saosinav 0991 si7im wa0 i:ti - supreme court of ohio and … pro se appellant, mary a. briggs mary...
TRANSCRIPT
1N° SUPREM COURT OF OHIdB
PRAMILA M. DOMADIA, et al
Appellees
V.
MARY A. BRIGGS, et al
Appellants
On Appeal fxoara the ( seaugo-aCounty Covxt ofAppeals,Eleventh AppeLa*.o L3astdot
8'oua°t of AppeahCase No. 2009 ts.2899
MEMO UM 7At SUPPORT OF JURISI7ICTIOIdOF APPELLANT KARY A. BRIGGS
Panl A. Newman (#0010859) (CQLTATSEL OF RECORD)
NEWMAN & BRICE, LPA214 East Park StreetChardon, Ohio 44024(440) 286-9549Fax No. (440) 286-6814
Ran126 aol.com
Pro Se APPELLANT, MARY A. BRIGGS
Mary A. $riggs
13113 Claridon Troy RoadBurton, Ohio 44021(440) 635-0464
eljctbtes(;awandstre^m, at^,t
4EA 'd86t0 'aN SSOSIAOV QJNVA 8113h1 Wd91:0 OloZ'8Z '8Vr
TaLE OF CONIEN-U
EXPLANATION OF WHY TIiIS CASE I$ A CASE OF PUBLICOR GREAT GENERAL IIVTEREST AND INVOI,VFS A SUBSTANTIALCONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION ..... ................................ . ......................... 1
ST.A.'IEMENT OF TIM CASE A..NO FACTS ...................... ,,,,,,,,<.,... 5
ARCUIvDEFtT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIO1dS OF.LAV'3 ............................. $
I'^_ oasit?o^ of T^v o I : ....... ................................ 8
PmRoH$ll0u of Lasv A7o. II:. ......... ................................... 9
CONCLUSION ........................................ ....................... .... ........... 10
CE1tTIFICATF, OF SERVICE .................,...........................................»........, 10
APPENDIX ApVSC. Page
Cpanioa ofthe Geauga County EleveAith Distrlct Court ofAlspeals(Dec. 14s 2009) ............................................................................ I
JradgmeDt Entry of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas(Junc4, 200s) ............................................................................ 12
Juclgment Entry of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas(Ju[y 22, 2008) .......... . ................................................................. 16
^EA d 8660 'ON saOSInaV 0991 SI7IM wa0 I:ti 0106'8l 'Nt+f
E XPLANATI®N OF tAlHY THiS CASE I§A AS^ Cf'PWLIC DR GRE&T C3^^T.qtVla
1N`T4S'^3A Si3f3STAN'1TA1 CONS'TfT[)'1'f®J+1AL Qt7'E3TI®N
'lbis case and this cause is criticaE to the public, of t generai intcrest aud raises a
substantial constitutional question.
Firatp in these dire ecoraonaic times that face the poop1_es of the State of Ohio a.zad oa.zr
Nation, it is imperative that individuals uitb good cause be giveaa their fair day in court. This
case involves the forecloscue of an owner oceupied sirtgle family residezace based on a Default
Judgment arising from a J nt Entry on 5/4/2007, for a Coxnplaint on a Copovit Note. The
Coguovit TTot,e was for an cntirely different property located within the same county. By
overlooking iulportant issues brought up to be considered, the Eleventh Distric'-i Court of Appeals
decision could have far reaching effects on many Ohioans.
Sldlaerc as the Court of A,ppeals were given valid errors to take into considerataon and
were supplied with a complete tra»saript of afl of the proeeedings, they fayted to recoguize some
clear and some not so clear evidence when they Arrived at thair conclusion. These will be
referred to cbronoiogicatty not in their order of i.txipostauce,
The trauseript will show testimony that Mr. Nevamao brought up the 30 to 60 day
oontinuance with no objection prior to Ms. Briggs even addressing the Court. When Ms. Briggs
was recognized by the Court she did discuss a continuance for the March 5, 2008. She then
explained to the court a settlement agreement reached with plaintiff's attorftey, Mr. Newman,
even though it was not referred to in that manner. Ms. Briggs was not represented by council, nor
was the 1]ontadfas present at the hea%9ng. Ms. Bxiggs started to inform the court of the tentative
agreement titat had been discussed the day prior wifla Mr. Newman, At no time did Ms. Bri
elude to the "ernent being tied to the requested continuance. During the b+.tofion for Default
Judgment 13earing,l in fact tried to have additional verbal evidence submitted to tbc Geauga
Court of Common I'lcas but was stopped short by the Honorable Judge Burt.Th.ere was then a
brief exehange with the co•art about not Briggs not having seen Coutt Documents. The Court told
her he would give the court reporter the file and she could go through it. Then the proceedings
were adjousaaed. Mr. Newman immediately approached Rriggs and requested the check for
S 14,000.00. Briggs wrote out the check payable to the Domadias believing their previous
discussion of settlement v.-as accepted and gave the ebeelC to Mr. Newxaaan. Then. Briggs
proceeded to look through the file and have copies madc.
68/9 d 8660'ON S80SIAR OJdtl3 S113M Udd01:b O1O6'8bUP
At the May 16, 2008, Default Judgment I3eariexg, Ms. lgriggs was under the belief that the
case was settied between the part#es. She did read from a notadzed affidavit into the record that
the plaintiffs had flled on their behalf on March 5, 2009. Ms. Briggs then addressed the Court
that other checks had been sent to the Domadias and she listed them by date, check number and
amount. These checks were not included in the notaaized affidavit or included, to the best of her
knotviedge in the Judgment ar.ti.ount and at that time she was under the beliefthat they had not
been cashed. Ms. Briggs then continued to address the court about giving Mr. Newman a check
forS 14,000.00 on P3larch 5, 2008 as discussed at the previous heatiog and about her adhexence to
the verbal settlement which included interest payments to be accepted for 12 to 18 months and
foreclosure would not occur because we laad a new agreement. Settlement of a matter does not
mean paycnent in fuIl imsnediately. Briggs then tried to admit evidence to the court but was not
peranitted to. The Court again "cut me ofi" and failed to aecogrrize the acceptance and cashing of
the $14,000.00 check as evidence that a settlement had been xeaohed. At no t3t o.e did I tender the
check to only reduce my debt as ixatplied by the Court. Then there was considerable talk between
Mggs and the Court to include Honorable Judge Burt not consideaing the affidavit filed by
Domadia and the untxue claims that were swed in it.
If the Eleventh ISistrict Court of Appeals thinks that the argacuents are without merit
based on not having been allowed by the Court to submit evidence as described in the transcripts.
Nor that having discussions on the record about aS 14,000.00 payment with anterest payments
discussed in court and not refuted by plaintidf's counsel dtaring that first hearing and then cashing
said check is not strong evidence of a settleanent, I strongly disagree with this opimion. I contend
that I did not originally subroit answers to the Cornplaitnt because I was without conncii and
when I believed a settlaaaaent had been reached by the actions of ptaintif('s attorney I was not
aware that I needed to. As oftiais writing I have yet to see the oxder GRANTING LEAVE TO
FILR ANSWFRB IN INSTANTER aceepting my answers filed by my counsel. The Eleventh
D'asuiet Court of Appeals ertor in their JUDGMENT lEN'I7tY OPINION (par5) by stating a
JUDGMENT LIEN was obtained in a separaee case by I7ornadaas in January of 2007. Complaint
in tb.at Case No.s 07M000449 and 35129393 was fiied and JI7I3G2VIl~NI' ENTRY entered into all
on 5/4/2007. 1 contend that it is an error of little consequence but, it is still an ez-ror,
bF./( d EbZO 'aN SbOSIAab OJW S113M Wdl l1 0101 '0b 'NVr
Second, The Constitution of the State of Ohio, is there as a basis in t* hich we form, our
government in the deznocratio society in which we live. It is inxperative that the Bi1J of Rights
and the fsrtiendenents be adhered to by all branches of government. Then by that government the
laws of The State of Ohio are set down. When elected or appointed governmeaat officials tadce
their Oath of Office, they swear or afEm to protect and defend the Corsstitution of ihe United
States and the i.ortstitution of the State of Ohio and to faithfnIly execute the duties of the office
they are to hold. I, ItRaty A. Briggs, am just a lifelong Geauga County resident that takes pride in
the painciples of our sovereign nation and the laws in the State of Okt,io. The notions that in our
courts we wall, no matter what our station in life, receive fair and uabiased txeatmctt. That we
will be able to facc our accusers, have evidence presented against us in a court of law and be able
to address all the facts and be giveo, an opportuaity to cross exatrsine the same.
I come fom a fairly snaall c.ounty of approximately 93,000 residents. I am aotive in my
community and know a gmat many people including most local goverYement officials. I am
honorable in my dealangs with others. I also have an urffinchin$ belief in the process.
Third, at the hearing on February 20, 2009, Mr. Newman counsel for the plaintiffs made
a stateataent that the court was asked if it was ok to accept the $14.000.00 from Ms.l3riggs. He
forther states that the court araswered "yes". (Tr, Page 8, laae 7-14) There is no record of this
conversation taking p1aCe at either the March 5, 2008 or May 16, 2008 hearing, I refer to copies
of the official court tranascripts. Later in the testimony at this heariaDg, Ms Briggs questioned why
the Domadias were not at the hearing. She then addressed her eoncem.s about the sworn affidavit
of not receaeiving checks (Tr, Page 31, line, 14-24 and page 32, line 1-8). The a°eason II bring
this up is I have taew evidence to present ►tt this case. Checks that were paid to the
>ilotnad.°eas that they claimed by affidavit they never received have been produced by Ms.
Briggs' Baetlc and cheecl&s dated atter 2006 were casheel by the 19onaadias in dbe+et coraflict
with their orfgenel C'agnovit Complafaat and the sworn affidavit senbnaitkd to court pn
Mmt°ch 5, 2008. (Dn. April 3, 2009 the honorable Judge Burt made a statenaent that "If you pay
the $14,000.00 that vaill be credited against the Judgnent. And it was."(Tr. Page 7, line 11-13)
The official court tramcript does not indicate that those statements were ever made at the hearing
that took place on March 5, 2008, the day Mr. Newzam asked for and received the check for that
GEl8 'd B6Z0'ON SdOSIAOV 09SV3 5113M Wdll:ti 0IO6'86'Nb'P
pout-th, on, Apri13, 2009 the Domadias were pxeseagt in the court roonn and would have
been called as witnesses. When the proceedings were stopped to call medical attention for IUIs.
Briggs, who had just been, released from the hospital that morning after having a heart attack on
April 1, 2008, T'he Judge abrnptly adjoFUned the hearixag and never reconvened 'zt so as to give
defendants an oppoztunity to call witnesses and the documents that had been requested for them
to produce. That there is new evidence that a swarn affidavit was in fact untme and finely casts a
large enough shadow to be looked at nxuc}a closer.
Lastly, this brings me to the belief that this case Merits 7Urfsdictdon on the grounds that it
has a Substantial Constitutional Question involved. More precisely the Ohio Bill of Rights:
Aitkae T; Baa oi Rtbts
Fitalienable Rag®ais.
§ I All men are, by nsature, free and independenY, and
have certain znalienable rights, among wlaich are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and
obtaining happiness and safety.
(1851)
Rarli°ess,J'®r gaafuvy; Due process.
§16 All courts shall be opcn, and every person, for an
injury done him in his land, goods, persoII, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, and sbull
have justice administered without denial or delay.
Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts
and in such raaanner, as may be provided by law.
(1851, atn, 1912)
Powers re$erved to tltae,peopk,
§20 This enumeration of rights shall not be construed
to impair or deny others re ' by the people, and all
powers, nat hereira delegated, xemain vrith the people.(1851)
VA d aHo 'ON saoSIaad ONv3 S713A wd<<:^ 0146'9Z'NUP
STATEMENT OF CASEIn August 2007, Appeliees, Pramila and M.J. Dorreadia, fr°lod a foreclosure 2xtion on the
zesideuce of Appellant Mary A. Briggs ("Appellant") in the f"ieauga County Court of Common
Pleas.
On November 29, 2007, A.ppeliees filed a Motion for Default Juc#gerrmt. On Much 5 and May
16,2009, Appellees iwd ApWLlent Mary Briggs attended hea^.xxxgs on the n;atter. On June 4,
2009, the Geauga Courzty Court of Common P1eas issued a Judgment Enitry granting the i9efault
Judgment for forcalosure.
On July 2, 2008, Oefendant Mary Briggs filed a Motion for Relief from Judgrixent, Motion to
File Answer Instazwr, and Answer with the triai court, On July 3, 200$, Defendant lbfary Briggs
filed a Notice of Appeal witl► this Court, On February 4, 2009, this case was remmdeed to the
trial court for purposes of hearzn g acgEasnents on Defendant btary Baiggs' Ivfotion for Relief front
Judginent.
The Motion for ktelief from Oefault Judgment was set for heaelug. On Febxaary 20, 2009, the
parties met for a hearing on Defendant Briggs' Motion for Relief £foal Defatilt Judgmen4, which
was continued to April 3, 2009. The trial court continued the hearings and ordered Defendant
Briggs' to brief the issue of whether Plaintiffs' at#orney, Paul Newman, was a potential witness.
On Apri16, 2009, the trial cAUat entered its Judgment Entry denying Defendant Briggs' Motion
for Relief from Judgment.
bFIOI d 86Z0'dN SNOSIABtl 0'JBUj S113M WdllI 0IOZ'8t'NHP
sTA°^ NT OF FACTSOn May 7, 2007, Appellees obtained a judgoaent lien pursuant to a cograovit j t obtained
against Appellartt. Chn August 7, 2007, Appellees filed a foreclosure action on tlxe residence of
Appellaert, at 13113 Claridvat-Troy Road, Burton, Ohio. 3'.d. p. 4. On Noveffiber 29, 2007,
A.ppellees filed a Motion for Default Judgment and circulated a judgment entry. T.d. p. 23, 32,
35. in Appellee`s Motion for Default Judgment they sought jaadgrnent and, foreclosure agnainst
defandants Mary Briggs, Joan and Kenneth 17ettelbach, and Pew-Ohio Corp.
Appellant, who was pro se at the time, physicatly appeared and was presez ►t in court for the
hearings on the foreclosore matter on March 5 and May 16, 2008. See T.p. of March 5, 2008 and
T.p. of May 16, 2008. At both hearin.gs and in prior communication with Appellees' counsel,
Appellant discussed settletnent and resoltttion of the raattec. T.p. of March 5, 2008 p. 3 and T.p.
ofMay 16, 2008 p. 7, 10, 1 5- 18. Althoupb no focmal answer was filed with the trial coaart,
Appellant contacted Appellces' counsel and believed she had an agreement with Appellees to
pay the sum of Foaarteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.00) in March 2008 and bliaae Hundred
Seventy-Seven Dollars and Sixteen Cents ($977.16) per month for one year, during which timc
Appellant would have the opportunity to refin.ance or otheawkse satisfy the obligation to
Appellees. T.p. of May 16, 2008 p. 6-8. Appellees cashed Appellant's check written in March
2008 for Potutftaa Thousand Dollars ($14,000.00) pursuant to the verbal agreement. T.p. of May
16, 2008 p. 6. Appellant relied on her conversations and inteanctions with Appellees' counsel,
and thcrefow did not file a written answer with the trial court. Ftwhermore, Appellant requested
a coxLtinuance on the May 16, 2008 hearing due to severa{ medical pxobtcrns, including an
infection and thyroid problesns. T.p. of May 16, 2008 p. 3. The Wal court and opposing counsel
refused to allow a contiztuance. Id. Appellaut e:zpaessed 3
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to Judge Burt on May 16, 2008 that she was experiencing ined'aW problems and she was not in a
condition to represent hersclf to the best of her ability.l'ri.
On June 4, 2008, the trial cour[ issued a Judginent Entry g,aantisag the Default Judgment which
stated JSefendunt Briggs failed to answer or make an appearance. Furthe-more, this JuAe 4, 2008
Judgment Fsitty failed to include the priority creditor, Geauga Savings Bank, in the distribution
of prdceed3 because they failed to appear at the Defau[t Judgment hearings. However, Geauga
Savings.Banlc had submitted an Answer to T'taintiffs' Complaint on September 7,2007 claiming
its interest in the property. In a separate appeal, Couit of Appeals Case No. 2008-Gm2848, this
Court rernanded the matter to trial court to con.sider C;eauga Savings Bank's Motion for Relief
from Judgment. On Novem.ber 21, 2008, the trial court granted relief from a portiorl of t118
Judgment Entry file.d on June 4, 2008.
1Chis Court remanded this case to the uial court in the pacvious a^ppeal fzled in July 2008 to hear
arguments on the issue of Defendant Briggs' Motion for Relief from Judgment. During the
Motion for Relief from Judgment J'roceedino on February 20, 2009, Judge Burt asked
Defendant Baiggs to provide evidenc,e of the settlement agtwment between the parties prior to
the hearing of March 2008. See Traust:tipt of ]Procoediugs of Febt7aary 20, 2009. The trial court
requested transcripts of tape xecorded conversations and a brief addressing the issue of whether
Attorney Newman's testirnony was necessary to prove the March 2008 settlement, T.p, of
Febnaary 20, 2009 p. 30 and 33. During the Febnuary 20, 2009 proceeding, the trial court
admitted that its e,arZler fnding that Defendant Briggs' did not appear was inoorrect. T.p. of
February 20,2009 p. 3.
On April 3, 2009, the trial court heard arguments regarding the Maech 2008 settlement and the
issue of whether Attorney Newman was a potential witness. See Transcript of Proceedings of
April 3, 2009. In those proceediugs, the teial cotut explained that the default judgment from June
4,4
vat j Rhr.o m sHaNnov Maaj SII3M wa<< ti 0106,si ,NVr
2008 needed to be corrected because it stated thst Ms. Briggs did not make an appearanee. T.p.
of Apra13, 2009 p. 5. The trial court adutitted that Ms. Briggs did make an appearance, but
considered this error to be procedneal rather tbaa one of substance that affected the outcome of
the caso. Id During these proc,cedings, Ms. Briggs was again asked to prove the settletsient of
March 2008. T.p. of April 3, 2009 p. 25.1.7efeaxdaa ►t $riggs once again testified regarding her
reliance on tbe settlement agreenaent of March 5, 2008. T.p. of Apri13, 2009 p. 27-32. At this
heaxing, Ms. Briggs testified despite some issues with chest pains. T.p. of April 3, 2009 p. 42.
Dcfcndant Briggs testifaed that she had suffered a heart attack the day before and had been
released from the hospital that momiug so that she could t,estify, Id. Ms. Briggs testified that she
had cotttacted her attorney the day before who proposed filing a continuance due to her medical
condition. T.p. of April 3, 2009 p. 42-43. Ms. Briggs chose not to request a cozttixiuance because
she knew the hearing was impoztant and tbat the Domadias lad come all the way from North
Carolina and she did not wan^:t to cause an inconvenience. Id Judge Burt continued to ask for
eviderice, but before all evideatce was presented Ms. Briggs cautioned that she ruigW need
medical attention, which is when Jiidge Burt ended the hear1ng. T.p. of April 3, 2009 p. 46.
On April 6, 2009, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry, which Yefexs back to the validity of the
June 4, 2008 Judgment Enttry on the Default Judgnzent. In ehe Apxg16, 2009 Judgment Entry, the
trial court affirms the findings in the June 4, 2008 Judgment Entry, but made no mention of
Creauga Savings Bank's appeal and the trial couR's xelief granted to Geauga Savings Bank on
November 21, 2008. Thus, a fina l Judgment Entry addressing all pattaes and issues brought up
during the course of this case has not beeo entered by the trial court, aad it is uualear to
Appellant as to which Judgment Entry should be considered the fiuat order of the trial court.
A^GU1t9EIdT ^1 SUPF43RT flP PTid3pOSITI0N5 OF 1,A9J
LAW AND ARGUMENT
&^onositfoffi of T.a^rr ^
This new evidence that was not allowed into the court record makes this case even more
important to have another viewin.g, siuce there might have been criminal activity at play here all
along.
Chapter 2921: OFFENSES AGAINST 3iiS'PICE AND PUBLICADMINISTRATION
^^^ 1 1 1s aa9l4;t ti^a^
Ptl 16 -S.
tr^ifl d 8610 'oN sa081naa oNv3 S1131a W1:0 0106WVr
As uSed in sections 2921.01 to 2921.45 of the Revised Code:
(A) "Pubhc official" means any elected or appointed officer, or employee, or agent of the state orany political subdivision, whether in a temporary sr permanent capacity, and includes, but is notlimited to, legislators, judges, and law enforcement officsrs.
(g) "Public servant" means any of the following:
(1) Any public officiai;
(2) Any person performing ad hoc a governmental function, including, but not limited to, a juror,member of a temporary commission, master, arbitrator, advisor, or consultant;
(3) A person who is a candidate for public office, whether or not the person is elected orappointed to the office for which the person is a candidate. A person Is a candidate for purposesof this divisiori if the person has been nominated according to law for election or appointment topublic office, or if the person has filed a petitlon or petitions as required by law to have theperson's name placed on the ballot in a primary, general, or special election, or if the personcarnpaigns as a write-in candidate in any primary, general, or special election.
(C) "patiy offie:ial" means any person who holds an elective or appointive post in a polltical partyin the United States or this state, by virtue of which the person dlrects, conducts, or partidpatesin directing or conducting party affairs at any level of responsibility.
(D) "Afiicial proceeding" means any proteeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, orother governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath, and includes anyproceeding before a referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person takingtestimony or a deposition in connection with an official proceeding.
2923011 Perjury.
(A) No person, in any ofFlcial proceeding, shall knowingiy make a false statement under oath orafPirmation, or knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false statement prevlously made, wheneither statement is material.
(8) A falslfication is material, regardless of its admissibility in evidence, if it can affect the courseor nutcome of the proceeding. It is no defense to a charge under this section that the offendermistakeniy believed a falsification to be immaterial.
(C) It is no defense to a charge under this section that the oath or affirmation was administeredor taken in an irregular manner.
(0) Where contradictory statements relating to the same material fact are made by the offenderunder oath or afflrmation and within the period of the statute of limitations for per)ury, it is notnecessary for the prosecution to prove whtch statement was false, but only that one or the otherwas false.
(E) No person shall be convicted of a violation of this section where proof of faisity rests solelyupon contradiction by testimony of one person other than the defendant.
(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of per,jury, a felony of the third degree,
^Fr^i A eHo 'ON SSOS[AflV OJSV3 S113M Wdll b oIot VOr
2921e12 Taonper6ng wkh eviden .
(A) No person, knowing that an offic'sat proceeding or investigation is in progress, or Is about tobe or likely to be instituted, shall do any of the foilowing:
(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair itsvalue or avallatriPity as evidence in such proceeding or investigation;
(2) Make, present, or use any record, docurraent, or tkaing, knowing It to be false and withpurpose to mislead a public official who is or may be engaged in such proceeding orInvestigation, or with purpose to corrupt the outcome of any such proceeding or investigation,
(8) Whoever violates this sectlon is guilty of tampering with evidrance, a felony of the thirddegree.
Effective bate: 01-01-1974
Chapter 2905. tCIDNAPPENG AND EXTORTION
29Q5.11 artion,
(A) No person, with purpose to obtain any valuable thing or valuable benefit or to induce anotherto do an unlawful act, shall do any of the following:
(1) Threaten to commit any felony;
(2) Threaten to commit any offense of violence;
(3) Violate section 2903.21 or 2903.22 of the Revised Code;
(4) Utter or threaten any calumny against any person;
(5) Expose or threaten to expose any matter tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt,or ridicule, or to damage any person's personal or business repute, or to impair any person'scredit.
( B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of extortion, a felony of the third degree.
(C) As used In this section, "threat" indudes a direct threat and a threat by innuendo.
2905.12 Coepcion®
(A) No person, with purpose to coerce another into taking or refraining from action concerningwhich the other person has a legal freedom of choice, shall do any of the following:
(1) Threaten to commit any offense;
(2) Utter or threaten any calumny against any person;
17^r4i A R67n'nN S80S1+1flti 6JaVI S113M WdZl:b OIOt'8l'Nbf
(3) Expose or threaten to expose any matter tending to subjed any person to hatred, contempt,or ridicule, to damage any person's personal or biislness repute, or to impair any person's credit;
Pro °teonw 2
5ubstantiat Constitutional Question involved. More precisely the C►ktio Bill of Rights:
Ac2iele I: giY mf ffleghb
d®saleeraable Rtsbts.
§ 1 A.ll men are, by natuee, free and ixidependent, and
have cexteitt inalienable rights, amnng which am those
of enjoying and defoudang life and liberty, ac9uiring,
possessing, and proteckiaag property, and seeking and
obtaining happiness and safety.
(18.51)
Re,dress, for mjrsyy, Deae lrr°ocess.
§ 16 All cotarts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done him, in his land, goods, person, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall
have justice admio.istered without denial or delay.
Suits may be brought against the stue, in such conrts
and in such noaffxo.er, as may be provided by law.
(1851, are. 1912)
Powers reserved to tkepeople.
§20 "1'his enum.eradon of rights shall not be construed
to irnpair or deny others reWned by the people, and all
powers, not herein delegated, remain with tbe people.
(1851)
V/01 a aA7n M sNns,nOv nANvI s»am wazt:ti 010z NUr
CQNCLiJSI(3R1
For tbe reasons discussed above, this case involves rnatters of public and great general interest
and a substantial constitutional question. 'Che appellant xequests that this com2 accept jurisdiction
in tlzis case so that the important issues presented will be reviewed on the merits.
Respectfully subxaitted,
riggs
Mary A. Bziggs
Pro Se
Certific@te_qf Sqrvia
I cettify that a copy of this Notice of Appeal vm sent by ordinary U.S. nsaaxl to oouazsel for
appellees, Paul A. Newman, Esq. 214 East Park StYeet, Cbardoxa, Ohio, 44024 on Ianuary 28,
2010,
Snggs, Pr S
btiri A QFWM sHOSIA(la OD8d3 S113M WdtlI OIOl'Ol'NVP
STATE OF OHIO fkCdtr IN THE COURT OF APP EALS1 ^1._
COUNTY OF GEAU GA r 14 ^,^b^ ELEVENTH DISTRICT^^'n^sxa
Pi^iAMIL.A M. DOMADIA, JdJ®GN1EN7 ENTRY
Pieintiffs-,4ppeii ,CASE NO. 2009-G-2009
mvss
MARY A. BRIGGS, et af.,
Defendant-Appellant.
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appeliant s assignments
of error are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the
judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
Ri ft G t3G MAR 1AiUE
FOR THE COURT
nciei 'Jii Wn M 5N()SlAOV 0J8Vj S113M WdZl:b OiOZ Sb'NdP
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA BDlddPN® ® y OHIO
PRAMILA M. DOMADIA, et a1., 9 o piNtl ON
P1a1 ntiff5-Appel l@es^0 P^ CASE NO. 2009dG-2899
- vs - _.c,^^^ .
MARY A. BRIGGS, et aI., ^^^ -t.,da
Defendant-Appellant.
Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 07 F 000821.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Pauf A. Newman, Newman & Brice, L.F'_A., 214 East Park Street, Chardon, OH 44024
(For Plaintiffs-Appellees).
Carolyn J. Pasohke, Law Offices of Carolyn J. Paschke Co., L.P.A., 10808 KinsmanRoad, P.O. Box 141, Newbury, OH 44065 (For Appellant Mary A. L3riggs) .
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.
{QA} Ms. Briggs appeals from the trial court's judgment overruling her motion
for relief from default judgment, finding she failed to submit any meriforious grounds for
relief from the trial court's grant of default judgment and issuance of a foreclosure.1
(12) Ms. Briggs contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for
relief from judgment because the trial court incorrectly noted that she failed to make an
1. We address Ms. Briggs' appeal from the, original foreclosure decree, which granted default judgment infavor of the t]omadias in the companion case of Domadia v. Briggs, 11th 9ist_ No. 2068-G-2847.
*1141 a 00VON S80SIAD OJNVJ S113M wdii:1 0101'8b'NUP
appearance or file an answer in the foreclosure action, and made such a finding in the
court's foreclosure deoree. She further contends that the trial court improper6y shifted
the burden of proof to her because the Domadias did not make a prima facie showing
that default judgment was warranted,
{Q3} We agree with the trial court, finding Ms. Briggs' contentions to be without
merit. The trial court held two hearings on Ms. Briggs' motion for relief from defaul4
judgment, leniently allowing her ample time to submit evidence of the alleged settiement
agreement. The court agreed with Ms. Briggs that the initial finding that she did not,
make an appearance was incorrect, but that in any case, it had no effect on the validity
of the judgment as Ms. Briggs did appear, was present at both hearings, and defended
herself actively in the suit. She failed to submit any evidencg that the original judgrrrent
that prompted the Domadias' foreclosure action and their motion for default judgment
was satisfied or that a settlement agreernent had been reached. Furthermore, the
Domadias clearly established a prima facie case by subrnitting evidence of an
unsatisfied judgment and enforceable judgment lien on tier property.
(14} Thus, we find Ms. Briggs' assignments of error to be without merit and
affirm.
Sulbstantive and Prcrcedural Faots
The genesis of this case was an original money judgment against Ms.
ariggs in the amount of $146,560.75. Thereafter, a judgment lien encurnbered Ms.
6riggs' property located in Claridon Township.
{%7j In August of 2007, the Domadias filed a foreclosure action, and in
November of 2007, they filed a motion for defautt judgment. Two hearings were held on
^,r mi *J 0670 nrtl
2
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the motion for default judgment, the first on March 5, 2008, where the Domadias
presented evidence as to the outstanding amount of the judgment. Ms. Briggs
appeared at the default hearing and requested a continuance, believing the case could
be settled, and informed the court she was prepared to give the iylornadias a check for
$14,000 that very day.
{18} The court did continue the hearing on the motion for default judgment and
noted that Ms. Briggs had not filed an answer. Ms. Briggs conteradod that she never
received the original cornplaint. The court reviewed the case file and showed her that
service was proper. The court also offered her the entire court file for viewing. tUls.
Briggs did make the payment, which the Domadias accepted at the end of this hearing,
and the amount was later credited to her in the final foreclosure decree.
{%9} At the second hearing, held on May 16, 2008, the court reminded Ms.
Briggs that she was not before the court to defend the original cognovit judgment that
had been entered in the previous case. The court explained that the ®omadias' current
action was a foreclosure action to execute the judgment lien. The court further
explained to Ms. Briggs that the only defense to the foreclosure action would be that the
judgment was paid in full. It is beyond dispute that Ms. Briggs failed to submit any
evidence of safisfaction of the judgment or, for that matter, any evidence of an
executory settlement agreement. The court further found that the patlies were unable
to settle the rraatter and directed the Domadias' attorney to submit an appropriate
judgment entsy.
{¶iD} Several weeks later, on June 4, 2008, the court granted the Domadias'
motion for default judgment and issued the foreclosure decree, finding that Ms. Briggs,
3
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although duly served, failed to answer or make an appearance. The court found that
$147,373.60, plus interest at a rate of 8% per annum, remained due and owing on a
judgment in favor of the Domadias from March 5, 2008 (crediting Ms. Briggs with the
$14,000 payment). The court further found that all necessary parties were properly
sen+ed and that two other parties, including Geauga Savings Bank, faited to attend the
two hearings before the court.
{¶11} The court ordered that Ms. t3riggs' property be soid and the liens
marshaiied, concluding that the Domadias, as:the first and best lien holders, were
entitled to satisfaction of the lien, and that the Ceauga County Treasurer was owed
accrued real property taxes, assessments, penalties, and interest.
{¶A2} Both Ms. Briggs and Geauga Savings Bank filed motions for relief from
default judgment. At the same time, both Ms. Briggs and the bank filed appeals from
the court's grant of defeuit judgment to the Domadias, We issued a stay of execution in
Geauga Savings Bank's appeal and remanded the 'matter to allow the trial court to rule
on the bank's motion for relief from judgment. Geauga Savings Bank's appeal was
dismissed after its claim was settled. We discuss Ms. Briggs' appeal of the foreclosure
decree in the companion case, Domadia v. Briggs, 11th Bist, No. 2008-G-2847.
{113} The court held a hearing on Ms. Briggs' motion for relief from judgment on
February 20, 2009. The basis of her argument was an incorrect finding in the trial
courYs June 4, 2008 foreclosure decree that she failed to appear or file an answer. The
cotirt responded that although the finding was incorrect because Ms. Briggs did appear,
the error had no effect on the final determinati®n of the case.
4
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{¶14) Ms. ftggs also argued that she made a substantial payment of $14,000 at
the March 6, 2008 hearing, and that she had reached a settlement agreement with the
Domadias' counsel. The court noted that all the parRies agreed that the $14,000 had
been paid and due ctedit was given to her in the foreclosure decree.
{115) On direct examination, Ms. Briggs revealed that she had taped several
conversations with the Domadias' counsel. She further claimed that they had numerous
settlement discussions, and that, in fact, a settlement had been reached_ She
submitted several checks to the Domadias in April and May of 2008, but they were
never cashed. She further purported to have evidence of a settlement agreement
documented by tape recordings that if Ms. Briggs could pay half the balance and
guarantee the rest, the Domadias would dismiss the foreclosure action.
{116} The court continued the hearing in order for Ms. Briggs to produce the
recorded conversations, and for the parties to brief the issue of whether the Domadias'
counsel was now a witness in the case. In addition, the court noted it would not issue a
ruling on Ms. Briggs' motion for relief from default judgment until after that time.
(117} Ms. Briggs did offer one recorded telephone conversation with the
Domadias' counsel. The date of the call was not given. In the transcript, Ms. Briggs
inquired as to a conversation she had with counsel the day before, where he indicated
that he would not file the foreclosure decree if Ms. Briggs secured a commitment for the
loan. Counsel denied he agreed to the time delay, and informed Ms. Briggs that it was
the court that had the power to delay the order. After some back and forth
disagreement about their past conversation, Ms. Briggs conceded she did not have the
full amount or a loan commitment.
5
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(q(is} After holding a hearing on April 3, 2009, the court denied Ms. Briggs'
motion for relief from default judgment, finding that the $14,000 the Domadias accepted
after the March 5, 2008 hearing was credited t® Ms. Briggs in the foreclosure decree.
The court further reviewed that on February 20, 2009, Ms. Briggs testified she had proof
by way of recorded phone conversations ydith the Domadlas' counsel that a settlement
had been reached, but that she filed only one such recorded conversation on March 12,
2009. The court found that the transcript "cleady and unambiguously shows that
Plaintiffs' c,®unsel had not entered into an agreement or settlement with Defendant
Briggs. At most, the transcript demonstrates that counsel was willing to consider
setifement if Defendant Briggs could obtain and provide to Plaintiffs' counsel a valid
loan commitment."
{$19} The court explicitly addressed the claim that the June 4, 2008 judgment
entry contained an incorrect finding that Ms_ Brigg.s did not make an appearance in the
action. The court agreed that such finding was incorrect, but that fact did not change
the validity of the foreclosure decree.
{120} The court overruled Ms. Briggs' motion for relief and granted a stay of the
foreclosure only, as the originai monetary judgment against Ms. Briggs in favor of the
Domadias for $146,560.70 was never appealed.
{921} Ms. Briggs now timely appeals the court's denial of her motion for relief
from default judgment in the Domadias' foreclosure action, raising two assignments of
error:
(q(22} "[1.] The trial court erred in granting a default judgment and by failing to
properly address the issue of defendant's appearance in the case at hand.
6
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(¶23) "[2] The trial court improperly misplaced the burden of proof at the default
judgment hearing."
{124} ^ ndard ®f ^ev^e^r ^otiorr for R®tief Frotra ^t^adgr^ent
(125} "A reviewing court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for relief
from judgment to determine if the frial court abused its discretion." Miller v. Sun Castle
Enterprises, Inc., 11th ®ist. No. 2007-T-0054, 2006®®hio-4669, ¶40, (citations omitted),
quoting Bank One, NA v. SKRL Tool and Die, Inc., 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-045, 2004-
Ohio-2602, ¶15. See, also, GTE Automatic Rlectr/c v. ARC leadustt7es, 47 Ohio St.2d
146, 150. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than error of ►aw or judgment;
it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable,
Blakernore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio S0d 217, 219.
{126} "Relief from judgment may be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), which
states in relevant part:
{127} "t3n motion and upon`such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable negiect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Giv.R. 59(B); (3) fraud (whether hereto denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment
has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the
judgment." Id. at¶49-50; quoting Civ.R. 60(B).
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(q(28} "Regarding the rnoving pady's obligations for a Civ.R. 60(6) motion, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has held:
{129} "To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(8), the movant must
demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is
granted; (2) the party is entitied to relief under one of the grounds stated In Civ.R.
60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where
the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(8)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Id. at 151-52, quoting GTE
Automatic Etectrdc at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶30} ^ai9rsre to Il^alce an ^pC^aranee rsr Fite an At^^
{131} In her first assignrnent of error, Ms. Briggs contends the trial court erred in
finding that she failed to appear or file an answer in the foreclosure action. We find this
argument to be wholly without merit.
{q32) At the outset we note that Mi. BrEggs' contention is moot. Ms. Briggs was
present for both hearings on the ®omadias' motion for default ]udgment and defended
herself in the action. Quite sirrtpfy, the court granted the bomadias' motion and ordered
the foreclosure because Ms. Briggs offered no evidence that the judgment was satisfied
or that a settlement agreement had been reached. Thus, it is clear the trial court did not
abuse its discretlon in finding that the incorrect statement as to her lack of appearance
did not change the vatidity of the foreciosure decree.
(133) We recognize that "[d]efault judgment is a disfavored procedure.
Therefore, in the main, Ohio courts have interpreted the requirement that a party to be
held in default must have 'appeared' in the case, in order to be entiTted to notice of the
at,ciar a aAtn nN SN05[A(IV OUVj S113M WdEt:b O10U86'Nb'P
default hearing, with extreme liberty. Essentially, a perty has appeared, for purposes of
Coiv.R. 55(A), if it has had any contact, however informai, indicating it intends to deferid
the suit, with the party moving for default judgment.° Quatchoice v. Baumgartner, 11th
i)ist. No. 2007-'id0086, 2008-Qhio-1023, ¶14, citing, Rocha v. Salsbury, 6th Dist. No, F-
05-014, 2006-Ohio-2615, 119-20.
{134} Ms. Briggs' appearance, however, does not equate to sufFicient grounds
for relief from the default judgment when the original money judgment that underlies this
case clearly remains unsatisfied. Ms. Briggs activei:y defended herself on the motion for
default judgment. She was present for both hearings on March 5, 2008, and May 16,
2008. The caurt continued the March 5, 2008 hearing so that Ms. Briggs couid submit
evidence of an alleged settlement to satisfy the judgment.
{135} Ms. Briggs, however, apart from correctly claiming that she did appear,
offered no evidence upon which relief could be granted. Indeed, she presented no
meritorioLi5 defense, no evidence of mistake, iriadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect; no newly discovered evidence; no evidence of fraud, no evidence the judgment
had been satisfied, or any "other reason justifying relief from the judgment."
(136) The Domadias filed the foreclosure actidn in order to satisfy their judgment
which had been granted in a separate case in January of 2007. Ms. Briggs contends
she did present evidence of a settlement agreement in the form of two checks she
issued to the CJomadias in April and May of 2008. Ms. Briggs admits these checks were
not cashed.
{¶37} She is correct that on the day of the March 5, 2008 hearing, she gave the
®omadias a check for $14,000, which was cashed. The cour2 took notic.e of the
9
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$14,000 payment and credited this amount to Ms. Briggs against the total amount due
on the judgment in the foreclosure decree. Quite simply, Ms. Briggs offered no
evidence of a settlement agreement and did not satisfy the outstanding judgment
against her.
{qi3&} To support her assertion that the parties had reached a settlement
agreement to stop the foreclosure action, Ms. Briggs submitted one recorded
conversation with the ®omadias' counsel, which only reinforced the fact that a
settlernent agreement had not been reached. After holding two hearings on her motion
for relief from default judgment, and a record that is devoid of any evidence of a
settlement agreement, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's judgment
overruling Ms. Briggs' motion for relief from default judgment.
(9'34) Ms, Briggs' first assignment of error is without merit,
(9(40} Mis^urdera ®^
(141} In her second assignment of error, Ms, Briggs contends that the trial court
misplaced the burden of proof at the original hearings on the Domadias' motion for
defauit judgment. Ms. Briggs contends that the Domadias merely submitted an affidavit
with their complaint, and that they failed to prove a prima facie case with proper
evidence.
{142} We find Ms. Briggs' contention to be wholly without merit. The Domadias
properly submitted evidence of the judgment they received in Januaey ®f 2007. They
then filed the instant foreclosure action and motion for default judgment to collect their
judgment eight months later when the judgment remained unsatisfied. Ms. Briggs
offered no evidence in rebuttal, and Niied to appeal the original judgment.
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(1943} During the hearings on her relief from default judgment, Ms. Briggs
submitted no evidence that a settlement agreement had been reached or that the
judgment had been satisfied. Quite simply, she provided no me(torious grounds upon
which the trial court could grant relief from the default judgment. The court allowed her
ample time, indeed, patiently granting her a continuance between the hearings on her
motion for relief to allow her to submit proof of a settlement. Ms. Briggs simply
submitted an undated recording of her telephone conversation with the Domadias'
counsel that actually proves no agreement was reached.
{144} The Dornadias presented the court wfth evidence of an unsatisfied
judgment and an enforceable judgment lien combined vrith a request for marshalling of
liens and sale of real property within the couet's jur6sdiction. Ms. Briggs failed to rebut
this evidence with proof of payment in full that the lieh was satisfied or evidence that a
settlement agreement had been reached. Thus, her second assignment of error is
clearly without merit.
{145} The judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
TIMOTHY P. CANN®N, J.,
concur.
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^u^t +"' ^"~+ ^) IN THE COURT OF COM!?hON PLEASt:-GEAUGA C'JUNTY, OHIO
.^+
P?r1fW1A-Wl13(}I?^AtbIA et at.
Plaintitfs,
V.
MARY A. BRIGGS, et al.
Defendants
CASE N0. 07 F 000821
JUDGE FORREST V?r. BURT
) J?JDCgiVI^NT E^tTRY
This matter came on for consideration of plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment
against defendant, Mary A. Briggs. The Courf finds that Mary A. Briggs was duly served
according to law but has failed to answer or make an appearance. It is the finding of the
Court that Default Judgement for foreclosure is hereby granted against Mary A. Brrgqs in
regard to Exhibit A, the described premises.
The Court finds thatthere is^due to Pramila M. Domadia and M.J. Domadia the sum
of One Hundred Forty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Three and 60/100 Dollars
($146,373.60), plus interest at the rate of Eight Percent (8%) per annum ft-orn March 5,
2008, plus costs of this action and the Preliminary Judicial cost.
The Coutt finds that afl necessary parties have been properly served according to
law and that Joan A. Dettelbach, Kenneth A. Dettefbach, Penn-C?hio Energy Corporation
and Geauga Savings Bank have failed to attend two hearings before this Court. The Court
further finds that Joan P. Dettelbach and Kenneth A. Dettelbach have failed to answer and
are found in def2,ult. The Court further finds that Penn-Ohio Energy Corp6ration is not a
legal carporation.
The Court further finds that there is due to the Geauga County Treasurer accrued
+,cinc a Wn'nN SNOCtA(IN 007i S113M Wdtr11 OIOZ'Ot'NUf
real property taxes, assessments, peneities and interest thereon, and on the premises
described herein. The exact amount being unasceriainable at the daie hereof, but which
amount will be determined at the time of sale o° said premises for which amount the
Geauga County Treasurer has a good and valid lien.
The Court further finds zero amounts for the Geauga Savings Sank.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that unless the surns
herein found due togefher With the costs of this action, including the cost of the Judicial
Certificate of Title filed herein forwhiCh the plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement, befulfy
paid within three days fi-om the date of eniry oi this decree the equity of redemption of all
defendants in the premises described harein be foreclosed, and that an oi-der of sale shall
issue to the Geauga County 5heriff ordering hirn to sell the same at public sale, as upon
execution and according to law, free and clear of all interest of all parties to this action,
after having the same properly appraised and advertised according to law.
il° i5 FURTHER QR®ERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that ihe Sheriff upon
confirmation of sale, shall pay from the proceeds thereof the following:
1. To the Clerk of Courts, the cost of this action,
2. To Pramila M. Domadia and M.J. Domadia, for the Judicial Certificates of
Title the sum of Seven Hundred and Seventy-Five Dollars ($775.00);
3. To the Geauga CountyTreasurer, for the taxes, assessments, penalties and
interest due and payable on said premises;
4. To plaintiffs, Pramila M. Domadia and M.J. Domadia, the sum of One
i°Iundred Forty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Three and 60/100
Dollars ($41=E,373.60), pfus interest at the rate o; Eight Percent (8%) per
a,cnc a aUnnr,i SNOSIAflV 09NNj S113M Wdb11 O106'86'NUf
annum from March 5, 200E;
5. To the Sheriff, who shall hoid the balance ot funds, if any, pending further
order of this Court;
6. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGeD AIVD DECREED tliat in the event
plaintiff M.J. Domadia is the first and best lien holder and should it be the
successful bidder at the Sheriff's sale, said plaintiff shall not be required to
make a deposit at the time of sale, but shall pay all Court coNts tiue and
owning, taxes and assessments upon presentmentofthe 3iaternentfrom the
Geauga County Sheriffi
7. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that upon
distribution of the proceeds of sale as aforesaid, the Clerk of this Court shall
issue her Certificate to the Geauga County Recorder directing him to enter
the same on the margin of the records of said mortgages and liens releasing
the same from the premises. Record is hereby ordered.
DATE !a p
^ TFE GFBZ'f,
r' a^'P^ (per Gi^il Ftu.^te ^(^) )^ na^^ o^thispardw
u^ and i'^ dikta of jcs tibn,
Per Sup.R.26(F), oxhi4its, if any, may beratrieved after40 days ftr,m the concfusion oflifidafion, including Bmes fordir'ect appeal.Contact the Courf t3eparier orsaid exhihitsshall be destroyed 180 days irom Phe dafe ofthis entrv.
hr n[ t aF7t1 'nN S80SIAOtl OJSVj S113M WdWb oIDZ BZ'NUr
EXHIBI'T "A"
Situated in the T ownship of Claridon, County of Geauga and State of Ohio, and known as partof Lot No. 1, in Section No. 13, East Survey, in said Township and bounded: Beginning on theSouth line of said Lot No. 1 where the center of the road running northeriy and southerlythrough said lot crosses said line;
Thence South $9 1/4 deg. East•along the south line of said lot about 41.07 chafns to thesoutheast corner of the same;
Thence North 3/4 deg. East along the east line of said lot, which is also the east line of saidSection, 10.93 chains to the southeast corner of 29 acres of lar,d set off to Jason C. VJells inp-arcition of the estate of Benjamin Sweet recorded in Vol. 40 at Page 3 of Common PleasRecord oF Geauga County;
Thence North 89 1/4 deg. West 41.07 chains to the center of the aforesaid North and Southroad;
Thence South 3/4 deg. West along the center of said road about ? 1.03 chains to the place ofbeginning, containing about 45-02 acres oF land. Be the same more or less.
EXCEPTING A1vD RESERVING 5.0 acres of land coriveyed to Oarbara E. Motil by deed Vo1. 399,Page 968 Geauga County Records of Deeds. Be the same more or less.
Property Address: 13113 Claridon-Troy Road, Burton, OH 44021Tax rD No.: 12-049700
hC^CC A A670 •nN CNOSInOV 0hHV4 s113M wdbl :b olgl 'aUNbr
ih ufalfloF1 ^Lcs^S Cuun 1IN `f L(COLTRT OF COMMON PLEAS
2^^^ a SL ^ Z rgf^ ^fJ- ACTG,A COUNTY, 0I3110
nE cuU[iTSf;'Fb0i!a c13uP3iY
Plaintiff
_vs_
MARY A. Bl.tIGC"rS, et al.
Defendants
CASE N®. 07 P 00082I
JUDGE PORREST W. 13T71t'T
.Ti1d?g PTr EIdTRY
This matter cazne on for consideration on the Court's own motion.
Motions for Retief from dudgment have been Bled with this Court on behalf of Llefettdant
Mary A. $ajtggs and Defendant Geauga Savings BariL Subsecluent to the f•aling of their
respective Motions for Relief from 7udgxnent, the aforementioned Defendants filed notices of
appeal. The filing of notices of appeal have divested tixis Court of juzisdiction to consider the
Motions for Relief from Judgment.
Until such time as the Defendants' appeals are disposed of by the Lle'aenth District Cotut
of Appeals or the matter is .remanded to this Court to address the Motions for Relief from
Judgment, this Court may not zule upon said motions. The hearing on the Motions for Relief
fxozra Judgment scheduled for July 30, 2008, is cancelled.
U
-^O ST W.
-
BTJR'T`, JTJJaGE
cc: Paul A. Newman, Esq.
Anthony A, Cox, Esq.
Bridey Matheney, APA
Mary A. Briggs
3
3
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