W I L L I A M J . D U I K E R : S A C R E D W A R

Chapter 6Defeating Vietnamization

Background

1968: Tet offensive – turning point?

long way to go.

Nixon stated during the presidential campaign, that he had a “secret plan” to bring an end to Vietnam War

Military force could be used to bring about some form of political settlement

The Road to Disengagement

Nixon was adopting the strong anticommunist line that he had held as vice president during 1950s

Nixon’s foreign policy: improve relations with China while reducing confrontation with the USSR.

Five-point strategy

Turning the war gradually over to the South Vietnamese

Training them to handle their own self-defense

Diplomatically isolating Hanoi from its sponsors in Moscow and Beijing

Continuing the peace negotiation with the DRV in Paris

Engaging in a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops

The Road to Disengagement

Two possible scenarios:

A negotiated settlement or a gradual extrication of U.S. forces

Saigon’s capacity for self-defense increased

Negotiations: Hanoi insisted on its existing demands Total withdrawal of U.S. troops

The replacement of the Thieu regime by a tripartite coalition government

Nixon’s proposal: Precise timetable for the mutual and simultaneous withdrawal of all

foreign troops from South Vietnam

Free elections under international supervision and to an active rolafor the NLF in the South Vietnamese political process.

North Vietnamese avoided a direct reply.

Countering Vietnamization

April 1969, the Politburo concluded that it’s forces must continue to maintain an offensive position on the battlefield to prevent the United States from settling in and attempting to prolong the war.

The 1969 campaign was clearly a disappointment

COSVN concluded that the immediate goal could no longer be “victory in a short period of time”.

The Invasion of Cambodia

Hanoi’s success = neutrality of neighboring Laos and Cambodia.

Southern Lao as an infiltration route into South Vietnam -> extend the HCM Trail through Laos

Establishing COSVN headquarters inside Cambodian border

Mid-1960s:

Before: Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) –neutralist leader Sihanouk

After: Pol Pot with Khmer Rouge forces against the Sihanouk government

1970: Sihanouk was overthrown by members of his own government

The Invasion of Cambodia

New government: PM Sirik Matak Immediately demanded the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops

Hanoi refused -> clashes between Cambodian armed forces and Vietnamese units operating in the area

Nixon administration: Dilemma widening the war

Approving a military assault by both South Vietnamese and U.S. armed forces across the Cambodian border to seize/destroy COSVN

Congress forced the administration to withdraw all U.S. forced

Hanoi: Pham Van Dong helped Sihanouk form a new alliance – National

United Front for Kampuchea (FUNK)

Breaking the Stalemate

Early 1971:

South Vietnamese forces crossed the border to attack HCM Trail in southern Laos retreated in disarray

By then, Hanoi was waiting out the Americans’ withdrawal.

Nixon abandoned the demand for mutual withdrawal, but still must leave Thieu in Power. Hanoi asked U.S. to stop supporting Thieu. Washington refused.

U.S improved relations with PRC China began to pressure the North Vietnamese to accept a compromise settlement

The Easter Offensive

Late 1971:

Vo Nguyen Giap: “only a decisive defeat on the battlefield, would convince the Nixon administration and the American people that there were only two alternatives to negotiated withdrawal – further escalation or humiliation

February 1972: Easter holiday attack

Started at Quang Tri province, south of DMZ

Crack North Vietnam troops mauled unprepared and inexperienced ARVN units in the area and drove them in disarray toward the South.

The Paris Agreement

Early May 1972:

Hanoi’s secret negotiator Le Duc Tho returned to Paris to test the Nixon ad.’s willingness to make concessions for peace

Nixon reacted strongly to Easter offensive and resumed the bombing of North Vietnam

Le Duc Tho’s new proposal: formation of a coalition government including representatives of both the PRG and the Thieu regime (first time Hanoi offered a settlement that left Thieu in power)

October 1972:

Tho abandoned coalition government demand and agreed to a cease-fire in place, followed by the total withdrawal of U.S. forces and the exchange of prisoners of war.

The Paris Agreement

December 1972:

President Thieu balked, since there was no departure of North Vietnamese in the South.

Nixon ordered a blockade of Haiphong harbor and renewed the bombing of DRV.

January 1973:

Tho agreed to most of U.S. conditions, Thieu was left in power

Final agreement was signed.

The Fragile Peace

The Paris agreement never really came into effect

ARVN units aggressively sought to expand the area

North Vietnamese troops engaged in operations of their own in countryside.

COSVN: proposal to launch a major campaign during the spring of 1975 Politburo approved the plan for a major offensive centered on Ban

Me Thuot, the largest city in the central highlands.

The Final Offensive

April 1975:

North Vietnamese units wiped up remnants of South Vietnamese resistance in the northern and central provinces and advanced rapidly toward Saigon in 4 weeks.

Nguyen Van Thieu made a last-minute appeal to Washington, but the response was negative

Final victory

W I L L I A M J . D U I K E R : S A C R E D W A R

Chapter 7 Why the Communist Won

The Reasons

The aura of legitimacy of the Communist Party

Virtue of its generation of struggle against the French

Extraordinary leader: Ho Chi Minh

Rival nationalist parties were consistently unable to formulate a program that could appeal widely to the mass of Vietnamese population

The ineffectiveness of the nationalist movement forced its political leaders to rely on outside support for their survival

Communist’s domain of revolutionary strategy

Original Factors

Communist victory as a consequence of the weakness of the Vietnamese bourgeoisie under the domination of the French colonial system. Weakness of the Saigon regime had deep historical roots that

transcended the personalities and actions of individual leaders.

Weakness of the middle class in modern Vietnam was the historic weakness of the commercial sector during the traditional period.

Vietnamese Confucianism was closely identified with the concept of selfless devotion to the cause of the fatherland Appeal of Marxist ideas among intellectuals

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