saving bosnia on capitol hill - the case of senator bob dole

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Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the caseof Senator Bob DoleHamza Kariaa Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo,Bosnia and HerzegovinaPublished online: 06 Mar 2015.

To cite this article: Hamza Kari (2015) Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case of Senator BobDole, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 13:1, 20-39, DOI: 10.1080/14794012.2014.990734

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Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case of Senator Bob Dole

Hamza Kari*

Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Received 13 November 2013; accepted 13 May 2014 )

The aim of this article is to analyse the role played by former US Senator BobDole in the formulation of American foreign policy towards Bosnia from 1992 to1995. While the existing literature on US policy during the war in Bosnia almostexclusively focuses on the Clinton administration, this article argues that theadministration was reacting to pressure from Senator Dole and other congres-sional Bosnia hawks. The article will provide a narrative of Senator Dolesactivism and contend that he was consistently the most active senator on the issueof Bosnia; and it will show that congressional pressure prodded the Clintonadministration into taking a more forceful policy aimed at ending theBosnian war.

Keywords: Bob Dole; Senate; Congress; Bosnia; war in Bosnia; Yugoslavia

Several years after French President Jacques Chiracs June 1995 visit to Washington,DC, Richard Holbrooke recalled that Clinton: sent Chirac on an impromptu trip toCapitol Hill to see Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and Speaker Newt Gingrich,hoping that he would be able to persuade the Republican leaders to give theAdministration greater support on Bosnia.1 This is a testament to how far theexecutive and legislative branches had parted ways on the issue of Bosnia. In fact,Holbrooke, the chief architect of the Dayton Peace Accords, wrote later thatcongressional efforts by Senators Joseph Lieberman, Joe Biden and Bob Dole tounilaterally lift the embargo on Bosnia led to some of the most emotional andcontentious struggles of the Clinton Administration.2 And according to Holbrooke,Dole had made Bosnia his personal project.3

In the literature on US policy towards Bosnia during the 19921995 war, the roleof Senator Bob Dole in advocating for a more forceful policy has been noted; yet, forthe most part, authors have focused on his 1995 bipartisan legislative proposal theDoleLieberman bill that sought to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.4But this legislation represented the culmination of Senator Doles active involvementon the issue of Bosnia since the beginning of the conflict. This article seeks to traceDoles Bosnia policy activism throughout the Bosnian war and, based primarily onthe archives of the Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas,

*Email: [email protected] article is dedicated to my parents Hamida and Fikret Kari.

Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 2015Vol. 13, No. 1, 2039, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.990734

2015 Board of Transatlantic Studies

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will provide a narrative of how this activism shaped US policy towards Bosnia fromthe dissolution of Yugoslavia until the crafting of the Dayton Peace Accords.

By the time the Bosnian war raged in the early 1990s, Senator Bob Dole alreadyhad a distinguished legislative career behind him. Born in 1923, the KansasRepublican was first elected to Congress in 1960 and to the US Senate in 1968,where he served until 1996. He was chairman of the Republican National Committeein 1971 and1972 and was President Gerald Fords running mate in 1976. Dole wasalso the longest-serving Republican leader in the Senate, having first been elected asmajority leader in 1984 a position he held from 1985 to 1987 and again from 1995to 1996 and serving as minority leader in the interim, from 1987 to 1995. A senatorwith presidential ambitions, he ran in the Republican primary in 1988 and becamethe Republican nominee in 1996. To campaign full-time for the presidency, Doleresigned from the Senate in June 1996. His advocacy for Bosnia throughout the19921995 war and his increasing criticism of the Clinton administrations handlingof Bosnia threatened to spill over into the 1996 presidential race. For the Democraticincumbent, resolving the Bosnian conflict prior to the 1996 election seemedpolitically prudent. For Bob Dole, Bosnia was not simply a political issue to beexploited; indeed, his interest in the Balkans dated as far back as the mid-1980s.

The collapse of Yugoslavia

As the process of Yugoslavias demise began to unfold in the early 1990s, theRepublican administration of George H. W. Bush was also coping with thedissolution of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the democratisationof Eastern Europe, and a host of other foreign policy challenges. In the wake of thisgeostrategic realignment, the future direction of US foreign policy had yet to beclearly articulated. The Republican Party itself comprised several factions, with anti-interventionists like Pat Buchanan arguing for US disengagement from globalcommitments, realists calling for action where national interest was at stake andnationalists who remained focused on domestic issues.5 Top officials in the Bushadministration including James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Dick Cheney were allrealists who were sceptical of interventions in strategically peripheral regions, and intheir view, Yugoslavia was precisely that. In fact, Baker was quoted as saying thatthe USA had no dog in this fight. The realist views of the administrationnotwithstanding, pressure did build over time for action to be taken in both Bosniaand Somalia. In a pre-election year, the reluctance of the administration to getinvolved in a potential quagmire seemed practical, and the only substantial policyimplemented by the administration was the establishment of a no-fly zone overBosnia.6

Though his party was in power in Washington, Senator Bob Dole soon distancedhimself from the Bush administrations cautious approach to Yugoslavia, and theKansas Republican stood out in Congress for his interest in the Balkans. Thesenator, himself a Second World War veteran, had been following human rightsissues in Yugoslavia since 1986. His focus had been on violations of human rights ofAlbanians in the country,7 and his previous exposure to Yugoslavia left him wellpositioned to understand the nuances of Yugoslav politics and the federations pathto disintegration.

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As one of its first policies towards Yugoslavia, the Congress adopted the NicklesAmendment in 1990 as part of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing andRelated Programs Appropriations Act of 1991, which became Public Law 101513on 5 November 1990.8 The legislation called for the termination of aid to Yugoslaviaif certain human rights abuses were not addressed, and implementation of sanctionsbegan on 5 May 1991. But less than three weeks later, Secretary of State JamesBaker suspended sanctions, declaring that Yugoslavia was respecting HelsinkiAccord principles. The Nickles Amendment mandated that financial appropriationscould not be used to provide direct aid to Yugoslavia and US representatives ininternational financial institutions were also instructed not to support the provisionof such aid. The legislation was not to apply to those Yugoslav republics that hadconducted free and fair elections.9 Senator Dole had taken an active role inpromoting these measures, writing to his colleagues in the Subcommittee on ForeignOperations and in the Appropriations Committee beginning in October 1990, urgingthem to support the legislation,10 which had been introduced by Senators DonaldNickles and Alfonse D'Amato.11 As the Bush administration prepared to reinstateaid in late May 1991, Dole and Nickles wrote to President George H.W. Bush toexpress their opposition, stating that provisions of the law conditionalising thepossible resumption of aid had not been fulfilled.12

Dole continued to advocate this policy approach in March 1991 when hepublished an op-ed in which he argued that foreign aid represented a tool forsupporting democracy and freedom. He wrote that he had introduced legislationproviding for direct aid to those republics on the road to democracy, while at thesame time denying aid to communist central governments in Belgrade and Moscow.He warned that the situation in Yugoslavia was worsening and pointed out that, ofthe six federal Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and three others had held free elections.He ended the article by declaring that this is no time to be rewarding Belgrade withAmerican taxpayer dollars.13

In April 1991, the Senate adopted resolution S.Res.106 introduced by SenatorDole, calling on the Yugoslav president and army to cease the use of force againstBosnia and other federal republics. The resolution reflected the Senates majorityview that US policy should be based on human rights for all in Yugoslavia.14 Afterthe adoption of the resolution, Dole wrote to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovicinforming him of the Senates vote. In his letter, Dole stated that the resolution didnot take a stand on the future of Yugoslavia but did take a stand against theYugoslav army using coercion and force against Bosnia and other federalrepublics.15

As the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated, Secretary of State James Bakervisited Belgrade on 21 June 1991. He was to write in his memoirs that the purpose ofhis visit was to convey a message that would try to shock the various republicleaders into accepting two basic realities: that they needed to negotiate theirdifferences, not act unilaterally; and that under no circumstances would theinternational community tolerate the use of force.16 Several days prior to this visit,Dole sent Baker a letter commending him on the decision to make an appearance inYugoslavia. Dole wrote that it was his and the Senates view that it would be wrongto undermine those democratic forces within the country who are seeking to achievealternative structures of government.17 His aim was to emphasise that those

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Yugoslav federal republics which were on the path to democratisation should not beundermined in the name of maintaining Yugoslav unity at any cost.

The following month, Dole wrote to President Bush stating that the situation inYugoslavia was worsening. He urged Bush to take steps to pressure, and ifnecessary compel, the Yugoslav army to halt its aggression, and he recommendedthat Bush personally appeal to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to use his influencewith the Yugoslav Government to end all military operations, to establish a NATOpeacekeeping force, and to call for a Security Council meeting to consider a UNpeacekeeping force.18 In August 1991, Senator Dole again wrote to President Bush,this time together with 13 of his Senate colleagues, to draw the presidents attentionto the situation in Yugoslavia. They urged him to send a special envoy to thecountry.19 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft replied stating, We believe itis critical that our immediate focus be in support of EC efforts in Yugoslavia.20 InSeptember, Dole wrote another letter to President Bush, again urging him to send aspecial envoy to Yugoslavia to provide US leadership, and he asserted that allowingthe European Community to take the lead on Yugoslavia had not producedconclusive positive results.21

By November of that year, Senator Dole sought to impose punitive measures onSerbia for its role in Yugoslavias descent into chaos. He signed a letter, along withseven other senators, addressed to fellow lawmakers and stating that the situation inYugoslavia had become a war, that the efforts of the European Community hadbeen ineffective, and that the USA must become actively involved. The authorsstated that the Yugoslav army was controlled by Serbian strongman SlobodanMilosevic, who they described him as the last hardline communist leader inEurope. These senators felt that the USA had to send a clear message to Milosevicand that their legislative measure S.1793 was geared to this end by forbidding USassistance to Serbia and the parts of Yugoslavia under Serbian control, and puttingan end to US-facilitated multinational aid, air travel and all trade unless thepresident certified that Serbia had ended armed conflict, respected internal bordersand ceased all human rights abuses.22

The Bush administration and Bosnia

The European Economic Community decided in December 1991 to recognise theindependence of former Yugoslav republics Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnian leader-ship faced two choices: to remain part of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia or to optfor independence. The choice was clear. The Bosnian referendum on independencewas held on 29 February and 1 March 1992. Despite the Serbian Democratic Partyscampaign to discourage Bosnian Serbs from voting, the turnout was approximately64%, with overwhelming support in favour of independence.23 On 6 April, the EECrecognised Bosnia, followed by US recognition the next day. The Yugoslav NationalArmy (JNA) and Serb paramilitaries in Bosnia commenced their genocidal war.

In the last year of the Bush administration, Senator Dole continued to advocatefor a stronger US role in ending the conflict and pushed for punitive measuresagainst Serbia for its role in the violence. He framed the debate by representing thenature of the conflict in Bosnia as one of aggression and genocide and his pressstatements from the period are marked by this terminology. His critique of theWestern approach to Bosnia was marked by references to appeasement.


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Senator Doles advocacy for Bosnia was not a matter of partisan politics. He hadbeen calling for more vigorous policy during the Republican Bush administrationand continued this advocacy into President Clintons first term. Indeed, the domesticUS debate over Bosnia cut across party lines. Interventionists comprised both formerdoves like Congressman Frank McCloskey and neoconservatives such as RichardPerle. The anti-interventionist camp similarly comprised both Democrats andRepublicans.

As the Bush administration proceeded to diplomatically isolate Serbia, SenatorBob Dole and Democratic Senator George Mitchell wrote to Russian PresidentBoris Yeltsin on 11 May 1992 to express their dismay that Russia supported Serbiain the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and that it recognised thenew Yugoslavia. We find Russia's recognition and support for the present Serbiangovernment indefensible, they wrote, and they urged Yeltsin to refrain fromestablishing diplomatic relations with Serbia until Serbia began respecting HelsinkiAccord principles.24 In a letter to President Bush written the next day, Dole and 12of his Senate colleagues supported the Presidents decision to recall the USambassador in Belgrade and encouraged efforts to expel the then rump Yugoslaviafrom the CSCE. They argued again that the USA should play a more active role inBosnia. Specifically, the senators raised the idea of the establishment of a securityzone around the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo to allow for the functioning of theBosnian state.25 In late May 1992, in a Commencement Address he delivered atSterling College in Kansas, Dole called for a total economic blockade of Serbia, afreeze of Serbias assets in the USA and across the globe, and a suspension of alldiplomatic relations with Serbia. He further called for the USA to take the lead indiplomatic efforts to move peacekeepers into Bosnia.26

In September 1992, Senators Dole and Biden introduced bipartisan legislationthat provided for US military assistance not exceeding $50 million in equipment tobe made available to the Bosnian Government once the embargo was lifted.27 Thiswas the first legislative initiative aimed at providing military assistance to Bosnia,and it was conditional on the preparedness of US allies to join in such an assistanceeffort.28 Though it was dependent on the lifting of the embargo, this legislation wasto herald a series of legislative initiatives with a similar policy aim; and by the end of1992, Dole had come to the conclusion that lifting the embargo was the best policy.The UN arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in 1991 had remained in place afterBosnias independence, depriving Bosnia of its right to self-defence. The embargohad frozen the military advantage in favour of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Effortsto lift the arms embargo soon became the focus of Congress as it formulated USpolicy towards Bosnia.

On 17 December 1992, Dole and 12 other senators wrote to President Bushstating that the genocide of the people of Bosnia is continuing we believe that theUN arms embargo against Bosnia must now be lifted. While they laudedhumanitarian effort and sanctions against Serbia, they also felt that allowingBosnians to defend themselves was critical. In a dramatic tone, the senators wrote,What is at stake is the survival of an entire nation.29 Thus began a three-yearcongressional campaign aimed at allowing the Bosnian Government to defend itspeople and territory.

At the end of that year, Dole published an open letter to Milosevic in which hestated that Milosevic had been pursuing the dream of a Greater Serbia and that this

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had resulted in genocide in Bosnia. He called for air strikes against Serbias militaryassets if Milosevic did not end the bloodshed in Bosnia. The fate of HitlersGermany awaits you and Serbia, wrote Dole.30

Doles efforts to shape US policy on Bosnia were assisted in no small part by hisforeign policy adviser Mira Baratta.31 Of Croatian ancestry, Baratta was prescienton a number of policy issues as they evolved. The Dole Library archive shows that asearly as late August 1992 long before the failure of the London Peace Conferencewas evident Baratta had written to the senator that principles espoused in Londonwere worthy, but that the absence of starting dates and deadlines for theirimplementation and the fact that there were no enforcement mechanisms wereproblems.32 Barratta was to remain Doles adviser through 1995.

The Clinton administration and Bosnia

With Democrats in power in Washington, the Republican Party found itself indisarray on foreign policy. The GOP opposed Clinton on a number of issues but hadyet to formulate and articulate an alternative foreign policy vision. Officially, theparty opted for unilateralism; but in fact, Republicans comprised realists, national-ists, interventionists and anti-interventionists with sometimes very divergent views.Realists put forth arguments for the selective use of US force for strategic nationalinterests. Humanitarian interventions were frowned upon. Nationalists were scep-tical of international institutions and called for a freer hand in foreign policy, as theysaw institutions and treaties as hampering an assertion of US power. Interventionistsargued for US military dominance in the world and viewed the USA as crucial forachieving international order; they were supportive of US interventions on the globalperiphery because they viewed them as crucial for maintaining US credibility on theworld stage. This group frequently found itself outnumbered within its own party.Lastly, there were anti-interventionists who called for US disengagement from itsglobal role.33

Disunity in the Republican Party on foreign affairs was illustrated in the varietyof positions party members promoted on the question of Bosnia. While Dole arguedfor lifting the embargo and arming the Bosnian Government, Senator John McCainopposed this on the grounds that such an intervention would lead to a quagmire. The1994 congressional elections ushered in the first Republican majority in 40 years anda new class of freshmen legislators, but most of whom had little interest in foreignpolicy. The GOPs Contract with America had, after all, been primarily focused ondomestic issues.34 These differences among Republicans further crystallised theinternationalist and interventionist role played by Dole. His public pronouncementson the rationale for US intervention in Bosnia consistently underscored theimplications of non-intervention for US credibility and its repercussions on theinternational order.

Upon assuming office, Clinton inherited a US and Western policy towardsBosnia that had been left to the Europeans to shape. It included deployment of a UNpeacekeeping force, sanctions on Serbia and criticism of Serb atrocities. It was clearthat, absent US engagement, the conflict in Bosnia would be a protracted one.35

Former British Prime Minister John Major wrote in his memoirs that followingClintons election victory in November 1992, the USA and Britain differed on twoissues Northern Ireland and Bosnia. Indeed, Major recalled that:


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the conflict in Bosnia was a preoccupation on both sides of the Atlantic. For two yearsit remained a running sore between us. The most strident criticism of our policy camefrom American Senate and Congressional hawks, who were both keen to dictate policyand unwilling to deploy American serviceman to Bosnia, where they would face thehazards that confronted European troops.36

The Bosnian crisis occurred in the immediate post-Cold War period as the both theEuropean Community and NATO were in the process of transformation. TheEuropean Community was in the last stages of evolving into the European Union;and in the midst of early confidence among Europeans that they could manageYugoslavias disintegration, Luxembourgs foreign minister Jacques Poos declaredthat if anyone can do anything here, it is the EC.37 It was soon evident, though,that the European Community was ill-equipped to respond adequately to the crisis inBosnia. And NATO, too, was faced with a changing strategic landscape in Europe.Events since 1989 had ushered in a new approach by NATO to Central and EasternEurope. In fact, at a London summit in July 1990, NATO invited Central andEastern European countries and the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic liaisonswith the Alliance.38 This was one of the steps towards greater cooperation in andeventual enlargement of NATO. But as NATO was redefining its raison d'etre in theaftermath of the Cold War, the crisis in Bosnia threatened to spill over into the restof the Balkans region. This potential scenario had security implications for NATO,which led to the Alliances involvement in Bosnia. Both the European Communityand NATO were accustomed to incremental change during the Cold War and theirresponse to the Bosnian war exposed the slow pace at which they were able to adaptto the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

And, in the USA, Bosnia was not the only foreign policy crisis on the agenda.The Clinton administration was faced with an inherited commitment to ahumanitarian mission in Somalia, made by the Bush administration in August1992. Part of the reason the Bush administration had decided to take action inSomalia was due to pressure from then Governor Clinton over Bosnia. DavidHalberstam notes that it was a widespread belief at top levels of the administrationthat deploying troops to Somalia was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ColinPowells way of doing something humanitarian but, equally important, of notsending troops to Bosnia, a place that, as far as he was concerned, was far moredangerous.39

If Senator Dole agreed with candidate Clintons publicly articulated interven-tionist policies during the election campaign, it did not take long for Dole to criticisethe incoming administration for distancing itself from those campaign pledges. AsClinton wrote in his memoirs, he was faced with dug-in positions when he assumedoffice. I was reluctant to go along with Senator Dole in unilaterally lifting the armsembargo, for fear of weakening the United Nations, wrote Clinton, adding that hewas also not in favour of using unilateral airpower that would strain the NATOalliance.40 Since 1992, Senator Dole had been calling for an end to the arms embargoand use of air power against the Bosnian Serb military; and Democratic congress-man Frank McCloskey had been advocating an identical policy. Bosnian Govern-ment officials had also been proposing the same thing for some time. While the exactorigins and ownership of lift and strike cannot be attributed to one individual, thepolicy was officially adopted by the incoming Democratic administration in early

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1993. John Major recalled that when he visited Washington in February 1993, theAmerican opinion had become almost evangelical for the policy of lift and strike lifting the arms embargo and starting air strikes against Bosnian Serbs whichgreatly concerned us.41 Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was towrite many years later that the American administration was under constantpressure from Senator Bob Dole, Margaret Thatcher, and other partisans of lift.42It was clear that Doles advocacy for this policy option was starting to have animpact.

In fact, as early as 10 February 1993, Dole issued a statement in response to thenascent Clinton administrations plan for Bosnia. Secretary of State WarrenChristopher had unveiled a policy that excluded any military option for Bosniaand committed the deployment of US troops to Bosnia only if a comprehensivepeace arrangement agreed to by all sides was reached. Reluctant to support theVance-Owen peace proposal, which imagined a division of Bosnia into provinces,the administration did express its support for the peace process.43 Dole criticised theadministrations plan as falling short of candidate Clintons promises and he rejectedthe Vance-Owen peace plan as fundamentally flawed.44

The legitimate Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats agreed to the Vance-Owen peace plan in March 1993, but Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the plan.Europeans had by then made clear to the US administration that they objected toallied use of force in Bosnia. And unilateral American action in Bosnia was not anoption as the administration did not want to become solely responsible for Bosnia.The top ranks of the administration were divided on the use of force, with VicePresident Al Gore and US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright vocallyadvocating the use of air strikes. Eventually, on 1 May 1993, Clinton made thedecision to adopt the lift and strike policy that Senator Dole and RepresentativeMcCloskey had been advocating.45 But this policy was abandoned soon afterbecause Secretary of State Warren Christopher failed to get the support of allies inEurope.

Why did the new Administration fail to use force in Bosnia early on? SamanthaPower proffered three reasons: (1) the US military was opposed to intervention, (2)the administrations foreign policy team comprised multilateralists not keen onacting without the support of European allies and (3) Clinton was concerned aboutdomestic public opinion.46 Further, American allies, particularly the British and theFrench, had troops in Bosnia as part of the UN force. They objected to air strikes onSerb targets on the ground that could lead to retaliation against their peacekeepers;and they objected to lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, too. According to IvoDaalder, containment of the Bosnian conflict rather than intervention became thebasis of US policy.47 Undaunted, Senator Dole was to champion the lift and strikepolicy and insist on it for the remainder of the Bosnian war. He also remained afierce critic of the Vance-Owen, and later the Owen-Stoltenberg, peace plans.

On 16 April 1993, Dole wrote to President Clinton urging him to take the lead inproviding a strong response to the Serbian attack on Srebrenica. Dole pushed for anultimatum in eastern Bosnia: the withdrawal of Serbian troops or NATO air strikes.He argued that resolutions adopted up to that point provided the necessaryauthorization, and he emphasised that he was not calling for the deployment ofground troops. He again urged Clinton to lift the embargo against the BosnianGovernment.48 President Clinton replied on 22 April, stating that he was pursuing


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policies focused on diplomatic isolation and the toughening of sanctions but thatother options remained on the table.49 Later that month on 30 April 1993 Doleand 16 of his Senate colleagues wrote once more to the president, warning of the riskof not acting to stop Milosevics aggression. The senators acknowledged that theSenate had favoured multilateral action until then and stated that they wouldsupport a Presidential decision to participate in multinational air and missile strikeson Serbian military targets. They further stated that these actions could lead to anegotiated settlement and that to achieve this aim, we would also support aPresidential decision to lift the arms embargo so the Bosnians could defendthemselves.50 Though supportive of a more forceful policy towards Bosnia,Congress had yet to obtain sufficient support for the use of airpower; and onesignificant obstacle was the long shadow of the Vietnam War and concomitant fearsof a similar quagmire.51

Bob Doles first legislative proposal to end the embargo on Bosnia came in May1993, only four months after the new administration had taken over. On 27 May1993, Dole introduced the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1993 to lift theembargo on Bosnia and authorise up to $200 million in military aid to the BosnianGovernment. In a press statement, Dole emphasised that the embargo wasintroduced prior to Bosnias independence and prior to the aggression on Bosnia.He argued that continued application of the embargo continues to impair Bosniasright to self-defence. encouraging further aggression. He also acknowledged themultilateral approach favoured by President Clinton but criticised the focus onmultilateralism as a goal in itself.52 On 20 July 1993, Clinton wrote to Dole statingthat he supported lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and that the USA supportedan attempt by the Non-Aligned Movement in the UN to lift it. The effort failed toconvince the allies, though, and Clinton reiterated that the approach from thebeginning had been to maintain Western unity and preserve alliance cohesion.53

Serb forces increased their pressure on the besieged Bosnian capital of Sarajevoin the summer of 1993, and Dole concluded by August of that year that the UNeffort in Bosnia was futile. NATO involvement in Bosnia, which began with theenforcement of the no-fly zone in April 1993, appeared to offer a more promisingavenue for ending the conflict. On 6 August 1993, when the Bosnian capital was onthe verge on falling, Dole issued a statement pressing NATO to act and declaringthat the Alliance had the authority to do so, based on Article 51 of the UN charter.He claimed that NATOs credibility was on the line and said that only NATO, andnot the UN, could do the job. He criticised the Owen and Stoltenberg-led peace talksand called on Clinton to reconsider his position on the Geneva talks.54

Lift by legislation

Dole had tested the congressional waters on Bosnia with the resolution he introducedin May 1993 to lift the embargo. Having failed to garner sufficient support for thislegislation, he stepped up his efforts in 1994. His next aim was to put the Senate onthe record as supporting this policy goal. On 27 January 1994, the Senate adopted anamendment (S.AMDT.1281) introduced by Dole, which stated that Serbia wasdirectly involved in the conflict in Bosnia and had been supporting irregular forces inthe country. It further stated that Bosnia had been unable to defend itself due to theinternational arms embargo and that the Bosnian Government had the right, under

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Article 51 of the UN Charter, to seek assistance for self-defence. The amendmentexpressed the sense of the Senate that the US embargo on Bosnia should be liftedand stipulated that the president should not only terminate the embargo upon receiptof such a request from the Bosnian Government but that he should also providemilitary assistance to Bosnia if requested. The amendment was adopted in the Senateby a vote of 879.55 This was to be a first and symbolic legislative victory for Doleon the issue of Bosnia.

Buoyed by the success of this amendment in early 1994, in April, Doleintroduced a bill to lift the arms embargo. The proposed legislation had 33 co-sponsors and reflected the January amendment by stipulating once again that thepresident should terminate the embargo after receiving a request from Bosnia forassistance with self-defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter.56 In a statement tothe press on 21 April 1994, Dole said that he was authoring bipartisan legislation,along with Senator Joe Lieberman, to lift the embargo. Clintons announcement of anew initiative to expand the use of NATO air power to protect safe havens in Bosnianotwithstanding, Dole wrote that:

now is the time to strengthen the President's hand by letting the British, the French, andthe Russians who have objected to lifting the embargo on Bosnia know that the USCongress fully supports going it alone if necessary because this embargo has no legalbasis and is unjust.

In other words, Dole saw his legislation as leverage that Clinton could use indiscussions with allies who opposed lifting the embargo. Dole pointed out that hisproposal went further than my earlier amendment and mandates a termination ofthe US arms embargo, adding that the best way to ensure that US forces will not besent on the ground to fight this war for the Bosnians is to lift the embargo and givethem the means to fight it themselves.57 Senator George Mitchell, who had workedwith the administration to put together an alternative proposal, offered anamendment which stipulated that the USA would act multilaterally, through theUN Security Council, to lift the embargo.58

Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic had written in early May to bothSenators Dole and Lieberman on the eve of the vote on their legislation. Silajdzicwrote that the hopes of the Bosnian people are turned to the United States Senate,and argued that peace was not possible without a balance of power. He said that theBosnian Government had participated in all peace talks but that the illegal embargoprevented the country from defending itself. Since the embargo had failed to end thewar, Silajdzic urged a change of course.59 Interestingly, both the Dole and Mitchellamendments were agreed to in the Senate, by a vote of 5049. The Washington Postobserved that the contradictory messages communicated by the adoption of thesetwo different legislative proposals were a testament to the Senates ambivalenceabout US policy towards Bosnia. Still, the Senate was in favour of lifting theembargo even if it had not reached consensus on how to achieve it.60

It was in the summer of 1994 that Senator Dole paid a visit to Bosnia, his onlyone during the war. In Europe to mark the Normandy commemoration, hiscongressional delegation visited the Bosnian capital in early June. Along withSenators John Warner and Joe Biden, Dole met with President Alija Izetbegovic andother high-ranking Bosnian officials. Dole declared that it was incomprehensible that


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ethnic cleansing and genocide were taking place in Europe at the end of the twentiethcentury.61 Following his visit, Dole wrote to Izetbegovic, saying that he was deeplymoved by the courage of the Sarajevans he met during his visit.62

A change in tactics

Following the failure of his April bill to inspire concrete action, Dole opted for a newlegislative tactic: to attach his amendment to larger binding legislation. On 24 June1994, Senator Dole proposed such an amendment, which provided that the presidentwould terminate the embargo on Bosnia. Doles measure was supported once againby Senator Lieberman. The amendment was to the National Defence AuthorizationAct for Fiscal Year 1995. In view of Clintons pledge to veto legislation demandingunilateral lifting of the embargo, Dole attached his amendment to the defenceauthorization bill because he knew it would be difficult for Clinton to veto the entirebill. On 1 July 1994, the amendment did not pass the Senate, with a split vote of 5050.63 Senator Sam Nunn had offered a counter amendment on 26 June 1994, statingthat Congress supported a multilateral lifting of the embargo but that a unilaterallifting of it would result in several unwanted consequences, including disruption ofContact Group peace efforts, withdrawal of NATO troops from Yugoslavia, anddamage to NATO, and that it would negatively affect the cooperation of other statesin the enforcement of other sanctions. The amendment provided that the lifting ofthe embargo would be undertaken if the Bosnian Serb side refused to accept theContact Group peace proposal or that a partial lifting would take place if BosnianSerbs attacked the UN safe areas while the peace proposal was being discussed.

According to the Washington Post, on 23 June, military officials from Denmark,Britain, France and Spain testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee andurged Congress not to unilaterally lift the embargo on Bosnia. They argued that sucha move would escalate the violence and affect the enforcement of other embargoes.Later that day, Bosnias member of the presidency, Ejup Ganic, testified as well,arguing that the embargo was imposed on the former Yugoslavia but had left newlyindependent Bosnia defenceless. He also stated that the UN safe areas were in factthe most unsafe places in the country. Ganic emphasised that he was not calling forthe deployment of US troops but simply wanted to be allowed to defend Bosnia.64

According to the New York Times, the Clinton administration had already beenconducting a furious diplomatic and lobbying campaign aimed at heading offSenator Doles legislation for a unilateral lifting of the embargo; and theadministration threw its support behind Senator Nunns legislative proposalinstead.65 The amendment was passed by a vote of 5248. Phone calls by PresidentClinton and Vice President Al Gore to various senators to garner support for Nunnsamendment had apparently been effective.66

But Senator Dole pressed on, and on 8 August 1994, he introduced anotheramendment on behalf of 11 other senators, including Lieberman, McCain,Moynihan, DeConcini and Helms (No. 2479), which stated that:

the President shall terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government ofBosnia and Herzegovina no later than November 15, 1994 so that the Government mayexercise its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

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Then, on 10 August 1994, Nunn introduced his own amendment on behalf of fourother senators (No. 2524), which sought to initiate a process to lift the embargo onBosnia. Known as the NunnMitchell amendment, the legislation provided for theadministration to introduce an embargo-lifting resolution in the UN SecurityCouncil if Bosnian Serbs failed to accept the Contact Group peace proposal withina specified period of time. In the case that the Security Council failed to vote on theresolution and Bosnian Serbs refused to accept the Contact Group plan, then:

None of the funds available to the Department of Defence for any fiscal year shallthereafter be used for the purpose of participation in, support for, or assistance to theenforcement of the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina67

In a letter to Senator Nunn, Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to ending the armsembargo on Bosnia. I believe lifting the embargo unilaterally would have seriousimplications going well beyond the conflict in Bosnia itself, wrote Clinton, pointingout that such an approach would disrupt the ongoing negotiation process, strainrelations with European allies, adversely affect NATO cohesiveness and damagerelations with Russia. He committed his administration to introducing a SecurityCouncil resolution on lifting the embargo if Bosnian Serbs did not accept ContactGroup proposal by mid-October of that year. He also indicated that he wouldconsult with Congress on unilaterally lifting the embargo if the Security Councilfailed to pass such a resolution.68 Steven Greenhouse of The New York Times quotedadministration officials as saying that it was under intense pressure from CapitolHill that Clinton set a deadline to discourage Congress from supporting theunilateral lifting of the embargo.69

Doles latest amendment to the defence appropriations bill was adopted on 11August in the Senate by a 5842 vote. In addition to 37 Republicans, 21 Democratsvoted for the amendment, revealing the bipartisan nature of support for theproposal. The NunnMitchell amendment was also passed, by a 5644 vote, withthe support of 46 Democrats and 10 Republicans. Finally, in early November 1994,the Clinton administration announced that it had ordered the military to end itsparticipation in the enforcement of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government.70

In his memoirs, Clinton wrote that on 10 November 1994, he announced that theUnited States would no longer enforce the arms embargo in Bosnia. The move hadstrong support in Congress and was necessary because the Serbs had resumed theiraggression71 In fact, this decision was imposed on the administration by Congressand was strongly influenced by the sustained campaigning of Senator Dole on theissue.

The decision not to enforce the embargo, as Ivo H. Daalder put it, came aboutbecause Clinton agreed to this action in negotiations with Congress in order toprevent passage of a law that would have unilaterally lifted the embargo72 TheNunnMitchell amendment was therefore adopted to stave off Doles far moresweeping legislative proposal. Daalder observed that Congress had succeeded inforcing an end to US enforcement of the embargo,73 and Michael Haltzel, a formeradviser to Senator Joseph Biden, singled out the NunnMitchell amendment as oneof the most important congressional decisions on US policy towards Bosnia.74

Analysts have pointed to the implications of this congressional pressure ontransatlantic relations. The congressional decision to cut off funds for embargo


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enforcement severely damaged the trans-Atlantic bond that is the basis of the NorthAtlantic Alliance, asserted Frederick Bonnart.75 George Melloan wrote that aquarrel between US and European allies erupted:

when the Clinton administration on Nov 11 refused to further enforce the UN armsembargo with regard to any weapons destined for the Bosnian government. Congresshad demanded this because of rising disgust in America over an embargo that mainlyhandicaps the war's victims.

As Melloan pointed out, European shock over this decision was surprising unlessthey thought Bill Clinton would ignore Congress.76

The new majority leaders first order of businessThe legislative proposals introduced by Senator Dole had kept attention on Bosniaon Capitol Hill and beyond. However, it was with the Republican victory in theNovember 1994 congressional elections that pro-intervention voices on the Hillgained a new political ally: the new Majority Leader. With Doles advocacy for thelifting of the embargo well known, Clinton was therefore in no position to ignorecongressional sentiment on the embargo question.77

After his election as Majority Leader, Dole turned to Bosnia as one of the firstlegislative initiatives in his new capacity. He introduced what was by far the mostsignificant legislation on Bosnia on 4 January 1995 the Bosnia and HerzegovinaSelf-Defense Act of 1995. In the final version of the bill as passed by both Houses, itstipulated that the president would terminate the US arms embargo on Bosniafollowing receipt from the Bosnian Government of such a request or after a decisionto withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia. Termination of the embargo would beundertaken twelve weeks after the Bosnian Government requested the departure ofUNPROFOR.78 Administration opposition, the relative quiet in Bosnia, and a laserbeam-like focus on domestic issues in the Republican-led Congress combined toshelve the Dole bill through the winter and early spring of 1995, observedDaalder.79 The proposal languished in the Senate from January to July when itwas taken up again. It was in the wake of Srebrenica that congressional pressure onthe administration mounted. Doles non-partisan policy activism towards theBalkans, his own war experience and the aftermath of Srebrenica were factors thatappeared to pit the Republican would-be presidential challenger against theDemocratic incumbent.80

Two important amendments were offered and adopted to the 1995 legislativeproposal. Senator Nunn put forth an amendment that reiterated the ContactGroups pledge that a UN Security Council resolution lifting the embargo wouldbe pursued if Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact Group peace plan.81 SenatorWilliam Cohens amendment called for the USA to bring the issue of lifting theembargo before the UN General Assembly if the Security Council failed to adoptsuch a resolution.82 As the Senate prepared to vote on Doles bill in July 1995,according to Bob Woodward, Dole assured Secretary of State Warren Christopherthat he was not seeking to take over the foreign policy. A Senate resolution, Dolepointed out, would give Clinton leverage with the Europeans to claim that his handswere being tied by Congress.83 Indeed, President Clinton recalled later that in the

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summer of 1995, in the aftermath of Srebrenica, the congressional move to lift thearms embargo had strengthened our ability to push for a more aggressive action indealings with the allies.84 The Senate resolution passed by a vote of 6929 and hadthe support of 21 Democrats and 48 Republicans. According to Woodward, it wasseen as stunning and direct repudiation of Clinton and his policy It was bindinglegislation and an open challenge to Clintons authority.85 The legislation had evengained the vote of influential Senator Sam Nunn, who had previously supported theadministration, as well as that of Republican Senator John Warner.86 As Daaldernoted, Congress sent a strong message to the administration when the bill passedboth houses of Congress by margins sufficient to override a presidential veto.Further, the prevailing congressional view had shifted towards support for armingBosnians and away from a policy of supporting UNPROFOR in Bosnia, which wasseen as no longer viable.87 According to the New York Times, the vote represented arare frontal legislative attack on a Presidents foreign policy and the first timeCongress [had] intervened so forcibly in Mr. Clinton's Presidency.88 Still, theproposal was vetoed by President Clinton on 11 August 1995.

The problem for Clinton was that European allies with troops on the ground inBosnia warned that they would withdraw their peacekeeping troops if the USCongress unilaterally lifted the embargo. President Clinton had previously pledgedthat he would assist NATO allies in case of their withdrawal; but he had alsoconditionalised troop deployment on the achievement of real peace in Bosnia. Thesuccess of Doles Senate resolution was leading the USA on a path towards troopdeployment to assist in the withdrawal of allied peacekeepers and this was somethingthe administration was determined to avoid.89 British Defence Minister MalcolmRifkind, attending a foreign policy conference in Congress in June 1995, sharplycriticised lawmakers who supported the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia,stating that this would result in an escalation of violence. Rifkind was critical ofmembers of Congress who did not heed European views on the conflict in Bosnia.90

As Colin Dueck put it, This congressional pressure, combined with deterioratingevents on the ground in the Balkans, finally forced Clinton to seize the initiative.91David Halberstam noted that Clinton was also under specific pressure to act inBosnia from Senator Bob Dole, who was both a presidential contender and theMajority Leader, and who likely had enough votes to override a Clinton veto onarms embargo legislation.92 After the Senate vote in July, National Security AdviserAnthony Lake was dispatched in early August 1995 to Europe to present the allieswith his new Endgame Strategy for wrapping up the conflict in Bosnia. Thestrategy had been debated that summer, when the administration found its options inBosnia limited by the UN command, a Congress which demanded action, and alliesreluctant to use force.93 As the election year approached, resolving the Bosnianconflict became an imperative. The new strategy included both a new initiative forpeace talks and the decision to use air power. According to Woodward, the allieswere to be told that Clinton would veto the legislation but that he was unsurewhether he had enough support in Congress to sustain the veto.94 Among others,Lakes plan called for a comprehensive peace plan based on the Contact Groupproposal; mutual recognitions of Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia; a plan for regional economic integration; and the provision of militaryassistance to the Bosnian Government, with the goal of establishing a balance ofpower.95


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In his study of US policy towards Bosnia, Daalder writes that a changingdomestic political context was one of the factors that led the USA to actively engagein Bosnia in the summer of 1995. The congressional votes with which the legislationon lifting the embargo were passed indicated that Congress could override Clintonsearly August veto. Aware of this, the Clinton Administration had to provideCongress with a credible alternative course if its inevitable veto was going to besustained.96 This alternative course was Lakes Endgame Strategy.

Enforcing the peace

The Endgame Strategy as pursued by Richard Holbrooke led to the Dayton peacetalks in November 1995, which ended the war in Bosnia. After the success of thepeace talks, Clinton asked Congress for support in implementing the peace.Republicans in Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives, vigorouslyopposed the deployment of US troops to Bosnia.97 Dole joined Senator JohnMcCain in supporting Clinton's decision to deploy troops and Dole was instrumentalin convincing twenty-eight Republicans to support the deployment decision,resulting in a Senate vote to support it, of 6039.98

Senator Dole had once again risen to the occasion, and this was not lost on eitherside of the aisle. Former President Gerald R. Ford wrote to Dole in early December1995 congratulating him on his statesmanship in support of the deployment of troopsas part of the NATO peacekeeping force to Bosnia. Ford praised this example ofbipartisanship in foreign policy and considered Dole's support most helpful inconvincing the Congress and the American People that the decision is appropriatediplomatically and militarily.99 Former President George Bush similarly praisedDole's support of Clinton's decision and for putting the interests of the countrybefore his political interests.100 Holbrooke also acknowledged that Senator Doledeserved credit, saying he had ignored every opportunity to exploit the issue.101David Halbsertam similarly observed that Dole had not only been helpful toClinton on Bosnia, but would not use it as a campaign issue.102 Leon Fuerth,former national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore, disagreed with the notionthat Congress shaped the Clinton Administration's policy towards Bosnia, but didsingle out Bob Dole as the leading congressional voice on the issue.103

Interviews conducted by this author with former senior Bosnian officials manyyears after the war all pointed to the crucial role played by Senator Dole. FormerForeign Minister and Prime Minister Haris Silajdi recalled that US policy towardsBosnia evolved through the lens of the question of whether the arms embargo shouldbe lifted. He believed that the congressional vote on lifting the embargo led to thedecision to conduct air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions in the summer of 1995. Inthis context, Silajdi particularly recalled the role played by Dole and his adviserMira Barrata.104 Former Bosnian Ambassador at the UN and Foreign Ministertowards the end of the war, Muhamed airbey, also recalled that Dole and his staffwere very well informed and very active on Bosnia.105 Selmo Cikoti, DefenceAttach in the Bosnian Embassy in Washington, DC from 1994 onwards concurredwith this characterization, as did Mirko Pejanovi, a wartime member of theBosnian Presidency.106 Former European negotiator Carl Bildt also noted in hismemoirs that Bosnian government officials had maintained contact with their friendsin Congress and particularly pointed to Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed

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airbey's contact with the office of Senator Bob Dole.107 For his unwaveringsupport for Bosnia during the war, the Canton of Sarajevo in April 2014 awardedformer Senator Bob Dole the title of Honorary Citizen.

Conclusion

The foreign policy activism of Senator Bob Dole in shaping US policy towardsBosnia, from the dissolution of Yugoslavia until the Dayton Peace Accords, is oftenoverlooked but its impact cannot be overstated. Doles interest in Yugoslaviaextended back to the mid-1980s, positioning him to understand the currents ofchange that overwhelmed the country in the early 1990s. He was among the firstlegislators in the Western world to understand the nature of Milosevics policy ofterritorial expansion and he sought to frame the policy debate accordingly. Andduring the war in Bosnia, Dole focused his legislative spotlight on lifting the armsembargo imposed on Yugoslavia but applied to Bosnia. Realising very early on thatthis impaired Bosnias ability to defend itself, Dole worked tirelessly to repeal thispolicy. He undertook five major legislative proposals including introducing a bill,offering an amendment, attaching an amendment to a defence authorization bill, andintroducing new legislation in 1995 in his capacity as Majority Leader.

Though supportive of multilaterally lifting the embargo, Dole quickly realisedthe infeasibility of this approach and from 1993 pushed for a unilateral approach.His legislative efforts served to pressure the Clinton administration and provided theadministration with potential leverage in its dealings with reluctant allies. And afterthe Dayton Peace Accords were reached, Dole again asserted himself, persuading anumber of fellow Republicans to support Clintons decision to deploy US troops toenforce the peace in Bosnia.

Senator Bob Dole was at the forefront of congressional efforts to shape USpolicy on Bosnia and was unquestionably committed to keeping the issue of Bosniaat the top of the legislative agenda. Struggling against the instincts of both the Bushand Clinton administrations as well as many members of Congress, the seniorlegislator and war veteran nonetheless sought to steer American policy towards amore assertive position in Bosnia. It is only by considering his crucial role that wecan obtain a clear picture of the transformation and formulation of US policytowards Bosnia during the war. Senator Doles efforts to work across party lineswere not always a politically expedient choice, yet his willingness to do so shaped hislegacy, especially on the issue of Bosnia. Indeed, as David Halberstam noted, Dolewas perhaps one of the last figures from the internationalist bipartisan generation ofthe past.

AcknowledgementI would like to thank the Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas,Kimberly Storr for editing and two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

Notes1. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), 67.2. Ibid., 3031.3. Ibid., 173.


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4. Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York:Harper Perennial, 2002); Bob Woodward, The Choice: How Bill Clinton Won (New York:Simon & Schuster, 1996); David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, andthe Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001).

5. Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World WarII (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2323.

6. Dueck, Hard Line, 2467.7. Power, A Problem from Hell, 253.8. Stephen John Stedman, The Former Yugoslavia, in Economic Sanctions and American

Diplomacy, ed. Richard Haas (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 181.9. Public Law No: 101513.10. Senate Papers Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 7, Foreign Policy

Issues Relating to Balkan States, 19901994 (2 of 2); Senate Papers LegislativeRelations, Box 210, Folder 1, Foreign Policy Dick Yugoslavia, 19911992 (1 of 2),Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas;Foreign Operations Conference Sends Strong Message, Senate, October 27, 1990,Congressional Record, 101st Congress, 2nd Session.

11. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 7, Foreign Policy Issues Relating toBalkan States, 19901994 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive andSpecial Collections, University of Kansas.

12. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 6, Foreign Policy Issues to BalkanStates 19901994 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and SpecialCollections, University of Kansas.

13. Bob Dole, Get Smart about Foreign Aid, Washington Post, March 18, 1991, A11.14. S.Res.106 To express Senate support for democracy and human rights in Yugoslavia

and Senate opposition to the use of force against democratic republics governments inYugoslavia, April 18 (legislative day, April 9) 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session.


16. James A. Baker III, and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution,War & Peace, 19891992 (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1995), 479.


18. Ibid.19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 6, Foreign Policy Issues to Balkan

States 19901994 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and SpecialCollections, University of Kansas. The other signatories of the Dear Colleague letter wereDonald Riegle, Al Gore, John Glenn, Alfonse DAmato, Jesse Helms, Larry Pressler, andDon Nickles.

23. Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, op. cit., p. 2301.24. Senate Papers Legislative Relations, Box 210, Folder 1, Foreign Policy Dick

Yugoslavia, 19911992 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and SpecialCollections, University of Kansas.

25. Ibid.26. Ibid.27. Power, A Problem from Hell, 301.28. H.R.5368 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related programmes Appropria-

tions Act, 1993, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session.29. Senate Papers Legislative Relations, Box 210, Folder 1, Foreign Policy Dick


30. Bob Dole, An Ultimatum to Mr. Milosevic, Los Angeles Times, December 17, 1992.

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31. Power, A Problem from Hell, 422.32. Senate Papers Legislative Relations, Box 210, Folder 2, Foreign Policy Dick


33. Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World WarII (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2537.

34. Dueck, Hard Line, 2589.35. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 56.36. John Major, The Autobiography (HarperCollins, 1999), 497.37. Power, A Problem from Hell, 2589.38. NATO Handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 378.39. David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 2501.40. Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Arrow Books, 2005), 513.41. John Major, The Autobiography, 539.42. Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 471.43. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 101.44. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 130, Folder 3, Foreign Policy Senate Foreign

Relations Committee Hearing on Yugoslavia, Feb 1991 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Instituteof Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas.

45. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 137.46. Power, A Problem from Hell, 304.47. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 18.48. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 230, Folder 4, International Affairs Yugosla-

via, 19921993 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and SpecialCollections, University of Kansas.

49. Ibid.50. Ibid.51. Clifford Krauss, Many in Congress, Citing Vietnam, Oppose Attacks, New York Times,

April 28, 1993.52. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 230, Folder 4, International Affairs Yugosla-

via, 19921993 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and SpecialCollections, University of Kansas.

53. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 230, Folder 4, International Affairs Yugosla-via, 19921993 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and SpecialCollections, University of Kansas.

54. Ibid.55. S.AMDT.1281 Amends S. 1281 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994

and 1995, January 27, 1994, 103rd Congress, 1st Session.56. S.2042 A bill to remove the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia

and Herzegovina, April 21, 1994, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.57. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 599, Folder 10, Press, Subject Files, Bosnia,

1994, Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University ofKansas.

58. S.AMDT 1696 Amends S.2042 A bill to remove the United States arms embargo of theGovernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 21, 1994, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.

59. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 224, Folder 5, June Trip to Bosnia andHerzegovina, 1994, Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections,University of Kansas.

60. Helen Dewar, Conflicting Directives in Senate: Votes Oppose Arms Embargo,Washington Post, May 13, 1994; Rowan Scarborough, Senate Action Sends MuddledMessage on Balkans, Washington Times, May 13, 1994.

61. Podijeljeni na embargu, Osloboenje, 6.VI.1994, 3.62. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 114, Folder 8, Foreign Policy Congressional

Delegation (CODEL) The Balkans, 1994 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of PoliticsArchive and Special Collections, University of Kansas.

63. S.AMDT.1851 Amends S. 2181 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year1995, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.


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64. John F. Harris, Europeans Urge Hill to Keep Arms Embargo Against Bosnia,Washington Post, June 24, 1994.

65. Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton Tries to Head Off Senate on Bosnia Embargo, New YorkTimes, June 24, 1994.

66. Katharine Q. Seelye, Senate Fails to Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo, New York Times, July2, 1994.

67. S.AMDT.2524 Amends H.R.4650, 103rd Congress (19931994).68. William J. Clinton, Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

on the Arms Embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48968&st=bosnia&st1=congress (accessedMarch 16, 2014).

69. Steven Greenhouse, Clinton Proposes Deadline to End Bosnia Arms Embargo, NewYork Times August 12, 1994.

70. Michael R. Gordon, President Orders End to Enforcing Bosnian Embargo, New YorkTimes, November 11, 1994.

71. Clinton, My Life, 633.72. Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy (Washington,

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 31.73. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 61.74. Interview with Dr. Michael Haltzel, 14 June 2011, Sarajevo.75. Frederick Bonnart, American Strikes a Body Blow to the Trans-Atlantic Security

Alliance, New York Times, November 14, 1994.76. George Melloan, NATOs Credibility Is Again on the Line, Wall Street Journal,

November 21, 1994.77. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 32.78. S.21 Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, January 4, 1995, 104th

Congress, 1st Session.79. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 62.80. Power, A Problem from Hell, 423.81. S. AMDT. 1848 to S.21 Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, January 4,

1995, 104th Congress, 1st Session.82. S.AMDT.1851 to S.21 Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, January 4,

1995, 104th Congress, 1st Session.83. Woodward, The Choice, 264.84. Clinton, My Life, 666.85. Woodward, The Choice, 265.86. Elaine Sciolino, Senate Vote to End Embargo May Prove a Pyrrhic Victory, New York

Times, July 28, 1995.87. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 64.88. Elaine Sciolino, Defiant Senators Vote to Override Bosnian Arms Ban, New York Times,

July 27, 1995.89. Power, A Problem from Hell, 423424.90. Steven Greenhouse, Britains Defense Chief Attacks Some in Congress Over Bosnia,

New York Times, June 22, 1995.91. Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War

II (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 260.92. Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 3023.93. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 80.94. Woodward, The Choice, 265.95. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 1123.96. Ibid., 165.97. Dueck, Hard Line, 260.98. Power, A Problem from Hell, 441.99. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 113, Folder 4, Foreign Policy Bosnia, 1995,

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas.100. Ibid.101. Holbrooke, To End a War, 345.

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102. Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 359.103. Interview with Leon Fuerth via Skype, 11 October 2011.104. Interview with Haris Silajdi, Sarajevo, 27 May 2011.105. Telephone interview with Muhamed airbey, 20 September 2011.106. Interview with Selmo Cikoti, Sarajevo, 20 February 2012; Interview with Mirko

Pejanovi, Sarajevo, 2 July 2012.107. Carl Bildt, Misija mir (Zid, Sarajevo, 1998), translated from Swedish to Bosnian by

Amna Ibriagi, 250.

Notes on contributorHamza Kari is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University ofSarajevo. He obtained his BA in Political Science and International Relations from BogaziciUniversity, MA in International Relations and European Studies at the Central EuropeanUniversity and an MA from the Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service. Hecompleted his Ph.D. at the University of Sarajevo in 2014. His recent publications includeOne-Way Ticket to Kuala Lumpur: Bosnian Muslims in Malaysia in the Early 1990s,Indonesia and the Malay World, Volume 42, Issue 124, 2014, In Support of a Non-memberState: The Organisation of Islamic Conference and the War in Bosnia, 19921995 Journalof Muslim Minority Affairs, Volume 33, Issue 3, 2013, and Balkans in Marylands 2ndCongressional District: Helen Delich Bentley and the War in Bosnia, Croatian PoliticalScience Review, Volume 50, Number 5, 2013.


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9 Marc

h 201

5

AbstractThe collapse of YugoslaviaThe Bush administration and BosniaThe Clinton administration and BosniaLift by legislationA change in tacticsThe new majority leader's first order of businessEnforcing the peace

ConclusionAcknowledgementNotesNotes on contributor

saving bosnia on capitol hill - the case of senator bob dole

Documents

issueof bosnia

bosnia yugoslaviaseveral

active senator

case of senator bobdole

us senator bobdole

congressional bosnia

university of sarajevo

capitol hill