Sisterhoodagreementsingeneraltermswithoutspecificcooperationprojects.

P4:Membership

ininternationalassociationsorwo

rkgroupsonborderand/orregion

alissues.

P5:Membership

ininternationalassociationsorwo

rkgroupsonglobalissues.

Table2(cont.)

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82 .

Table3:Level

ofInternationalRelationsofMexicanFederalUnits(

June2009)

STATE

Abbrev.

I1

I2

IT

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

ET

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

PT

TOTAL

Aguascalientes

Ags

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.10

BajaCalifornia

BC

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.00

0.5

0

1.10

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.60

2.70

BajaCaliforniaSu

r

BCS

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.80

Campeche

Camp

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.60

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.60

1.70

Coahuila

Coah

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.80

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.80

2.60

Colima

Col

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.10

Chiapas

Chis

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

1.00

3.00

Chihuahua

Chih

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.60

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.80

1.90

DistritoFederal

DF

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

1.00

3.00

Durango

Dgo

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.40

1.80

Guanajuato

Gto

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.60

2.10

Guerrero

Gro

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.40

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.20

1.10

Hidalgo

Hgo

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.00

0.2

0

0.80

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.60

1.90

Jalisco

Jal

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

1.00

3.00

EstadodeMxico

EdeM

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.20

0.2

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

1.00

3.00

Michoacn

Mich

0.5

0

0.5

0

1.00

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.60

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.60

2.20

Morelos

Mor

0.5

0

0.0

0

0.50

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.00

0.0

0

0.60

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.0

0

0.2

0

0.60

1.70

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STATE

Abbrev.

I1

I2

IT

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

ET

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

PT

TOTAL

Nayarit

Nay

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.60

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.40

1.50

NuevoLen

NL

0.50

0.50

1.00

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

1.00

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.80

2.80

Oaxaca

Oax

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.40

1.30

Puebla

Pue

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.80

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.60

1.90

Quertaro

Qro

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.40

1.30

QuintanaRoo

QRoo

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.60

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.80

1.90

SanLuisPotos

SLP

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.60

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

1.50

Sinaloa

Sin

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.20

1.10

Sonora

Son

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.60

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.60

1.70

Tabasco

Tab

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.80

1.70

Tamaulipas

Tams

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.60

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.60

1.70

Tlaxcala

Tlax

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.60

1.50

Veracruz

Ver

0.50

0.50

1.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.80

2.20

Yucatn

Yuc

0.50

0.50

1.00

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.60

2.00

Zacatecas

Zac

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.60

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.60

1.70

AVERAGE

0.50

0.19

0.69

0.20

0.20

0.09

0.05

0.10

0.63

0.18

0.12

0.16

0.11

0.04

0.60

1.92

Table3(cont.)

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84 .

order of increasing costs of implementation, P1 represents courtesy trips abroad;P2 is trips abroad directed to address the migrant population or activities carriedout before other governments for the protection of local emigrants; P3 measures

the conclusion of general sisterhood agreements where specific areas of interna-tional cooperation are not specified; P4 represents membership in internationalassociations or working groups that have a regional or border scope; and, finally,P5 establishes the membership in international associations or organizationswhose scope is global.

When the three areas of international activity are added, the range of variation,depending on the number of activities enacted, is between 0 and 3. Based on this,the following ranges of international participation of the federal units can beestablished, according to the total points obtained by each unit (see Figure 1).

Based on this typology, it is possible to quantify the international activity of theMexican federal units. Such an exercise will be presented in the following para-graphs for two different periods (2004 and 2009), in order to analyse and com-pare the levels of international activity between Mexican federal units and itsvariation in time (see ables 2 and 3).

According to able 2, the states with the higher levels of international relations(high) are: Jalisco (2.60); Baja California (2.00); and Chiapas (2.00). In 2004,these states distinguished themselves from the rest for having an offi ce dedicatedto international affairs, which depended directly on the states executive. In addi-

tion, they have within their respective ministry of economics an offi ce in chargeof the economic promotion of the state. Tese are the only three states to obtain1 point in the institutional component. In the economic area, although none ofthese units reaches the highest possible grade, their participation is remarkable.Chiapas and Jalisco also stand out in the economic area for having agreements topromote local development. In the political aspect, Jalisco and Chiapas, besidesabasco and the Estado de Mexico, are states that belong to an internationalassociation with global scope, not only circumscribed to the discussion of imme-

diate problems, like those derived from a border or regional situation. Accordingto the typology, these three states would be placed at a high level of sub-statediplomacy.

As an example of the international relations of these states, Jalisco has designedits regional development policy based on the experience of the Committee of the

If otal = 3, then very highIf 2 otal < 3, then highIf 1 otal < 2, then mediumIf otal < 1, then low

Figure 1. ypology of sub-state diplomacy

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- 85

Regions of the European Union. Jalisco has an Offi ce of International Affairs thatdepends upon the governors offi ce. Its goals are to establish, promote, facilitate

and coordinate communication and collaboration among the governmental units,and national, international and non governmental organizations, to strengthenthe international presence of Jalisco. Its objectives are to plan, develop, coordinateand direct, along with the state ministries, the agenda of the states executiveregarding his international trips and to promote cooperation with internationalorganizations, states and regions of the world.

In the case of Chiapas, as a consequence of its growing international visibilityderived from the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in 1994,the state created a Coordination of International Relations in 2001 to promotelocal development. Its mission is to consult and support all areas of the statesgovernment to establish projects, proposals and negotiations with internationalactors. By 2002, Chiapas had established relations with 43 countries in five con-tinents, as well as with diverse international organizations. Even if the majority ofthese relations were reduced to the conclusion of a general cooperation agreementthat received little or no follow up, some of the relations generated specific coop-eration projects. For example, in 2004, Chiapas signed an agreement with theEuropean Union, through which it received 15 million euros to support its gov-

ernments programmes on poverty alleviation and the conservation of the Lacan-dona rainforest. Chiapas also maintains relations with international organizationssuch as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Inter-Ameri-can Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, from which it has received resources and training in the form ofinternational decentralized cooperation.

Meanwhile, 23 Mexican states can be identified in the medium sub-state diplo-macy level. Although they can all be positioned within the same level, it is not ahomogenous group in terms of their level of international activity. Tere are some

aspects, both economic and political, that are only executed by some of them.Given that the great majority of Mexican federal units lay within this category, itwill be divided in three subcategories in order to provide a more detailed analysis.As such, divided in equal parts, the three sub-levels of medium sub-state diplo-macy are: medium-low (1 P < 1.33); medium-average (1.33 P < 1.67); andmedium-high (1.67 P < 2). Te lower rank includes twelve states: Baja Cali-fornia Sur; Colima; Hidalgo; Michoacn; Morelos; Nayarit; Oaxaca; QuintanaRoo; Sinaloa; laxcala; Yucatn; and Zacatecas. Tere are six units located withinthe middle rank: Campeche; Chihuahua; Puebla; abasco; amaulipas; and Vera-

cruz. Finally, in the rank of medium-high diplomacy, five states are included:Coahuila; Guanajuato; Estado de Mxico; Nuevo Len; and Sonora. From thislast group, all states except for Sonora have the highest possible grade in the eco-nomic component.

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23/34

- 87

activities in the political arena. Te case of the Federal District during the admin-istration of Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador (2000-2006) is worth noting. Even

though it had an offi ce in charge of attracting foreign investment, there were noattendance logs to any event for the promotion of the state abroad, nor visibleprogrammes to encourage exports. Also, the series of agreements signed withforeign counterparts were either for technical cooperation or so general that noreal bonds were established. Lpez Obradors successor, Marcelo Ebrard (2006-2012), has reactivated the international participation of the Federal District.

In only five years (between 2004 and 2009), the international relations of Mex-ican states have increased considerably. It is important to notice that, on average,the international activity of the federal units rose from 1.38 to 1.92 points, thatis, 0.54 points in just five years, which is equivalent to an increment of almost 40per cent in international activity.

By 2009, none of the federal units rank at the low level. Tere are 21 statesin the medium level, divided according to the three subcategories: medium-lowwith six states (Aguascalientes, Colima, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quertaro and Sinaloa);medium-average with three states (Nayarit, San Luis Potos and laxcala); andmedium-high with twelve states (Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chihuahua,Durango, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Sonora, abasco, amaulipas

and Zacatecas). At the high level, there are seven states (Baja California, Coa-huila, Guanajuato, Michoacn, Nuevo Len, Veracruz and Yucatn).Finally, in 2009, four federal units ranked at the very high level Chiapas,

Distrito Federal, Jalisco and Estado de Mxico in 2004 there were none. Tesefour units are characterized by carrying out all of the activities included in thequantitative analysis. Teir involvement in international relations is such thatthese states, along with Coahuila and Hidalgo, were the main actors in the cre-ation of the Association of International Affairs Offi ces of the States (Asociacinde Oficinas de Asuntos Internacionales de los Estados, AMAIE), which was offi cially

founded on 2 April 2009, with the initial participation of thirteen federal units.AMAIEs mission is to coordinate the states foreign activities, both in the globalarena and with the federal government.

Moreover, starting in 2009, Chiapas has unified its coordination of interna-tional activities and the promotion of tourism, creating the Ministry of ourismand International Relations. Although it is not a ministry exclusively dedicated tointernational relations, Chiapas is the first state to take its external affairs to aministerial level.

Te federal units whose level of international relations increased most drasti-

cally in the last five years were the Distrito Federal (2.10 points), Estado deMxico (1.10) and Chiapas (1.10), while Durango, Michoacn, Nuevo Len andYucatn increased their international activity by 0.90 points. Only three states(Colima, Sinaloa and Sonora) did not increase their international participation,while no state reduced its external projection in net terms. Te international

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88 .

activities that grew the most were political, with an average increment of 0.33points, while the institutional structure and economic activity rose by 0.14 and

0.07 points, respectively.Regarding Distrito Federal, its growing international activities under Ebrards

administration are due to several internal changes: 1) the reinitiation of interna-tional trips by the local executive; 2) the reactivation of cooperation and sister-hood agreements that already existed; 3) the strengthening of mechanisms toattract foreign investment and to promote exports; 4) the project to open fiverepresentation offi ces to attend to its emigrant community abroad; 5) a wideningin the number of foreign counterparts, at all levels of government and with publicand private international organizations; and 6) the coordination of all of theabove in a harmonic way by restructuring the bureaucracy of the General Coor-dination of International Affairs. As such, Ebrards administration, unlike thoseof his predecessor, has made international affairs an essential part of his govern-ment strategy. As a result, the Federal District passed from a level of low to veryhigh international participation between 2004 and 2009.33

Te Variables that Explain the International Activity of Mexican Federal Units

Once the sub-state diplomacy of the Mexican federal units has been measured,the following step is to confront these levels of participation with the explanatoryvariables of the articles hypothesis level of income, juxtaposed governmentand geographic position to establish the impact of these variables on the per-formance of Mexican states in the international arena.

Economic Variable: Income

Te greater the level of income of a federal unit, measured through the states

gross internal product, the more economic resources there should be to invest inpublic policies, including greater international participation. In order to test therelationship between the level of state income (2004 data, in millions of constantpesos of 2003) and the level of international relations, a statistical model (Ordi-nary Least Squares) was used to describe the relation between the two variables.

Te result of the regression was a moderately significant statistical relationbetween income and level of participation. However, observing 2004 data, theFederal District is an outlier, since it is the federal unit with the highest incomeand the lowest level of international activity. Given that it was an atypical case

between 2000 and 2006 (as previously discussed), this federal unit was excluded

33) Jorge A. Schiavon, Las Relaciones Internacionales del Distrito Federal, in Consuelo Dvila, Jorge A.Schiavon and Rafael Velzquez Flores (eds), Diplomacia Local: Las Relaciones Internacionales de las Enti-dades Federativas Mexicanas(Mexico City: UNAM, 2008), pp. 175-204.

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- 89

Graph 1. International Relations and Income in 2004

from the model. When the statistical model is executed including only the31 states, the results are impressive: the coeffi cient establishes a positive relationbetween income and international relations (8.27*10-6), which is statistically sig-nificant with a degree of confidence of 99 per cent (0.001) and an adjusted R2of 0.4429. By not including the Federal District, the level of statistical relationbetween both variables is considerable and significant at the level of 1 per cent ofconfidence, and approximately 45 per cent of the variation in the level of sub-state diplomacy can be explained by a single variable: income (see Graph 1).

Te same statistical exercise was performed for 2009 including the 32 federalunits. Te results of the OLS model between the income of the federal units(using 2008 data, since the data for 2009 was not yet available, in millions ofconstant pesos of 2003) and the level of international relations, generates a posi-tive relationship coeffi cient (5.91*10-6), with statistical significance at the 99 percent level of confidence (0.001), and an adjusted R2of 0.3931. Tis means thatby 2009 the statistical relationship exists between the two variables exists for allof the federal units the Federal District is no longer an outlier and there isno change in the level of statistical significance and almost no modification in the

level of importance of the income variable (Graph 2). In sum, in terms of correla-tion, approximately 45 per cent and 39 per cent of the variation in the statesinternational relations in 2004 and 2009, respectively, is explained by one vari-able: state income.

Source: INEGI, Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mxico

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

$1,000 $10,000 $100,000 $1,000,000

LevelofInte

rnationalRelationsin2004

State GDP in 2004 (in millons of constant pesos of 2003, logarithmic scale)

Ags

BC

BCS

Camp

Coah

Col

schiavon paradiplomacia en méxico

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