SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET ALFACTSIn Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. As a result, Custodio was injured and died.To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. However, Makabuhay, widow of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. hereinafter referred to as the carrier and its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable.ISSUES1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driverHELD1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed.Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.Dispositive Judgment affirmed.FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)FACTS - On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.- When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation:SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said MasterSuch liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:xxx xxx xxxf) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions.xxx xxx xxxPar. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels.ISSUEWON both the pilot and the master were negligentHELDYES.- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. PILOT- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. - Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. MASTER- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. - Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing.- The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC.CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. - There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG)FACTS- respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14,1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.- More than 2 years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. - January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused, prompting him to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso- January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi, father of Wendell- both set of parents came up with versions of the storyGotiongs:> Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicideLibis:> an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification- CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. - IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liableISSUEWON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libis liable for vicarious liabilityHELDYESRatio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180 CC.Reasoning- undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.- A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.'- BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary> if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. But if the liability id direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS SO> RULES:+ for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY= premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)+ liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR= youth welfare code= FC: responsibility of parents+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED

TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)FACTS- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged ten, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc.- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. - The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice.ISSUE- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.HELD-- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable.Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. However, because of his minority, the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable. Article 2180 reads the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible The father and, incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.- The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus, under this doctrine, a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing, controlling, and disciplining of the child. The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. As stated, sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption.Disposition Petition granted. Decision set aside.

G.R. No. 30112, Mabalacat Sugar Co. v. Ramirez et al., 53 Phil. 496STATEMENTPlaintiff alleges that it is a domestic corporation and for more than seven years has been in the quiet and peaceful possession of a strip of land 2,664 meters long and 5 meters wide across the land of the minor defendants in the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Mabalacat, province of Pampanga, which is specifically described in the complaint.That it built a railway and made permanent improvements on the land in the nature of embankments, bridges, sewers and telephone lines for the proper transportation of sugar cane from the Hacienda Concepcion to its sugar central in the municipality of Mabalacat, and that it has been in the peaceful use, possession and enjoyment of the railway for about seven years. That on the 4th and 5th of September, 1927, the defendants jointly and mutually, with the aid of more than one hundred other persons acting for and with them, raised and destroyed the rails of plaintiff's railway, a large portion of which were twisted, and destroyed the bolts and ties, and left the railway a wreck as a means of transportation for the plaintiff. That by reason of such wrongful acts plaintiff was damaged in the sum of P32,000.It is then alleged that the defendants by means of violence threatened to, and will, dispossess plaintiff of the strip of the land in question, and it prays that pending the action, the court issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants prohibiting them from in any manner disturbing plaintiff's possession of a strip of land, and that upon final hearing, plaintiff have judgment against the defendants jointly and severally for P32,000, and that the injunction be made permanent.For answer the defendants made a general and specific denial, and as a counterclaim alleged that by reason of the injunction, which was granted by the court on motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were damaged in the sum of P2,000, for which they pray for a corresponding judgment against the plaintiff.Upon such issues the lower court rendered judgments against the defendants Manuel Lazatin and Tomasa C. Viuda de Pamintuan, as guardian of her sons, to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff P2,083.99 and costs, and absolved Jose V. Ramirez from the complaint.From this judgment both parties appealed, and the plaintiff assigns the following errors:I. The lower court erred in not adjudging to the plaintiff damages caused by the necessary delay in its milling operations due to the destruction of its railway by the defendants, in the sum of P20,760.II. The lower court erred in not adjudging to the plaintiff the sum of P6,739.53 as damages sustained by it due to the forcible removal and destruction of its railway by the defendants.The defendant as appellants, assign the following errors:I. The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for damages upon the dismissal of the principal action of injunction.II. The trial court erred in condemning the defendants-appellants, Manuel Lazatin and Tomasa Vda. de Pamintuan, as guardian of the minor children Pamintuan to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff company the sum of P2,083.99 as damages, and in not absolving the same defendants-appellants to the payment thereof.III. The trial court erred in not adjudicating to the defendants-appellants their counterclaim for P2,000 by way of damages and in not condemning the plaintiff company to pay thereof.

IV. The trial court erred in admitting Exhibits C and C-1 against the objection of defendants and without their proper identification by the plaintiff.V. The trial court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint and in not sustaining the same.JOHNS, J.:It must be conceded that any lease, right, title or interest which the plaintiff ever had to the use or possession of the strip of land in question had expired, and that the plaintiff was nothing more than a tenant at will or sufferance. That is to say, at the time of the alleged acts of which plaintiff complains, it had no legal right to the use or possession of the land, and that any right which it ever did have had expired with the contract for the lease of the land by the defendants to Dizon and Tiglao. In this situation, the defendants had the legal right to remove plaintiff's railway from their land, and plaintiff cannot recover damages from the defendants for the doing of that which they had the legal right to do. It is true that after the lease had expired by the terms there were negotiations between the parties for a renewal or extension of the lease. It is also true that such negotiations fell through, and that the lease was never renewed or extended. Hence, it follows that the defendants are not liable for any damages which the plaintiff may have sustained from growing out of the failure to renew the lease, and for such reasons the plaintiff's first assignment of error is not well taken.Be that as it may, the railway track in question has lawfully been on the defendants' land and in the use and possession of the plaintiff for about seven years, and while it is true that after the expiration of the lease, the defendant, upon notice to the plaintiff, had the legal right to terminate the lease and remove the track, yet they had no right to do so in the manner in which it was done. In its removal it was the duty of the defendant to remove the track without any unnecessary damage to the plaintiff. That is to say, in such removal the defendants had no legal right to bend or twist the rails or to destroy the railway ties, fishplates, bolts and nuts and spikes, and that such removal should have been made without any serious injury or damage to the materials of which the railway was constructed. For such wrongful acts, the lower court awarded damages to the plaintiff the sum of P2,083.99.In the opinion of the writer the amount of such damages is about P4,000. Be that as it may, my associates are all of the opinion that the amount awarded by the lower court is reasonable, and that its judgment in that respect should be affirmed.From what has been said, it follows that there is no merit in the defendant's appeal. If the defendants had torn up and removed the track in a peaceful and orderly manner and without any unnecessary destruction to plaintiff's property, they would not then be liable for any damages. But the proof is conclusive that it was done with a large body of men and in a hasty manner, and with force and violence, and that the whole track was torn up and removed in about two days' time and without any regard to plaintiff's rights.The evidence is conclusive that the track was removed at the instance and request of Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan, the guardian of minor defendants, and the lower court rendered judgment against her as such guardian. That was error. The judgment for the amount of damages awarded to plaintiff should be against Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan personally and in person, and not as guardian, for the simple reason that the minor are not legally liable for a tort committed by their guardian. That is to say, the judgment of the lower court for damages against Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan, as guardian of the minors, is reversed, and in lieu thereof a corresponding judgment will be entered against Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan personally and in person, and that in all other things and respects, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff. So ordered.Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Street, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

YHT vs CAFACTS Maurice Peaches McLoughlin is an Australian businessman-philanthropist who used to stay at the Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984. He met Brunhilda Mata-Tan who befriended him and showed him around. Tan convinced Mcloughlin to transfer to the Tropicana from the Sheraton where afterwards he stayed during his trips from Dec 1984 to Sept 1987. On 30 Oct 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as his usual practice. The box required two keys, the guest had one and one from the management. He placed US $10,000 in one envelope and US$5,000 in another , AU$10,000 in another envelope and other envelopes with his passport and credit cards. On 12 Dec 1987, he took from the box the envelope with US$5,000 and the one with AU$10,000 to go to Hong Kong for a short visit, because he was not checking out. When he arrived in HK, the envelope with US$5,000 only contained US$3,000, but because he had no idea if the safety deposit box has been tampered, he thought it was just bad accounting. After returning to Manila, he checked out of the Tropicana on 18 Dec 1987 and left for Australia. When he arrived he discovered that the envelope with US$10,000 was short of US$5,000. He also noticed that the jewelry he bought in Hong Kong which he stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet. He went back to the PH on 4 Apr 1988 and asked Lainez (who had custody of the management key) if some money was missing or returned to her, to which the latter answered there was not. He again registered at the Tropicana and rented a safety deposit box. He placed an envelope containing US$15,000, another of AU$10,000. On 16 Apr, he opened his safety deposit box and noticed that US$2,000 and AU$4,500 was missing from the envelopes. He immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to McLoughlin. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep. McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez got in touch with Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive, Lopez and Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana and thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note. He made Lopez and Tan sign a promissory note for him for the loss. However, Lopez refused liability on behalf of the hotel, reasoning that McLoughlin signed an "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box" which disclaims any liability of the hotel for things put inside the box. On 17 May 1988 McLoughlin went back to AU and consulted his lawyers. They wrote a letter addressed to Pres. Cory Aquino which was pushed back to the DOJ and the Western Police District. He went back from the PH to AU several times more to attend business and follow up but the matter was only filed on 3 Dec 1990 since he was not there to personally follow up. McLoughlin filed an action against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin. The CA modified only the amount of damages awarded. Tan and Lopez, however, were not served with summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez, Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.(a) whether the loss of money and jewelry is supported by the evidence. YES. Where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great respect is accorded to the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.(b) whether there was gross negligence on the part of the innkeepers Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. They even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening McLoughlins safety deposit box.The management contends that McLoughlin made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The evidence on record is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion. They should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter had been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of times at the early hours of the morning. Art 2180, par (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Given the fact that the loss of McLoughlins money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas employees both the employees and YHT, as owner of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Art 2193.WON the "Undertaking for the Use of the Safety Deposit Box" is null and void.Yes, it is null and void. Art. 2003[1] is controlling. This is an expression of public policy that the hotel business like common carriers are imbued with public interest. This responsibility cannot be waived away by any contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.The CA (former case) even ruled before that hotelkeepers are liable even though the effects are not delivered to them or their employees, but it is enough that the effects are within the hotel or inn.Pars. 2 and 4 of the undertaking manifestly contravene Art. 2003 of the NCC. Meanwhile, the defense that Art. 2002 exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of the guest, family or visitors falls because the hotel is guilty of negligence as well. This provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss.dispositive Damages awarded by the lower court sustained US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment; Air fares for a total of 11 trips + transpo expense Hotel payments Moral 50K ED 10K AF 200K[1] Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the Arts brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Arts 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or diminished shall be void.VICTORY LINER V HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDANFACTS- Andres Malecdan, a 75 yr old farmer, was crossing the National Highway. A Dalin bus stopped to allow him to pass. However, a bus of the petitioner overtook the Dalin bus and his Malecdan. Malecdan died.- A suit was brought for damages against the bus company. Judgment was rendered in favor of the heirs of Malecdan. The court awarded them:a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;b. P88,339.00 for actual damages;c. P200,000.00 for moral damages;d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorneys fees of whatever amount that can be collected by the plaintiff; andf. The costs of the suit.ISSUEWON the court erred in the amount of damages awardedHELDYES- To justify an award of actual damages, there should be proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. We cannot take into account receipts showing expenses incurred some time after the burial of the victim, such as expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year death anniversaries. - The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should likewise be reduced. The trial court found that the wife and children of the deceased underwent intense moral suffering as a result of the latters death. Under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Under the circumstances of this case an award of P100,000.00 would be in keeping with the purpose of the law in allowing moral damages. (they only prayed for 100k in the RTC, but RTC gave them 200k)- On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 for indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the Court.- Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases involving quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence. In this case, petitioners driver Joson, Jr. was grossly negligent in driving at such a high speed and overtaking another vehicle. He did not even help the victim. The amount of exemplary damages is properRAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION vs PeopleG.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000Facts: Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed amended information with Regional Trial Court, charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property, the said accused being the driver of a Trailer Truck Tractor registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, drove and operated in a negligent, careless and imprudent without taking the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence the said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., and Pacquing, resulted reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property.Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty. The offended party made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged. The offended parties actually filed with the RTC, Isabela, a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same. The trial court rendered a joint decision finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law, ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendants the actual damages, and the dismissal of the complaint.Issues: (1) Whether or not Rafael Reyes Trucking can be held liable because of filing separate civil action base on quasi-delict(2) Whether or not the award of damages in the criminal case was properHeld: (1) First issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused(2) Second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer, civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION VS LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA ENAMO, MYRNA TAMAYO & FELIX OLEDANFacts: Raul Tutor was the driver of a Fuso tractor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo. Was charged and convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation and Equitable Leasing Corporation a complaint for damages docketed as Civil case in the RTC of Manila. Upon motion of the plaintiffs counsel in the Trial court an order dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin Lim from the Complaint, because they could not be found. Petitioners answer with counterclaim that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that Tutor was an employee not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.The RTC rendered its Decision ordering petitioner to pay actual and moral damages and attorneys fee to the respondents it held that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered with the Land Transportation Office, thus the petitioner was liable to respondents.The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was still to be legally deemed the owner/ operator of the tractor, even if that vehicle had been the subject of a Deed of Sale on file with the LTO still remained in petitioners name. And CA upheld respondents to claim for moral damages against petitioner because the appellate court considered Tutor (driver) an agent of the registered owner/ operator.Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial Court gravely erred when they decided and held that petitioners was liable for damages suffered by private respondents based on quasi-delict for the negligent acts of a driver who was not the employee of the petitioner(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they awarded moral damages to private respondents despite their failure to prove that the injuries they have suffered brought by the petitioners wrongful act.Held: (1) In negligence cases under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies, committed by their employees in the discharge of the latters duties. This liability attaches when the employees found to be insolvent and thus unable to satisfy the civil liability adjudged. Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, and quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an employees act or omission, respondents having failed to recover anything in the criminal case. The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injuries suffered by respondents and their kins were due to the fault of the driver of the Fuso tractor. The lease Agreement of between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that ownership of the subject tractor will be registered in the name of the petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid. Thus the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.(2) Moral damages is designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and similar injury caused by a person. Must proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted, so because moral damages are payment award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrong doer. Article 2219 (2) provides that the liability of the petitioner as the registered owner of the vehicle, respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the factual basis for the award and its causal connection to the acts of Raul Tutor. Indeed, the damages and injuries suffered by respondents were the proximate result of petitioners tortuous act or omission. Thus the evidence gives no doubt that such discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by the trial court.HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner, vs. DAVID TUAZON, respondent.Facts: Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").His complaint that the driver of the Country Bus willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut.Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses"). The Cerezo spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars and granted by the court. Atty. Elpidio B. Valera appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court. The trial court issued an order resolving Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte motion. The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existing rules.Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. The trial court issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence. After considering Tuazons testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Forondas liability because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision. She filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence." Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case.The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court refused to grant relief from judgment because the Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal. The Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence by conclusive evidence, they also failed to prove that they had a good and substantial defense. The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because they relied on an expected settlement of the case.The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.

The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court of appeals a petition for review on certiorari the Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition and failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, with prayer for restraining order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution records show that the petitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the remedy of an annulment of judgment is no longer available. Issues: (1)Whether or not the case needed to be reviewed(2)Whether or not the lower courts and the court of appeals gravely erred in rendering decision(3)Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages Held: (1)The Supreme Court held that the petition has no merit. The issues are interrelated. An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious manipulation of legal technicalities that they have managed to delay the disposition of the present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon. For these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. The issues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt about the correctness of the decision of the trial court.(2)The lower courts and the court of appeals did not erred in rendering their decision, and was infact competent to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence. this court affirms the decision thereto.(3)There is a modification that the amount due shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial courts decision.DULAY V CAFACTS- Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.- Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent: > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC.> that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. > that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability.> that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA)Petitioner> the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. > that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180> that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 33 and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ISSUEWON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action HELDYES- Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:"Sec 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused." - It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case.- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co; Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro). - Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL), represented by its General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents.This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons and damage to property as a result of a vehicular accident.The facts are as follows:Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus (hereafter referred to as Bus 203) with plate number NVR-III-TB-PIL and body number 203. Bus 203 is owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the Government Service Insurance System.On February 22, 1985, at around six oclock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escorts hood was severely damaged while its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela.On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated and later tried jointly. The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: EsmscIn Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the night previous to the accident of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. There was therefore, no sleep for them, notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be totally discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were enroute home to Valenzuela from La Loma, the car encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was detached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as testified to by Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car started to run only after five oclock in the morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a party still on their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible accident. The accident happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of the driver John Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore control the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed sleep could have prompted him to overtake the preceding vehicle.Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1,2 and 3) will clearly show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the impact.The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their drivers, and its exercise of due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is committed by its employees, drivers especially, from the unrebutted testimonies of Cesar Cainglet.The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the point of the impact. From these damages as shown by the picture, it can be clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It was the car driven by John Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and correct lane.[2]Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989, dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo then appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on December 21, 1994, rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It held (1) that the trial court erred in disregarding Rommel Abrahams uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to the fault of the driver of Bus 203; (2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3) which had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the vehicles could have been changed; (3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was overtaking another vehicle when the accident happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent; and (4) that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver Armando Jose. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: JksmWHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the defendants-appellees MCL and Armando Jose are adjudged to pay jointly and severally:1. Rommel Abraham, represented by his father Felixberto Abraham:(a) P37,576.47 as actual damages;(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;(c) P15,000.00 as moral damages;(d) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and(e) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.2. The heirs of John Macarubo:(a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death;(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and(d) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.Costs against the appellees.SO ORDERED.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners MCL and Armando Jose raise four issues which boil down to the question whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort who was at fault for the collision of the two vehicles.It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the particular contention.[3] In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on photographs, identified in evidence as Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the position of the two vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their lane.[4]The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abrahams testimony which was obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[5] In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez,[6] where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail.[7] EsmIn this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abrahams self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abrahams testimony, the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203s lane. As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort.Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It was filled with passengers,[8] and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it was overtaking another vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford Escorts smashed hood was only about one or two meters from Bus 203s damaged left front. If there had been a great impact, such as would be the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have ended up far from each other.In discrediting the physical evidence, the appellate court made the following observations:We cannot believe that it was the car which overtook another vehicle and proceeded to the lane occupied by the bus. There was a traffic jam on the "bus lane" while traffic was light on the "car lane." Indeed, we find it inconceivable that the car, occupying the lane without any traffic, would overtake and traverse a heavy traffic lane.[9] (Underscoring supplied.)

This is correct. However, the fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it encroached on the opposite lane occupied by Bus 203.Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on February 21, 1985, the night before the accident, he and John Macarubo went to a friends house in La Loma where they stayed until 11 p.m.[10] Abrahams explanation as to why they did not reach Valenzuela until six oclock in the morning of the next day when the accident happened indicates that the Ford Escort careened and slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect. Abraham told the court:[11] EsmmisATTY. RESPICIO:Q: I am sorry, Your honor. After leaving Arnels place where did you go?ROMMEL ABRAHAMA: We proceeded in going home, sir.Q: You were on your way home?A: Yes, sir.Q: What time did you . . . I will reform the question. You met the accident at about 6:00 oclock the next day, 6:00 oclock in the morning the next day, did it take you long to reach BBB?A: Our car had a mechanical trouble somewhere at 2nd Avenue, sir.Q: What kind of trouble?A: The cross-joint were detached, sir.Q: Are you familiar with cars?A: A little, sir.COURT:Q: What time was that when you have this cross-joint problem?A: About 12:00 oclock perhaps, sir.Q: What happened to the cross joint?A: It was cut, maam.Q: You were able to repair that cross-joint 12:00 oclock and you were able to run and reached this place of accident at 6:00 oclock?A: No, we were not able to get spare parts, maam.Q: Why were you able to reach this place at 6:00 oclock?A: We went home and look for the spare parts in their house, maam.Q: House of Macarubo?A: Yes, maam.Q: So you were able to repair the car?A: Yes, maam.Q: What time were you able to repair the car?A: Around 5:00 oclock in the morning, sir.Q: You were able to replace the cross-joint or what?A: Ginawaan ng paraan, maam.Q: How?A: The cross-joint were welded in order to enable us to go home, maam.Q: No spare parts was replaced? MsesmA: No, maam.Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escorts rear cross-joint was cut/detached. This mechanism controls the movement of the rear tires. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a cars maneuverability, the matter should have been treated as a serious mechanical problem. In this case, when asked if they were able to repair the cross-joint, Abraham said "Ginawaan ng paraan, maam," by simply welding them just so they could reach home. His testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was hastily repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs made thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable Abraham and Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact, the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not have been overtaking another vehicle, it actually strayed into the bus lane because of the defective cross-joint, causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could have been moved because there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203s conductress, testified that, immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the injured driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital.[12] This fact is not disputed by private respondents.Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellants brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escorts lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, 3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally offered by a party.Finally, the appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Armando Jose.[13] Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not required.

The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Esmso. . . .Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.. . . .The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence of their employees. As held in Poblete v. Fabros:[14][I]t is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent superior, where the negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657; Balica vs. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 30 Phil. 768), as observed in the same cases just cited.Therefore, before the presumption of the employers negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established. While the allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employees negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employers vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising from the same incident.[15]For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in holding petitioners liable to private respondents. The next question then is whether, as the trial court held, private respondent Juanita Macarubo is liable to petitioners.Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for the quasi-delicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo. ExsmIn its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car.[16] Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo.Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubos negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge its burden, MCLs third-party complaint should be dismissed.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaints filed in Civil Cases Nos. 2206-V-85 and 24428-V-86 against Manila Central Bus Lines and Armando Jose, as well as the third-party complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 against Juanita Macarubo, are hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZONFACTS- On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman, Jr., a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises thereof, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months. Petitioner, represented by his guardian, filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC, RL Security Agency and Solomon,- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. It further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCs motion to dismiss. Petitioners MFR was denied, Hence, this appeal. ISSUES1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law, for the injury sustained by petitionerHELD1. NO- Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following:xxx xxx xxxEmployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper, acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.xxx xxx xxxLastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman, Jr. RCC was not the employer of Solomon. The employer of Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client of the latter. It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients of such agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC and Solomon, petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.- Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.- The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority: xxx xxx xxx(2) Teachers and professors;xxx xxx xxx(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;xxx xxx xxxArt. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.xxx xxx xxxArt. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student."- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc, a student of that Institute, which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case.- Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.2. YES- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.- It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.- In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC.Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. VS NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANAG.R. no. 126297January 31, 2007NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA VS JUAN FUENTESG.R. no. 127590 January 31, 2007Facts: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed the surgery and found the malignancy in her sigmoid necessitating the removal. Dr. Juan Fuentes performs hysterectomy Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. The attending nurse entered the remarks that the sponge count lacking 2. Since nowhere to be found the surgeon avail to continue closure. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain she consulted both the doctors about it but they told that it was natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil. Natividad, went to the United States after four months of consultation and laboratory examinations, she was free of cancer. Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains, her daughter found gauze protruding from her Vagina. Then after the pain intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment. Dr. Ramon Gutierez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina a foul-smelling gauze which badly infected her vaginal vault. Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage. Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case but it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States. The case was pending; Natividad died and was duly substituted by her above-named children (the Aganas). RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice, ordering the defendants PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Dr Miguel Ampil and Dr. Juan Fuentes to pay to the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, except in respect of the award for exemplary damages and the interest thereon which are the liabilities of defendants Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, Aganas filed with the RTC a motion for a partial execution of its Decision. Aganas again filed a motion for an alias writ of execution against the properties of PSI and Dr. Fuentes. RTC granted the motion and issued the corresponding writ, prompting Dr. Fuentes to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary injunction. During its pendency, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution5 granting Dr. Fuentes prayer for injunctive relief.PRC Board of Medicine rendered its Decision in Administrative Case dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes. The prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision Dr. Miguel Ampil is liable to reimburse defendant-appellant Professional Services, Inc., whatever amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-appellees. Dr. Ampil filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a ResolutionAganas maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Ampil asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him liable for negligence and malpractice.Issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability(3) Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. Held: (1) Dr. Ampil is liable for Negligence and Malpractice, an attempt to absolve himself, gears the Courts attention to other possible causes of Natividads detriment. His arguments are purely conjectural and without basis. He did not present any evidence to prove that the American doctors were the ones who put or left the gauzes in Natividads body. Neither submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the record of operation, particularly the number of gauzes used. As to the alleged negligence of Dr. Fuentes, we are mindful that Dr. Ampil examined his (Dr. Fuentes) work and found it in order. (2) The court is not convinced, that the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving Dr. Fuentes of any Liability. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had s