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1. MELIZZA VS CA

FACTS:Melliza sold under a deed several tracts of land to the then Municipalityof Iloilo, including lots 1214-C and 1214-D. The instrument of sale did notmention lot 1214-B, although it was contiguous to the other two lots, but

stipulated that the area being sold shall include the area needed for theconstruction of the city hall site, avenues and parks according to the Arellanoplan. The Arellano plan had long been in existence before the execution of thedeed.

DOCTRINE:The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinatething is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object ofthe sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new orfurther agreement between the parties. The requirement was deemed fulfilledunder the contract of sale because it specifically referred to such other portions of

the lots required by the Arellano plan, which had long been in existence and itspecifically provided for the land areas needed for the city hall site. Therefore, atthe time of the perfection of the contract, the exact area of the land needed,which was the subject matter of the sale, could be determined by simply referringto the Arellano plan, without the parties needing to draw-up a new contract, noreven to clarify matters or explain their intentions.

2. ALCANTARA-DAUS v. SPOUSES DE LEON

FACTS:

Spouses De Leon are the owners of a parcel of land situated in the

Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan with an area of Four Thousand TwoHundred Twelve square meters more or less. Respondent Hermoso De Leoninherited the said lot from his father Marcelino De Leon by virtue of a Deed ofExtra-Judicial Partition. Said lot is covered by Original Certificate of Title No.22134 of the Land Records of Pangasinan.

Sometime 1960s, Spouses De Leon engaged the services of the late Atty.Florencio Juan to take care of the documents of their properties. They wereasked to sign voluminous documents by the latter. After the death of Atty. Juan,some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had beenconveyed by sale or quitclaim to Hermosos brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juanand his sisters, when in truth and in fact, no such conveyances were everintended by them. Furthermore, respondent found out that his signature in theDeed of Extra-judicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leonwas forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo deLeon to Aurora Alcantara

Spouses De Leon demanded the annulment of the document and re-conveyancebut defendants refused. Petitioner, Aurora Alcantara-Daus averred that she


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bought the land in question in good faith and for value on December 1975 andthat she has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over thesame and has been appropriating the produce thereof without objection fromanyone.

The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered its Decision in favor of hereinpetitioner. It ruled that respondents claim was barred by laches, because morethan 18 years had passed since the land was sold. It further ruled that since itwas a notarial document, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition in favor of Rodolfo deLeon was presumptively authentic.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Deed of Absolute executed by Rodolfo De Leon over the landin question in favor of petitioner was perfected and binding upon the partiestherein?

Whether or not the evidentiary weight of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition withQuitclaim, executed by respondent Hermoso de Leon, Perlita de Leon andCarlota de Leon in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was overcome by more than apreponderance of evidence of respondents?

HELD:

First Issue:NO. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to

transfer ownership of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of salecannot be challenged on the ground of the sellers non-ownership of the thingsold at the time of the perfection of the contract.Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties,its consummation by delivery is yet another matter. It is through tradition ordelivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over the thing sold.Undisputed is the fact that at the time of the sale, Rodolfo De Leon was not theowner of the land he delivered to petitioner. Thus, the consummation of thecontract and the consequent transfer of ownership would depend on whether hesubsequently acquired ownership of the land in accordance with Article 1434 ofthe Civil Code. Therefore, we need to resolve the issue of the authenticity andthe due execution of the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim in his favor.

Second Issue:NO. As a general rule, the due execution and authenticity of a document must bereasonably established before it may be admitted in evidence. Notarialdocuments, however, may be presented in evidence without further proof of theirauthenticity, since the certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence ofthe execution of the instrument or document involved. To contradict facts in a


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notarial document and the presumption of regularity in its favor, the evidencemust be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.

The CA ruled that the signature of Hermoso De Leon on the Extrajudicial Partitionand Quitclaim was forged. However, this factual finding is in conflict with that of

the RTC. While normally this Court does not review factual issues, this rule doesnot apply when there is a conflict between the holdings of the CA and those ofthe trial court, as in the present case.

After poring over the records, the SC finds no reason to reverse the factualfinding of the appellate court. A comparison of the genuine signatures ofHermoso De Leon with his purported signature on the Deed of ExtrajudicialPartition with Quitclaim will readily reveal that the latter is a forgery. As aptly heldby the CA, such variance cannot be attributed to the age or the mechanical actsof the person signing.

3. SIY CONG BIEN V HSBC

Facts

Otto Ranft called at the office of the herein plaintiff to purchase hemp (abaca),and he was offered the bales of hemp as described in the quedans abovementioned. The parties agreed to the aforesaid price, and on the same date thequedans, together with the covering invoice, were sent to Ranft by the plaintiff,without having been paid for the hemp, but the plaintiff's understanding was that

the payment would be made against the same quedans, and it appear that inprevious transaction of the same kind between the bank and the plaintiff,quedans were paid one or two days after their delivery to them. However, on theday the Quedan was supposed to be delivered, Ranft died. Thereupon, Siydiscovered that Ranft delivered such quedans to the Hongkong Shanghai Bankto whom Ranft was indebted to. Siy then filed before the estate proceedings tocollect the debt of Ranft and filed an action against HSBC to demand for therecovery of possession of the quedans. Siy further argued that there wasnegligence in the part of HSBC, because Ranft had not yet acquired ownershipover the quedans at the time of its indorsment to HSBC.

Issue

Whether or not HSBC acquired the quedans in good faith

Held

The Supreme Court held that the quedans is now owned by HSBC, and not byRanft nor by Siy so as he claims. Ranft delivered to HSBC the quedans for a


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valuable consideration, which is valid, and that as it appears as well, thosequedans were negotiable in form and endorsed in blank. So, upon delivery, it nolonger becomes property of the indorser but the indorsee as it appears in thiscase, unless he pays for his indebtedness.

For a warehouse receipt to be negotiated, it should be properly indorsed anddelivered which is evident in this case. Since it was a blank warehouse receipt, itmay be delivered to any person, and the bearer thereon becomes the owner ofthe receipt.

As to the question of ownership, Siy voluntarily clothed Ranft with all theattributes of ownership, thus he is estopped to question the valid title of thequedans. There is now no remedy for the plaintiff, and the bank is notresponsible if the quedans be negotiated to the bank as there is no proof of fraudon the part of the defendant.

DOCTRINE: The quedans were issued in the name of Siy Cong Bien dulyendorsed in blank, and thus negotiable in form. It follows that on the delivery ofthe quedans to HSBC they were no longer the property of the endorser unless heliquidated his debt with the bank. It is a representation that the one to whom thepossession of the receipt has been so intrusted has the title to the goods. If theowner of the goods permits another to have the possession or custody ofnegotiable warehouse receipts running to the order of the latter, or to /bearer, it isa representation of title upon which bona fide purchasers for value are entitled torely, despite breaches of trust or violations of agreement on the part of the

apparent owner.

4. MAPALO VS MAPALO

FACTS:Illiterate spouses were tricked into signing a deed of donation of theeastern portion of the land to Maximo, the brother of the owner of the land. Thedocument signed by the spouses was actually a deed of sale conveying theWHOLE property to Maximo. Maximo sold the whole lot to the Narcisos.

DOCTRINE:A contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces noeffect whatsoever where the same is without cause or consideration in that thepurchase price which appears thereon as paid has in fact never been paid by thepurchaser to the vendor. The deed of sale is governed by the Old Civil Code. If itis w/o consideration, it is inexistent. If it is only w/ a false consideration, it isvoidable. In this case, the consideration of P500 was totally absent. Theinexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and cannot be the subject ofprescription


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5. Republic v. Phil. Resources,

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, in representation of the Bureau ofPrisons, instituted against Macario Apostol a civil complaint. PDRC moved to

intervene. The complaint says that sometime prior to Apostols transactions thecorporation had some goods deposited in a warehouse. Apostol, then thepresident of PDRC, but without the knowledge or consent of the stockholdersthereof, disposed of said goods by delivering the same to the Bureau of Prisonsin an attempt to settle his personal debts.

DOCTRINE: PRDC has legal interest in the case because A1458 provides thatthe purchaser may pay a price certain in money or its equivalent, which meanspayment of the price need not be in money. Whether the goods claimed byPRDC belong to it and delivered to the Bureau of Prisons by Apostol in paymentof his account is sufficient payment therefore, is for the court to pass upon and

decide after hearing all the parties in the case.***VILLANUEVA NOTESThis case is not at all authority to say that under A1458, as it defines a contract ofsale, the term equivalent of price can cover other than money or other media ofexchange, since this case covers not the perfection stage of a contract of sale,but rather the consummation stage where the price agreed upon can be paidunder the mutual arrangements agreed upon by the parties to the contract ofsale, even by dation in payment, as is the case herein

6. Toyota Shaw v. CA, 244 SCRA 320 (1995)

FACTS: Luna wanted to buy Toyota Lite Ace, met w/ a sales rep ad emphasized that he

needed the Lite Ace not later than June 17, 1989 because he, his family and a balikbayan

guest would use it on June 18 to go to his home province where he would celebrate hisbirthday. He also intimated that if he does not arrive in his hometown with a new car, he

would become a laughing

stock. Sales rep informed them that the vehicle was being readied for delivery but after

about 1 hour, Bernardo told them that the car could not be delivered since nasulot angunit ng ibang malakas.

DOCTRINE:No obligation on Toyotas part to transfer ownership of a determinate thingto Sosa and no correlative obligation on Sosas part to pay a price certain appears therein.

Nothing was mentioned about the full purchase price and the manner the instalments

were to be paid. A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is anessential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. A

disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price

7.Navarra v. Planters Dev. Bank,


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.

Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa MetropolitanWaterworks andSewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) is a union in the said public sector (MWSS) created

and registered pursuant to Executive Order No. 180.

On May 7, 1993, a petition for election of officers was filed by Bonifacio deGuzman,

former auditor of KKMK-MWSS before the Bureau of Labor Relations(BLR);

The BLR granted the petition and the Labor Organization Division of the Bureaushall

supervise the conduct of said elections;

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, ledby its president, Genaro Bautista, but was denied by BLR;

An appeal was filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employmentwhere the

order of the BLR was assailed as having been issued with graveabuse of discretion andwithout jurisdiction, and so dismissed the petition for lackof jurisdiction;

The then incumbent officers filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, QuezonCity,

with the issuance of temporary restraining order, but the petition wasdismissed for being

insufficient in form and substance, and for want of genuine justiciable issue. Theresolution became final;

However, on November 25, 1993, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer of Temporary

Restraining/Injunction was filed by Bautista, et al., before RTCQuezon City (Branch 87)to enjoin the respondents (present officers, BLR, etc.)from proceeding with the election

of officers scheduled on December 2, 1993.The petition was granted;

On December 2, 1993, the election proceeded in defiance to the order of thecourt. Hence,

an order was issued by the court to refrain from giving effect of theelection and

recognizing the persons supposedly elected, and hereby orderingthe latter to refrain fromassuming office and acting as officers of the KKMK-MWSS. The court subsequently

issued a writ of preliminary injunction;

The case was re-raffled to Branch 220 of RTC Quezon. The respondents filedaReiteration of Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift Writ Preliminary Injunction onthe

ground of lack of jurisdiction and that the injunction does not anymore servedits purpose.

The instant case was dismissed;

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista, et al alleging that the RTC has

jurisdiction considering that the case before it is an action for prohibition, as aresult ofwhich, the said writ was reinstated;

A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents but was denied.Hence,

they filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary


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injunction and/or restraining order, before the Court of Appeals

sales digest 123

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