russian voices from a danish company

Russian Voices from a DanishCompanySnejina Michailova and Alla Anisimova

This article starts by discussing inclusionand exclusion as key characteristerics oflocal middle managers and specialistsworking in a foreign-owned company. Itthen analyzes the way thesecharacteristics distinguish two groups ofRussians working for a Danish companyin Russia – the “insiders” and “outsiders”– including how they interpret and reactto foreign managers’ decision-making andplanning. The Russians’ ideas andpractice of decision-making and planningwere very different from those adopted bythe Danes. The article concludes bysuggesting guidelines on how to reducecross-cultural conflicts.

Managing across cultures is a major challenge forwestern businesses in Russia, perhaps more than mostcountries. Even in organizations established bywesterners, the influence of 74 years of socialistexperience on the local culture is usually a seriousobstacle to effective communication and co-ordinationwithin the organization. This article analyzes thechallenges from the perspective of Russian middlemanagers and specialists with the aim of improving

Case Study

western managers’ understanding of the nature ofcross-cultural conflicts. Based on a case of a Danishcompany investing in Russia, we address twoquestions:

● How do Russians perceive themselves and theforeign organization they work in and how doesthat influence their behavior?

● What are the main issues in the Danish approachtowards managing that Russians perceive asparticularly different from their own and howdoes this affect the interaction between Russiansand Danes?

The article focuses on two issues that have not sofar been thoroughly explored either in mainstreaminternational human resources research or inintercultural and cross-cultural management research.First, whereas published research focuses either on theexpatriates’ perspective (Fontaine 1989, Bartlett andGhoshal 1991, Brewster 1991) or on the interactionbetween the host and foreign cultures (Kitching 1976,Hunt et al 1987, Buono and Bowditch 1989, Mirvisand Marks 1992, Markoczy 1993), this article lookspredominantly at topics related to local workers inforeign-owned organizations: by taking as a point ofdeparture the locals’ perspectives, understandings andinterpretations. Second, whereas research whichfocuses on host cultures and local workers usuallyconcentrates on local top managers or the mostinfluential executives, this article discusses perceptionsand behaviors adopted by local middle managers andspecialists in foreign-owned companies. (“Specialist”

© London Business School

Business Strategy Review, 1999, Volume 10 Issue 4, pp 65-78

Business Strategy Review

is a term arising from the Russian classification ofprofessions and refers to a person with a highereducation and with a specialization in a particular areaof work.)

The key word is “perception”. Perceptions are ofkey relevance because:

● they relate to the cognitive process of selecting,organizing and interpreting the multitude of stimulithat are perceived;

● they constitute the basis for people’s behavior.

The way individuals interpret messages, viewthings and provide meaning is disparate. Theindividual’s perceptual world is their personal image,map or picture of their social, physical andorganizational environment (Buchanan and Huczynski1997, 55). Personal characteristics and psychologicalfactors have a strong impact on individual perceptions.At the same time, perceptions are influenced bysociocultural factors (Bowditch and Buono 1997) andby the culture of the group(s) they belong to definedas a set of shared meanings and values developedthrough social actions and/or socialization practices(Nicholson 1998, Jermier et al 1991, Trice and Beyer

1993). Consequently, individuals react differently tothe same stimuli and in the same situations. The notionof perception helps to explain these reactions. Itsessence in process terms is the selection of stimuli andtheir organization into meaningful patterns. Theperceived reality, not reality itself, is the basis of theiractions and behavior. “The world as it is perceived isthe world that is behaviorally important” (Robbins1998, 90). People’s behavior as a function of theirperceived world, as opposed to their objective world,is especially significant in a cross-culturalorganizational setting. Developing cohesive patterns,impressions and images of other people through theprocesses of categorization and stereotyping is mainlybased on perceptions.

The Company and the StudyThis case study concerns Dancom (not its real name),a large Danish company which is a world leader insome of its areas of business. The organizationencompasses significant cultural divergences in its day-to-day interactions since it has subsidiaries in morethan a hundred countries and employs more than20,000 people worldwide. Dancom started itsactivities in Russia as a Sales Office in 1993. Currently

The AuthorsOur experience affects the way we generate andanalyze data. Boyacigiller and Adler (1991) pointout that one of the researchers’ responsibilities isto specify clearly the cultural limitations of theirwork. We therefore outline our own backgroundin terms of empirical experiences and theoreticalorientation.

We are both female researchers in our early 30s.We were both born and grew up in a socialist regimecharacterized by a specific “block culture”(Sztompka 1993). This allows us to have an insiderunderstanding of the Russian context and theRussian respondents’ perspective. Our experiencesof living abroad for the last seven years increasedour cultural sensitivity in different ways. One ofus is a Bulgarian who has been studying andworking in Denmark for the last five years. Theother is a Russian who has spent four years inPoland and one year in the Czech Republic. Thelanguages we can speak influence our research,including ourselves, the researched field, and theways in which we collect data and address issues

(Usinier 1998). For us, language is not merely atechnical issue, it shapes both our individual viewsand the ideas we share with those who speak thelanguages we speak.

We are conscious of the increasing importanceof indigenous management theories, ie theoriesbased on local socio-cultural factors andconditions (Kanungo and Jaeger 1990). However,we mainly work within the western stream oforganizational and management research, whichwe use as a point of reference in this paper aswell. This allows us to communicate ourunderstanding of the Russian perspective to thewestern audience.

We believe we are able to move from our innerworlds into the world we study by using ourselvesrather than being stuck and limited in ourselves. Atthe same time, we are aware of the fact that we areselectively perceptive. The interpretations wedevelop are embedded in our own experiences,“mindsets” (Fischer 1988) and “intellectual styles”(Galtung 1981).

66 Snejina Michailova and Alla Anisimova

Winter 1999

it is represented by a sales office, a production unitand two branch offices in four different Russian cities.

The research for this paper is a part of a largerstudy of Dancom’s organizational culture, which tookplace in 1998 (references to Dancom henceforth referto Dancom’s operation in Russia). Data were collectedin the sales office and the production unit in one of thecompany’s Russian locations, which employs around ahundred people. The 20 participants in this study wereselected out of 102 for the way that they representdifferent national backgrounds (Danes and Russians),and different age, gender, and department affiliations.They also had to personify different hierarchicalpositions and to have had different length ofemployment and experience of promotion in Dancom.

Among the 20 participants, ten are managers (threetop managers and seven middle managers) and tenare specialists in IT, marketing, technical support,sales, engineering, logistics, administration, finance orproduction (see Appendix for full methodologicaldetails). Thirteen of the respondents are male andseven female. Nine participants were under 30, andfive participants were over 40. Five respondents hadworked for Dancom for under one year, and anotherfive for five years.

Three of the managers are Danes – the generalmanager, the marketing director, and the technicalsupport director. The fourth Dane in the company isthe finance specialist. All middle managers, two topmanagers and all but one of the specialists are Russian.

Besides its sales activities, Dancom also has aproduction unit. It had been involved in Russia forfive years – an important criterion for us in selectingthe Danish company for our research. One or twoyears would not really have been long enough fororganizational participants to have developed strongimpressions and perceptions of the organization andtheir foreign colleagues. On the other hand, 10-15years might have made organizational participantsaccustomed to many of the issues that they found“strange”, “alien” or “just very different” in thebeginning. A third criterion in the selection was thepresence of Danes in the Russian company. Had theDanes been involved on a more marginal or distantbasis in Dancom’s everyday life, our respondents, andconsequently we as researchers, would not have beenable to crystallize the phenomena and processes thatare the subject of this study.

The fact that it is a single case limits therepresentativeness of our study although qualitativesampling improves the quality of data and relegates

representativeness to secondary importance(Gummesson 1991). We conduct “analyticgeneralizations”, not “statistical” ones (Yin 1994) –in epistemological terms we opt for “logical inference”rather than for “statistical inference” (Smith 1991).It is important for us to understand the phenomenathemselves – how do Russians perceive themselves andthe foreign-owned company they work for and whatdo they interpret as very different in the Danish andRussian way of managing.

However, the research questions we ask in thisarticle highlight problems common to many foreign-owned companies in Russia (and have relevance forforeign direct investors in many other countries). Datawhich we are in the process of generating andanalyzing in the framework of the action researchproject SODIAC (Sculpturing OrganizationalDynamics in a Context: Lessons from and for DanishCompanies Operating on the Russian Market) stronglysuggest that other foreign-owned companies in Russiaare dealing with the same or very similar problemsand concerns.

Characteristics of “Insiders” and “Outsiders”Inclusion, as defined by Russians working at Dancom,refers mainly to the individual’s perception ofbelonging to the organization and the ability tocommunicate and share information with people atdifferent levels of the company. The degree of inclusionvaries. The collected data suggest that Dancom’smiddle managers and specialists form two maingroups, which we call “hosting insiders” and “hostingoutsiders”. The term “hosting” refers to the fact thatboth groups consist of locals. The division betweenbeing inside and outside the organization is suggestedby the respondents: they all are members of theorganization, however some of them feel like outsiders– as though they are not really being included in thecompany’s life. These two groups are characterizedby a number of specific features (table 1).

The Hosting InsidersHosting insiders find the general atmosphere in theorganization friendly. They are satisfied with andproud of working for Dancom, identify themselvesclosely with the organization, refer to it as “theircompany”, and use metaphors such as “community”,“friendly village”, and “Dancom nation” whendescribing the company. Most of them refer to theinternal climate as peaceful, calm, and friendly. Theyperceive the organization’s successes and failures as

Russian Voices from a Danish Company 67


Table 1

Main characteristics of hosting insiders and hosting outsiders

Hosting insiders Hosting outsiders

Perceive the atmosphere in the company as friendly Perceive the atmosphere in the company as peacefulbut indifferent

Identify themselves strongly with the organization Do not identify themselves strongly with theorganization

Are dissatisfied and even upset with formalization of Respect formalization of communication andcommunication and procedures and lack of informal procedures and accept and even appreciate the lackrelations with superiors of informal relations with superiors

Have close relations with foreign colleagues Have no close relations with foreign colleagues

Do not make a clear distinction between Russians Distinguish strongly between Russians and Danesand Danes in Dancom in Dancom

Distinguish clearly between local Danes and Danes Do not distinguish strongly between Danes in thein headquarters local office and in headquarters

Are self-motivated and work long hours Are motivated by money and do not work longer thanthe official office hours

Have relations with each other apart from work Do not have relations with other members apart fromwork

Stay longer and feel very comfortable at company�s Leave company�s internal social events earlierinternal social evens

Characterize the communication with headquarters in Denmark as formal, inefficient and slow. Tend to interpretthat as lack of respect towards Russians.

their personal successes and failures, and some referto Dancom as the most important part of their lives.

As two of the Russian middle managers express it:“I actually don’t have any life beyond the workat Dancom.”“I could not even dream of working forDancom, it is such a famous name, a leader inthe field.”Hosting insiders are dissatisfied and even upset

with formalization of the communication flow andprocedures in the company. They appreciate highlyinformal relations with their superiors and feel thatthis increases the level of unity within Dancom ingeneral and their efficiency in particular:

“I could enter my Danish superior’s office anytime and discuss a problem directly. I did nothave to write official requests or other papersto solve the problem.” (Sales manager)One of the Russian sales engineers describes the

early days in the company like this:“There was a time at the very beginning whenwe worked in the apartment of my Danish boss,

there was no office space yet. It was the besttime, we were all so close to each other!”These two quotations confirm previous findings

that close relationships and friendship are highlyvalued in the Russian context (Dabars and Vokhmina1995, Holden et al 1998, Ledeneva 1998; note thatthe Russian language has many different words for“friend”). As they also indicate, Russians do not havegreat respect for other people’s private space. Theirtendency to be rather intrusive can be associated,among other factors, with the living conditions in mir(the communal villages) and in overcrowdedcommunal apartments (Kets de Vries 1998, 18). Themir mentality largely explains the Russian employees’respect for solidarity and loyalty to one another.Russians subordinate their individual interests andpriorities to those of the group. Their need foraffiliation and belonging is strong and confrontationwithin the group is treated as a disaster. Obolonsky(1995, 18) has elaborated on this issue in moredefinitive terms by talking about the “anti-personalattitude” at the cost of the group life. He summarizes


Winter 1999

its essence as “to reject even a relative independenceof the person”. This aggressive anti-individualism hasat least two basic features: a leveling psychology(pseudo egalitarianism) and a compulsive pseudo-collectivism. They are based on a “dramatically anti-personal stereotype of ‘all as one’, implying situationswhere, irrespective of the will of the individual, he isinvolved in a sectarian joint activity where his personalopinion means practically nothing. The person issacrificed, victimized in a vulgarized idea of unity andconformism.”

The data also suggest that informal relations withsuperiors are closely associated in Russian minds withorganizational validation and recognition and seemto be important for Russian employees’ self-esteemand perception of their role in the organization. Closeand informal relations with superiors are often seenby Russians as additional reward from organization:

“If my boss likes me, if I feel that he respectsme, that he is interested in my opinion – then Iwill work better… I mean, I feel satisfactionand pride. It is maybe no less important thanthe money.” (Sales manager)The hosting insiders’ reflections can also be

interpreted in the light of the fact that the Russianworking climate in general is relationship-oriented(Holden et al 1998, Zaytseva 1998, Ledeneva 1998)and that the relationship orientation is still the keymethod among Russian managers. A plausibleconsideration for this finding could be attributed tothe fact that formalization is associated with anincreasing number of rules, regulations, andprocedures and that Russian employees are known aspeople who fight procedures (Zaytseva 1998, 4).

Closer links with foreign colleagues result in thefact that hosting insiders have less tendency thanoutsiders to explain their colleagues’ behavioralstandards by reference to their nationality. They claimthat they do not distinguish between the Russians andDanes in the company, but make a clear distinctionbetween “Danes working in Russia” and “Danes inthe headquarters”. “Local Danes” are perceived aspart of the common “Dancom nation” in the Russianoffice, whereas Danes in headquarters are perceivedas foreigners.

Hosting insiders are self-motivated in their workand usually work long hours at the office. They havedeveloped informal relations with each other andwith the Danish superiors outside work and tend tostay longer together at the internal company socialevents.

The Hosting OutsidersHosting outsiders, in contrast, interpret harmony asa surface and superficial phenomenon and mention“hidden streams, controversies and conflicts”. Someof them explicitly relate the existing harmony to thepresence of Danes in the company:

“Who knows how it would be if the Danes werenot here… Maybe we would have many openconflicts. But it is not good to behave rudely infront of the foreigners.” (IT specialist)Those newcomers who belong to the outsiders’

group feel “lost and lonely” in spite of the “takingaround the office” ritual introduced by theadministration and aimed to facilitate the socializationprocess. They refer to the attitude of other employeesas “polite but indifferent”:

“If you need help and ask for it you willprobably get it, but do not expect that somebodywill come up to you and ask whether you needhelp.” (specialist in the Technical Supportdepartment)Hosting outsiders are formal in the way they

behave. They find the absence of more informalworking relationships with their superiors acceptableand even welcome. They claim that a certain level offormalization is necessary in a big company:

“There are many hidden streams, conflictsbetween departments and people. Structurizationand formalization can solve these problems.Mechanisms, duties, structures must beformalized.” (specialist in the IT department)Hosting outsiders perceive the atmosphere at

Dancom as peaceful but indifferent. Some of themclaim that they work only for money and do not reallyidentify themselves with the organization:

“The needs and goals of the company and myown goals are two different worlds.” (specialistin the marketing department)Hosting outsiders are members whose initial

expectations are not met. They tell of experiencingdissatisfaction, frustration and irritation:

“I feel disappointed from a professional pointof view. Everyday routine does not leaveenough time for self-education.” (productionspecialist)“I was rather disappointed from aprofessional point of view when I startedworking for Dancom. Danes do not applyadvanced IT technologies in Russia. In otherdivisions and in the headquarters they usethem, they pay attention to this, they also have



resources. Here they don’t.” (specialist in theIT department)The negative attitude toward formalization of

relations and procedures could also be interpreted inthe light of Russians’ wrong expectations towardswestern companies. Consider the following:

“We, Soviet people, had an idea that we hadbureaucracy and they – freedom. And now Ithink that Russia was backward in terms ofbureaucracy, it is much more bureaucratic here[ie in this western-owned company].” (Russiansales engineer)Naturally, these respondents tend to compare

Dancom with Russian firms and organizations wherethey have been working previously:

“In the bank where I worked before, self-education during working hours was possible,there were no problems.” (project specialist)Some of the hosting outsiders feel restricted in

their personal creativity and professionaldevelopment, and point to the standardization anduniformity of equipment and technologies as themain reason for that:

“In the Russian company where I was workingpreviously, I had complete freedom in myprogramming activities. This is not the case inDancom – almost everything is standardizedhere.” (specialist in the IT department)Dancom employs a selected group of highly-

educated Russian professionals. When their self-development expectations are not fulfilled, this turnsout to be a source of strong disappointment. Theemployees’ professional development which is notdirectly linked with the company goals and needsmight not be among the priorities of the company.Since there is a strong connection between expectationsand perceptions, a possible explanation of the hostingoutsiders’ dissatisfaction is the fact that Dancom’smanagers are not clear and explicit about what theemployees might expect in terms of work perspectivesand professional development.

Hosting outsiders do not have close relations withtheir foreign colleagues. They do not distinguishbetween Danes in Russia and Danes in headquarters.However, they make a clear distinction betweenRussians and Danes in Dancom.

Hosting outsiders do not work longer than theofficial office hours. Their relationships in thecompany are strictly based on work. If they attendsocial gatherings, they usually stay there only for ashort time.

Another aspect of the inclusion/exclusion orinsider/outsider issue is related to language skills.Russians who are not able to speak Englishconstitute the majority of the hosting outsiders’group. They often feel excluded from or limited intheir access to information and interpretations oforganizational events and from the informal oralcommunication flows. Since part of the formal writtencommunication (memos, letters, orders, etc.) isbilingual (English-Russian), those Russians whoseEnglish skills are less than adequate meet difficulties,mainly in oral communication with Danish colleaguesbut also with written information which is notavailable in the Russian language. Non-English-speaking Russians do not perceive themselves as “apart of the whole”, as members of a world-widemultinational organization.

Who Are the Insiders and Outsiders?The hosting insiders’ population is representedmostly but not exclusively by the so-called“founders” or old-timers – employees who joinedDancom immediately or soon after its establishmentin Russia. However, some of the hosting insidersjoined the company just recently. In our sample, fiveinsiders had worked in the company for more thanfour years, three for more than two years, and twofor about a year. There were only two outsidersamong those who worked for Dancom more thanfour years, three among those who had worked theremore than two years and five employees for less. Itis worth mentioning that all three Russian topmanagers are among insiders whereas, amongmiddle managers, two Russians and two Danesbelong to the outsiders’ group. As far as specialistsare concerned, six of them are hosting outsiders andfour are hosting insiders.

The relations between departmental affiliation andinsider/outsider distinctions are as follows:

Table 2

Departmental Affiliation of Hosting Insiders andOutsiders

Engineering 1 insider 1 outsiderSales 2 insiders 3 outsidersTechnical Support 2 outsidersIT 1 insider 1 outsiderMarketing 1 insider 1 outsiderFinance and Accounting 2 insiders 1 outsiderAdministration 2 insidersLogistics 1 insiderProduction 1 outsider


Winter 1999

United against Headquarters in DenmarkOne thing which both hosting insiders and outsidersare agreed on is their attitude to head office inDenmark. For both groups issues related to thecommunication with headquarters are especiallysensitive. Both groups characterize it as formal,inefficient, and slow:

“Our sales engineers cannot get a response fromthe headquarters for months. Everything isdiscussed, documented, but no actions aretaken.” (sales manager)“You send a fax to the headquarters but thereis either no response or a very formalmeaningless reply.” (specialist in the TechnicalSupport department)The headquarters are referred to as “a huge, clumsy

monster”, “inflexible structure”, and “slowconservative machine”:

“The headquarters are slow and inefficient –they spend a lot of time in order to introduce anew product. As a result some segments of themarket are taken by competitors - usually smallcompanies that are more flexible and are ableto fill the gap and to adjust quickly theirproducts to the specific requirements.”(production specialist)Some Russian employees associate the

formalization and the inefficiency of thecommunications flows between Dancom and theheadquarters in Denmark in the following way:

“It seems that Russia is not the main priorityfor those who are sitting in Denmark and areresponsible for the Russian market.” (ITmanager)“There is lack of respect and attention towardRussian colleagues. The headquarters’ attitudetoward the Russian subsidiary is that ofconsumption, it is not a true partnership.”(specialist in the Technical Support department)Russians interpret the lack of response from the

headquarters as a lack of respect towards their workand the Russian subsidiary. However, the reason whyheadquarters do not respond to all requests might bethat it is trying not to interfere in the activities ofDancom on an everyday basis and to increase theresponsibility of the local managers and employees.The centralization/decentralization debate in terms ofrelationships between the headquarters andsubsidiaries has particular overtones when interpretedby the Russians: some of our respondents claim that atop-down approach in this relationship is appropriate.

They perceive that as a part of the integration of theRussian subsidiary into the “Dancom world” and ascontributing to organizational stability in thesubsidiary.

Another possible explanation of the slowness ofcommunication is a certain caution at headquarterstoward Russia dictated by the instability andunpredictability of the Russian market and the overallRussian political situation. Decisions concerningRussian companies require more discussions and morecareful analysis at headquarters than is the case formore stable countries:

“I think they are just afraid to invest in Russiatoo much, they are never sure what will be heretomorrow. That is why they are very careful. Ithink they try to behave in such way that if it isnecessary they can quit here immediately andleave.” (Executive Director’s secretary)Sometimes this “careful policy” leads to

economically unprofitable decisions for Dancom. Astory told by one of the specialists in the administrationillustrates this:

“At the beginning when the question was raisedabout the company’s building all Russianssuggested we buy [a building] because the pricesfor real estate were rather low at that time andit would be cheaper in a long run to buy thebuilding than to rent it. But the Danes said“no”. And since then the rent was rising all thetime, so if we calculated now how much rentwe have paid during five years – it would bealready more than if we had bought the buildingfive years ago”.

Decision makingOrganizations are networks of decisions, decisionmakers, and decision making (Cyert and March 1992,Hickson et al 1986, O’Reilly et al, 1987, Choo 1998,Janis and Mann 1977) and all organizational behaviorsprings from decisions. Nutt (1997) has pointed outthat inadequate decision-making techniques costbillions of dollars each year in wasted time and moneyand that “even a small improvement in the way thatdecisions are made could have a dramatic effect onorganizational performance” (p52).

Decision making is an issue which Russian middlemanagers and specialists, both insiders and outsiders,perceive as “confusing”. There is a striking differencebetween their way of making decisions and the wayDanes do it. According to the Russian respondents,Danes take decisions on the basis and as a result of



teamwork. They claim that Danish managersrepeatedly stress the importance of group discussions,co-ordination of actions and the need to reachconsensus when making decisions. They are ready todiscuss problems openly and to give and receivefeedback. All this confuses the Russians who describethemselves as individualists at work and as preferringthe individual mode of decision making. They do notconsider discussions important and try to avoid themespecially when they concern problems:

“Russians have strong resistance if somebodytries to step into their business area.” (Danishmanager)Russians perceive the collective mode of decision-

making, which implies discussions aimed towardconsensus, as slow, non-flexible and inefficient:

“Danes discuss the same issue several times andstill think they have to discuss more, it takes somuch time...” (head of the sales department)“Everything in Russia changes so fast, there isno time for long discussions and slow decision-making. One has to be fast and very flexible.”(head of the marketing department)Russian middle managers and specialists claim that

they are oriented toward final results rather thandiscussions of how toachieve these results.Russians describe theirown decision-makingmethods in Dancom asshort-term and result-oriented. They admit thatthey do not reflect on the

status of the events in the working process. For them:“the job is either done or not done. It simplyhas to be done instead of discussing how it issupposed to be done.” (specialist in the salesdepartment)This makes it difficult for Danish superiors to

control their subordinates’ work and even makes themthink that the job is not being done at all:

“The Danish managers worry and want to besure that everything is being done and is undercontrol. They constantly write check-lists andmemos for every single event. It seems to themthat nothing is under control. And then theyare surprised that the job is done and startasking: How did you manage to do all this?”(specialist in the marketing department)Russian middle managers and specialists find

discussions with colleagues, joint setting of priorities,

developing frameworks as a team, and informing eachother about ongoing issues and processes as “loss oftime”. This is rather different from what they perceiveas their own strengths: quick reaction to changing andunexpected situations and ability to act on the basisof fragmented information. Those are features shapedunder conditions of instability, scarcity and lack ofclarity of information. In a similar study we conductedin another foreign-owned company in Russia, localmiddle managers perceived the collective decision-making adopted by their western colleagues as aneffort to diffuse responsibility and to hide the absenceof knowledge and professionalism.

These perceptions can be discussed within theframework of Eisenhardt’s (1989, 1990) findingsregarding the behavior of top management teams incompanies dealing with “high-velocity” environments.She found out that slow decision-makers focused onanalyzing different alternatives in depth whereas fastones compared the various alternatives by a quickanalysis of the information available. Additionally,planning and information oriented towards the futurewere typical and significant for slow managers,whereas fast decision-makers relied mainly on currentenvironment and circumstances and currentoperations. Our respondents’ statements are in linewith these findings: Russians in Dancom do not discussin depth and are focused on the current situation.However, there are three aspects where the case invitesinterpretations that differ from or are not discussedin Eisenhardt’s analysis and conclusions. The firstrelates to “sharing information” which, according toher study, is a characteristic of the fast decision-makers. The second aspect modifies the “currentorientation” with little or no time lag by combining itwith a strong appreciation of traditions andorientation towards the past. The third is intuition asan element in the decision-making process.

The way Russians in Dancom make decisions isnot based on sharing information which leads to twoopposite consequences: either a rather limited accessto information or being overloaded with information.According to our observations both in Dancom andother organizations in Russia, Russian participantstreat information as a source of power, status andauthority rather than as a basis for taking decisions.To use Mintzberg’s (1973) vocabulary, they are mainlyoccupied with playing the “monitoring” informationalrole in the sense of seeking and receiving information.At the same time, they try to avoid the “disseminating”informational role in terms of diffusing, transmitting

“the job is eitherdone or not done. Itsimply has to bedone instead ofdiscussing how it issupposed to be done”


Winter 1999

and sharing information. This then leads to engagingin the role of “resource allocator” and “disturbancehandler” at the cost of “negotiating” and “acting asan entrepreneur”.

The Russian middle managers and specialistscontinuously refer to their previous experiences andtraditional features of the Russian way of handlingissues and situations. Whereas efficiency, predictability,professionalism and modernity are seen as the keyforces for rationality in the west (Adams and Ingersoll1990), belief in fate and destiny dictate an underlyingbelief system in the Russian environment. While aprofessionally-oriented modern western societyprovides little space for traditions and they areregarded as slowing down the pace of progress,Russians value them very highly. They perceive thefuture orientation and focus on action andachievement in the western context as rather differentfrom admiring history and traditions.

Russian middle managers and specialists inDancom tend to make decisions and act on the basisof intuition which often does not meet theunderstanding of their Danish superiors, although theyappreciate it when it brings positive results. Accordingto the Russians, Danes value only logical argumentsand convincing proofs:

“Sometimes I feel that something has to be donebut I can not explain why, I just know so. Thenit becomes a problem, because if the Danishmanager is not convinced, he will not agree andconsequently will not make a decision. What isconvincing for a Dane? Logical argumentationbut not the specific Russian experience in thespecific Russian conditions.” (IT manager)Following the Russian respondents, Danes do not

really acknowledge and respect their expertise andexperience when they take decisions. This is most oftenmentioned in relation to recognition of their “localRussian knowledge” as opposite to “the western/Scandinavian/Danish way of doing things” exercisedby the Danes. Russians in Dancom characterize thelocal Russian environment as highly unstable andunpredictable whereas they describe the western wayof doing business as designed for stable market andpredictable societal conditions:

“The Danish approach might be good for stablemarkets where everything is known and can beplanned ten years ahead, but it is rather differentin Russia – yesterday there was no market andtoday it is developing so quickly.” (head of thesales department)

Russians feel that the Danes should have more trustin the suggestions coming from Russian middlemanagers and specialists and in their interpretationsof particular situations. A different behavior isperceived as disrespect and negligence. Russianparticipants tell of experiencing frustration, feelingpersonally offended and being held back:

“The Danes don’t listen to you, they do whatthey think is better, then they realize it does notwork here, but time and money are alreadywasted.” (specialist in the accountingdepartment)“Distrust and arrogance toward Russianservices motivated my Danish superior to ordercomputer equipment from Denmark and to usethe services of Danish computer firms in spiteof my suggestions to use Russian IT firms,which were able to provide the required servicesunder similar conditions. Dancom lost moneyand quality simply because the Danish managerdid not trust anything Russian.” (IT manager)These quotations and our observations suggest that

the Russian middle managers and specialists have astrong need to be askedfor advice in the processof taking decisions on amore operational level,concerning how a certaintask can be implementedafter the strategicdecision has been alreadytaken. When western managers fail to do that, Russianemployees react negatively and interpret their behavioras clear disrespect. This is in line with Lawrence andVlachoutsicos’ (1990) findings on Russian employees’involvement in the decision-making process.

At the same time, this and another study conductedin a Russian-western joint venture (Michailova 1997)show that Russian employees feel confused whenasked to actively take part in the early stages of thedecision-making process. They respect one-manauthority and expect their superiors to decidestrategically upon setting the overall framework andgoal in terms of what has to be achieved.

At the beginning of the decision-making process,Russian employees treat early involvement, showinginitiative and coming up with suggestions differentlyaccording to whether they are dealing with Russianor with western managers. In the first case, theyinterpret such behavior as intervening in the superior’sjob, lack of respect towards him or questioning his

“Russian employeesfeel confused whenasked to actively takepart in the earlystages of the decision-making process”



abilities. One of the sources of that type of behavioris to be found in the rule of accepting the leaderwithout any questioning (Bronfenbrenner 1970,Pearson 1990). Another explanation might be theemployees’ traditional alienation from the results oftheir own work. Work was for decades psychologicallydisregarded as a kind of unprofitable conscriptionenforced from above (Obolonsky 1995, 19-21). Theethic of the ‘work horse’ is well integrated in thatapproach – the individuals do not interfere in thingswhich are ‘none of their business’. This is “an ethic of

one’s inferiority andone’s boss’s superiority:‘Whatever I do nothinghappens’, ‘They cantwist me to a ramhorn’. These areargued by a markedloyalty to whatever

happens according to the others from ‘above’, whichcamouflages a pragmatic, selfish calculation, apractical desire to insure oneself against all sorts ofrisk; or a cynical disposition to make moral relativisma life-time principle”.

If Danish (or western) managers try to involveRussian employees early in the decision-makingprocess, the Russians perceive the managers as beingcharacterised either by confusion, unnecessary softnessand lack of ability (that forces them to consultsubordinates) or by complete unfamiliarity with thespecificity of the Russian context. This is expressed instatements, such as “Westerners don’t know what todo, that’s why they ask us”.

PlanningRussians and Danes in Dancom also define planningdifferently. Danes interpret planning as a long-termactivity. They use active planning as a managementtool along with executing and adjusting at differentstages of their work as managers. In the minds of theDanish participants planning is an instrumental value,a tool for evaluation of work progress:

“Planning is simply a question of setting somegoals to have something to focus on. And ifyou do not reach a goal, it is not a defeat, it isnot a personal defeat, it might turn out thatthere is a natural explanation for that and thenyou just have to adjust your goals for the nextperiod of time.” (Danish manager)However, they confess that “in Russia it does not

work that way”. Danes characterize Russian

employees as not interested in planning, especially inlong-term planning:

“Russians do not find it very important to settlea plan for the whole year. They think ‘OK, weknow what to do for this month and the nextmonth, and that is enough’.” (Danish manager)This is in line with how Russians perceive

themselves. They consider long-term planning to beuseless. As one of the Russian middle managers triedto explain to the Danish superior:

“It is impossible to plan everything in Russia.There may be some issues where you can planmaximum a year ahead – issues related to bigstable customers – but otherwise everythingchanges so quickly.”According to the Russian understanding as

expressed by our respondents, planning is a strongcommitment:

“When you make commitment you also haveto be responsible for it. If you don’t reach yourgoal you have to explain why you don’t. Notreaching a goal is a defeat.” (sales engineer)Planning understood as an ultimate value might

be seen as a heritage of the socialist system where aplanned economy on a societal level reinforced theplan execution by all means, including manipulationsand massive collective overtime work (Anisimova1999). We suggest that it might also be rooted incenturies-old history, in the times of the villagecommunes. The members of the communes “openlyand uninhibitedly exercised their right to articulatetheir interests and opinions before decisions weremade. However, once a decision had been reached,they were obliged to abide by it.” (Vlachoutsicos 1998,13). The specific feature, however, is that the decisionwas taken by one single person who did not necessarilyrespect the opinions and voices of the others.

The data suggest that insiders and outsiders clearlydiffer in their attitudes toward Danish work methodsin general and certain aspects of decision-making andplanning processes in particular. Insiders tend toevaluate Danish work methods more positively thanoutsiders. Among the ten Russian insiders weinterviewed, five evaluate them positively, four more-or-less positively, and only one negatively. However,four outsiders evaluated Danish work methodsnegatively and three more-or-less positively. Thisdifference seems to be linked with their perceptionsof foreign partners and ways of relating to them.Insiders who have closer and more informal links withforeign colleagues tend to accept their way of doing

“Work was for decadespsychologicallydisregarded as a kindof unprofitableconscription enforcedfrom above”


Winter 1999

things, whereas outsiders who perceive Danes asaliens find their work methods alien as well. It is not,then, surprising that self-motivated insiders evaluatemore positively the Danish decision-making based ondelegation of responsibility than do the hostingoutsiders.

There are major differences in the meaningsRussians and Danes imply in a number of words andphrases in the communication and interaction process.People’s understandings are not uniform and notionsand terms are not used in a vacuum. They involvedifferent associations in different culturalenvironments. In that sense, notions themselves mightbe viewed as cultural artifacts and language as a meansof communication in a particular culture rather thana universal means of communication. In a contextwhere different cultures interact, the meaning of thenotions is used as a matter of continuous negotiationand change and language is a guide for classifyingreality into perceptional units that make a differencefor people in the culture (Whorf 1956, Terpstra andDavid 1991). The variety of meanings as such is notproblematic. The problem is the failure to clarify andnegotiate the meanings. This causes a great deal ofuncertainty in the interaction process with a heavyimpact on organizational everyday life in Dancom.

ConclusionThe analysis developed in this article leads to somepractical lessons and guidelines for western investors/managers/expatriates involved in companies withwestern participation in Russia.

● Be aware of and conscious about the varietyamong the locals in terms of hosting insiders andhosting outsiders. Map the organization; identifywho personifies the insiders’ and outsiders’“camps” and what are their roles in theorganization.

The degree to which the local organizationalmembers are “included” in the organization varies.They all are members of the organization, ie insiders.But many of them feel like outsiders, perceivethemselves as outsiders and are perceived by the othersas outsiders. Whereas hosting insiders identifythemselves strongly with the organization and arehighly motivated in their work, the hosting outsiderslook at it only as a place for earning money. Whilehosting insiders develop good operational relationshipswith their foreign colleagues, hosting outsiders havedifficulties in coping with “the other” and stick to the

rather negative stereotypes and images of foreignersthey have developed. In the Dancom case, there is nostrong positive correlation between the duration ofemployment and being an insider/outsider – there area number of people who joined Dancom when thecompany got established but are outsiders and someof the newcomers feel very much insiders.

● If possible, select and appoint local members withEnglish language capabilities. Invest effort inlearning the Russian language as a sign ofrespecting your Russian colleagues and theirculture.

The Dancom case suggests that Russians whounderstand or/and speak English have much higherchances of being actively involved in thecommunication and interaction with the foreignmanagers and specialists and, more generally, of beingpart of the insiders’ subculture. This contributes totheir feeling of being “in” the organization. Whenforeign managers feel they are “outsiders”, this islargely because they are excluded from the informallife and communication of the Russian company,especially in the cases when Russians do not speakEnglish. Learning Russian is the most efficient bridgeto the Russians. Sometimes, the effort alone, withoutreally reaching good results, is a big step towardsgaining the trust and respect of the Russian members.

● Pay a lot of attention to how headquarters handlesthe communication flow with the Russiancompany.

Russian organizational members are very sensitivetowards the intensity of communication flow with theheadquarters. A delay or a lack of response from thecentral units is easily interpreted as a lack of respecttowards the Russian subsidiary and even to theRussian nation rather than a sign of increasing freedomin solving problems independently. Both hostinginsiders and hosting outsiders share this view andattitudes.

● When taking decisions, do not be afraid to applytop-down oriented techniques. Be careful inadopting participative approaches invitinginitiative and responsibility at the bottom of theorganization – they are neither understood, norwelcomed.

Top-down management approaches are highlyrespected by Russian organizational members. At thesame time, they perceive long discussions in groups



and teams and efforts to reach a consensus in thedecision-making process as “useless”, as “a waste oftime”, and, even worse, as “an effort to cover one’slack of knowledge and professionalism by hidingbehind the group”. One-man authority, the so-callededinonachalie, is interpreted as well-functioning andbringing results. Therefore, it makes sense, especiallyin the initial phase of the development of the Russiancompany with western participation, to gain therespect of the local members by demonstrating anability to act as a “strong leader” able to givedirections, define tasks clearly and follow up theirexecution.

● When introducing strategic plans, formulateshort-term oriented tasks with achievable andobservable results and assign Russians to workon them. Keep in mind that planning for Russiansis a strong commitment, an end that has to beachieved by all means – it is not an instrumentfor adjusting and evaluating.

Russian middle managers and specialists do notrespect long-term plans with uncertain outcomes.Many of them have exercised planning in the socialistpast and their idea of planning is strongly influencedby those previous experiences. Although the wholeplanning idea became largely discredited after 1991and for many people “plan” became a dirty word,when in use, it is still associated with an ultimate goal.

Dr Snejina Michailova is a Visiting AssociateProfessor at Copenhagen Business School. AllaAnisimova is affiliated with the Institute ofPhilosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy ofScience and with Novosibirsk State University.The authors are grateful to the respondents inDancom and the people who made possible thefieldwork in the company and to Kenneth Hustedand Klaus Meyer, both from CBS and to theanonymous referees. Snejina Michailova gratefullyacknowledges the support in the framework ofthe action research project SODIAC (SculpturingOrganizational Dynamics in a Context: Lessonsfrom and for Danish Companies Operating onthe Russian Market).

ReferencesAdams, G. & Ingersol, V. 1990. Culture, technicalrationality, and organizational culture. American Reviewof Public Administration. 20(4): 285-302Anisimova, A. 1999. Organizational culture and cross-cultural relations: the case of a Danish company in Russia.Paper presented at the CEP conference “Culturaltransformation and civil society”. May. KrakowBartlett, C. & Ghoshal, S. 1991. Managing acrossborders. London: London Business SchoolBowditch, J. & Buono, A. 1989. The human side ofmergers and acquisitions: managing collisions betweenpeople and organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-BassBoyacigiller, N. & Adler, N. 1991. The parochialdinosaur: organizational science in a global context.Academy of Management Review. 16(2): 262-290Bowditch, J. & Buono, A. 1997. A primer onorganizational behavior. Fourth edition. New York: JohnWiley & Sons.

Consequently, not executing the plan as formulatedinitially is seen as a defeat. Close monitoring of changesin the organization and its environment and changingthe plan accordingly is not understood/applied as anidea or an approach by Russian managers andspecialists.

Having pointed out the above features, we do notsuggest to western managers the approach “when inRome do as the Romans do”. However, we advocatea careful contextualization of the concepts andtechniques applied.

Brewster, C. 1991. The management of expatriates,London: Kogan PageBronfenbrenner, U. 1970. Two worlds of childhood: U.S.and USSR, New York: SAGEBuchanan, D. & Huczynski, A. 1997. Organizationalbehavior. Third edition. London: Prentice Hall.Buono, J. & Bowditch, A. 1989. The human side ofmergers and acquisitions: Managing collisions betweenpeople and organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-BassChoo, C. 1998. The knowing organization: howorganizations use information to construct meaning,create knowledge, and make decisions. Oxford UniversityPressCyert, R. & March, J. 1992. A behavioral theory of thefirm. Second edition. Oxford: BlackwellDabars, Z. & Vokhmina, L. 1995. The Russian way.Lincolnwood, Illinois: Passport BooksEarley, C. & Singh, H. 1995. International and


Winter 1999

the factory walls: decision making in Soviet and USenterprises. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard BusinessSchool PressLedeneva, A. 1998. Russia’s economy of favors: blat,networking and informal exchange . CambridgeUniversity PressMarkoczy, L. 1993. Managerial and organizationallearning in Hungarian-Western mixed managementorganizations. The International Journal of HumanResource Management. 4(2): 277-304Michailova, S. 1997. Interface between western andRussian management attitudes: implications fororganizational change. Working paper No. 8, Center forEast European Studies, Copenhagen Business SchoolMintzberg, H. 1973. The nature of managerial work.New York, NY: Harper & Row.Mirvis, P. & Marks, M. 1992. Managing the merger.Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-HallNicholson, Nigel. 1998. (Editor) The Blackwellencyclopedic dictionary of organizational behavior.Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell BusinessNutt, P. 1997. Better decision-making: a field study.Business Strategy Review. 8(4): 45-52Obolonsky, A. 1995. Russian politics in the time oftroubles: some basic antinomies. A. Saikal & W. Maley(Eds.) Russia in search of its feature. CambridgeUniversity Press. 12-27Ogbor, J. 1990. Organizational change within a culturalcontext: the interpretation of cross-culturally transferredorganizational practices. Lund studies in economics andmanagement. Lund University PressO’Reilly, C., Chatman, J. & Anderson, J. 1987. Messageflow and decision making. Handbook of organizationalcommunication. F. Jablin et al. (Eds.) Newbury Park:Sage. 600-623Pearson, L. 1990. Children of glasnost: growing up Soviet.Seattle: University of Washington PressRobbins, S. 1998. Organizational behavior: concepts,controversies, applications. Eighth edition. NJ: Prentice-Hall.Smith, N. 1991. The case-study: a vital yet misunderstoodresearch method for management. N. Smith & P. Dainty(eds.) Management research handbook. London:Routledge. 145-158Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. 1990. Basics of qualitativeresearch: grounded theory procedures and techniques.California: SageSztompka, P. 1993. Civilizational incompetence: the trapof post-communist societies. Zeitschrift für Soziologie.22 (2): 85-95Terpstra, V. & Davis, K. 1991. The cultural environment

intercultural management research: what’s next?Academy of Management Journal. 38(2): 327-340Eisenhardt, K. 1989. Making fast strategic decisions inhigh-velocity environments. Academy of ManagementJournal. 32 (3): 543-576Eisenhardt, K. 1990. Speed and strategic choice: howmanagers accelerate decision making. CaliforniaManagement Review. 32 (3): 39-54Fernandez, J. 1987. Anthropology as a vocation: listeningto voices. E. Schultz & R. Lavenda. Culturalanthropology. New York: WestFischer, G. 1988. Mindsets. Yarmouth, ME: InterculturalPressFontaine, G. 1989. Managing international assignments.The strategy for success. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-HallGaltung, J. 1981. Structure, culture and intellectual style:an essay comparing Saxonic, Teutonic, Gallic andNipponic approaches. Social science information. 20(6):817-856Geertz, C. 1973. The interpretation of culture. New York:Basic BooksGummesson, E. 1991. Qualitative methods inmanagement research. London: SageHickson, D., Butler, R., Cray, D., Mallory, G. & Wilson,D. 1986. Top decisions: strategic decision-making inorganizations. San Francisco: Jossey-BassHolden, N.; Cooper, C. & Carr, J. 1998. Dealing withthe new Russia: management cultures in collision. NewYork: John Wiley & SonsHunt, J., Less, S., Grumbar, J. & Vivian, P. 1987.Acquisitions: the human factor. London: London BusinessSchool / Egon ZehnderJanis, I. & Mann, L. 1977. Decision making: apsychological analysis of conflict, choice, andcommitment. New York: Free PressJermier, J., Slocum, J, Jr., Fry, L. & Gaines, J. 1991.Organizational subcultures in a soft bureaucracy:resistance behind the myth and façade of an officialculture. Organization Science. 2: 170-194Kanungo, R. & Jaeger, A. 1990. Introduction: the needfor indigenous management in developing countries.Indigenous management in developing countries. P.Kanungo & A. Jaeger (Eds.), London: Routledge, 1-19Kets de Vries, M. 1998. The anarchist within: clinicalreflections on Russian character, leadership style, andorganizational practices. Working paper No. 96, INSEADKitching, J. 1976. Why do mergers miscarry? HarvardBusiness Review. November-December. 84-101Lawrence, P. & Vlachoutsicos, C. 1990 (Eds.) Behind



of international business. Third edition. Cincinnati:South-Western Publishing Co.Trice, H. & Beyer, J. 1993. The cultures of workorganizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice HallTyler, S . 1986. Post-modern ethnography: fromdocument of the occult to occult document. J. Clifford& G. Marcus (eds.) Writing culture. Berkeley: Universityof California Press. 122-140Vlachoutsicos, C. 1998. The dangers of ignoring Russian

communitarism. Transition. The World Bank, October:13-14Whorf, B.1956. Language, thought, and reality. NY:WileyYin, R. 1994. Case study research: design and methods.Applied research methods series. Vol. 5. Second edition.California: Sage.Zaytseva, T. 1998. Intercultural management in Russia:a comparative analysis. HD Forum. 19: 4-6

The departmental affiliation of the participants wasas follows:

Appendix: Methodological Details

The department affiliation of participants

IT 1 middle manager, 1 specialist

Technical Support 1 middle manager, 1 specialist

Marketing 1 middle manager, 1 specialist

Finance and 1 top manager, 2 specialistsaccounting

Sales 1 top manager, 3 specialists1 middle manager,

Administration 1 middle manager, 1 specialist

Engineering 1 top manager, 1 specialist

Logistics 1 middle manager

The research was based on twenty semi-structuredinterviews with participants (four with the Danes andsixteen with Russians), direct and participantobservation, informal conversations, and analysis ofdocuments. Interview questions were centered aroundthe issues of perceptions of Dancom, perception ofthe foreign partner, interaction, communication,planning and decision making. Observational dataconsisted of notes taken during and after interviewsand informal discussions. In the process of generatingfield data, “thick description” emerged, descriptionthat involves “guessing at meanings, assessing theguesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions fromthe better guesses (Geertz 1973, 20). We appliedStrauss and Corbin’s (1990) model for coding data instages. During the open coding each data unit wasanalysed for evidence of the categories designated toorganise the data. In the coding process we startedwith line-by-line analysis since “at the outset of a studyit is important for generating categories which tell youwhat to focus on in your next interview or

observational site” (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 73). Asresearch proceeded and some categories were alreadydefined we switched to paragraph coding which isfocused on labelling the major idea of sentence orparagraph and allows coding around those categorieswhich are already defined.

We focus on the perspective of the Russianmanagers and employees, on their way of perceiving,understanding and interpreting organizational life inDancom. When we quote Danish managers, we usetheir statements as a point of reference, not as a basisfor comparison. The selected quotations carry out adouble function – representation and evocation. Whenthe purpose of quoting was to illustrate our findingwe chose those quotations which seemed to be themost typical for the item under discussion andrepresented idea, notion or concept repeatedlymentioned by different organizational members. Whenour aim was to stress the diversity and represent thevariety of opinions and attitudes we tried to selectpolar expressions. Our task was “to hear voices, torepresent voices” (Fernandez 1987, 12). At the sametime, following Tyler (1986, 125), quotations are“fragments of discourse intended to evoke in the mindsof both reader and writer an emergent fantasy of apossible world of common sense reality”.

One of the categories that emerged from the datain relation to perception of organization by itsmembers is inclusion in the organization. Interviewdata and observations revealed items which were latergrouped around the following notions: belonging tothe organization, attitudes to foreign colleagues, abilityto communicate and share information, and type ofmotivation. The difference in relation to those itemsallowed us to distinguish two groups of employeeswhich we have clustered around the inclusion/exclusion debate.


russian voices from a danish company

Documents