savannah turner thesis

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND LEGAL ATTITUDES

Religious Orientation and its Relationship with Legal Attitudes

Savannah D. Turner

2015

A thesis presented to the

Department of Psychology

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the B.A. with honours degree

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

© 2015, Savannah Turner

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND LEGAL ATTITUDES ii

Abstract

Using Carleton University students (n=59) correlational analysis was used to examine the

relationship between religious orientation and legal attitudes. Intrinsic and extrinsic religious

orientation was examined alongside the legal attitudes: trust in the legal system, juror bias, and

punishment orientation. Overall, we found that the relationship between religious orientation

(i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic) and both juror bias and trust in the legal system varies. However,

intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation did not demonstrate a relationship to punishment

orientation in this study. Future research should be conducted to increase the generalizability

of the study and increase the strength of the data gathered. This research is imperative because

it can influence our understanding of the relationship between religious orientation and legal

attitudes, as the relationship between these variables has implications within society.

Keywords: religious orientation, legal attitudes, punishment orientation

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND LEGAL ATTITUDES iii

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Evelyn Maeder for all her support,

knowledge, patience, and guidance. I would also like to thank Kendra McLaughlin who was

always available to help, and was a valued mentor. Without both Evelyn and Kendra my thesis

would not have come together. Finally, I would like to thank the Carleton University students

who allowed me to use their data for my research.

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND LEGAL ATTITUDES iv

Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ ii

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... iii

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ iv

List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... v

List of Appendices ...................................................................................................................... vi

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

Legal Attitudes: Religious Orientation .................................................................................... 4

Legal Attitudes: Trust in the Legal System ............................................................................. 6

Legal Attitudes: Juror Bias ...................................................................................................... 8

Legal Attitudes: Punishment Orientation .............................................................................. 10

Rationale of Study ................................................................................................................. 14

Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................. 14

Method ....................................................................................................................................... 15

Participants ............................................................................................................................ 15

Materials ................................................................................................................................ 15

Procedure ............................................................................................................................... 17

Results ....................................................................................................................................... 17

Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 25

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 30

References ................................................................................................................................. 32

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND LEGAL ATTITUDES v

List of Tables

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics: Gender …………………………………………………………...22

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics: Age……………………………………………………………….22

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics: Current Year of Study………………………………………........22

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics: Religious Affiliation……………………………………………..23

Table 5

Descriptive Statistics: Political Affiliation………………………………………...…….23

Table 6

Correlational Analyses Between Religious Orientation and Trust in the Legal System.. 24

Table 7

Correlational Analyses Between Religious Orientation and Juror Bias........................... 24

Table 8

Correlational Analyses Between Religious Orientation and Punishment Orientation..... 24

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND LEGAL ATTITUDES vi

List of Appendices

Appendix A. Informed Consent.........................................................................................38

Appendix B. Intrinsic/Extrinsic-Reviewed Scale………………………..........................40

Appendix C. Juror Bias Scale ……………………….......................................................41

Appendix D. The Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System Scale …........................42

Appendix E. Punishment Orientation Scale …..................................................................44

Appendix F. Demographics…...........................................................................................46

Appendix G. Debriefing….................................................................................................48

Appendix H. Informed Consent to the Use of Data …......................................................50

Appendix I. Notice for Recruitment ….............................................................................51

Appendix J. Completion Code to receive credit for participation….................................52

Appendix K. Ethics Approval Form ….............................................................................53

Appendix L. Ethics Approval Form- Addendum ….........................................................54

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND LEGAL ATTITUDES 1

Religious Orientation and its Relationship to Legal Attitudes

Occasionally within a court of law a judge, prosecutor, defendant, and jury panel are

assembled for a trial (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). The jurors are crucial members associated

with a trial because their job is to relay a final verdict to the judge presiding over the case

(Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Each juror must review the evidence provided by both the

prosecution and defence in order to reach a final verdict. However, the evidence presented in

trial is not the only mechanism that plays a role in the decision making process of jurors

(Bornstein & Miller, 2009; Carlsmith, 2006; Keller, Oswald, Stucki & Gollwitzer, 2010). A

jury member’s personal beliefs, motivations, and attitudes also contribute to the decision-

making process of reaching a final verdict (Bornstein & Miller, 2009; Carlsmith, 2006; Keller,

Oswald, Stucki & Gollwitzer, 2010). For example, jurors’ attitudes or beliefs regarding race,

religion, or gender may influence the decisions made along with the evidence presented in trial

(e.g., attitudes towards the defendant’s racial group may predispose the juror to be more or

less likely to convict the defendant). Understanding the factors that influence jury decision-

making has been a point of interest for psychology in recent years (e.g., Bader, Desmond,

Carson, Mencken & Johnson, 2010; Miller, Maskaly, Peoples & Sigillo, 2014; Tiliopoulos,

Bikker, Coxon & Hawkin, 2007). However, there is a lack of research surrounding jury

members’ religious attitudes and motivations or orientations, and how these factors are related

to decisions made in court (Bader et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2014). Specifically, little

information is known about the relationship between religious orientation (i.e., intrinsic or

extrinsic) and legal attitudes such as juror bias, trust in the legal system, and punishment

orientation, and how these relationships may influence jury decision-making.

According to Bornstein & Miller (2009) as cited in Berman (2000), Hamburger (1993),

Marty (2005), and Sergest (1994), religion and law are connected, as law was founded on


values formed by religion. The fundamental association between religion and law suggests

that there may be a relationship between religious orientations, legal attitudes, and jury

decision-making (Bornstein & Miller, 2009; Proctor, 2006; Tiliopoulos et al., 2007). First, it is

important to note the difference between religiosity, religion, and religious orientation. The

term religiosity refers to how devoted or faithful an individual is to practicing their religion;

religiosity can be measured by recording an individuals church attendance (Bader et al., 2010;

Walker, Smither & DeBode, 2011/2012; Wisneski, Lytle & Skitka, 2009). However, the term

religiosity has been criticized by previous researchers for over simplifying the term by relating

it to simplistic measures such as church attendance (Walker et al., 2011/2012). Religion refers

to the specific denomination with which an individual affiliates him or herself, for example an

individual may affiliate themselves as someone who practices Catholicism, Judaism, or Islam

as a religion (Miller et al., 2014). Religious orientation, which is the variable of interest in this

study, refers to the beliefs an individual has regarding the existence of a deity and how these

beliefs contribute to the formation of his or her moral, social, and spiritual motivations

(Allport, 1950; Allport & Ross, 1967). For example, an individual’s church attendance may be

motivated by social gains (e.g., friendship) or may be motivated by spiritual gain (e.g.,

maintaining a relationship with an individuals respective deity).

Gordon Allport (1950) was the main contributor to the development and understanding

of the concepts of religious orientation (also see Allport and Ross, 1967; Flere, Edwards &

Klanjsek, 2008; Tiliopoulos et al., 2007). Allport initially began researching religious

orientation due to his interest in the “orientations” or motives behind religious actions

(Allport, 1950; Flere et al., 2008). By expanding on Allport’s (1950) initial research, Allport

and Ross (1967) further developed ideas surrounding religious orientation and produced a

questionnaire capable of determining ones religious orientation known as the


Intrinsic/Extrinsic scale (Allport, 1950; Flere et al., 2008; Tiliopoulos et al., 2007). Through

further research, Allport (1950) and Allport and Ross (1967) identified two components of

religious orientation or motivation. Allport (1950) first referred to these components of

religious orientations as immature and mature religiosity. However, through additional

exploration, these components soon evolved once religious orientation was better understood;

immature religiosity evolved to become extrinsic religiosity and mature religiosity evolved

into intrinsic religiosity (Allport, 1950; Allport and Ross, 1976; Flere et al., 2008).

Since Allport (1950) and Allport and Ross (1967), the topic of religious orientation has

been increasingly researched; the topic has not only become better defined and understood, but

has been increasingly applied to the “real world”. Over the last 40 years research has

determined that religious orientation can be an important construct for predicting ethical

judgments, intentions, moral actions, and decision making within a courtroom (Miller &

Hayward, 2007/2008; Miller et al., 2014; Vitell, Bing, Davison, Ammeter, Garner &

Novicevic, 2009). For example, Bader, Desmond, Mencken, and Johnson (2010) examined

participants’ conceptions of a God. Bader and colleagues (2010) examined whether an

individual perceives God as loving, punishable, or angry and the relationship these perceptions

had on participants’ punitive attitudes toward criminals. In doing this, Bader and colleagues

(2010) demonstrated that it is reasonable to assume that moral reasoning fostered by

religiosity (i.e., terms defined as amount of “religiousness” measured by church attendance,

biblical literalism etc.) in terms of conceptions of a God shapes the attitudes society members

foster toward a variety of issues such as criminal punishment. Previous research has also

demonstrated that religious characteristics (e.g., Evangelists or Devotionals) or orientations

(e.g., intrinsic religiosity) are related to legal attitudes and cognitive frameworks for decision-

making (Miller, 2013; Miller & Hayward, 2007/2008; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al.,


2011/2012). While investigating the relationship between religious characteristics and

motivations, Miller (2013) found that religious characteristics and motivations do in fact relate

to legal attitudes and cognitive frameworks for decision-making. For example, Miller

demonstrated that Devotionalists (i.e., “how religious someone is: how often they attend

church or base their daily decisions on their religious beliefs”; Miller, 2013, p. 497) were

consistently related to being punitive (Miller, 2013). Based on these findings it is important to

continue to research the relationship between religion and legal attitudes, and how this

potential relationship might influence jury decision-making (Bader et al., 2010; Bornstein &

Miller, 2009; Miller, 2013).

Despite the important research findings establishing a relationship between religious

characteristics and legal attitudes, Miller and colleagues (2014) note that researchers have not

yet fully determined how religious orientations (e.g., religious motivations) correlate with

legal attitudes and legal outcomes (e.g., jury verdicts). Specifically, Allport and Ross’s (1967)

religious orientation framework has not been empirically associated with various legal

attitudes such as attitudes of juror bias, trust in the legal system, and punishment orientation.

Expanding research on the relationship between religious orientation, legal attitudes, and

punishment orientations can help predict how religious orientation may influence jury

decision-making. An improved understanding of the relationships can help educate the courts

and psychological research on the associations between religious orientation, legal attitudes,

and processes within jury decision-making (Miller et al., 2014).

Religious Orientation

Allport (1950) and Allport and Ross (1967) identified two aspects of religious

orientation: Extrinsic religious orientation and Intrinsic religious orientation. Extrinsic

religious orientation is defined as an “externalized” religion, meaning these individuals are


motivated by religion because it assists them in making friends, creating social support

systems, increasing popularity, and allows them to personally benefit rather than spiritually

benefit (Flere et al., 2008; Miller, 2013; Power & McKinney, 2014; Tiliopoulos et al., 2007;

Weaver & Agle, 2002). As a result, an individual who has an extrinsic religious orientation is

motivated by religion as a tool for non-spiritual self-serving purpose; using religion selfishly

for personal gain (e.g., social benefits) not for religious or spiritual benefits (Flere et al., 2008;

Miller, 2013; Power & McKinney, 2014; Tiliopoulos et al., 2007; Weaver & Agle, 2002).

Extrinsically oriented individuals have been found to be less likely to utilize religion in day-to-

day behavior, as such respective religious beliefs are less likely to guide life or appear in

motivations behind decision-making compared to those who foster intrinsic religiosity (Clark

& Dawson, 1996; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012; Wisneski et al., 2009).

Alternatively, an individual who has an intrinsic religious orientation is described as

being motivated by his or her religion; intrinsic religious orientation is defined as

“internalized” religion (Flere et al., 2008). An individual who is intrinsically oriented uses

religion to fulfill a relationship with a higher power (e.g., deity) and does not use religion for

non-spiritual outcomes such as to gain popularity or status (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller et

al., 2014; Power & McKinney, 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012; Wisneski et al., 2009). People

who have an intrinsic religious orientation tend to live lives based on the guidance of spiritual

leaders and religious tenets on what is right and wrong (Power & McKinney, 2014). They also

allow their religion to govern their attitudes and behaviors (Walker et al., 2011/2012). As

such, these individuals will use religion as a framework for guiding their day-to-day life and

decision-making (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012;

Wisneski et al., 2009). Overall, people with an intrinsic religious orientation tend to develop a

lifestyle and make decisions appropriate for their religious beliefs using their religion as a


means to a “non-selfish”, spiritual end (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et

al., 2011/2012; Wisneski et al., 2009).

Research surrounding religious orientation has been able to determine that both

intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation foster different characteristics, and are associated

with different attitudes, beliefs, and motivations. For example, intrinsic individuals tend to

exhibit higher levels of fundamentalism (i.e., represents traditional religious beliefs;

fundamentalists take religious text literally), while extrinsic individuals tend to exhibit higher

levels of authoritarianism (i.e., following the law strictly) (Chau, Johnson, Bowers, Darvill &

Danko, 1990; Miller, 2013; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012). Research has also

demonstrated that people with an extrinsic religious orientation tend to be utilitarian and more

trusting of secular beliefs in comparison to people who have an intrinsic religious orientation

(Clark & Dawson, 1996). The various attitudes, beliefs, and motivations (e.g.,

authoritarianism) should continue to be examined as they are exhibited differently based on

religious orientations, and have been demonstrated to be related to legal attitudes (e.g.,

religious orientation predisposes individuals to be more or less authoritarian, and in turn, more

or less punitive; Miller, 2013).

Legal Attitudes: Trust in the Legal System

Perceptions of trust in the legal system are important constructs for the legitimacy of

the institution of law (Martin & Cohn, 2004; Proctor, 2006; Sprott & Greene, 2010; Wisneski

et al., 2009). This is because if citizens do not perceive or believe they can trust in their legal

system, then the likelihood established laws are conformed to is decreased (Sprott & Green,

2010). As such, trust in the legal system is related to the perceptions or opinions individuals in

society have regarding the legal systems ability to make the “right” or moral decision, in order

to protect and treat the public justly (Finamore & Carlson, 1987; Sprott & Greene, 2010;


Wisneski et al., 2009). Tyler (2001) has found that public perceptions of the legal system (i.e.,

police officers, the court system) are evaluated based on fairness, competence, and integrity

demonstrated by the legal system (see also Martin & Cohn, 2004; Sprott & Greene, 2010).

Overall, evaluations of fairness, competence, and integrity influence how the public perceives

how they are treated by the legal system and are also related to citizen’s trust with the legal

system (Martin & Cohn, 2004; Sprott & Greene, 2010; Tyler, 2001).

Citizens’ trust in the legal system is socialized through public institutionalization (i.e.,

schools, families, friends, and religious institutions) (Martin & Cohn, 2004). Martin and Cohn

(2004) demonstrated that religious institutions (i.e., church, church groups etc.) influence

attitudes and trust towards the legal system. For example, religious institutions may teach

citizens to trust in the teaching of religious laws over secular “man made” laws (Bornstein &

Miller, 2009). Previous research has also demonstrated that religious orientation is related to

one’s tendency to trust the legal system’s ability to make decisions for the general public

(Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009). For example, Wisneski and colleagues (2009) found

religious orientation can be related to an individual’s ability to trust in the Supreme Courts

capability to make decisions related to physician assisted suicide. Specifically, results from

Wisneski and colleagues (2009) study demonstrated that religious people are less likely to

trust legitimate authorities to makes decisions about issues deemed as moral issues such as

physician assisted suicide.

Previous research demonstrated that extrinsically orientated individuals are not

significantly motivated, affected, or guided by religious beliefs or laws whereas, intrinsically

religious individuals develop lives in relation to their religious beliefs or laws, and as such are

less likely to trust a secular law over the laws of their own religion (Clark & Dawson, 1996;

Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012; Wisneski et al., 2009). For these reasons, it is


believed that extrinsically oriented individuals will report higher levels of trust in the legal

system, whereas intrinsically oriented individuals will report lower levels of trust in the legal

system (Proctor, 2006; Wisneski et al., 2009). Although there is previous research relating to

religious orientation and legal attitudes, according to Martin and Cohn (2004), little attention

has been given to legal attitudes such as trust in the legal system. This research can contribute

to an enhanced understanding of the relationship between religious orientation and a legal

attitude such as trust in the legal system.

Legal Attitudes: Juror Bias

A juror’s task is to evaluate trial evidence and provide a verdict of the case after

evaluating the information presented to them in court (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Jurors

are instructed to consider verdicts based on two factors: the probability of commission (i.e.,

likelihood defendant committed the crime) and reasonable doubt (i.e., juror member’s

certainty the defendant committed the crime) (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Jury members are

asked to remain impartial during the course of the trial (Norton, Sommers, & Brauner, 2007).

Specifically, in Canada the jury is instructed to set aside any personal biases or attitudes about

religion, race, and gender (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Tanovich, Paciocco, & Skurka,

1997). Although jury members are interviewed before trial to increase neutrality and

impartiality in Canada, it is nonetheless possible for bias to be present in the decision-making

process (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Tanovich, Paciocco, & Skurka, 1997).

As such, the concept of neutrality has been accepted by legal scholars and researchers

as legal fiction (Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Miller, Maskaly, Green

& Peoples, 2011). For example, personal characteristics of jurors and situational case-specific

factors (i.e., strength of evidence presented in court) have both been demonstrated to influence

bias in the courtroom (De La Fuente, De La Fuente, Immaculada & Garcia, 2003; Kassin &


Wrightsman, 1983; Miller et al., 2011). Jurors’ personal characteristics such as intelligence,

age, gender and religious affiliation are characteristics that create personal biases, and these

biases can be related to legal outcomes in court (e.g., religious affiliation can lead a juror to

assign more guilty verdicts) (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Miller et al., 2011). According to

Kassin and Wrightsman (1983), the most effective individual characteristic that is a predictor

of jury decision-making is authoritarianism; as an individual who demonstrates

authoritarianism is likely to strictly or obediently follow the law. As such, an individual who

demonstrates authoritarianism is more likely to be more biased toward siding with the

prosecution (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983).

An individual can interact with a piece of evidence differently than another, suggesting

that juror bias varies individually. As juror bias is related to the ways in which individuals

organize, retrieve, and assess information presented at trial, juror bias can overwhelm the

evidence and influence their decision (i.e., predisposing them to lean towards verdicts of guilt

or innocence at trial; De La Fuente et al., 2003; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Lecci & Myers,

2008; Miller et al., 2011). As such, an individual’s attitudes or bias to favour the defendant or

prosecution can affect how a piece of evidence in trial is interpreted and how this

interpretation is integrated into the decision making process (De La Fuente et al., 2003; Lecci

& Myers, 2008; Miller et al., 2011). For example, De La Fuente and colleagues (2003) found

that individuals who were biased towards the prosecution gave more guilty verdicts after

deliberation, meaning that the deliberation process was unable to unbiased the decision.

An individual’s religious orientation has been previously demonstrated to be related to

juror bias (i.e., bias towards the prosecution or defence; Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013;

Walker et al., 2011/2012; Weaver & Agle, 2002). Intrinsically oriented individuals have been


previously demonstrated to be more mature, (i.e., a mature form of religious sentiment that

services as a guide for ones way of life, intrinsically oriented individuals are related to better

mental health, are more integrative, and less self serving; these qualities lead intrinsically

oriented individuals to be described as more mature) and with this maturity they have been

correlated to tolerance (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013; Walker et al., 2011/2012;

Weaver & Agle, 2002). Higher levels of both tolerance and maturity demonstrated in

individuals who are intrinsically oriented are related to decreased levels of bias, as the ability

to demonstrate tolerance and maturity counteracts juror bias, predisposing them to be more

likely to have a pro-defence juror bias (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013; Walker et al.,

2011/2012; Weaver & Agle, 2002). However, individuals who are extrinsically oriented have

been demonstrated to be immature in comparison to intrinsically oriented individuals, and

have been demonstrated to be unrelated to tolerance (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013;

Walker et al., 2011/2012; Weaver & Agle, 2002). The qualities fostered by extrinsically

oriented individuals predispose them to be more likely to have a pro-prosecution juror bias

(Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013; Walker et al., 2011/2012). For these reasons, it is

believed that individuals who are intrinsically oriented will be less related to juror bias (i.e.

more likely to side with defence) whereas, individuals who are extrinsically oriented will be

related to juror bias (i.e., more likely to side with prosecution) (Clark & Dawson, 1996;

Miller, 2013; Walker et al., 2011/2012). Understanding individual differences and how these

are related to legal attitudes is important in order to better understand the relationship between

jury bias and religious orientation (Lecci & Myers, 2008).

Legal Attitudes: Punishment Orientation


Punishment is a common aspect of daily life; therefore, punishment within society is

inescapable (Carlsmith, 2006). Every individual has developed their own orientation towards

punishment based on their attitudes and beliefs (Carlsmith, 2006; Keller, Oswald, Stucki &

Gollwitzer, 2010). Ideas of punishment are constructed similarly to our attitudes toward trust

in the legal system (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; McKee & Feather,

2008; Keller et al., 2010). Consequently, our punishment attitudes are also socialized attitudes

and beliefs learned through families, school, and religious institutions. For example, Drinan

(2000) references the finding that a Catholic juror is less likely to support a verdict of capital

punishment because the Catholic Church has declared its opposition towards this kind of

punishment. Punishment is a fundamental component of our social life as social behavior is

derived from punishment (i.e., if you steal you will be punished; stealing is not a pro-social

behavior); however, little is known to psychologists about punishment orientation and its

relationship to religious orientation (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Keller et al.,

2010). Specifically, psychologists know little about the individuals who are assigning

judgments to wrongdoers (i.e., jury members who make judgments on an offender) (Carlsmith,

2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002).

Punishment orientation is defined as either retributivism or utilitarianism. Retributive

punishment orientation style originates from the just deserts theory, a theory that is

retrospective rather than prospective (i.e., a style of punishment defined by backward looking

concerned with righting the past) (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Carlsmith, 2001; McKee & Feather,

2008; Weiner, 2006; Yamamoto, 2014). According to just deserts theory, individuals who

exhibit a retributive punishment style believe that when an individual harms society the

wrongdoing merits punishment; however, punishment must be justified (i.e., an eye for an

eye) (Carlsmith, 2006). Retributive punishment is morally proportional, meaning the severity


of punishment should mirror the severity of the offence committed (Carlsmith, 2006). When

making a decision on punishment, decision-makers with a retributive punishment orientation

will focus on society’s sense of moral outrage and the magnitude of harm inflicted, as such,

punishment is determined on a case-by-case basis (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Yamamoto, 2014).

Individuals who exhibit a utilitarian punishment orientation are concerned with the

well-being of an entire group (i.e., society as a whole) rather than individual rights, meaning

that punishment is justified if it will benefit the overall public or educates the public

(Bentham, 1789/2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Mill, 1859/2008; Yamamoto, 2014). A

Utilitarian punishment orientation is related to three theories: deterrence, incapacitation, and

rehabilitation (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Yamamoto, 2014). Deterrence theory

assumes that the wrongdoer is a rational actor and that the punishment makes the wrongdoing

unattractive or unappealing (Carlsmith, 2001; Carlsmith, 2006). As such, the punishment

incurred by the wrongdoer should be sufficient to prevent future offenses (Carlsmith, 2001;

Carlsmith et al., 2002). Deterrence theory proposes that forms of punishment are created to

discourage individuals from committing crimes or continuing to commit crimes (i.e.

wrongdoers punishment should be sufficient to prevent future crimes), by altering the cost and

benefit framework, making crime look like an unattractive option (Carlsmith, 2006). Forms of

punishment that relate to deterrence theory are punishments involving fines or jail time

(Carlsmith, 2001; Carlsmith et al., 2002). In this theory the publicity and crime rate must be

relatable to the offense, meaning that a wrongdoer should be punished publically so the public

can learn by example (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Utilitarian punishment is similarly related to

incapacitation, meaning that incarcerating individuals for an offence would theoretically

prevent the offender from committing another crime (i.e., the goal of placing an offender in

jail is to prevent future crime; Carlsmith, 2006; Yamamoto, 2014). Thirdly, utilitarian


punishment is also related to rehabilitation, with a goal to assist the offender by educating or

encouraging the individual to exhibit pro-social behavior. Rehabilitation as related to

utilitarian punishment is based on reforming the offender rather than incapacitating (i.e.,

incarceration) to prevent future crimes (Yamamoto, 2014).

Punishment orientation has been linked to attitudes and beliefs or values fostered by

individuals (McKee & Feather, 2008). For example, McKee and Feather (2008) found that

vengeance attitudes (i.e., the desire for revenge, or desire to see an offender punished for his or

her injustices) are related to punishment orientation. Specifically, McKee and Feather (2008),

found that individuals with vengeance attitudes demonstrated patterns associated with

retribution. McKee and Feather (2008), also found that utilitarian punishment styles were

associated with authoritarians supporting incapacitation or deterrence theory. If punishment

orientation can be linked to attitudes, beliefs, or values, it is possible to assume that the idea of

punishment orientation can also be related to one’s religious orientation. To support this

statement, Clark and Dawson (1996) found that religion is one of the foundations for personal

moral decision-making. For this reason religious orientation in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic

religiosity will be examined to determine its relationship to punishment orientation. For the

purpose of this study, punishment orientation can be broken down into four subscales: Ideal

Utilitarianism, Ideal Retributivism, Harsh Retributivism, and Harsh Utilitarianism

(Yamamoto, 2014). Ideal retributivism is concerned with a desire to ensure that innocents are

never punished, whereas harsh retributivism is related to placing blame on a criminal, ensuring

those who deserve punishment receive it (Yamamoto, 2014). Harsh utilitarianism and ideal

utilitarianism sub scales are focused on punishing offenders (Yamamoto, 2014). There is no

research examining punishment orientation and the relationship to religious orientation,

therefore this study’s examination of the relationship is exploratory.


Rationale of Study

Research over the years has demonstrated that religion affiliation (i.e. Catholic, Hindu,

Buddhist) is related to legal attitudes and juror decision-making (Miller, 2013; Miller &

Hayward, 2007/2008; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012). However, according to

Miller and colleagues (2014), limited research has examined how religious orientation

correlates with legal attitudes. The purpose of this study is to explore and bridge this gap in the

research literature and to better understand how religious orientation relates to legal attitudes

and punishment orientation.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: People with a stronger intrinsic religious orientation will have less trust in the

legal system whereas, people with a stronger extrinsic religious orientation will have more

trust in the legal system. This is hypothesized because previous literature has demonstrated

that individuals with a stronger intrinsic religious orientation are more trusting of their own

religious laws rather than secular man-made. Whereas, extrinsically orientated individuals are

not significantly motivated, affected or guided by religious beliefs or laws, and therefore may

be more likely to trust in a secular legal system (Proctor, 2006; Wisneski et al., 2009).

Hypothesis 2: People with a stronger intrinsic orientation will exhibit a pro-defence jury bias

as they foster higher levels of tolerance and maturity, which has been previously demonstrated

to counteract bias, predisposing intrinsically religious individuals to be less related to juror

bias (i.e. more likely to side with the defence) (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013; Walker

et al., 2011/2012). People with a stronger extrinsic orientation will likely exhibit pro-

prosecution verdicts. This is hypothesized because research has demonstrated that extrinsically

oriented individuals have a negative relationship to tolerance, maturity, and a positive

relationship to authoritarianism (i.e. following the law strictly); predisposing them to be


related to juror bias (i.e. side with the prosecution) (Chau et al., 1990; Clark & Dawson, 1996;

Miller, 2013; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012).

Hypothesis 3: There is no research examining religious orientation and its relationship to

punishment orientation; therefore, this study’s examination of this relationship is exploratory.

Method

Participants

Participants (n=59) attending Carleton University were recruited through the

participant recruitment SONA system. Participants received .5% bonus credit toward their

final grade for their respective Psychology class for participating in this experiment. The study

was advertised on SONA as “Religiosity and Legal Attitudes” and took approximately 20-35

minutes to complete.

The participant sample consisted of 17 men and 42 women ranging from the ages of

18-52 years (M=20.72, SD= 5.61) enrolled in Carleton University’s various Psychology

classes (see Table 1 and Table 2). A total of 35 participants were in their 1st year of university

studies, 12 participants were in 2nd year, six participants were in 3rd year, and six participants

were in 4th year (M=1.71, SD= 1.01; see Table 3). A total of 13.6 % of participants identified

as Protestant, 42.4% as Roman Catholic, 3.4% as Orthodox, 1.7% as Jewish, 16.9% as

Muslim, 1.7% as Buddhist, 11.9% as Agnostic, and 8.5% participants indicated “other” as

their religious affiliation (see Table 4). A total of 3.4% of participants identified their political

affiliation as Very Conservative, 3.4% as Conservative, 32.2% as Moderate, 39% as Liberal,

8.5% as Very Liberal; another 3.4% indicated “other” political affiliation and specified their

political affiliation, and 10.2% of participants preferred not to disclose their political affiliation

(see Table 5).

Materials


Intrinsic/Extrinsic-Reviewed Scale (I/E-R) (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). The I/E-R

scale was used to determine the participants’ religious orientations (i.e., intrinsically

religiously oriented or extrinsically religiously oriented). A sample question from the I/E-R

scale measuring intrinsic religious orientation is “ I enjoy reading about my religion”; a

sample question to measure extrinsic religious orientation is “I go to church because it helps

me to make friends.” The I/E-R scale consists of 14 questions rated on a 5-point Likert scale

ranging from “1 = Strongly Agree” to “5 = Strongly Disagree”; 8 items pertained to intrinsic

religious orientation, and 6 items pertained to extrinsic religious orientation (Gorsuch &

McPherson, 1989).

Juror Bias Scale (JBS; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). The JBS was used to determine

participants’ juror bias (i.e., tendency to side with the defence or prosecution). The JBS

consists of 22 questions all rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “1 = Strongly Agree”

to “5 = Strongly Disagree”. A sample question related to pro-prosecution bias from the JBS

scale is “A defendant should be found guilty only if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty”. A sample

question related to pro-defence bias from the JBS scale was “The death penalty is cruel and

inhumane”.

The Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System Scale (ATCLS; Martin & Cohn,

2004). The ATCLS scale was used to determine attitudes toward the criminal legal system,

specifically examining individuals’ concepts of the integrity, competence, and fairness of the

legal system. The ATCLS consisted of 38 questions all rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging

from “1 = Strongly Agree” to “5 = Strongly Disagree”. A sample question from the ATCLS

scale is “Most of our laws are fair and just.”

Punishment Orientation Scale (POQ) (Yamamoto & Maeder, 2015). The POQ scale

was developed to determine punishment orientation. The POQ consists of 22 questions all


rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “1 = Strongly Agree” to “5 = Strongly Disagree”

with 4 subscales: Ideal Utilitarianism, Ideal Retributivism, Harsh Retributivism and Harsh

Utilitarianism. A sample question from the POQ scale relating to Ideal Utilitarianism is

“Punishment is more about righting a previous wrong than about the ‘greater good.” A sample

question from the POQ scale relating to Ideal Retributivism is “It is better to let 10 guilty

criminals go free than to punish 1 innocent person.” A sample question from the POQ scale

relating to Harsh Retributivism is “Criminals are bad people and get what is coming to them.”

A sample question from the POQ scale relating to Harsh Utilitarianism is “An overly harsh

punishment may be necessary to prevent others from committing the same crime.”

Demographics. Participants were asked questions pertaining to their demographics.

Participants were asked to provide information about their gender, age, and year of university

study (i.e., 1st year, 2nd year, 3rd, year, or 4th year undergraduate, Master’s student or Doctoral

student). Participants were also asked to report their religious affiliation (i.e.. Christian,

Muslim, Buddhist, etc.), and political affiliation (i.e., Conservative, Moderate, Liberal, etc.).

Procedure

First, participants read the consent form; if the student agreed to participate, the study

began. Participants answered questions from the Religious Orientation, Juror Bias, Attitudes

Toward The Criminal Legal System, and Punishment Orientation questionnaires and

completed questions regarding demographics. After the participants finished the

questionnaires, they received the online debriefing explaining the purpose of the study. Lastly,

participants were asked to allow or prohibit the use of their data for analysis. Following the

study, students received course credit for participating; students still received course credit if

they withdrew their data.

Results


Item Assessment

Intrinsic/Extrinsic-Reviewed Scale (I/E-R) (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). Item 3

and 10 were reverse coded as per Gorsuch & McPherson (1989). Item 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12 and

14 related to intrinsic measurement while items 2, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 13 related to extrinsic

religious orientation measurement. Internal consistency of the intrinsic religious orientation

sub scale was moderate in this sample (a = .81, M = 2.89, SD = .80), as was the internal

consistency of the extrinsic religious orientation subscale (a = .70, M = 2.82, SD = .63).

Juror Bias Scale (JBS; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Items relating to the defence

subscale were recoded as per Kassin and Wrightsman (1983). Items 8, 13, 15, 19, 20, and 21

measured juror bias related to the defence, while items 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 17

measured juror bias related to the prosecution. Item 1, 4, 7,18 and 22 were filler questions and

were removed from analysis similar to Kassin and Wrightsman’s (1983) analysis of the

questionnaire. Internal reliability for questions testing juror bias related to the prosecution was

weak in this sample (α = .65, M = 2.81, SD = .45). Internal reliability for questions testing for

juror bias related to the defence was also weak in this sample (α = .45, M = 2.68, SD = .51).

The Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System Scale (ATCLS; Martin & Cohn,

2004). Items 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 19, 20, and 21 were recoded as per Martin and Cohn

(2004). The Attitudes toward the Criminal Legal System scale had moderate internal

reliability in this sample (α = .89, M = 3.17, SD = .39).

Punishment Orientation Questionnaire (POQ) (Yamamoto & Maeder, 2015). The

Punishment Orientation scale had 4 subscales. Items 1, 2, 4, 8, and 15 related to measuring

Ideal Utilitarian. Items 3, 10, 13, 18, and 22 related to measuring Harsh Utilitarian. Items 5, 6,

11, 12, 16, 17, and 19 measured Harsh Retribution. While items 7, 9, 14, 20 and 21 measured

Ideal Retribution. Lastly, item 14 was reverse coded as per Yamamoto and Maeder (2015).


Ideal Utilitarian had weak internal reliability (a = .61, M = 3.38, SD = .53) and Harsh

Utilitarian demonstrated weak internal reliability in this sample (a = .49, M = 2.60, SD = .53).

Harsh Retribution had moderate internal reliability in this sample (a = .74, M = 3.12, SD =

.57), and Ideal Retribution had weak internal reliability in this sample (a = .62, M = 3.32, SD =

.60).

In total 139 students participated in this study; however, many participants were

removed for various reasons. While cleaning the data, 4 participants were removed

immediately as they did not consent to the informed consent. Another 5 participants were also

immediately removed, as they did not consent to the use of data at the end of the study.

Nineteen participants were removed because they did not provide any response feedback, or

only completed half the study. Fourteen participants failed one of the three attention checks,

and were removed from the study. Another 7 participants were removed as they completed the

study in less than 5 minutes; the questionnaire should have taken participant more than 5

minutes. Lastly, 31 participants were removed from the study as they did not indicate any

religious affiliation or identified as Atheist. After the data was cleaned a remaining participant

pool of 59 was analyzed (n = 59).

Trust in the Legal System.

First, we hypothesized people with higher levels of intrinsic religious orientation

would have lower levels of trust in the legal system, we also hypothesized people with higher

levels of extrinsic religious orientation would have higher levels of trust in the legal system.

This was examined using correlation analysis, by correlating the composite means of the

subscales of the I/R scale (i.e. intrinsic and extrinsic sub scales) with the composite mean of

the Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System scale. Table 6 shows that intrinsic religious

orientation was weakly correlated to the Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System (r = -


.34, p = < 0.01), which generally supports our hypothesis as participants with higher levels of

intrinsic religious orientation had more negative scores (i.e. lower levels) on the Attitudes

Toward the Criminal Legal System scale. This means that participants with higher levels of

intrinsic religious orientation had less trust in the legal system. A non-significant correlation

was demonstrated between extrinsic religious orientation and the Attitudes Toward the

Criminal Legal System scale (r = -.15, p = .23). This does not support our hypothesis as it was

hypothesized that participants with higher levels of extrinsic religious orientation would

demonstrate higher levels of trust in the legal system.

Juror Bias.

Secondly, we hypothesized that participants with higher levels of intrinsic religious

orientation would exhibit higher levels of a pro-defence bias and lower levels of a pro-

prosecution bias. We also hypothesized people with higher levels of extrinsic religious

orientation would exhibit higher levels of a pro-prosecution bias and lower levels of a pro-

defence bias. Correlational analysis was conducted between the mean sub-scales of the

intrinsic/extrinsic questionnaire (i.e., composite intrinsic mean scores and composite extrinsic

mean score) and mean subscales of the Juror Bias Scale (i.e., composite prosecution mean

scores and composite defence mean scores). A non-significant correlation was demonstrated

between intrinsic religious orientation and a pro-prosecution bias (r = .19, p = .14), and a pro-

defence bias (r = -.14, p = .29) on the Juror Bias scale. This means that participants with

higher levels of intrinsic religious orientation did not have a relationship to juror bias. These

non-significant correlations contradict our hypothesis as we hypothesized participants with

higher levels of intrinsic religious orientations would exhibit higher levels of a pro-defence

bias and lower levels of a pro-prosecution on the juror bias scale (See Table 7). We found that

participants with a higher extrinsic religious orientation tended to have a pro-prosecution bias


on the juror bias scale (r = .26, p < 0.05). This correlation generally supports our hypothesis as

we hypothesized participants with higher levels of extrinsic religious orientation would have a

pro-prosecution bias. A non-significant correlation was found between extrinsic religious

orientation and a pro-defence bias on the juror bias scale (r = -.22, p = .08). This does not

support our hypothesis as we hypothesized that participants with higher levels of extrinsic

religious orientation would have less pro-defence bias (see Table 7).

Punishment Orientation.

Lastly, the investigation of the relationship between religious orientation and

punishment orientation was exploratory. These relationships were examined using correlation

analysis, by correlating the composite means of the subscales of the I/R scale with the

composite subscale means of the Punishment Orientation Questionnaire subscales (i.e., ideal

utilitarianism, harsh utilitarianism, harsh retributivism, ideal retributivism). Table 8 shows that

a non-significant correlation was present between intrinsic religious orientation and each of

the punishment orientations. Table 8 shows a non-significant correlation between participants

with higher levels of intrinsic religious orientation and higher levels of both ideal

utilitarianism (r = -.02, p = .87), and harsh utilitarianism (r = 0.00, p = .98). A non-significant

correlation was also found for participants with higher levels of intrinsic religious orientation

and higher levels of both harsh retribution (r = -.18, p = .15), and ideal retribution scores (r =

.08, p = .50). Extrinsic religious orientation was not significantly correlated to any of the

punishment orientations on the POQ scale. A non-significant correlation was found between

participants with higher levels of extrinsic religious orientation and higher levels of ideal

utilitarianism (r = .18, p = .15), harsh utilitarianism (r = .01, p = .90), harsh retribution (r = -

.13, p = .29), and ideal retribution scores (r =. 12, p = .35) on the punishment orientations

scale.


Table #1 Gender Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Male 17 28.8 28.8 28.8

Female 42 71.2 71.2 100.0 Total 59 100.0 100.0

Note. Descriptive statistics of participant’s gender Table #2 Age Statistics N Valid 58

Missing 1 Mean 20.72 Std. Deviation 5.619 Age Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 18 21 35.6 36.2 36.2

19 10 16.9 17.2 53.4 20 8 13.6 13.8 67.2 21 8 13.6 13.8 81.0 22 3 5.1 5.2 86.2 23 4 6.8 6.9 93.1 24 1 1.7 1.7 94.8 28 1 1.7 1.7 96.6 44 1 1.7 1.7 98.3 52 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 Total 58 98.3 100.0

Missing System 1 1.7 Total 59 100.0

Note. Descriptive statistics of participant’s age

Table #3 Current Year of Study Statistics


N Valid 59 Missing 0

Mean 1.71 Std. Deviation 1.018 Current Year of Study Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 1st year undergraduate 35 59.3 59.3 59.3

2nd year undergraduate 12 20.3 20.3 79.7 3rd year undergraduate 6 10.2 10.2 89.8 4th year undergraduate 6 10.2 10.2 100.0 Total 59 100.0 100.0

Note. Descriptive statistics of participant’s year of study

Table #4 Religious Affiliation Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Protestant 8 13.6 13.6 13.6

Roman Catholic 25 42.4 42.4 55.9 Orthodox 2 3.4 3.4 59.3 Jewish 1 1.7 1.7 61.0 Muslim 10 16.9 16.9 78.0 Buddhist 1 1.7 1.7 79.7 Agnostic 7 11.9 11.9 91.5 Other (please specify) 5 8.5 8.5 100.0 Total 59 100.0 100.0

Note. Descriptive statistics of participant’s religious affiliation

Table #5 Political Affiliation Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Very Conservative 2 3.4 3.4 3.4

Conservative 2 3.4 3.4 6.8 Moderate 19 32.2 32.2 39.0 Liberal 23 39.0 39.0 78.0


Very Liberal 5 8.5 8.5 86.4 Other (Please Specify) 2 3.4 3.4 89.8 Prefer not to disclose 6 10.2 10.2 100.0 Total 59 100.0 100.0

Note. Descriptive statistics of participant’s political affiliation

Table #6 Correlations Between I/R Scale and Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System

Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System

Composite Scale Mean Score Intrinsic Religiosity Mean Score

Pearson Correlation

-.349**

Sig. (2-tailed) .007 N 59

Extrinsic Religiosity Mean Score

Pearson Correlation

-.156

Sig. (2-tailed) .238 N 59

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table #7 Correlations Between I/R Scale and Juror Bias

Juror Bias Scale Prosecution Orientation

Mean Score Juror Bias Scale Defence Orientation Mean Score

Intrinsic Religiosity Mean Score

Pearson Correlation

.191 -.140

Sig. (2-tailed) .147 .291 N 59 59

Extrinsic Religiosity Mean Score

Pearson Correlation

.268* -.226

Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .085 N 59 59

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Table #8


Correlations Between I/R Scale and Punishment Orientation

Punishment Orientation

Questionnaire Ideal Utilitarian

Mean Score


Questionnaire Harsh

Utilitarian Mean Score


Questionnaire Harsh

Retributivist Mean Score


Questionnaire Ideal

Retributivist Mean Score

Intrinsic Religiosity Mean Score

Pearson Correlation

-.021 -.002 -.189 .089

Sig. (2-tailed)

.874 .988 .152 .500

N 59 59 59 59 Extrinsic Religiosity Mean Score

Pearson Correlation

.189 .016 -.139 .123

Sig. (2-tailed)

.152 .906 .293 .353

N 59 59 59 59

Discussion

Little is known about the relationship between religious orientation and legal attitudes,

and how these relationships may influence jury decision-making (Bader et al., 2010). The

relationships between religious orientation and legal attitudes are important to understand as

religion and law are fundamentally connected (Bornstein & Miller, 2009 as cited in Berman,

2000; Hamburger, 1993; Marty, 2005; Sergest, 1994). For these reasons, we conducted a study

that would allow us to better understand the relationships between religious orientation as

outlined by Gordon and Ross (1967) and the legal attitudes trust in the legal system, juror bias,

and punishment orientation.

We hypothesized that people with a stronger intrinsic religious orientation would have

less trust in the legal system, because previous literature demonstrated that individuals with a

stronger intrinsic religious orientation are more trusting of their own religious laws rather than


secular man made laws (Proctor, 2006; Wisneski et al., 2009). This hypothesis was somewhat

supported as participants with strong intrinsic religious orientations were found to have less

trust in the legal system. This finding is consistent with previous research that has

demonstrated that individuals with intrinsic religious orientation are less likely to trust in the

legal system (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012; Wisneski

et al., 2009). Our finding is also consistent with Wisneski and colleagues (2009) research

demonstrating that religious orientation can be related to an individual’s ability to trust in the

Supreme Court to make legal choices for society that are deemed as moral decisions (i.e.,

physicians assisted suicide). A lack of trust in the legal system demonstrated by participants

with a stronger intrinsic religious orientation may be because these participants have been

taught by their religious leaders to trust in religious laws over secular laws, making them more

likely to trust in laws established by their religion rather than established secular laws

(Bornstein & Miller, 2009). Additionally, we hypothesized that participants with stronger

extrinsic religious orientation would have more trust in the legal system, because they are not

motivated, affected, or guided by religious beliefs or laws (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, et

al., 2014; Walker et al., 2011/2012; Wisneski et al., 2009). However, this hypothesis was not

supported, as extrinsically religious participants did not have attitudes that related to having

more or less trust in the legal system.

Secondly, we hypothesized that participants with a stronger intrinsic orientation would

exhibit a pro-defence jury bias. We hypothesized this because it has been previously

demonstrated that qualities of tolerance and maturity counteract pro-prosecution biases,

predisposing individuals with an intrinsic religious orientation to have a pro-defence bias. This

hypothesis was not supported, as individuals with a stronger intrinsic orientation did not

demonstrate a significant relationship to a pro-defence bias or even a pro-prosecution defence.


Perhaps, intrinsically religiously oriented individuals relationship to tolerance and maturity

does not predispose them to have a pro-defence bias as previously believed, or even a pro-

prosecution in the courtroom (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013; Walker et al., 2011/2012;

Weaver & Agle, 2002).

We also hypothesized that participants with stronger extrinsic orientation would

exhibit pro-prosecution verdicts because of their tendency to be less tolerant and mature

(Clark & Dawson, 1996; Walker et al., 2011/2012; Weaver & Agle, 2002). This hypothesis

was generally supported, as participants with a stronger extrinsic religious orientation were

more likely to have a pro-prosecution bias. It is important to note that participants with a

stronger extrinsic religious orientation typically did not have a pro-defence bias. This effect is

consistent with previous research that demonstrated that extrinsically religious individuals are

less related to tolerance and maturity predisposing them to be more likely to have a pro-

prosecution bias rather than a pro-defence bias (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013; Walker

et al., 2011/2012; Weaver & Agle, 2002). Perhaps, an extrinsically oriented individual’s

tendency to exhibit a pro-prosecution may also be predicted by their attitudes towards

authoritarianism, as authoritarians are likely to be biased toward siding with the prosecution

because they tend to follow laws strictly (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983).

Lastly, we examined how religious orientation and legal attitudes relate to punishment

orientation, because McKee and Feather (2008) demonstrated that punishment orientation had

links to ones attitudes, beliefs and values. Additionally, Clark and Dawson (1996) found that

religion is the foundation for personal moral decision making, such as decisions regarding

punishment. As such, we examined how ones religious orientation rather than religious

affiliation could be linked to punishment orientation. We did not find a significant relationship

between either intrinsic or extrinsic religious orientation and any of the punishment


orientations. Perhaps, religious orientation is not related to punishment orientation. However,

the relationship between religious orientation and punishment orientation was exploratory, as

little research has been conducted around this framework.

This study had two main strengths associated with it: this study was able to acquire a

good sample size as per Gravetter & Forzano (2012), and this study adds to the gap in

research, because research such as this has not yet been done; specifically in relation to

punishment orientation. Although there are considerable strengths, there are some limitations

associated with this study. For example, the use of Carleton University students can be viewed

as a weakness. The use of university students may limit the study’s ability to be generalized to

the rest of the population; as university students are only a segment of the population (Payne

& Chappell, 2008). Secondly, the use of students may have limited the strength of the data

relating to religious orientation and legal attitudes, as many students may not have developed

strong affiliations or opinions concerning their religious orientation or legal attitudes (Payne &

Chappell, 2008). As such, this study should be replicated with a more diverse population to

increase generalizability and strength of data. The analysis used was also correlation; this

analysis only shows the direction and strength of the relationship between the variables, rather

than a cause and effect relationship. This study could also be replicated using different

analysis such as one-sample t-tests, in order to improve the understanding of the variables.

There are several future directions for research suggested by this study. For example, this

study can be replicated with a population that may be more inclusive and generalizable. Future

research can also apply religious orientation in terms of intrinsic or extrinsic orientation as

outlined by Allport and Ross (1967) to other legal attitudes such as attitudes toward capital

punishment or doctor assisted suicide.

Implications


Trust in the legal system is essential because it increases the likelihood that laws will

be followed by society members (Sprott & Green, 2010). We found that participants who

were more intrinsically religiously orientated had less trust in the criminal legal system, while

participants with stronger extrinsic religious orientation were not significantly more or less

likely to trust in the criminal legal system. As we found that an intrinsic religious orientation

predispositions individuals to trust the legal system less, this can impact the likelihood that

these people will respect secular laws (Sprott & Green, 2010). As such, if the rates of

obedience to the law increase with trust, should the legal system spend more time gaining the

trust of the public in order to increase the probability that established laws are followed,

possibly decreasing offender rates and recidivism?

The most significant relationship we found was that extrinsically religious participants

scores demonstrated a weak relationship to a pro-prosecution bias. As such, religious

orientation (i.e. extrinsic religious orientation) can be related to an individual’s juror bias. By

identifying individual differences in legal attitudes (i.e. juror bias) and its relationship to

religious orientations (i.e. intrinsic/extrinsic) we can better understand how information

presented at trial is processed and integrated into the decision making process. This research

can allow us to understand why a juror member is more or less likely to side with the

prosecution or defence based on their religious orientation. This research can alter our

understanding of how constructs of bias within a jury may contribute to the decision-making

process (i.e. allow us to understand the variation in guilt/not guilty judgments) (Lecci &

Myers, 2008). In better understanding the relationship between juror bias and religious

orientation, serious questions and implications arise. For example, if our religious orientation

predisposes us to have a bias towards the defence or prosecution, while participating as a juror


can we be trusted to provide an impartial verdict? Can regular citizens be trusted to give a

verdict impartially if ones religious orientation is related to juror bias?

Understanding the relationship between religious orientation and juror bias may also

impact attorneys ability to dispose of juror members based on a challenge for cause (i.e. the

ability to remove a juror from the jury) motions proving that a juror is bias and cannot be

impartial (Norton, Sommers, & Brauner, 2007). As such, research like this can bring change to

juror’s tasks in court if the concept of impartiality is called into question, due to an

individual’s religious orientation and the relationship to juror bias. Overall, by continuing to

research legal attitudes and the relationship to religious orientation we are able to answer

questions and better understand the relationships implications within society.

Conclusion

Religion and the law are connected; however little information is known about the

relationship between religious orientation (i.e., intrinsic or extrinsic) and legal attitudes such

as juror bias, trust in the legal system, and punishment orientation (Bader et al., 2010; Miller et

al., 2014). This study was conducted in order to close the gap in knowledge regarding

religious orientation and legal attitudes. This study was also conducted to better understand

punishment orientation and its relationship to religious orientation, as this has never been

researched. Overall, we found that the relationship between religious orientation (i.e., intrinsic

and extrinsic) and both juror bias and trust in the legal system varies. However, intrinsic and

extrinsic religious orientation did not relate to punishment orientation in this study. Although

this study has strengths due to the use of university students, this study should be replicated to

increase the generalizability and strength of data. Future research should continue to examine

the relationship between religious orientations and legal attitudes set out by this study, and

should also expand research to other legal attitudes. However, this research is impetrative as it


tends to the gap in Psychological research and sheds light on the implications of the

relationship between religious orientation and legal attitudes within society.


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Appendix A

Informed Consent

The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the study and the nature of your involvement. The informed consent must provide sufficient information such that you have the opportunity to determine whether you wish to participate in the study. ________________________________________________________________________Present study: Religiosity and Legal Attitudes

Research personnel. The following people are involved in this study, and may be contacted at any time if you have questions or concerns: Savannah Turner (Principal Investigator) [email protected]; Dr. Evelyn Maeder (Faculty Sponsor): [email protected], Phone: 613-520-2600 ext. 2421; Kendra McLaughlin (Research Assistant) [email protected].

Concerns. Should you have any ethical concerns about this research, please contact Dr. Shelley Brown (Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B, [email protected], Phone: 613-520-2600 ext. 1505). You may also contact the Carleton University Research Office at [email protected].

Purpose. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships among mock jurors' legal attitudes and demographics.

Task requirements. We are asking you to read and answer a series of questions pertaining to religious orientation and legal attitudes. The study will take approximately 20-35 minutes.

Benefits/compensation. You will receive a 0.05% increase in your final grade in one of PSYC 1001, 1002, 2001, 2002 or NEUR 2001, 2002 for participating in this study.

Potential risk/discomfort. There are no physical risks to participating in this study. Some individuals might feel uncomfortable when asked to answer sensitive questions regarding religious orientation, legal attitudes, or personal attitudes. If you feel any discomfort or distress, you may choose not to answer specific questions, and you will not be penalized in any way if you do this. The debriefing form at the end of the study provides contact information for local support services that you may contact if you need or want help.

Anonymity/Confidentiality. All participants’ information will be non-attributable to participants names and contact information and coded for analysis. Participants will be given a participation code; this code will not be traced back to their name, personal information, or data. We collect data through the software Qualtrics, which uses servers with multiple layers of security to protect the privacy of the data (e.g., encrypted websites and pass-word protected storage). Please note that Qualtrics is hosted by a server located in the USA. The United States Patriot Act permits U.S. law enforcement officials, for the purpose of an anti-terrorism investigation, to seek a court order that allows access to the personal records of any person without that person's knowledge. In view of this we cannot absolutely guarantee the full


confidentiality and anonymity of your data. Participant’s IP addresses will not be collected in this study; this function has been disabled in Qualtrics to maintain anonymity/confidentiality. The data obtained will be retained for 5 years after the study’s completion on password protected computers and may be shared with colleagues and competent professionals in the future. With your consent to participate in this study, you acknowledge this.

Right to withdraw. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may skip any question that makes you feel uncomfortable and/or you do not want to answer for any reason by clicking the next button at the bottom of their screen. You may withdraw after giving your consent by selecting the withdraw button at the bottom of the page and you will still receive the full compensation for participating. If you withdraw, you have the right to request that your data be deleted. If you decide to drop out, we ask that you read the Debriefing form at the end and move to the last page to retrieve your Completion Code. Please be advised after you consent to allow the use of your data at the end of the study you will no longer be able to withdraw data.

________________________________________________________________________

This study has received clearance from Carleton University Research Ethics-Board-B (Reference # 15-229)

________________________________________________________________________

Consent to participate:

___ I have read the above form and understand the conditions of my participation. My participation in this study is voluntary, and I understand that if at any time I wish to leave the experiment, I may do so without having to give an explanation and with no penalty whatsoever. Furthermore, I am also aware that the data gathered in this study are confidential and anonymous with respect to my personal identity. By clicking this box I AGREE to participate in this study.

___ I have read the above form and understand the conditions of my participation. My participation in this study is voluntary, and I understand that if at any time I wish to leave the experiment, I may do so without having to give an explanation and with no penalty whatsoever. Furthermore, I am also aware that the data gathered in this study are confidential and anonymous with respect to my personal identity. By clicking this box I DISAGREE to participate in this study.


Appendix B

Intrinsic/Extrinsic-Reviewed Scale (Gorsuch &McPherson, 1989)

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the 5-point scale: (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree, 4 = Agree, 5= Strongly Agree)

1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree, 4 = Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

1. I enjoy reading about my religion. (I)

2. I go to church because it helps me to make friends. (E)

3. It doesn't much matter what I believe so long as I am good. (reverse score) (I)

4. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer. (I)

5. I have often had a strong sense of God's presence. (I)

6. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection. (E)

7. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs. (I)

8. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow. (E)

9. Prayer is for peace and happiness. (E)

10. Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life. (reverse score) (I)

11. I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends. (E)

12. My whole approach to life is based on my religion. (I)

13. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. (E)

14. Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life. (reverse score) (I)

*Subscales: (I)= Intrinsic items: 1,3,4,5,7,10,12,14 and (E)= Extrinsic items: 2,6,8,9,11,13****


Appendix C

Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983)

This questionnaire is designed to assess people's opinions and attitudes on various legal issues. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the 5-point scale:


1. Appointed judges are more competent than elected judges. (filter) 2. A suspect who runs from the police most probably committed the crime. (P) 3. A defendant should be found guilty only if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty. (P) 4. Most politicians are really as honest as humanly possible. (Filter) 5. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy. (P) 6. In most cases where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good

lawyer. (P) 7. In general, children should be excused for their misbehavior. (filter) 8. The death penalty is cruel and inhumane. (D) 9. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which

they are charged. (P) 10. For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty if there is a 90%

chance that he committed the crime. (P) 11. Defense lawyers don't really care about guilty or innocence, they are just in the

business to make money. (P) 12. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the

crime. (P) 13. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court. (D) 14. Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony. (P) 15. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation. (D) 16. If a grand jury recommends that a person be brought to trial, then that person probably

committed the crime (P) 17. Extenuating circumstances should not be considered-if a person commits a crime, then

that person should be punished. (P) 18. Hypocrisy is on the increase in society. (Filter) 19. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned. (D) 20. If a majority of evidence- but not all of it-suggests that the defendant committed the

crime, then the jury should vote not guilty. (D) 21. If someone commits a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he

should not be convicted. (D) 22. Some laws are made to be broken. (filter)

*Sub scales: Filter, P= Prosecution, D= Defense *All Defense (D) subscales were reverse scored


Appendix D

The Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System Scale (Martin & Cohn, 2004)

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the 5-point scale:


1. Juries make accurate decisions most of the time. 2. Punishment in this country is basically ineffective. (R) 3. Prosecuting attorneys care more about justice than getting a conviction. 4. Most of our laws are fair and just. 5. Juries often base decisions on their prejudices instead of facts. (R) 6. Minorities are often given unfair punishments. (R) 7. Defense attorneys are dishonest if it means they can win a case. (R) 8. Most police are genuinely honest and concerned with helping others. 9. Juries often lack the intelligence to make reasonable decisions.(R) 10. One reason there is so much crime is because police officers are incompetent. (R) 11. Judges usually make fair decisions. 12. Most prosecuting attorneys don’t have the time or resources to do their jobs well. (R) 13. Only the brightest, most knowledgeable people can become judges. 14. Most defense attorneys are as fair to the defendant and the victim as possible. 15. Police officers unfairly harass certain groups such as minorities and high-school kids

(R) 16. Trial by jury is one thing that keeps the legal system from being corrupted. 17. In general, prosecuting attorneys do a good job of getting guilty people convicted. 18. Most of our laws are effective at protecting people. 19. Lots of police are corrupt and hypocritical. (R) 20. Prosecuting attorneys are out to get the defendant. (R) 21. Judges are easily ‘‘bought off’’ by corrupt politicians. (R) 22. Because police officers are trained so well there is less crime than there might be. 23. Our current system of punishment is effective at preventing crime. 24. Defense attorneys care more about their clients than about making money. 25. Judges are the most trustworthy of all the legal professions. 26. In general, defense attorneys represent their clients very well. 27. Because lawyers can pick jury members, juries can no longer be trusted. (R) 28. Most prosecuting attorneys are as fair to the victim and defendant as possible. 29. Our laws are too ‘‘loose’’ and open to interpretation. (R) 30. Police officers treat everyone equally because they are able to ignore prejudice. 31. There are too many laws that impose on personal freedom. (R) 32. Judges tend to let bias and prejudice affects their decisions. (R) 33. Prosecuting attorneys are dishonest if it means they can win a case. (R) 34. A lot of judges make poor decisions. (R) 35. Most defense attorneys don’t have the time or resources to do their jobs well. (R) 36. Juries make fair decisions most of the time.


37. Defense attorneys aren’t fair to victims because they represent criminals. (R) 38. The punishment given usually fits the crime.

* R= Reverse Scored


Appendix E

Punishment Orientation Questionnaire (Yamamoto & Maeder, 2015)

This questionnaire is designed to assess people's opinions and attitudes on various legal issues. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the 5-point scale:


Ideal Utilitarianism

1. Punishment is not about “an eye for an eye” – if we are to harm a person using punishment, there must be some benefit to the community.

2. Punishment should be about looking forward to improve society, not backward to address the criminal’s misdeeds.

3. Punishment is only justified when it benefits society. 4. When considering an appropriate punishment, the potential benefit to society is more

important than the need to avenge the particular injustice. 5. Punishment is more about addressing society’s needs than serving out justice to a

single individual. 6. Punishment is inherently wrong and should only be administered when the benefit of

doing so outweighs the harm it causes.

Ideal Retributivism

1. It is better to let 10 guilty criminals go free than to punish 1 innocent person. 2. It is more important to keep innocent people free from punishment than it is to ensure

that all guilty persons are punished for their crimes. 3. It is better to let one dangerous criminal go unpunished than it is to punish an innocent

person. 4. It is inevitable that the justice system will “misfire”; we should just accept that

sometimes people are accidentally punished. (Reverse scored)

Harsh Retributivism

1. Punishment is necessary because it restores the balance of justice. 2. It is more important to punish a guilty person because he deserves it than it is to punish

him to benefit society. 3. The goal of punishment should be to give the guilty person what he deserves. 4. Criminals are bad people and deserve punishment. 5. Even if society would not benefit at all from punishing a guilty person, he should still

be punished because he deserves it. 6. Criminals are in prison because they deserve to be there.


7. Making sure that a criminal is punished appropriately for the crime he committed is more important than making sure that the punishment addresses societal needs such as deterrence.

8. I feel emotionally satisfied when a criminal gets what he deserves.

Harsh Utilitarianism

1. An overly harsh punishment may be necessary to prevent others from committing the same crime.

2. If a crime has a low detection rate (i.e. it is difficult to catch criminals who commit this particular crime), we should punish those who are caught harshly to prevent others from thinking they can get away with it.

3. Crimes that receive a great deal of publicity should be punished severely, even if the crime was not severe, so that society knows there is a strong response.

4. If someone commits a crime, that person is dangerous and must be removed from the community to protect other people.

5. Criminals deserve to be publically identified and shamed


Appendix F

General Information/ Demographics

Gender:

Man / Woman / Transgender / Other (Circle one)

Age: ______

What is your current year of study at Carleton University?

_____ 1st year (undergraduate) _____ 2nd year (undergraduate)

_____ 3rd year (undergraduate) _____ 4th year (undergraduate)

_____ Master's _____ Doctoral

Please indicate what your present religion is, if any?

1 Protestant (Baptist, Methodist, Non-denominational, Lutheran, Presbyterian,

Pentecostal, Episcopalian, Reformed, Church of Christ, etc.)

2 Roman Catholic (Catholic)

3 Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints/LDS)

4 Orthodox (Greek, Russian, or some other orthodox church)

5 Jewish (Judaism)

6 Muslim (Islam)

7 Buddhist

8 Hindu

9 Atheist (do not believe in God)

10 Atheist (do not believe in God)

11 Nothing in particular

12 Other (Please Specify)


Other ________________

How would you describe your political orientation, if any?

1. Very conservative

2. Conservative

3. Moderate

4. Liberal

5. Very liberal

6. Other (Please Specify)

Other _______________

7. Prefer not to disclose


Appendix G

Debriefing

Thank you for your participation in this study! This is a debriefing form, which will clarify the purpose of our study and why we are interested in this issue.

What are we trying to learn in this research?

The purpose of this research was to understand how an individual’s religious orientation is related to their general views of the law (e.g., punishment orientation, juror bias, and trust in the legal system). This study will provide a framework to assist in understanding how one’s religious orientation is related to legal attitudes, which can enhance our understanding of jury decision-making.

Why is this important to scientists or the general public?

Previous research has demonstrated that an individual’s religious orientation can be related to their legal attitudes (Miller, 2013; Miller, Maskaly, Peoples, Sigillo, 2014; Walker, Smither, Debode, 2012; 2011). For example, someone who uses religion as a framework for day-to-day decision making (i.e. intrinsically orientated) is less likely to trust a secular law as they place more trust in their religious beliefs, whereas someone who does not use religion as a means to an end (i.e. extrinsically orientated) is more likely to trust a secular law (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, Maskaly, Peoples, Sigilo, 2014; Walker, Smither, Debode, 2012;2011; Wisneski, Lytle, Skitka, 2009). The present study will provide a framework to assist in creating a better understanding of how one’s religious orientation is related to their legal attitudes. Specifically, this research can provide a better understanding of jury decision-making, and how decisions can be related to juror’s religious orientation and legal attitudes (i.e. fostering more or less bias in the court room). Why was the use of deception necessary?

Partial deception was used in this study because we did not want participants to know the exact purpose of the study. The exact purpose of the study was not disclosed because we did not want participants to modify answers to conform to our hypotheses, or feel concerned about how they were being evaluated.

What are our hypotheses and predictions?

We hypothesized that individuals who are intrinsically religious will be less trusting in the legal system because they are more trusting of their own religious laws, whereas extrinsically religious individuals will be more likely to trust the legal system as they do not use religion as a means to an end as intrinsically orientated individuals do (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, Maskaly, Peoples, Sigilo, 2014; Walker, Smither, Debode, 2012;2011; Wisneski, Lytle, Skitka, 2009). We also hypothesize that religious orientation can influence juror bias.


Juror bias is the inability to put prejudices and biases aside (i.e. prejudice or biases towards gender, race, religion etc.), which can in turn, affect the outcome of a jury’s legal decisions and verdicts (Norton, Sommers, Brauner, 2007; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). We hypothesized that intrinsic religiosity will not be related to juror bias as previous research has demonstrated intrinsically orientated individuals are less prejudice and demonstrate tolerance, whereas extrinsically oriented individuals have been found to generally hold more prejudices (Clark & Dawson, 1996; Miller, 2013; Walker, Smither, Debode, 2012; 2011). Lastly, regarding punishment orientation and its relation to religiosity is currently exploratory research and no predictions were made.

Where can I learn more?

Miller, M. K. (2013). Relationship between religious characteristics and responses to vigilantism. Personality and Individual Differences, 55(5), 496. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2013.04.014

Walker, A. G., Smither, J. W., & DeBode, J. (2012; 2011). The effects of religiosity on ethical judgments. Journal of Business Ethics, 106(4), 437-452. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1009-4

Is there anything I can do if I found this experiment to be emotionally upsetting?

Yes. If you feel any distress or anxiety after participating in this study, please feel free to contact the Carleton University Health and Counseling Services at: 613-520-6674, http://carleton.ca/health/our-services/counselling-services/, or the Distress Centre of Ottawa and Region at 613-238-3311 (http://www.dcottawa.on.ca).

What if I have questions later? If you have any remaining concerns, questions, or comments about the experiment, please feel free to contact Savannah Turner (Principal Investigator), at: [email protected], Dr. Evelyn Maeder (Faculty Sponsor), at: [email protected] (613-520-2600, ext. 2421), Kendra McLaughlin (Research Assistant) at: [email protected].

Should you have any ethical concerns about this research, please contact Dr. Shelley Brown (Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B, [email protected], Phone: 613-520-2600 ext. 1505). You may also contact the Carleton University Research Office at [email protected].

This study has received clearance from Carleton University Research Ethics-Board-B

Thank you for participating in this research!


Appendix H

Informed Consent to the Use of Data The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the study and that you agree to allow your data to be used for research and teaching purposes. We are now asking for your consent to allow your data to be used for research and teaching purposes. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to examine if prospective jurors' religious orientation is related to legal attitudes such as one's punishment orientation, juror bias, and trust in the legal system. Anonymity/Confidentiality. The data collected in this study are kept anonymous and confidential. Right to withdraw data. You have the right to indicate that you do not wish your data to be used in this study. If you indicate this is your choice, then all measures you have provided will be destroyed. At this time, if you consent, you will no longer be able to withdraw your data from the study, however; if you do not choose to give consent, you will still receive course credit. If you do not consent to the use of data, your data will be promptly destroyed and removed from the study. Signatures: I have read the above description of the study investigating religious orientation and its relationship to legal attitudes such as ones trust in the legal system, punishment orientation and juror bias. The data in the study will be used in research publications or for teaching purposes. By consenting, I agree to allow the data I have provided to be used for these purposes.

I CONSENT I DO NOT CONSENT


Appendix I

NOTICE FOR RECRUITMENT

Study Name: Religiosity and Legal Attitudes Description: This study asks participants to read and complete a series of questionnaires regarding religious and legal beliefs and attitudes. Eligibility Requirements: We are looking for Carleton University students participating in SONA. All participants must be fluent in reading English. Duration and locale: 25-35 minutes (online) Researchers: Savannah Turner, Psychology [email protected]; Dr. Evelyn Maeder, Criminology and Criminal Justice: [email protected], Phone: 613-520-2600 ext. 2421; Kendra McLaughlin (Research Assistant) [email protected]. This study has received clearance from Carleton University Research Ethics-Board – B (Reference # 15-229, insert your protocol reference number once obtained) and date of ethics expiration (08/31/2016).


Appendix J

Completion Code to receive credit for participation:

SURVEY COMPLETION CODE:

(Completion code in Qualtrics)


Appendix K

Ethics Approval


Appendix L

Ethics Approval- Addendum

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