ryan document one
TRANSCRIPT
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No. 108184
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
GEORGE H. RYAN, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS,
REP. KURT M. GRANBERG, SEN.JAMES CLAYBORNE, SEN. DON
HARMON, REP. RICHARD T.
BRADLEY, SEN. WILLIAM BRADY,
REP. LEE DANIELS, and REP. PHILIP
COLLINS, in their official capacities,
Defendants-Appellants.
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On Appeal from the Appellate Court of
Illinois, First Judicial District
No. 1-07-1601
There on Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois, County
Department, Chancery Division
No. 06 CH 28340
The Honorable
MARTIN S. AGRAN,
Judge Presiding.
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
LISA MADIGAN
Attorney General
State of Illinois
MICHAEL A. SCODRO
Solicitor General
100 W. Randolph St., 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 814-3312
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
JAN E. HUGHES
Assistant Attorney General
100 W. Randolph St., 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 814-2129
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ARGUMENT
The Board Of Trustees Correctly Concluded That Ryan Forfeited All Of His
Pension Benefits Because His Felony Convictions Related To, Arose Out Of,
And Were Connected With His Service To The State While A Member Of
The General Assembly Retirement System.
A. Introduction
Using the well-settled principle that clear statutory language should be
given effect without reading into it limitations not intended by the legislature, the
Board of Trustees terminated all of George Ryans pension benefits pursuant to
section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code, which pertains to the General Assembly
Retirement System (the System) and states that
[n]one of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid
to any person who is convicted of any felony relating
to or arising out of or in connection with his or her
service as a member.
40 ILCS 5/2-156 (2008). This provision is clear as written: Ryan, who was a
member of the System throughout his service as a member of the General
Assembly and as Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and Governor,
committed felonies that were related to, arose out of, or were in connection with
his service as a member. Therefore, pursuant to section 2-156, Ryan is entitled to
none of the pension benefits that he earned in any of the offices he held as a
System member.
Ryans argument focuses on section 2-105 of the Code, which defines
member as [m]embers of the General Assembly of this State including persons
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who enter the military service while a member of the General Assembly and any
person serving as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer,
Comptroller, or Attorney General for the period of service in such office. 40
ILCS 5/2-105 (2008). Based only on conjecture, Ryan claims the phrase for the
period of service in such office is an express limitation that narrows the scope
of the term Member to the period of service in a specific office. Appellee Brief
at 14. But the meaning of a statute cannot be based on supposition. See Petersen
v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 447 (2002) (a court cannot ignore plain language of
statute based on conjecture). After all, the purpose of rules of construction is to
arrive at a reasonable meaning of a statute consistent with the intent of the
legislature. Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 514 (2007). Conjecture does not
substitute for reasoned analysis.
The phrase on which Ryans entire argument rests does not in any way limit
the felony forfeiture provision to the office or offices he held when he committed
his crimes; on the contrary, it simply defines eligibility in the System based on the
length of the term of the particular elected office. Considering the language of the
phrase, its history, and its relationship to other provisions in the Code, it is clear,
based on established tools of statutory construction and without resort to
guesswork, that the phrase simply refers to a members eligibility and not to a
limitation on the felony forfeiture provision. As such, this Court is asked to reject
Ryans arguments and reverse the appellate courts decision.
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B. The phrase for the period of service in such office in the definition of
member refers to a members eligibility in the System and does not
limit the felony forfeiture provision.
Ryan was a member of the System when he committed his felonies, and, in
accordance with the plain language of the felony forfeiture provision, he must
forfeit all of his pension benefits, regardless of which specific office he held when
they accumulated. While it is true that a statute should be read as a whole to
determine legislative intent (Lacey v. Village of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 361
(2009)), the phrase for the period of service in such office in the definition of
member does not in any way limit the application of the felony forfeiture
provision to only those offices in which Ryan served when he committed his
crimes. Ryans approach would require this Court to read into the felony forfeiture
provision limitations that the legislature did not intend. See Sangamon County
Sheriffs Dept v. Ill. Human Rights Commn, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 138 (2009) (where
language is clear, court should not read into it limitations legislature did not
express); People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504, 516 (2009) (court does not depart
from statutes plain language by reading into it conditions that conflict with
expressed intent).
1. The plain language of the phrase for the period of service in
such office supports a finding that the phrase describes
eligibility in the System.
The phrase for the period of service in such office is a term of System
eligibility and not a limitation on the felony forfeiture provision. The legislature
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made clear by including the phrase in the definition of member that an
officeholder is eligible for membership only during the period of his or her elected
office. To illustrate, an individual who is a member of the General Assembly for
one term and some years later is elected Comptroller is eligible for membership in
the System during his or her terms in office, not during the intervening years.
Thus, section 2-105 simply provides that a person is a member of the System for
the period of service in office.
The Boards interpretation of the phrase for the period of service in such
office is further supported by the Codes definition of service. Section 2-
110(A) provides that [s]ervice means the period beginning on the day when a
person first became a member, and ending on the date under consideration,
excluding all intervening periods of nonmembership following resignation or
expiration of any term of office. 40 ILCS 5/2-110(A) (2008). This is consistent
with the meaning of the phrase in section 2-105 describing the period during which
an officeholder is eligible for membership in the System.
Ryan criticizes the Boards reliance on the definition of service, claiming
that the last two words in the phrase for the period of service in such office, and
not the word service is the operative language. Appellee Brief at 22-24. But
this position is contradicted by Ryans own arguments. For example, he contends
that: member is expressly limited in scope to the period of service in each
constitutional office (id. at 1); member is restricted to the period of service in
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such office (id. at 13); the phrase for the period of service in such office is an
express limitation (id. at 14); and the period of service in a specific office -
results in a significantly narrower forfeiture provision (id. at 18). Contrary to
Ryans assertion, these other statements show that he, like the Board, believes that
the meaning of the term service in the definition of member is relevant to the
interpretation of the statute. Ryans internally inconsistent argument regarding the
significance of the term service does nothing to rebut the Boards plain reading
of the statute the definition of service supports the conclusion that the phrase
for the period of service merely limits an elected officials eligibility for
membership in the System and nothing more.
Under Ryans theory, the phrase somehow treats the offices listed in section
2-105 as separate entities, meaning that the forfeiture applies only to those benefits
earned in the office or offices directly related to the felony conviction. Appellee
Brief at 14-15. But he reads too much into this simple phrase, which says nothing
about treating the various offices separately for purposes of the felony forfeiture
provision, and such a purpose cannot be implied.
More significantly, if the legislature intended to create separate entities for
purposes of the felony forfeiture provision, it knew how to do so, for that is
precisely what it did in the portion of the Code relating to the Illinois Municipal
Retirement Fund (IMRF). See Taddeo v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ill. Mun. Ret.
Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 598-600 (2005) (plaintiff allowed to keep pension from
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Proviso Township because he committed felonies as mayor of Melrose Park and
these were two separate participating municipalities under IMRF). In the IMRF
portion of the Code, the legislature mandated that each participating municipality
and its instrumentalities, and each participating instrumentality, shall be treated as
an independent unit within the fund[.] 40 ILCS 5/7-204 (2008). In contrast, the
System was created as one entity for the benefit of members of the General
Assembly and statewide elected officials, where its funds and property shall be a
trust separate from all other entities. 40 ILCS 5/2-101 (2008).
Unlike the IMRF, where the separate participating municipalities each make
contributions to the retirement fund on behalf of their participating employees
based on a separate municipality contribution rate (40 ILCS 5/7-172, 7-211(a)
(2008)), the State is obligated to make contributions and pay all administrative and
operational expenses for every member of the System (40 ILCS 5/2-125, 2-126.1
(2008)). Furthermore, under the IMRF, the separate liabilities and reserves of each
participating municipality or instrumentality are segregated (40 ILCS 5/7-203
(2008)), whereas the assets of the System shall be invested as one fund, and no
particular person, group of persons or entity shall have any right in any specific
security or property, or in any item of cash, other than an undivided interest in the
whole (40 ILCS 5/2-153 (2008)).
These examples of critical differences between the portions of the Code
governing the IMRF and the System show that when the legislature intends to
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create membership divisions for purposes of felony forfeiture, it knows how to do
so unambiguously. There is no language in the portion of the Code relating to the
System that can be read either explicitly or implicitly as the legislatures intent to
treat Ryans pension as divisible for purposes of the felony forfeiture provision.
The offices that comprise the System are treated as one undivided entity, and all of
the members of the System serve the citizens of the State, unlike the employees
covered by the IMRF who serve the various separate municipalities that employ
them. In contrast to the elaborate and explicit means by which the legislature
created separate divisions for purposes of the IMRF felony forfeiture provision,
the legislature surely did not intend to create the same sort of divisions for the
System when it added the phrase for the period of service in such office to the
definition of member.
2. The history of the phrase for the period of service in such
office shows that it is a term of eligibility and not of limitation
on the felony forfeiture provision.
Ryan suggests that the intent of the legislature to limit the felony forfeiture
provision by adding the phrase for the period of service in such office is evident
from the progression of the amendment that transferred the constitutional
officers from the State Employees Retirement System (SERS) to the System.
Appellee Brief at 16-17. Had Ryan considered the entire history of the definition
of member and not just a selected portion, he would have seen that the phrase
refers only to eligibility and has no bearing on the felony forfeiture provision.
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When the Pension Code was enacted in March 1963 (1963 Ill. Laws 161-
732), member was defined as [m]embers and presiding officers of the General
Assembly of this State, including persons who enter military service while a
member of the General Assembly. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 108 1/2, para. 2-105.
At that point, the constitutional officers were members of SERS. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1963, ch. 108 1/2, para. 14-143.
In 1969, the Systems definition of member was amended to add a
statement of eligibility:
Members and presiding officers of the General
Assembly of this State, including persons who enter
military service while a member of the General
Assembly provided that the President of the Senate in
office on the effective date of this amendatory Act, and
a member of the system,shall be eligible as a member
only until the expiration of his term of office.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 108 1/2, para. 2-105 (1969 Ill. Laws 1514, 1514; Public
Act 76-741) (emphasis added).
When the statewide elected officers were moved from SERS to the System
in 1975, a second paragraph was added to the foregoing definition of member in
section 2-105:
Any person elected by vote of the people of the whole
State to the Office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller, or Attorney
General for the period of his service in such office.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108 1/2, para. 2-105 (1975 Ill. Laws 2882, 2883; Public
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Act 79-959). Because the first paragraph of section 2-105 made clear that
membership would not continue beyond the expiration of a term of office, it is
reasonable to read the phrase for the period of service in such office in the
second paragraph as ensuring that the constitutional officers eligibility for
membership similarly would be tied to the term of office for which they were
elected.
In 1985, the definition of member was amended to read as it does today:
Members of the General Assembly of this State
including persons who enter military service while a
member of the General Assembly and any person
elected to the Office of Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller,
or Attorney General for the period of his service in
such office.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108 1/2, para. 2-105 (1984 Ill. Laws 3114, 3116; Public
Act 83-1440).
The history supports the view that the phrase on which Ryans argument is
based describes when a state legislator or any of the statewide elected officers are
eligible for membership, but does not constitute any sort of limitation on the
Systems felony forfeiture provision.
On a related note regarding the history of the amendment that transferred
the statewide elected officials from SERS to the System, the Board noted in its
opening brief (pp. 29-31) that during legislative debates reasons were given for
transferring the constitutional officers from SERS to the System, yet there was no
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mention that the transfer was done for the purposes of limiting the felony forfeiture
provision. The conclusion drawn from the debates is that the transfer occurred to
upgrade the constitutional officers pension and not to give them increased
protections under the felony forfeiture provision, as Ryan had claimed.
In response, Ryan states merely that the lack of discussion about the felony
forfeiture provision is inconsequential. Appellee Brief at 16-17. At the same time,
he continues to believe, albeit erroneously, that the purpose of the transfer of the
constitutional officers to the System was to give them a narrower felony forfeiture
provision. Id. at 15. But if, in fact, they were given more protection than they had
under the SERS statute, surely such a significant change would have been
mentioned during the legislative debates, but it was not.
C. Relevant case law supports the Boards decision.
In terminating Ryans pension, the Board analyzed Taddeo, Wells v. Bd. of
Trustees of the Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 361 Ill. App. 3d 716 (2nd Dist. 2005), appeal
denied, 217 Ill. 2d 627 (2006), and Grever v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ill. Mun. Ret.
Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 263 (2nd Dist. 2004), appeal denied, 217 Ill. 2d 561 (2005)
(see S.R. C. 225-31). The Board explained in its brief (pp. 16-20) that its decision
was in harmony with all three cases. In response (Appellee Brief at 17-20, 24-27),
Ryan claims that the Boards reliance on decisions involving the IMRF exposes
the fundamental flaw in the Boards argument (id. at 17). Given that he believes
that Taddeo provides the clearest guidance (id. at 24), that his situation is
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analogous to Grever (id. at 25), and that these decisions are informative (id. at
24), his argument that the Boards reliance on the decisions was somehow error is
hardly convincing.
In any event, the Boards decision was consistent with Taddeo or Grever.
Both cases involved the IMRF portion of the Code, which, as previously shown,
treats each participating municipality as an independent unit within the fund. In
Taddeo, this Court found that the plaintiffs felony related to his position as
Melrose Park mayor, but not to his Proviso Township supervisor position, and
determined that he forfeited only that portion of his pension that he earned from
Melrose Park. 216 Ill. 2d at 598-60. The Grever court concluded that a felony
conviction connected to the plaintiffs service as an Ela Township supervisor
resulted in the forfeiture of benefits earned only from that employment relationship
and not from his service with other municipalities participating in the IMRF. 353
Ill. App. 3d at 267.
Although Wells also involved the IMRF, unlike Taddeo and Grever, the
employee had worked for only one municipality the Village of Antioch and
held various positions during his employment with the Village. 361 Ill. App. 3d at
718. The court determined that he should forfeit his entire pension because the
IMRF portion of the Code d id not limit application of the felony forfeiture
provision to particular positions held in the course of an individuals service as an
employee for a single employer. Id. at 722.
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The facts of this case are similar to those in Wells, which involved the
employees service in various positions with one municipality. Ryan served one
entity, the State of Illinois, in various elected positions. As the Board correctly
concluded in accordance with Wells, the key factor rests on the singularness of
the employer (S.R. C. 290).
In all of these cases, forfeiture is tied to the identity of the entity for which
the public service was performed and to which the felonies were related: Taddeo
forfeited his benefits because the felony related only to his service to Melrose
Park; Grever lost his pension because his crimes were committed during his
service to Ela Township; Wells forfeited all of his benefits because his felony
conviction related to his employment with only one entity, the Village of Antioch;
and Ryan lost all of his benefits because his crimes were connected with his
membership in the System and his service to only one entity, the State of Illinois.
Under the reasoning of Taddeo and Grever, pension benefits are not
forfeited to the extent they are earned in the service of a governmental employer
different from the one to which the officers felony convictions relate. The
Taddeo and Grever decisions also rested on the explicit provisions in the IMRF
statute that treat municipalities as independent employers within the pension fund.
See 40 ILCS 5/7-203, 7-204 (2008). The Boards decision is consistent with these
cases because Ryan belonged to one retirement system in service to the State of
Illinois the sole employer participating in the System. Nothing in the portion of
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the Code governing the System either implicitly or explicitly treats the various
elected offices as separate entities for the purpose of pension credits or payments
or for forfeiture of benefits upon a service-related felony conviction.
Ryan claims that his situation cannot be compared to the cases involving the
IMRF because its felony forfeiture provision provides for the loss of benefits upon
any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with [the persons] service
as an employee (40 ILCS 5/7-219 (2008)), whereas the Systems forfeiture
provision uses the term member rather than employee. Appellee Brief at 17-
21. Again, his argument rests on the erroneous premise that the language in the
phrase for the period of service in such office in the definition of member limits
the felony forfeiture provision to the specific offices held. But, as has been shown,
the premise is unwarranted, and his argument fails. And as the Board explained in
its opening brief (pp. 35), it is irrelevant that the felony forfeiture provisions in the
various portions of the Code use different terms to best describe their members and
participants. See, e.g., 40 ILCS 5/16-199 (2008) (Teachers Retirement System
applies to service as a teacher); 40 ILCS 5/18-163 (2008) (Judges Retirement
System applies to service as a judge).
Also in the opening brief (pp. 22-23), the Board cited Shiomos v. State
Employees Ret. Bd. for the proposition that pension benefits that have
accumulated in one pension fund are subject to forfeiture by and through the
renewed agreement which is formed each time a person chooses to become a
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public official as defined by the pension statute. 626 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa. 1993).
Ryan claims that Shiomos is distinguishable because that statute, which mandates
the forfeiture of pension benefits if the public official is convicted of any crime
related to the public office or public employment, does not limit the forfeiture to
the period of service in a specific office.
Again, however, because the premise of Ryans argument is erroneous
regarding the meaning of for the period of service in such office, his attempt to
distinguish Shiomos fails. The Board recognized that the forfeiture provisions at
issue here and in Shiomos are not identical (see Opening Brief at p. 22, n.4 for the
wording of the Pennsylvania forfeiture provision), but both cases involve one
pension fund and individuals who continued to accumulate pension benefits
through service in various public offices. As such, it is relevant that the Shiomos
court concluded that it is not unconscionable or unreasonable to provide that at
every new term of employment a public official or employee renews and amends
his or her pension contract to include the new public service and to place at risk
that which may have already been earned. Such is the nature of the public
employment agreement. 626 A.2d at 163.
D. A Nexus Exists Between Ryans Crimes And His Service As A Member.
This Court in Devoney v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemens Annuity & Benefit
Fund for the City of Chicago, held that when applying a felony forfeiture
provision, the pivotal inquiry is whether a nexus exists between the employees
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criminal wrongdoing and the performance of his official duties. 199 Ill. 2d 414,
419 (2002). That forfeiture provision stated then, as it does today, that a
policeman is disqualified from receiving benefits if the felony is one relating to or
arising out of or in connection with his service as a policeman. See 40 ILCS 5/5-
227 (2008). The Devoney court concluded that [u]nder the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute, what triggers disqualification is the existence
of a connection between the actual felony conviction and the officers service as a
policeman. 199 Ill. 2d at 419.
Consistent with the Devoney holding, the Board correctly recognized that
[b]y using the phrase [n]one of the benefits in
conjunction with the phrase any felony relating to or
arising out of or in connection with his or her service
as a member[,] the plain language of Section 2-156
mandates the forfeiture of all [r]etirement [a]nnuity
provided for by the System where a nexus exists
between the felony conviction and the participants
official duties, regardless of whether the participant
held distinct offices or positions with the State.
(S.R. C. 287). Having found the necessary nexus, the Board terminated all of
Ryans benefits.
Ryan argues that the Boards decision ignores the nexus requirement
because his convictions related only to his service as Secretary of State and
Governor. Appellee Brief at 24-27. But this position is contrary to the plain
language of the felony forfeiture provision, which requires a nexus between the
crimes and the officials status as a member of the System. 40 ILCS 5/2-156
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(2008). Under the statute, all members are in service to the State, the contributions
are not segregated by the various offices held, the funding obligation rests on the
State and not on the individual offices, and divisions are not made between the
offices for purposes of loss of pension benefits due to a felony conviction. Where
there is a nexus between the felony conviction and any of the offices held by a
member of the System, none of the benefits . . . shall be paid[.] Id.
In support of his argument, Ryan relies on Taddeo and Grever and states
that his pension is derived from service in separate offices. Appellee Brief at 25.
On the contrary, his pension is derived from his service as a member of the
System. As stated previously, the IMRF portion of the Code creates clear
divisions among the participating municipal employers, but the System contains no
similar divisions, and Ryan owed a duty of conscientious service to all of the
citizens of the State. When he violated the public trust, all of his benefits were
tainted, the required nexus was established, and the forfeiture of all of his benefits
resulted in accordance with the plain language of the Code.
E. Because The Legislature Mandated That None of the Benefits Shall be
Paid, A Partial Forfeiture Cannot Satisfy The Felony Forfeiture
Provision.
Although Ryan is correct (Appellee Brief at 17) that pension statutes are
liberally construed in favor of the annuitant (see, e.g., Shields v. Judges Ret. Sys.,
204 Ill. 2d 488, 494 (2003)), he fails to acknowledge that this canon of
construction has its bounds (Mattis v. State Univ. Ret. Sys., 212 Ill. 2d 58, 76
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(2004)). While a pension statute should be liberally construed, if the intention of
the legislature is obvious from the language used, that intention must be made
effective, and the judiciary will not be warranted in giving the act a meaning not
expressed in it. Robbins v. Bd. of Trustees of the Carbondale Police Pension
Fund, 177 Ill. 2d 533, 545 (1997). Because section 2-156 of the Code requires a
total forfeiture of all pension benefits, Ryans contention that a partial forfeiture
satisfies the statute must be rejected.
Ryan argues that a partial forfeiture of his benefits representing those that
accrued during his service as Secretary of State and Governor strikes a proper
balance between the purpose of the felony forfeiture provision and the principle
that forfeitures are not favored. Appellee Brief at 27-30. And he claims that
forfeiture of the benefits that accrued when he was in the General Assembly and
Lieutenant Governor would constitute a substantial injustice. Id.
Putting aside that Ryans proposed partial forfeiture would defy the
statutes plain language and, even assuming for the sake of argument that a partial
forfeiture still might deter others (albeit less effectively), deterrence is not the only
purpose of the forfeiture provision. The provision is intended to protect the
publics right to conscientious service from government officials (Kerner, 72 Ill.
2d at 513), but it also protects public funds and preserves respect for government
service (see MacLean v. State Bd. of Ret., 733 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (Mass. 2000)).
Public monies were used to satisfy the States obligation to make
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contributions to the System to help fund members pensions. See 40 ILCS 5/2-124
(2008) (State appropriates funds to contribute to the System); 40 ILCS 5/2-125
(2008) (State has obligation to make required contributions)). Because Ryans
crimes constituted a fundamental breach of the public trust held by all of the
citizens of Illinois, a total forfeiture of Ryans benefits ensures both that no public
monies are used to fund his pension and that the purpose of the forfeiture provision
is accomplished.
A public official has an obligation to serve the public trust honorably and in
good faith. People v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191, 210 (1980). Section 2-156 was in effect
when Ryan became a member of the System in 1972 and throughout the remainder
of his public service and, thus, he knew each time he was elected and continued his
membership in the System that he would forfeit his pension if he were convicted of
a felony related to his service as a member. There surely is no unfairness in
applying that long-standing provision to him now where he failed to comply with
the condition that he perform his duties honorably at all times.
Ryan argues that the General Assembly is satisfied that a partial forfeiture
strikes a proper balance because it declined to enact legislation that would have
overruled Taddeo and Grever. Appellee Brief at 29-30. He refers to House Bill
159 (see Appellee App. at A50-A54), which was introduced in December of 2006
and would have moved all of the felony forfeiture provisions to a single provision
in Article 1 of the Pension Code. According to the Bill, a person who is
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convicted of a felony relating to, arising out of, or in connection with his or her
service as a participating member of any retirement system or pension fund may
not receive any benefits provided in the Code, including any benefit for service not
related to the felony conviction. Id. at A51. The Bill did not have a third reading
and on May 25, 2007, was [r]e-referred to Rules Committee[.] Id. at A54. No
further action was taken on the Bill. Id.
Ryan errs in attaching any significance to the facts that the Bill did not have
a third reading and a vote was not called. Even if the principle of legislative
acquiescence applies, based on the obvious differences between the sections of the
Code relating to the IMRF and the System, any acquiescence in the Taddeo and
Grever results would be irrelevant to the outcome in this case. In any event, a
presumption of legislative acquiescence is merely a jurisprudence principle and not
a rule of law. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 331 (2007).
The felony forfeiture provision clearly requires that Ryan receive none of
his pension benefits. Allowing him to keep a portion of his pension is not only
contrary to the plain language of the provision, but it destroys its purpose, which is
to protect the public by ensuring that the members of the System will honorably
perform the duties of the offices for which they were elected. A forfeiture of all of
Ryans benefits promotes the policies underlying the felony provision and makes
certain that the citizens of Illinois, whose trust Ryan betrayed, are not required to
pay for his retirement.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons and those in the opening brief, the Defendants-
Appellants, the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System and
the individual Members of the Board, respectfully request that this Honorable
Court reverse the appellate courts decision and affirm the Boards decision
terminating all of Ryans pension benefits based on his felony convictions.
Respectfully submitted,
LISA MADIGAN
Attorney General
State of Illinois
MICHAEL A. SCODRO
Solicitor General
100 W. Randolph Street, 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 814-3312
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
JAN E. HUGHES
Assistant Attorney General
100 W. Randolph St., 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 814-2129
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this reply brief conforms to the requirements of Rule 341(a)
and (b). The length of this reply brief, excluding the pages containing the Rule
341(d) cover, the Rule 341(h)(1) statement of points and authorities, the Rule
341(c) certificate of compliance, the certificate of service, and those matters to be
appended to the brief under Rule 342(a), is 20 pages.
JAN E. HUGHES
Assistant Attorney General
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STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) SS.
COUNTY OF COOK )
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that
three copies of the Reply Brief of the Defendants-Appellants were served upon the
below-named party by depositing such copies in the United States mail at 100
West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, in an envelope bearing sufficient first
class postage on September 3, 2009, before 5:00 p.m.
Kyle P. De Jong
Winston & Strawn LLP
35 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60601
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me
this 3rd day of September, 2009.
NOTARY PUBLIC
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No. 108184
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
GEORGE H. RYAN, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS, REP. KURT M.
GRANBERG, SEN. JAMES
CLAYBORNE, SEN. DON HARMON,
REP. RICHARD T. BRADLEY, SEN.
WILLIAM BRADY, REP. LEE DANIELS,
and REP. PHILIP COLLINS, in their official
capacities,
Defendants-Appellants.
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On Appeal from the Appellate Court ofIllinois, First Judicial District
No. 1-07-1601
There on Appeal from the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, County Department,
Chancery Division
No. 06 CH 28340
The Honorable
MARTIN S. AGRAN,
Judge Presiding.
NOTICE OF FILING BY MAIL
TO: Kyle P. De Jong
Winston & Strawn LLP35 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60601
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that I filed the original and twenty copies of the Reply Brief of
the Defendants-Appellants with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 200 E.
Capitol Ave., Springfield, Illinois, 62701, by depositing the same in the U.S. mail at 100 West
Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, with proper postage prepaid, before 5:00 p.m. on September
3, 2009. Three copies of that Reply Brief are hereby served upon you.
LISA MADIGAN
Attorney GeneralState of Illinois
By:
JAN E. HUGHES
Assistant Attorney General
100 W. Randolph St., 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 814 2129