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RussianStrategicIntentions

AStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)WhitePaper

May2019

ContributingAuthors:Dr. JohnArquilla (NavalPostgraduate School),Ms.AnnaBorshchevskaya(TheWashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicy),Dr.BelindaBragg(NSI,Inc.),Mr.PavelDevyatkin(TheArcticInstitute),MAJAdamDyet(U.S.Army,J5-PolicyUSCENTCOM),Dr.R.EvanEllis(U.S.ArmyWar College Strategic Studies Institute), Mr. Daniel J. Flynn (Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence (ODNI)), Dr. Daniel Goure (Lexington Institute), Ms. Abigail C. Kamp (NationalConsortium for the Study of TerrorismandResponses toTerrorism (START)),Dr. RogerKangas(NationalDefenseUniversity),Dr.MarkN.Katz(GeorgeMasonUniversity,ScharSchoolofPolicyandGovernment),Dr.BarnettS.Koven(NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)),Dr.JeremyW.Lamoreaux(BrighamYoungUniversity-Idaho),Dr.MarleneLaruelle (George Washington University), Dr. Christopher Marsh (Special Operations ResearchAssociation),Dr.RobertPerson(UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint),Mr.Roman“Comrade”Pyatkov(HAF/A3KCHECKMATE),Dr.JohnSchindler(TheLocarnoGroup),Ms.MalinSeverin(UKMinistry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)), Dr. Thomas Sherlock(UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint),Dr.JosephSiegle(AfricaCenterforStrategicStudies,NationalDefenseUniversity),Dr.RobertSpaldingIII(U.S.AirForce),Dr.RichardWeitz(CenterforPolitical-MilitaryAnalysisattheHudsonInstitute),Mr.JasonWerchan(USEUCOMStrategyDivision&RussiaStrategicInitiative(RSI))

Prefaces Provided By: LTG Theodore D. Martin (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC)), RDML Jeffrey J. Czerewko (Joint Staff, J39), Mr. JasonWerchan (USEUCOM StrategyDivision&RussiaStrategicInitiative(RSI))

Editor:Ms.NicolePeterson(NSI,Inc.)

EditorialSupport:Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois(NSI,Inc.),Ms.SarahCanna(NSI,Inc.),Mr.AliJafri(NSI,Inc.),Mr.ThomasRieger(NSI,Inc.),Dr.JohnStevenson(NSI,Inc.),Ms.MariahYager(NSI,Inc.)

TheviewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheDepartmentofDefenseortheU.S.Government.

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DisclaimersTheviewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyor

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JOINT STAFF PREFACE

RDML Jeffrey J. Czerewko (Joint Staff, J39)

Understandingthefutureofglobalcompetitionandconflictisnowmoreimportantthaneverbefore. In a dynamically changing world, the nature and character of warfare, deterrence,compellence,escalationmanagement,andpersuasionarekeyandessentialindetermininghowtheUnitedStatesanditspartnersshould:

• Strategizetodefendtheirglobalinterestsagainstactivitiesthatareintendedtoundercutthoseinterestsacrossthespectrumofcompetition;

• Defend their interests against threats by regional competitors via ways and meanscomplementary to strategies vis-à-vis China and Russia but do not undercut otherinterests;and

• Prepare US and partner forces to respond to unexpected and agile developments inglobalpoliticsandtechnologybyidentifyingareasforcooperation,mitigatingthethreatofactivitiesshortofarmedconflict,anddeterringarmedconflictacrossmultiplesourcesofnationalpower(e.g.,trade,diplomacy,security).

TheNationalSecurityStrategy(NSS),NationalDefenseStrategy(NDS),andNationalMilitaryStrategyallnotethatfutureconfrontationsbetweenmajorpowersmaymostoftenoccurbelowthe levelof armedconflict. In this environment, economic competition, influence campaigns,paramilitaryactions,cyberintrusions,andpoliticalwarfarewilllikelybecomemoreprevalent.Such confrontations increase the risk ofmisperception andmiscalculation, between powerswithsignificantmilitarystrength,whichmaythenincreasetheriskof armedconflict.Inthiscontext,theUScapabilitytoinfluencetheoutcomesofbothglobalandregionaleventsmustbereconsidered. The growing divergence among great powers (i.e., the US, China, and Russia)regardingwhat constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and escalationmanagementactivitiesshouldbecarefullyexamined.

Tothatend,thiswhitepaperreviewsRussianactivitiesacrosstheglobetobuildanenhanced,fundamentalunderstandingofthecontemporaryandfutureinfluenceenvironment.CounteringRussianprovocativeactivitiesrequiresacomprehensivestrategyandtheNDSrecognizesthisfactinordertosuccessfullycounterRussianprovocativeactivities;asaresult,theUSmustcollaborativelyemploy multiple instruments of national power in a synchronized manner. As white papercontributorBrigGen(ret)RobSpaldingIIIsuggests,“theUSrolewithregardtoRussiashouldbetocontinuetoengageEuropeanalliestotaketheleadforbalancinginEurope.Theallies’goalshouldbedeterrence.Atthesametime,theUSshouldbilaterallyengageRussiatopeelthemawayfromChina’sorbit. The US can work with Russia in ways that improve the US-Russia relationship withoutdetractingfromEuropeaneffortstobalanceanddeter.”

Thearticlesinthiswhitepaperprovidegovernmentstakeholders—intelligence,lawenforcement,military,andpolicyagencies—withvaluableinsightsandanalyticframeworkstoassisttheUS, itsallies, and partners in developing a comprehensive strategy to compete and defeat this Russianchallenge.Significantobservationsinclude:

• RussiaisadoptingcoercivestrategiesthatinvolvetheorchestratedemploymentofmilitaryandnonmilitarymeanstodeterandcompeltheUS,itsalliesandpartnerspriortoandafter


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theoutbreakofhostilities.Thesestrategiesmustbeproactivelyconfronted,orthethreatofsignificantarmedconflictmayincrease.

• Russiaexhibitsadeep-seatedsenseofgeopoliticalinsecuritywhichmotivatesittopursuestrategic objectives that establish an uncontested sphere of influence in the post-Sovietregion. Yet, Russians increasingly disagreewith the Kremlin’s assertions that the US is aloomingexternaldangerandasubversiveforceinRussiandomesticpolitics.

• Russia’sgrayzonetacticsaremosteffectivewhenthetargetisdeeplypolarizedorlacksthecapacity to resist and respond effectively to Russian aggression. According to Russianstrategicthought,deterrenceandcompellencearetwosidesofthesamecoin.

OnlywithanalignedandsynchronizedwholeofgovernmentapproachwilltheUScompeteandwinagainst emerging powers like Russia and China. Such collaboration requires a commonunderstandingofourcompetitors,theirtacticsanddesiredendstatesandweintendthatthiswhitepaperwillachievethiscriticalobjective.

RDMLJeffreyJ.CzerewkoDeputyDirectorforGlobalOperationsJointStaff,J39


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USEUCOM PREFACE

Mr. Jason Werchan (USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI))

Understanding Russia’s broad strategy, goals, and capabilities in the gray zone is of criticalimportance to United States European Command (USEUCOM).Russia presents two primarychallengesandtaskedmissionsfortheCommand.Thefirst,andUSEUCOM’shighestpriority,istodeterRussianaggressionagainsttheAlliance(i.e.thefightwedonotwant).ThesecondistocounterRussian malign influence and activities below the level of armed conflict (i.e. the fight we arecurrentlyin).

ThisWhitePaperdirectlysupportsthislatterchallenge,andhighlightstheglobalnatureofthegrayzone competition. It expounds upon the specific challenge of what the 2018 National DefenseStrategydirectsas ‘ExpandingtheCompetitiveSpace’withRussia. ‘Competition’ isarelativenewmissionfortheDepartmentofDefense.WhiletheUnitedStatesfocusedonexecutingtheglobalwaron terror, Russia actively pursuedmalign influence in all regions of the world tomitigate theirinferior conventional capability. They are executing active and at times aggressive foreign andsecuritypoliciesintheirself-proclaimednearaboard,Afghanistan,andSyria.Russiahasagrowingand demonstrated capacity and willingness to exercise malign influence in Europe and abroad,includingintheUnitedStates.

As the designated Coordinating Authority for the Russia Problem Set, USEUCOM is leading theDepartment’sexecutionofaglobalcampaignplandesignedtoachievethetwoprimaryobjectivesofdeterringRussianaggressionandcompetingbelowthelevelofarmedconflict.However,counteringRussiangrayzoneeffortsarenotspecifictojusttheCommandortheDepartment,butmustbepartofawholeofUSGovernmenteffortthatleveragesallelementsofnationalpower.Itmustaddressareas to compete globally and challenge Russia where they are perceived to have asymmetricadvantages.Itmust also identify and develop the specific and niche tools needed to successfullyexpandthecompetitivespace.ThiswhitepaperprovidesacomprehensivedeepdivewithrespecttotheRussianFederationandaddressesthechallengesandopportunitiesfortheUnitedStatesanditsnetworkofalliancestosucceedinthefightwearein.

JasonWerchanStrategyProgramManagerRussiaStrategicInitiative(RSI)USEUCOMStrategyDivision


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OPENING REMARKS: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE

Dr. John Arquilla (Naval Postgraduate School)

Inthe1830s,AlexisdeTocquevillewasthefirsttopredictthatRussiaandtheUnitedStateswouldbecomeglobalpowers.AttheendofthefirstpartofhisDemocracyinAmerica,Tocquevillemused:“Theirstarting-pointisdifferent,andtheircoursesarenotthesame;yeteachofthemseemsmarkedoutbythewillofHeaventoswaythedestiniesofhalftheglobe.”

The“startingpoint”forourownstrategicthinkingaboutRussiatodayshouldbearecognitionofthevalidityofTocqueville’sprediction.Byanymeasure,Russiaisandwillremainasignificantshaperofworldevents—particularly inareasclose to its locusofcontinentalpower(e.g.,Crimea,Donetsk,Abkhazia, andother regions considered its “nearabroad”).Needless to say,NATOexpansionhasinfringedonRussia’sperceivednaturalsphereofinterestandservesasacauseoffrictionbetweenitandtheUS.

Farther afield, Russia will retain strategic interests that will inform and guide its policies. Itsintervention in Syria speaks to a centuries-long interest in attaining some sort of geostrategicMediterranean foothold. Support for the flagging socialist government in Venezuela can beunderstood in terms of a small-scale investment in encouraging a sustained “pink tide” in LatinAmericathatprovidesavaluabledistractionfortheAmericans—rightintheirtraditionalbackyard.

Intermsofnuclearmatters,itisclearthatafreshroundofarmsracingthreatens.TheUnitedStatescaneitherembracethis,hopingtooutpacetheRussians,ortrytoheadoffsuchacostlycompetitionwitharededicatedarmscontrol/reductionpolicy.Giventhatthiscompetitionisnolongerbilateral,itmakesbettersenseforWashingtonandMoscowtoworktogethertocorraltheotherswhoarenowmaking dangerous progress with intermediate and other—including long-range—weapons.Revisiting Ronald Reagan’s offer to Russia,made back in the ‘80s, to share research on ballisticmissiledefense,wouldbeanadroitmoveaswell.

Alastpoint:Weshouldthinkaboutpotential“shocks,”themosttroublingofwhichwouldbeifPutinperformeda“reverseNixon”andplayedhisownversionofthe“Chinacard.”Theworldsystem,andAmericaninfluenceinit,wouldbecompletelyupendedifMoscowandBeijingalignedmoreclosely.PerhapsagoodAmericanstrategywouldbetoplaya“Russiacard”first.Obamatriedtodosowithhis “reset.” Trump wanted to do this, but he was derailed by the electioneering apparentlyorchestratedbyMoscow.Still it isnot too late forsuchamove.Afterall, theUnitedStatesworkscloselywithRussiaonspaceoperations.Isitabridgetoofartohopeformorecooperationattheterrestriallevel?


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ms. Nicole Peterson (NSI, Inc.)

ThiswhitepaperwaspreparedaspartoftheStrategicMultilayerAssessment,entitledTheFutureofGlobalCompetitionandConflict,indirectresponsetoaseriesofquestionsposedbytheUnitedStatesArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC).Twenty-threeexpertscontributedtothiswhitepaperandprovidedwide-rangingassessmentsofRussia’sglobalinterestsandobjectives,aswellastheactivities—grayorotherwise—thatitconductstoachievethem.Thiswhitepaperisdividedintofivesectionsandtwenty-fivechapters,asdescribedbelow.Thissummaryreportssomeofthewhitepaper’shigh-levelfindings,butitisnosubstituteforacarefulreadoftheindividualcontributions.

ThereisbroadconsensusamongthecontributorsthatRussianPresidentVladimirPutinisindeedadheringtoaglobalgrandstrategy,whichaimstoachievethefollowinggoals:

• ReclaimandsecureRussia’sinfluenceoverformerSovietnations

• Regainworldwiderecognitionasa“greatpower”

• Portrayitselfasareliableactor,akeyregionalpowerbroker,andasuccessfulmediator(Katz;Borshchevskaya) in order to gain economic,military, and political influence over nationsworldwideandtorefinetheliberalistrulesandnormsthatcurrentlygoverntheworldorder(Lamoreaux)

According to Dr. Robert Person, these goals are motivated by Russia’s deep-seated geopoliticalinsecurity.SincethecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Russiahasstruggledtofinditsplaceintheglobalcommunity,whichhaslefttheleadershipwithalingeringdesiretoregaintheinfluenceandpowerthatitoncehad.Inparticular,RussiaseekstoregainitsinfluenceoverformerSovietstates,whichitclaimsareinitsrightful“sphereofinfluence”(Lamoreaux;Person;Marsh).Asaresult,oneoftheUnitedStates’coregoals,namelypromotingandprotectingthe international liberalorder,comesintocontentionwiththegoalsofRussia’sgrandstrategy.ThisunderpinstheKremlin’sbeliefthatitmustcontainandconstrainUSinfluenceandactivitiesinEuropeandelsewhereacrosstheglobe.AsMs.AnnaBorshchevskaya’scontributionsuggests,theRussianleadership’sworldviewiszero-sum;it believes that in order for Russia to win, the USmust lose. However, Dr. Christopher Marsh’scontributionsuggeststhatthisworldviewisnotnecessarilysharedbytheRussianpopulationoritselite.

Asevidencedbytherangeof“grayzone”activitiesitengagesin,anumberoftheexpertcontributorsarguethattheRussianleadershipseesitselfasatwarwiththeUSandtheWestasawhole.FromaRussianperspective,thiswarisnottotal,butrather,itisfundamental(Goure)—atypeof“war”thatisatoddswiththegeneralUSunderstandingofwarfare.Russiabelievesthatthereisnounacceptableorillegitimateformofdeterrence,compellence,orescalationmanagement(Goure).Italsodoesnotbelieve in the continuum of conflict that the US has constructed. Like Russia’s perception of itscompetitionwiththeUS,itsperceptionofconflictisdichotomous:oneiseitheratwarornotatwar.Tofightandwinthiswar,Russiabelievesthatthesuccessfulintegrationofallinstrumentsofstatepower(Goure),aswellastheorchestratedemploymentofnon-militaryandmilitarymeanstodeterand compel (Flynn), are paramount. Furthermore, Russianmilitary concepts include options foremployingpreemptiveforceto induceshockanddissuadeanadversaryfromconductingmilitaryoperationsandtocompelade-escalationofhostilities (Flynn).Theauthorsobserve thatRussia’s


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strategiesarecontinuouslyevolvingandexpectthatthediscrepancybetweentheRussianandtheUSunderstandingof“conflict”and“war”willcontinuetogrow,leadingtoahigherriskofescalationinfuturesituationsinvolvingbothnations.

Overall, Russia’s influence abroad is growing, and the Kremlin hasmastered the use of “hybridwarfare”indrivingRussia’sforeignpolicy(Lamoreaux).Russiautilizesavarietyofgrayzonetacticsaround theglobe.These include theuseofparamilitary forcesandotherproxies, interference inpoliticalprocesses,economicandenergyexploitation(particularlyinAfrica),espionage,andmediaand propagandamanipulation. Putin is also adept at blendingmilitary and civilian elements formaximumimpact(Weitz).

ThespecifictacticsofhybridwarfarethatRussiausesvarybyregion.InEurope,forexample,Russiahas utilized propaganda, an increasing dependence on external energy resources, and politicalmanipulationtoachieveitsprimarygoals(Schindler;Lamoreaux).Incontrast,intheMiddleEastandAfrica—importantsourcesofmineralsandothernaturalresourcesfromaRussianperspective1—Russiahasprimarilyutilizedeconomicexploitationtools(Katz;Borshchevskaya;Severin).InCentralAsia,Russiamaintainsamuchmorelimitedpresence,duetoChina’sgeographicproximityandthecurrentlevelsofeconomicandsecurityengagementbyotherregionalactors(Kangas).Nevertheless,RussiadoesretaininfluenceintheCentralAsia,asaresultofitshistorical, linguistic,andculturalconnections to the region (Laruelle; Dyet). Likewise, in Latin America, Russia lacks a sufficientamountofdeployableresourcesto fully implement itsstrategyortoextendits influenceveryfar(Ellis).However,asDr.BarnettS.KovenandMs.AbigailC.Kampobserve,RussiamakesupforitsshortcomingsbyengaginginepisodicandreactiveendeavorstodisruptUSinfluenceintheregion.

AlthoughRussiantacticsvarysignificantly,inallregionsoftheworldenergyhasbeenakeysourceofRussianpowerandinfluence(Weitz;Lamoreaux;Borshchevskaya;Devyatkin;Pyatkov;Werchan).Globally,manycountrieshavedevelopedastrongrelationshipwithRussiawhenitcomestoenergy.Russia’s energy priorities extend worldwide, and European nations in particular have becomedependentonRussiaforaccesstotheseresources.AfricaandtheArctichavealsobecomesignificantasRussialookstoexploitopportunitiesforenergy-relatedcommerce.

DespitethestrengthofRussia’sgrowinginfluenceabroadandthediversearrayofgrayzonetacticsitusestoachieveitsstrategicgoals,theUScanstilllimittheresultsofthisgrandstrategy.ThereisbroadconsensusamongthecontributorsthatcounteringRussianprovocationswillrequiretheuseofall instrumentsofnationalpower.Inparticular,USsuccesswillbereliantbothonitsabilitytoinfluencepopulations,states,andnon-stateactors,andonitsabilitytominimizeRussia’sinfluenceon theseactors(Bragg).Creatingeffectivenarratives ineachof theregionscovered in thiswhitepaperwillbecriticalforachievingthisgoal(Kangas;Bragg).Furthermore,theUScancounterspecificRussian gray zone activities, such as diversifying energy sources to reduce European nations’dependenceonRussia(Pyatkov;Werchan)andcounteractingpropagandabycreatingbothresilientdemocratic institutions and populations abroad, particularly in Europe (Pyatkov). Finally, it isimperativethattheUSestablishesaconsensusdefinitionof“grayzone”(Bragg)andreevaluatesoldparadigmsdefiningwarandpeace,asweentera“neweraofinternationalpoliticswhichisdefinedbyshadesofgray”(Weitz).Oncedefined,afederalagencydedicatedtograyzoneactivitiesmayberequired in order to implement a true whole of government approach to combatting Russianinfluenceactivitiesabroad(Werchan).

1Russiahasmilitary,geostrategic,cultural,andpoliticalinterestsandobjectivesintheseregionsaswell.


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Report Overview

Thiswhitepaperhasbeenseparatedintofiveparts:

Part I analyzes the key sources ofmotivation or interests that drive Russian global competitiveactivitiesandstrategy.Thispartalsoaddresses the fundamental issuesbeingcontestedandhowtheseissuesimpactenduringUSnationalinterests.

PartIIexamines,fromaRussianperspective,whatconstituteslegitimateoracceptabledeterrence,compellence, and/or escalation management. Part II also evaluates how Russia perceives thecontinuumofconflict,aswellashowitplansfor,operateswithin,andmanagesriskwithinthegrayzone.Lastly,PartIIassessestheimplicationsofthedifferencesbetweenUSandRussianthinkingforseniorpoliticalandmilitarydecisionmakers.

PartIIIidentifiesactionstheRussiansareundertakingintheGrayZoneacrossthefollowingregions:a)Europe,b)CentralAsiaandChina,c)theMiddleEast,d)Africa,e)LatinAmerica,andf)theArctic.

Part IV identifiespotentialactions that theUScouldemployeitherproactivelyor in response toprovocativeRussianactivitiesinthegrayzoneacrossthefollowingregions:a)Europe,b)CentralAsiaandChina,c)theMiddleEast,d)Africa,e)LatinAmerica,andf)theArctic.

PartVhighlightscapabilitiesthattheUSrequirestoeffectivelyrespondtoactionstheRussiansareundertakinginthegrayzone.

Part I. What Drives Russia’s Global Interests and Strategy?

Chapter1:Dr. JeremyW.Lamoreaux identifies threemotivationsunderpinningRussian grandstrategy: (1) for the country to be recognized as a great power with its own distinct sphere ofinfluence;(2)theRussianeliteperceptionthatRussiahasamoralrighttopredominancewithin“its”sphereofinfluence;and(3)thedesiretoseeUSglobalinfluencecurbedand,ifpossible,scaledback.

Chapter2:Usingthemilitary’straditionalunderstandingof“strategy”asthecoordinatedintegrationofends,ways,andmeans,Dr.RobertPersonexplicatesRussiangrandstrategy.Themain“end”ofRussiangrandstrategyinthe21stcenturyisestablishingisa"Yalta2.0,"inwhichRussiaenjoysanuncontestedsphereof influenceinthepost-Sovietregion,broadcastsRussianvoiceandinfluenceglobally, and establishes reliable constraints on American globe-trotting and regime-changeactivities. Russia's ways can be described as one of “asymmetric balancing" through gray zonechallenges to prevent uncontested US influence from setting the global agenda. Russia's means,Personargues,expandedwiththeoilboom,allowingcriticalinvestmentsandincreasesindefensespendingtobemade.

Chapter3:Usingsurveydata,Dr.ThomasSherlockshowsthatneithertheRussianmasspublic,norRussiaelites,believe that theWest,particularly theUnitedStates,posesacriticalmilitaryorpoliticaldangertotheRussianstateorregime.WhilebothelitesandmembersofthemasspublicaresupportiveofrestoringRussia’sgreatpowerstatus,theyoftendefineagreatpoweranditsprioritiesmoreintermsofdomesticsocio-economicdevelopmentthanintheproductionanddemonstrationofhardpower.TheseperspectivesincreasinglycomeintoconflictwiththoseofKremlin.

Chapter 4: Dr. Richard Weitz explores key motivations and interests driving Russian globalcompetitiveactivitiesandstrategies.HediscusseshowRussianstrategistsadeptlyselectgrayzone


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tools optimized to their objectives. These tools often include paramilitary forces, economic andenergyexploitation,andmediaandpropagandamanipulation.HesuggeststhatWashingtonmustreevaluateoldparadigmsbetweenwarandpeacetomaintainstrategicprimacyinthisneweraofinternationalpoliticsthatisdefinedbyshadesofgray.

Chapter 5: Dr. ChristopherMarsh takes on one of themost significant questions surroundingRussianforeignpolicy:whetherpresidentVladimirPutinhasanoverarchingstrategy.Inhispaper,he describes Putin’s grand strategy for Russia and the world. He also analyzes each of Russia’sinterestsandtowhatdegreetheyposeathreattovitalUSnationalinterests.

Part II. How Does Russia Perceive Deterrence, Compellence, Escalation Management, and the Continuum of Conflict?

Chapter6:Dr.DanielGourearguesthataccordingtoRussianstrategicthought,RussiaisalreadyatwarwiththeWest.Thereisnoseparateconceptofgrayzone:warisnottotal,butitisfundamentaltotheRussianperspective.ItfollowsthatRussia’sabilitytomanageriskintheso-calledgrayzoneisafunctionofitssuccessfulintegrationofalltheinstrumentsofstatepower.

Chapter7:Mr.Daniel J. FlynndescribesRussian coercive strategies involving the orchestratedemploymentofnonmilitaryandmilitarymeanstodeterandcompeltheUnitedStatespriortoandafter any outbreak of hostilities. The risk to the US is that these strategies increase the risk ofmiscalculationandescalationduringafuturecrisisinvolvingtheUnitedStates.

Part III. What Gray Zone Actions Are Russia Undertaking Across the Globe?

Chapter 8: Dr. John Schindler identifies Russian activities in Europe within a historical andideologicalframework.Indoingso,heidentifieskeysimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthePutinregime and Tsarist Russia, as well as the regime and the Soviet Union. Present day Russianinstitutionsandreligiousdiscourseareexamined,andDr.SchindlerpredictsthattheKremlinwillactaggressivelyinanumberofdomains,includingthefewinwhichitholdsanadvantageagainsttheUnited States and its allies. He suggests that a near-term future of “Special War” (i.e. low-leveloperationsthatfallbelowthethresholdofdeclaredwar)willbetheRussianmodusoperandiandcautionsUSandalliedpolicymakerstoguardagainstsuchactions.

Chapter9:Dr.JeremyW.LamoreauxexplainsthatthelistofRussianactivitiesinEuroperemainslongandcomplex,andthemeansthattheKremlinusestosowinstabilityspangeopolitics,economics,diplomacy,andmilitarydomains.Inthischapter,Dr.LamoreauxpaysspecialattentiontoRussia’sabilitytopropagatesocietaldiscord,particularlythroughRussian-linkedpopulationsintheBalticStates.Thesepopulations,whetheractiveorpassiveparticipantsinacampaign,arevulnerabletoRussianactionsaimedatweakeningsocialcohesioninthesestates.Shortofeachsidegrudginglyacceptingtheother’sclaimsonthecontinent(whichisimprobable),RussiaandtheWestarelikelytobelockedinatsomelevelofcompetitionforthenearfuture.

Chapter10:Dr.MarleneLaruellestatesthat,despiteamorecrowdedfieldoflargestatesvyingforinfluence in Central Asia, Russia still retains a prime position as “first among equals,” due to itshistorical, linguistic, and cultural connections to states in the region. Towit, Russia can exerciseremunerative,punitive,andideologicalpoweroverthestateswithinthebloc.Ithastriedtodevelopitsdiplomatic,economic,andmilitaryrelationshipswithstatesintheregion,withvaryingdegreesofsuccess. Even though the space for great powers to exert influence has becomemore crowded,


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becauseofrelativelyrecentoverturesbyChinaandtheUnitedStates,thisregionisnotnecessarilyasiteofzero-sumstatistcompetition,duetosharedobjectivesbythesegreatpowers.

Chapter11:Dr.MarkN.Katzexplainsthat,althoughtheUnitedStatesandRussiashareanumberofobjectivesintheMiddleEast,themeansbywhichRussiaseekstoachievetheseobjectiveswilllikelycontinuetobringitintoconflictwiththeUnitedStates.TheKremlinhaspurporteditselfasareliable interlocutor and partner to Middle Eastern nations, some of whom fear waveringcommitmentbytheUnitedStatesrecently.AnimatedlargelybyfearsofarestiveMuslimpopulationthatcouldendupwithinhisborders,inadditiontoeconomicandprestigeconcerns,VladimirPutinhasbeenconductingdeftdiplomacywithintheregion.However,hisstrategyisvulnerabletoshockstothesystemandmaynotbeabletowithstandArabSpring/ColorRevolution-styleuprisingswithintheregion.

Chapter 12: Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya highlights Russia’s series of multi-faceted outreachinitiativesinAfrica.Througheconomic,military,andothermeans,RussiaiscreatinganintentionaldependenceamongNorthAfrica’smilitary,politicalleadersandbusinessmenoncontinuousRussiansupport. For more autocratic regimes, Russia’s support is intended to provide a shield againstWesterninfluenceintheareathroughformingallianceswiththecountry’sstrongmen,whileservingasanintermediaryforlocalconflictresolution.Russia’skeyinterestsincludegainingandprotectingaccesstotheMediterraneancoast,whileexploitingopportunitiesforenergyandtrade.Theintentoftheseeffortsisincreasedpoliticalleverage,ratherthanagenuineresolutionforthepeopleofNorthAfrica.

Chapter13:Ms.MalinSeverinarguesthatRussiabelievesthatitiscurrentlyengagedinamulti-facetedconflictwiththeWest,andisconstrainedbyWesternpoliciesandactions.Assuch,Russiahas established several footholds in Africa. The Russian presence goes beyond seeking naturalresources;RussiahasplacedprivatemilitarycontractorsandadvisorsintoseveralAfricanregimes,includingtheCentralAfricanRepublic,amongothers.TheseactionsreflectastrategysimilartothatrevealedthroughRussianactivitiesintheUkraineandSyria,andinvolvementislikelytoincreaseastheUSpotentiallytakesstepstolimitWesternpresenceinAfrica.

Chapter14:Dr.R.EvanEllisexplainsthatRussianactivityinLatinAmerica,whileconstrainedbyresources and geopolitical events, has been historically focused on the Cuban, Venezuelan, andNicaraguanregimes,althoughitisnotlimitedsolelytothoseregimes.Byattemptingtocreatebotheconomicandmilitaryfootholds,Russiaseeksopportunitiestoexpandits influenceintheregion.Despitesetbacksduetoregionalevents,RussiaislikelytocontinuetoexplorewaystoleverageandexploitopportunitiesforincreasingbothitsmilitaryandeconomicpresenceinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.

Chapter15:Mr.PavelDevyatkinwritesthatRussia’sactivitiesintheArctichaveincludedmoremultilateralcooperation,andhavebeenfocusedonsecuringaccessfornorthernshippingroutesandenergyextraction.TheformationoftheArcticCouncilbetweenRussiaandotherArcticcountrieshasenabled cooperationon resolutionof territorial claims, aswell asoil spill and search-and-rescueoperations.Strategically,theArcticregionplaysasignificantroleinRussia’senergy,economic,anddefensepriorities,asevidencedbythesizeandactivitiesoftheNorthernFleet,aswellasfrequentmentioninRussianpublisheddoctrine.


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Part IV. How Should the US Counteract Russian Gray Zone Activities Across the Globe?

Chapter 16: Mr. Roman “Comrade” Pyatkov discusses potential global actions to counterprovocativeRussianactivities.TheUSNationalDefenseStrategy(NDS)callsoutRussianactionstoundermineNATOandmodifyEuropeanandMiddleEasternsecurityandeconomicorganizationsinits favor(NationalDefenseStrategysummary,p.2).CounteringRussianprovocationsrequiresallinstrumentsofnationalpower,andUSresponsescanbebothproactiveandreactive.Proactively,theUnited States can strengthen its allies’ and partners’ democratic systems of governance, whilereducingtheirdependenceonRussianenergythroughdiversificationofenergysources.TocounterRussian military proxies, the United States can increase the capabilities of allies and partners.Meanwhile,RussianthreatstouseforcecanbemitigatedbydemonstratingUSresolveandcapabilitytodeteranddefeatRussianaggression.

Chapter17:Dr.JeremyW.LamoreauxfocusesoncounteringRussianinfluenceintheBalticStates.HewritesthatRussianinfluenceinEuropehappensprimarilythrough“hybridwarfare”techniques.Tocounterthis,theUnitedStatesoughttotakestepstostrengtheneconomic,political,andsocietalliberalism across Europe. Economic and political liberalism both create strong states, capable ofprovidingtheinstitutionsnecessaryforsocietalliberalism.Societalliberalism,whenitisupheldbytheruleoflaw,helpscreateamorediverse,yetunited,populacethatismorecommittedtothestateanditsbasicinstitutions,andlesslikelytobeinfluencedbyoutsidesources(inthiscase,Russia).

Chapter18:Dr.RogerKangasrecommendsaUSapproachtoRussianactivitiesacrossCentralAsia.He begins by discussing the particular difficulties of Central Asia, geopoltically. Among the sub-regionsof theworld, theareaofCentralAsia isoneof themoredifficult regions tooutline clearactionsfortheUS,simplybecauseoftheadvantagesthatotherlargepowershave,duetogeographicproximityandcurrentratesofeconomicandsecurityengagement.GiventhisgeopoliticalrealityinCentralAsia,theUShasalimitedroletoplay.Ifthe“toolsofengagement”areexercisedconsistentlyandclearly,theUScanhaveapositiveinfluenceintheregion.Thecountriescollectivelychafeatthatnotiontheyarepartofa“RussianNearAbroad.”Officialsandanalystsfromtheregionrepeatedlydiscuss theneed tochoose their futurepathsofengagement,whether in termsofmulti-vectoredsecurityrelationsordiversifyingtradeandexport/importroutes.ThesesignalscanbeaddressedbyUSpoliciesandactions.TherefrainfromneedingtheUStoactasa“balancer”isheardfromsuchactors,aswellasmanyintheWashington,DCthinktankcommunitythatfocusonCentralAsia.Todothis,theUSmustbeabletoshapeitsownnarrativeintheregion,combattingarathervitriolicRussianmessagethatpaintstheUSinanegativelight.

Chapter19:Dr.RobertSpaldingIIIdiscusseshowtheUSrolewithregardtoRussiashouldbetocontinuetoengageEuropeanalliestotaketheleadforbalancinginEurope.Theallies’goalshouldbedeterrence.Atthesametime,theUSshouldbilaterallyengageRussiatopeelthemawayfromChina’sorbit. The US can work with Russia in ways that improve the US-Russia relationship withoutdetractingfromEuropeaneffortstobalanceanddeter.ThiscanbeappliedbyengagingwithRussiainotherregionalorfunctionaldomainsthatdonotdetractfromEuropeaneffortstodeter.

Chapter20:MAJAdamDyetarguesthat,whilethebreakupoftheSovietUnionpresentedtheUSwith new engagement opportunities in Central Asia, options to expand US influence in the arearemain limited.Heargues thatdespiteCentralAsian ire atRussianactivities inUkraine,Russianinfluenceinthearearemainshigh,andUSpolicymakersshouldtakeacarefullymoderatedapproachtoengagementinCentralAsia.Suggestionsofdiplomatic,security,andeconomicactivitiesthattheUScouldundertakeareoffered,asarecautionsabouttreadingoverlong-standingRussianredlines.


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Chapter21:MAJAdamDyetdiscussesavarietyofwaysinwhichtheUnitedStatescanrespondtoRussiangrayzoneactivitiesintheMiddleEast—thebalanceofwhich,heargues,aredirectlytiedtoRussianstrategiccultureandaworldviewbasedinahistoryofinvasionandmilitaryencirclement.

Chapter 22: Dr. Joseph Siegle discusses Russian interests in Africa, namely access to naturalresourcesandnewmarketsforRussiangoods,includingweapons.Hearguesthat,asaresult,Russiahastendedtosupportautocraticoruninclusiveregimes,givingtheUSanopportunitytodistinguishitself in Africa by pursuing an assertive policy against individual corrupt leaders and positiveengagement,whilealsosupportingdemocraticreforms.

Chapter23:Dr.BarnettS.KovenandMs.AbigailC.KampexplainthatRussia’sactivitiesinLatinAmericahavelargelybeenanextensionofitseffortstooperatewithinthegrayzonebetweenovertmilitary conflict andnormalpeacetimeoperations. InLatinAmerica, theKremlinhas engaged inelectoralmeddlingandtargeteddisinformationcampaignsinordertoimposecostsonadversaries.InMexico,Russianmediahadvocallysupportedachosencandidate,andobserversnotedactivitybybotsandtrollsinsupportofthatcandidate’sagenda.InColombia,RussiahadlongsuppliedarmstotheRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FARC),aleftistinsurgency,butsincethegroup’srecentpeace dealwith the Colombian government, theKremlinmay need to change tactics in order tomaintaininfluencetherein.Colombia’scomplexpoliticaldynamics,nevertheless,providesafertileground for Russian activities, spanning electoral meddling, mass media disinformation, andhardlinerswithintheFARC.

Part V. What Capabilities Does the US Need to Effectively Respond to Russian Gray Zone Activities?

Chapter24:Dr.BelindaBraggprovidesasummaryoffindingsfromanSMAprojectongrayzoneconflict,notingtheimportanceofhoningacleardefinitionofthe“competitivezone”withinwhichgrayactivitiesoccur.ShealsonotesthataneffectiveUSresponsetotheseactivitiesrequiresaddedcapabilities to both influence foreign populations and block the efforts of others to manipulatepopularsentiment.

Chapter 25:Mr. Jason Werchan argues that Russia’s form of governance gives it “significantflexibility”andanadvantageovertheUSwhenitcomestograyzoneactivities.TheUSneedsatruewhole-of-government approach to counter Russia in this area. Werchan suggests that the USgovernment should identify a lead federal agency for US activities in the gray zone. He alsoencouragesthedevelopmentoftheUS’s“capabilitytoeffectivelyfosterdistrustanduneasebetweentheRussiaFederationandChina,”aswellasUSeffortstoreduceEuropeandependenceonRussianenergyresources.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS USArmyTRADOCPreface ii LtGenTheodoreMartin(USArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC))

JointStaffPreface iv RDMLJeffreyJ.Czerewko(JointStaff,J39)

USEUCOMPreface v Mr.JasonWerchan(USEUCOMStrategyDivision&RussiaStrategicInitiative(RSI))

OpeningRemarks:NavalPostgraduateSchoolPerspective vi Dr.JohnArquilla(NavalPostgraduateSchool)

ExecutiveSummary vii

PARTI.WHATDRIVESRUSSIA’SGLOBALINTERESTSANDSTRATEGY? 1

Chapter1.TheThreeMotivationsforanAssertiveRussianGrandStrategy 1Dr.JeremyW.Lamoreaux(BrighamYoungUniversity-Idaho)

Chapter2.RussianGrandStrategyinthe21stCentury 7Dr.RobertPerson(UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint)

Chapter3.RussianPublicOpinionasaPotentialObstacletoAggressiveExternalBehaviorbytheKremlin 14

Dr.ThomasSherlock(UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint)

Chapter4.Moscow’sGrayZoneToolkit 21Dr.RichardWeitz(CenterforPolitical-MilitaryAnalysisattheHudsonInstitute)

Chapter5.Putin’sGrandStrategyandUSNationalInterests 26Dr.ChristopherMarsh(SpecialOperationsResearchAssociation)

PartII:HOWDOESRUSSIAPERCEIVEDETERRENCE,COMPELLENCE,ESCALATIONMANAGEMENT,ANDTHECONTINUUMOFCONFLICT? 32

Chapter6.RussianStrategicInterests 32Dr.DanielGoure(LexingtonInstitute)

Chapter7.Russia’sEvolvingApproachtoDeterrence 37 Mr.DanielJ.Flynn(OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence(ODNI))

PARTIII.WHATGRAYZONEACTIONSARERUSSIANSUNDERTAKINGACROSSTHEGLOBE? 43

EUROPEChapter8.RussianActivitiesAcrossEurope(AContrarianAssessment) 43

Dr.JohnSchindler(TheLocarnoGroup)

Chapter9.RussianActivitiesinEurope 49Dr.JeremyW.Lamoreaux(BrighamYoungUniversity-Idaho)

CENTRALASIA


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Chapter10.RussianActivitiesinCentralAsia 53 Dr.MarleneLaruelle(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity)

THEMIDDLEEASTChapter11.RussianActivitiesintheMiddleEast 58

Dr.MarkN.Katz(GeorgeMasonUniversity,ScharSchoolofPolicyandGovernment)

AFRICAChapter12.RussianActivitiesinAfrica 62

Ms.AnnaBorshchevskaya(TheWashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicy)

Chapter13.RussianActivitiesinAfrica(Continued) 70 Ms.MalinSeverin(UKMinistryofDefenceDevelopment,ConceptsandDoctrine

Centre(DCDC))

LATINAMERICAChapter14.RussianActivitiesinLatinAmerica 76

Dr.R.EvanEllis(U.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute)

THEARCTICChapter15.RussianActivitiesintheArctic 82

Mr.PavelDevyatkin(TheArcticInstitute)

PARTIV.HOWSHOULDTHEUSCOUNTERACTRUSSIANGRAYZONEACTIVITIESACROSSTHEGLOBE? 91

OVERVIEWChapter16.PotentialGlobalActionstoCounterProvocativeRussianActivities 91

Mr.Roman“Comrade”Pyatkov(HAF/A3KCHECKMATE)

EUROPEChapter17.CounteringRussianInfluenceintheBalticStates 95

Dr.JeremyW.Lamoreaux(BrighamYoungUniversity-Idaho)

CENTRALASIAChapter18.RecommendedUSResponsetoRussianActivitiesAcrossCentralAsia 99

Dr.RogerKangas(NationalDefenseUniversity,NearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudies)

Chapter19.RespondingtoRussianGrayZoneActivityinCentralAsia 104 MAJAdamDyet(U.S.Army,J5-PolicyUSCENTCOM)

CHINAChapter20.RebalancinginEuropetoReduceRussian-ChineseTies 108

Dr.RobertSpaldingIII(U.S.AirForce)

THEMIDDLEEASTChapter21.RespondingtoRussianGrayZoneActivityintheMiddleEast 111

MAJAdamDyet(U.S.Army,J5-PolicyUSCENTCOM)

AFRICAChapter22.USResponsetoRussianActivitiesinAfrica 117

Dr.JosephSiegle(AfricaCenterforStrategicStudies,NationalDefenseUniversity)

LATINAMERICAChapter23.WeaponizingPeace:Colombia’sDemobilizedFARCasaLevelerofRussian


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Influence 123Dr.BarnettKoven(NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START))andMs.AbigailC.Kamp(START)

PARTV.WHATCAPABILITIESDOESTHEUSNEEDTOEFFECTIVELYRESPONDTORUSSIANGRAYZONEACTIVITIES? 129

Chapter24.DefiningtheCompetitiveZonetoAidIdentificationofCriticalCapabilities 129Dr.BelindaBragg(NSI,Inc.)

Chapter25.RequiredUSCapabilitiesforCombattingRussianActivitiesAbroad 135Mr.JasonWerchan(USEUCOMStrategyDivision&RussiaStrategicInitiative(RSI))

Biographies 138


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Lamoreaux APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 1

PART I. WHAT DRIVES RUSSIA’S GLOBAL INTERESTS AND STRATEGY?

Chapter 1. The Three Motivations for an Assertive Russian Grand Strategy

Dr.JeremyW.LamoreauxBrighamYoungUniversity-Idaho

[email protected]

Abstract

TheUS’sagendainEurope,asithasbeenforthebetterpartof80years,istopromoteandprotectaninternational liberalorder, includingpolitical,economicandsocietal liberalization.SpreadingthisagendatoEasternEuropehasprovedchallengingasRussia’sownpolitical,economicandsocietalagendawithin theregionoftenopposes theWestern ideal.Oneof themostsignificantsourcesofconflict(potentialandreal)betweenRussiaandtheUSinEuropeisthedifferingperceptionsofhowtheglobalinternationalsystemoughttobe.TheUSseesEurope,Western,CentralandEastern,aspart of theUS-led liberal international order inwhichpolitical, economic and societal liberalismpromote a vibrant, dynamic and open system. Russia’s perception, however, is that the globalinternationalsystemoughttobeabalanceofpowerswheredifferingpowersliveandletlive,whereonepowerdoesnotforceitsideologiesontheother.Inthisaccounting,EasternEurope(andevenpartsofCentralEurope)werepartofRussia’ssphereofinfluenceandstilloughttobe.Russiahasgiven every indication that they do not intend to back down in what was once their sphere ofinfluence, and uses these differences as justification for its annexation of Crimea, support forseparatistsinDonbass,andcontinuedsupportforfrozenconflictsinGeorgia,Moldova,andbetweenAzerbaijanandArmenia.Assuch, theUS faces thechallengeofpromoting itsownagendawithinEuropewhilenotprovokingRussia.Thispaper looksatpotential roadblocks toengagingRussiaconstructively,aswellaspotentialavenuesmovingforward.

Russia’s Grand Strategy and Its Impact on US National Interests

TheprimaryfocusofthisanalysisisEasternEurope,specificallytheBalticStatesastheonlymembersoftheEUandNATOthatarealsoformerSovietstates.Arguably,thisregioniswheretheUS-RussiatensionsinEuropecometoahead.TheanalysisalsoindirectlytouchesonWesternEurope,aswellasnon-EU/NATOcountriesinEasternEuropesuchasMoldova,Ukraine,andGeorgia.

Three Drivers of Russia’s Competitive Activities and Strategy

Of the various motivations driving Russia’s global activities and strategy, three of them areparticularlyimportantforunderstandingRussia’sgeneralstrategicaims:thedesiresharedbytheRussianeliteforRussiatoberecognizedasagreatpower,thedesiretoprotectRussianidentityandabroaderSlavicidentity,andthedesiretoseetheUSglobalpowerlimited.Theanalysisaddresseachoftheseinturn.

ThefirstmotivationsharedamongRussia’selite,isforthecountrytoberecognizedasagreatpowerwithitsowndistinctsphereofinfluence(Petro,2018;Sergunin,2017).



Russiastillseestheglobalsystemasagreatpower/balanceofpowersystemwithdistinctspheresofinfluenceforeachgreatpower.However,oneishardpressedtolabelthecurrentsystema“greatpower”systemparticularlybecauseanyclaimstoaglobalbalanceofpowerismisleading.TheUSiscurrentlythedominantglobalactormilitarily,economically,and(arguably)evenideologically.WhilesomeactorscanrivaltheUSinfluenceonone,oreventwo,ofthesemeasurements(forexample,theEU on economic and ideological influence), no other actors can rival the US across all thesemeasurements. Indeed, even if the EU is considered as a potential balancer to US economicdominance, the concept of liberal internationalism is still the predominant “global” political-economicideology,anideologythatboththeUSandtheEUshare.Evenwould-berivalssuchasChinaarenotblindtotheliberalnatureoftheglobaleconomy.NorisRussia.Russiacertainlywantstobea great power, and are increasing their military spending accordingly, but in all three above-mentionedmetrics,theyarestillfarbehindtheUS(Kuhrt&Feklyunina,2017).

Thedesiretobeagreatpowerstemsnotonlyfromaperceptionoftheworldasagreatpowersystem,butalsofromasharedperceptionamongRussianeliteofaRussiansphereofinfluence.Historically,ofcourse,Russiawasnotonlyaglobalgreatpower,butthepredominantpowerwithinEurasia,withpredominance even extending as far west as Poland, as far east as Japan, and as far south asAzerbaijan.AsRussia’seliteseesthings,mostofthisstillshouldconstitutestheirsphereofinfluence.Therearetwoself-servingjustificationsforthebeliefstheelitehold.Thefirstreasonisthe300-yearhistoryofRussianpoliticaldominationintheseareas.Second,andevenmoreimportant(andmoredifficulttocounter),istheperceptionofadivinemandatetocontrolanyplacewhereethincSlavs(historically,“Rus”)areapredominantethnicity.(Thisisdiscussedmoreindepthinthefollowingsection.)

Granted,theKremlineliterecognizethattheirinfluenceinEasternEuropeiscurrentlylimited.And,theyrecognizethattheSovietUnionnolongerexists,dejure(though,itscollapsewascalledonethegreatestgeopoliticaldisasterofthepastcenturybyVladimirPutin).Theseinconveinces,however,donotchangethefactthat,accordingtotheKremlin,alltheseregionsstilloughttobetheirsphereofinfluence.Russianelitedesiresforcontrolandordermeanthatforordertoberestored,Russiamustagainberecognizedinitsrightfulplaceasagreatpowerandbeallowedtocontroltheirownsphereofinfluence.

ThesecondmotivationdrivingRussia’sforeignpolicyistheRussianeliteperceptionthatRussiahasamoralrighttopredominancewithin“its”sphereofinfluence.

Thisargument,thatRussiahastherighttoregionaldominancefordivineandethnicpurposes,stemsfrommorethan1000yearspreviouswhenPrinceVladimirwasbaptizedin988(Petro,2018).WhenheconvertedtoChristianity,specificallyRussianOrthodoxy,hebroughtwithhimhispeople,the‘Rus’who,more than1000years later, compriseRussians,Belarusians,Ukrainians, andquitepossiblyMoldovans,Kazakhstanis,andotherSlavicethnicities(Suslov,2015).Throughoutthefollowing1000years, thepolitical and religious elite in the regiondeveloped stronger ties to the extent that, atpresent, they lend each other legitimacy and support each other ideologically andmonetarilyImportantly, the conversionhappened inwhat ispresent-dayCrimea, currentlyunderKremlincontrol.Consequently,forgeopoliticalandspiritualreasons,TheKremlin(incoordinationwiththeRussianOrthodoxChurch)claimstherightanddutyofprotectingthespiritualandtemporalwellbeingof“Rus”,notallofwhomliveinRussia(Kelly,2018).

The thirdmotivationdrivingRussian foreignpolicy (and, stemming from the firstmotivation forgreat-powerrecognitionandaglobalbalanceofpower)isthedesiretoseeUSglobalinfluencecurbedand,ifpossible,scaledback.ItmakessensethatagloballydominantUSdoesnotportendwellfora



balanceofgreatpowersorfordistinctspheresofinfluence.Itisdeviantfromtheacceptablenormsin thegreatpowersystem.This isreflected inUS involvement in theMiddleEast,Asiaand,mostdamning,thespreadofNATOacrosseasternEuropeandeventheformerSovietBalticStates,allareaswhereRussiaseesthemselvesashavingarightfulclaimtoinfluenceinsteadoftheUS.

Furthermore, according to the Kremlin view, the US supports regime change in less-democraticcountriesthroughdemocratizingrevolutionsacrosstheMiddleEastandinUkraineandGeorgia,andthroughsupportingpro-democracyprotestsinRussiain2011-2012.Tomakemattersevenworse,inRussia’seyes, theverynatureofdemocracy isunstable(itdoesnothingto furthercontrolandorderwithinasociety,butfacilitatesjusttheopposite),andirregularresultsoverthepastfewyears(Trump’selection,Brexit,riseofnationalistpartiesinEurope,andthespateofelection-tamperingallegations…ironically, many directly against Russia…) illustrate just how unstable, and evenhypocritical,democraciescanbe(Taylor,2018).

ThebottomlineisthatRussiawantsglobalorder,specificallyintheformofabalanceofpower,whichwouldleavethemfreetoexercise,andenforce,controlwithin“their”sphereofinfluence.Forthattohappen,theinfluenceoftheUSmustbecurbed,atleast,andscaledbackifpossible.

Contested Issues

Theprimaryfundamentalissuebeingcontestediswhethertheglobalsystemisabalance-of-powersystemwhereinnation-statearestilltheprimaryactors,orwhetherwe’vetransitionedtoaUS-ledinternational liberal order. The reality seems to be somewhere in between. If the internationalsystemisaliberalorder,anystatehasarighttoparticipateincludingthosestatesthattheKremlinviewsasintheirsphereofinfluence.ThisranklesRussianpolicymakers.

If,however,theweareinabalance-of-powersystem,thequestionbecomeswhohaspreeminenceinEasternEurope.Accordingtooneperspective,therearethreedifferentpotentialgreat-powersforthatarea:theUS(withNATOasanimportanttool),anon-NATOWesternEuropeintheformoftheEU,andRussia(Oliver,2016).Unfortunately,thereisnosimpleanswerasallthree“greatpowers”wieldacertainlevelofinfluence.Atadeeperlevel,however,arethreesub-issues.First,whohasthe“right”toinfluenceinEasternEurope?Second,whohastherighttodictatepolicyvis-à-visethnicRussiansandethnicSlavsmorebroadly?Third,whatareappropriatetoolsforinfluence?

Asregardsthefirstsub-issue,allthreeactorsclaima“right”tohaveinfluenceinEasternEurope.OnRussia’spart,muchofEasternEuropebelongedtothematsomepointinhistoryand,accordingtohistorical precedent, they claim a historical prerogative to influence there (Roberts, 2017).Furthermore,theyshareacommonculture(inlargepartbecauseofasharedhistory)withmanyoftheethnicandlinguisticgroupsinEasternEurope.Thisincludesnotonlythosegroupswhoshareasimilar language or ethnicity, but also the largeRussian diaspora spread across Eastern Europe.Additionally,asEasternOrthodoxyisquiteprevalentacrossmuchofEasternEurope,RussiaandtheRussianOrthodoxChurch(ROC)continuetoclaimareligious/moralrighttoinfluenceintheregionasaprotectorsoforthodoxChristianity(Ziegler,2016).

WesternEuropeclaimsa“right”toinfluenceinEasternEuropeforsomereasonssimilartoRussia’s:asharedhistoryandasharedculture(Jakniūnaitė,2017).Theyevenclaimsomethingofamoral“right”,thoughsomewhatmoreremovedfromopenlyreligious-basedmoralismemanatingfromtheKremlinandtheROC.Rather,WesternEurope’smoralclaimtoinfluenceinEasternEuropestemspartlyfromasharedChristianhistory,butevenmoresofromtheguiltmanyinWesternEuropefeelfor “abandoning” eastern Europe to Soviet control following World War II (Mälksoo, 2009).



Importantly,though,thisguiltdoesnotuniteEuropeanelitesnearlytotheextentOrthodoxy(evenifnot practiced) unites Russia’s elites. Furthermore, Western Europe’s moral inclination to helpEasternEuropealsostems fromthebelief that the InternationalLiberalOrder(ILO:politicalandeconomicliberalization)reallydoesbenefitthoseitreaches.

TheUS“right”toinfluenceinEasternEuropemirrorsthelatterpartofWesternEurope’sjustification:partialguiltforabandoningEasternEurope,andpartialbeliefinthemoralbenefitsofliberalization.But, this lastpointaboutthemoralbenefitsof liberalizationalsodrawsomethingofadistinctionbetweentheUSandWesternEuropeanapproaches.TheUStendstoseethingsinblackandwhitewhileWesternEurope(andevenRussia)seesalotmoregray.Specifically,WesternEurope,whilestillquiteskepticalofRussia’sinterestsinEasternEurope,doesnotbelievethatEasternEuropemustsidewithRussiaortheWest:rather,thereisroomforcooperation,aviewalsoheldbyRussia,aslongasthesecountriesdonotleaveRussia’ssphereofinfluence(Molchanov,2017).

TheUS, on the other hand, tends to seeRussian influence in EasternEurope as largely negativebecauseitdisruptsthespreadofliberalism(Taylor,2018).Consequently,theUSisnotonlywillingto have influence in Eastern Europe, but also willing (and, arguably, eager) to inhibit Russia’sinfluencethere.Asthe“protector”ofpoliticalandeconomicliberalismglobally,theUShasthe“right”toprotectthoseliberalismsinEasternEurope,especiallyinthefaceofperceivedRussianoppositionto those trends. In otherwords, the US sees theworld through a lens similar to that of Russia,somethingofasphereofinfluence.But,whereRussiaseesgeographical/historical/moralspheresofinfluence,theUSseesgeopoliticalandideologicalspheresofinfluence.

Thesecondsub-issue(whohasarighttoinfluenceethnicRussiansandthosewhoshareasimilaridentity)isnotmuchdifferentfromthefirst,thoughthefocusnarrowssignificantlyfromEasternEurope in general, to Russians and those who share a common identity more specifically. Innarrowingdown, itmakesthediscussionallthemorevolatile.Russianotonlyclaimstherighttoprotect Russians on political and economic grounds, but also on religious grounds. And, thisprotection extends to others traditionally known as “Rus”, as well as other Eastern Orthodoxbelievers.Russia’sclaimstoinfluenceinEasternEuropeforhistorical,culturalandreligiousreasonsisalreadyastrongclaim.AddethnicRussianstothemix,andtheclaimbecomesdivinewithahealthydoseofnationalism.Underthiscombination,itbecomesvirtuallyimpossibletodissuadeRussiafrominsistingonasignificantsayinEasternEurope(Coyer,2015).

The third issue, toolappropriateness, isasmuchabouteffectivenessasabout jus inbello (or, thejusticeoftacticswithinconflict).FormuchofEasternEurope,theyarealreadyinstitutionallytiedwiththeWestboththroughtheEUandNATO.FromtheperspectiveoftheUSandWesternEurope,thisisaveryeffectivewaybothtospreadliberalismandtoalleviatetheguiltassociatedwiththeColdWar.Itanswersboththe“effective”question,andthe“just”question.However,Russia’stoolsareequally effective and, from their perspective, just. Theyhave tried formal political and economicapproaches(includinginvitingvariouseasternEuropeanstatesintoformalinstitutionssuchastheCSTOandtheEEA)buttheirofficialinfluenceisstillquitelimited.However,theirabilitytoinfluencecountriesthroughothermethodsisimpressive.Theirinfluencethroughtradepolicy,media(bothsocialandtraditional),electionmanipulation,saberrattling,andoutrightinvasionsandannexationshaveprovedveryeffectiveinkeepingmanyelitesintheUS,andWesternandEasternEurope,uneasyandunsurehowtoproceed(Conley,Mina,Stefanov,&Vladimirov,2016).



Impact on US National Interests

TheUSbenefitsgloballyfromthespreadofliberalism(Ravenhill,2017).TheILOmeansthattheUScanmaintainitsglobalinfluenceand,moreimportantly,itsentiredomesticpoliticalandeconomicsystem.Notonlythat,butthereisastrongbeliefsharedbypoliticalandsocietaleliteswithintheUSthatthespreadofliberalismtrulydoesmakeforabetterlifeforpeople,wherevertheymaybe.So,whenliberalismspreadsandcatcheson,ourinterestsaremetinternationallyanddomestically.This,intheory,createssomethingofapanaceafortheUnitedStates.

WesternEuroperepresentsthestrongestalliestheUShasinprotectingandpromotingliberalism.WithoutEurope,theUSisthearguablythelastpowerfulprotagonistofliberalism.TheUSneedsastrong,liberalWesternEurope.Tothatend,however,weneedastableEasternEuropewhereinisimbeddedliberalidealsjustlikethoseinWesternEurope.Theyprovidesomethingofabuffer,afrontline, between Western European liberalism and Russian illiberalism. In short, you have the USinterestinspreadingliberalismbuttingupagainstRussia’sinterestinpromotinggreatpowerpoliticsandspheresofinfluence,andEasternEuropeiscaughtinbothcross-hairs.

ThesourcesoffrictionbetweenRussianandliberalistperspectivesarethatneitherviewstheotherascompatible.Iftheinternationalliberalorderistosucceed,statesoughttobeallowedtoparticipatetotheextenttheywish.Russia’sdominanceofaspecificregionpreventsthis.However,ifpowersareto be balanced, one powers ideologies (and, thus, influence) should be considerably limited.Consequently,theUSseesRussiapreventingthespreadofinternationalliberalism,andRussiaseestheUSasinterferingoutsideofitsrightfulsphereofinfluence.

However,despitefriction,thesetwoperspectivesdonot,necessarilyneedtobemutuallyexclusive.AsasbeenevincedinacrosstheAsianTigers,inChina,andeven(attimes)inRussia,internationalliberalismdoesnothavetohappenallatonce.Statesdonotneedtoembracepolitical,economicandsocietal liberalism all at once (in fact, theWashington Consensus failures seem to indicate thatattemptingallthreeatoncedoesnotwork).Rather,theUSpushingeconomicliberalismmaybethebestway forward, specificallywithout pushing political liberalism. In regions already somewhatliberal,theUSisrighttopushsocietalliberalismandevenmorepoliticalliberalism.However,whereneithersocietalnorpoliticalliberalismhaveroots,econonimcliberalismisapotentuallyconsenuswayforward.

References

Conley,H.A.,Mina,J.,Stefanov,R.,&Vladimirov,M.(2016).TheKremlinplaybook:UnderstandingRussianInfluenceincentralandeasternEurope.Lanham:Rowman&Littlefield.

Coyer,P.(2015).(Un)holyalliance:VladimirPutin,theRussianOrthodoxChurchandRussianexceptionalism.Retrievedfromhttps://www.forbes.com/sites/paulcoyer/2015/05/21/unholy-alliance-vladimir-putin-and-the-russian-orthodox-church/#6d66ab7e27d5

Jakniūnaitė,D.(2017).InvestedinUkraine:ThestruggleofLithuaniaagainstRussiaoverthefutureofEurope.InG.Besier,&K.Stokłosa(Eds.),NeighbourhoodperceptionsoftheUkrainecrisis:FromtheSovietUnionintoEurasia?(pp.116-129).NewYork:Routledge.



Kelly,J.".M.(2018).Searchingforspiritualsecurity:ThetangledrelationshipoftheRussianOrthodoxChurch,theRussianstateandreligiousfreedom.UniversityofMiamiInternationalandComparativeLawReview,25,263-297.

Kuhrt,N.,&Feklyunina,V.(Eds.).(2017).AssessingRussia'spower:Areport.King'sCollegeLondonandNewcastleUniversity.

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Molchanov,M.A.(2017).Asqueezedcountry:UkrainebetweenEuropeandEurasia.InG.Besier,&K.Stokłosa(Eds.),NeighbourhoodperceptionsoftheUkrainecrisis:FromSovietUniontoEurasia?(pp.69-82).NewYork:Routledge.

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Petro,N.N.(2018).TheRussianOrthodoxChurch.InA.P.Tsygankov(Ed.),RoutledgeHandbookofRussianforeignpolicy(pp.217-232).London:Routledge.

Ravenhill,J.(Ed.).(2017).Globalpoliticaleconomy(5thed.).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Roberts,K.(2017).UnderstandingPutin:ThepoliticsofidentityandgeopoliticsinRussianforeignpolicydiscourse.InternationalJournal,72(1),28-55.

Sergunin,A.(2017).RussianperceptionsoftheUkrainiancrisis:Fromconfrontationtodamagelimitation?InG.Besier,&K.Stokłosa(Eds.),NeighbourhoodperceptionsoftheUkrainecrisis:FromSovietUniontoEurasia?(pp.41-68).NewYork:Routledge.

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Person APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 7

Chapter 2. Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century

Dr.RobertPersonUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint

[email protected]

Abstract

WhatarethemaincharacteristicsofRussiangrandstrategyinthe21stcentury?Thispaperarguesthatadeep-seatedsenseofgeopoliticalinsecuritymotivatesRussiatopursuestrategicobjectivestoestablishanuncontestedsphereofinfluencewithinthepost-Sovietregion,secureforRussiaaseatatthetableofothergreatpowersincriticalregionsoutsideitssphere,andcontainandconstrainAmerica’s unilateral and multilateral pursuit of its own interests globally. Since 2007, it hasdevelopedasophisticatedsetofgrayzonetacticsof“asymmetricbalancing”throughwhichRussiapursuesitsstrategicendswithinrelativelylimitedmeans.

Russian Grand Strategy

Thoughdefinitionsof“strategy”(grandorotherwise)abound,forthesakeofclaritythispaperwilladoptthemilitary’straditionalunderstandingof“strategy”asthecoordinatedintegrationofends,ways,andmeans(Lykke,2001).Grandstrategycanbeunderstoodas“thecollectionofplansandpolicies that comprise the states deliberate efforo harness political military, diplomatic, andeconomic tools together to advance that state’s national interest. Grand strategy is the art ofreconcilingendsandmeans.Itinvolvespurposiveaction”(Feaver,2009).Thus,whatmakessuchastrategy“grand”isthefocusonhigh-levelmattersofnationalinterest,aswellasthecomprehensiveuseofmilitary,political,economic,diplomatic,andevensocialtoolstoadvancethenationalinterests.

The “Ends” of Russian Grand Strategy

WhatarethecoreinterestsandoverarchingobjectivesoftheRussianFederationintheinternationalsystem–the“ends”thatRussiangrandstrategyseekstoachieve?ItisperhapsanuncontroversialclaimthatRussia’smostfundamentalinterestistosecureboththeRussianstateandthePutinregimeagainst foreignanddomestic threats.Ofcourse,anysensibleobserverwouldnotethat this is theobjectiveofanystateoperatingintheanarchicinternationalsystem.Indeedregimeandterritorial“security”asthecorenationalinterestsitsatthefoundationofmostrealisttheoriesofinternationalrelations(Waltz,2010;Mearsheimer,2001).Buthowstatesunderstandsecurity,howtheyperceivethreats, and how they respond to such threats is very much subject to national-level factors(Ripsman,Taliaferro,andLobell,2016).Asthefollowingdiscussionshows,Russia’sconceptionofitssecurityenvironment,thethreatstothatsecurity,anditsmethodsofachievingsecuritytakeonveryRussianflavors.Theseflavors—andthegrandstrategythattheyseason—aretheresultofawidearray of forces ranging fromgeography, history, domestic politics, culture, andof course, rivalryamongothergreatpowers.

If“nationalinterestassecurity”istoogeneraltobeofpracticaluse,wecandisaggregatethatbroadnationalinterestintothreekeyobjectivesthatsumtoagrandstrategythatIterm“Yalta2.0”duetoitssimilarityofthegrandstrategicvisionthatJosephStalintriedtoattainattheYaltaconferenceinFebruary1945.First,Russiaseekstoensureitsmilitary,political,andeconomicsecuritythroughanuncontestedandexclusivesphereof influence in the territory thatonce formed theSovietUnion(Graham,2016).Essentiallyasupercharged“MonroeDoctrine”forRussiainthepost-Sovietspace,



thisvisionwouldgiveRussiaaprivilegedpositionofinfluenceintheforeignanddomesticaffairsofthe countries in Russia’s sphere. Equally important, Yalta 2.0 denies other great powers frompursuinginterestsandinfluencewithinRussia’sexclusivesphereofinfluence.ItshouldbenotedthatestablishingasphereofinfluenceisnotsynonymouswiththereconstructionoftheSovietUnionortheannexationbyRussiaoftheformerSovietrepublics.ThoughthishasbeenclaimedasRussia’sobjective inrecentyears, it fundamentallymisreadsRussia’s trueobjective,which is toenjoy thebenefits of uncontested influence without bearing the cost of administering new territory andpopulations(Hill,2015).Second,thevisionofYalta2.0seeksforRussiaaseatatthetableanddecisivevoiceonissuesinregionswherearegionalgreatpowerisabsent(suchastheMiddleEast),orwheretherearemultiplegreatpowersintheregion(suchastheArctic).Inotherwords,itpositionsRussiaasaglobalplayerwithglobalinfluence.

ItshouldcomeaslittlesurprisethatthefirsttwopillarsofYalta2.0arelikelytogeneratesignificantfrictionwiththeUnitedStates,whichalsoseeksinfluenceinthepost-Sovietregionandthroughouttheentireglobe.Thisbringsustothethirdpillar:Inordertoachieveitsgrandstrategicobjectives,RussiaseekstocontainandconstraintheUnitedStates’unopposedunilateralpursuitofitsinterestsglobally.Thismandateismosturgentinthepost-Sovietregion.Inordertocarveoutitssphereofinfluence,RussiamustpushtheUnitedStatesoutoftheregion.Similarly,Russiamustmuscleitswayintoaseatatthetableinotherregionswhereitseeksinfluence,oftenbylimitingorcomplicatingwhatmayhavepreviouslybeenuncontestedAmericanpursuitofforeignpolicyobjectives.Finally,RussiamustpursueageneralstrategyofcomplicatingmattersfortheUnitedStatesandraisingthecostofaction,eveninregionswhereRussialacksadirectinterest.Bythrowingsand(orworse)intheUnitedStates’gearswhereveritcan,itmakesitmoredifficultfortheUStocarryoutitspolicyagenda in general. Importantly, most of the tactics used to pursue this objective of Americanconstraint arenot thoseof traditionalmilitarybalancing.Rather, they are tactics of “asymmetricbalancing,”whichIwilldiscussatgreaterlengthbelow.

Thesethreepillarsof“Yalta2.0”—uncontestedsphereofinfluenceinthepost-Sovietregion,Russianvoiceand influenceglobally,andconstraintof theUnitedStates—are themain “ends”ofRussiangrandstrategyinthe21stcentury.

The “Means” of Russian Grand Strategy

Inamomentwewillturnourattentiontoabroadoverviewofthe“ways”ofRussiangrandstrategy—thepoliciesthatMoscowhasimplementedinordertoachieveitsobjectives—andhowthosewayshaveevolvedoverthelast19years.Butfirstitisworthmakingbriefmentionofthematerialmeansthathaveenabledthoseways.OfparticularconsequenceinthisdiscussionisthefactthatRussia’sgrowing financial resources since 2000 have allowed it to pursue ever more assertive ways inpursuing its ends. After a traumatic decade of economic contraction in the 1990s, the 2000switnessedaperiodofmajoreconomicgrowthinRussia. Indeed,onlytheglobal financialcrisisof2008-9andthecollapseofoilpricesandpost-Crimeasanctionsin2014curtailedRussianeconomicgrowthinthePutinera(WorldBank,GDPpercapita,2019).

Between2000and2013,RussianGDPpercapitaincreasedbynearlyninetimes.ThemostcommonexplainationforRussia’seconomicexpansionisVladimirPutin’sstronghandonRussiaprovidedthestabilization that fueled Russia’s economic growth (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss, 2008, p. 68). Inactuality,Russia’srecoveryinthe2000scanlargelybeattributedtotherisingpriceofoil,onwhichtheRussianeconomy—andfederalbudget—aredependent(p.80).Butregardlessofwhodeservescredit, thereisnodisputingthefactthatthroughoutthe2000s,theresourceswhichRussiacouldapply toward its grand strategic objectives increased tremendously, such as a major military



modernization project in the aftermath of 2008 war with Georgia.. Data on Russian militaryexpenditures as percentage of GDP from2000-2016 showed that a broader economic expansionfueled expanded military spending: Larger defense expenditures (in absolute terms) were theconsequenceof risingGDPand risingdefense spending rates (WorldBank,Military expenditure,2019). To be sure, Russia’s pursuit of its grand strategic objectives goes well beyond militaryexpenditures,butitisclearthatRussia’sresourcesnecessarytopursuethe“ways”ofgrandstrategyhaveincreasedimmenselysince2000.Andthese increasedresources, Iargueinthenextsection,havehadaprofoundimpactonthenatureofthewaysinwhichRussiahaspursueditsgrandstrategy.

The “Ways” of Russian Grand Strategy

ThoughthestrategicobjectivesofRussiainthe21sthaveremainedrelativelystableoverthelast17years,thepoliciesassociatedwiththoseobjectives—the“ways”ofgrandstrategy—haveundergoneanimportantevolutionthroughoutthatperiod.Generallyspeaking,wecanidentifyseveraldistinctperiodsofRussianforeignpolicyapproachessincePutin’sascensiontothepresidencyin2000.Theperiodof“pragmaticaccommodation”lastedfrom2000-2003,duringwhichtimePutinpursuedapragmatic and accommodating foreign policy toward the United States in the hope of gainingconcessionsonkeyRussianinterestssuchaspreservingtheanti-ballisticmissiletreatyandpreveingeastward NATO expansion (Kuchins, 2016). This approach was replaced by a policy of “softbalancing” from 2003-2007 (Pape, 2005). Since 2007, Russia’s foreign policy approach can bedescribedasoneof“asymmetricbalancing”that—withtheexceptionofathawduringtheObama-Medvedev“reset”—hashardenedconsiderablysince2014.Duetospaceconstraints,Iwilllimitmyfocusinthispaperontheperiodof“asymmetricbalancing”thathaslastedfrom2007tothepresent.

Asymmetric balancing – 2007-2019

The period of “soft balancing” came to an end in 2007-8 with three foreign policy actions thatdemonstrated thatRussiahad themeansand thewill togowellbeyondsoftbalancing tactics topromoteitsgrandstrategicinterests.Ilabelthisperiodoneof“asymmetricbalancing,”inanodtothe asymmetric or “gray zone” methods of hybrid warfare that would become an increasinglyprominentpart ofRussia’s foreignpolicy toolkit (Person, 2018).We can conceiveof asymmetricbalancingasastrategythatliessomewherebetweensoftbalancingtactics(diplomaticmaneuvering)andhardbalancingtactics,likerearmamentandallianceformation.Or,moreaccurately,asymmetricbalancing utilizes a spectrum of tactics that range from soft to hard, though kinetic militaryoperationsareusedrarely.Asymmetricbalancingtakesplaceinthemilitary,political,economic,andsocialrealmsusingavarietyofovertandcovertmeasurestoexertinfluenceandshapeoutcomes.However, the purpose of asymmetric balancing is not necessarily military action or territorialconquest(whichmaybetheobjectiveofhybridwar).Rather,thepurposeofasymmetricbalancingistomoreforcefullycounterbalanceanadversarywhileremainingbelowthelevelofhardmilitaryalliancesoropenwarfare.

TheApril2007cyberattackagainstEstonia,amassivedenialofserviceattackexecutedfromwithintheRussianFederation,marksthebeginningoftheasymmetricbalancingperiod(Richards,2009).ThoughtechnicalexpertswereunabletofinddirectevidencethatthecyberattackwascarriedoutbyagentsoftheRussiangovernment,severalscholarsanddefenseofficalshavenotedthatthescaleofthe attack would have required an advanced level of centralized coordination unlikely to haveoriginatedwith a truly autonomous network of Russian-speaking hackers (Herzog, 2011, p. 53).Furthermore, themanipulative disinformation campaignwaged by the Russian government andRussianmediafollowingtheEstoniangovernment’srelocationofaSoviet-eraWWIImonumentinTallinn was characteristic of asymmetric balancing. A report by the Center for European Policy



AnalysisnotesthattheRussianEmbassyinTallinnhelpedestablishanorganizationnamed“NightWatch”todefendthemonument(LucasandPomeranzev,2016,p.22).Membersnotonlyledprotestsagainst themonument’s removal but also spreadmisinformation in the Russian-languagemediaabout themonument’s removal inorder to incite furtherdestabilizingprotests inTallinn(p.23).Thus,evenifitcan’tbeproventhattheKremlin’sfingerswereonthekepboardthatlaunchedthecyberattack, its fingerprintswere all over thepropaganda campaign incitingRussian speakers inEstoniaintothestreets.

The second jolting eventmarking the onset of the asymmetric balancing periodwas, somewhatironically,aconventionalwar.Whilethe2008warbetweenRussiaandGeorgiawasinmanyrespectsaconventional—ifpoorlyexecuted—war,itfeaturedseveralelementsofwhatisnowdescribedashybridwarfare.Furthermore,theRussiangovernmentandmilitaryderivedseverallessonsfromtheexperience,making crucial reforms to its conventionalmilitarywhile simultaneously developingmorerefinedgrayzonemethodsthatwouldbeutilizedagainstUkrainein2014.The2008warisinterestinginitsownrespectandiscoveredinthedetailitwarrantselsewhereinthisreport.Butforthepurposeof thispaper, the elementsof hybridwarfare areof less interest than thebalancingaspectsofRussia’sinvasionofGeorgia.IftheGeorgianwarwasaboutasymmetricbalancing,againstwhomwasRussiabalancing?

InBucharestinApril2008liestheanswer.Itwashereatthe20thNATOSummitthatthealliancedeclaredthat“NATOwelcomesUkraine’sandGeorgia’sEuro-AtlanticaspirationsformembershipinNATO.WeagreedtodaythatthesecountrieswillbecomemembersofNATO”(NATO,2008).ThoughUkraineandGeorgiahadhopedforamembershipactionplan(MAP)thatwouldhaveformallyplacedthem on the path to NATO membership, such a plan was not forthcoming. However, even thedefinitive(ifopenended)statementthatNATOmembershipwouldhappenonedaywasenoughtocrossacrucialredlineforRussia.AlreadyforcedtowatchimpotentlyasNATOexpandedintotheBalticStates,RussiamadeclearonseveraloccasionsthatitwouldnottolerateNATOcountriesonitssouthernandwesternborders.TheconflictallowedRussiatheopportunitytoensurethatGeorgia’sfrozenconflictswouldcontinuetosmolder.BysecuringperpetualborderdisputesbetweenGeorgia,Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, Russia managed in a few short days to postpone Georgian NATOmembershipindefinitelysincesuchdisputesdisqualifynewmembers.Inshort,thereisacasetobemadethatthe2008warwasaboutbalancingagainstNATOjustasmuchasitwasapoliticaldisputebetweenMoscowandTbilisi.

Perhapsservingasevidencethat individualpersonalitiesdomatter in foreignpolicy, therewasabriefwarmingofrelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussiaduringtheMedvedevpresidencyfrom2008-2012.Knownasthe“reset”followingtheruptureoverGeorgiain2008,theperiodfeltreminiscentoftheearliereraofpragmaticaccommodation.Thesidesfoundareasofmutualinterestandcooperation,downplayeddisagreementsinotherareas,andevenmanagedtosignamajorarmscontrolagreement,thenewSTARTtreaty.Thoughofficialbilateralrelationsimproved,behindthescenesRussiacontinued itsmilitarymodernizationprogramand furthersharpeningofgrayzonecapabilities,makingtheMedvedevinterregnumaperiodofhiddenasymmetricbalancingratherthanpausedbalancing(Bryce-Rogers,2013).

ThereturnofVladimirPutintothepresidencyin2012amidthelargestmassprotestsinRussiasincetheearly1990sbroughtthecooperativepragmatismoftheMedvedev-Obama“reset”toanabrupthalt.Moreimportantly,thoseprotestsagainstPutin’sstage-managedreturntopower,reinforcedhisfearsofexternally-supportedoppositionasathreattohisrule.Adomesticcrackdownensued,withPutintighteningthescrewsacrossawidearrayofperceivedpoliticalthreats(Person,2017).



Putin’sreturntotheKremlinmarkedthereturnofmoreforcefulmethodsofasymmetricbalancing,whichbegantomanifestthemselvesinlate2013.FacedwiththeprospectthatneighboringUkrainewas about to sign an association agreementwith theEuropeanUnion—an essential first step topossibleEUmembership—Russiarespondedwithacounter-proposalforUkrainianmembershipinitsEurasianCustomsUnion.Putintoanunenviableposition,UkrainianPresidentViktorYanukovychultimatelyacceptedtheRussianproposal,touchingoffthemassiveproteststhatwouldculminateintheMaidanRevolutionthatswepthimfromofficeinFebruary2014.

TheRussianoccupationofCrimeaandproxyinvasionofeasternUkrainethatensuedaffordedRussiaarareopportunitytoachieveseveralkeyobjectivessimultaneously,muchliketheGeorgianwarsixyearsprior.MilitaryinterventionintoeasternUkrainesecuredbothRussianmilitaryobjectivesandfurtheritsgeopoliticalobjectiveofassymetricbalancingagainstNATOandtheUnitedStatesthroughthe use of gray zone methods. By destabilizing Ukraine domestically through intervention andkeeping the conflict in the Donbas simmering, Moscow has simultaneously ensured that NATOmembershipisoffthetableforKyivwhileheighteningthelikelihoodofregimechangeinUkraine.Similarly, Russia’s implied threat of escalating the war in the Donbas deterred the Obamaadministration fromproviding lethalweaponry to theUkrainianmilitaryduring thecriticalearlyyearsoftheconflict.Andyet,theUkrainiangambitcannotbetakenasanunmitigatedsuccessinthepursuit of Yalta 2.0: Poroshenko’s government in Kyiv still stands, American military advisorscontinuetoassistUkraineinitseffortstoreform,andtheTrumpadministrationhassinceprovidedcrucialdefensivearmstoUkraine. Infact, theefforttopullUkrainebackintoRussia’sorbit likelybackfiredinthefinalanalysis,asRussia’sactionsoverthelast5yearshavefirmlygalvanizedtheonce-dividedUkrainianpopulationinoppositiontoRussia’soccupation(Kulyk,2016).

Thesamecouldbesaidinotherregions.RussianattemptsatasymmetricbalancingintheBalticstateshavekeptthose—andtheirNATOallies—onhighalert.ProvocativeflightsintoNATOairspaceandmajormilitaryexercisesneartheBalticbordersareproperlyseennotaspreludetohybridwarperse, but as a case of asymmetric balancingmeant to challenge and complicate NATO operations.Moreover, theeffortstosowdiscordamongthealliesandwithinthedomesticpopulationsoftheBaltic States have come up short. Once again, these efforts have produced a counter-balancingresponsefromtheUnitedStatesandNATOintheformofsignificanttroopbuildupsintheregion(NATO,2018).

Similarly,theRussianmilitarycampaigninSyriainsupportoftheAssadregimecanbeseenthroughthelensofasymmetricbalancinginpursuitoftheYalta2.0strategy.Thoughthiscaseisoneofveryhardmilitarymethods,itisnotclearthatRussiaispursuingaclearmilitaryinterestinSyria.Rather,itisawaytoensureRussiahasasayinwhateverendcomesofthewar,andattimesitappearsasthoughRussiahasthedominantvoiceintheconversation.

Finally, the most stunning example of asymmetric balancing may very well be the RussianinterventionintheUSpresidentialelectionof2016.Itisperhapsfittingthattheeraofasymmetricbalancingbeginswiththe2007cyberattackagainstEstoniareachesitsapexwiththemassivecyberoperationsin2016againsttheDemocraticPartyanditspresidentialcandidate,HillaryClinton.Itwasa bold—and ultimately reckless—strategy, but one that fits perfectly within the arsenal of theasymmetricbalancerandtheYalta2.0grandstrategicobjectivesofcontainingAmericanintereststhroughnontraditionalmeans.



Conclusion

DisturbingasRussia’sepisodesofasymmetricbalancingoverthelastfewyearsmaybe,theepiloguesofeachof thoseepisodesremindsus that in thegreatgameofgreatpowerpolitics,everyactionproducesareaction.Or,inthewordsofKennethWaltz,“powerbegstobebalanced”(Waltz,2012,p.2).ThecounterbalancingandotherunintendedconsequencesarisinginreactiontoRussia’smostaggressivemethods of advancing its grand strategy suggest thatMoscow has overreached in itsefforts toachieve itsgrandstrategicvisionofamultipolarworlddefinedbyexclusivespheresofinfluence.ThoughthewaysandmeansofRussiangrandstrategyhaveexpandedinpursuitoftheends,itisfarfromclearthatRussiaisanyclosertoachievingthoseendsthanitwasin2000whenVladimirPutinbegan.

References

Bryce-Rogers,A.(2013).Russianmilitaryreformintheaftermathofthe2008Russia-GeorgiaWar.Demokratizatsiya,21(3).

Feaver,P.(2009).Whatisgrandstrategyandwhydoweneedit.ForeignPolicy.April8.http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/08/what-is-grand-strategy-and-why-do-we-need-it/

Graham,Thomas(2016).TheSourcesofRussianConduct.TheNationalInterest.August24.https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-sources-russian-conduct-17462

Herzog,S.(2011).RevisitingtheEstoniancyberattacks:Digitalthreatsandmultinationalresponses.JournalofStrategicSecurity,4(2),49-60.

Hill,Fiona.(2015).ThisisWhatPutinReallyWants.TheNationalInterest.February24.https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-putin-really-wants-12311

Kuchins,Andrew.(2016).ThatbriefU.S.-Russiastrategicpartnership15yearsago?Newinterviewsrevealwhyitderailed.TheWashingtonPost.September23.https://wapo.st/2cxfvNy?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.00b1e3e6ad7d

Kulyk,Volodymyr.(2016).NationalidentityinUkraine:impactofEuromaidanandthewar.Europe-AsiaStudies68(4):588-608.

Lucas,EdwardandPomeranzev,Peter.(2016).Winningtheinformationwar:techniquesandcounter-strategiestoRussianpropagandainCentralandEasternEurope.CenterforEuropeanPolicyAnalysis.August.http://infowar.cepa.org/Winning-the-Information-War

Lykke,Arthur.(2001).TowardanUnderstandingofMilitaryStrategy.InJosephR.CeramiJamesF.Holcomb,Jr.,editors,U.S.ArmyWarCollegeGuidetoStrategy.StrategicStudiesInstitute,.http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub362.pdf

McFaul,M.,andStoner-Weiss,K.(2008).TheMythoftheAuthoritarianModel-HowPutin'sCrackdownHoldsRussiaBack.ForeignAffairs87(1),68-84.

Mearsheimer,J.(2001).Thetragedyofgreatpowerpolitics.WWNorton&Company.



NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(2008).BucharestSummitDeclaration.April3.http://www.nato.int/cps/in/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm

NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(2018).NATO’sEnhancedForwardPresence.https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_12/20181205_1812-factsheet_efp_en.pdf

Pape,R.(2005).SoftbalancingagainsttheUnitedStates.InternationalSecurity30(1).

Person,R.(2017).Balanceofthreat:ThedomesticinsecurityofVladimirPutin.JournalofEurasianStudies8(1),44-59.

Richards,J.(2009).Denial-of-Service:TheEstonianCyberwaranditsimplicationsforU.S.nationalsecurity.InternationalAffairsReview18(2).http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65

Ripsman,Norrin,JeffreyW.Taliaferro,andStevenE.Lobell.2016.NeoclassicalRealistTheoryofInternationalPolitics.OxfordUniversityPress.

Waltz,K.2010.Theoryofinternationalpolitics.WavelandPress.

Waltz,K.(2012).WhyIranshouldgetthebomb:Nuclearbalancingwouldmeanstability.ForeignAffairs91(4):2-5.

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Sherlock APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 14

Chapter 3. Russian Public Opinion as a Potential Obstacle to Aggressive External Behavior by the Kremlin

Dr.ThomasSherlockUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint

[email protected]

MostRussians applaud the official narrative thatRussia has re-emerged as a great power underVladimirPutin,particularlywith theannexationofCrimea, andalsoagreewith the claimsof theRussianstatethatAmericaisanunfriendlypower.YettheyincreasinglydisagreewiththeassertionsoftheKremlinthattheUnitedStatesisaloomingexternaldangerandasubversiveforceinRussiandomesticpolitics. In linewith theseopinions,manyRussiansareunwilling tobear theeconomicburdenofanescalatingconfrontationwiththeWest,demonstratingtheinitially limited,andnowwaning,politicalsignificanceofthe“Crimeaeuphoria”(or“Crimeaeffect”)andthe“rally‘roundtheflag”phenomenageneratedbytheannexationof2014andensuingtensionswiththeWest.

Russian elites oftendiffer from the general public in their strongerbacking for amore assertiveforeignposture.Nevertheless,suchpreferencesareoftenmoderatedbyapreoccupationwithsocio-economic problems at home and by the apprehension that Russia will neglect domesticmodernizationindefinitelyifitsforeignpolicyisconfrontational.LikeRussianmasspublics,Russianelites often view the external environment as dangerous, a perception that is cultivated by theKremlin tohelpproducepatriotic “rally” sentiments. Yet this “rally” effect is dulledby thebeliefamongelitesandmassesthat thegreatest threatstoRussiaarerooted in itssocialandeconomicunderdevelopment.

RussiansocietyoftenfindsdomesticproblemsmuchmoreworrisomethanUSmilitarypowerora“colorrevolution”fomentedbytheWest,bothofwhichtheKremlinhasframedasimportantthreatsinitseffortstomobilizedomesticsupportersandisolateopponents.Drawingextensivelyonopinionsurveys in Russia, the paper concludes that amajority of Russians are likely to believe that theKremlin should not emphasize costly policies intended to counter US military power or otherpotentialAmericanthreats.

Introduction and Context

MostRussiansembrace theofficialnarrative thatRussiahas re-emergedasagreatpowerunderVladimirPutinandalsoagreewiththeclaimsoftheRussianstatethatAmericaisahostilepower(GerberandZavisca,2016).Yet,theyincreasinglydisagreewiththeassertionsoftheKremlinthattheUnitedStatesisaloomingexternaldangerandasubversiveforceinRussiandomesticpolitics(Sherlock,2019).Inlinewiththeseopinions,manyRussiansareunwillingtoshouldertheeconomicburdenofanescalatingconfrontationwiththeWest,demonstratingthelimitedpoliticalsignificanceofthe“Crimeaeuphoria”(or“Crimeaeffect”)producedbytheannexationaswellasthe“rally‘roundtheflag”phenomenongeneratedbyensuingtensionswiththeWest.

The “Crimea effect” strengthened Putin’s authority by somemeasures butwas less successful inprovidingdurablesupportforRussia’ssocio-economicandpoliticalinstitutionsandpolicies.BeliefamongRussiansthatthecountrywasheadedintherightdirectionincreasedfrom40%inNovember2013to64%inAugust2014(fivemonthsaftertheannexationofCrimea),butthendroppedto44%



byMarch 2019 (Levada, March 2019). Even Putin’s approval numbers have suffered significantdecline,dueinparttoanunpopulargovernmentproposalinmid-2018toraisetheretirementage.

AlthoughamodestmajorityofRussians (54% inOctober2018) still approve “on thewhole” theKremlin’s foreign policy, they are increasingly preoccupied with problems at home (VTsIOM,“Otsenkavlastei,”2018).Surveydatarevealrelativelyweakapprovalamongthepublicforaforcefulexternalposture, includinginterventioninthe“nearabroad”tocheckAmericanpowerorprotectRussian-speakersfromperceiveddiscrimination.Similarly,alargemajorityofRussiansdonotfavorthecreationofanempirereminiscentoftheSovietUnionortsaristRussia.

Russia’selites,unlikeitsmasspublics,oftenadvocatetheprojectionofstatepower, includingthecreationofasphereofinfluenceinEurasiawhichexpertsintheWestoftenidentifyasacentralgoaloftheKremlin’sforeignpolicy(Kotkin,2016).Nevertheless,many,perhapsmost,oftheseelites(likemasssociety)wanttheirgovernmenttoemphasizedomesticsocio-economicdevelopment,nottheproductionanddemonstrationofhardpower.

LevGudkov,theRussiansociologistanddirectoroftheindependentLevadaCenter,apublicopinionand sociological research organization that is highly respected in the West, provided a similarassessmentinmid-2018.Gudkovobservedawaning“Crimeaeffect”—popularapprovalofRussia’sforeign policy as a reemerging great power—among Russianswho increasingly believe that theKremlin’s pursuit of its geopolitical goals comes “at the [social and economic] expense of thepopulation” (BBC,Russkaia sluzhba, 2018).The lowqualityofhealth careandgovernment socialprograms,aswellas limitedemploymentopportunities,are fundamentalconcernsof thegeneralpopulation;elitesarealsoconcernedwithRussia’sstalledsocio-economicandpolitialmodernization(Sherlock,2019).

OtherexpertsandscholarsunderscorewhytheseconditionsposeaseriousproblemfortheKremlin.DmitriTrenin,theheadoftheCarnegieCenterinMoscow,observesthatPutinandhisrulingcircleunderstand thatRussia’s future, and theirown, “dependsmostlyonhowordinary citizens feel….Russiaisanautocracy,butitisanautocracywiththeconsentofthegoverned”(Trenin,2016).TreninechoesHansMorgenthau,whoidentified“nationalmorale,”orthe“degreeofdetermination”withwhich society approves its government’s foreign policy, as a core element of state power. ForMorgenthau,moraleisexpressedintheformofpublicopinion,“withoutwhosesupport[i.e.,consent]nogovernment,democraticorautocratic,isabletopursueitspolicieswithfulleffectiveness,ifitisable to pursue them at all” (Morgenthau, 1967). While most Russians currently back, if oftencautiously, theKremlin’s foreignpolicy, a costlyandunpredictableescalationof conflictwith theWestinthecontextofRussiansocio-economicstagnationordeclinecouldundermine“consent”withuncertainpoliticalconsequences.

This argument is developed in two sections and a brief conclusion. The first part examines theattitudesofthegeneralpublicinRussiaonissueswithimplicationsforRussianforeignpolicy.ThesecondsectionaddressesthesetopicsfromtheperspectivesofsegmentsoftheRussianelite.Theconclusionprovidesasummaryand identifies important limits to the influenceofeliteandmassopiniononRussianforeignpolicy.EmpiricalsupportfortheargumentdrawsonabroadselectionofmassopinionsurveysandfocusgroupsconductedinRussia,particularlythosebytheLevadaCenter(seeSherlock,2019forthecompletelist).



Russian Mass Attitudes: Aversion to Aggressive Foreign Policies

AquestionintheMarch2017LevadasurveyfocusedononeoftheKremlin’sjustificationsforthetheannexationofCrimeain2014:ShouldMoscowprotectRussianspeakersinthecountriesofthe“nearabroad”(otherthanUkraine)iftheyexperiencedseriousdiscrimination(Levada,March2017)?Thesurveyquestionasked:“IftherightsofethnicRussiansinneighboringcountries(apartfromUkraine)areseriouslyviolated,whatshouldRussiado?”35.8%selectedtheresponse“Russiashouldworktowardapeacefulsettlementoftheproblem”while29.8%believedthatRussiashouldnotbecomeinvolvedinsuchdisputes.28.1%oftherespondentsfeltthat“allmeans”(includingmilitaryforce)shouldbeusedtoprotectRussian-speakerswhomightbemistreatedintheregion.

ThateachofthethreepossibleresponsesgarneredroughlyequivalentlevelsofsupportunderscoresthedivisionswithinRussiansocietyon this central issue—and thedomesticpolitical risk for theKremlin in fomentingaggressionof the sort fearedby theBaltic states. It isnoteworthy that thevillages, towns, and small cities in Russia’s “heartland” that the Kremlin moved to activate asconservative counterweightsafter thepoliticalprotests in2011and2012exhibitedonlymodestlevelsofapprovalforthe“righttoprotect”Russiansinbordercountries.Thesepopulationcenterswere slightly above or below the national average of 29.8% in advocating non-intervention.Respondents in Moscow were least willing to approve direct involvement by Russia in ethno-nationalistdisputes.41.2%ofMuscovitesfeltthatinterventionwouldbeanunjustifiedintrusionintothe“internalaffairsofothercountries.”Thisnumbermarkeda22%increaseoverthepercentageofresponses(19%)amongMuscovitestothesamequestionadministeredtwoyearsearlier,intheJuly2015Levadasurvey(Levada,2015).

Aquestion in theMarch2017LevadasurveyalsoprobedhowRussianswouldreact toUkraine’spossible acceptanceof an invitation to joinwesternpolitical, economic, and security institutions.37.7%ofrespondentsoverallthoughtthatRussiashouldallowUkrainetojoineithertheEuropeanUnion or NATO, despite that country’s strong historical, cultural, socio-economic, and strategicimportancetoRussia.Closeto48%ofMuscovitessupportedthispositionasdid37%ofrespondentsfromRussia’s villages and towns. Opposition to Ukraine’s entry intoNATO, but not the EU,wasexpressedby27.8%ofsurveyparticipants. Justunder18%ofrespondents felt thatRussiashould“blockanydecisionbyUkrainetojoineithertheEUorNATO.”

Surveys on attitudes toward Ukraine reveal an important distinction in how Russians evaluatepossibleexternalthreats:amajorityislesstroubledbytheriskofforeignattackandmoreconcernedaboutRussia beingdrawn into a conflict in a bordering country likeUkraine.Despite significantpublic sympathy for the insurgency in easternUkraine, only 13% of respondents in a late 2014Levadasurvey(attheheightofpatrioticandexpansionistenthusiasminRussia)wouldapproveasonjoiningthepro-Russiamilitias(Levada,November2014).Just3%ofrespondentsinaFebruary2015surveywould“definitely”(22%would“probably”)supporttheintroductionofRussiantroopsintotheconflict(Levada,Ezhegodnik,2015).AnothersurveybyLevadainOctober2014foundthatamajorityapprovedtheeffortsofindependentRussianNGOstocompilelistsofactivedutysoldiersoftheRussianArmykilledorwoundedintheKremlin’sclandestinewarineasternUkraine(Levada,Ezhegodnik,2014).Mass perceptions of economic vulnerability help explainwhymany Russians do not support anaggressiveforeignpolicyevenif theyarestrongsupportersofPutin.Russiansofalldemographiccategoriesareoftenreluctanttoriskgreatereconomicdifficultiesforthesakeofthestateanditsforeignpolicy,reflectingthelimitationsofwhatRussiansociologistsrefertoas“practicalpatriotism”(GorshkovandTikhonova,90).AccordingtosurveysadministeredbytheInstituteofSociology,only



8% of respondents were “absolutely” willing to approve policies designed to restore Russia’sinternational power and defensive capacity “even if thesemeasureswere linked to a significantdeclineintheirstandardofliving,”while30%were“somewhatwilling”toenduresuchcosts,foratotalof38%(GorshkovandTikhonova,90,96).23%ofrespondentswere“absolutely”unwillingtodo so, and 39% were “more unwilling than not” to engage in such self-sacrifice (for a“willing/unwilling”ratioof38:62).Forrespondentswhoapproved“theactivitiesofV.PutininthepostofPresidentofRussia,”theratio,at45:55,demonstratesthatapprovalofPutin’sforeignpolicyisveryoftenconditionalevenamonghisdevotedfollowers;theratio’simbalancegrewto30:70forthosewhosupportedPutin’spresidencyonly“inpart”((GorshkovandTikhonova,100).

The Dimension of Elites: Approaches to Threats, Power, and Identity

TowhatextentdotheopinionsofRussianelitesresemblethepreferencesofmasspublicsexaminedabove?DoRussia’selitessupportanaggressive,expansionistforeignpolicy?AretheyconcernedthattheexternalenvironmentposessignificantthreatstotheRussianstatethatrequiremilitarization?DotheyemphasizehardorsoftpowerasthefoundationofaresurgentRussia?AlthoughdetailedandreliableinformationabouttheattitudesofRussia’selites(political,economic,security,andcultural)aftertheannexationofCrimeaismuchmorescarcethandataontheviewsofthegeneralpublic,afewimportantsourcesareavailableforanalysis.Oneisparticularlyrelevant:TheRussianElite2016analyzesthelatestwaveoftheSurveyofRussianElites,thelong-termstudyoftheattitudesofRussianelitesonforeignanddomesticconditionsandpolicies(Rivera,2016).Therespondentsareleadersfrompoliticalandbureaucraticinstitutions(thelegislature,federaladministration,etc.),privateandstate-owned enterprises, the security services (including themilitary), themedia, and academicresearchinstitutions.

InlinewiththeMarch2017LevadasurveyandotherpollsoftheRussianpublic,mostoftheelitesinTheRussianElite 2016 didnotperceiveAmerica tobe a graveor immediatemilitaryorpoliticalmenace.ThesurveyaskedrespondentstoevaluateseveralpotentialdangerstoRussiaonafive-pointscale,withfiverepresentingan“utmostthreat.”Apluralityofrespondents(32.1%)thoughtthatthe“inabilitytosolvedomesticproblems”wasan“utmostthreat”(36.7%selectedthisresponseinthe2012waveofthesurvey)while22.2%considered“terrorism”inthesamelight.The“growthoftheUS military vis-à-vis the Russian military” trailed far behind, with only 7.4% of respondentsselectingthisfactorasan“utmostthreat”–thelowest levelsincethe1993wave(7.1%).Earningeven lower percentages were “border conflicts in the CIS countries” (4.5%), “ethnic (domestic)tensions”(3.3%),“informationwarconductedbytheWest”(2.5%)and“colorrevolution”(2.2%).

It is noteworthy that the participants in different waves of this survey of elites found domesticproblemsmuchmoreworrisomethanUSmilitarypower,Americaninformationwarfare,ora“colorrevolution” fomentedbytheWest.Eachof thesechallengestheKremlinhas framedas importantthreatsinitseffortstomobilizedomesticsupportersandisolateopponents.TheseresultsandotherdatasuggestthatasignificantnumberofRussia’selitesdidnotbelievetheKremlinshouldemphasizecostlypoliciesdesignedtooffsetUSmilitarypowerorotherpotentialAmericanthreats.

Russia’sInstituteofSociologyconductedasurveyinlate2015whichoffersadditionalinsightintothepoliticalattitudesandpolicypreferencesofkeysegmentsoftheRussianelite(Institutsotsiologii,2015).Initsreportbasedonthesurvey,theInstituteanalyzedtheviewsofanoccupationalcross-sectionofinfluentialssimilartothatoftheSurveyofRussianElitesproject,including154leaders(94inMoscowand60indifferentregions)inthefollowingcategories:government,business,the“thirdsector”(NGOs,civilsociety),massmedia,andscience.Thestatedpurposeofthesurveywastoelicit



assessmentsofthehealthofRussia’ssocietyandpoliticalsystemaswellasviewsontheprospectsfornationaldevelopmentoverthenextfiveyears.

Gatheredduring thepatrioticupsurgeof2015, the resultsof the survey challenge the claim thatRussianowenjoyssignificantlygreatersolidaritywithinsociety,andbetweensocietyandthestate.AtissueisthestrengthofthemobilizingtheSochiOlympics,theannexationofCrimea,theensuingconflictwith Ukraine, and particularly the subsequent confrontationwith theWest.While theseeventsbuoyedthestandingofthepresidentandthearmedforces,andalsobolsteredprideinRussianidentity,theirpositiveeffectonhowelitesevaluatethesocio-politicalsystemappearslimited.ThesurveyconfirmsthatdiverseRussianelitesoftenremainmorepreoccupiedwithdomesticproblemsthanwiththreatsfromtheexternalenvironmentorwithRussia’sstatusasagreatpower.

Using a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), the first question of the survey asks respondents to“evaluate the current condition of Russian society” according to “important characteristics” thatmightbefoundinanycountry.Alistof13items,suchasthe“levelofinter-ethnictensions”andthe“leveloftolerance,”wasgiventotheparticipants.Theonlyitemtoreceiveascoreof“8”(relativelyhigh)wasthe“levelofsocialstratification”inRussiaandsociety’sunequalaccesstoresources.

Atatime(2015)whenonemightexpecttofindrobustevidenceofthe“Crimeaeffect,”the“levelofpatriotism”scoredonly5.8onthe10pointscale.Respondentsplacedthe“physicalandpsychologicalhealth”ofsocietyatarelativelylow4.3,whilethe“moralconditionofsociety”registered4.2.Thedegreeoftrustingovernmentwasscoredat3.9,andinterpersonaltrustinsocietyat3.5.ConfidenceinRussia’s“democraticvaluesandinstitutions”(elections,parties,etc.)cameinlastat2.9.

Theanswerstootherquestions inthesurveyreveal thepolicyprioritiesofmanyelitesandtheirevaluationof foreign anddomestic threats. In their assessmentof external dangers, respondentsidentifiedthedependenceoftheRussianbudgetoninternationaloilandgasmarketsasthegreatestthreat(8.3)amongthe13itemsonthelist,areferencetothevulnerabilitiesofRussia’seconomicmodel.TheprospectofRussiabeingdrawnintoabroaderconflictinUkrainewasnext(8.1),followedbycapitalflightandthedeclineinforeignanddomesticinvestment(7.6).AlthoughrespondentswerefearfulofanewColdWaraccompaniedbyanarmsracewithharmfuleffectsonRussiandevelopment(7.2),theyplacedthe“information-psychologicalwarfare”oftheWest,aswellasthethreatofa“fifthcolumn,”lastonthelist,at5.0.

Conclusion

The Russian Elite 2016, the Institute of Sociology survey and other data demonstrate that whileRussia’selitesaresensitivetointernationalthreats,asignificantnumberdonotbelievethattheWest,particularly theUnitedStates, poses a criticalmilitaryorpoliticaldanger to theRussian stateorregime.Numerouslarge-NsurveysoftheRussianpublicrevealsimilarperspectives.SuchattitudeschallengetheKremlin’scorenarrativeofRussiaasaresurgentgreatpowerthreatenedbytheUnitedStatesanditsfifthcolumnists(Sherlock,2019).

AnalysisoftheviewsofelitesandmasspublicsalsosuggeststhatamajorityofRussiansdefineagreatpoweranditsprioritiesmoreintermsofdomesticsocio-economicdevelopmentthanintheproduction and demonstration of hard power. From this standpoint, Russians often view thepathologiesof their country’sdevelopmentalandpoliticalmodelas themost important threat toRussia’sinternationalinfluenceanddomesticwell-being.



AstheplausibilityoftheKremlin’smeta-narrativeweakens(andasthe“Crimeaeffect”decays)animportantquestioniswhether(ortowhatextent)theperspectivesofmuchofRussiansocietyanditseliteswillinfluencetheKremlin’sdomesticandforeignpolicy.Whileseveralotherfactorsclearlypush in the opposite direction, toward an aggressive foreign policy, it remains true that publicopinionmatterstotheKremlinandthatmuchofRussiansocietyatthemassandelitelevelvaluesrestraintinforeignpolicyandgreaterattentiontodomesticsocio-economicdevelopment.

To read the more detailed, published paper on which this submission is based, please visithttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10758216.2018.1561190.

References

BBCRusskaiasluzhba(August2,2018).“Sotsiologiizafiksirovali….”Retrievedfromhttps://www.bbc.com/russian/news-45036599;andhttps://www.levada.ru/2018/08/02/sotsiologi-zafiksirovali-nailuchshee-otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-ssha-i-es-so-vremen-anneksii-kryma/

Gerber,TheodoreandJaneZavisca(2016).“DoesRussianPropagandaWork?”TheWashingtonQuarterly,39(2),79-98.

Gorshkov,M.K.,andN.E.Tikhonova,eds.(2016).Rossiiskoeobshchestvoivyzovyvremeni,vol.3.Moscow:VesMir.Chapter4,“Otchegogotovyotkazat’siiarossiianeradisvoeistrany.”

Institutsotsiologii(2015).Rossiiskoeobshchestvo–2020.Ekspertnyiobrazbudushchego.Analiticheskiiotchetpoitogamekspertnogooprosa.Retrievedfromhttp://www.zircon.ru/upload/iblock/0f6/ESPM-2015_Rossiyskoe_obshestvo-2020%20_ekspertniy_obraz_budushego_ov2.2c.pdf

Kotkin,Stephen(2016).“Russia’sPerpetualGeopolitics.”ForeignAffairs,95(3),2-9.

LevadaCenter(November13,2014).“VolunteerFighters.”Retrievedfromhttp://www.levada.ru/eng/volunteer-fighters.

LevadaCenter(2014).Obshchestvennoemnenie.Ezhegodnik,(printversion)(table22.107),192.

LevadaCenter(2015).Obshchestvennoemnenie.Ezhegodnik,(printversion)(table24.41),232.

LevadaCenter(July2015).Unpublishedsurvey.Pleasecontacttheauthorforthisdata.

LevadaCenter(March2017).Unpublishedsurvey.Pleasecontacttheauthorforthisdata.

LevadaCenter(March2019).“Polozheniedelvstrane.”Retrievedfromhttps://www.levada.ru/indikatory/polozhenie-del-v-strane/

Morgenthau,Hans(1967).PoliticsAmongNations.TheStruggleforPowerandPeace.NewYork:Knopf..

Rivera,SharonWerning,etal.(2016).TheRussianElite2016.HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll.Retrievedfromhttps://www.hamilton.edu/documents/russianelite2016final.pdf



Sherlock,Thomas(2019).“RussianSocietyandForeignPolicy:MassandEliteOrientationsAfterCrimea.”ProblemsofPost-Communism.DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1561190

Trenin,Dmitri(2016).“TheRevivaloftheRussianMilitary.”ForeignAffairs,95(3).Retrievedfromhttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/system/files/pdf/articles/2016/95304.pdf

VTsIOM(September2018).“Otsenkavlastei.”Retrievedfrom

https://wciom.ru/news/ratings/ocenka_vlastej/


Weitz APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 21

Chapter 4. Moscow’s Gray Zone Toolkit

Dr.RichardWeitzCenterforPolitical-MilitaryAnalysisattheHudsonInstitute

[email protected]

Russianstrategistsareadeptinselectinggrayzonetoolsoptimizedtotheirtarget.TheKremlin’sgrayzoneportfolio includes paramilitary forces and other proxies, economic and energy exploitation,mediaandpropagandamanipulation,andadditionalassetsRussia’shybridwarfareapproachblendsmilitary and civilian elements to have maximum impact on the target. Hybrid tactics are mosteffectivewhen the target entity is deeply polarized or lacks the -capacity to resist and respondeffectivelytoRussianaggression.Conversely,countriesthatareresilientagainstattemptstodividetheirpopulace,applyeconomiccoercion,andwieldproxyforcescanbetterhandlesub-conventionalthreatsfromRussia.Washingtonmustreevaluateoldparadigmsbetweenwarandpeacetomaintainstrategicprimacyinthisneweraofinternationalpoliticsthatisdefinedbyshadesofgray.

Tools of Power

Paramilitary and Other Proxies

Moscowhasavarietyofmilitary,paramilitary,andnon-militaryassetsavailableforuseinhybridoperations. These elements include Russian special operations units, paramilitarymilitia groupsassociatedwiththeFederalSecurityService(FSB)andRussianmilitaryintelligence(GRU),hybridbusinessesthatareconnectedtotheRussianpolitical-economicelite,andKremlin-friendlymediaconglomerates. Financial support and propaganda can be useful inmobilizing a disenfranchisedgroup abroad, while deploying auxiliary forces like local volunteer militia or coordination withintelligence offices can provide additional tools. Russia has demonstrated in the recent Crimeanconflict that civilian sympathizersmaybe employed to blockmilitary installations. Furthermore,businessescanbecalleduponby thestate toexecutemilitary-political rolesas instructedby theKremlin.ThesehybridbusinessesareledbyKremlin-friendlydirectorswhoconductlegalbusinessoperationswhilealsoemployingtheirresourcesatthestate’sdirection.

RussianSpecialForces,theFSB,andtheGRUoftensupportthisendeavor.Theintelligenceagenciesare powerful force multipliers to establish preconditions for successful overt or semi-overtoperations. They can mislead the adversary, shape public opinions, and pursue other forms ofsubterfuge.InthecaseoftheCrimeanPeninsula,theFSBandGRUhelpedreconnoiterthebattlespaceanddisruptUkrainiancommandandcontroltoimpedeatimelyresponse.Themainvalueofcovertand ambiguous forces is to exploit weaknesses in the target nation. However, mercenaries,independentnationalists,warlords,andotherproxiesaremotivatedbytheirowninterestsandtheiractions could impact Russia in a negative way. For example, the Malaysian Airliner MH17 wasdownedbyRussian-supportedlocalmilitias,whichwereperhapsnotactingunderMoscow’sorders.

Information and Influence Operations

The main goals of Russian information and influence operations include exploiting divisions intargetedstatestoachieveRussianforeignpolicyaims,ensuringcontinueddomesticsupportfortheregime,maintainingcompliantgovernmentsinotherstates,keepingunfriendlygovernmentsweak



and off balance, and influencing international perceptions of Russian actions while excludingWesternswayfromMoscow’ssphereofinfluence.

Russia’sinformationstrategyissimilartothatoftheSovietUnionduringtheColdWar.TheSovietstrategy of maskirovka, or military deception, involved misleading the Soviet Union’s enemiesregardingitsmilitarytactics,timing,andtechnology.Sovietinformationwarfarewascloselyrelatedto the concept of Reflexive Control,which has been defined by Timothy Thomas as “ameans ofconveyingtoapartneroranopponentspeciallypreparedinformationtoinclinehimtovoluntarilymakethepredetermineddecisiondesiredbytheinitiatoroftheaction.”

Contemporary Russian hybrid warfare employs a similar strategy, though it has evolved astechnologyhasdeveloped.ThenewapproachhastakenthetraditionalemphasisonpsychologicalwarfarefoundinSovietconceptualizationsofpropagandaandadaptedittouseacrossthenewmediaenvironment. Faster communication speeds, the quickening of the news cycle, and the highlyglobalizednatureofthe21stcenturyinformationecosystemincreasedtheeffectivenessofRussianpropaganda.These advanceshavemade it easier for theRussiangovernment to influenceglobalpublicopinionthroughtheInternet,socialmedia,24-hournewsagencies,andotherplatforms.

Russian media activity focuses both on disinformation and enhancing Russia's image abroad.Falsified information is meant to confuse target audiences by presenting them with biasedinformationthatpromotespro-RussianperspectivesaboutRussianforeignpolicygoals.Toachievethisend, theRussiangovernmenthasemployedRussianstate-controlledmediaandonline trolls.Theselatteractorspostpro-Russiancommentsandinformationonsocialmediatoobscureorfalsifyinformation toengender suspicionand fear.Russian informationoperationsadhere to fourmainprinciples:takingasmalltruthandstretchingit,usingpropagandatoelicitanemotionalresponsefromitsintendedaudience,sendingconflictingmessagestocreatemythsandchaos,andensuringitsnarrativesremainintheinformationecosystemforextendedperiods.

ForeigninfluenceoperationsalsoplayavitalroleinRussianhybridoperations.OnetacticRussiahasusedisitscovertsupportforbothright-andleft-wingoppositiongroups.Internationally,Russiahassought to develop relationswith leftist governments and tieswith prominent European leaders.Russia also employs cultural organizations like the Russkiy Mir Foundation and the RussianOrthodoxChurch to influenceethnicRussiansorRussian speakers residingabroad.Within somenearby countries,Moscowcan resort tomoreexplicit subversive tactics suchas theprovisionoffinancial support to pro-Russian political parties and economic bans of certain foreign importspurported tobe contaminatedorunsafe fordomesticuseor consumption.Russiaalsohabituallyfunds pro-Russian domestic parties in other states and takes other measures to infiltrate bothEuropeanpoliticsandbusinesses.

Economics and Energy

Russia’s energy and economic assets—comprising oil and gas sales, other trade and investment,embargoes and cutoffs, remittances, and tariff and currency manipulation—provide importantweaponsinMoscow’shybridtoolkit.Theseeconomicassetscanbeemployedalone,orinconcertwithothereconomic,military,andpoliticaltoolssuchasmilitaryforce,armssales,andeconomiccoercion.Russia’senergypolicyiscloselyalignedwithitsnationalsecuritystrategygiventhestate’shighdependencyonenergyexports for government revenues. Inparticular,Russiahas regularlymanipulatedenergychainstoexerteconomicpressureandterritorialinfluence.



Russiahasshownaproclivitytouseenergycontracts,proposedpipelines,andsupplymanipulationto influence post-Soviet countries. For instance, after invading Ukraine, the Russian governmentquicklyseizedallUkrainianenergyproductionandstoragefacilities.Thisseizure’spurposewastodepriveKyivofrevenuesgeneratedfromthetransitofenergythroughthecountryand,therefore,pressureitintoacceptingamorepro-Russiandisposition.Inaddition,Russiawasabletogainvasttractsofmaritimezonesandlandtolocatemorenaturalgas.MoscowisstilltryingtoisolateUkrainefrom other European sources of energy and render itwholly dependent on Russian gas and oil.Furthermore,theenergycoercionhasbeenaccompaniedbyacampaignofeconomicwarfareagainstUkrainethatincludeshightariffs,embargos,anddelaysofimportsdesignedtoshapeotherUkrainianpolicies to Moscow’s benefit. Moscow also can alsomanipulate remittances of foreign workersworkinginRussiaaswellasthethreattoexposeforeigncorruption.

Recommendations

Hybrid tactics are most effective when the target state has lost the will or capacity to resist.Conversely, countries that do not have these vulnerabilities face little threat from Russianadventurismshortof full-scalewar.Themostprevalent indicatorsor“signposts”thatanentity isvulnerabletoRussianhybridactionsincludepoliticalandsocialturmoil,largeRussianinvestmentsinitskeycapabilities,andweaksecuritystructures.

Fundamentally,theUnitedStatesmustreevaluateoldparadigmsthatseparatewarandpeaceinthewake of current international conflicts. Institutional and analytical changes are essential forenhanced strategic awareness. Strengthening Western institutions and civil society to buildresilienceagainsthybridthreatsisimperative.

US responses should prioritize robust cyber defenses, situational awareness, flexibility, anddeterrence at the strategic, operational, and even tactical levels. The United States must adjustquicklytothechangingstrategiesofRussianinformationoperations,specificallythestudyofRussianReflexiveControl techniques.Western governments should raise standards for transparency andintegrityinresearch,advocacy,lobbygroups,and“TrackII”diplomacy;encourageWesterngroupstoexposeandchallengeRussianpropagandaanddisinformation,whetherconductedbytheRussiangovernmentovertlyorthroughintermediaryinstitutions;andassistWesterninstitutionstosustaindialogue and collaborative researchwith free-thinking Russians inways that do notmake themvulnerable to Russian internal security laws. Counterstrategies against Russian influence andinformationoperationsusedintheColdWarmayproveeffectiveifmodernized.WesternresponsesmuststrivetobeasextensiveandmultifacetedasRussiansoftpowerinitiatives.

IntermsofpreventingRussiansubversion,preemptive“targethardening”throughpolitical,social,and economicmeasures canmake itmore difficult forMoscow to undermine a state. Bolsteringgovernance and legitimacy candepriveMoscowof soft targets andopportunities for subversion.Western governments and international organizations can share best practices for eliminatingcorruption,reducingethnictensions,increasingcyberdefenses,andresistinginformationwarfare.

Otherspecificpolicyrecommendationsinclude:

• takingatoughlineonintelligenceactivityintargetstates,includingexpellingsuspectedspiesregardless of a likely tit-for-tat response, to deter penetration and control by Russianintelligence services and prevent easy access to local political elites and/or local socio-economicassets;



• maintaining potent intelligence services and police forces and providing them with thetraining,guidance, andpurview toempower them tomeethybrid forcechallenges,yet inmeasuredandappropriatewaysthatwillnotworsenlocaldissatisfactionorprovideRussiawithapretextforaction;

• developingandimplementingeffectivelegislationandcorrespondingenforcementagencies,especiallywherefinancialmonitoringandmedialicensingareconcerned;

• demonstrating strong and unified national and international political will to stand up toRussiapublicly;and

• showingawillandcapacitytofighthybridattackswithdefenseanddeterrencemeasures—ratherthanadoptingtheRussianplaybookdirectly,thismeansleveragingWesternstrengthsin areas such as finance, soft power in third nations, intelligence gathering, and evencyberwarfare.

References

Galeotti,M.(7July2014).Putin’ssecretweapon.ForeignPolicyMagazine.Retrievedfromhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/07/putins-secret-weapon

Galeotti,M.(2November2014).CrimeAndCrimea:Criminalsasalliesandagents.RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.Retrievedfromhttp://www.rferl.org/content/crimea-crime-criminals-as-agents-allies/26671923.html

Galeotti,M.(December2014).Behindenemylines:TherisinginfluenceofRussianspecialforces.Jane’sIntelligenceReview.

Galeotti,M.(30July2015).Timetothinkabout‘hybriddefense.’WarOnTheRocks.http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/time-to-think-about-hybrid-defense

Galeotti,M.(2015).‘Hybridwar’and‘littlegreenmen’:Howitworks,andhowitdoesn’t.InPikulicka-Wilczewska,A.&Sakwa.R.(Eds.),UkraineandRussia:People,politics,propagandaandperspectives(pp.156-164).Retrievedfromhttp://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf

Galeotti,M.(5April2016).Moscow’sMercenariesinSyria.WarOnTheRocks.Retrievedfromhttp://warontherocks.com/2016/04/moscows-mercenaries-in-syria

Kofman,M.&Rojansky,M.(April2015).AcloserlookatRussia’s‘hybridwar.’Washington,DC:WoodrowWilsonCenter.Retrievedfromhttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no7-closer-look-russias-hybrid-war

Kofman,M.(11March2016).Russianhybridwarfareandotherdarkarts.WarontheRocks,Retrievedfromhttp://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts

Laruelle,M.(April2019).Russia’sMilitiaGroupsandtheirUseatHomeandAbroad.Paris:Institut



françaisdesrelationsinternationals.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/laruelle_russia_militia_groups_2019.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3YLHJ0r94F_xY0e6N3r3MZ8G0uBO0pZuLkRDLbqCwqP86KckP8O9_LpNU

Thomas,T.L.(2004).Russia’sreflexivecontroltheoryandthemilitary.JournalofSlavicMilitaryStudies,Vol.17,237-256.Retrievedfromhttps://www.rit.edu/~w-cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf

Thomas,T.L.(2015).Russia’smilitarystrategyandUkraine:Indirect,asymmetric–andPutinled.JournalofSlavicMilitaryStudies,Vol.28,445-461.Retrievedfromhttp://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Putin's-Russia/Russia’s%20Military%20Strategy%20and%20Ukraine%20article%20slavic%20mil%20studies.pdf

UnderstandingRussian“HybridWarfare”andWhatCanbeDoneAboutIt:ArmedServicesCommittee.HouseofRepresentatives.105thCongress(28March2017)(TestimonyofChistopherS.Chivvis).Retrievedfromhttps://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf


Marsh APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 26

Chapter 5. Putin’s Grand Strategy and US National Interests

Dr.ChristopherMarshSpecialOperationsResearchAssociation

[email protected]

Abstract

OneofthemostsignificantquestionssurroundingRussianforeignpolicyiswhetherornotRussianpresidentVladimirPutinhasanoverarchingstrategy.ThiswhitepaperarguesthatPutin,infact,isaseriousstrategistandthathehasagrandstrategyforRussiaand,indeed,theworld.ItsummarizesthedebateoverwhetherornotPutinhasagrandstrategybeforeexaminingthekeyinterestsdrivingit. Finally, it examines the threat Russia’s strategy poses to vital US national interests. Theseassertionscanbesummarizedinthepointsbelow.

• RussianPresidentVladimirPutinhasagrandstrategythatheisfollowing.

• Thethreadsofthisstrategycanbeseenatthetheater/operationallevelandjointogetheratthegrandstrategiclevel.

• Russiaseeksavetopoweroveritsnearabroadandconsiderstheareapartofitsexclusivesphereofinfluence.

• RussiahasenteredintoastrongalliancewithChina,onethatismutuallybeneficial.

• Russian recidivism is a threat to US national interests, particularly to NATO and its newmembers.

Motivations Driving Russian Globale Competitive Activities and Strategy

OneofthemostsignificantquestionssurroundingRussianforeignpolicyingeneralandUS-RussianrelationsinparticulariswhetherornotRussianpresidentVladimirPutinhasanoverarchingstrategyor if he is merely reacting to international events as they unfold, simply taking advantage ofopportunities as they are presented to him by the international system. If he does have anoverarching strategy,what key interests are driving this strategy? And finally,what threat doesRussiaposetovitalUSnationalinterests?

ThiswhitepaperarguesthatPutininfactisaseriousstrategistandthathehasagrandstrategyforRussiaand,indeed,theworld.Whilehemayinfactreacttoopportunitiesastheyarepresentedtohimbytheinternationalenvironment,theselinesofeffortcombineintoacoherentglobalforeignpolicyagendathatseekstorepositionRussiaasagreatpowerintheemergingworldorder.

JustwhatisthisvisionofRussia’splaceintheworldanditsrelationswithitsneighbors?ItisoneinwhichMoscowisoneofseveralcentersofpower,perhapsasUShegemonygiveswayto, ifnotamultipolarworldorder,perhapsaChinese-centricworld. It isaworldinwhichRussia isperhapsdistantfromEuropeanvalues,butnotsodistantfromEuropeanpoliticalandeconomicprocessesandinstitutions.Inthisworld,EasternaswellasWesternEuropeareforcedto“playnice”withRussiaas a major energy source and political andmilitary power. The same holds true for East Asia–particularly China. While Russia is not about to copy a Chinese model of economic or political



development(Marsh,2006), itseekstopositionitself insuchawayastoembraceChinainasoftalliance(Lukin,2018;Lo,2008),oneinwhichMoscowcanmaintainapositionofsovereigntyandindependence as its eastern flankbecomeshome to theworld’s largest economy,most populacestate,andperhapsthenextglobalhegemon.

WheredoesthisleaveRussiavis-à-vistheUnitedStates?RussiaislikelytocountertheUSwhereitcandosoatacceptablecost,asPutinweighsthepunitivedamagesassociatedwithitsactions(forinstance in Ukraine or meddling in US elections) against the advancement of its foreign policyobjectives(asinSyria,whereRussiaseekstobeasignificantactorinthesettlementofMiddleEasternaffairs).MoscowwillseektocounterUSactionsimplybecauseitresentsAmericanglobalhegemony,anditcandosobecausetheUSpoliticalsystem’sdysfunctionality(bythedesignoftheFoundingFathers)tempersitsresponsewhileitsalliancesystem,too,leadstotheimpositionofcoststhatdonotoutweighthebenefitofMoscow’sperceivedgains.

In response toRussiabeingnamedasa target in thePentagon’s2018NationalDefenseStrategy,Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated that he “regrets that instead of having a normaldialogue”theUS“seekstoproveitsleadershipthroughsuchconfrontationalconcepts”andstressedthatRussiaisstill“readyfordialogue”(Bovdunov,2018).Despitesuchproclamations,Russiahasnorealinterestina“reset”inUS-Russiarelationsinthenearterm(Gvosdev&Marsh,2014,pp.92-95).Infact,itwelcomes(andseekstocontributeto)theweakeningoftheAmericanpoliticalsystemandtherelativedeclineofWashington’sinfluenceintheworld.Indeed,itseekstofurthersuchdecline,asitsinterferenceinthe2016USpresidentialelectionsattests.

Thepurpose of thiswhite paper is tomapout the contours of Putin’s grand strategy. It does sothroughananalysisofRussianforeignpolicy,itswrittendocumentsrelatedtostrategy,andPutin’sownactions.ItisthusbothapaperaboutRussianforeignpolicyandnationalsecurity,butonethattakesseriouslyPutin’sglobalagenda.AtthecenterofthepaperisareviewofthedebateoverwhetherornotPutinisastrategistoropportunist,arguingstronglyinfavoroftheformeroverthelatter.Itthenconcludeswitharestatementofthepaper’sargumentregardingRussia’sgrandstrategyandhowthatstrategyrunscountertoUSnationalinterests.

Putin: Strategist, Opportunist, or Fool?

AsPosner(2014)pointsout,someRussia-watchershaveengagedin“loopyspeculationaboutPutin’smotives,muchofitbasedonconjecturesabouthispsychologicalmakeup,”withsomepeoplethinkingheisirrationalorpsychologicallyunstable.PosneralsoidentifiesthosethatthinkPutinsimply“actstacticallyinresponsetoshort-termopportunities[and]hasnostrategicvision.”AnneApplebaum(2015)isanexcellentexample.WhilesheclearlyidentifiesPutin’stacticofsowing“organizedchaos”wherehecan,sheconcludes,“TheonlypointindoingthatistocreatetheimpressionofcrisistomakepeoplenervousandhaveNATOmembersquestionNATO’scommitmenttothemandtocreatethisimpressionofuncertainty.”Thisorganizedchaos includes“flying inBritishairspace,campingoutnear the borders of Baltic states and kidnapping foreignmilitary officers,”which she states is a“strange strategy,” but it “keeps theRussian people reliant on him. It also serves as an effectivedistractiontokeephisillegitimaterisetopoweranafterthought.”ButApplebaumconcludedthatit“sounds odd to call it a grand strategy, and there's a way in which it really isn’t even aboutgeopolitics.”“Whatwe’rewatching,”Applebaumconcludes,“issomeonetryingtostayinpowerbychanging the narrative, changing the story andmaking sure the revolution he fears doesn’t takeplace.”



Incidentally,thisinterpretationofRussiangrandstrategydoesnotdiffermuchfromthatofMichaelMcFaulwho in 2003—more than a decade and a half ago—said that Putin’s grand strategywassimplytostayinpower.AsMcFaulputit,Putin’sstrategicplanwastoputinplacearegimethatwas“neitheraccountabletothepeoplenorconstrainedbyautonomouspoliticalactors.”Asearlyas2004,thefutureUSAmbassadortoRussiasawthisplan,unfortunately,assucceeding,whileothersintheWestdidnotevenrecognizeitbecauseeach“stageoftheplan’srealizationhasbeencloudedwithcontroversy,subjecttoconflicting interpretations, itsactorsdeckedingrayratherthanblackandwhite.”Buttobesure,McFaulsawa“systematicplantorollbackdemocracy.”

Writingonlya fewyears later,CelesteWallander (2007) seesPutin’sgrandstrategyas less thangrand,andisinagreementwithMcFaulthatdomesticissuesareatthecenterofPutin’sproblems.ButwhereasMcFaulseesPutin’sgrandplanasrollingbackdemocracy,Wallanderseesthefailureofdemocratizationasahindrance toPutinbeingable tocarry througharealgrandstrategy. InheranalysisofRussia’sstrategicenvironment,nationalinterests,andthetypeofstateandeconomythatPutinbelievesisneededtosecurethem,WallanderconcludesthatRussiangrandstrategyis“neithergrand,norstrategic,norsustainable”(p.140).Sheleavesopen,however,thequestionofwhetherornotRussiawillsurviveasagreatpowerinthe21stcentury,asthesourceofitspower–thestateandeconomy–arealsothemainsourcesofitsweakness.

S.FrederickStarrandSvanteCornellhavecommentedonthosemanyRussianandforeignobservers“whohypothesizedthatallthesediverseinitiativesonPutin’spartarosefromasinglestrategy,”butthatthey“failedtomaketheircaseinaconvincingmanner”(2014,pp.6-7).Thatmaybetrue,butthepairdoanexcellentjobinarguingtheirpointthattheEurasianUnionispartofPutin’soverallgrandstrategyandhisactionsvis-à-vis the formerSovietstates isawell-orchestratedattempttoestablisha“newkindofunioncomprisedofformerSovietrepublicsandheadedbyRussiaitself”(p.7).Astheyargue,eventsbetweentheinvasionofGeorgiain2008andthearmedseizureofCrimeain2014have forcedpolicymakers andRussia-watchers to acknowledge the “possibility that theRussianRepublic underVladimir Putin has reorganized its entire foreign anddomestic policy inordertopursue”thissinglestrategicobjective.

Oneobserverwhois instrongagreementwithsuchaninterpretationofRussianforeignpolicy isMichelGurfinkiel,whoarguesthattheSoviet“deepstate”survivedthecollapseoftheSovietUnionandthatRussia’s“primarystrategicgoal[today]istobringtogetheralltheRussian-speakingpeoplesinto a single nation-state” (2018). Additionally, Gurfinkiel sees the reestablishment of a singlegeopolitical unity, if not a single state, for the “Eurasian community,with Russia as first amongequals.”ThisisperhapsmoreperniciousofaninterpretationthanStarrandCornellforesee,butithasstrongparallels.

ButPutin’sambitionsreachbeyondRussia’snearabroadandtotheinternationalsystemitself, inwhichitseekstoregainandretainitspositionasagreatpower.GurfinkielalsoseesthisandidentifiestheweakeningoreliminationofrivalpowercentersinEuropeaspartofMoscow’splan(e.g.,NATOandtheEU).Finally,heforeseesMoscowpursuingaworldpowerrole“byreactivatingsupportforformerSovietclientregimeslikeBaathistSyriaandCuba”(2018).

BritishscholarAndrewMonaghan’s(2013)assessmentofwhetherornotPutinhasagrandstrategyfocusesonthecascadeofnewconcepts,strategies,anddoctrinesthatattempttoframeplansinalong-termhorizon, to 2020 and beyond, thatMoscowhas been publishing over the past decade.FollowingPutin’s 2012 reelection, a series of presidential instructions andnewplans have beenpublishedtoupdatethisoverhaul.Monaghanexaminesthiscommitmenttostrategicplanningandseeks to determinewhether or not it is tantamount to a grand strategy.While he suggests that



Moscowhasshapedabroadhorizonandmadesomeprogresstowardsachievingthegoalsithassetout,Monaghanrightlyarguesthatagrandstrategyismorethansimplyformulatingplans.Hethusconcludes by exploring the difficulties Moscow faces including the evolving and competitiveinternationalenvironmentandaslewofdomestictroubles(andhisarticlewaswrittenbeforetheannexation of Crimea and the resulting international sanctions). “Taken all together,”Monaghanconcludes,while“Moscowiscommittedtostrategicplanning,agrandstrategyremainsaworkinprogress”(p.1236).

Indeed,strategicplanningmaybebecomingconfusedwithstrategyandgrandstrategyitself.InanexcellentpieceonRussia’sStrategy–2020(publishedin2012),JulianCooper(2012)isalsolookingatsuchdocumentsastheonesMonaghandoes,butCooperfocusesspecificallyontheprocessandplanningthatwentintodevelopingStrategy–2020.Butplanningdoesnotequatetostrategy,thoughasEisenhowersaid,“plansareworthless,butplanningiseverything”(WallStreetJournal,1957,p.14).

AlongwithBeijing,MoscowseeksamultipolarworldinwhichUShegemonycomestoanend.AsAlexander Lukin recently pointed out, the “common ideal of a multipolar world [has] played asignificantroleintherapprochementbetweenRussiaandChina”(2018,p.78).AsGregoryKarasinput itover twentyyearsago,during theYeltsinyears, thesupportof the twogreatpowers foramultipolarworldwas“particularlyimportant”atthattime“whentheinternationalcommunitystillface[d] the inertia of the way of thinking that characterized the Cold War, claims to exclusiveleadership,andattemptstoreducethedevelopmentofinternationalrelationstounipolarity”(1997,p.16).This isevenmoreso thecase today, some twentyyears later,whenRussiahasrecoveredsignificantlyfromthepost-Sovietglutitfounditselfinduringthe1990swhileChinahascontinuedtogrowsteadilyandmodernizeitsmilitary.

In the Crosshairs

Russia and China were explicitly mentioned in the 2018National Defense Strategy as the greatpowerswithwhichtheUSisincompetition.BothRussiaandChinahavecomealongwaysincethe1990s,andthe“friendship”thatemergedintheimmediatepost-Tiananmenperiodandcontinuedtogrowovertheyearsnowtodayappearstobeoneofthestrongestbilateralalliancesontheplanet(Allison,2019).Notonlydoestheallianceprovideeachcountrywithasecurerearflank,technologytransfers and weapons sales support each other’s military-industrial complexes and militarymodernization.WhileRussiaisstillaheadofChinaincertainareas,includingmaritime,aviation,andweaponssystems,theKremlinknowsthatthisedgewilllikelygivewayinthenext10-20years,asChinaemergesasthemoreadvancedandpowerfulofthepair.HencethefocusofactingSecretaryofDefensePatrickShanahanon “China,China,China”—forall indicationsare that, in the long term,ChinawilldwarfRussianmilitarypowerandpresentthegreatestthreattoUSinterestsandnationalsecurity.

Together, Russia’s tentacles on its former Soviet neighbors andMoscow’s strategic alliancewithBeijinginpursuitofamultipolarworld(inwhichtheUSisnolongertheglobalhegemon)formthetwomain pillars uponwhich Putin’s grand strategy rests. All other aspects of its foreign policybehavior can be traced back to this dual-pronged grand strategy. As the 2018National DefenseStrategy puts it, “Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of theirgovernmental,economic,anddiplomaticdecisions,toshattertheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationandchangeEuropeanandMiddleEast securityandeconomicstructures to its favor.”These, inanutshell,aretheobjectivesofRussia’sgrandstrategy.AllofMoscow’smachinations—bothforeign



anddomestic,fromclampingdownoncivillibertiesathometomeddlinginVenezuela’srevolutionabroad—areallinsupportoftheselargerstrategicobjectives.

Theenduringnational interestsof theUnitedStatesare thesupportof freedom, liberty,and freemarkets around the globe. Our friends and allies figure prominently here, aswe allywith otherdemocraciesandregimesthatshareourvalues.SuchwasthejustificationfortheexpansionofNATO,especially as articulated by President Bill Clinton at the time. He also stated in regard to NATOexpansionthatEuropeansecuritywasavitalUSnationalinterest,pointingtothetwoWorldWarsasexamplesofwhathappenswhennationsgotowarwitheachother.TwentyyearsafterthefirstwaveofNATOexpansion,thesamecanbesaidofourNATOpartners,allfledglingfree-marketdemocracies,makingprogressatvariouspaces.Russia’sactionsinGeorgiaandUkrainehavemadeknowntotheworldthatitdoesnotconsiderthebordersofEuropeanstatesassacrosanct,whichisseenbytheUSas a critical component of the international system. Russia thus presents a challenge to theseinterests,notonlyinEurope,butallalongitsborder,particularlyincountrieswithsignificantpocketsof Russian-speakers (e.g., Kazakhstan, Estonia, etc.). Whether NATO members or not, RussianaggressionandrecidivismruncountertoUSnationalinterests,andtheUSiscompelledtocounterthisaggressionwhereitcan.TheproblemhereisthatRussiahasapropensitytoactinthegrayzonebetweenpeaceandwar,wheretheycandenyinvolvementandquiteoftengetawaywithactionsthatviolateinternationalnorms,ifnotinternationallaw.Aswelooktothefutureandtrytoanticipateit,wemustfocusonRussia’sgrayzoneactivitiesandhowtheymaycountervitalUSnationalinterests.

References

Allison,G.(14December2018).ChinaandRussia:Astrategicallianceinthemaking.TheNationalInterest.

Applebaum,A.(28September2015).Putin’sgrandstrategy.PubliclecturedeliveredattheGeorgeBushSchoolofGovernmentandPublicService,CollegeStation,Texas.

Bovdunov,A.(19January2018).Sopernichestvovelikikhderzhav’:ChemprodiktovananovayaoboronnayastrategiyaPentagona.RT.Retrievedfromhttps://russian.rt.com/world/article/472066-ssha-oboronnaya-strategiya-rossiya

Cooper,J.(2012).ReviewingRussianstrategicplanning:Theemergenceofstrategy2020.Rome:NATODefenseCollege.

Gurfinkiel,M.(15April2018).ThestrategicgoalsofarestoredRussia.BESACenterPerspectivesPaper,No.796.

Gvosdev,N.&Marsh,C.(2014).Russianforeignpolicy:Interests,vectors,andsectors(pp.92-95).Washington,DC/ThousandOaks,CA:Sage/CQPress.

Karasin,G.(1997).RossiyaiKitainaporogetysyacheletiya.Mezhdunarodnayazhizn,6,pp.1-16.

Lo,B.(2008).Axisofconvenience:Moscow,Beijing,andthenewgeopolitics.Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress.

Lukin,A.(2018).ChinaandRussia:Thenewrapprochement.London:Polity.



Marsh,C.(2006).Unparalleledreforms:China’srise,Russia’sfall,andtheinterdependenceoftransition.Lanham,MD:LexingtonBooks.

McFaul,M.(17November2003).ThegrandstrategyofVladimirPutin.TheWeeklyStandard.

Monaghan,A.(September2013).Putin’sRussia:Shapingagrandstrategy?InternationalAffairs,89(5),pp.1221-1236.

Posner,E.(25April2014).Putin’sgrandstrategy.[BlogPost].Retrievedfromhttp://ericposner.com/putins-grand-strategy

Starr,S.F.&Cornell,S.(2014).Introduction.InStarr,S.F.&Cornell,S.(Eds.)Putin’sgrandstrategy:TheEurasianUnionanditsdiscontents(pp.1-8).Washington,DC:CentralAsia-CaucasusInstitute.

U.S.DepartmentofDefense(2018).Nationaldefensestrategy.Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense.

Wallander,C.(2007).DomesticsourcesofRussia’sless-than-grand-strategy.InTellis,A.&Wills,M.(Eds.)StrategicAsia2007–2008:Domesticpolitics,changeandgrandstrategy(pp.140-175).Seattle,Washington:NationalBureauofAsianResearch.

WallStreetJournal(19November1957).Meetingtheunknown(p.14),Column1.


Goure APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 32

PART II. HOW DOES RUSSIA PERCEIVE DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, ESCALATION MANAGEMENT, AND THE CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT?

Chapter 6. Russian Strategic Intentions

Dr.DanielGoureLexingtonInstitute

[email protected]

Abstract

OnecannotunderstandhowtheRussianleadershipthinksstrategicissueswithoutappreciatingthefactthattheKremlinseesitselfasbeingatwarwiththeWest.TouseacommonUSmilitaryterm,itisalwaysphasezero.AsviewedfromMoscow,thewarisnottotalbutitisfundamental.SinceRussiais at war, for the Kremlin there is no separate gray zone, nor are there unacceptable forms ofdeterrence,compellence,orcoercion.InRussianstrategicthought,deterrenceandcompellencearetwosidesofthesamecoin.FortheKremlin,deterrenceisaformofoperantconditioning;itisineffectwhentheUSanditsalliesconditiontheiractionswithaneyetowardsavoidingconfrontationwithRussia.Compellence istheactiveformofthesameprinciple. It isamatterofactivelychallengingWesternactionsinordertoforceastanddown.Insteadofthetermcompellence,abetterwordtodescribetheRussianapproachiscoercion.Russia’sabilitytomanageriskintheso-calledgrayzoneisafunctionofitssuccessfulintegrationofalltheinstrumentsofstatepower.TheKremlinviewsconventionalandnuclearforcesasmeansformanagingrisk.Thethreattoresorttothedeploymentof conventional forcesor to employnuclearweapons is a time-tested toolof theKremlin’s crisismanagementstrategy.

Deterrence, Compellence, and the Continuum of Conflict—A Russian Perspective

To understand the Russian view of deterrence, compellence, and the continuum of conflict, it iscriticaltobeginwitharecognitionofthefactthatthesearepolitical-legalconstructsthatarederivedfromaWesternphilosophical-normativetradition.Moreover,RussianleadersbelievethattheUSandits allies are attempting to impose on Russia these legal constructs along with those that arefoundationaltodemocraticgovernanceandtheexistinginternationalorder.TotheKremlinthisishostilebehaviorthathasthepurposeofpreventingRussiafromtakingitsrightfulplaceasagreatpower. Inaddition, the impositionofaWesternpolitical-legalculturewouldthreatenthecurrentleadership’sholdonpower.

One cannot understand how the Russian leadership thinks about strategic issues withoutappreciatingthefactthattheKremlinseesitselfasbeingatwarwiththeWest.TouseacommonUSmilitaryterm,itisalwaysphasezero.TheUSsecurityconstructisrootedintheideathatthereiswarandthereispeace.ThisisinadequateasaframeworkforunderstandingRussianstrategicthought.Westernstrategicthinkershavehadtocreateanewconcept,thatofa“CompetitiveZoneorGrayAreaConflict” that isallegedtoexist in thespacebetweenwarandpeace inaclumsyattempt toreconciletheRussianandWesternviewsofthecurrentpolitical-militarystruggle.

TheKremlinbelievesthattheWesthasbeenengagedinanongoingwaragainstRussia,employingafullrangeofmeans,butparticularlyinformationoperations.Consequently,theKremlinseesitselfas



having to fight a sophisticated international counterinsurgency campaign against the West, ingeneral,andNATOandtheUnitedStates,inparticular.

Asviewed fromMoscow, thewar isnot total, but it is fundamental. ForRussia, thewar is aboutoverturningtheexistinginternationalorderinordertocreateanenvironmentinwhichtheKremlinachieves threeessential, evenexistential, goals.The first isgainingavetooveranyactionby theUnitedStatesanditsalliesthatmightthreatenRussiansecurity.Thesecondiscreatingasphereofinfluencethatencompassesthestatestoitseastandsouth.Thethirdisbeinggrantedtherighttopreventitspolitical,legal,andeconomicsystemfrombeing“infected”byWesternideasandvalues.

AsPutinandotherRussian leadershavemadeclear, thiswar isoneusingprimarilynon-militarymeansandintendedtodestabilizetheRussiangovernmentandpoliticalsystem.Thethreattheyfearisoneofpoliticaldestabilizationathome. In effect, theprincipal threat toRussian security is aninsurgency,butonethatexistsnotsimplywithinRussiabutoutsideitaswell.

President Putin’s decision is influenced by Russia’s experiences since the end of the ColdWar–internalcoupattempts,terroristattacks,‘coloredrevolutions’aroundRussia,warsinsideandoutsideofRussia,unfinishedreforms,andperceptionsofRussia’snaturalvulnerabilitytoafatesimilartothat of the Soviet Union given its one-dimensional economic base and political superstructure.However,Putin’spolicyisdrivenmostlybyconcernsaboutRussia’sinabilitytocompeteonalmostanylevelandinalmostanyspherewiththeworld’sgreatestpowersabsentfundamentalchangestothesecurity,energy,economic,andfinancialsystemsaroundRussia(Covington,2015,p.3).

SinceRussiaisatwar,fortheKremlin,thereisnoseparategrayzone.Norarethereunacceptableforms of deterrence, compellence, or coercion. The war is being fought on multiple levelssimultaneouslyandwithallmeansavailable,ifnotineveryway.TheRussianstrategyseekstomoveseamlessly between political/diplomatic activities, economicmeasures, para-military operations,andtheemploymentofconventionaland,finally,nuclearforces.Theuseofnon-militarymeansorwhattheWestidentifiesaspara-militaryforcesispreferablelargelybecauseitismoreefficientthanemploying classic military forces and because Russia could be called the West’s equal or evensuperiorinthesecapabilities.

RussiahasmadeuseofthelimitedmeansatitsdisposalbothtodetertheWestandtofurtheritsefforts to undermine external threats.Western observers tend to focus on the non-military andparamilitarymeansemployedbyMoscow,labelingthemasexamplesof“hybridwarfare”orof“grayzone”conflictcapabilities.AsRussianexpertsarequicktopointout,thesetermshavenoequivalentsinRussianstrategictheory.Thesemeansarebeingemployedasapartofaseamless,coordinatedconflictstrategythatseesnotruedistinctionbetweenwarandpeace.

Anydiscussionofso-calledgrayzoneconflictsshouldnotobscureanunderstandingoftheextenttowhichRussiaseesmodernizingitsconventionalandnuclearforcesasessentialtoolsofitsapproachto conflict below the threshold of war as defined in theWest. Also, these same capabilities arerelevant,evencritical,tothewayMoscowseekstoconductlocalaggressions.RussianadventuresinEasternEuropeandtheMiddleEasthaverapidlymorphedfromhybridoperationsemployingnon-traditionalmeansandmethodstoclassicconventionalmilitaryoperations.TherecentinterventioninSyriawasamodelpowerprojectionoperation,suggestingthattheRussianmilitaryisquitecapableoflimitedhighintensityconventionaloperations(Monaghan,2015,p.72).

WhatmakesRussiaaparticularlydangerousadversaryisthatitsuseofthesenon-traditionalmeansis integrated with and supported by traditional conventional military capabilities and both are



coveredbyanuclearumbrella.Moreover,asdemonstratedbytheoperationstoseizeCrimeaanddestabilizeEasternUkraineaswellasnumerousrecentexercises,theRussianmilitaryisincreasinglycapable of and, one might argue, specifically designed to support the employment of non-traditional/informationalmeansandmethods.

Russianthinkingaboutconventionalandnucleardeterrenceisstronglyinfluencedbytheirviewthatthesecapabilitiesarerelevant,evencritical,toachievingvictoryinconflictsthatprimarilyinvolvenon-militaryorparamilitarymeans.WhiletheRussianmilitaryplansforthepossibleuseofnuclearweaponsinaconflictwithNATO,thisdoesnotmeanthatRussianleaderswouldwelcomesuchascenario.Inadditiontoservingastheprimarydeterrentofanuclearattackonthehomeland,Moscowviews nuclearweapons as a counter to theWest’s advantages in long-range conventional strikecapabilitiesandakeytoolinitsstrategyforso-calledhybridwarfare.ThisexpansiveviewoftheroleofnuclearweaponsinconflictwithNATOsuggeststhattheclassicnotionsofredlinesandrungsontheescalationladdermaybedisappearing.AsDr.StephenBlank(2018)observed:“arguablythereisaseamlesswebleadingfromconventionalscenariosuptoandincludingthesesupposedlylimitednuclearwarscenarios,perhapsusingtacticalnuclearweaponsforwhichtheWestasofyethasfoundnoresponse.”

Thedevelopmentofadvancedconventionalcapabilities,includinghypersonicweapons,isviewedbyRussiabothasameansofdeterring/coercingtheWestandasawayofachievingmilitaryimpactsequivalenttothosethatresultfromtheemploymentofnuclearweaponswhileavoidingmanyofthedownsidecollateralconsequences.Ifsuccessful,traditionalstrategicdeterrencecouldbeextendedtotherealmofconventionalconflict.

Russia’sabilitytomanageriskintheso-calledgrayzoneisafunctionofitssuccessfulintegrationofalltheinstrumentsofstatepower.TheKremlinviewsconventionalandnuclearforcesasmeansformanagingrisk.Thethreattoresorttothedeploymentofconventionalforcesortoemploynuclearweaponsisatime-testedtooloftheKremlin’scrisismanagementstrategy.

Moscowiswillingtoacceptlimitedgainsandthecreationofso-calledfrozenconflictsifthisavoidsunnecessaryorcostlyescalation.ThisisparticularlythecaseintheregionsthatMoscowbelievesarewithin itssphereof influence.Thesituation inEasternUkraine isanexampleofa frozenconflict.WhileMoscowwould like tohaveUkraine in itsorbit, it ispreferable toensure that thiscountryremainweakandinastateofperpetualinternaldivisionthanthatitshiftsallegiancetotheWest.

Inaddition,over thepast severaldecades,Moscowhassuccessfullyaddednewcapabilities to itsmoreestablishedsuiteofmeans.Forexample,thecreationofprivatepara-militarycompanieshasallowedtheKremlintodeploysophisticatedcombatunitsinregionalconflicts.

TheessenceoftheRussianapproachtodeterrenceandcompellenceishowtheseconceptsareusedasactivetoolsoftheRussianstrategytoconductthewarwiththeWest.DeterrenceandcompellenceservetheneedtopreventtheUSandtheWestfromcounteringRussianeffortstoinfluenceeventsinthe international environment while simultaneously countering Western actions that threatenRussiaoritsdesiredsphereofinfluence.

TheKremlinhaslongemployednon-kineticmeans,frominformationwarfaretocyberoperationsand classic espionage/influence operations not only to achieve specific political and militaryobjectives,suchasunderminingthecredibilityofWesterninstitutionsandpoliticalprocesses,butalsoasawayofinfluencingWesternpoliticalandmilitarythoughtregardingthenatureofmodernwarand,hence,theboundariesofclassicdeterrenceoperations.Forexample,theWesthaschosen



nottotreatRussianattemptstoinfluenceitspoliticalprocessesasactsofwar.Asaresult,Russiacanoperateinthisdomainwithoutaconcernthatitsactionswilltriggeraclassicdeterrenceresponse.TheWestis,ifanything,self-deterred.

WhilesomeWesternexpertsdescribeRussianthinkingregardingdeterrenceasprimarilydefensiveinnature,thisismisleading.RussianmilitarydoctrineseesthethreattoemployconventionaltheaterorstrategicnuclearforcesasameansofdissuadingorevendefeatingoutrightaWesternresponsetolesserRussianaggression.Insuchascenario,itisRussiathatisseekingtoalterthestatusquobymeansofforce,andthefunctionofitsconventionalandnuclearforcesistodeteraWesternresponse.Information operations, conducted prior to onset of hostilities would be directed, in part, tosensitizing Western leaders and populations to the risks associated with any effort to counterRussianaggression.

InRussianstrategic thought,deterrenceandcompellenceare twosidesof thesamecoin.For theKremlin, deterrence is a form of operant conditioning; it is in effect when the US and its alliesconditiontheiractionswithaneyetowardsavoidingconfrontationwithRussia.Compellenceistheactiveformofthesameprinciple.ItisamatterofactivelychallengingWesternactionsinordertoforceastanddown.

Insteadofthetermcompellence,abetterwordtodescribetheRussianapproachiscoercion.Themost effective coercion is achieved with a minimum employment of military force. Russia isdevelopinganarrayofinformational,conventional,andnuclearmeanstoallowittopursue‘cross-domaincoercion’(Adamsky,2017,p.1-28).formationoperationsworkacrossallpotentialdomainsor formsof conflict to orchestrate activities and support establishment of a favorable balance offorces.FromtheKremlin’sperspective, informationoperationscanoverturnregimesanddestroycountries,asexemplifiedinthebreakupofYugoslaviaandthevariouscolorrevolutions.Thespecterofextremeviolenceresultingfromtheuseofadvancedconventionalortheaternuclearweaponsisan essential element of the information campaign, employed to paralyze Western responses toRussianaggression.

Moscowtypicallyseekstomanageescalationpriortotheinitiationofacrisisorconflict.TheinvasionofCrimeaisanextremelyusefulexampleofasophisticated,multi-levelstrategiccampaigntoachieveageo-politicalobjectivewhilemanagingescalation.Theuseofinformationoperations,cyberattacks,andpara-militaryforcesasapreludetotheintroductionofconventionalmilitarycapabilitiesbackedupbythethreatoflong-rangestrikeforcesenabledRussiatoincreasethemilitarythreatintheareaasneeded to controlUkraine’s and theWest’s response to the invasion.Russianmilitary leaderssoughttocommunicatetoNATOthethreatthatanattempttoretakeCrimeacouldbemetbytheuseofnuclearweapons.

Moscowseesitsnuclearforcesascentraltoitsabilitytocontrolescalation.TheKremlin’sdeclaratorynuclearpolicy,itspublicitycampaignaroundnewnuclearcapabilities,theallegeddevelopmentof“terror”weapons,theexpansionifitstheaternucleararsenalanddeploymentofadvancednuclearweaponstoEuropeareallintendedtocreateanatmospherethatwillcontributetoRussia’abilitytocontrolescalationintheeventofaconfrontationwiththeUSorNATO.

TheRussianmilitaryisfocusedonthedevelopmentofasymmetriccapabilitiesthatcancounterthesophisticatedconventionalsystemsbeingdevelopedintheWest.ThisisamajorreasonforRussia’slitiesrely.Even limitednuclearstrikesat theoutsetofaconflictarea formofescalationcontrol.investment in anti-space capabilities, electronic warfare, cyber weapons, and advanced theaternuclearweapons.EscalationcanbecontrolledbyusingthoseasymmetriccapabilitiestoblindUS



forcesanddenythemcriticalnetworksonwhichitsadvancedprecisionstrikecapabilitiesrely.Evenlimitednuclearstrikesattheoutsetofaconflictareaformofescalationcontrol.

ThecontestbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussiaisprimarilymilitaryandwillbewonorlostlargelyby non-military means. In order to deny Moscow’s goal of disrupting the current internationalsecuritysystem,it isnecessarythattheWestdenytheKremlintheabilitytodisruptthisorderatminimumriskandanacceptableprice.CounteringRussianhybridwafareoperationsanddeterringRusianconventionalandnuclearthreatswillensurethatthecompetitionbetweentheRussiaandtheUnited States remains in areas where the latter has distinct advantages such as economics,information,theruleoflaw,theglobalbankingsystem,andadvancedtechnology.

References

Adamsky,D.(2017).FromMoscowwithcoercion:Russiandeterrencetheoryandstrategicculture.JournalofStrategicStudies(pp.1-28).DOI:10.1080/01402390.2017.1347872

Blank,S.J.(Ed.).(2018).TheRussianmilitaryincontemporaryperspective.CarlisleBarracks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,U.S.ArmyWarCollege.

Covington,S.(August2015).Putin’schoicesforRussia(p.3).BelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs,Cambridge,MA:HarvardKennedySchool.

Monaghan,A.(2015-16).The‘war’inRussia’s‘hybridwarfare’(p.72).Parameters,45(4).


Flynn APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 37

Chapter 7. Russia’s Evolving Approach to Deterrence

Mr.DanielFlynnOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence(ODNI)

[email protected]

Abstract

Russia is adopting coercive strategies involving theorchestratedemploymentofnonmilitaryandmilitarymeanstodeterandcompeltheUnitedStatespriortoandaftertheoutbreakofhostilities.Russia’sevolvingstrategies,however,will likelyincreasetheriskofmiscalculationandescalationduringafuturecrisisinvolvingtheUnitedStates.SincetheendoftheColdWar,Russia’sapproachtodeterrence has evolved as its capabilities and assessment of the strategic environment changed.Russian military planners are adopting comprehensive approaches to deterrence involving theorchestrated employment of nonmilitary and military means, including information, space,conventional military, and nuclear capabilities. Russia’s concepts also include options forpreemptivelyemployingforcetoinduceshockanddissuadeanadversaryfromconductingmilitaryoperations and to compel a de-escalation of hostilities. In response to a threat of US militaryintervention that challenge Russian vital interests, Moscow would probably seek to use theseapproachestodissuadeandcompelWashingtontolimitUSactionsandpreventtheoutbreakofasignificantmilitary conflict and, failing that,manage escalation and induce a de-escalation in anattempttoendtheconflictonfavorableterms.

How Russia Defines “Deterrence”

Russianstrategistsdefinetheconceptof“deterrence”intheirmilitarypublicationsdifferentlythanthe United States. Russian discussions of “deterrence” include elements of both dissuasion andcompellenceandismoreanalogoustowhattheUSmilitarywoulddefineascoercion.Forexample,accordingtoDimaAdamsky(2015),Russianprofessionaldiscourseoftenmixesthetermscoercion,deterrence, and compellence and uses them interchangeably. This is not just simply an issue oftranslation or variations in terminology. It is a difference in fundamental mindset. In Russianconcepts,“deterrence”actionscanoccurintimesofpeaceandcrisistopreventwarandsupporttheachievement of political goals. “Deterrence” actions also can take place after the outbreak ofhostilitiestomanageescalationandcompelade-escalationoftheconflictonfavorableterms.Forexample,RussianmilitarymighttakeforcefulactionsduringacrisistocompeltheUnitedStatestochangeitsbehaviorandforgoconductingamilitaryintervention.WhilefromtheUSperspectivesuchactionswouldappearhighlyescalatory,theRussianmilitarywouldviewitselfasoperatingintherealm of “deterrence” and conducting defensive actions with the intent of preventing furtherhostilitiesandde-escalatingthecrisis.Failuretounderstandthismindsetcouldcreateconditionsformiscalculationandunintentionalescalationoffuturecrises.

Russia’s Evolving Approach to Deterrence

Since the end of the Cold War, Russian military strategists have redefined their approach todeterrence in response to changes in the strategic security environment and Russian militarycapabilities. Kristen Ven Bruusgaard (2016), in her study of Russian “strategic deterrence,” hasidentify several stages in Russianmilitary thinking regarding deterrence from the 1990s to thepresent.Oneshouldthinkofthesestages,however,asacontinuousprocessofRussianexaminationandreevaluationonhowbesttopreventandmanageUnitedStatesandNATOmilitaryoperationsin



the post-ColdWar period rather than discrete strategies. Since the 1990s, Russia’s approach todeterrencehasexpanded,shiftingfromafocusonnuclearweaponstoincorporatingconventionalmilitaryandnonmilitarymeansasRussiancapabilitiescontinuedtoadvance.

The Emergence of the Theory of “Nuclear De-Escalation”

Bythelate1990s,Russianmilitarystrategistsrealizedtheyhadaproblem.AlthoughtheColdWarwasoverandaglobalnuclearwarwiththeUnitedStateswasextremelyunlikely,Russiastillfacedthe prospect of potential US or NATO intervention in a limited local or regional conflict thatthreatenedRussianvital interests.The1999NATOinterventionagainstSerbiaduringtheconflictoverKosovorealizedRussianfears.FromMoscow’sperspective,NATO’sattackonaRussianclientstate,overRussia’sobjectionsandwithoutaUNmandatemeantthatRussiandeterrencecapacityhadseriouslydiminished.Furthermore,RussianstrategistssawNATO’sinterventioninKosovoasraisingthepossibilityoftheUnitedStatesorNATOinterveninginotherconflictsintheregion,suchasinChechnyathatwouldposeevengreaterproblemsforRussia’ssecurityinterests(Sokov,2014).

Given the deteriorated condition of Russian conventional military capabilities, Russian militarystrategists consideredhow to employRussia’s nuclear arsenal in a regional conflict toprevent asignificant intervention by a superior conventional military force. The problem for Russianstrategistswas how tomake the threat of nuclearweapons appear credible to have the desired“deterrent”effect(S.Yu.etal,2000).Tohaveacrediblecoercivecapability,thesestrategistsbelievedRussiahadtodemonstrateitswillingnesstoemploynuclearweaponsinresponsetoaninterventionby a conventionally superior adversarywhile at the same time limiting the potential for furtherescalationtoastrategicnuclearexchange.Thisthinkingledtothetheoryofnuclearde-escalation.This theory assumes thatMoscow’s vital national interestswouldbemore at stake in a regionalconflictonRussia’speripherythanthatofpotentialadversary,suchastheUnitedStatesorotherNATOmembers.Byemployingnuclearweaponsearlyinsuchaconflict,Moscowwoulddemonstratethat thecosts involvedwouldoutweighanybenefitsanadversarywouldhope toobtain throughmilitaryoperations.

Thetheoryalsoarguedthatconstrainingthephysicalimpactofthenuclearweaponsemployedtocreate “tailored damage”—by either using very low-yield weapons (i.e., “nonstrategic” nuclearweapons)orbytargetingunpopulatedareasorinfrastructurethatlimitedthenumberofcasualtiesandavoidedstrikesontheadversary’snuclearforces—Russiacoulddemonstrateitsresolvewithoutprovokingaretaliatorynuclearstrike(Nedelin,Levshin,&Sosnovsky,1999).2Theintendedeffectontheadversaryismorepsychologicalthandestructiveanddesignedtoaltertheadversary’sperceivedcost-benefitcalculusandtherebypreventfurtheraggression.Proponentsofthede-escalationtheorybelievedthatanadversary,inthepositionofdecidingbetweenwhethertorespondinkindandriskescalatingtheconflicttoafull-scalenuclearwarordeescalatingandnegotiatinganendtotheconflictwouldchoosethelatter,especiallyinsituationswheretheirownvitalnationalinterestsarenotatstake.

The Development of “Nonnuclear Deterrence”

Although the Russian military establishment agreed on the continued role of Russian strategicnuclearweaponsindeterringglobalnuclearwar,debatecontinueduringthe2000sovertheviabilityofusingnuclearweaponsalonetopreventorde-escalatelarge-scaleregionalconventionalconflicts(Blank, 2011). Russian strategists continued to argue whether the use of nuclear weapons in a 2Seealso:Malkowetal,andSokov.



conventionalregionalconflictwouldhavethedesiredeffectofde-escalationor, instead,drivetheadversarytorespondinkind(VenBruusgaard,2017).AstheRussianmilitarybegantorebuilditsconventionalcapabilities,Russianstrategistsgavemorethoughttothecoerciveroleconventionalstrikeweaponsmightplay. In theearly2000s, formerDeputyDefenseMinisterAndreiKokoshinargued that there were limits to “nuclear deterrence” and that Russia needed to invest inconventionalprecision strike systems toobtaina credible “pre-nucleardeterrent” (McDermott&Bukkvoll,2017).The2010RussianmilitarydoctrinemadeaninitialreferencetouseofprecisionweaponsaspartofRussia’s“strategicdeterrence.”The2014doctrinealsomentionsthatRussiawillachieve“deterrence”usingnuclearandnonnuclearmeans.

Similartotheroleofnuclearweaponsinaregionalconflict,Russianstrategistsbelievedthemodernconventional weapons had the potential to prevent or control military aggression by imposingdamagethatwouldbeunacceptabletoanadversary.AnumberofRussianstrategistsandofficialsargued in favor using such strikes preemptivelywhenUS orNATO attacks against Russia’s vitalinterests appear imminent (Velez-Green, 2017). In 2008, Major General Burenok and ColonelAchasovwroteinMilitaryThought,thejournalofRussianGeneralStaff,thatRussiashouldprepare“anticipatory”orreciprocalnonnuclearattacksagainstvitaltargetsofanaggressortoimposecoststhatwouldexceedthebenefitsthatanadversaryhopestoachievethroughmilitaryoperations.Theauthors argued that Russia should carry out nonnuclear strikes when military aggression by asuperiorconventionaladversaryisimminenttodeterthatadversaryfromtakingaggressiveactionsandtodeescalatethesituation.Furthermore,Russiashouldtargetthesestrikesagainstanenemy’svitalinfrastructure,suchassatellite,communications,airdefense,commandandcontrol,andpowergeneration systems, which would be disruptive to the enemy but not inflict high losses on thepopulationinordertolimittheriskoffurtherescalation(Burenok&Achsov,2008).ThePresidentoftheRussianAcademyofMilitarySciences,GeneralMakhmutGareyev,alsostatedthattheopeningminutesofacontemporarylimited-objectiveconflictshouldincludeanticipatorystrikesagainstanadversary’scommandandcontrolandconventionalstrikesystems(Polegayev&Alferov,2015).

Thedevelopmentofa“nonnucleardeterrent,”however,doesnotreplacethecoerciveroleRussiannuclear weapons play in regional conflicts. Rather, nonnuclear capabilities are a “pre-nucleardeterrent”capabilityprovidingMoscowwithcoerciveoptionsatlowerlevelsofconflictintensity.Ifsuchoptionsfailtodetertheenemyorcompelade-escalation,Moscowwouldstillhavetheoptionofemployingnuclearstrikes.Inthismanner,Russia’snonnuclearstrikesalsoserveasalastwarningtoanadversarytode-escalatebeforeRussiacrossesthenuclearthreshold.

Incorporating “Nonmilitary” Deterrence

In2008,GeneralGareyevproposedanewconceptfor“strategicdeterrence.”Hedefined“strategicdeterrence”as “asetofinterrelatedpolitical,diplomatic,information,economic,military,andothermeasuresaimedatdeterring,reducing,andavertingthreatsandaggressiveactionsonthepartofanystate(orcoalitionofstates)byansweringmeasuresthatreducetheoppositeside's fearorbyanadequatethreatofunacceptableconsequencestoitasaresultofretaliatoryactions”(Gareyev,2008).Inthisconcept,Russiawoulddeterandcompeladversariesthroughacombinationofnonmilitaryandmilitarymeansratherthansolelythroughthethreateneduseofforce.Thismightincludeusingsocial media and other informational means to shape public opinion to dissuade opposition toMoscow’sactionsormanipulating thesupplyofRussianenergyresources topersuade importingstatestoaltertheirbehavior.Theprinciplenonmilitarymeasuresemployedin“strategicdeterrence”would include political, diplomatic, legislative, economic, informational, psychological, andmoralmeasures (Matvichuck&Khryapin, 2010). Russia’s 2015National Security Strategy codified thisconceptof“strategicdeterrence”bynotingthat“[i]nterrelatedpolitical,military,military-technical,



diplomatic,economic,informational,andothermeasuresarebeingdevelopedandimplementedinordertoensurestrategicdeterrenceandthepreventionofarmedconflicts.”

“Strategic Deterrence” and the Russian Way of War

Russia’sconceptof“strategicdeterrence”isintegraltoRussia’scurrentapproachtowarfare.Russianstrategists view “deterrence” operations as occurring both prior to and after the outbreak ofhostilities.Priortohostilities,MoscowseekstoshapethestrategicenvironmenttodissuadeUSorNATOinterventionagainstRussiansecurityinterests.Attheonsetofhostilities,Russia’sgoalistopreventfurtheraggressionandcompelade-escalationandendtheconflictontermsfavorabletoMoscowassoonaspossible.Russia’sapproachseekstonegateanybenefitsanadversaryhopestoattainateachlevelofconflictbysignalingcapabilitiesandwillingnesstoimposecostsatevenhigherlevelsofescalationtodissuadefurthermilitaryoperationsandcompelade-escalationofhostilities.

If Russia’s initial actions fail to prevent a superior adversary from intervening militarily andthreateningRussia’svitalinterests,RussianmilitaryliteratureindicatesMoscowwoulduseforcetopreventfurtherinterventionandde-escalatethesituationtoendhostilitiesontermsfavorabletoMoscow.Thiscouldinvolveconventionalorinformationstrikesonanadversary’skeyinfrastructure.IfthesituationwasseriousenoughthreattoRussia’svitalinterests,Russiaalsomightpreemptivelyconduct conventional strikes in anticipation of an adversary’s imminent military operations tocompel the adversary to reconsider and to deter further hostilities. If conventional strikes areinsufficient to compel an adversary to de-escalate, Russian doctrine and statements by RussianofficialssuggestsMoscowwouldthreatenandpotentiallyemploylimitednuclearstrikestoconvincethe adversary that the costs of further military intervention outweighs any expected benefits(Matvichuck&Khryapin,2010).SeeTable1.

Implications for Future Crisis Dynamics

Russia’s approaches to deterrence raise the risk of miscalculation on both sides. The factorscontributing to this risk include limitations inRussian capabilities to effectively signal their ownintentionsandmanageescalationincontemporaryconflicts.

AmbiguityinRussianthresholdsforescalation,thedual-usenatureofsomeoftheweaponsemployedforsignaling,andthepotentialdividebetweenmilitaryandcivilianleadershipthinkingarelikelytoimpedeRussia’s ability to clearly signal their intentions ina crisis.Russia’s thresholds for takingpreemptiveandothercompellentactionsappearambiguous, raising therisk thatatanopponentmight trigger a forceful response unintentionally. It also possible that Russian military officialsthemselvesmaynotknowpriortoacrisistheexactconditionsatwhichcertainactionswouldoccur.DimaAdamsky(2015,p.18),forexample,notesthatasofatleastthefallof2015Russianstrategicplanners still lacked a codified procedure to estimate the conditions for which they wouldrecommendtotheseniorleadershipwhentoemploynuclearweaponstode-escalateaconflict.Thedual-usenatureofsomeRussia’sweaponsystemsisalsolikelytocomplicatesignalingofMoscow’sintentduringacrisis.ThedeploymentsofRussianweapons,liketheIskander,thatcancarryeitherconventionalornuclearweaponscreateambiguityoverwhetherMoscowintendssuchdeploymentsto signal a lowering of the nuclear threshold, for example. Russia’s approach to deterrence andcompellenceisalsobasedonthethinkingofmilitarystrategists.Duringacrisis,itispossiblethatthepoliticalleadershipinMoscowwouldoptforamoreconservativeapproachandnotapprovetakingpreemptiveactions.However,theRussianmilitaryislikelytomakepreparationsduringacrisis,suchasincreasingthereadinessofthearmedforcesanddeployingspecificweaponsystemstobeabletocarryoutsuchactionsifapproved.Thismightleadtoasituationinwhichtheotherside,observing



suchmilitarypreparations,inadvertentlyperceivessuchactivityasanintenttoconductpreemptiveorescalatoryactionsleadingtoanunintendedheighteningoftensions.

ThecharacterofmodernconflictwillprobablychallengetheabilityofRussianmilitaryleaderstomanage escalation in a future crisis. Russia’s approach to deterrence include the use of newcapabilities, such as cyber and counterspace weapons, for which there is a lack of mutualunderstanding with the United States as to implications the use of these weapons will have onescalation dynamics during a crisis situation. A lack of mutually agreed upon norms betweencountries on the use of such weapons and where they fall on the “escalation ladder” creates asituation ripe formiscalculation and inadvertent conflict. The speed ofmodern conflictwill alsochallengeRussianmilitaryofficialstoassesstheeffectoftheirdeterrentactionsandadaptquicklyinarapidlychangingsituation.Modernmilitarycapabilitiessuchascyber,anti-satelliteweapons,andlong-range, high-speed missiles—including potentially hypersonic weapons in the future—candecreasethetimeformakingdecisionsandevaluatingresponsesinaconflict.

Table 1. Potential Russian Coercive Actions During Peacetime, Crisis, and Conflict

Peacetime IncreasingTensions—Crisis InitialPeriodofConflict

Goal:ShapetheStrategicEnvironmenttoDissuadeAggressionagainstRussianInterests

Useinformation,economic,diplomatic,andpsychologicalmeanstoshapeperceptionsthroughstrategicmessaging

Signalanddemonstratenewmilitarycapabilities

Conductmilitaryexercisestodemonstratemilitarystrength

Employprimarilynon-militarymeans,includingcyberactivitiesandcovertsupporttoproxies,toadvanceinterestswhilestayingbelowthethresholdforopenwarfaretoavoidpromptingforeignintervention

Goal:PreventCrisisfromEvolvingtoMilitaryConflictbyDeterringAggression

ConductstrategicmessagingtofosterdivisionsbetweenWashingtonanditsallies

Manipulateexportofenergysuppliesaspartofeconomiccoercion

Demonstratepreparednessformilitaryactionsbydeployingforcesandconductingsnapexercises

Signalcapabilitiestoconductspecificdeterrenceactionsbyopenlydeployingkeycapabilities,suchascounterspaceweaponsandIskandermissilesystems

Demonstratecybercapabilitiesthroughmanipulationofkeyadversaryinformationsystems

ConductnuclearsaberrattlingthroughofficialstatementsaboutRussiannuclear

Goal:CompelaDe-escalationandDeterFurtherAggressionthroughActionsTakenPreemptivelyorDuringtheEarlyStagesofConflict

Conductlimitedcyberandotherinformationattacksoncriticalinfrastructure,includingnon-destructiveattacksonsatellitesystems

Conductdestructiveattacksonspacesystems

Employconventionalprecision-strikesystemsinlimitedattacksagainstcriticalinfrastructuretheinitialperiodofconflict

Usenonstrategicnuclearweaponsinalimitedordemonstrationmode

Employstrategicnuclearforcesinalimitedordemonstrationmode



capabilities,deploymentofdual-useforces,long-rangepatrolsofRussianbombers,and/orexercisesinvolvingnuclearforces

References

Adamsky,D.(November2015).Crossdomaincoercion:ThecurrentRussianartofStrategy.ProliferationPapers,TheInstitutFrançaisdesRelationsInternationales,No.54.

Blank,S.(Ed.).(2011).Russianuclearweapons:Past,presentandfuture.Carlisle,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,U.S.ArmyWarCollege,pp10-11.

Burenok,V.M.&Achsov,O.B.(January2008).Non-nucleardeterrence.MilitaryThought(1).

Gareyev,M.A.(8October2008).Strategicdeterrence:Problemsandsolutions.KrasnayaZvezda(RedStar),No.183.

Malkov,S.Yu.etal.(15December2000).Onthequestionofamethodologyforselectionofrationalstrategiestosafeguardstrategicstabilityandnucleardeterrenceinthemodernera.StrategiskayaStabilnost,No.3.

Matvichuck,V.V.&Khryapin,A.L.(January2010).Astrategicdeterrencesystemundernewconditions.MilitaryThought.

McDermott,R.N.&Bukkvoll,T.(1August2017).Russiaintheprecisionstrikeregime.NorwegianResearchDefenseEstablishment.

Nedelin,A.V.,Levshin,V.I.,&Sosnovsky,M.E.(May-June1999).Oprimeneniiiadernogooruzhiyadlyadeeskalastiivoennikhdyestvii[OntheUseofNuclearWeaponsfortheDe-EscalationofMilitaryConflict],MilitaryThought,No.3,pp.34–7.

Polegayev,V.I.&Alferov,V.V.(2015).Nonucleardeterrenceinthestrategicdeterrencesystem.MilitaryThought,July-September.

Sokov,N.N.(March2014).WhyRussiacallsalimitednuclearstrike“de-escalation,”BulletinoftheAtomicScientists.

Velez-Green,A.(April2017).TheunsettlingviewfromMoscow(p.22).Washington,D.C.:CenterforNewAmericanSecurity.

VenBruusgaard,K.(19July2016).Russianstrategicdeterrence.Survival,58:4.

VenBruusgaard,K.(22September2017).ThemythofRussia’slowerednuclearthreshold,”WarontheRocks.


Schindler APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 43

PART III. WHAT GRAY ZONE ACTIONS ARE RUSSIANS UNDERTAKING ACROSS THE GLOBE?

Chapter 8. Russian Activities Across Europe (A Contrarian Assessment)

Dr.JohnSchindlerTheLocarnoGroup

[email protected]

Abstract

RussiatodayisaspoilerintheUS-ledinternationalsystem,especiallyinEurope,wheretheKremlincontinuestoenjoyadvantagesoverUSGandNATOinkeyareassuchasespionageandpropaganda,inwhichRussianasymmetricpowerpunchesfaraboveitsweight.Contrarytoconventionalanalysis,aftertwodecadesunderVladimirPutin,RussiarepresentsanideologicalchallengetotheWest,notjust a political and military rivalry. Although NATO continues to possess impressive overmatchagainstMoscow, thatedge isdwindling, andWesternvulnerabilities in certainmilitaryareasarealarming. Moreover, the unwillingness of Western experts and governments to confront theideological–aswellaspoliticalandmilitary–aspectsofourrivalrywithPutinismmeansthatthethreatofsignificantarmedconflictisrising.

The Nature of the Regime

Putin’sRussiabearssimilaritiestotheTsaristpastandthemorerecentCommunistonebutistrulyreflectiveofneitherprevioussystem.AlthoughPutinhimselfisverymuchaproductoftheSovietsystem,indeedheisderidedasasovok(‘dustpan’inRussian,meaningonewhouncriticallyadmirestheSovietpast)byhisenemiesathome.Histwodecadesinpowersincetheendofthe1990shavedelivered significant breaks from the Bolshevik experience in politics and Russian societymorebroadly.

Putin’sRussiaisneitherfreeinaWesternsensenorunfreeinaSovietone.Itisahybridregime,a‘manageddemocracy’ofapeculiarlyRussiansort,withtheKremlinbestowingaccoladesonaspectsoftheTsaristlegacyandtheCommunistonetoo,whilestillbeingcriticalofboth.Thoughpoweriscentralizedat‘thetop’intheKremlin,andregionalpowercenterswerebroughtunderMoscow’sheelintheearlyyearsofPutinism,itwouldbeincorrecttoviewPutin’sregimeaspossessingthelongarmsoftheSovietsystemunderStalin,forinstance.

Heretheprominentroleofwealthybusinessmen,so-called‘oligarchs,’isimportantbutfrequentlyovervalued by Western commentators. Although Putin rules with help from oligarchs and hasbecome a billionaire himself thanks to those close and mutually beneficial relationships, topbusinessmen who fall afoul of ‘the top’ go into exile and not infrequently wind up dead undermysteriouscircumstances.(Schindler,2016)

It’scustomarytotrackPutin’sdisenchantmentwiththeWest(particularlytheUnitedStates)tohisinfamousspeechatthe2007MunichSecurityForum,yetitneedstobestatedthattoomanyWesternexperts failed to realize justhowangry theKremlinwasgrowingat theWestby the late-aughts.Moreover,mostofthemmissedindeliblesignsintheyearsrunninguptothe2014annexationofCrimeaandRussia’saggressionagainstUkrainethatMoscowwasbecomingimplacablyopposedtothepostmodernWestonanideologicallevel.HerePutin’sfierycommentsatthe2013ValdaiClub,



where he denounced theWest as godless and even Satanic, deservedmore attention than theyreceivedabroad (Schindler,2014).

These themesbecame regimepropaganda, and the events of 2014werehailedbyPutinwith anunprecedenteddoseofRussian (russkiy not rossiskiy 3) nationalism, combinedwithThirdRome-flavoredreligiousmysticismwiththestaunchbackingoftheRussianOrthodoxChurch,whichhasbecomeamajorsupporteroftheregimeandthedefactostatereligionunderPutin.4Thisheadybrewof religiousnationalism falls ondeaf ears in theWest,which finds it strange andatavistic, yet itresonateswithaverageRussiansinawaythatBolshevismneverdid.

ItshouldbenotedthatRussiansarenotespeciallyreligiousintermsofchurchgoingbutunderPutin,Orthodoxyhasbeenrebornandweaponizedtobolstertheregimeandencouragepopularsupportforitspolicies.PutinhimselfputsonaconvincingactofbeinganOrthodoxbeliever,andwhetherhereally is one (or not) is immaterial to the prominent role that Russian Orthodoxy now plays increating pro-regime ideas and actions among average Russians. This hearkens back to ancientOrthodox notions of symphonia (‘symphony,’ meaning symbiosis between secular and religiousrulers)whichstandinmarkedcontrasttocurrentWesternideasabout ‘separationofchurchandstate.’MoscowinrecentyearshasmadeclearthatitviewsthepresentclashwiththeWestashavingadeepideologicalaspect,rootedinnationalismandreligion,whethertheWestnoticesthisornot(Schindler,2018a).

After9/11,therewasarushamongAmericanstograsptheoriginsoftheSalafijihadistideologythatmotivated its purveyors’ aggression. Similarly, it is now imperative forWesterners to grasp thePutinistideology,whatmotivatesit,andwhyitisencouragingmoreconfrontation–notconciliation–withtheWest.

The Special Services

OneaspectofPutinismthatisuniqueinRussianhistoryisthedominantroleofthesecurityagencies,what Russians term the ‘special services,’ in nearly all regime affairs. The dominance of thesesecretiveagenciesintheformulationofpolicy,foreignanddomestic,hasnoprecedentinRussianhistory, which for centuries has valued its spy services more than Western countries do. Theconnection of Putin’s special services to the past, including the darkest periods of Communistoppression, is illustratedbythefanfarewithwhichtheregimerecentlycelebratedthehundredthanniversaryof thebirthof theSovietsecretpolice–andtheirdirectconnectiontoKremlinspiestoday(Schindler,2017).

Here’sPutin’spastintheKGBplaysamajorroleandastheKremlinboss,hehassurroundedhimselfwithseniordecisionmakersverymuchinhisownimage.Indeed,therearefewpeopleat‘thetop’inMoscow who didn’t grow up in the Soviet intelligence apparatus, military or civilian. They are‘Chekists’tousethepropertermandPutinhimselffamouslystated,‘thereareno“former’Chekists.”5

3IntheRussianlanguage,russkiydenotesRussianinanethnicsensewhilerossiskiyreferstoanyoneinRussia,e.g. theRussianFederationisRossiskayaFederatsiya.

4OntheThirdRomemythandRussianimperialideologyseePoe,M.(2001).Moscow,theThirdRome:TheOriginsandTransformationsofa"PivotalMoment".JahrbücherFürGeschichteOsteuropas,49(3),neuefolge,412-429.Retrievedfromhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/41050783

5Intheoriginal(whichhasbecomeamantraofPutinism):«Бывшихчекистовнебывает»



Inmanyways,Putinismcanbeviewedasthefulfillmentofthelong-termgoalofYuriAndropov,theheadoftheKGBfrom1967to1982(andbrieflythetoppartyboss,1982-84),whoassessedapoliticalsystem in collapse andwantedChekists, theonly truly reliable element, to takeover everything.UnderPutin,theyhavedoneso.

HeretheFederalSecurityService(FSB),whichPutinheadedin1998-99,playsapreeminentrole,andtheFSBandRussia’sotherintelligenceagenciescarrymuchmoreweightinbroadpolicymakingthananyWesternspyservicesdo.Theyfunctionastheregime’sbackbone,itscorpsd’elite,andtheypossessthefavorof‘thetop’–andallRussiansknowit.UnderPutin,Russia’sspecialservicesholdapowerandprestigetheyneverhadundertheCommunists,whenthosehadtobesharedwiththepartyandthemilitary.However,thedominanceofChekistsinMoscowmandatesabiasforaction(sometimes for its own sake), a knack for tactics over strategy, and a tendency to conspiratorialgroupthinkintheupperreachesoftheKremlin.

The Military

Russia’smilitarywasamajorloseroftheSovietcollapse,andonlyoverthepastdecadehasitbeguntoshowsignsofrenewedvitalityandoperationalcompetence,bothofwhichweresorelylackinginthe1990s,asrevealedbythedebacleoftheFirstChechenWar(1994-96).MorerecentoperationsinGeorgiain2008andinCrimea/Ukrainein2014-15havedemonstratedthattheRussianmilitaryisaforcetobereckonedwithagain.

TheappearanceoftheLittleGreenMenofRussianmilitaryintelligence(GRU)inthelatterconflictstunnedtheworld,butjustasimpressivewasthebattlefieldperformanceofRussianartilleryandelectronicwarfare (EW),whichwhen linked together decimatedUkrainian units. In these areas,RussiaisaheadofNATO,includingtheU.S.Army,whichhaslostagenerationinartilleryandEWandisnowplayingcatch-up.GiventhehistoricaldominanceofartilleryintheRussianarmy,thismeritsseriousattentionbytheAtlanticAlliance(Schindler,2018b).

Russia’smilitarystillhasmajorproblemswithreadiness,corruption,andmoralecomparedtomostNATOforces,butitsstrengthoughtnottobeunderestimated.WhilethereislittlequestionthatNATOwould prevail in any protractedwar against Russia, inwhich the Atlantic Alliance’s fullmilitaryresourcescouldbebroughttobear,Russia’soddsinanyshortormedium-termconflictappearmorefavorable.

Thatsaid,thereisadearthofseriousstrategicthinkingintheKremlin,aswitnessedbythe‘frozenconflict’ in southeastern Ukraine, where the Russianmilitary and its local proxy forces in 2014purchasedabridgeheadtonowhereandnobodyinMoscowseemstoknowhowtoendthatlow-boilwarwhilesavingface,fiveyearson.GivenRussia’smountingeconomicproblemsstemmingfromitsaggressionwithUkraine,thefactthattheGeneralStaffseemsstuckinDonbasraisesquestionsaboutstrategicdecision-makinginMoscow.

Spiritual Security

ThatseeminglyendlesswarinUkrainehasbeensoldtotheRussianpublicasastrategicnecessitytoprotectfellowRussiansfromthegenocide-inclined‘fascistjunta’inKiev.ThereligiousaspectsoftheUkraine war have been given prime attention in Kremlin media, and the conflict has become ashowcasefortheregime’sideology,whichapprovesofconflictwiththeWest–evenmilitaryconflict–whenneededsincethegodlesspostmodernWestisinleaguewiththeDevil:accordingtoKremlinpropagandists,quiteliterally.



Suchmessages seem laughable to theWest but are taken seriously bymany Russians, not leastbecausetheypossessdeepresonancewithcenturiesoftheirhistory,whichhaslongpreachedaboutthe incompatibility of Eastern Orthodox values with the ‘heretic’ West. Now that critiqueencompasseswitheringlanguageaboutWesternsecularismanddecadencetoo,butitsoutlineswerefoundinRussiahalfamillenniumago.

Thisreligiousvisionhasbeenalsoendorsedbythespecialservices,who,ledbytheFSB,havecreatedadoctrinetheycall‘spiritualsecurity,’meaninganadherencetotraditionalreligionandconservativesocialvaluesasacorecomponentofnationalsecurity.ThisisthedriverofKremlineffortstoexpelWestern‘heretics’(usuallyProtestantEvangelicalsorJehovah’sWitnesses)fromRussia,whichshownosignsofabating;ratherthecontrarysince2014.PutinhasstatedthatRussia’s‘spiritualshield’–meaningtheOrthodoxChurchanditsteachings,withthebackingoftheregime–areasimportanttoRussia’ssecurityashernuclearshield,sotheWestneedstopayattention(Fedor,2011,p.168-181).

What Putin Wants

WehavenoideawhatPutin‘really’believesasamatteroffaith,butinpracticaltermsheisahard-headedrealistwhoisfundamentallycautious–in2014-15herepeatedlyturneddownGeneralStaffpleas to widen the war in Ukraine when Russian strategic victory over Kiev would have beenrelativelyeasy–yetpronetooccasionalgamblinginvabanquefashion.WeshouldnotexpectthatPutinwillwakeonedayanddecidetounleashall-outwaronNATO,butthechancesofthathappeningbyaccidentarerisingasbothsidesgrowincreasinglywaryandpronetoprovocations.

PutindoesnotwanttherestorationoftheSovietUnion,noraTsaristEmpire2.0,buthedoesnotrecognize the 1991 post-Soviet settlement as final. To the Kremlin, those aremerely lines on aCommunistmap.Putin’sacceptanceofUkrainianstatehoodisconditionalatbest,andthesamecanbesaidforhistakeonBelarus;Minsk’seffortstodistancetheircountryfromMoscow’stentaclesaredoomedtofailinextremis.PutinwillneverpartwithCrimea,thatmatterissettledasfarasmostRussiansareconcerned,butanegotiatedsettlementof theUkrainecrisis ispossible,yetonlyonRussia’sterms,whichseemunlikelytofindfavorinKiev–orBrussels.

Atroot,PutinwantsRussiatoberespectedasagreatpower,thehistoricandgeographichegemonoverEasternEurope,possessingaproprietaryinterestinRussiansoutsidethebordersoftheRussianFederation.Putinandhis regimeview theEuropeanUnionwithundisguisedcontemptwhile theKremlin’sassessmentoftheBalticStatesisthattheyarenot‘countries’inthesensethatRussiais.TheriskofaRussianprovocationgoingbadlywrongisnotablyhighregardingEstonia,givenrecentaggressiveFSBoperationsagainstthatcountry.6

Russia’scurrenteconomicproblems,derivedinlargepartfromsanctionscausedbytheUkrainewar,willmaketheKremlinmore,notless,likelytoengageinadventurismagainsttheWestandNATO.WhilePutindoesnotconsciouslyseekmajorwarinEurope,thepossibilityofthatbreakingoutonthefringesoftheformerSovietUnionarerising,notfalling,in2019.

6TheFSB’s2014plannedabductionoftheEstoniancounterintelligenceofficerEstonKohveronthetenseborderbetweentheircountriesispreciselythesortofaggressiveChekistprovocationthatcouldresultinanunwantedwarbetweenRussiaandNATO.See:Whitmore,B.(2015,June3).WhyEstonKohverMatters[RFE/RL].RetrievedApril9,2019,fromThePowerVerticalwebsite:https://www.rferl.org/a/why-eston-kohver-matters/27052027.html.



What’s Ahead for EUCOM and NATO

AggressiveRussianSpecialWar–thatis,espionage,disinformation,cyber-attacksanddisruptions,propaganda,terrorism,evenassassinationsabroad–willcontinuetobetheKremlin’smajorday-in,day-outweaponofchoiceagainstNATOandtheWest.7SpecialWar, ledbyRussia’spowerfulandaggressivespecialservices,willbeemployed,withoutrestraint,toweakenWesternresolvewhilecreatingpoliticalandmilitaryconditionsfavorabletoRussia.ThatMoscowwantstheendofbothNATOandtheEU–andtheUSmilitaryoutofEast-CentralEurope–shouldnotbeindoubt.

EUCOMandNATOneedtobepreparedtobluntaggressiveRussianmilitarymovesontheAlliance’sfringes,especiallytheBalticStates,whilethepossibilityofaKremlin-backedcoupinMinskisreal.ForwantofarapidresponsebyNATO,suchregionalconfrontationscouldeasilyturnintoawiderwarwhichnobodyoneithersidereallywants.

EUCOM’s current force posture in the AOR is inadequate to realistically deter possible Russianadventurism on the Atlantic Alliance’s eastern edge. Deficits in artillery and EW are especiallyserious,whileoverallNATOreadinesstocontestpossibleRussianaggressioninEasternEuropeislacking.

What is to be Done?

1. UnderstandtheideologicalaspectsoftherebornmilitaryandpoliticalconfrontationbetweenPutin’sRussiaandtheWestsince2014.

2. UnderstandtherealdriversofKremlinpolicymaking,particularlyastheyrelatetoRussianactivitiesdesignedtoweakenanddividetheWest(especiallyNATOandtheEU).

3. Understandthecentralroleofthe‘specialservices’inKremlindecision-making,andhowthedominanceofspiesinMoscowcreatesthreats–andopportunities–fortheWest.

4. UnderstandPutin’sstrategicaimsinEuropeandthepreeminentroleofSpecialWarintheKremlin’squotidianaggressionsagainstNATOandtheWest.

5. StrengthenNATO’smilitaryposture(includingrapidlydeployableforces)ontheAlliance’seasternedgetodeterKremlinprovocationsandaggression.

6. DevelopeffectiveNATOcounterespionageandcounterpropagandacapabilitiestolimitthedamageinflictedonWesterninstitutionsbyKremlinSpecialWar,whichwillnotcease,sincetheyarecost-effectiveforMoscow.

7. AcceptthatColdWar2.0ishereandshowsfewsignsofabatingwithoutthefallofPutinism–whichisunlikelytohappensoon.Moreover,Putin’sreplacementcouldbeamoresincereRussiannationalistthanheis.Thisconflict,toincludeideologicalaspects,isheretostayforatleastdecades.

7Thisauthorcoinedtheterm“Russia’sSpecialWar”in2014,see:Higgins,A.,Gordon,M.R.,&Kramer,A.E.(2017,December20). Photos Link Masked Men in East Ukraine to Russia. The New York Times. Retrieved fromhttps://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html.



References

Fedor,J.(2011).RussiaandtheCultofStateSecurity:TheChekistTradition,fromLenintoPutin.NewYork:Routledge.

Schindler,J.R.(2014,December27).Putin’sOrthodoxJihad.RetrievedApril9,2019,fromTheXXCommitteewebsite:https://20committee.com/2014/12/27/putins-orthodox-jihad/

Schindler,J.R.(2016,March16).AnotherDefectorDeadinWashington.Observer.Retrievedfromhttps://observer.com/2016/03/another-defector-dead-in-washington/

Schindler,J.R.(2017,December22).RussiaCelebratestheGrimCentenaryofOppressivePoliceRule.Observer.Retrievedfromhttps://observer.com/2017/12/putin-russia-celebrate-centenary-of-brutal-cheka-police-force/

Schindler,J.R.(2018a,March21).RussiaHasanIdeology—andIt’sasEntrenchedasCommunismWas.Observer.Retrievedfromhttps://observer.com/2018/03/russia-putin-ideology-rules-cold-war-2-0-like-soviet-communism/

Schindler,J.R.(2018b,August28).OutgunnedU.S.ArmyIsn’tPreparedForWarWithRussia.Observer.Retrievedfromhttps://observer.com/2018/08/post-gulf-war-us-army-unprepared-for-war-with-russian-military/



Chapter 9. Russian Activities in Europe


[email protected]

Abstract

Russia continues to present a threat to theUnited States in Europe, specifically through the useofmedia, traderelations, foreigndirect investment,energy trading,diplomacy,militaryposturing(wargames,airandseaspaceviolations),interferenceinthepoliticalprocesses,andthecontinuationoffrozenconflicts.Inshort,theKremlinhasmasteredtheuseof“hybridwarfare”indrivingtheirforeign policy. By suchmethods, Russia potentially underminesUS interests in Europe farmoreeffectivelythaniftheyweretoposeanysortofdirectmilitarythreat.

Russian Gray Zone Actions in Europe

Primary Russian Interests and Objectives

Russia’sprimaryinterestsinEasternEuropeare:tomaintain,orregain,itssphereofinfluence;toprotectandpreservetheidentitiesofRussianslivingintheregion,aswellastheidentitiesofotherswho share a common language, culture, religion and ethnicity; to limit the influence ofWesternEuropeandtheUSinEasternEurope.

Recent Actions Short of Armed Conflict in Europe

TherearetheregularavenuesRussiausesinforeignpolicy:themedia,traderelations,foreigndirectinvestment,energytrademanipulation,diplomacy,militaryposturing(wargames,airandseaspaceviolations), interference in political processes, and the continuationof frozen conflicts.However,thereisaonegeneralpracticethatwarrantsacloserlook:Moscow’sabilitytosowsocietaldiscord.Considerthefollowingscenarios.

First,theethno-linguisticRussianpopulationintheBalticStatescanpotentiallybeusedasafifth-column.ThisisnottoclaimthatRussiaisintentionallyplantingandtrainingethnicRussiansintheBalticStatesasagentsofsubversion(though,thatispossible).Infact,theydon’tneedanysortofspecialized training. Rather, Russia can easily use the already-existing discontent among ethnicRussianpopulationsintheBalticStateswho,inmanycases,havelimitedrightssimplybyvirtueoftheirstatusasethnicandlinguisticminorities.Furthermore,thispopulationextensivelyconsumesRussianmedia.TheKremlin, knowing this, intentionally feeds these consumerspro-Russian, andanti-Westerncontent.Additionally,anti-RussianlegislationwithintheBalticStatessimplyservestoheightenthisdiscontent.

Second,inadditiontotheexistingdiaspora,largenumbersofRussiansaremovingfromRussiatotheBalticStates;thisrepresentssomethingofareversalof1990smigrationtrends.Thesemigrantsareoftenwealthy,investinthelocaleconomy,sendtheirchildrentoeliteschools,andbecomeactiveinlocalpoliticsandsociety.WhilethereisnoguaranteethatanyoftheseareplantsfromtheKremlin,nor that they are definitely promoting a pro-Kremlin agenda, there is every possibility. TheygenerallyenjoythefreedomsofferedbylivinginanEUcountry,butalsostillhaveastrongconnection



withRussiaandthere issomepotential(regardlessofhowsmall) that theybecomeanother fifthcolumn.

Third,RussiahasthepotentialtoinfluencethedomesticpoliticalsceneacrosstheWest.Russiadoesnotevenneedtopushapro-Russiaagenda.Itsimplyhastopromotediscontent,othering,andgeneralsocietal divisions across the West. In doing so, Russia effectively divides society, weakens civilsociety, and undermines the potential bi-or multi-partisan nature of a functioning democracy.Thoughpotentiallyextreme,andnotnecessarilyrealisticintheimmediatefuture,societaldivisionscould become so dilapidating that Russia simply has to exaggerate and enhance differences (soeffectivelydonethroughsocialmedia),andthenwatchtheWesttearitselfapart.EvenifRussiadoesnot do this extensively within the Baltic States, the West tearing itself apart, especially in theweakeningorcollapseoftheEUand/orNATO,wouldmeanthatRussiawouldnotneedtotakeanysortofmilitaryactionandcouldstillre-claimtheBalticStates(andpotentiallyotherstateswithinEurope)backintotheirsphereofinfluence.AsignificantlyweakenedWestcoulddoverylittleaboutit.

Russian Influence Activities Among Key Regional Actors and Civilian Populations

Russia is attempting to influence key regional actors in Europe primarily through media, traderelations,foreigndirectinvestment,energytrading,diplomacy,militaryposturing(wargames,airand sea space violations), interference in the political processes, and the continuation of frozenconflicts.ItisinterestingtonoteherethattwooftheprimarystatesinWesternEurope,(GermanyandFrance)arenotpatentlyopposedtotakingasofterapproachtowardRussiathantheUSortheUK. While both Germany and France are still supporting sanctions, both have also indicated awillingnesstoengagewithRussiamoreasequals(implyingtheymaynotviewallofRussia’sactionsinEasternEuropeasaggressivelyastheUS,theUKandothersviewthem).PerhapstheymayrespectRussia’s views of power balances and spheres of influence. With Brexit pending, this couldsignificantlychange theEU’sapproach toRussiaand, in thatvein, towardEasternEurope.At theextreme,thiscouldportendveryillfortheBalticStates.

Russia is attempting to influence key civilian polulations in Europe primarily through media:traditional and social. Russia is very good at arguing that they occupy a high ground vis-à-vis amorallydefunctWest(withitsincreasingsecularizationandpromotionof“non-traditional”practicessuchastheLGBTQlifestyleandabortion).Unfortunately,sellingthemoralhighgroundtoethno-linguistic Russians is not so difficult in Estonia and Latvia as both states have, to some extent,sidelinedethnicRussians,manyofwhomhavelivedinthosestatesall their lives.Additionally, inEuropemoregenerally,Russiadoesn’tneedtopromoteanysortofagendaspecifictothemselves.They simplyneed to encouragediscordbetweengroups,which theyeffectivelydobypromotingnationalism.

Perceived Russian Threats in Europe

RussiaperceivesNATOas theprimary threat to its interests inEurope.Again,Kremlin’s focus isspheres of influence and a balance of power. NATO expansion into the Baltic States, and talk ofexpansionintoGeorgiaandUkraine,throwbothoff.Additionally,though,theKremlinseesthespreadof democracy as a threat to the current Putin administration. Democracy in Eastern Europe isprimarilypromotedbytheEUthroughtheEuropeanNeighborhoodPolicy(ENP)andtheEasternPartnership (EaP). However, as both programs are largely uninfluential (with no promise of EUmembership, both programs cannot sufficiently incentivize active participation among EasternEuropeanstates),theydonotposethatgreatofathreattoRussiaatpresent.



Looking to the Future

Potential Future Russian Activities in Europe

Russia will continue to use all of the avenues previously mentioned in this paper. Where openmilitary aggression would provokean equally aggressiveresponse from the West, this sort oftampering(oftenreferredtoashybridwarfare)couldwellelicitasubduedorhesitantresponsefromtheUSorWesternEurope. Specifically,Russiawill continue toput evenmoreeffort into sowingdiscord across the West. It is an extremely cost-effective way of weakening the West andunderminingliberalinternationalism(countriesmaywellhesitatetocooperatewiththeWestiftheirsocietieshaveturnedagainstitself).Iftheopportunitypresenteditself,RussiawouldencourageafrozenconflictintheBalticStates.However,thisseemsratherunlikelysimplybecause,atpresent,thereisnotanysortofsignificantseparatistmovementinanyoftheBalticStates.ThiscouldchangeifethnicRussianscoalesceintosomethingofafifthcolumn.

A Potential Win-Win Scenario

Awin-winscenariolooksverydifferentfromaUSperspectivethanfromaRussianperspective.FromaUSperspective,itinvolvesRussiarecognizing,andobserving,sovereigntyforeveryindependentstateintheregion.Thiswouldincludedecreased(oreliminated)wargameswhichborderontheBalticStatesanddecreasedoreliminatedair-andmaritime-spaceviolations.Farthertotheeast,itwouldinvolveRussiapullingoutof frozenconflicts inGeorgia,Moldova,Azerbaijan/Armeniaandeastern Ukraine, and giving Crimea back to Ukraine. Russia would need to decrease politicalinterferenceintheWest.Essentially,RussiawouldneedtostopdoingeverythingtheUSdislikes.

FromtheRussianperspective,awin-winlookslikeNATOremovalfromtheBalticStates(boththepresence currently there and, ultimately, membership in general), though Russia would not beopposedtotheBalticStatesremainingmembersoftheEU.ItlooksliketheBalticStatesrecognizingethnicRussiansasequalcitizens, includingRussianasanofficial language inat leastEstoniaandLatvia, and automatic citizenship for those remaining from the Soviet era who do not yet havecitizenship.ItlooksliketheliftingoftheUkraine-promptedsanctions.Inotherwords,itlookslikeabalanceofpowerwhereRussiahasasphereofinfluenceupto(andprobablyincluding)theBalticStates,theUShasasphereofinfluenceinWesternEuropeupto(butnotincluding)theBalticStates,and theBalticStatesserveasbufferstates thatarestill, at leastculturallyandeconomically (butdefinitelynotmilitarily)European.ItalsomeansnofurthertalksofexpandingNATOtoUkraineorGeorgia.

Conclusion

Two final thoughts. First, the concept of ‘relative deprivation’ argues thatwhen one group feelsdeprivedrelativetoanothergroup,andperceivesthatthesystemperpetuatesthedeprivation,thedeprived group ismore inclined to drastic action to change a ‘defunct’ system. This can includeeverythingfromproteststoviolenceorevenrevolution.Itisimportanttonotethatthereneednotbeanyactualdeprivation:justtheperceptionthatthereisdeprivation(whichiswheresocialmediaplays a significant role). Ironically, though the West is arguably more equal than most illiberalregimes,perceptionsofdeprivationpersist,inpartbecauseoftheeasyofspreadingfalseinformationviasocialmedia,andinpartbecauseinstitutionalizedinequalitystillactuallypersistsintheWest,forexampleinEstoniaandLatvia.Pursuanttothis,theWestneedstoaddressboththeperceptionofdeprivation(byencouragingandfacilitatingthecrackdownonfalseinformationonsocialmedia)and



the realityofdeprivation (byencouraging/pressuringethnic and linguistic equality in theBalticStates).BothofthesecansignificantlylimitRussianinfluenceintheWestandpromotethespreadofinternationalliberalism.

Second,andfinally,theUSanditsalliesinEuropeneedtothinkverycarefullyabouthowtospreadliberalism.Whileliberalismiscertainlytobedesired,ifitisnotapproachedinasensibleway(i.e.inawaythatwillnotprovokeRussia),itwillunderminetheveryspreadofliberalismacrossEasternEurope and could set the regionback even further.With that inmind, theUSneeds tomaintaininfluenceinareasthatarealreadypartoftheEUand/orNATO.Stepslikethosementionedabovewillpromote this. Furthermore, theUSneeds toencourage the continued spreadof liberalismacrossEasternEurope,butnotnecessarilythroughthespreadofNATO.Rather,theUSneedstoencouragetheEUtore-energizetheENPandEaP(orcreatesomethingmoreuseful)totakeamoreactiveroleinthespreadofliberalisminEasternEurope.


Laruelle APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 53

Chapter 10. Russian Activities in Central Asia

Dr.MarleneLaruelleGeorgeWashingtonUniversity

[email protected]

Abstract

ForRussia,CentralAsiaconstitutesacriticalregion.Ithaslosthegemonyoveritbutmaintainsthestatusof“firstamongequals”insomecrucialrespects.Afteraveryactiveperiodbetween2010and2015, Russia has been taking less decisive actions in Central Asia over the past three years butcontinuestodevelopitsstrategiesfortheregion,albeitataslowerpaceandwithoutasmuchfanfare.Russiaistheonlyexternalactorthatcandisplaythreeformsofpower:remunerative,punitive,andideological/normative.Remunerativepower,themaincarrotthatMoscowusedintheregionduringthehappydecadeofthe2000s,isnowdifficulttoexertgiventhecurrenteconomicslowdown.Sofar,theKremlinhasneverusedpunitivepowerontheCentralAsianstates.Ideologicalpowercouldprovethemost enduring, because it is not purely state-centric but is embedded in social and culturalinteractionsbetweenRussianandCentralAsiansocieties.

Russian Gray Zone Activites—Central Asia

Russian Interests and Objectives

CentralAsiarepresentsanecessarypiecetosecureMoscow’sproclaimedroleasthepivotofalargerEurasian region, thoughnot at the level of the contestedneighborhoodofUkraine andMoldova.CentralAsiaisanaturalgatewaytovastterritoriestotheeastandsouthofRussia’sborders,aswellaspartofa—stillpotential—North–SouthEurasiantransportationcorridor.

Russia’s interaction with the region is unparalleled by any other external actor. Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan constitute the core of Russia-ledmultilateral institutions in the post-Sovietspace,bothinsecurity(CollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganization)and,fortheformertwo,ineconomic cooperation (Eurasian Economic Union) (Kropatcheva, 2016; Libman, 2018). All theCentralAsianstates,withtheexceptionofTurkmenistan,aremembersoftheShanghaiCooperationOrganization,andtwo(KazakhstanandTurkmenistan)arefull-fledgedparticipantsofthe“CaspianFive”group,theorganizationofCaspianlittoralcountries.CentralAsianleadersareroutinelyinvitedtoBRICS(Brazil,Russia, India,China,SouthAfrica)summits.RussiaalsocountsonCentralAsia’svotesat theUNGeneralAssembly, thoughMoscow is sometimesdisappointedwith thepositionstakenbytheblocnations.

Russianremainstoa largeextentthe linguafrancaoftheregion,andmanyCentralAsiannativescontinue to be educated in Russian universities. Russian diasporas, while they have shrunkthroughoutCentralAsia,stillplayimportanteconomic,political,andculturalrolesinKazakhstanandKyrgyzstan(Laruelle,2016).CentralAsiaalsoremainsthemainsourceoflabormigrantstoRussia.Finally, the rapidly growing Chinese presence in Central Asia increases incentives for regionaleconomicandpoliticalelitestorelyonMoscow—amongotheractors—asacounterweighttoBeijing.AstheleadershiptransitioninTashkentinSeptember2016demonstrated,Russia’srelationswithCentral Asian countries are very resilient: post-Karimov Uzbekistan has been moving closer toMoscowaftertwodecadesofamorevolatilerelationship.



ThoughallCentralAsianleadersaimtodiversifytheirforeignpolicyportfolios,today,almostthreedecadesafterthedisintegrationoftheSovietUnion,Moscowremainsacriticallyimportantcenterofpoliticalgravityfortheregion.Ithaslosthegemonyovertheregionbutmaintainsthestatusof“firstamongequals”insomecrucialrespects.

Russian Influence Activities—Key Regional Actors

Russiaistheonlyexternalactorthatcandisplaythreeformsofpower:remunerative,punitive,andideological/normative.Remunerativepower,themaincarrotthatRussiausedintheregionduringthehappydecadeofthe2000s,isnowdifficulttoexertgiventhecurrenteconomicslowdown.Sofar,theKremlinhasneverusedpunitivepoweraloneontheCentralAsianstates.Ideologicalpowercouldprovethemostenduring,becauseitisnotpurelystate-centricbutisembeddedinsocialandculturalinteractions betweenRussian and Central Asian societies. This ideological power can be studiedthrough the normative influence ofRussia over Central Asian societies,which expresses itself atmultiplelevels:

• Institutionally,byconsolidatingtheauthoritarianstatusquo—fromvalidatinglocalelectionsand maintaining socializing mechanisms (contacts between presidential administrations,SecurityCouncils,Parliamentaryexchanges)toshapingthedefinitionofregimesecurityassimilartostatesecurity(Jackson,2010;Roberts,2015).Russia'semphasisonstability,stateauthority, and non-interference suit the Central Asian governments better than politicaldesigns advanced by other external actors, especially Western ones that prioritizedemocraticandliberalstandards.

• Diplomatically,bydevelopingasophisticatedpublicdiplomacyprogramthatoffersCentralAsianelitesandsocietiesalargearrayofideologicalandassociativeproductsthatcanadapttotheirlocalcontext—fromEurasianintegrationtoaRussianWorldand/oraconservativevaluesagendathatcansatisfyethno-nationalistsandthemoreIslamically-orientedpartofthepopulation.

• Culturally,bysharingthemediadynamicscomingfromRussiaandextendingthemtoCentralAsia,althoughatdifferentlevelsdependingonthecountryandtheconstituencies.

Russian Influence Activities—Key Civilian Populations

RussiamediapresenceconstitutesprobablythemaintoolofinfluenceovercivilianpopulationsinCentralAsia. Yet it remainsdifficult to study the impact thereof. Russianmediapresence canbedividedintothreevectors.ThefirstoneconstitutesexogenousinfluenceuponCentralAsia,activelyproducedbyMoscowandaimingatinfluencingCentralAsianpublicopinion(RussiaToday,weakintheregion,andSputnik,amongthemostpopularwebsitesintheregion).TheothertwovectorsareemittedpassivelybyRussiabecausetheyareproducedfirstandforemostfordomesticaudiences,notforeignones.OneoftheseisRussianmediathatarestate-controlledbutnotactivelydirectedatforeignaudiences,includingalargeshareoftheprogrammingonCentralAsianchannels,whichwasoriginallyproducedforRussianones.Theotherisnon-governmentalculturalproductsthatlikewisefindaudiencesabroadmoreorlessincidentally.ThisisthecaseformanyRussianculturalproducts,fromliteraturetomusic,whicharedirectedprimarilyatdomesticaudiencesbutalsofindsuccessinCentralAsia.



SociologicalsurveysinformerSovietstatesshowpublicopinioninthreecountriesofCentralAsia—Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,andTajikistan—largelysharingthesameinterpretationsaspublicopinionin Russia. This parallel is less evident in Uzbekistan, yet compared to many other post-Sovietcountries,UzbekpublicopinioncanstillbeconsideredcloselyalignedwithitsRussiancounterpart.WehavealmostnoinformationforTurkmenistan.In2015,theUSBroadcastingBoardofGovernorsand theGallupOrganizationpublisheda seriesof surveysconducted throughout thewholepost-Sovietregion(BroadcastingBoardofGovernors,2016).ThesesurveysshowunambiguouslythatinKyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, themajority of the public consider Russianmedia to behighlyreliable—andsignificantlymoresothanWesternmedia.

However, it ishardtodeterminetheextentofRussianmediainfluence,whichsegmentsofpublicopinionitaffects,whichspecificissuesitfocuseson,orhowtointerpretit.Itisthereforecrucialtodissociate Russian media influence topic by topic. Russian media have been most successful inshapingCentralAsianpublicopiniononforeignpolicyandworldview,promotingthenotionsthattheliberalorderisanillusion;everythingisgeopolitical;theUnitedStateshasahiddenhandineverymajorworldevent;historyismadebycivilizations;andRussiaoffersatleastabalanceagainstorpossiblealternativetotheUS/liberalorder.ThisexplainswhyCentralAsianpublicopinionlargelysupportedtheRussianperceptionofthecrisisinUkraine,aswellaslawsagainstNGOsandother“foreignagents,”whichthemediaframeinthis“civilizational”language.

However, Russian media have failed, partly or largely, to produce a narrative on Central Asiandomestic issues.When it comes to questions related to Central Asian history and Russia’s placewithinit,ornationalidentity,CentralAsianpublicopinion—eveniftheysharemanyaspectsofthecurrentSovietnostalgia—ismuchmorecriticalthantheRussianmediawouldlikeittobe.ThesamegoesforseeingRussiansocietyandtheRussianeconomyasamodelforthefuture—successismorelimitedthanMoscow’smassiveinvestmentinitsmediasoftpowerwasexpectedtoachieve.

Russia’s Perceived Threats in Central Asia

Russia’sconcernsforCentralAsiamostlyboildowntothreenegativescenarios,eachofwhichwouldshatterthecurrentstatusquoandleadtomultiplecomplicationsfortheKremlin(Malashenko,2013;LaruelleandKortunov,2019).

(1)Chaoticregimechangegeneratinginstability—especiallyinKazakhstan.Anythingsimilartothe“ArabSpring”inoneoranumberofCentralAsiancountrieswouldberegardedasadirectthreattoRussia’ssecurity.SuchadevelopmentcouldjeopardizeRussianandRussian-speakingdiasporas,callintoquestion the integrityofMoscow-ledmultilateral institutions in theregion, fan the flamesofregional nationalisms, and even provoke interstate military conflicts over unresolved territorialdisputes.

(2)ThespreadofIslamicradicalismandterrorism—fromAfghanistanifthecurrentleadershipinKabul falls, or based on Central Asian homegrown trends, facilitated by mounting social andeconomicproblems,developmentinequality,highcorruption,andabuseofpowerbylocalleaders.Growingdemographicpressures (particularly inUzbekistan), environmental problems, andwhatMoscowinterprets,rightlyornot,aslocalleaders’deficitofsoundlong-termdevelopmentstrategiesarealsobeingkeptinmindbyRussianexpertsandpolicymakers.

(3)AnoveralldeclineinRussianinfluence,withChinatakingovertheregionnotonlyeconomicallybutalsointermsofsecurity,culture,language,andthelike(WilhelmsenandFlikke,2011).ThenewgenerationsofCentralAsians—exceptforlabormigrants—feelmuchlessconnectedtoRussiathan



theirpredecessors.Forsomemembersofthenewgenerations,itisChina,notRussia,thatisregardedasthedevelopmentalmodeltofollow.True,thereisalsoagrowingfearofChina“takingover”theregion,whichforcesregionalelitestolookatmaintainingcloserlinkstoMoscow,butthisfearwillnotnecessarilybesharedbynewgenerationsoflocalleaders.

Past and Potential Future Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict

Afteraveryactiveperiodbetween2010and2015,RussiahasbeentakinglessdecisiveactionsinCentralAsia over the past three years. There are several reasons for this slowdownof activism:tensionswiththeWestanda“pivot”toAsiathatkeepMoscowbusyonadailybasis,ononeside;andeconomiccrisis(bothdomesticandlinkedtoWesternsanctions),aswellasthe2018presidentialelectionsandthepreparationforwhatmightbePutin’slastterm,whichpushtheKremlintobemoreinward-looking,ontheotherside.

Thatsaid,RussiacontinuestodevelopitsstrategiesforCentralAsia,albeitataslowerpaceandwithlittleattention.ItbenefittedfromthechangeofpresidentinUzbekistanbycreatingnewpartnershipswith theMirziyoyev regime; it has alsobeen acceleratingmilitary and security cooperationwithKazakhstan, especially the project of a Unitary Regional Anti-Air Defense System. Additionally,MoscowhasconsolidateditsstrangleholdoverKyrgyzstan,whichisnowentirelybackintheRussianorbitafteryearsofbeingthemostpro-Westerncountryintheregion;Russiaalsokeepsacloseeyeon Tajikistan. Despite this, Russia has failed to convince Kazakhstan to draw closer and acceptsupranationalinstitutionsinsidetheEurasianEconomicUnion,ortoconvinceTajikistantoentertheEurasianEconomicUnion.

Envisioning a Win-Win Scenario

No“GrandBargain”betweenRussiaandtheUnitedStateslookspossibleorevendesirableatthispoint.Itmakeslittlesensetodiscussanygeneral“codeofconduct”ofthetwopowersinCentralAsiaorforthemtofighteachotheronsuchgeneralissuesasdefinitionsof“democracy,”“stability,”andsoon.Obviously,thefirststeptowardmanyconstructiveproposalswouldbeforeachpowertostoptreatingtheotherasanadversaryintheCentralAsiancontext:underminingeachother’sobjectivesintheregionisazero-sumgameforMoscow,Washington,andCentralAsiaalike.

Central Asia stands out as a comparatively “nontoxic” region where there are limited, but notinsignificant, opportunities for US-Russia collaboration both bilaterally and within multilateralframeworks.GiventhecurrentsourstateofUS-Russiarelations,itwouldmakesensetokeepexistingpocketsofUS-RussiacooperationinCentralAsiaunderthepoliticalradar.Thatapproachwouldhelpprotectthiscooperationfrombecominganotherbargainingchipintheongoinggameofsanctionsandcountersanctions.Difficult though itmaybe,aneffortshouldbemadetode-link interactionsbetweenMoscowandWashingtonintheregionfromUS-RussiadisagreementsonIranorSyriaasfaraspossible.

BehindthehighlevelofdistrustandfeelingofadversityonboththeRussianandUSsides,therearestill several domains where their respective soft powers complement each other: in the spaceindustry,civilsecurity, job-creationmechanismsandruralhumancapital,andknowledge-sharing(Laruelle andKortunov, 2019). Small, symbolic joint projects targeted at enhancing security andpromotingdevelopmentintheregionwouldalreadybeamajoraccomplishmentdemonstratingthatUS-Russiainteractionintheregionisnotdoomedtobeazero-sumgame.



References

BroadcastingBoardofGovernors,J.(2016,February4).AssessingRussia’sInfluenceinitsPeriphery:IsRussiaReallyWinningtheInformationWar?RetrievedMarch17,2019,fromhttps://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2016/02/BBG-Gallup-Russian-Media-pg1-02-04-165.pdf

Jackson,N.J.(2010).Theroleofexternalfactorsinadvancingnon-liberaldemocraticformsofpoliticalrule:acasestudyofRussia’sinfluenceonCentralAsianregimes.ContemporaryPolitics,16(1),101–118.https://doi.org/10.1080/13569771003593920

Kropatcheva,E.(2016).RussiaandtheCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganisation:MultilateralPolicyorUnilateralAmbitions?Europe-AsiaStudies,68(9),1526–1552.https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1238878

Laruelle,M.(2016,October24).WhyNoKazakhNovorossiya?Kazakhstan’sRussianMinorityinaPost-CrimeaWorld:ProblemsofPost-Communism:Vol65,No1.fromhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10758216.2016.1220257?journalCode=mppc20

Laruelle,M.,andKortunov,A.(2019)“EnvisioningopportunitiesforU.S.-RussiacooperationinandwithCentralAsia.”HarvardU.S.-RussiaWorkingGroupPaper.

Laruelle,M.,andRoyce,D.(2015)KazakhstanipublicopinionoftheUnitedStatesandRussia:testingvariablesof(un)favorability.CentralAsianSurvey,forthcoming.

Libman,A.(January9,2018).EurasianEconomicUnion:Betweenperceptionandreality.RetrievedJanuary2,2019,fromhttp://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/01/09/8767/

Malashenko,A.(2013).TheFightforInfluence:RussiainCentralAsia.CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace.Retrievedfromwww.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpj5q

Roberts,S.P.(2015).ConvergingpartysystemsinRussiaandCentralAsia:Acaseofauthoritariannormdiffusion?CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies,48(2),147–157.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.004

Wilhelmsen,J.,&Flikke,G.(2011).Chinese–RussianConvergenceandCentralAsia.Geopolitics,16(4),865–901.https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2010.505119


Katz APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 58

Chapter 11. Russian Activities in the Middle East

Dr.MarkN.KatzGeorgeMasonUniversity,ScharSchoolofPolicyandGovernment

[email protected]

Abstract

RussianactivitiesintheMiddleEasthavebeenanimatedbyanumberofobjectives.Theseincludemakingsurethattheregiondoesnotserveasasourceofsupport forChechenandotherMuslimrebelsinRussia,pursuingRussianeconomicinterests,demonstratingthatRussiacanoperateasagreat power in areas beyond the former Soviet Union, and advancing Russia’s image as amoresuccessfulmediatorthantheUnitedStates.InadditiontoitsmilitaryinterventioninSyria,Moscowhasbecomeveryactivediplomaticallyintheregion.RussianPresidentVladimirPutinhasmetwithmanyMiddleEasternleaders,includingseveralofthemmultipletimes.IntheMiddleEast,RussiaclaimstobeamorereliablesupporteroftheauthoritarianstatusquothantheUS,whichMoscowportraysasadisruptivepower.Putininparticularhassoughttopursuegoodrelationswithopposingsides in theMiddleEast’smany conflicts, andhe canbe expected to avoidmakingahard choicebetweenanyofthem(includingbetweenIsraelandIraninSyria).WhileMoscowandWashingtonactually have some common interests in the Middle East (e.g. their mutual opposition to SunnijihadistssuchastheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant(ISIL)andAlQaeda,andsharedsupportofthesamegovernments),RussiaalsoseekstotakeadvantageofanydifferencebetweentheUSandvarious actors in theMiddleEast to increaseRussian influencewith them.Thus, despite sharingcommoninterests,RussiaisunlikelytocollaboratewiththeUSinpursuitofthem.

Examining the Gray Zone—Russia & the Middle East


Russia has several interests in the Middle East. First and foremost, Moscow wants to preventChechnyaandthestatusofMuslimsinRussiagenerallyfrombecomingananti-Moscowcausecélèbrein theMuslimworld theway thatAfghanistanwas in the1980s.UnderPutin, then,Moscowhascourted all Muslim governments and the major nationally-oriented opposition groups (such asHezbollah,Fatah,andHamas).MoscowclassifieseventheTalibaninthislattercategoryandbelievesthatthetwosidescanworktogether.Additionally,theRussiangovernmenthassoughttocooperatewitheachofthesegroupsatleasttothepointthattheyhavenointerestordesiretosupporteitherinternationalist jihadist groups (such as Al Qaeda or ISIL) or Chechen or other Muslim groupsoperatinginsideRussia.

Datingbacktohisearlyyearsasheadofstate,at theturnof thecentury,PutinhasalsoseentheMiddleEastasaplacenotjusttoadvancetheeconomicinterestsofRussiaasawhole,butofsectorsoftheeconomythatarevitaltohimandhisprincipalsupporterssuchasRussia’spetroleum,arms,nuclearpower,andagriculturalindustries.RussianowsellsaconsiderableamountofarmstotheMiddleEast.IthasconstructedonenuclearreactorforIranandhopestobuildmoreforitaswellasothercountriesintheregion.Additionally,MoscowsellsasignificantamountofwheattoEgyptinparticular. Russian petroleum firms have found investment opportunities in the Middle East;relatedly, several Gulf Arab states have invested large sums in the Russian petroleum industry.Furthermore, Russia’s economic interactionwith theMiddle East helpsMoscowboth escape theimpactofWesterneconomicsanctionsandlimititseconomicdependenceonChina.



TheMiddleEastisalsoaregioninwhichRussiaseekstodemonstratethatitisaglobalgreatpower,andnotjustaregionalpowerconfinedlargelytoitsformerSovietsphere.ThepreservationoftheAssadregimeinSyriahasbeenespeciallyimportantforMoscowsinceSyriahoststheonlyRussiannavalbaseoutsidetheformerUSSR.EspeciallycomparedtotheUS’sproblematicinterventionsinAfghanistan, Iraq, andLibya, the successfulRussianmilitary intervention inSyria since2015hasservedtoburnishRussia'simageasarisinggreatpower.

Inaddition,PutinseesthemanyconflictsintheMiddleEastasopportunitiesforRussiandiplomacyto take charge of conflict resolution efforts, even if such efforts donot actually come to fruition.Moscownowsees theUSSR’sbreakingdiplomatic relationswith Israel in1967ashavingbeenamistake.ThisclearedthewayfortheUStoworkwithallsidesintheArab-Israelidispute,whiletheUSSR was unable to engage with Israel; this dynamic enabled the US to dominate the peacenegotiationsafterwards.MoscownowseestheUSandRussianpositionsasbeingreversed:theUScannotorwillnottalkwithcertainparties(includingIran,theAssadregime,andHezbollah)whileRussiatalkswitheveryone.Indoingso,MoscowhassoughttopersuadeMiddleEasternactorsthatRussiaisinafarbetterpositionthantheUStobringaboutconflictresolution.

Russia isnotactively trying topush theUSoutof theMiddleEastbut sees themanydifferencesbetweentheUSontheonehandanditsMiddleEasternalliesaswellasadversariesontheotherasanopportunity to increaseRussian influencewith them.Byhavinggood relationswithallmajoractorsintheMiddleEastexceptthejihadists,MoscowalsowantstoensurethattheydonotsupportanyAmericanefforttoexcludeRussiafromtheregion.

Recent Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict, in the Middle East

TheRussianinterventioninSyriathatbeganin2015isMoscow’smostimportantrecentactionintheMiddleEast.Whatisespeciallyremarkableaboutthisevent,though,istheregionalreactiontoit.Inthepast,aSovietmilitaryinterventionintheregionwouldhavebeenseenashostileandeventhreatening by neighboring countries. However, despite uneasiness by many Middle Easterngovernmentsatthisrecentaction,theseleadershavenotunderstoodthiscampaignaspresagingaRussianthreattothem.Indeed,topofficialsfromsomeMiddleEasterngovernmentsthathadcalledforthedownfallofAssadandwereangryatRussia fordefendinghisregimehavealsoexpressedadmirationforhowPutinloyallysupportshisallies.Theycontrastthiswithwhattheyperceiveasthe Obama Administration undercutting America’s longstanding Egyptian ally, Hosni Mubarak,during the 2011 Arab Spring as well as the Trump Administration’s announcement that it iswithdrawingUSforcesfromSyria.

Perhaps Putin’s greatest achievement in theMiddle East has been to create the impression thatRussiaisafirmsupporteroftheregion’slargelyauthoritarianstatusquogovernmentswhiletheUS,either because of its support for democracy andhuman rights, or simply its desire to reduce itsinvolvementintheregion,isnot.

ThisdoesnotmeanthatsomeMiddleEasterngovernmentshavenothadimportantdifferenceswithRussia. Israel,SaudiArabia,andtheUnitedArabEmirates inparticularareunhappyatMoscow’slevelofcooperationwithIran.Yetdespitethis,eachofthesestateshasincreaseditscooperationwithRussia. In2015-16,Russia’srelationswithTurkeydeterioratedsharplywhenTurkishforcesshotdownaRussianmilitaryaircraftneartheTurkish-Syrianborder.Sincemid-2016,however,Russian-Turkish relations have rebounded strongly (likely spurred by Turkish President Recep TayyipErdoğan’sapologyovertheincident,andErdoğan’sperceptionofRussiansupportduringtheJuly



2016Turkishcoupattempt; indeed,ErdoğanunderstoodRussiansupport tobegreaterthanthatofferedbymanyWesternnations).

Attempted Russian Influence in the Middle East

PutinhasbeenassiduouslycourtingMiddleEasternleadersinhisownspecialway.Heseemsmuchless concerned about being liked than in creating a situationwhere it ismore advantageous forMiddle Eastern leaders to cooperate with him than to not do so despite their objections to hiscooperationwiththeiradversaries.Thekeytothesuccessofthispolicyistwofold:1)Putinexpressesunqualifiedsupportforthecontinuationofanygivenleader’srule;and2)whilePutinwillnotreducehissupporttoanycountry’sadversary,heiswillingtoincreasesupportforthecountrythatfearsit.Forexample,whilePutinwillnotreduceRussiansupportforIrantopleaseSaudiArabia,heiswillingto increaseRussian cooperationwith SaudiArabia (even though this displeases Iran).Of course,MiddleEasternleadersarepursuingasimilarstrategytowardMoscowbyenmeshingRussiainsuchlucrativerelationshipswiththemthatPutinandhispowerfulassociatesseetheirowninterestsasbeingservedthroughmaintaininggoodrelationswitheachofthem.

AsinRussiaitself,MoscowseescivilianpopulationsintheMiddleEastaspotentiallydestabilizingforcesthatneedtobekeptunderstrictcontrolbygovernmentsinordertoavoid“colorrevolution”or“ArabSpring”scenarios.Thus,itisofgreatimportanceforRussianpropagandatotrytodiscredit“democracy” as being a recipe for chaos that somehow benefits the US (which only promotes“democracy,”Moscowargues,inpursuitofitsownnarrowinterests)aswellasthejihadists(whichMoscowoftenclaimsthattheUSactuallysupports).Asnotedearlier,MoscowisespeciallyconcernedthatRussia’streatmentofitsownMuslimsnotbecomeananti-RussiancausecélèbreinthebroaderMuslim world the way that Afghanistan was in the 1980s. To this end, Russian propagandaemphasizes that Moscow supports certain Muslim causes that the US does not—especially thePalestiniancause—eventhoughRussia(andindeed,severalArabgovernments)closelycooperatewithIsrael.

Perceived Russian Threats in the Middle East

Ata timewhenRussiagetsalongwithallMiddleEasterngovernmentsandthemajornationally-orientedMiddleEasternoppositionmovements(i.e.,everyoneexceptinternationalistjihadistslikeAlQaedaandISIL),theprimarythreattoRussianinterestsintheregionischange.ThedownfallofMiddleEasterngovernmentsnowcooperatingwithRussiacouldleadtotheriseofnewonesthatseeit asanenemy.Evena changeof leadership inanexistinggovernmentcould lead toadecline incooperationwithRussia. Suchchange,of course, also threatens the interestsof theUSandotherexternalpowersintheregion.Itisnoteworthy,though,thatwhiletheSovietUnionoftenbenefitedfromchangeintheregion(especiallywhenananti-Americanregimereplacedapro-Americanone),Putin’sRussiahasbecomesuchastaunchdefenderofthestatusquointheMiddleEastthatitmaybelessabletoadjusttochangethantheUSandotherexternalpowers.

Looking to the Future – Anticipating Russian Actions

Russiacanbeexpectedtocontinueitscurrentcourseofaction,i.e.sellingarms,atomicreactors,andanythingelseitcantowhoeverintheMiddleEastcanbuythem;continuingtocooperatewithSaudiArabia(inparticularinsettingoilproductionquotasinsupportofthehigheroilpricesthattheyandotheroilproducingcountriesdesire);continuingconflictresolutioneffortsinSyria,Libya,Yemen,andelsewherethatregardlessoftheirchancesofsuccess,keepRussia(andnottheUS)asthefocus



of diplomacy in the region; and taking advantage of any and all disagreements betweenMiddleEasterngovernmentsandtheUStoimproveRussiancooperationwiththeformer.WhileeachofthepartiestotheMiddleEast’smanydisputeswilltrytopushMoscowtosidewiththemmoreandtheiropponentsless(orevennotatall),Moscowwilldoallitcantoavoidmakinganysuchchoicebutwillseektocooperatewithall.Moscow’sattitudeisthatitwillnotstopcooperatingwithanyonestateatthebehestofanother,butitiswillingtoincreasecooperatingwithall.

Imagining a Win-Win

TheUSandRussiadosharesomecommoninterestsintheMiddleEast.UnliketheSovietUnionwhichoften sought toundermineMiddleEastern governments allied to theUS,Putin’sRussiabasicallysupportsthemall.Furthermore,theUSandRussiabothopposejihadistgroupssuchasAlQaedaandISIL.Itwouldappear,then,thatthereissomeroomforRussian-AmericancooperationintheMiddleEast.ButeventhoughRussiadoesnotfavorregimechangeinanyUS-backedMiddleEasternstates,itdoesseektotakeadvantageofdifferencesbetweentheUSandthosestates.AndwhileMoscowgenuinelyfearsSunnijihadists,itseemsmuchlessinterestedincombatingthem(eitherbyitselforwiththeUS)thaninbuck-passing(i.e.,benefitingfromtheeffortsofotherstofightthejihadistssothatMoscowcanavoiddoingso).RussianobservershaveexpressedthefearthatifjihadistforcesarepushedoutofvariousMiddleEasterncountriesbytheUSoritsallies,theywillmigratetoRussiaorotherplaceswhereMoscowdoesnotwanttohavetofacethem.SomeRussianobserversbelievethatthisisactuallywhattheUSistryingtoencourageinapurportedbuck-passingstrategyofitsown.

Thereis,ofcourse,thepossibilityofawin-winscenariofortheUSandRussiaintheMiddleEastevenif theydonotcooperatetoachieve it.Thiscouldoccurthroughthegeneralweakeningof jihadistforcesintheMiddleEastandelsewhere.ItcouldalsooccurthroughtheMiddleEasterngovernmentswhichbothMoscowandWashingtonsupportcontinuingtoseekgoodrelationswithboth. JustasRussia balances between opposing sides in the Middle East, Middle Eastern states can balancebetweentheUSandRussia.


Borshchevskaya APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 62

Chapter 12. Russian Activities in Africa

Ms.AnnaBorshchevskayaTheWashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicy

[email protected]

Abstract

Russia’sinterestsandobjectivesaregeostrategic,economic,political,military,andtosomeextentcultural.Theiroutreach isexpanding.Moreover,Moscow’s success inSyria ishelping to fuel thisoutreachandcreateopportunitiesMoscowlikelyhadn’tplannedonpriortotheintervention.Mostimportantly,WesterninactionmadeiteasyforPutintostepinandasserthimself.Politicalobjectivesmatter to the Kremlin in a zero-sumworldview: for Russia to win, the US has to lose. Politicalpriorities for Moscow are creating a perception of Russia as a great power, a key regionalpowerbroker,more reliable than theUS, andapartner that standsby its friends and can talk toeveryone,pullingWesternalliesclosertoMoscow.Economicobjectivesarealsoimportant,includingaccesstoenergyandnaturalresourcemarkets.Lastly,softpowerplaysanimportantrole.Moscow’soutreachtoNorthAfricagoesbacktothebeginningofPutin’spresidency,whereasitsventureintotherestofAfricaisfarmorerecent,butwillincreasinglymatterintheyearsahead.ChinaisclearlyamoredominantactorinAfrica,butRussiaismakinginroads.Ironically,itisChinathatposesagreateroverall threat toRussiathandoesNATOandtheWest,butMoscowprioritizesanti-Americanism.Ultimately,astrongandcoherentUSpresenceisthebestdeterrentforRussiainAfrica.

Russian Interests and Objectives in Africa

Russia’sinterestsandobjectivesaregeo-strategic,economic,political,military,andtosomeextentcultural.RussiahashistoricallybeenfarmoreactiveinNorthAfricathanintherestofthecontinent,especiallyinEgypt,Libya,Algeria,Morocco,andTunisia.However,RussiabeganactiveoutreachtotherestofAfricaatleastthreeyearsago,andthisoutreachisexpanding.Moreover,Moscow’ssuccessinSyriaishelpingfuelthisoutreach.

North Africa

The Arab Spring originated in Tunisia. Moscow saw these events as a continuation of what itperceivedasUS-sponsoredregimechange,whichhadtobecheckedlestitonedayoustPutinhimself.Putindoesn’tbelieveit’spossibleforpeopletoriseupagainsttheirrulerontheirown.

To give one relatively recent example, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted theKremlin’sconvictionthatWashingtonstandsbehindregimechangethroughttheworld:

“Anywhere,inanycountry—inEasternEurope,inCentralEurope—therearealotoffactswhentheUSembassyliterallyrunsthe[political]processes,includingtheactionsoftheopposition…Ithinkthey[Americans]themselvesdon’tconsideritaninterventionbecause,first,they[thinkthey]candoanything,andsecond,it’sintheirblood”(RIANovosti,2017).

Togiveanearlierexample,inDecember2016,onemajorKremlin-controlledpublicationdescribedtheArabasa"seriesofgovernmentcoups...initiatedbytheAmericanspecialservices"(REGNUMNewsAgency(Moscow),2016).



TheArabSpringalsocausedPutintotemporarilyloseinfluencehelaboredtogainwiththeregimesthatwereoverthrown.ButbeyondtheArabSpring,Moscowalwayshadinterestsintheregion.Oneprimary driver of those interests is desired access to the Mediterranean coast. Kremlin rulershistoricallysawthisaccessascriticaltoRussiabeingabletoachievegreatpowerstatusandprovidegreaterleverageovernEurope.Putinisthelatestiterationofthishistory.Moscow’sinterestsandobjectivesontheMediterraneangohandinhandwithaccessitseekssimultaneouslyintheBlackandCaspianSeas.Thus,portaccessisimportantforMoscow,especiallyasitistryingtoexpanditsanti-access/areaofdenial(A2AD)layoutinSyria.

PeelingWesternalliesawayfromtheUnitedStatesandcloserintoMoscow’ssphereofinfluenceisacritical Russian objective. Putin seeks to establish himself in a peacemaker role, and in so doingpresentshimselfasamorereliableactorwhocannotonlytalktoeveryonebutalsowilldowhathesays he will do, unlike perceptions of the US. Reducing American, and more broadly Westerninfluence,isanimportantRussianobjectiveinNorthAfrica.

Economicobjectivesarealsoimportant,suchasaccesstoenergyandmarkets.Togiveoneexample,Libya’soil-richeastisimportantfortheKremlin.Algeria’senergymarketisimportanttotheKremlin.MoscowisbuildingEgypt’snuclearpowerplantanrecentlybegansupport forMorocco’snuclearenergy program (Davidson, 2018; “Russia andMorocco sign aggreements”, 2017; “Morocco andRussia to SignNuclearDeal”, 2018). Sudan’s energy resources are also important to theKremlin(“ThereturnofRussiatoAfrica”,2018).

Lastly, soft power matters also, in terms of relating to different cultural groups. Moscow seeksconnectionswithChristiancommunitieswhileatthesametimepresentsRussiaasacountrythatunderstandstheIslamicworld,givenitsgeographicproximitytotheregion,uniquehistorywithit,anditslargeandgrowingMuslimminority.Indeed,someRussianofficialsmakethehajj,ajourneyrarelyseenamongAmericangovernmentormilitarypersonnel.

The Rest of Africa

EconomicobjectivesareimportantinMoscow’soutreachtotherestofAfrica.SinceatleastMarch2014,whentheWestsanctionedRussiaoveritsillegalCrimeaannexation,MoscowlookedoutsidetheWestforeconomicopportunities.

PutinalsounderstandsAfrica’senormouspotential,andassuchstatedthat “Africacannotbeonperipheryofinternationalrelations”(RIANovosti,2016).

Moscowseeksthecontinent’snaturalresourcesinadditiontoenergyandarmssales.Butpoliticalobjectivesarealsotiedcloselytoeconomicones.AfricancountriesarealargeblocwithintheUNGeneralAssembly,andthreeAfricancountriesareontheUNSecurityCouncil.Additionally,Russia’soutreachwithinAfricacannotbeentirelyseparatedfromMoscow’sMiddleEastobjectives.TheHornofAfricaallowspowerprojectionintotheMiddleEast.TheGulfofAdenprovidesinfluenceovertheSuez Canal. Oleg Ozerov, Russian Foreign Affairs ministry’s deputy director for Africa andambassadortoSaudiArabianotedrecentlythatAfricancountriesrequestedRussianassistanceafterobserving Russia’s “success in counterterrorism operations in Syria” (Valdai Club, 2018). WhenSudanese President Omar al-Bashir met with Putin in November 2017, Syria was among theirdiscussiontopics,showinghowtheKremlinworksmultipleanglesinitsdiplomacy.TheSyriafactormatteredbecause,amongotherissues,PutinisworkingonrehabilitatingAssad,andBashirishelpfulinachievingthatend,especiallysincemostrecently,BashirbecameoneofthefirstArableaderstovisittheSyriandictator(“Sudan’sPresidentBashirasksPutin”,2017;“Sudan’spresidentisfirstArab



leader”,2018).ThatBashirsteppeddowninmid-Aprilofthisyearasaresultofmassiveprotestsisimportant, but doesn’t take away from the broader point of Putin working to leverage corrupt,authoritarianAfricanleaders,ifnotwarcriminals,toachievehisownaims.

Just as in theMiddle East, in Africa,Moscow seeks a powerbroker role and to sidelineWesterninfluence,whiletheregion’sautocraticrulerswelcomeafellowauthoritarian’ssupport.Inaddition,theanti-WesternundercurrentinRussia’soutreachtoAfricaseemstohaveareceptiveaudienceintheregionbeyondautocratic rules.Russiawasneveracolonialpower inAfrica,and theregion’sperceptionsofRussiaintermsofracismandprejudiceissues(includingitsSovietpredecessor)likelydo not correspondwith Russia’smore grim reality in this regard. Here too, soft powermatters.HistoricallytheRussianOrthodoxChurchhashadarelationshipwithEthiopia’sMonopysiticchurch.(Matusevich,2007).Morerecently,MoscowhasbeentryingtoattractwhiteSouthAfricanfarmerstocometoRussia,playingonPutin’simageasaprotectorof“traditional”valuesagainstwhattheWestdescribesastheimmoral,degenerateWest(Ferris-Rotman,2018).

Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict, in Africa

Overall Regional Steps: Diplomacy, Business, Military, Political

Overall,MoscowhasbuiltrelationswithallmajorrelevantactorsinNorthAfrica,andisincreasinglyapplying the samemodel to the rest of the continent.Moscowwent on a broad charmoffensivehostingmultiplediplomaticexchangeswithrepresentativesfrommanyAfricancountriesinrecentyears.SeniorRussianofficialssuchasMinisterofForeignAffairsSergeyLavrovincreasinglytourthecontinent.Most recently, in January2019, Lavrov travelled to theMaghreb.Previously, inMarch2018,hetouredAfricatovisitprimarilyformerColdWarallies,ostensiblyatthesametimeasthenSecretaryofStateTillerson.Russianshadowyprivatemercenaries—inrealitywithtiestoRussia’sDefenseMinistry—areplayinganincreasingroleinseveralAfricancountries,including,forexample,LibyaandtheCentralAfricanRepublic (CAR) (Seddon & Wilson, 2018). Reportedly, Moscow has donated weapons and senttrainers to bolster the government’s fight, as well as expand the contractors’ role to work asmediatorsamongdifferentwarringgroups.Moscow’sweapondonationsinparticularhighlighthowtheKremlinusesactivitiestobolsteritsownleverageinaconflictsituationandsidelineWesternactorswhileultimatelyfailingtoprovidegenuineconflictresolution.Indeed,creatingadependenceontheKremlinandmanagingconflicts,ratherthanfocusingongenuineconflictresolution,islikelyPutin’sultimategoal.Moscow’sbusinessoutreachtoAfricahasincreased.Reutersreportsthatsince2014,“Moscowhassigned19military cooperationdeals in sub-SaharanAfrica, includingwithEthiopia,Nigeria, andZimbabwe,accordingtoitsforeignanddefenseministriesandstatemedia”(Ross,2018).Italsohasplanstoestablish“afive-personteamatCAR’sdefenseindustry”(Ross,2018).Moscowinvolvesitselfinavarietyofnaturalresourceprojects,supportstheregion’sstrongmenthroughseveralmeans,including supporting their election strategies, sending teams of military instructors to trainpresidentialguardsandprovidingshipmentsofweapons.InZimbabwe,Moscowagreedtoinvestinthecountry’sdiamondindustry.Russia’s state-run Rosatom is working in Zambia and Rwanda on nuclear power, while RussianenergyfirmsRosneftandLukoiaredevelopingoilandgasfieldsacrosstheentireAfricancontinent,focusingonMozambique,Nigeria,Ghana,andCameroon,EgyptandAlgeria.



Overall,tradebetweenRussiaandAfricaisgrowing.AccordingtoofficialRussiansources,in2017,thevolumeoftradebetweenRussiaandAfricancountriesgrewbyovertwentypercentfrom2016,to$17.4billiondollars.Inaddition,MoscowalsoplanstoholditsfirstRussia-AfricabusinessforumthisOctober(Ignatova,2019).

North Africa

Russia’sinvolvementinNorthAfricahasbeenmorerobustthanintherestoftheregion.

InEgypt,Russiasignedanagreementtobuildanuclearpowerplant,andholdjointnavaldrillsandothermilitaryexercises. Additionally,EgyptincreasinglydependsonRussianweaponry.In2014,thetwocountriesinitialedarmscontractsworth$3.5billion--theirlargestdealinmanyyears,tobefundedbySaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirates.Thedealhadn’tgonethroughyet,butrecentmediareportsdiscussEgypt’splanstobuy“overtwodozen”RussianSu-35fighterjetsina$2billiondeal tobuyadditionalSu (“U.S.warnsEgypt”,2019).TheEgyptianmilitaryalreadyownsseveralRussianhelicopters;accordingtofirsthandpilotaccounts,theyareaverygoodfitforEgypt'sneeds(Borshchevskaya,2015).

Withinthiscontext,EgyptcametoacceptMoscow’spositiononSyria’sAssadandlastyeardeclinedaUSrequesttosendEgyptiantroopstoSyria.

On the economic front, Russian tourists are poised to return to Egypt in the near future. Theircontribution ishugely important toEgypt.Egypthademergedas the topdestination forRussiantouristsinrecentyears.Forexample,approximately3millionofRussiantourists(outofatotalof10millionayear)havetravelledtoEgyptannuallyin2014forexample,untilthebanonRussiantourismto the country following the October 2015 terrorist attack that resulted in the death of all 224passengersonboardtheMetrojetthatcrashedovertheSinaiastheresultoftheattack.Putinliftedthe travel ban last year. (“Resuming Russian tourism”, 2018; Borshchevskaya, 2015). The twocountries also created a free-trade zone. In recent years, overall bilateral trade has grown toapproximately $6.5 billion a year according to official government sources (“Russia and Egypt”,2018).

InLibya,Moscowhasprovidedassistanceinseveralways,includingprintingmoneythatreportedlywas transferred to a branch loyal toKhalifaHaftar, aswell as airliftingmany dozens ofHaftar’swounded soldiers and flying them toMoscow for treatment. Haftar himself has visitedMoscowseveraltimes.InadditiontotherelationshipwithHaftar,MoscowhasbuilttieswithallmajorfactionsinLibya—Hafter,pro-Qaddafifactions,andtheUN-recognizedgovernmentofSerraj(“RussiamakesmoveonLibya”,2019).Additionally,Russian “private contractors” areactive inLibya, ostensiblyhelpingonvariousbusiness-relatedprojects.

AlgeriaandMoscowsignedastrategicpartnershipagreement inApril2001andAlgeriahas longbeenamajorpurchaserofRussianarms,aswellasapartnertosomeextentintheenergysector.Thelatterisgrowing,asinDecember2018Russia’sTransneftandGazpromincreasedcooperationwithAlgeria’sSonatrach(“TransneftandSonatrachtodevelopcooperation”,2017).Reportedly,RussiamayalsostartproducingRussianLadacarsinAlgeria(“RussiamaystartproducingLada”,2019).

InTunisia,Russiantouristshaveplayedamajorroleintheeconomyforthelastseveralyears,pickingupfollowingTurkey’sshootdownofaRussianplaneinlate2015.OnatriptoTunisseveralyearsago I routinely heard shopkeepers speak Russian to tourists. Tunisia also is home to a Russian



immigrant community that goes back to the Bolshevik revolution; Tunis has a Russian culturecenter—placesthatareknowntobefrontsforintelligencegatheringactivities(Lifhits,2018).

In2016,Morocco'sKingMohammedVIcametoMoscowforthefirsttimesince2002,andsignedagreementsonimprovingeconomicrelations.Morerecently,MoscowbeganprovidingsupportforMorocco’snuclearenergyprogram.MotivatingRabat’spolicymayhavebeenMoroccanfrustrationwith both perceived Obama and Trump administration sympathy toward the Polisario Front’spositionwithregardbothtoahumanrightsmonitoringcomponenttoMINURSO’smissionaswellaslackofenthusiasm forMorocco’spositionon theWesternSahara.That thePolisarioFrontwasaSovietColdWarproxyisanironic,butnotinsurmountableobstacleinMoscow’soutreachtoRabat.

Perceived Threats to Russian Regional Interests

ForallofRussia’sstridesinAfrica,it’sclearthatChinaisthedominantactorintheregion,especiallyoutsideofNorthAfrica.Moscowofficialsdon’tdirectlytalkofChinaasathreat—indeeditistheWesttheyroutinelynameasathreatacrosstheglobe,butit’sdifficulttoimagineRussiasettlingonplayingsecondfiddletoanyoneunlessRussiaundergoesafundamentalchange.Fornow,atleasttheyaresettlingonspheresofinfluence.Privately,however,RussianshavefearedChina’sriseforyears.

Russianofficialstalkaboutterrorismthreatsemanatingfromtheregion.Whiletheoreticallyit’seasytoseesuchathreattoRussia, it ishardtoreconcilethatpositionwithMoscow’sactionstowardsterrorism—sometimescontributingtoit,orfailingtofightitwithanyconsistency.

Ultimately,Moscowfearsregimesturningpro-US.AstrongandmeaningfulUSpresencemorethananythingislikelytodeterRussia,especiallyonethatsignalsUSunwaveringcommitment,andonethatisfocusednotonlyongeopoliticsbutalsoonlong-termdevelopmentandvalues,especiallyinAfricabeyondthecontinent’snorth,wherehistoricallyUSinvolvementhadbeenrelativelylimitedandnarrowlyfocusedonCold-wareracompetition.

Anticipated Potential Russian Actions in Africa

Onepossibleactionisagreaterattempttomediatetheregion’sconflictsandbydoingsogivingRussialeverageoverallmajoractorsratherthancreateagenuineresolution.Egypt’sgrowingtilttowardMoscowisincreasinglyworrisome(Borshchevskaya,2018).IntheabsenceofaclearUSrole,Libyaappears tobeaprimecandidate forMoscowtoplaya largerpowerbrokerrole(Borshchevskaya,2017).Anotherpotentialsetofactionsaremoreenergy,arms,andnaturalresourcedealswithRussiaacross the region, along with Moscow’s continued attempts to gain berthing rights on theMediterranean.Third,effortstorehabilitateSyria’sAssadarelikelytocontinue.

Imagining a Win-Win Scenario

Putin’sworldviewiszero-sum,soit’shardtoimagineawin-winscenario.ForPutintowin—tolook“great,”theUShastolose.Duetoourfundamentallyopposingvaluesandworldviews,wearelikelytohaveahardtimecomingupwithgenuinelysharedgoalsthatbothsidescantrulyworkontogether.

Conclusion

BynowtheWestclearlyseesRussiaasanadversary.However,thebroaderissueinthebackdropofRussia’sactivitiesinAfricaisthattheWesthasyettocomeupwithacoherentpolicytowardsRussia



itself,regardlessoftheregionwhereitoperates.BeforeturningtoRussia’sactivitiesinAfrica—andelsewhere—theWestmustdefinewhatbroaderstrategicvisionitintendstopursuewithregardtoRussia.

WesternanalystsoftendescribePutinasamereshort-termopportunist.ManydismissRussiaasadecliningpowerthat, ifanything,canbeadistraction fromthe largeremergentcompetitionwithChina.YetitistheWestthathasyettothinkaboutRussiastrategically.Russialacksinresourcesbutnotdetermination.TheWesthastheresourcesbut lacksaclearvision.Resourcescan,overtime,diminishinimportancewhenouradversariesseethatwearenotseriousaboututilizingthem,andwhenweremainambiguousinthefaceoftheirdetermination.

References

Borshchevskaya,A.(2015,February6).HowtojudgePutin’striptoEgypt.TheWashingtonInstitute.Retrievedfromhttps://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-to-judge-putins-trip-to-egypt

Borshchevskaya,A.(2017,February13).AfterSyria,Putin'sNextMoveCouldBeLibya.TheHill.Retrievedfromhttp://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/319272-after-syria-libya-could-be-putins-next-move

Borshchevskaya,A.(2018,June21).CouldRussiaFlipEgypt?TheNationalInterest.Retrievedfromhttps://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-russia-flip-egypt-26367

Davidson,J.(2018,July1).Egyptsaystostartbuildingnuclearplantinnexttwoyears.Reuters.Retrievedfromhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclearpower/egypt-says-to-start-building-nuclear-plant-in-next-two-years-idUSKBN1JR1M0

Ferris-Rotman,A.(2018,September23).WhyRussiaiswooingSouthAfrica’swhitefarmers.WashingtonPost.Retrievedfromhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/why-russia-is-wooing-south-africas-white-farmers/2018/09/23/3308a7c4-b6a3-11e8-ae4f-2c1439c96d79_story.html?utm_term=.875d48e77d92

Ignatova,O.(2019,January16).Первыйбизнес-форумРоссия-Африкапройдетвоктябре,Parlamenskaya.Gazeta.Retrievedfromhttps://rg.ru/2019/01/16/pervyj-biznes-forum-rossiia-afrika-projdet-v-oktiabre.html

Lifhits,J.(2018,April3).WhydidTrumpexpeltheDirectoroftheRussianCulturalCenter?TheWeeklyStandard.Retrievedfromhttps://www.weeklystandard.com/jenna-lifhits/why-did-trump-expel-the-director-of-the-russian-cultural-center

Matusevich,M.(ed.)(2007).AfricainRussia,RussiainAfrica:ThreeCenturiesofEncounters.AfricaWorldPress.

MiddleEastMonitor(2017,October12).RussiaandMoroccosignagreementstoinauguratemilitaryandsecuritycooperation.Retrievedfromhttps://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171012-russia-and-morocco-sign-agreements-to-inaugurate-military-and-security-cooperation/



Morocco&Russiatosignnucleardeal.(2018,October5).TheNorthAfricaPost.Retrievedfromhttp://northafricapost.com/25700-morocco-russia-to-sign-nuclear-deal.html

REGNUMNewsAgency(Moscow)(2016,December4).Retrievedfromhttps://regnum.ru/news/polit/2213257.html

ResumingRussiantourismtoEgypttodecinetouristflowfromTurkey.(2018,October19).EgyptToday.Retrievedfromhttp://www.egypttoday.com/Article/9/59184/Resuming-Russian-tourism-to-Egypt-to-decline-tourist-flow-to

RIANovosti(2017,August11).Лавров заявил, что США в некоторых странах руководят оппозицией, Retrievedfromhttps://ria.ru/20170811/1500209550.html

Ross,A.(2018,October17).HowRussiamovedintoCentralAfrica.Reuters.Retrievedfromhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-russia-insight/how-russia-moved-into-central-africa-idUSKCN1MR0KA

RussiaandEgyptreadytotaketheirpartnershiptonewlevel–Lavrov.(2018,October13).Retrievedfromhttp://tass.com/politics/1025824

RussiaandMoroccosignaggreementstoinauguratemilitaryandsecuritycooperation.(2017,October12).MiddleEastMonitor.Retrievedfromhttps://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171012-russia-and-morocco-sign-agreements-to-inaugurate-military-and-security-cooperation/

RussiamakesmoveonLibyapeaceasclasesragenearTripoli.(2019,April9).TheMoscowTimes.Retrievedfromhttps://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/09/russia-makes-move-on-libya-peace-as-clashes-rage-near-tripoli-a65149

RussiamaystartproducingLadavehiclesinAlgeria(2019,January30).TASS.Retrievedfromhttp://tass.com/economy/1042513?mc_cid=446e26a2cb&mc_eid=b7ebb1001d

Seddon,M.andWilson,T.(2018,August21).Journalists’deathshighlightRussia’smovesintoAfrica.FinancialTimes.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ft.com/content/7e55b796-9cac-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d

Sudan’sPresidentBashirasksPutinfor‘protection’from‘aggressive’U.S.(2017,November23).France24.Retrievedfromhttps://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asks-putin-protection-aggressive-us

Sudan’spresidentisfirstArableadertovisitSyriasincecrisis.(2018,December18).Reuters.Retrievedfromhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-sudan/sudans-president-is-first-arab-leader-to-visit-syria-since-crisis-idUSKBN1OF0TE

U.S.warnsEgyptoverRussianSU-35fighterjetsdeal.(2019,April9).DefenseBlog.Retrievedfromhttps://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-to-judge-putins-trip-to-egypt

ThereturnofRussiatoAfrica.(2018,November16).HeraldPress.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nbs.ntu.edu.sg/NewsnEvents/Pages/Inthemedia-



Details.aspx?news=2f0e3381-39a8-4c98-92f1-d54e19799c6e

TransneftandSonatrachdevelopcooperation(2017,September20).Transneft.ru.https://en.transneft.ru/news/view/id/14662/?re=en

ValdaiClub.(2018,December19).Russia’sreturntoAfrica:Interests,challenges,prospects.Expertdiscussion[Videofile].Retrievedfromhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BzCZpSPmvzE


Severin APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 70

Chapter 13. Russian Activities in Africa (Continued)

Ms.MalinSeverinUKMinistryofDefenceDevelopment,ConceptsandDoctrineCentre(DCDC)

[email protected]

Abstract

Russiahasbeentakingstepstoadvanceitseconomic,military,andgeopoliticalinfluenceinAfricasinceVladimirPutincametopowerin2000.ThiscampaignhasintensifiedinrecentyearsandthereestablishmentoffootholdsinAfricaappearstobeguidedbypurposesofarmstradeandaccesstonaturalresources.TherecentannouncementthatRussiaisinvitedbytheCentralAfricanRepublictoopenamilitarybaseinthecountrysuggeststhatMoscowisusheringinadirectiontowardsagreaterfocusonstrategicpowerprojectionandgeopoliticalinfluence.TheRussian‘lightfootprint’approachwithprivatemilitarycontractors(PMCs)andembeddedadvisorstoAfricanregimes,ascultivatedand refined in Ukraine and Syria, will almost certainly remain an essential part of the Russianoperational‘toolbox’inthefuture.ThisinterventionistmodelcouldgaininmomentumacrossAfricabythepotentialwithdrawalofUStroopsonthecontinent.

Russian Gray Zone Activites—Africa


Thepolitical leadership inRussiahas formanyyearsheldapessimistic,borderingondystopian,outlook on the future in two overlapping areas. Firstly, with an oil-dependent economy underincreasingpressurefromgreaterglobaluseofrenewables, apopulationprojectedtoshrinkbythemillions,anda fragilestatesystemforwelfareprovision,Russia isundergreat internalpressure.Corruptionandnepotismatalllevelsundermineeffortsatreformandchange.

Secondly,thereisbroadconsensusacrosstheRussianpolicycommunitythatinternationalaffairshave entered a time of considerable competition across multiple domains: over resources,technological dominance, cultural values, influence, and access tomarkets. Russian officials andanalystsoftenemphasizetheirviewthatamajortransitionawayfromtheWestisunderwayintheinternationalarchitecture,resultinginchaosandpossiblywarthroughthe2020s(Monaghan,2017).

FromaRussianpointofview, thecountry is currentlyengaged inamulti-facetted,multi-domainconflictwiththeWest,inwhichtheUSanditsallieshavebeenusingitscomprehensivepoweroptionsto undermine, weaken, and marginalize Russia. Moscow views itself as being besieged andconstrained by the West’s policies, which they view as a continuation of classical containmentstrategy. Since Putin came to power, the Russian objective has been to break this ‘siege’ andchallenge, ifnotover-turn, the statusquoand regain its rightful statusasagreatpower.FromaRussianpointofview,competitionwiththeWestisazero-sumequation,andthereisreportedlyasenseoffrustrationinMoscowthattheWesthasyettofullyrealizethatRussiaandtheWestareinagrayzonestateofconflict,shortofarmedstruggle,andhavebeenforseveralyears(Giles,2019).

SinceRussianarmedforcesdonotpossesstheresourcesrequiredtocompeteonanequalfootingwith the US, Russia has developed its own approach to competition, seeking out and exploitingcontestedspacesandpointsofvulnerability,whetheritstemsfromavacuumofmilitarypower,ofpoliticalwilltouseit,oradivergenceofthreatperceptionwithinacountryoranalliance.Information



has been weaponized, and disinformation has become an incisive instrument of state policy.Nowhere isWesternconfusionmoreclearlydemonstratedthan inRussianemploymentofdigitaltechnology,usedtoreinforceoneofRussia’skeytoolsofstatecraft,maskirovka,literallytranslatedas‘littlemasquerade’.Theconceptofmaskirovkainvolvescamouflage,denial,deceit,misdirection,andoperationaldexterity(Pollock,2017).

Private military companies

AnotherofMoscow’striedandtestedapproaches,whichhasbeenrefinedsincetheGeorgianWarin2008, has been to employ coordinated, ‘low intensity’ and bespoke packages wherever anopportunityorpowervacuumemerges.Thesepackagesoftenincludeprivatemilitarycontractors(PMCs),specialforces,andmilitaryspecialists(technicalspecialists,C-2,electronicwarfare,drones,signals, ISR, etc.). Together, these components represent an increasingly flexible instrument forrefinedexpeditionarywarfare.

Althoughstill formally illegal inRussia, theuseofPMCsandmercenarieshasallowedMoscowtomanage public opinion, by way of offering a degree of separation from the Russian state. Thisapproach has been evident in Eastern Ukraine, Syria, and Sudan—theatres in which Russia’sinvolvementhasbeendeliberatelyambiguous.PMCsalsoofferanopportunitytoconfuseRussia’srivals andmuddy thewaters concerning the identity and objectives of the forces, exploiting thewildernessofmirrorsthatdisinformationreinforces.

Russia,itappears,hasobservedhowtheWesthasutilizedmercenariesandmilitarycontractorsinhistorical and contemporary campaigns from the Yemen civil war in the 1960s to more recentoperationsinAfghanistan,Iraq,andLibya.ButtheRussianuseofPMCsdiffersfromthestandardWesternperspectiveinthesensethatRussianPMCscarryoutpurelymilitaryfunctions,bothkineticandnon-kinetic,ratherthanthesupportingandenablingtasksofWesternPMCs(Sukhankin,2018a).

Byutilizing the vast pool of formermilitarymanpowerwithinRussia andpost-Soviet states, theKremlinseekstoachievestrategiceffectandincrementaladvantageacrossmultipledomains,whilemitigatingtheriskofstrategicover-commitmentandmilitaryover-extension,asoccurredduringtheproxywarsofthe1980s.Insummary,thesedeniablenon-stateforceshaveofferedtheKremlinawayof streamlining its expeditionary capabilities while advancing Russian geo-economic interests,withoutrequiringmajorinvolvementofthestateanditsresources.

Recent Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict

DuringtheColdWar, theSovietUnionhadseveralmilitarybridgeheadsontheAfricancontinent,althoughnomilitarybasesofitsown.Today,RussiabenefitsfromtheselegacyColdWar-eratiesandcultivatesessentiallythesamegroupofcountriesasitdidbackthen,includingAngola,Libya,andSudan. Many of these countries’ leaders have attended Russian institutions, such as the PatriceLumumba University in Moscow, or the Frunze military academy. These relationships are nowproviding Russiawith an advantage in this new “Scramble for Africa” (Carmody, 2016). RussianpresenceinAfricahasintensifiedoverthepastcoupleofyearsand,since2015,Russiahassignedover20militarycooperationagreementswithAfricanstates(Hedenskog,2019).ThisdevelopmenthascaughtmanyWesternanalystsandpolicymakersoff-guard.

Asoneoftheworld’slargestexportersofenergy,Russiaisdrivenbydifferentimperativesthansomeof the other external actors engaged in securing access to African oil supplies (Carmody, 2016).However,asSiberiandepositsofnaturalmineralshavereducedinprofitability,acquisitionofother



typesofnaturalresourcesremainsapriority.Africancountrieshavealsobecomean increasinglyimportant foodsupplier toRussianmarkets, especiallyafterRussiabanned the importof certainWesternfoodproducts.

Moreover,Africancountrieshavebecomeanincreasinglyimportantsourceofdiplomaticsupport,invenuessuchas theUnitedNations. Inaddition, in the faceof continuedWesternsanctionsandastagnanteconomy,armsexportsareperceivedasanincreasinglylucrativeareaforRussianeconomicgrowth,insellingbothsurplusstockpiledColdWareraequipmentaswellasnewerequipmenttoprovide hard currency revenues to finance its military industrial sector and research anddevelopment. From 2012-2016, Russia accounted for 35 percent of arms exports to the region,makingitAfrica’slargestsupplierofarms(Hedenskog,2019).

Russia’sexpansionintothewar-tornanddeeplyimpoverishedCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR)hasrecentlybecomethefocusofmuchmediaattention,followingthedeathofthreeRussianinvestigativejournalists.AfteranapprovalfromtheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilinJanuary2018,RussiawasallowedtosupplytheCARregimewitharmsandammunition.ThedeliveryoftheRussiandonationofAK47s,sniperrifles,andgrenade launcherswasaccompaniedbyhundredsofRussian“civilianexperts.”Severalopensourceinvestigations,suchastheoneperformedbytheRussianoppositionnewspaperNovaiaGazeta,havepointedoutthatthese“experts”wereinfactmercenarieslinkedtotheprivatemilitarycompanyWagner,whichinturnislinkedtoaRussianbusinessmanwithclosetiestoPutin(NovayaGazeta,2018).ThesesoldiersoffortunehavebeenusedinSyriaandSudanaswellasintheRussianmilitaryoperationinDonbas.

Inadditiontosendingmercenariestohighlyunstablecountries,Russia’srenewedpushforAfricaappears to include an element of gaining access to the host nation’s decision-making circles andcreatingnewmalleablenetworks.Forexample,CAR’sPresidenthasagreedtotheappointmentofaRussian citizen, Valeriy Zakharov, as his national security advisor. A similar approach has beenadopted in Sudan, where Moscow has managed to establish permanent representation in thecountry’sMinistryofDefence(Hedenskog,2019).

In January 2019, the CAR’sMinister of Defence announced that the countrywouldwelcome theopening of a Russianmilitary base on its territory. This declaration has been interpreted as anindicatorthatMoscowisseekingtogainfootholdsinAfricaforpurposesbeyondresourceacquisitionandmilitaryequipmentsales.Ifsuchabaseweretoopen,analystshavespeculatedthattheformerFrench colony, strategically situated at the heart of the continent, could become Russia’s newgeopolitical base and point of entry for expanding Russia’s influence throughout East Africa(Sukhankin,2019).

FromtheviewpointofsomeAfricanregimes,especiallythosewithautocraticleadership,Russia’sbidtoprovideareliablesupplyofmilitaryequipmentandtrainedpersonnelwithoperationalexperienceandspecializedskills(withouttheconditionsofmoralprescriptionsoftheWest)representsawaytomaintainthestatusquoinanincreasinglyunstableregion.ThefactthatMoscowneverattemptedto colonize theAfrican continent, but rather supported the anti-colonial struggle, likely providessomecredibilitytoKremlinasareliablepartner(Hedenskog,2019).Putin’ssteadfastsupportfortheAssadregimeandtheprotractedmilitarycommitmentinSyriaprovidefurtherevidencethatRussiaisareliablesponsorandpartnertoautocraticregimes.

Russianofficialshavehinted thataRussianmilitarybase in theCARcouldbecomean importantprecedent and that other African countries might follow suit. Indeed, members of the RussianparliamenthavedeclaredthatRussiaisreadytochallengeFrance’sdominanceinthispartofAfrica



(Sukhankin,2019).TheregionthusappearstobesetouttobecomeyetanotherarenaforRussianchallengingofWesternglobalinfluence.ItislikelythattheKremlin’suseofPMCswillbecomemoreextensive and entrenched in Russian policy in the coming years, and that we will see morewidespreademploymentofstrategically flexibleandoperationallyadaptable forcesacrossAfrica.ThisdevelopmentmaybeexacerbatedbythediminishedstatusofAFRICOMwithinUSandWesternstrategic thinking.TheannouncedwithdrawalofUS troops in countries suchasCamerooncouldprovidenewexploitablepowervacuumsandwindowsofopportunityinwhichRussiacouldemployitsrefinedandstreamlinedformofexpeditionarywarfare.

Figure 1. Source of map: Hedenskog, J. (2019). Russian military cooperation in Africa. FOI brief

References

Adamsky,D.(2018).FromMoscowwithcoercion–Russiandeterrence,theory,andstrategicculture.JournalofStrategicStudies,41(1-2),33-60.



Beaumont,P.(11September2018).Russia’sscrambleforinfluenceinAfricacatchesWesternofficialsoff-guard.TheGuardian.

BBCNews.(2018).USAfrica:BoltonUnveilsPlantoCounterRussiaandChinaInfluence.

Carmody,Padraig(2016),TheNewScrambleforAfrica,secondedition,Malden,MA:PolityPress

Connolly,R.&Boulegue,M.(2018).Russia’snewstatearmamentsprogramme–ImplicationsfortheRussianarmedforcesandmilitarycapabilitiesto2017.TheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairsResearchPaper,ChathamHouse.

Deni,J.R.(Ed.).(July2018).CurrentRussiamilitaryaffairs–AssessingandcounteringRussianstrategy,operationalplanningandmodernization[Conferenceexecutivesummaries].StrategicStudiesInstitute,Carlisle,PA:U.S.ArmyWarCollege.

Fainberg,S.(December2017).RussianSpetsnaz,contractorsandvolunteersintheSyrianconflict.Russia/NISCentre,Russie.Nei.Visions,No105Ifri.

Giles,K.(2019).Moscowrules:WhatdrivesRussiatoconfronttheWest.ChathamHouseInsights.

Goble,P.(6November2018a).Moscow’sneo-colonialenterpriserunningintodifficultiesinCentralAfricanRepublic.EurasiaDailyMonitor,TheJamestownFoundation.

Goble,P.(13November2018b).MoscowlayinggroundworkfordeepermilitaryinvolvementinLibya.EurasiaDailyMonitor,TheJamestownFoundation.

Hedenskog,J.(2019).RussianmilitarycooperationinAfrica.FOIbrief.

Hodgson,Q.(2003).IstheRussianbearlearning?AnoperationalandtacticalanalysisofthesecondChechenWar1999–2002(pp64-90).JournalofStrategicStudies,26(2).

McGregor,A.(2018).HowRussiaisdisplacingtheFrenchinthestruggleforinfluenceintheCentralAfricanRepublic.TheJamestownFoundation–EurasiaDailyMonitor–15thMay2018

Monaghan,A.(2017a).PowerinRussia.ManchesterUniversityPress.

Monaghan,A.(2017b),Globalstrategictrends6:Geopolitics,governance,defenceandsecurity.ReportcommissionedforDefenceResearchandDevelopmentCanada.

NovayaGazeta(2August2018).Retrievedfromhttps://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/02/77376-nam-nuzhen-svoy-tsar

Ogulturk,M.C.(2017).Russia’srenewedinterestintheHornofAfricaasatraditionalandrisingpower–Turkisharmedforces(pp.121–143).RisingPowersQuarterly2(1).

Pollock,J.(13April2017).Russiandisinformationtechnology–Russia’sreinventionofwarexploitsoldtechniquesforanewcentury(pp.4–5).MITTechnologyReview.

Renz,B.(2018).Russia’smilitaryrevival.Polity.

Russel,M.(November2018).RussiaintheMiddleEast–Fromsidelinestocentrestage.European



ParliamentaryResearchService.

Sukhankin,S.(13July2018a).Continuingwarbyothermeans:ThecaseofWagner,Russia’spremierprivatemilitarycompanyintheMiddleEast.TheJamestownFoundation.

Sukhankin,S.(12October2018b).RussianPMC’sinYemen:Kremlin-style‘securityexport’inaction?EurasiaDailyMonitor,TheJamestownFoundation.

Sukhankin,S.(12November2018c).Russia’shiredgunsinAfrica.EuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations–Commentary.

Sukhankin,S.(23January2019).TheKremlin’sgameintheCAR:Whateoesthefacadeconceal?TheJamestownFoundation,EurasiaDailyMonitor.

Ripley,T.(30January2019).Moscow’smission–Russianexpeditionarywarfarecapabilities.Jane’sDefenceWeekly.

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Ellis APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 76

Chapter 14. Russian Activities in Latin America

Dr.R.EvanEllisU.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute

[email protected]

Abstract

RussianengagementinLatinAmericaislimitedinboththeresourcesithasavailabletodedicate,aswellastherangeofcountriesandsectorsinwhichitprincipallyfocuses.ItsengagementisgenerallyepisodicandoftenreactivetoUSactivitiesinwhatitconsidersitsown“nearabroad,”includingUSattemptstoexpandtheboundariesofNATO,deploymissiledefensesystemsinRussia’speriphery,USdeploymentsduringthe2009GeorgianCivilWar,andUSpressuresonRussiaduringtheUkrainecrisisof2013-14.Nonetheless,asanuclearpowerwithsignificantconventionalcapabilities,whichhasdemonstrateditswillingnesstoactbelligerentlyagainsttheUSinthehemispherethroughthedeploymentofnuclearcapableTu-160bombersandwarshipsonmultipleoccasions(amongotherbehaviors),Russia’spositionandactivitiesinLatinAmericamustbeconsideredapotentialstrategicthreattotheUSIncontrasttothePRC,Russiaarguablyhasagreaterreserveofunderstandingofthepolitics of the region, largely from the (now aging) cold-war era intelligence specialists andacademicswho in the previous eraworkedwith the Cubans and other promoters of communistinsurgencyintheregion.

WhileRussiahasfarfewerresourcestoactinorimpacttheregion,comparedtothePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC),andwhileRussiaandChinaoccasionallycompetewithrespecttocommercialprojectsandarmssalesintheregion,thereisaninherentsynergybetweenPRCandRussianactivitiesinLatinAmerica,whichmustbeconsideredwhenassessingtherisksposedbyRussia’sactivities.Specifically,PRCloans,investments,commoditypurchases,anddiplomacyhelpsustainpopulistregimesintheregionsuchasVenezuela,contributetotheviabilityofthoseregimes.SubsequentlyengagingwithRussiatendstobeinamannermorehostilethanwithChina,whoismoreactivelyseekingtoavoidconflictwith theUS.Russia’s fledgingefforts tocoordinatewithChina inLatinAmericaonselectissues,suchasthecrisisinVenezuela,magnifiesthestrategicthreatthatitsactivitiespresenttoUSinterests.

Russian Interests and Objectives in Latin America

Russia’s strategic interests in Latin America do not directly originate in its current security,prosperity,orregimesurvival,somuchastheyareaproductofthecurrentregime’sdesiretoshowdomesticaudiencesthatitisreturningRussiatoa“greatness”rootedinaromanticizedconceptofRussia’s19thand20thCenturypast.RussiaalsohasaninterestinexploitingLatinAmerica’sproximityand economic andhuman connectedness to theUnited States, in order to act there inways thatthreatentheUSasavehicleforbuyingRussiagreaterautonomyofactioninthegeographicareaclosetoitsownterritory.

Russia’scurrentgovernmentunderVladimirPutin(andtoanextent,thatofhispredecessorDimitryMedvedev)hasworkedwithacoalitionofanti-USregimes,includingthoseinVenezuela,Nicaraguaand Cuba, to maintain a political andmilitary position that demonstrates Russia’s global reach,sendingawarningtotheUSthatRussiacouldthreatentheUSinits“backyard”iftheUScontinuestopressureRussiaandinterfereinRussia’s“nearabroad.”Separately,throughhelpingtopropuprogueregimessuchas thoseofVenezuelaandNicaragua,andmanipulate thepoliticsofothers, suchas



Mexico, Russia seeks to undermine the consolidation of the region as a group of pro-US statesadheringto“WashingtonConsensus”policiesoffreetrade,democracy,andtheruleoflaw,andintheprocess,distracttheUSandweakenitsstrategicpositionintheWesternhemisphere.

Beyondsuchstrategicgoals,Russiaalsohassomecommercial interests inLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.WhiletheseinterestsaretosomedegreerelatedtonationalprioritiesthroughtheprofitsofRussianbusinessesandRussia’sabilitytofeeditself,theyaremoreprincipallyinterestsofRussiancompanies and the individual oligarchs that control them (including Igor Sechin, head of the oilcompanyRosneft,orOlegDeripaska,thebillionaireheadofminingconglomerateRusal)(Ellis,2015).

WhileRussiapurchasessignificantamountsofmeatandotheragriculturalproductsfromtheregion(principally fromSouthAmerica),andwhileRussiaopportunistically leveragessuchpurchasestostrengthenrelationshipswiththeindividualcountriesinwhichitconductssuchtransactions,Russiadoesnotbehaveinawaythatsuggeststhatitconsiderssuchfoodsuppliesandotherproductsfromthe region critical to its national interests, or a key vehicle in a broader plan for securing othernationalobjectives(suchastrengthening itsstrategicposition inspecificpartsofLatinAmerica).(Ellis,2015).

Recent Russian Activities in Latin America

Russian activities in LatinAmericamay be divided into (1) political-military initiativeswith keypartnersbutwhichalsohaveaneconomiccomponent,(2)morepurelyeconomicactivitiesinsearchof expandedpolitical leverage, and (3)non-economic influenceoperations,principally seeking tosupportRussia’sfriends,andsewdoubtsorunderminesupportfortheUS,regionalstability,orpro-marketdemocraticvaluesinothernationsoftheregion.

Overall,Russia’spositioninLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeaninthepastfiveyearshasweakenedconsiderably, due largely to a political shift to the right across the region. That shift has beendeepened and sustained, ironically, through the negative political and economic example of thepopulist-socialistMaduroregimeinVenezuela(whichRussiahelpedtosustaininpower).OutsideofVenezuela, such changes include the replacement the pro-Russian Peronist regime of ChristinaFernandezdeKirchnerbythepro-marketgovernmentofMauricioMacriinArgentina’sOctober2015elections. The expulsion of Christina and her leftist-Peronist government substantively frozeArgentina’scourtshipofRussia,whichhadincludedconsiderationofthepurchaseofRussianSu-24fighteraircraft,oildeals,nuclearpowercollaboration,andtheconstructionofahydroelectricfacilitybytheRussianfirmInterRao.InPeru,theApril2016victoryofneoliberalPedroPabloKuczynski(replacedbyequallyconservativeMartinVizcarrainPeruwhenKuczynskiresignedinMarch2018),similarlyslowedRussianadvancesandset thestage foran investigationofcorruptionassociatedwiththepurchaseofRussianhelicoptersbytheprecedingadministrationofOllantaHumala.InChile,inDecember2017, elections removed the center-leftConcertación coalition from thepresidency,returning to power center-right businessman Sebastian Pinera. In the process, it ended Chile’scautiousexplorationofmilitarytieswithRussia,begunbyoutgoingPresidentMichelleBachelet,whohadbeendrawntotheleft,inpart,throughthecommunistsinhercoalition.SimilarlyvictoriesinColombiabyconservativeIvanDuqueinthatnation’sMarch2018election,inParaguay,byMarioAbdo Benitez in April 2018, and in Brazil, by Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018, foreclosed tiescautiously being developed with Russia by governments in those countries (including thecontemplatedpurchaseofaRussianairdefensesystembyBrazil)(Ellis,2017).



Russia’smostsignificantactivitiesinLatinAmericainrecentyearsarguablycenteronthenation’sthreeprincipalenduringstrategicpartners:Venezuela,Nicaragua,andCuba,althoughRussiahasalsosufferedsignificantsetbacksineachoftheserelationshipsduringtheperiod.

Venezuela, under the socialist governments of Hugo Chavez and NicholasMaduro, has been thepartnerthathasmostpermittedRussiatouseitsterritoryandresourcestoadvanceRussianstrategicobjectives.From2006untilVenezuelanresourcesbegantorunout,coincidingwithChavez’death(officiallyinMarch2013),Venezuelaboughtover$11billioninarmsfromRussia,includingSu-30fighter aircraft, Mi-35 attack helicopters,Mi-17 transport helicopters, T-72 tanks, BMP and BTRarmored vehicles, and a range of other equipment (Ellis, 2015). On three separate occasions,Venezuelaallowed(perhapsencouraged)Russiatooperatenuclear-capableTu-160bombersoutofitscountry(in2008,2013,and2018),andin2008,RussiadeployedwarshipstoVenezuela.In2008and2013,VenezuelaallowedRussiatoestablishamilitaryairbaseonLaOrchilaisland,justofftheVenezuelancoastandincloseproximitytotheUnitedStates.TheRussianoilcompanyRosnefthasloaned an estimated $6 billion to the Venezuelan national oil company PdVSA and has investedbillionsmoreinthecountry.IthashelpedtoshelterVenezuelafromtheeffectofUSsanctionsbymakingitsVadinarrefineryinIndiaavailabletorefineVenezuelanoil,asanalternativetousingUSGulfcoastrefineries.RussiaalsosentmercenariestoVenezuelainDecember2018andallowedtheVenezuelanoil companyPdVSA to relocate its offices fromLisbon toMoscow.Russia also joinedChinainFebruary2019inblockingaUnitedNationsresolutionthatmighthavefacilitatedaUNpeaceenforcementforcetohelpthelegitimategovernmentofJuanGuaidoconsolidatehisphysicalcontroloverVenezuela(Schwirtz,2019).

Russia’shelptoVenezuelahasnotalwaysproducedthehoped-forresults.ItsarmssalestoVenezuelaweresignificantlycurtailedwhenVenezuelaranoutofmoney.FourofRussia’sfiveoilcompaniespulledoutofVenezueladuetobadexperiencesthere(Lukoil,TNK,Gazprom,andSurgutneftegaz).PdVSA,theVenezuelanstate-ownedenergycompany,hasfallenbehindinitspaymentstoRussianenergyproducerRosneft.Makingmattersworse,RosneftislikelytobepreventedfromtakingcontrolofthedownstreamoilcompanyCITGO,offeredbyPdVSAascollateralfora$1.5billionloan.

WiththedeepeningcrisisinVenezuela,NicaraguahasexpandedinvalueasapartnerforRussiaintheregion.BuildingonNicaragua’spreviousrelationshipasaclientstateoftheSovietUnionfrom1979-1990,whenformercommunistpresidentDanielOrtegaandhisSandinistapartyreturnedtopowerin2007,NicaraguaendeareditselftoMoscowbyrecognizingthepro-RussianseparatistsinSouthOssetiaandAbkhaziaduringthe2008Georgiancivilwar.Inthedecadewhichfollowed,RussiaprovidedNicaraguafoodsupplies,bussesandotherdonatedgoods,aswellasT-72tanks,armoredvehicles,patrolboats,andmissileboatstoupgradeitsmilitary,apolicetrainingcenterinManagua,andanantenna-ladenGLONASSsatellitedownlinkfacility(suspiciouslyclosetotheUSembassyinManagua).NicaraguaalsosignedanagreementfacilitatingaccessbyRussianwarshipstoitsports,aswellasallowingRussianTu-160bomberstolandinthecountry(intheprocessviolatingColombianairspace)whilevisitingtheregionin2013.

WhileCuba’srelationswithRussiawerestrainedduetothelatter’sabruptwithdrawaloffinancialsupportfollowingthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991,Russiaboughtsomegoodwillbyforgiving$30billionoftheisland’soutstanding$35billionincold-wareradebt.RussiancompanieshavebeeninvolvedinCuba’snickelandpetroleumindustries,andcommittedtoconstructionprojectsinvolvingthermoelectricplants,anairportandtheMarielport.Russianfirmsalsosoldordonatedcarsandother vehicles to Cuba, and explored renovating the Cienfuegos refinery (and possibly evencompletingCuba’scoldwar-eraJuraguanuclearpowerplant).Nonetheless,despiteproclamationsofinterest from Russian legislators, Cuba has not led Russia resume use of its Cold-War signals



intelligence facilities inLourdes,Bejucal, or SantiagodeCuba (formonitoring theUS), norhas itboughtsignificantquantitiesofRussianmilitaryequipmentorparticipated inallof theoccasionssince2008inwhichRussiahasdeployedmilitaryassetstotheregion.Cubahas,however,permittedsome visits by Russianwarships (including the docking of the signals collection ship Leonov inHavanaHarbor in February 2014when the USwas negotiatingwith Cuba to restore diplomaticrelations).

Beyondthesekeypartners,withrespecttomilitaryengagement,RussiahasleveragedprevioussalestoPeru(beginningundertheregimeofGeneralJuanVelascoAlvaradoandcontinuingwithMig-29salesduringtheadministrationofAlbertoFujimori),tosellthecountryMi-17s,Mi-35s,andotherequipment and supportpackages, although in at leastone case (regarding replacementofPeru’sagingBM-21self-propelledrocketlaunchers),RussialostouttoaChinesecompetitorsellingitsType90Bsystem.RussiahasalsosignedamilitarycooperationagreementwithSuriname.

With respect to extractive sectors, Russian oil companies are doing work in Ecuador Bolivia,Venezuela, andCuba, amongother countries,whileRusal, asnotedpreviously, has apresence inJamaica, Guyana and Cuba. Nonetheless, all of these ventures are generally hampered by lowinternationalcommoditypricesandalackoffundstoexpandthroughacquisitionsasaggressivelyastheirChinesecounterparts(Ellis,2014;Ellis,2018).

WithrespecttosalesofRussianproductsandservices,beyondarms(whereRussianhelicoptersandotherequipmentarerelativelycommonintheregion),RussianconstructioncompanyInterRaoandtheequipmentmanufacturerPowerMachines,aswellasLadacarsandKamaztrucks,onlyhavealimitedpresence.FortheUS,thelighterRussianpresenceis,inpartpositive,sincethelackofsalesmeansthatRussianproductsarenotseenascompetitionby localmanufacturers, inthewaythatChineseproductsoftenare(Ellis,2016).

WithrespecttoRussianimportsfromLatinAmerica,whileRussiapurchasesasizablequantityofmeatandgrains,principallyfromthesoutherncone,thesizeoftheRussianmarketdoesnotgenerallyinspiretheimaginationofLatinAmericanpoliticiansandbusinessmenthewaythe1.4billion-personChinesemarketdoes.

Likely Future Russian Activities in Latin America

Forthemoment,RussiaappearslikelytocontinueitsprincipallyreactivesetofpoliticalandmilitaryactivitiesinLatinAmerica,andlimitedeconomicengagement.Themostlikelysourcesofnear-termchangemaycomefromtheevolvingsituationsinVenezuela,Cuba,Mexico,Nicaragua,andGuatemala,aswellasthroughexpandedcooperationwiththePRCintheregion.

In Venezuela, US-led military intervention (including a multi-national force responding to abreakdownoforder),couldleadRussiatoopportunisticallyjoinCubainsupportingelementsofthemilitary and collectivos that remain loyal toMaduro, and attempt towage a protracted guerillacampaignagainsttheGuaidogovernment(perCubandoctrineadoptedbytheVenezuelanmilitary),aswellassupportothercriminalgroupsresistingtheimpositionoforder,includingtheELN,FARCdissidents,and“sindicatos”intheVenezuelaninterior,amongothers.

In Cuba, consolidation of power byMiguelDiaz-Canel, including the eventual retirement of RaulCastrofromleadershipoftheCommunistParty,incombinationwithacontinuedhardlinefromtheUS,couldleadtheregimetofinallypermitanexpandedRussiandefensepresence,includingpossible



baseaccessagreementsorreneweduseofSIGINTfacilitiessuchasLourdes,Bejucal,andSantiago,inwaystheCubanshavebeenreluctanttodothusfar.

In Nicaragua, successful elimination of dissidence by the Ortega regime could pave the way forrenewedRussianengagement,currentlyoperatingatalowprofilecoincidingwiththepoliticalcrisisthatbeganinApril.

InGuatemala,followingtheconstitutionalcrisisbetweenthegovernmentofJimmyMoralesandhisSupremeCourtovertheUNanti-corruptionbodyCICIG,theJune2019electionscouldbringanewleftistgovernmenttopowerthatembracesamoreactiveRussianpresence(deLeon,2018).

InMexico, frustrationby the leftistAMLOgovernment overUS rhetoric andpolicies regarding aborderwall,migrantsandUSfailuretoratifythenewUSMCAtradedealcouldleadAMLOtomorefullyembracebothChinaandRussiaascounterweightstotheUS.WhileRussiahaslittletosell,loanto, or invest in Mexico, it could engage in expanded symbolic defense interactions such asinstitutional visits, officer training in Russia, Russian training inMexico, or joint exercises.Withrespecttoarmssales,AMLO’scancellationofpurchasesofUSBlackhawkhelicopterscouldopenthedoorforittodomoreworkwiththeRussiansinupgradingitsMi-17s.

Perceived Russian Threats to its Interests in Latin America

Russia arguablydoesnothave anyvital interests inLatinAmerica that it is likely toperceive asthreatened.Itmay,however,feeltheobligationtouseitsvetointheUnitedNations,diplomacy,loansandothertoolstohelpdefend“friendly”regimesinVenezuela,Nicaragua,andCuba,duemostlytoitsfearofdamagetoitsreputationifitallowsthemtobeoverthrownwithUShelp.

Russian Efforts to Influence Key Actors in the Region

IncontrasttoChina,whichusesaccesstoitsmarketsandthepossibilityofloansandinvestmentastools of soft power, Russian ability to exert influence through economic resources, either byprovidingaidordenyingcommercialtransactions,isminimal.Evenamongitsfriends,Russia’sabilityto exert influence in the region is limited. Cuba has long regarded itself as independent from(althoughalliedwith)Russia,andasaleader(notafollower)withrespecttocommunistandleftistpoliticsintheregion.Indeed,therearearguablemoreCubanthanRussianagentsonthegroundinVenezuela,withagreaterabilitytounderstandandinfluencetheoutcomeofthecurrentcrisis(evenwithRussia’soilpresence).

Russian Efforts to Influence Civilian Populations in the Region

Beyond the favors that Russia can extract from friendly governments in exchange for theircooperation,itsabilitytoexertinfluenceintheregionisconcentratedonusingtraditionalandsocialmediainfluenceoperationstoshapeLatinAmericanpoliticsatthemargins.

Withrespecttomediaoperations,theRussiannewsorganizationsRussiaTodayandSputnikhaveclearlysoughttopositionthemselvesascrediblealternativemediaoutletsacrosstheregion,withcontentthatsubtlyseekstoquestiontheUS,conservativeregimes,andconfidenceingovernance,democratic processes, andWestern values therein. As a compliment, Russiamay be using socialmediatoplant“fakenews”ormagnifystoriesthatsupportitsstrategiccommunicationobjectives,possibly using trolls and bot farms to further those same objectives. Yet, to date, Russia neither



appearstohavesucceeded,norhastriedtousepropagandatosecuretheelectionofapro-RussiangovernmentanywhereinLatinAmerica.

References

DeLeon,I.(9December2018).SandraTorresyRaúlMolinaAspiranalaPresidencia,Guatevision,Retrievedfromhttps://www.guatevision.com/noticias/nacional/elecciones-2019-sandra-torres-y-raul-morales-aspiran-a-la-presidencia/.

Ellis,EvanR.(2014).ChinaontheGroundinLatinAmerica:ChallengesfortheChineseandImpactsontheRegion.NewYork:Palgrave-Macmillan.

Ellis,EvanR.(June2015).TheNewRussianEngagementWithLatinAmerica:StrategicEngagement,Commerce,andDreamsofthePast.U.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute,Retrievedfromhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1275.

Ellis,EvanR.(June2016).CharacteristicsandAssessmentofRussianEngagementwithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,EnsayosMilitares,Vol.2,No.1,Retrievedfromhttp://www.ceeag.cl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/1junio16.pdf,pp.29-42.

Ellis,EvanR.(5December2017).RussianEngagementinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean:AnUpdate.GlobalAmericans.Retrievedfromhttps://theglobalamericans.org/2017/12/russian-engagement-latin-america-update/.

Ellis,EvanR.(March2018).Haciaunaasociaciónestratégica:LasinversionesdeChinaenAméricaLatina.RedCAEM.Retrievedfromhttp://chinayamericalatina.com/wps-papers/.

Schwirtz,M.(28February2019).RussiaBlocksVenezuelaMeasureatU.N.,CallingItaU.S.PloyforRegimeChange.TheNewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttps://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/americas/russia-venezuela-veto-united-nations.html.


Devyatkin APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 82

Chapter 15. Russia and the Arctic

Mr.PavelDevyatkinTheArcticInstitute

[email protected]

Abstract

Russia has important socio-economic and security interests in the Arctic. This paper analyzesRussia’s interests and recent activities in the region. It is argued that Russia’s Arctic strategy isgenerallyorientedtowardsexpandingupondomesticeconomicprojects(e.g.energyandshipping),workingwithArcticstatestowardscircumpolarcooperation,andusingthemilitarytosecuretheirinterests.Russia’sactionsareconsistentwiththeirofficialinterestsandobjectives,andarepragmaticconsideringtheregion’seconomicandstrategicsignificance.

Russian Interests and Objectives in the Arctic

The Russian Federation’s strategy in the Arctic is a contested topic in academia, media, andpolicymaking.Russiaisoftenportrayedastheforemostinstigatorofconflictintheregion.ItistruethattheRussiangovernmenthasdeclaredthatallactivityintheArcticshouldbetiedtotheinterestsof “defense and security to the maximum degree” (President of the Russian Federation, 2001).However,Russia’spoliciesaregenerallymorefocusedondomesticsecurityandeconomicprojectsratherthanoutwardexpansion.

Whenanalyststalkofthe“scramblefortheArctic”andRussia’s“plantodominatetheArctic,”werisktheemergenceofasecuritydilemma(Hosa,2018;Peck,2018).A2013DepartmentofDefensereportwarned,“ThereissomeriskthattheperceptionthattheArcticisbeingmilitarizedmayleadtoanarms racementality” (United StatesDepartment of Defense, 2013). The portrayal of Russia as athreateningrivalintheArcticdistortsourunderstandingoftheKremlin’sstrategyintheregion.

US-RussiatensionsinotherregionsoftheworldhavecontributedtosuspicionsurroundingRussia’sactivitiesinthefreezingandfarawayNorth.However,overthepasttwodecades,RussiahasbeenacooperativeactorinArcticgovernanceandhasfocusedondomesticdevelopmentissues.Russia’sdependenceonnaturalresourcesandthedegradationofSoviet-erainfrastructurehavemadeRussiaincreasinglyorientedtowardsremedyingitsinternalissuesintheRussiancontrolledArcticregion.Bypartneringwithforeignactorsineconomicprojects,Russiaisalsopartiallyinternationalizingitsenergyextraction,naturalresources,andmaritimeshipping.

SincetheendoftheColdWar,theArctichasbeenanexemplarofconstructiveinterstatediplomacy.Perhaps the greatest example of circumpolar cooperation is the Arctic Council (AC), anintergovernmental forumthatactsbyconsensusbetweentheeightArcticstates– theUS,Russia,Canada,Sweden,Norway,Finland,Denmark,andIceland.AlthoughtheACdoesnotdiscussmilitaryand security issues, it has successfully enabled the negotiation of legally binding agreements onsearchandrescue(SAR)operationsandoil-spill response,aswellas theresolutionofcompetingterritorialclaimsbetweenRussiaandNorwayintheBarentsSea.

Moscowalsohasaninterestinmaintainingacomprehensivesea,airandlandpresenceintheRussianArctic.AftercloseexaminationofRussia’smilitaryandsecuritypoliciesintheArctic,itisreasonabletosaythatRussiaseekstodefenditssovereigninterestsinaregionthathasbeenofstrategicand



cultural importancetoRussia forcenturies.Themythicalstatusof theArctichasbeensignificantthroughoutRussianhistory.ThenorthwardexpansionsofIvantheTerribleandPetertheGreatwerefundamental to the growth of the Russian Empire. The faraway northern regionswere also thesettingsforthebrutalgulagcampsunderStalin.

State Development Policy

Russia’s official Arctic strategy and interests are best understood by examining the governmentpublications put forward by the various bodies of the Russian state. In September 2008, theFoundationsoftheStatePolicyoftheRussianFederationintheArcticforthePeriodUntil2020andBeyond was adopted by then President Dmitry Medvedev. The document presents the RussianFederations’ national interests and basic objectives for state policy in the Arctic region. Russia’sobjectivescanbesummarizedasfollows:

• toactivelyworkwithArcticstatesonthebasisofinternationallaw,

• tocreateastandardizedSARsystemtopreventaccidentssuchasdrowningandoilspills,

• tostrengthenRussia’srelationshipswithmultilateralforumssuchastheAC,

• toeffectivelymanagetheNorthernSeaRoutemaritimeshippinglanes,

• toimprovestatemanagementofeconomicdevelopment,

• tosupportscientificresearch,

• toimprovethequalityoflifeofindigenouspeoples,and

• todeveloptheArctic’snaturalresourcebase.

Russia’s interests in the Arctic are evidently complex but generally oriented towards internaleconomicandsocialdevelopment,alongwithinternationalcooperationthroughexistinglegalandmultilateral regimes. In 2013, President Putin approved theDevelopment Strategy of the RussianArcticandtheProvisionofNationalSecurityforthePeriodUntil2020.Thestrategy,arevisionofthe2008document,providesamorecomprehensivedescriptionofRussia’sobjectives,priorities,andmeans of implementation. The documentmentions economic and environmental prioritiesmoreoftenthanitdiscussesdefenseaims.Furtherobjectivesinclude“developingtheRussianicebreakerfleet,modernizing theair serviceandairportnetwork, andestablishingmodern informationandtelecommunication infrastructure” (President of the Russian Federation, 2013). Throughout thestrategydocument,thesemeasuresaretiedtoeconomicinterests.Forexample,surveillanceoftheRussian Arctic’s maritime areas is necessary since the region’s harsh climate hinders economicdevelopment,withoutanadequatemonitoringsystem.

Security Interests

RussianmilitarypresenceintheArctichasthreegoals:toprotectnationalsovereigntyintheregion,tosecureeconomicinterests,andtodemonstratethatRussiaremainsagreatpowerwithfirst-ratemilitarycapabilities(Heininen,Sergunin&Yarovoy,2014).IncontrasttotheSovietera,whenthestate’smilitaryposturingwasorientedtowardsconfrontation,thecontemporaryRussianmilitaryin



the Arctic is not focused on paritywith NATO. These themes can too be found in the followinggovernmentdocuments.

TheForeignPolicyConceptoftheRussianFederationstatesthattheArcticisaregionwhereRussiamust“promotepeace,stabilityandconstructive internationalcooperation.”Russiaalsoproclaimsthatthestatewill“befirmincounteringanyattemptstointroduceelementsofpoliticalormilitaryconfrontationintheArctic.”TheNationalSecurityStrategyto2020(NSS)outlinesRussia’spositionthatthe“developmentofequalandmutuallybeneficialinternationalcooperationintheArctic”mustbeprioritized.

TheDevelopmentStrategyoftheRussianArcticandNSScontainamuchlessassertivetonecomparedtothedocuments’earlierversions(MinistryofDefenseoftheRussianFederation,2009;PresidentoftheRussianFederation,2008).ThenewerArcticstrategypapersfocusoncombatingsocio-economicissuessuchas“smuggling,terrorism,andillegalimmigration”insteadofbalancingmilitarypowerwith other states. The 2008 and 2013 editions of theDevelopment Strategydo notmention themilitaryactivitiesofothernations.

Russia’sMinistryofDefensehasconsistentlycalledforthedevelopmentofRussianmilitaryfacilitiesintheArctictomeet“emergingthreats”(Fomichev,2015).The2014MilitaryDoctrineoftheRussianFederation declares that armed forces must be present in the Russian Arctic to secure nationalinterestsevenduringpeacetime.However,thedocumentcallsforageneralmilitaryrenovationtoreplaceoldicebreakersandotherdecrepitunits.

Energy and Natural Resource Interests

The2013DevelopmentPolicyhighlightsRussia’sinterestinexpandinglarge-scaleeconomicprojectsinvolving energy extraction. One of Russia’s main priorities is to satisfy Russia’s need for“hydrocarbon resources, water bio-resources and other types of strategic raw materials.” ThedocumentcharacterizestheArcticasamajorsourceofnaturalresources(PresidentoftheRussianFederation,2013).

TwothirdsofallRussianoilandgasisestimatedtobefoundinRussia’sexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ) in the Arctic (Claes &Moe, 2014). Asmuch as twenty percent of Russia’s gross domesticproduct (GDP) isgeneratedwithinRussian territories in theArctic (Laruelle,2014).Accordingly,exploitation of the Arctic’s resources is considered essential for Russia’s social and economicdevelopment.FormerPresidentMedvedevdeclaredthatthestate’s“firstandmaintaskistoturntheArcticintoaresourcebaseforRussia”(Klare,2013).

IntheEnergyStrategyforRussiaupto2030, theArcticisdescribedasakeyregionforincreasing“geological exploration, private investments, and state participation in the development of newterritoriesandwaters.”ThisdocumentalsoproclaimstheRussianstate’shopestoenhanceRussianenergy companies’ positions abroad and provide an environment for efficient internationalcooperationforsophisticatedenergyprojectsintheArctic.

Maritime Shipping Interests

ThefadingseaiceintheArctichasledanalystsandpolicymakerstoheraldthedevelopmentofanewmaritimeshipping lane, theNorthernSeaRoute (NSR).Theroutemaybecomeashorter lane forshippingbetweenthemajorportsofEastAsiaandWesternEurope.TheNSRiswithinRussia’sEEZ,



meaningthatRussiahasjurisdictionovertheroute.Asaresult,theNSRreceivesgreatattentionintheDevelopmentStrategyandTransportStrategyoftheRussianFederationupto2030.Russiaaimstodevelop theNSR by commissioning nuclear icebreakers, improving the ports along the lane andcreatingamonitoringsystem.Furthermore,itisahighpriorityforRussiatobuildaneffectivebordercontrolservicetomonitortherouteandenforceregulations.

Moscow also has a partial interest in internationalizing access to theNSR, but is so far orientedtoward regulating the route for national economic development. For instance, recent legislationexcludedforeignvesselsfromtransportingRussiannaturalresourcesalongtheNSR(TASS,2017).However,thecautionofallowingforeignshipsintotheRussianEEZisunderstandableconsideringitslocationonRussia’snorthernborder.

AdmiralRobertPapp,theStateDepartment’sSpecialRepresentativetotheArcticunderPresidentObama,stated,“Russiaisdoingthosethingswewouldbedoingourselvesiftherewasanincreaseintrafficaboveourcoast”(Jopson&Milne,2015).AlargecomponentofRussia’smilitaryintheArctichasbeendesignatedtosecuretheNSR.TheMinistryofDefensehasprioritizedsecuritymeasurestocombatoilandwastespills,smuggling,poaching,andtoprovideSARservicesnecessaryinthehighseas.

Recent Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict, in the Arctic

Russia’sactionsintheArcticdemonstrateacommitmenttorealizingtheireconomic,security,anddevelopmentalobjectives.Russiahaspartiallyfocusedonoffshoredrilling,mineralextractionandmaritime shipping.On theotherhand,Moscow is actingdefensivelyduringa timeofheightenedtensionswithneighboringcountriesandasaresult,isbuildingitssecurityintheregion.TheKremliniscommittedtoconfrontinganyemergingthreatstoitsArcticterritory,maritimetransportventuresandenergyprojects.Russiahasopenedorreopenedmilitaryfacilities,conductedmilitarydrills,andmaintainedacomprehensivearmedpresence.Russia’ssecurityinterestscanbedescribedasrealistandpragmatic.RussiaaimstomaintaincontrolovertheregionwhileatthesametimecooperatingwithotherArcticstates’throughmilitarydrillsandSARoperations.

Security Activities

Russia’s security actions in the Arctic reflect a commitment to upholding national sovereignty,securing ongoing economic interests, and asserting Russia as a first-classmilitary power in thetwenty-firstcentury.Sincethe2007polarexpeditionwhenRussianscientistsplantedtheirflagontheNorthPole’sseabed,manyWesternjournalistsandpoliticianshavecastRussianactionsintheArctic as expansionist, aggressive and threatening.PopularperceptionsofRussia’sArctic actionshavealsoturnednegativeaftertheUkrainianCrisis.

ItwasexpectedinthewakeofthecrisisthattheKremlinwouldrampupandaccelerateitsmilitaryactivities in the Far North. However, therewas no paradigmatic shift of Moscow’s vision of themilitary’sroleintheArctic.RussianmilitaryactivitiesintheArcticremaincomparabletothoseofotherArcticstatesprotectingtheirsovereigntyandeconomicinterests(Sergunin&Konyshev,2015).AlthoughRussia’smilitaryprojectionintheArcticismostlyaerialandnaval,therearegarrisonsofRussiangroundtroopsandsecurityservicesthroughouttheRussianArctic.

TheNorthernFleetisperhapsthemostimportantaspectoftheRussianmilitaryintheregion.Sincethe1950s,ithashadthegreatestnumberoficebreakersandsubmarinesoftheSoviet/Russiannaval



fleets.Severalshipsareunderconstructionduetoneedforcoastalshipstoconductrapidoperations,but they have been afflicted by delays. Alarmist media and politicians declare that Russia isdramaticallyincreasingitsnavalpresence.Inreality,RussiahasfewernavalunitsintheArcticthantheSovietUnionhadduringthe1980s.Russiaisrebuildingitsnavyafteravirtualabsenceduringthenineties(Heininen,Sergunin&Yarovoy,2014).

Russia’sonlyaircraftcarrier, theAdmiralKuznetsov, ispartof theNorthernFleet. Ithoststwentyfighterjetsandtenhelicopters.Inaddition,therecentlyrepaireddestroyer,theVice-AdmiralKulakov,wasintroducedintotheNorthernFleetin2011.Navalaviationincludes200combataircraftandfiftyhelicopters(Lasserre&Tetu,2016).

TheNorthernFleet includesaround forty surface ships and forty submarines,mostofwhicharerundownColdWareraunits.Thesea-basednucleardeterrencecapabilitymakestheNorthernFleetafundamentalpartofRussia’smilitary.Consequently,Russiahassince2007expandednavalpatrolsnearNorwegianandDanishterritories,increasedtheoperationalradiusoftheFleet’ssubmarines,andcommencedbelow-icetrainingforsubmarines(Klimenko,2016).However,Russiansubmarinesareintheprocessofre-equipingandmodernizingratherthanstrivingforsuperiorityorparity.TheRussian navy aims to deploy new ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) but they cannotcomparetoUSconventional-strikecapabilities.USAtlanticnavalpresencevastlyoutnumberstheRussianArcticpresence(English&Thvedt,2018).

In2007,RussianstrategicbombersstartedflyingovertheArcticforthefirsttimesincetheendoftheColdWar.Theseflightsarecriticizedbyjournalists,butauthoritativemilitaryexpertsrecognizethattheresumptionofbomberflightsismoreabouttheKremlin’sdesiretonotlosecapacityandfordomestic approval rather than outward aggression (Lasserre & Tetu, 2016). Close encountersbetweenNATOandRussianfighterandbomberpilotsintheairabovetheArctichavedrawnmediacriticism,butNATOofficialssaythesepracticesare“perfectlylegal”and“welcome”(Posey,2016).Russiadoesnothaveanyfifth-generationfightersdeployedatallnoranadvancedairbornewarningsystem that can compare to theUS’multipleF-22 andF-35 squadrons inAlaska andunmatchedairbornewarningsystem(English&Thvedt,2018).

Russiahasalargefleetoficebreakingvessels,buttheyareforescortingcommercialshippingandsupplyingresearchstationsandremotecommunities.TheyhaveminimalmilitaryutilityandserveasimilarpurposeastheUSicebreakersdoinsupportingtheCoastGuard.TheRussianArcticborderguardwasestablishedin1994tomonitorshipsandillegalfishing.Nowadays,thisforceimplementsthe2011ArcticCouncilagreementonthemaintenanceofaMaritimeandAeronauticalSARSystem.

Thesemeasurescanbeinterpretedas“softsecurity”actionsthatdonotswaytheregionalmilitarybalance, but instead focus onmonitoring. The Russian Coast Guard concentrates onmonitoringshipping,fishing,andextractionintheArcticwaters,conductingSARoperations,aswellasprotectingagainstoilandwastepollution.ThisisinlinewiththeactivitiesofotherArcticstates’coastguards.ThecoastguardsoftheeightArcticstatesestablishedtheArcticCoastGuardForumin2015.Theforum was established for the coast guards to combine emergency response operations in thenorthernseas(Grant,2017).

AftertheendoftheColdWar,theregionalmilitarypresenceseverelydeterioratedandisnowinneedofmodernization.Giventheeconomicandstrategicsignificanceoftheregion,itisunderstandablethatRussiaaims tobuild itsmilitary forces in the region tomeetemergingdangersandsecurityissues.Furthermore,RussianmilitarypracticesshouldnotbecastasathreatsincetheircapabilitiesarenotcomparabletoUSsuperiormilitarypresence.



Economic Activities

TheArctichaslongbeenasignificantsourceofenergyandresourcesforRussia.DuringtheSovietera, thecoal,minerals, andoilof theFarNorthplayedkey roles in thenation’s industrialization.Currently, there are a number of hydrocarbon companies operating in the Arctic. Sanctions onRussian oil and gas executives, low oil prices, and the difficulties of extraction in the hostileenvironmenthavebeenobstaclestoRussiaprocuringthebenefitsof itsArcticresources.Despitethesechallenges,RussiahasmadeeffortstodevelopitsArcticenergyprojectsaswellascollaboratewithforeignpartners,sinceunilateralextractioncanbeexpensiveandcomplicated.

In2018,Russia’sMinisterofNaturalResourcesDmitryKobylkinannouncedamajorfiveyearplanto invest in infrastructure and resourcedevelopment. For theperioduntil 2024, the sumof $83millionwillcoverinvestmentsinrailways,seaports,andhydrocarbonandcoalfields.Thissumiscomparable to what the Russian government invests in healthcare and education combined(Staalesen,2018).OffshorecommercialproductionisonlyunderwayatthePrirazlomnoyefield.Thisfieldwasdiscovered in thePechoraSea in1989. It isestimatedtohold70milliontonsofoil.OilproductionoperationsatPrirazlomnoyebeganin2013underthelicenseofGazprom.ItistheonlyRussianhydrocarbonproductionprojectbeingimplementedontheArcticshelfbecauseofa2008banprohibitingprivatecompaniesfromaccesstooffshorefields(Gazprom2019).

YamalLNG(liquefiednaturalgas)isanothersignificantenergyprojectinRussia’sNorth.Launchedin2013,YamalLNGisoneofthelargestandmostcomplexLNGprojectsintheworld.ItisajointventurebetweenRussia’slargestindependentgascompanyNovatek,FrenchgascompanyTotal,theChinaNational PetroleumCorporation, and the Chinese Silk Road Fund. Largely due toWesternsanctionsandRussiancountersanctions,Russiahaspivotedeastwardsand fosteredrelationshipswith Asian countries, especially China. As a heavily industrialized country, China has a growinginterestinsecuringtheirenergysupply,andislookingtotheArcticforhydrocarbonsandminerals.

YamalLNGispivotaltothemaritimeeconomyoftheArcticasitisoneofthemajorsourcesofcargofrom the Arctic to China. In 2018, icebreaking LNG carriersmade landmark voyages across theNorthernSeaRoute(NSR).NovatekhasusedtheNSRsince2010,but2018markedthefirsttimeithassentanLNGcarrierfromYamaltoChinaandtoNorthernEurope(G-Captain,2018).ThismarksanewperiodforthegasindustryandeconomicgrowthforRussia’snorthernregions.NovatekplanstobuildasecondLNGprojectcalledArcticLNG-2.Itissettobecompletedby2023.SaudiArabiaisalsosettoinvest$5billioninNovatek’sfutureLNGproject.ThecombinedLNGprojectsarepredictedtorivaltheworld’sleaderQataringasproduction(Daiss,2018).

InMay2018,PresidentPutinsetanambitioustargetfortheNSR.PutinannouncedthatshippingontheNSRshouldreach80milliontonsby2024.ThisisastarkincreasefromtheRussianMinistryofNaturalResources’initialestimateof72milliontonsby2030(Staalesen,2018).Theseobjectivesarenot impossiblesincetheYamalLNGprojectaccountsforshippingmillionsoftonsofLNG.Putin’sannouncementwaspartofacollectionofgovernmentobjectivesthataimtoreducenationalpovertyandeventuallymakeRussiaintooneoftheworld’sfivebiggesteconomies.Tosupportthisobjective,itwasannouncedinNovember2018thatRussiawillinvestover$4billiontobuildanArcticportalongtheNSR(TASS,2018).

Therearealsoongoingprojectsfortheextractionofnaturalresourcessuchaspalladium,gold,nickel,andplatinumintheMurmanskregion.In2018,Russiaunveiledthefirstsea-basedfloatingnuclearpowerplant.The21,000tonstationisscheduledtobetowedtotheArcticinthesummerof2019.



Greenpeace has nicknamed it “floating Chernobyl” (Wootson, 2018). Russian ambitions for themaritimeeconomyareambitiousanditshowsinthebreadthofcollaborationsandinvestments.

Toconclude,RussianinterestsandactivitiesintheArcticaregenerallyorientedtowardsachievingdomestic economic and social development. Russia’s major economic ambitions involve energyextraction and maritime shipping. Considering these projects’ economic significance and thegeographical location of theArctic, Russia has amilitary interest to secure this region. Russia isadamantaboutsecuringitsterritoryaswellasassertingitssovereignty.

References

Claes,D.H.&Moe,A.(2014).Arcticpetroleumresourcesinaregionalandglobalperspective,GeopoliticsandSecurityintheArctic:RegionalDynamicsinaGlobalWorld.Routledge:London,p.97-120

Daiss,T.(29October2018).“$5billionSaudiLNGinvestmentplaysintoRussia’shands,”OilPriceRetrievedfromhttps://oilprice.com/energy/natural-gas/5-billion-saudi-lng-investment-plays-into-russias-hands.html

English,R.&Thvedt,A.(2018).TheArctic.RoutledgeHandbookofRussianForeignPolicy.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.

Fomichev,M.(25February2015).Shoygu:shirokiyspektrugrozRossiiformiruyetsyavArktike[Shoigu:awiderangeofthreatstoRussiaisbeingformedintheArctic]RIANovosti.Retrievedfromhttps://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150225/1049607549.html

Gazprom.(2019).Prirazlomnoyefield.Gazprom.Retrievedfromgazprom.com/projects/prirazlomnoye

G-Captain.(19July2018).RussiashipsfirstYamalLNGcargoestoChinaviaNorthernSearoute.G-Captain.Retrievedfromhttps://gcaptain.com/russia-ships-first-yamal-lng-cargoes-to-china-via-northern-sea-route

Grant,A.(24March2017).U.S.,othernationsgathertoworkonArcticissues.BostonGlobe.Retrievedfromhttps://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/03/24/joins-with-russia-and-other-nations-coast-guard-agreement-for-arctic/mVoiUgz5w5Jqwtvos1tDPI/story.html

Heininen,L.,Sergunin,A.&Yarovoy,G.(2014).RussianstrategiesintheArctic:AvoidinganewColdWar.Moscow:ValdaiDiscussionClub,.Retrievedfromhttp://www.valdaiclub.com/files/11482

Hosa,J.(28October2018)HasRussiaalreadywonthescramblefortheArctic?TheMaritimeExecutive

Jospon,B.&Milne,R.(9March2015).U.S.urgedtoassertitselfoverArctic.TheFinancialTimes.

Klare,M.(8December2013).RushingfortheArctic’sriches.TheNewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/opinion/sunday/rushing-for-the-arctics-



riches.html

Klimenko,E.(2016).Russia’sArcticsecuritypolicy:Stillquietinthehighnorth?.SIPRI,PolicyPaper45

Laruelle,M.(2014).Russia’sArcticstrategiesandthefutureofthefarnorth.Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe

Lasserre,F.&Tetu,P.L..(2016).RussianairpatrolsintheArctic:arelong-rangebomberpatrolsachallengetoCanadiansecurityandsovereignty?NorthernResearchForum

MinistryofDefenseoftheRussianFederation.(2009)OStrategiinatsional'noybezopasnostiRossiyskoyFederatsiido2020goda[OntheNationalSecurityStrategyoftheRussianFederationuntil2020].RossiyskayaGazeta,no.4912.Retrievedfromhttps://rg.ru/2009/05/19/strategia-dok.html

Peck,M.(6January2018)RussiahasaplantodominatetheArctic.TheNationalInterest

Posey,C.(September2016).TheguardatNATO’snortherngate.AirandSpace

PresidentoftheRussianFederation.(2001).OsnovygosudarstvennoypolitikiRossiyskoyFederatsiivArktike[BasicsoftheRussianFederationStatePolicyintheArctic]GovernmentoftheRussianFederation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.sci.aha.ru/econ/A111c.htm

PresidentoftheRussianFederation(2008)OsnovygosudarstvennoypolitikiRossiyskoyFederatsiivArktikenaperioddo2020godaidal'neyshuyuperspektivu[FoundationsofthestatepolicyoftheRussianFederationintheArcticfortheperioduntil2020andbeyond].RossiyskayaGazeta,no.4877.Retrievedfromhttps://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html

PresidentoftheRussianFederation.(2013)OStrategiirazvitiyaArkticheskoyzonyRossiyskoyFederatsiiiobespecheniyanatsional'noybezopasnostinaperioddo2020goda[OntheStrategyfortheDevelopmentoftheArcticZoneoftheRussianFederationandNationalSecurityforthePeriodto2020].GovernmentoftheRussianFederation.Retrievedfromhttp://government.ru/info/18360/

Sergunin,A.&Konyshev,V.(2015).RussianmilitaryactivitiesintheArctic:Myths&realities.ArcticYearbook:ArcticGovernanceandGoverning.Akureyri,Iceland:NorthernResearchForum

Staalesen,A.(14December2018).Russiapresentsagrandiose5-yearplanfortheArctic.TheBarentsObserver.Retrievedfromhttps://www.thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic-industry-and-energy/2018/12/russia-presents-grandiose-5-year-plan-arctic

Staalesen,A.(15May2018).It’sanorderfromtheKremlin:shippingonNorthernSearoutetoreach80milliontonsby2024.TheBarentsObserver.Retrievedfromhttps://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2018/05/its-order-kremlin-shipping-northern-sea-route-inccrease-80-million-tons-2024

TASS(16November2017).Putinrasschitvayet,chtotol’kosudampodflagomRFrazreshatperevozit’uglevodorodypoSMP[PutinexpectsthatonlyshipsundertheRussianflagwill



beallowedtotransporthydrocarbonsintheNSR].Retrievedfromhttp://www.tass.ru/ekonomika/4735263

TASS(28November2018).RussiancorporationeyesconstructionofanewArcticport.TASS.Retrievedfromtass.com/economy/1033248

Trenin,D.&Baev,P.(2010).TheArctic:AviewfromRussia.CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace.Washington,DC

UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense.(November2013).ArcticStrategy.Washington,DC

WootsonJr,C.(1May2018).Russiasaysitssea-basednuclearpowerplantissafe,Criticscallita‘floatingChernobyl.’TheWashingtonPost

Zysk,K.(2008).RussianMilitaryPowerandtheArctic.TheEU-RussiaCentreReview:RussianForeignPolicy,no.8,p.80-86.


Pyatkov APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 91

PART IV. HOW SHOULD THE US COUNTERACT RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE GLOBE?

Chapter 16. Potential Global Actions to Counter Provocative Russian Activities

Mr.Roman“Comrade”PyatkovHAF/A3KCHECKMATE

[email protected]

Abstract

TheUSNationalDefenseStrategy(NDS)callsoutRussianactionstoundermineNATOandmodifyEuropeanandMiddleEasternsecurityandeconomicorganizations in its favor (NationalDefenseStrategy summary, p. 2). Countering Russian provocations requires all instruments of nationalpower. TheNDS recognizes that simple fact and points out that successful competition requiresintegratingmultipleelementsofnationalpower(Mattis,2018p.4).TheNDSstates,“incompetitionshort of armed conflict, revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatoryeconomicpractices,propaganda,politicalsubversion,proxies,andthethreatoruseofmilitaryforcetochangefactsontheground”(Mattis,2018,p.5).USresponsescanbebothproactiveandreactive.Proactively,theUnitedStatescanstrengthenourallyandpartnerdemocraticsystemsofgovernance,whilereducingtheirdependenceonRussianenergythroughdiversificationofenergysources.AsduringtheColdWar,themosteffectiveantidotetopropagandaisfreepress,backedupbyresilientdemocratic institutions. To counter Russianmilitary proxies, the United States can increase thecapabilities of allies and partners. Meanwhile, Russian threats to use force can be mitigated bydemonstratingUSresolveandcapabilitytodeteranddefeatRussianaggression.IftheUSredlinesareclearlycommunicated,andbackedupbycredibleforce,escalationcanbeavoided.ThespecificRussian redlines are not as critical for the Competitive Zone actions, because due to its natureCompetitiveZoneprovocativeactivitiestakenbyRussiaaredesignedtostayawayfromopenconflict.Atthesametime,theUnitedStatesneedstogroomanewgenerationofRussiaexpertswhonotonlyunderstand Russian actions in the current context, but that have a cultural and historicalunderstandingofRussiaonwhichtobasetheirrecommendationsforfutureUSactions.TheUnitedStatesremainstheworld’smostpowerfulnation,withthelargestGDPandmostpowerfulmilitary.It has tremendous resources available throughall the instrumentsofnationalpower to confrontprovocativeRussianactions.

Introduction

The return of the Great Power competition, as articulated in the latest strategic guidance, isreinvigoratingtheUSgovernment’seffortstowardsamorecompetitiveapproachtowardsChinaandRussia.Thispaperaddresses,fromaglobalperspective,thequestionofwhatpotentialactionstheUnited States could employ proactively or in response to Russian provocative activities in theCompetitiveZone.TheNationalDefenseStrategy(NDS)laysoutthepriorityofefforttoaddresstheRussian threat. Specifically, the NDS calls out Russian actions to undermine NATO and modifyEuropeanandMiddleEasternsecurityandeconomicorganizationsinitsfavor(Mattis,2018,p.2).Whilethisisasomewhatbroadcharacterization,thespecificidentificationofRussia’sobjectivesasdescribedbelowcanfocustheUSgovernment’seffortstocounterRussianprovocativeactions.The



UnitedStatesremainstheleadingdiplomatic,economic,andmilitarypowerintheworld.Assuch,itisuniquelycapableofaddressingRussia’sprovocativeactions.

Potential Actions to Counter Russian Activities

AsarticulatedintheNDS,Russiaisfocusingitseffortsintwogeographicareas,EuropeandtheMiddleEast.WhiletheUnitesStatescannotbeeverywhere,itcanfocusitsactionstoaddressbothregions.That does notmean thatRussian actions should be ignored in other areas of theworld, such asCentralorSouthAsia.However,inthoseareastheUSactionsandresponseswillbebasedonChineseactions.Incontrast,theUnitedStateshassignificantinterestsvis-à-visRussiainbothEuropeandtheMiddleEast. InEurope,NATOistheprimarysecurityorganizationthatshapesUSsecuritypolicy.While intheMiddleEast,ourGulfpartnersrepresentasignificantresource investmenttoensureregionalstability.

CounteringRussianprovocationsrequiresall instrumentsofnationalpower.TheNDSrecognizesthatsimplefactandpointsoutthatsuccessfulcompetitionrequiresintegratingmultipleelementsofnational power (Mattis, 2018, p. 4). In order to address specific provocative actions, one has tounderstandwhatthethreatis.TheNDSstatesthatstatessuchasRussiaare:“revisionistpowersandrogueregimesareusingcorruption,predatoryeconomicpractices,propaganda,politicalsubversion,proxies,andthethreatoruseofmilitaryforcetochangefactsontheground(Mattis,2018,p.5).ThelistofprovocativeactionsarenotallencompassingbutprovidesagoodstartingpointtofocusUSresponses.

USactionscanbebothproactiveandreactive.Akeyproactiveactionisstrengtheningourallyandpartner capabilities to expose, attribute, and reduce corruption. As listed in the CorruptionPerceptions Index—with minor exceptions—the least corrupt countries in the world aredemocracies (CorruptionPerception Index, 2018). Therefore, it naturally follows that theUnitedStatesshouldfocusitsinstrumentsofpoweronstrengtheningdemocraticgovernanceinalliedandpartner nations. In Europe, it means focusing on former communist nations such as Bulgaria,Romania,Ukraine,andothers.ThepropositionismoredifficultintheMiddleEast.MostofAmerica’spartnersarenon-democraticgovernments.Therefore,thereisnotmuchtheUScandotoincreaseitsMiddleEastpartner’sresistancetocorruption.Instead,theUSmustacceptthatthesecountriesaremoresusceptibletocorruptpracticesbyadversariessuchasRussiaandbereadytomitigateanyfallout. The same goes for the rest of theworld. Democratic systems of governance present thebiggestchallengetoRussianandChineseuseofcorruptpractices.

AnotherwayRussiapresentsa challenge is in theuniquewayuses its state-ownedhydrocarboncompaniestopursuepoliticalobjectives.InEurope,thethreattoouralliesistheirdependenceorRussianoilandgas.Thatdependencecanbeproactivelymanagedbyencouragingdiversificationofenergy sources and investments in alternative energy sources. In theMiddleEast,RussiahasnosimilareconomicleverageagainstUSpartners.

In the information realm, Russian propaganda is an age-old problem. While the methods ofpropagandaRussiauseshavechangedfromSoviettimes,theproblemissimilartotheonetheUnitedStatesfacedduringtheColdWar.AsduringtheColdWar,themosteffectiveantidotetopropagandais free press, backed up by resilient democratic institutions. Reactively, the US government canexposeRussianpropagandaeffortstotheUSandalliedpublicstoeducatetheirsocietiesonspecificRussianprovocativeactions.TheadvantagefortheUnitedStatesisthatAmericancompaniessuchasGoogle,Twitter,andFacebookareattheforefrontofsocialmediawhileatthesametimearesubject



toUSoversight.ThismeansthattheUnitedStatescanuselegislativeactionstoexposeRussianactorsspreadingpropagandaonthoseplatforms.

Beyondthenon-militaryinstrumentsofpower,Russiausesbothproxiesandthethreatofforcetoachieveitsobjectives.BothoftheseactionswereclearlydemonstratedinUkrainein2014andhavecarriedovertootherplacessuchasSyria.Tocountertheseactions,bothproactiveandreactivestepscanbe taken.Proactively, theUnitedStatescan increase thecapabilitiesofalliesandpartners tocombatRussianproxiesthroughtrainingandequipmentasbeingdonenowinUkraine.Meanwhile,Russian threats to use force can be mitigated by demonstrating resolve and capability to deterRussianaggression.Concurrently,theUnitedStatesshouldcontinuetomodernizeitsconventionalforces,whileintegratinginnovativetechnologiessuchasmachinelearning,artificialintelligence,bigdataanalytics,quantumcomputing,andaugmentedrealitytomaintainUSmilitaryedge.InEurope,theUnitedStates,throughNATO,candemonstratetoRussiathatthereisawillingnessandcapabilitytoresistRussianthreats.Inconjunctionwithpartnersandallies,theUScandothesameintheMiddleEast.TheefforttocounterRussiathereislessdemandingsinceRussia’sonlycloserelationshipiswithSyria,andRussiadoesnotphysicallyborderanyUSpartnersorallies.Reactively,theUnitedStateshasusedforceagainstRussianproxiesthatthreatenedUSandalliedinterestsinSyriain2018,towhichRussiaproducednoresponse(Gibbons-Neff,2018).

TherangeofactionstheUnitedStatescantakeagainstRussianprovocativeactionsisvast.Somewillcontinueasdaytodayactivities,suchasactionstocountercorruptionandpropaganda.Others,suchas proxy engagement can be perceived as more escalatory by the Russians. However, if the USredlinesareclearlycommunicated,andbackedupbycredibleforce,escalationcanbeavoided.Someactionssuchascorruptionoreconomiccoercionmightnotbepossibletodeter,howevertheycanbemitigatedthroughproactiveactions.

Throughout the spectrumof competition, theUnited States should be cognizant of any potentialRussianredlinesthatcouldescalatethesituation.ThismustbedonethroughthelensofUSstrategy.ThespecificRussianredlinesarenotascriticalfortheCompetitiveZoneactions,becauseduebyitsnatureCompetitiveZoneprovocativeactivitiestakenbyRussiaaredesignedtostayawayfromopenconflict.OnecanassumethatattacksonRussiaproperorsupportforaregimechangeinMoscowwouldbe aRussian redline.Beyond theseobvious redlines, the rest of the competitive activitieswouldfocusonotherelementsofpowerthatshouldnotrisetothelevelofapotentialredline.

UnderpinningalloftheseeffortsistheneedforabaselineofknowledgeaboutRussiathroughouttheUSgovernment.TheSovietexpertisethatwasresidentwithindifferentUSagencieshasatrophiedfollowingthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion.FortheUnitedStates,toidentifythecorrectactionstoemployproactivelyorreactivelyagainstRussia,itneedstogroomanewgenerationofRussiaexpertswho not only understand Russian actions in the current context, but that have a cultural andhistoricalunderstandingofRussiaonwhichtobasetheirfuturerecommendations.

Evenwithoutthatbaselineofknowledge,theUnitedStatesstillhastoactbothpro-andreactively.Theworst-casescenariofortheUnitedStateswouldbetoignoreRussianactionsthatthreatenUSobjectivesworldwide,butspecificallyinEuropeandtheMiddleEast.AstheNDSstatesRussiawantstoundermineNATOandchangesecurityandeconomicrelationshipsintoitsfavor.TheUnitedStatesknowswhatRussiawants;theworstcasewouldbeallowingittohappenthroughinaction.

Conclusion



TheUnitedStatesremainstheworld’smostpowerfulnation,withthelargestGDPandmostpowerfulmilitary. It has tremendous resources available through all the instruments of national power toconfront provocative Russian actions. The range of provocative actions that Russia takes willleverageallinstrumentsofUSnationalpower.UntiltheRussianleadershipchangesitscourse,RussiawillcontinuetothreatentoUSandWesterninterests.TheUnitedStatescanandshoulduseallitscapabilities,proactivelyandreactively,inconjunctionwithalliesandpartners,toaddressRussianactivities.Thisshouldbedonewithclearpriorities,asarticulatedinthestrategicguidance,whilebeingcognizantofanyotheremergingpointsofcontention.

References

CorruptionPerceptionIndex2018.(2018).TransparencyInternational.Retrievedfromhttps://www.transparency.org/cpi2018

Gibbons-Neff,T.(2018,May24).Howa4-hourbattlebetweenRussianmercenariesandU.S.commandosunfoldedinSyria,NewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html

Mattis,J.(2018).Summaryofthe2018NationalDefenseStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaRetrievedfromhttps://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf



Chapter 17. Countering Russian Infuence in the Baltic States


[email protected]

Abstract

RussianinfluenceinEuropehappensprimarilythrough“hybridwarfare”techniques.Tocounterthis,theUnitedStatesoughttotakestepstostrengtheneconomic,politicalandsocietalliberalismacrossEurope. Economic and political liberalism both create strong states capable of providing theinstitutionsnecessaryforsocietalliberalism.Societalliberalism,whenitisupheldbytheruleoflaw,helpscreateamorediverse,yetunited,populacemorecommittedtothestate,toitsbasicinstitutions,andlesslikelytobeinfluencedbyoutsidesources(inthiscase,Russia).

Promoting Liberalism in Europe

TheUS isbestprotectedwithin theglobalcommunitywhenpoliticalandeconomic liberalizationthrive.Economicliberalization(whichevenauthoritarianregimesembrace)isnotenough.Politicalliberalizationisvital.TheUSandWesternEuropearethekeyproponentsofpoliticalliberalization.

TheUSneedstoreengagethepromotionofpoliticalandeconomicliberalization.ThesamebroadapproachtheUStookvis-à-vistheSovietUnion(promotingtheidealsofliberalismviamedia:VOA,radiofreeeurope,etc.)isthesameapproachRussiaisusingtodaywhiletheUSseemstohavebackedoffofit.Instead,Western“morals”(whichoftenhavenothingtodowithUSforeignpolicyidealsofpoliticalandeconomicliberalism)arebeingpromotedviaentertainmentmediaandprovidingfoddertoRussia’sargumentthattheyhavethehighermoralground.ByallowingUSentertainmentmediatobethesoletransferenceofwhatitmeanstobe“Western,”thenarrativefocusesalmostsolelyonsocietal liberalization. This means the US risks disregarding the basic political and economicinstitutionsthatmakesuchrightspossible.Societalliberalizationisbuiltonpoliticalandeconomicliberalization.TheUSmustpromoteinclusion,tolerance,andawidevarietyofhumanrightsacrossEurope;butdosowithoutcrossingthelineofpromotinganagendaofregimechange.Rather,theyneed to encourage political and economic liberalization among the population, and then let thepopulacedothesocietalchanging.

IfthereisonemoraltheUSoughttobepushing,itistransparency.Transparencyisakeycomponentof any functioning liberal political or economic system, and yet that is exactlywhatmanyof thecountriesinEasternEuropelack.Specifically,transparencyinUkrainewouldsignificantlyimprovethechancesofenduringdemocratizationandmarketization.

US Actions in the Competitive Zone

TheUScandotwothings:activelypromoteliberalizationandtransparency,andactivelyencouragealliestonarrowthegapsbetweentheirownsocietalidentities.TheUScouldencouragetheEUtotakeamoreactiveapproachtoliberalizationinEasternEuropecountriessuchasUkraineandtheBalkans.Economicandpoliticalstability(throughliberalization)canlimitRussia’sinfluence.Itisarealstretch,buttheEUcouldbeencouragedtoincentivizeliberalizationbyofferingmorespecificoptionsformembershipforsomeofthesecountrieswhereas,atpresent,theprospectofmembershipis not realistic (in large part because of expansion fatigue within the EU). Still, the EU can be



encouraged to do more. Promoting transparency alongside liberalization will lend credibility todemocratic institutions and processes, and to market institutions and processes. When thosesucceed,Russia’santi-Westernpropagandawilllosesomeofitsinfluence.Additionally,doingsowilllimittheanti-WesterninfluenceofRussia’spropaganda.

Second,theUSneedstoencouragesocietalhealing.ThiswouldmaketheUSsomewhathypocritical(aswe need significant societal healingwithin our own country), but societal healing, especiallywithintheBalticStates,woulddomuchtolimitRussia’sinfluencethere.ManystatesacrossEasternEuropesufferfromtensionsbetweendifferentethnic/religious/linguisticgroups.TheBalticStates,especially Estonia and Latvia, though experiencing this tension between ethnic Balts and ethnicRussians,areinapositionthatreflectssomethingofaJanus.Ontheonehand,theyarealreadyintheEUandNATO,sodon’tneedtomakeanysocietalchangestosecure institutionalsupport.Ontheotherhand,theyarealreadymembersoftheEUandNATO,sotheyareinaprimepositiontoembracethe Russian minorities while still being assured ofWestern institutional support. Specifically, ifRussians were finally afforded equal rights, the ethno-linguistic Russian population would haveconsiderably less incentive to believe Russia’s propaganda about having a moral high ground.Instead,beingtreatedequallycouldundermineRussia’sargumentsinthisregard.Forexample—andIcannotstressthisenough—iftheBalticStateswillreachouttotheirethnicRussianpopulations,invitethemtoparticipateasequalmembersofsociety,Russia’sinfluencewilldiminishsignificantly.Bymaintainingthosegaps,theymaintainandinviteRussianinfluence.

We could positively impact the situation by signaling our support for the Baltic States throughcontinuedNATOpresencetherewhilepubliclyencouragingsocietalreconciliationbetweenethnicBaltsandethnicRussians,andpubliclydiscouraging“Russian-bashing”byBalticelites.Sendasignalthatwearehappy to support themwithinWestern frameworksbutexpect them to refrain fromprovokingnegative/aggressivebehaviorfromRussia.

Strategic Implications of US Actions and Objectives

WeneedapoliticallyandeconomicallyliberalEurope.WeneedtheBalticStateswithinthatliberalEurope.But,weneedtheBalticStatestobesomethingofa“Finland”:conciliatoryandcooperativetowardRussia (evenwhilewary) insteadofprovocative. If theBaltic States continue toprovokeRussiandisfavor throughpoliciesunfriendly to ethnicRussians, and through strong anti-Russianrhetoricamongpoliticalelites,Russiahaseveryincentivetocontinuetheirrevanchistpolicies,whichjustheightenstheprospectforconflictbetweentheUSandRussia.TheUSadmittedtheBalticStatestoNATOandhastroopsintheBalticStates.Inreturn,theUShaseveryrighttoexpecttheBalticStatestorefrainfromprovocativediscourseandbehavior.

WithinEurope,theUSneedsto limitRussia’spropensitytopromotesocietaldiscord,becauseweneedasocietallystrongandvibrantEurope.IfRussiacandivideEurope,theUSispotentially leftalonepromotingtheinternationalliberalorderthathelpsusmaintainourownsecurity.WeneedEuropestrongsowecanbestrong.Andviceversa.

Russian Response to US Actions

FromaRussianperspective,anythinginvolvingthemilitarywouldbeseenasanescalation.Increasedmilitary—eveniffordefensivepurposes—willbeseenasanescalation.Adrawdownoftroops,ontheotherhand,couldbeseenasade-escalation.Unfortunately,adrawdownof troopseffectivelysignalstotheBalticStatesthattheydonotmattertotheUS.So,theUSiscurrentlycaught,verymuch,betweenarockandahardplace:increasetroopstooffermoreprotectiontotheBalticStates,andwe



risk escalating tensions with Russia; draw them down, and we risk angering the Baltic States,potentially causing them to become even more toxic towards Russia and, quite possibly, moreunwelcomingtotheirownethnicRussians.

However,iftheUSweretopubliclyencouragetheBalticStatestohealsocietalfissures,itcouldwellbesomethingofasalvetotensionswithethnicRussiansandpossiblyevenRussia.Inaddition,theoldadage“ifyoucan’tsaysomethingnice,don’tsayanythingatall”stillhassomestayingpower.TheleadersoftheBalticStatesarenotoriousforabusingRussiainnouncertainterms.ThisisespeciallytrueofLithuaniamostrecently.And,whenlookingathistory,theyhaveeveryreasontoviewRussianegatively.However,suchspeechdoesnothingtoeasetensionsbetweenRussiaandtheWest.AsitisinboththeUSandWesternEurope’sbestinteresttoimproverelationswithRussia,perhapstheUScouldactivelydiscourageopenhostilitytowardRussiaamongBalticelites.Thesamesentimentcanstillbesharedandactedonbehindcloseddoorsandthroughdiplomaticchannelswithoutthepublichumiliationassociatedwith awarofwords.AsRussia is already somewhatbacked into acornereconomicallyanddiplomatically,alreadytryingtocopewithinternationalhumiliationforthegeneral opposition to their blundering war with Ukraine, any progression in relations betweenRussiaandtheWestcouldstartwithsomethingofanolivebranchfromtheBalticStates.

Russian “Red Lines”

OfferingNATOmembership to Ukraine or (in another dimension) Belarus. These two states arepercievedintheKremlinasbeinginRussia’sshpereofinfuenceinnouncertainterms.Historicallythisistrue.Justasimportantly,Russiaclaimsareligious/moralrighttothesecountries(asexplainedinCh.1).Theseareabsoluteredlinesthat,wereNATOmembershiptobeunconditionallyofferedtoeitherofthesestates,wouldprovokefurtheractionfromRussia(alongthelines,orworse,ofwhatwe’veseeninCrimeaandeasternUkraine).Granted,NATOmembershipwasconditionallyofferedtoUkraine, but the likelihood of that happening seems very remote. The likelihood of NATOmembershipeverbeingofferedtoBelarusseemsentirelyunlikely.Regardless,theprospectofNATOmembershiphasalreadyprovokedRussia tomoveagainstUkraine, andany furtherprospectsofNATOexpansionintothesetwostateswouldprovokefurther,perhapsmoredestructive,response.

Atalesserlevel,FinnishorGeorgianNATOmembership,whilenotabsolutelyredlines,areriskyfortheUS.Finland,evenduringtheColdWar,maintainedaworking(iftense)relationshipwithRussia,butontheconditionthatFinlanddidnotjoinNATO.TherecentwarinUkraine(andannexationofCrimea) have leftmany in Finlandmore openly consideringNATOmembership. TheKremlin, inreturn,hasstated thatFinnishNATOmembershipwouldprovokesomeresponse.Georgia is inasituationsimilartoUkraine:they’vebeenoffered(rathertentatively)NATOmembership,butitlooksunlikeythattheywillaccedetomembershipanytimesoon.However,theprospectofNATOhavingmore influence inGeorgia,andespecially inAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia(whereamajorityof theinhabitantsareethnicRussian),doesnotrestatalleasywiththeKremlin.EitherofthesescenarioscouldprovokeaRussianresponse.

Potential Negative Outcomes & Worst-Case Scenarios

TheUScouldnegatively impact the situationby increasingmilitarypresence in theBalticStates,encouragingcontinuedprovocationbyBalticelites,encouragingcontinuedsocietaldiscord inthe



Baltic States, or encouraging Ukrainian/Georgian/Finnish (or, heaven forbid, Belarusian) NATOmembership.WecouldalsonegativelyimpactthesituationbydissuadingtheEUfromdoingtheirsharetopromotetheinternationalliberalorder(mostspecificallyontheirownborderstotheeast).Removingourselves,orothers,fromNATOwouldbejustasnegative.WeneedtomaintainastrongNATO.But,weneedastrongNATOwithoutmembersprovokingRussia.

Ifoneweretoimaginegraduallyworseningscenarios,wewouldseeaEuropebecomingincreasinglydivided, theBalticStates continueaggressivebehaviorswhile still expectingNATOprotection. Ineithercase,thedoorwouldbeopenforRussiatobecomemoreaggressiveintheiragendaofsecuringtheirsphereofinfluenceandlimitingUSinfluenceinEurope.Or,whilelessrealisticatpresent,wecouldimagineaRussiastartingafrozenconflictintheBalticStates.DoingsowouldrequiretheUStorespond(gettingusintosomesortofhotconflictwithRussia),orbackdown(seriouslylimitingourinfluenceacrossEuropeanddamagingourreputationontheglobalstage).

Conclusion

Asamatterofpromotinganinternationalliberalorder,theUSaseveryincentivetopromotetheirowninterestsintheBalticStates,notleastbecauseindoingsotheylimittheinfluenceofRussiaintheregion.But,thismeansthattheUSneedstoactivelypromoteNATOpresenceintheBalticRegion,while also promoting societal change. Specifically, the Baltic States need to be much moreaccommodating to their ethnic Russian populations and, so by doing, limit Russia’s influence.However,theUSneedstostopwellshortofpromotingthecontinuedspreadofNATOtootherstatesintheareasuchasUkraine,GeorgiaorFinland.


Kangas APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 99

Chapter 18. Recommended US Response to Russian Activities Across Central Asia

Dr.RogerKangasNationalDefenseUniversity,NearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudies

[email protected]

Abstract

Amongthesub-regionsoftheworld,theareaofCentralAsiaisoneofthemoredifficulttooutlineclear actions for the US, simply because of the advantages that other large powers have, due togeographicproximityandcurrentratesofeconomicandsecurityengagement.GiventhisgeopoliticalrealityinCentralAsia,theUShasalimitedroletoplay.Ifthe“toolsofengagement”areexercisedconsistentlyandclearly,theUScanhaveapositiveinfluenceintheregion.Thecountriescollectivelychafeat thatnotiontheyarepartofsome“RussianNearAbroad.”Officialsandanalysts fromtheregionrepeatedlydiscusstheneedtochoosetheirfuturepathsofengagement,whetherintermsofmulti-vectoredsecurityrelationsordiversifyingtradeandexport/importroutes.ThesesignalscanbeaddressedbyUSpoliciesandactions.TherefrainofneedingtheUStoactasa“balancer”isheardfromsuchactors,aswellasmanyintheWashington,DCthinktankcommunitythatfocusonCentralAsia.Todothis,theUSmustbeabletoshapeitsownnarrativeintheregion,combattingarathervitriolicRussianmessagethatpaintstheUSinanegativelight.

Geopolitics in Central Asia

Amongthesub-regionsoftheworld,theareaofCentralAsiaisoneofthemoredifficulttooutlineclear actions for theUS, simplybecauseof the advantages thatother largerpowershave, due togeographicproximityandcurrent ratesof economicand securityengagement.TheCentralAsianstatesofKazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,andUzbekistanhaveupto300yearsofdirectcontactwithRussia(astheRussianEmpire,theSovietUnion,andnowtheRussianFederation),withnearly70yearsofbeingpartoftheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics.Duringtheperiod1924-1991, that is, fromthenationaldelimitationof1924tothecollapseof thecountry in1991, thesestates were “Union Republics” politically, economically, and socially managed byMoscow. Since1991,eachhaschartedtheirowncourseofactioninthesefields,inadditiontoestablishingtheirownsecuritynationalstructuresandforces.

GiventhisgeopoliticalrealityinCentralAsia,theUShasalimited(orsometimesno)roletoplay.Thefive states have connectionswithRussia that are historic, institutional, and existential. AlthoughChinahasbecomethekeyeconomicactorintheregion,Russiaremainscriticalinotherareas.Itisimportant to stress that the Central Asian countries are different in terms of their capacity—economic,political,andsecurity—andhavevaryingrelationswithRussia.SomearemembersofthemultilateralorganizationsheadedbyRussia(CIS,CSTO,EurasianEconomicUnion),andothersarenot.ThreehaveRussiansecurityforcesontheirsoil,andtwodonot.TogeneralizetoomuchdistortsthepresenceofRussia in theregionand its importance.Over time, the levelofconnectivitywithRussiahasbecomemorecomplex;UzbekistanandTurkmenistanareperhapstheleast“dependent”onRussia,whileKyrgyzstanandTajikistan relyheavilyonRussian investment, opportunities forremittances from their citizens working in Russia, and security. Kazakhstan, touting its “multi-vectored”policy,engageswithRussia,butalsomakesitapointtohavefairlyrobustrelationswiththeEuropeanUnion,China,andtheUS,tonameafew.



Examining & Defining Russian Competitive Activities

Withinthisenvironment,whatwouldbecategorizedascompetitiveRussianactivities?Onecouldlook at increased pressure to host Russian troops in a given country or expanding the remit ofexistingunitstherein(TajikistanandKyrgyzstan).Economically,itcouldbepressuretoadheretoEurasian Economic Union guidelines and enhanced measures to create common markets andcurrencyguidelines,whilelimitingengagementwithnon-EurasianEconomicUnionnations.Finally,itwouldbeRussianpressuretohaveagivenstateintheregiondistanceitselffromtheUS/West,suchasnotparticipatinginUS-ledmissionsinAfghanistanornotsigningenergydealswithWesterncompaniesthatcoulddiversifyexportroutes.WhiletherehasbeenconcernraisedaboutRussiabeingmoreaggressivealong theKazakhstaniborder, it isunlikely that itwouldresort toactualkineticoperations (invasion) in the immediate future. Baring a radical shift inKazakhstan’s foreign andsecurity policy, or a crisis in the upcoming succession of PresidentNursultanNazarbayev, as hemanagesthecountry’sfuture,nothingshouldprompttheRussiangovernmenttoactinanovertlyhostilemanner.Therefore,onehastolookatthecompetitiveactionsnotedabovethatcouldforceagivenCentralAsianstatetodistanceitselffromtheUS.TheclosureoftheManasTransitCenterinKyrgyzstanin2014isagoodexampleofthis.WhiletherewaspopularsupportamongtheKyrgyzpopulationforclosingthebase,fueledlargelybyaRussian-influencedmediacampaign,theRussiangovernmentcontinuallycalledforthebase’sclosureandrepeatedlybroughtitupindiscussionswithKyrgyzofficials,asearlyas2005.Thatthedecisionwasnotmadefornearlyadecadehighlightsthevalueofthatfacility,aswellasthatoftheUSpartnership,hadfortheKyrgyzgovernment.

Conditions that Impact Russian Role

Wemustlookattheregionalanddomesticpoltical,economic,andsocialconditionsthatcouldreduceRussianinfluenceandeffectiveness.Firstofall,iftheregionremainsconflict-free,itislessofconcerntoRussia.This includes violencewithin a country (suchasKyrgyzstan in2010), or an increasedpossibility of spillover of terrorist groups emanating from Afghanistan. The latter scenario hasconsistentlybeenpartofRussianpublicstatementsonsecurityinCentralAsia.

Second,thedomesticpoliticalconditionshavetofocusonsystemicstabilitywithineachcountry.Itisnotenoughtohaveastrongleader,butsystemsthataregreaterthantheindividual.Tajikistan,forexample, relies heavily on the Rakhmon family, and Turkmenistan on the Berdymukhammedovleadership. The transition in Uzbekistan, even if not democratic, belies a certain institutionalstrengtheningthatmaybehappening“post-Karimov.”AsseenwithotherRussianneighbors,ifthepoliticaleliteandsystemarefracturedorweakened,theRussiangovernmentstandsabetterchanceofmanipulatingthatgivencountry.

Third, in terms of economic conditions, diversification and a greater independence of action arerequiredtoreduceRussianinfluenceandeffectiveness.IfaCentralAsiancountrycanparticipateinarangeof tradeandeconomicassociations,conductbusinesswithanyandall interestedpartnernations,andexportcommoditiesto,ortradegoodswithotherinterestedstates,thiswilldefactolimitRussianeconomicinfluence.Dampeningthisforthreeofthecountriesistheirmembershipinthe Eurasian Economic Union. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all have to follow theguidelines setby thisorganization,which isostensiblymanagedbyRussia.Likewise,Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan,andTajikistanallhavecitizensworkinginRussia,sendingbackremittanceswhichareimportantfortheoveralleconomicgrowthofthesecountries.TheRussiangovernment’sabilitytoallowordenysuchworkisaclear“Influence”thatishardtocounter.



Fourth, intermsofsocialconditions, the immediate issuethat isoftenraised is theroleofethnicRussianswithin the countries of Central Asia. As the protection of Russians abroad is a securityconcernarticulatedinRussiansecuritydocumentsandMr.Putin’sspeeches,oneneedstoassumethat Kazakhstan, with roughly 20 percent Russians, and Kyrgyzstan, with around five percentRussians,oughttobeconcerned.TheotherthreestateshaveminimalRussiancommunitiespresent,nearlythirtyyearsaftermassiveoutmigrationeffortstookplace.Comparedtothe1989SovietUnioncensus,thepercentageofethnicRussiansineachcountry,aswellasthetotalnumber,hasdropped.Itisanagingcommunitythatwillseethistrendcontinue,especiallyinlightofthefactthattheCentralAsianpopulationsthemselvesare increasingathealthyrates.Thatsaid, if theperceptionthattheRussiancommunityinagivencountryissomehowbeingthreatened,onecouldexpecttoseeaninitialRussianverbal reactions, leaving theoption for furtheraction.Realistically, theonlycountry thiswouldinvolvewouldbeKazakhstan.

A second “social element” needs to be recognized. While the Russian physical presence in thecountrieshasdecreased,themediaandinformationpresenceremainsfairlystrong.Itisthecasethateven news in Central Asian languages is simply a repetition of Russian-language sources, thuspresentingtheworldthroughaRussian-governmentapprovedlens.AslongaslocalmediainsistonutilizingRussiannewsfeedsandalternativesarenotasaggressivelyavailable,expecttoseethistrendcontinue.Curiously,popularsupportforstate-runmediaisdeclininginRussiaitself,especiallyasmore of the younger generation receive their news froma range of internet sources outside thegovernmentpurview.Perhapsover time, thisdiminutionofRussianmedia influencewill alsoberepeatedintheCentralAsianstates,asonlineaccesscontinuestoincreasetherein.

Defining the “Red Lines” and Worst Case Scenarios

Theescalatorymeasuresnotedabovewouldapproacha“redline”levelifcarriedoutwithoutRussianknowledgeorsupport.WeretheUStosetupamilitarybaseinCentralAsia,orhaveaCentralAsianmilitarypartnermorecloselywithUS-ledexercises,specificallyNATOones,Moscowwouldexpressanegativereaction.Otherwise,mostUSactionswouldprobablynotcrosssuchaline.

GiventhattheUSlargelyseesCentralAsiathroughtheeffortinAfghanistan,aworst-casescenarioisthattheCentralAsianstatessubmittoaRussian-controlledsecurityanddiplomaticefforttowardthatcountry,effectivelycuttingtheregionofffromSouthAsiaandbeyond.Russiansecurityrhetoricsuggestsabeltof statesaroundRussia itself,offeringabuffer fromexternal threats—nationalortransnational.Russia’ssuccessinmakingtheregionatrue“NearAbroad”wouldbedetrimentaltoUSSouthandCentralAsianpolicieswhichemphasizeCentralAsianconnectivity.

US Response to Russian Activities in Central Asia

Overall,theUScouldhave“limited”roleinrespondingtoRussiaactivitiesasit isdoubtfultheUSwoulddevotethenecessarytimeandresources.CentralAsiaisnotahighpriorityregionfortheUS,short of the Afghanistan theatre. However, it is this commitment to Afghanistan, as well as thebroader message highlighted that the US Is determined to counter revisionist regimes, that theCentralAsianregionneedstobeexamined.Thecountriescollectivelychafeatthatnotiontheyarepartofsome“RussianNearAbroad.”Officialsandanalystsfromtheregionrepeatedlydiscusstheneed to choose their future paths of engagement, whether in terms of multi-vectored securityrelationsordiversifyingtradeandexport/importroutes.TherefrainofneedingtheUStoactasa“balancer”isheardfromsuchactors,aswellasmanyintheWashington,DCthinktankcommunitythatfocusonCentralAsia.Therefore,inaratherobliqueway,thereisademandsignalfromsome



parts of the Central Asian region for the US to remain engaged, especially if Russia employscompetitiveactivitiesthatmightnotbedirectlycounteredatthistime.

TheUS’ tool kit is rather limited in its ability to respond toRussian competitive activities in theregion. The US has no permanent military presence in Central Asia, nor does it have a strongbusiness/diplomatic/civil society presence in the region as a whole. While the US maintainsembassiesinallfiveCentralAsianstates,andhasdonesosincethecountries’independencein1991,USinvestmentinthemismodestwhencomparedtowhattheUSiscurrentlydoinginotherpost-Sovietstates, letaloneregionalneighborssuchasAfghanistanandPakistan.Thatsaid,anyof theactions noted above can be countered with a consistent and clearmessaging of what is properinternationalbehaviorandwhatisnot.Thatis,ifandwhenRussiaassertsitselfbeyondwhatagivenCentral Asian state would like, the US needs to vocally support that country and refuse toacknowledgeaRussian“sphereofinfluence”inCentralAsia.TheUScanalsore-emphasizebusinessopportunitiesforAmericanfirmsandeducationalexchangesforstudentsintheregion,effortsthatweretoutedinthe1990s,butdiminishedinsubsequentyears.TheAmericanprivatesectorpresenceintheAstanaExpo2017wassupportedbytheUSembassyinKazakhstanandwasanopportunitytopositivelyportraytheUStoaKazakhaudience.Intheend,itisaboutpresentingaviablenarrativethathighlightsthestrengthsoftheUS,notalwaysfocusingonrefutingRussianfalseclaims.

Potential Russian Perceptions of US Actions

HighonthelistofUSactionsthatwouldirkRussiawouldbethereturnofUSmilitarybasesinCentralAsia, orperhaps just a strong increase in security cooperation.ThepresenceofUS troops in theregioninthe2000swas“accepted”byRussiaasitwasinthecontextofthecampaigninAfghanistanthatRussia itself vocally supported.However, since the closure of theManasTransit Center, thedrawdownofNATO/UStroopsinAfghanistan,andthecurrentdiscussionsofreconciliation/peaceprocess/withdrawalofforeignforcesinAfghanistan,theRussianpositiononnon-CSTO/SCOsecurityforces inCentralAsia is clear. Indeed, theCSTOhaswording to the effect that any foreign trooppresenceintheregionmustbeagreeabletoallCSTOmembers,effectivelygivingRussiavetopower.

AnyUS-sponsoredefforttodevelop“democraticnorms”orelectoralprocessesintheregionwouldalsobelookeduponwithgreatconcern.Again,inthe1990sandearly2000s,suchactivitieswerecommonforUSembassiesandNGOsinCentralAsia.WiththeRussian-framedperceptionof“coloredrevolutions,”particularlyinlightofthe2005overthrowofKyrgyzPresidentAskarAkayev,toseesuchUSengagementreturntotheregionwouldbeperceivedasanattempttoturnthecountriesawayfromRussiaandtowardstheWest.

Otheractionsmightnotbedirect“escalationofforce,”but“escalationofinterest”bytheUStowardCentralAsia.IncreasedvisitsofseniorUSpoliticalandmilitaryofficialsthroughtheregion,theopenexpressionofUS-backedregionalcooperativeefforts(C5+1),andpublicstatementsandUSsecuritydocumentsconnectingthefiveCentralAsianstateswithAfghanistan,andhencepartofabroaderUSregional policy are examples of this. Russia most likely would object to these, or at least raiseconcernswiththeleadersoftheCentralAsianstates.

Conclusion

Toconclude,theUShaslimitedoptionsinCentralAsia.Foryears,theUSemphasizedthattheCentralAsian states needs to createmore openpolitical systems,more diverse and accessible economicmarkets,justsocialsystemsthatrespectallcitizensregardlessofethnicity,religion,orgender,andastable and secure region that is void of violent extremist organizations. Obviously, the US-led



operations in Afghanistan imbued the American government’s perception of the region, oftenframingitinabroaderSouthandCentralAsiaregion.Since2001,asignificantpercentageofhigh-levelvisits,fundedprogramsandassistancepackages,andoverallprioritizationofefforttendedtofocusonsecuritymatters.AstheUSpresenceinAfghanistancontinuestochange,andlookstodosoevenmoreinthenearfuture,onecanexpectare-emphasisontheearlierpriorities,ifstillapplicable.

In terms of having a positive impact, the US already has a tool kit that can work—if properlyresourced.Securitycooperationefforts,modestastheyare,engagetheCentralAsiansecurityforceswith the US. Likewise, efforts of other US departments continue to build ties with the region.EmphasizingconnectivitywithAfghanistan,andbyextension,thebroaderSouthAsianregion,hasbeenamainstayofUSpolicytowardCentralAsiaandthishasfounditswayintohowthecountriesseethemselves.MeetingsandtradeagreementsbetweeneachCentralAsiancountryandAfghanistanareincreasingandimproving,alongthelinesexpressedbytheUS.Encouragingreforminacountry,ashasbeenthecasewithUzbekistanunderPresidentMirziyoyev,alsooffersapositive“carrot.”

Negative measures would include an acceptance of a Russian “sphere of influence,” first andforemost.WhenseniorUSofficialsacknowledgeRussia’sself-proclaimeddominantroleintheregion,eventothepointof“understanding”theillegalinvasionandannexationofCrimea,itisperceivedinthe region that the US has lost interest in being a global partner. Second, reducing aid andopportunities for Central Asian countries, and citizens, further alienates the region from theUS,requiringthattheylookelsewhere.PositiveperceptionsoftheUShavedroppedovertheyears,witheventslikethe2003invasionofIraq,ortheimplementationoftheso-called“Muslimban”in2017,createtheimpressionthattheUSissomehowhostiletoMuslimnations,whichincludeallfiveCentralAsianstates.Asnotedabove,giventheRussianmediainfluenceintheregion,suchactionshavebeenportrayedinanegativelight,furtherdiminishingUSobjectives.


Dyet APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 104

Chapter 19. Responding to Russian Gray Zone Activity in Central Asia

MAJAdamDyetU.S.Army,J5-PolicyUSCENTCOM

[email protected]

Abstract

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states have presented a new area ofengagementfortheUnitedStates.However,Russiamaintainsahighlevelofinfluencethroughoutthe region and seeks to bind the Central Asian states closer to itself while limiting the regionalinfluenceofoutsideactors,suchastheUnitedStatesorChina,andcreatingdifficultiesinthelevelofpenetration that canbe achieved.The region is somewhat chaotic,with significant domestic andpolitical challenges stemming from the post-ColdWar formation of national boundaries and aneclecticmixofethnic, tribal,cultural,andreligiousbackgrounds.Manybordersaredisputed,andmarkedpoliticalbordersdonotalwayscorrespondwithareasclaimedbyethnicgroups.Distrustamongstatesintheregionishigh,hinderingthepotentialforregionalcooperation.Russiamaintainsthelargestforeignmilitarypresence,andtheRussianledCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganizationisthedominantsecurityapparatus(Cooley,2012).Meanwhile,humanrights issuesanddemocraticreformsremainlowprioritiesforCentralAsianleaders.

Way Ahead

Thestrategic context inCentralAsiaandprevailing stateof affairs limit theoverall impactofUSeffortsintheregionandmakeastrongcaseforamodestapproachtocompetitionwithRussiainCentralAsia.Pendinganunexpectedevent,WesterninterestintheregionisexpectedtowaneasthewarinAfghanistandrawstoaclose.Chinacanbeexpectedtocontinueitsquestforafootholdintheregionbysignaling that it isaviableand interestedpartner—amove that canbeexpected tobereceivedfavorablybytheCentralAsianstates(Rumer,Sokolsky&Stronski,2016).

As Chinese economic investment increasingly turns into political capital and a greater securitypresence,itisincreasinglylikelythatChinaandRussiawillexperiencegreaterlevelsofcompetitionwitheachotherincomingyears(Aron,2019).Whileapragmaticrelationshipexistsbetweenthetwopowers based on shorter termmutual interests in the region and a close relationship betweenPresident Xi and President Putin, the two nations’ interests in their respective near abroadwilldivergeinthelongerterm(Stronsky&Ng,2018).

Responding to Russia in Central Asia

TheUnitedStates’roleinCentralAsiaandtheoptionsavailabletocompetewithRussiaintheregionarebothlimited.AswithinvestmentintheMiddleEast,policymakersmustcarefullyconsiderthereturnon investment inCentralAsiabefore committing excessive amountsof timeor resources.AlthoughRussianinfluenceintheregionhasdeclinedafteranegativereactioninCentralAsiatotheRussian incursion into Ukraine, the Central Asian states and Russia maintain strong historical,cultural, andethnic ties that theUnitedStates cannot readilymatch.While theUnitedStateshasinterestsinCentralAsia,theyarebroadlyappliedandconsistprimarilyofadesiretopreventthespreadofviolentextremismandweaponsofmassdestruction,preserveregionalstability,preventdominationfromaforeignpower,andpromoteeconomicaccess,growth,andthespreadofAmericanvalues. Someof thesearedirectlyalignedwithRussian interests in the region, especiallyas they



relatetocounterterrorism.However,theremaininginterestswillcontinuetoprovideopportunitiestocompetewithRussiainCentralAsia(Rumer,Sokolsky&Stronski,2016).

From a diplomatic standpoint, a continued US presence in Central Asia is essential. Diplomaticrelationships need to be cultivated within the Central Asian states, especially among thosedemonstrating the greatest potential for both economic and democratic development, such asKazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Diplomats must encourage potential reform attemptswithinCentralAsiaandcultivatepositiveincrementalchangesratherthanacuteandunrealisticones.CentralAsianstatesareawareoftheirstrategiclocationwithrespecttoRussiaandChinaandareinterestedinmaintainingfriendlydiplomatictieswiththeUnitedStatesintheinterestofbalancingtheothergreatpowers.WhenitservesUSinterests,theUnitedStatesshouldnotmissanopportunitytocapitalizeonanyoverturesthataremade.(Rumer,Sokolsky&Stronski,2016).

The prevalence of social media and a globalized network lends credence to the value of theinformationspaceasanelementofnationalpowerandaviablecountertoinaccuratemessagingandpropaganda. English language proficiency is correlated with higher levels of economic success,innovation,andsocialdevelopment.Itisthepredominantlanguageforinternationalbusiness,andnationsunderstandtheimportanceoflearningit(Muslimin2017)TheUnitedStatesshouldfocusoninformation campaigns that promote English learning and the benefits of understanding thelanguage. This maintains an interest in, and understanding of, Western and English dominantliterature, media, music, and culture, with select media venues providing a counter to RussiandisinformationandsupportingUSinterests.ThisincludeshighlightingRussianfailuresincollectingandreleasingaccurateinformationonRussiancasualtiesinSyria,asensitivetopicthatwouldportrayRussiainanegativelightinCentralAsia(Tsvetkova 2019).SimilartooptionsavailableintheMiddleEast,theUnitedStatescanamplifymessagingonRussia’shistoryofconflictwithMuslimsinaregionwithahighMuslimpopulationinCentralAsia.

CompetitionwithRussiabelowthelevelofarmedconflictinthemilitarydomainismorelimited.TheUSmilitary posture in Central Asia is almost nonexistent, and this is unlikely to change. TheUSmilitarycanpromoteUSvitalnationalinterestsbyconductinglessrestrictivesecuritycooperationprogramsinCentralAsiaandfacilitatingmilitaryequipmentsales.Theseactionsservetostrengthenpartnershipsandbuildpartnersecurityforcecapacityandcapability.Greatercapacityandcapability,inturn,reducestheriskofdominationfromaforeignpowernotfriendlytotheUSgovernmentandextendsAmericaninfluence.

Economically,theUScancontinuetofocusonexpandingsanctions,institutingexportcontrols,andimposingadditionalsecurityreviewsonRussianinvestmentsintechnologyfirms.Abroadstrategyfor containing Russia economically, such as blacklistingmajor Russian financial institutions andremovingRussiafromtheSocietyforWorldwideInterbankFinancialTelecommunicationnetwork,canalsoservetopunishRussiagloballyformalignactionsinCentralAsiaandelsewhere(Harrell,2019).While thisplaysout, theUnitedStatescanencouragegreaterbusiness investmentorgivefinancialincentivestoUSfirmsinterestedindoingbusinessinCentralAsia.

Effectiveness of Competition in Central Asia

ConditionsinCentralAsiathatwouldreduceRussianinfluenceandenhanceUScompetitiveeffortsarevaried.Whilesomepositiveconditionsdoexist,theUnitedStatesmustseriouslyconsiderthenetbenefitoftheinvestment.StrongereconomicandcommercialtiesbetweenCentralAsianstates,theUS,andEurope,coupledwithpolitical systemsor leadershippromotingdemocraticvalues, couldresultinanincreaseininfluencewieldedbytheUSandtheWestasawhole,thusyieldinggreater



opportunitiesforcompetitionwithRussia.IncreasedcooperationbetweentheCentralAsianstates,facilitatedthroughexpandedtradeagreements,greateroverallsecurityandstabilityintheregion,andpoliticalmovementstowardsdemocracywouldlikewisediminishRussia’scapabilityforregionalmanipulationandfurtherreducetheirinfluence.

Russian Red Lines

WithclearlydefinedinterestsinCentralAsia,Russia’sredlinesintheregionarealsomoreobvious.LongstandingconcernsofRussianleadershipwithregardtofeelingsofencirclement,invasion,andinstabilityareexacerbatedinCentralAsia.ThisregionisconsideredtobeRussia’snearabroad,andasignificantlossofinfluenceherewouldbeunacceptabletoRussianleadership.SeveralactionsthatcouldbeundertakenbytheUStocompetewouldincreaseRussia’sparanoiaandareclearredlines.One of these actions would be a new or expanded US posture in Central Asia, primarily theestablishmentofpermanentbaseswithintheregion.Largescalemilitaryexercises,dependingonthescenarioandnationsinvolved,couldalsobeseenasprovocativeinnature.Likewise,anyperceptionof a US attempt to promote pro-Western or pro-democracy reforms in Central Asia would bereminiscent of past “color revolutions” that Russia abhors andmay go to extra lengths to quell.Revolutionsof thiskindwereaRussian red line in thepast, andRussia’s close relationshipwithCentralAsiamakesitmorelikelytorespondtounrestthere.OutsideofUSactions,theperceptionthat Chinese economic interests in the region are beginning tomarkedly transition to a greatersecurityinterestwouldbeacauseforalarminMoscow.AChineseattempttoencroachontheRussianroleofsecurityguarantorfortheregionwouldbehighlydisconcertingforRussianleadership(Radin&Reach,2017).

Strategic Implications for US Actions

Inaworst-case,albeithighlyunlikely,scenario,overzealousorprovocativeUSactionsinCentralAsiacouldleadtoastrategicalliancebetweenRussiaandChinathatisnotcenteredonsharedideology,butratheronsharedgrievancesagainsttheUnitedStates(VanOudenaren,2019).Morelikelyworst-case scenarios for the region include Russian or outside actor-induced destabilization, or faitaccompli,whichwouldleadtoariskofRussiandomination,andtherebylimitCentralAsianstatesovereigntyandcreateRussianproxystates.Equallytroublingisacollapsescenarioorlarge-scaledestabilizingevent,suchasamassiverefugeeflownorthfromaresurgentcivilwarinAfghanistan,thatwouldallowfortheriseofanewandformidableextremistgroupcomparabletoISIS.

Ideally,USactionswouldcreateandunderpinstable,sovereign,andfunctionalCentralAsianstatesthatarefriendlytotheWestandaresupportiveofWesterninterests.Theseattributeswouldhelptoprevent the cultivation of terrorist organizations within national borders, the proliferation ofweaponsofmassdestruction,andproducegovernmentsthatpromotedemocracyandhumanrightswhilebeingresilientenoughtoresistinternalandexternalthreats.Unfortunately,thecurrentrealityis that the populace in Central Asia sees Russia as the greatest long-term investor and futureinfluencerintheregion,withChinaquicklygainingground.TheUnitedStateshasarolethatisfarmoremodest,andthisislikelytocontinue.



References

Aron,L.(2019,April04).AreRussiaandChinaReallyForminganAlliance?Retrievedfromhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance

Cooley,A.(2015,April01).TheNewGreatGameinCentralAsia.Retrievedfromhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-asia/2012-08-07/new-great-game-central-asia

Harrell,P.(2019,January03).HowtoHitRussiaWhereItHurts.Retrievedfromhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2019-01-03/how-hit-russia-where-it-hurts

Muslimin,A.(2017,December01).WhyAsianCountriesAreInvestingSoHeavilyInTheEnglishLanguage.RetrievedApril18,2019,fromhttps://www.forbes.com/sites/anismuslimin/2017/11/30/why-asian-countries-are-investing-so-heavily-in-the-english-language/#188034585e85

Radin,A.,&Reach,C.(2017).RussianViewsoftheInternationalOrder(pp.69-70,Rep.No.RR-1826-OSD).SantaMonica,CA:RAND.

Rumer,E.,Sokolsky,R.,&Stronski,P.(2016,January25).U.S.PolicyTowardCentralAsia3.0.Retrievedfromhttps://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/US-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0-pub-62556

Stronski,P.,&Ng,N.(2018,February28).CooperationandCompetition:RussiaandChinainCentralAsia,theRussianFarEast,andtheArctic.RetrievedApril15,2019,fromhttps://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/cooperation-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-and-arctic-pub-75673

Tsvetkova,M.(2019,February05).AfterdeadlySyrianbattle,evidenceofRussianlosseswasobscured.Retrievedfromhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-usa-insig/after-deadly-syrian-battle-evidence-of-russian-losses-was-obscured-idUSKCN1PU11Y

VanOudenaren,J.S.(2019,January12).America'sNightmare:TheSino-RussianEntente.Retrievedfromhttps://nationalinterest.org/feature/america’s-nightmare-sino-russian-entente-41447


Spalding APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 108

Chapter 20. Rebalancing in Europe to Reduce Russian-Chinese Ties

Dr.RobertSpaldingIIIU.S.AirForce

[email protected]

Abstract

TheUSrolewithregardtoRussiashouldbetocontinuetoengageEuropeanalliestotaketheleadfor balancing in Europe. The allies’ goal should be deterrence. At the same time, the US shouldbilaterallyengageRussiatopeelthemawayfromChina’sorbit.TheUScanworkwithRussiainwaysthat improvetheUS-Russiarelationshipwithoutdetracting fromEuropeanefforts tobalanceanddeter.ThiscanbeappliedbyengagingwithRussiainotherregionalorfunctionaldomainsthatdonotdetractfromEuropeaneffortstodeter.

US Response to Russian Influence and Activities in China

Thereare twoavenues to reduceRussian influence:1)Assist in strengthening theeconomicandpolitical institutions in the nations of Russia’s near abroad; and 2) Seek bilateral avenues ofcooperationwithRussiainregionsandfunctionsthatdonotdetractfromEuropeaneffortstodeterRussianaggression.

TheUSroleshouldbetoencourageEuropeanalliestobalanceRussianaggressioninEurope.Theirmaingoalshouldbedeterrence.Atthesametime,theUSshouldbilaterallyengageRussiatopeelthemaway fromChina’sorbit.TheUScanworkwithRussia inways that improve theUS-Russiarelationship without detracting from European efforts to balance and deter. This can beaccomplishedbyengagingwithRussiainotherregionalorfunctionaldomainsthatdonotdetractfromEuropeaneffortstodeter.

UponleavingtheIntermediate-RangeNuclearForces(INF)Treaty,theUScouldencourageEuropeanalliestointroduceintermediatemobileconventionalland-basedballisticandcruisemissiles.Theseweapons are hard to attrit, andwhen coupledwith a comprehensive C4ISR (command, control,communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) architecture can beextremelyeffective.

The other challenge for Europeans confronting Russian aggression is cyber and electromagneticpulse(EMP)attacks.TheUSshouldworkwithEuropeanalliestostrengthentelecommunicationsandelectrical infrastructure to preclude Russian preemptive attacks. The General Data ProtectionRegulation (GDPR) shouldbe followedwith actions that seek to insulateEuropean citizens fromdisinformation campaigns waged in social media. The US could encourage a strengthening oftelecommunicationsnetworkstosecureandencryptEuropeandata.

Russia’sprimarysourceofrevenueisliquifiednaturalgas(LNG)andoil.ThereshouldbeanefforttohelpdiversifyEuropeansourcesofenergywhilenotoverlyimpactingthepriceofRussianenergy.Analternate source of energy for Europe means that Russia cannot coerce Europe. However, thisalternatesourceshouldbeonethatmaintainsasmallfootprintjustshortofcompetingdirectlywithRussianenergy.RussianeffortstobuildpipelinesintoChinashouldbeforcefullydiscouraged.



Overall,themostimportantUSstrategyintheevolvingsituationwillbetodeterunwantedbehavior.OncethethresholdiscrossedthebestwaytodealwithacrisissituationwillbetouseittoisolateRussiafromtheInternationalCommunitywhilesimultaneouslyassistingthetargetedcountrywithmilitaryarms.

Russian “Red Lines” and Perception of Escalation

AnyencroachmentinRussia’snearabroadwillbeviewednegatively.Anynewmilitarydeploymentsmustbecarefullymanagedtoavoidtheappearanceofattemptedencirclement.AttemptingtofindareasofmilitarycooperationwithRussia,suchashumanitarianassistanceanddisasterrelief(HADR)outsidetheEuropeantheatercanbeameansofimprovingmilitaryrelationswithRussia.AnyconflictbetweenRussiaandacountryinitsnearabroadwillnegativelyimpactUSobjectives.

Russia’s“redlines”wouldincludenewtreatiesorotherwisepermanentUSsecurityrelationshipsinRussia’snearabroad.Dependingonthearea,USdeploymentscouldalsobeviewedasescalatory,butnotasaredline.

Diminishing the Russian-Chinese Relationship

Theweight of the effort in Europe should be centered around diminishing Russian and Chineseeconomicandinformationalinfluence.EncouragingEuropeanalliestostrengthenInternetsecurityandencryptioninordertodenyanonymitywillhelpthemcounterRussianeffortstousesocialmediatoinfluencetheircitizens.Multi-lateralexerciseswhichimprovecoordinationamongEuropeanalliesandpartnerswillhelpgrowconfidenceintheirabilitytodefendthemselves.Providinginformationon Chinese predatory lending will enable European countries to avoid China’s debt diplomacy.Constantengagementwithalliesandpartnerstoreinforcethedangersposedbyrevisioniststatesiscritical. DoD should work with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to increase the scope andeffectivenessofRadioFreeEuropeandVoiceofAmerica(VOA).Anyeconomicassistanceshouldbefocusedontelecommunicationsinfrastructureandenergydiversity.

UntiltheUScanadequatelycompeteacrossthewholeofnationunderwhatisconsideredtodayas“peacefulconditions” itwillcontinuetosee influencewaneinInternational Institutions.TheDoDshouldworkwiththeInteragencytodesignpoliciesthatdisincentivizeUScorporatebehaviorthataidsRussia andChina. For example, theUS Securities andExchangeCommission (SEC) can be apowerful force to signal US companies about the possible risk of sanctions or other potentialenforcementmeasures.Commerce’sBureauofIndustryandSecurityisanotherInteragencypartnerthat can use multi-lateral agreements like the Wassenaar Arrangement to signal potentialenforcement actions. The entity list is an effective tool for discouraging company behavior thatimpacts collective security. The requirement for placing companies on the Entity list is entirelydependentonthecharacterizationofanationalsecuritythreatasdeterminedbyDoD.

Conclusion

OverallitwillbeverydifficulttoplaceawedgebetweenRussiaandChina,butitisanecessity.RussiahasaneconomylessthanthesizeofTexas,whileChina’sistheworld’ssecondlargest.ThereforethecombinedstrengthofRussiaandChina is enough togiveRussia confidence in itsEuropeannearabroad.EuropeancountriesneedforenergyfromRussiacontinuestobethemainimpedimenttoreducingcoercion.However,itisprobablybetterinthelongruntohaveenergyflowingtoEuropefromRussiaratherthantoChina.



Russia isnotyetresponsivetoChinese intermediateballisticmissiles,but thiscouldchangeovertime.

OnesourceofpotentialfrictionbetweenRussiaandChinaistheBeltandRoadInitiative.Reinforcingthe idea to the Russians that there is the potential to lose influence in Central Asia could beaccomplishedthroughintelligencesharingregardingChineseactivities.Additionally,makingCentralAsiaandEasternEuropeancountriesawareofChineselendingpracticescouldbeuseful.

Therehavebeengreatadvancesintheareaoftargetedinfluencewhichneedtobeconsidered.Theuseofmulti-mediaandsocialnetworkscombinedwithAIcanbeapowerfulcombination.TargetingRussian operating in the near abroad as well as Russian citizens would be helpful in creatingoppositionforcontinuedcoerciveactionsinthenearabroad.ArecentNATOexercisewasusedtodemonstratethiscapabilitywhenresearcherswereabletoimpacttroopbehaviorintheexerciseviasocialmedia(Copp,2019).

References

Copp,T.(2019,February20).NATOtroopsgotcatfished&honeypottedonsocialmedia,revealingseriousvulnerabilities.MilitaryTimes.Retrievedfromhttps://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/02/20/nato-troops-got-catfished-honeypotted-and-revealed-how-vulnerable-they-are/



Chapter 21. Responding to Russian Gray Zone Activity in the Middle East

MAJAdamDyetU.S.Army,J5-PolicyUSCENTCOM

[email protected]

Abstract

Russia’sactionsintheMiddleEastaredeeplyrootedinitsstrategicculture.Moscowhasaworldviewshapedbyseveralhistoricalexperiencesofinvasionandanunderlyingfearofmilitaryencirclement.ThisculturecontinuestopermeateRussianstrategicthinkingandisexacerbatedbythebreakupoftheSovietUnion.ThisculturewasexacerbatedbytheSovietUnion’sbreakup—consideredablowtonationalpridethatledtoareassessmentofMoscow’sroleintheworld—andcontinuestopermeateRussianthinkingtoday(LantisandHowlett,2013).

Russian Strategic Calculus in the Middle East

Actions in Syria

Russia’s intervention in Syria and itsdestabilizing actions in theMiddleEast serve to expand itssphereofinfluence,posturemoreeffectively,andavoidencirclementfromorganizationslikeNATO(Kirkpatrick, 2017). Russian basing in Syria provides access to major transit routes like theMediterraneanSeaandalsohelpstoliberateRussiafromtheconstraintitfeelswithNATOcountriesfirmlypositionedalongitswesternperiphery.WithactioninSyria,RussiadisplayeditsgreatpowerstatuswhilepreservingthestatusquoandmaintainingaloyalallyintheformofBasharalAssad.ThecircumstancesoftheconflictcreatedasituationinwhichRussiabecameamajorplayerintheregionthatneededtoberecognized,areliablesecuritypartner,andastatewithsignificantequitiesandcloutinanykindofSyrianpoliticalsettlement.Russia’sstrategiccalculuswasbasedonwantingtoavoidanothersituationlikeLibya,wherenotonlyhadforeignpowersunderNATOintervened,buthadfacilitatedasituationthatwasmoredestabilizedandpronetoterroristthreatsthanithadbeenunderMuammar Gaddafi. Russia’s lingering distaste for regime change and fear of internationalterrorismmadethesituationinSyriaunacceptable,andappearasadirectthreattoRussiansecurityinterests, requiring decisive action before Western powers became involved (Sladden, Wasser,Connable,Grand-Clement,2017).

Actions with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries and Iran

RussiacontinuestomakeinroadsintotherestoftheMiddleEastinordertogarnerinfluenceandcapitalize on economic benefits. Moscow is heavily increasing the amounts of its infrastructuredevelopment,armsdeals,andenergyinvestmentinGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)countries.Therehavebeenseveralhighprofilevisitsanddiplomaticoverturescorrespondingtoincreasedbusinessdealingsandtradenegotiations(MalsinandSimmons,2019).RussiamaintainsacloserelationshipwithIranregardingmilitaryactionsinSyria,andinvestsinIranianinfrastructureandenergyaswell.TheseactionsservetopropagatethenarrativethatRussiaisastabilizingforceintheMiddleEast,asecurityguarantor,andarecognizedpowerwithsignificantinfluenceinitsnearabroad.

Way Ahead



Moscowwillcontinuetoexpandits influenceorconsolidategainswherever itperceivesa lossofrelativeinfluenceortheinvolvementofWesternpowers.MoscowviewstheMiddleEastasazero-sumgameinwhichanyperceivedorrealgainsmadebytheWestcomeatalosstoRussia.Theinversealsoholdstrue,whichexplainsMoscow’sopportunisticapproachtoEgyptinlightofitsfalling-outwiththeUnitedStatesinrecentyears.ThispatternofthinkingandbehaviorfromMoscowwilllikelycontinuewellintothefuture.Strategiccultureisaningrainedandhabitualperceptionoftheworld,reinforcedbyactionsthatotherstatestake(Gray,2006).ItwillbedifficultforRussiatochangeitsworldvieworitsactionsinthegrayzone.ThemalignactivityinwhichRussiaengagesiseffective,asdemosntratedwithitsactionsinCrimea,WesternUkraine,andtherecentUSelections,andcanbeexecutedwithoutresortingtoconventionalconflictwithWesternpowers.

Responding to Provocative Russian Actions in the Middle East

Thereareseveralways,belowthelevelofarmedconflictandwithoutcrossingRussianredlines,inwhichtheUnitedStatescouldrespondtoprovocativeRussianactions in theMiddleEast.Fromapolicystandpoint,strategiccompetitionwithRussiabelowthelevelofarmedconflictisnecessarytosecure US interests and advance American influence in the world (National Defense StrategySummary,2018).TheUnitedStateshasaroleinrespondingtoRussianactivitiesintheMiddleEasttomaintain key interests there, but the unique nature of this region limits the efficacy ofmanyoptions.ThenatureoftheMiddleEastrequirescarefulconsiderationofthereturnstheUnitedStatescancapitalizeonafter investingsignificanttimeandresources.Notallnations intheMiddleEastbehaveinawaythatreflectsthevaluesofUnitedStates.However,tokeeppotentialUSpartnershipsfromshiftingtoalessmorally-orlegally-consciouspower,theUnitedStateshastomakeconcessionsfor some behavior that would otherwise be unpalatable, like supporting Saudi Arabia’s and theUnitedArabEmirates’involvementinYemen.Policymakersshouldconsiderwhere,andhowtheywanttocompetewithRussiaintheMiddleEast,andacceptthatlongstandingdifferencesbetweentheUnitedStatesandmanystatesintheregionwillneverproduceidealresults.

Diplomatic

FocusingondiplomacywouldbeaneffectivemeanstocompetewithRussiaintheMiddleEast.Inrecentyears,RussiahasdrasticallyincreaseddiplomaticoverturesintheMiddleEastwithseveralhighprofilevisits,whiletheUnitedStateshasseveralambassadorialpostsintheregionthatarestillunfilled (Mathews,2018).Filling thesepostswithexperienceddiplomatswouldallow theUnitedStates to better counterRussiandiplomatic schemes, highlightRussian failures, and give greaterassurance to existing partners with regard to America’s commitment in the region, as well asencourageotherstoseekouttheUnitedStates.asthedesiredpartnerofchoice.DiplomaticinitiativesledbytheStateDepartmentintheMiddleEastshouldbemaintainedtoclearlyarticulateUSregionalinterests,whatpartnerscandotoassisttheUnitedStatesinachievingthoseinterests,andwhattheconsequencesof fallingshortwouldbe.Appropriately,diplomaticovertures likedeconfliction,ordiscussionswithRussiaaboutoperations inSyria,prevent situations inwhichcompetitioncouldescalatefrom“belowthelevelofarmedconflict”to“armedconflict.”Acontinuationofthesetypesofdiplomaticinitiativesshouldbeencouragedtoavoidmiscalculationandescalation.Asamajorpolicychange, theUnitedStaescouldengage insimilardeconflictionmeasuresoroffersomediplomaticovertureswith Iran.Russiaused therecentUSwithdrawal fromthe JointComprehensivePlanofActiontoestablishcloserrelationswithIran(Miles,2018).FollowingRussia’szero-sumlogic,anyinfluence the United States gains with Iran will come at the expense of Russian influence. ThecontinuoususeofpublicdiplomacyintheMiddleEastcanbeusedtopromoteAmericansoftpower.Additionally, the fact that the English language and elements of soft power, like Americanentertainment,haveahighervolumeofpenetrationintheMiddleEastthandoeithertheRussian



languageorotheraspectsofRussiansoftpowerpresentsaddiitonalopportunities.Americansoftpowerandinspirationremainverypotent intheMiddleEastandthroughouttheworld,allowingdiplomaticactivitiespromotingAmericanculture,language,andvaluestobeusedasvaluabletoolstopropelAmericaninterests(Rugh,2017).

Informational

Strategiccommunicationwillproveinvaluablefor“competitionbelowarmedconflict”intheMiddleEast.Theglobalprevalenceofsocialmedialendscredencetothevalueoftheinformationspaceasanelementofnationalpower,andtheneedtocounter inaccuratemessagingandpropaganda.Aninformationcampaigninthisregionwithproperlegalauthoritieswouldbeespeciallyworthwhile,both todiscreditRussianmessaging and toboostUS influence.TheUnited States canusemediavenues to counter Russian disinformation and promote US interests. This includes highlightingRussianindifferenceandinvolvementinhumanrightsabusesinSyria,orcollectingandreleasinginformationonRussiancasualtiesinSyria–agenerallyguardedandpoliticallysensitivetopictotheregime(Jones,2018).Additionally,theUnitedStatescanamplifymessagingonRussia’shistoryofconflictwithMuslims,suchaspastconflictinChechnya.USmessagingregardingthedefeatofRussianmercenariesinSyriaatthehandsofAmericanforcescankiewisebeamplifiedandspreadthroughouttheregion(Cook,2018).ItgivesanaccountofvastlysuperiorAmericanmilitarystrengthinaregioninwhichstrengthishighlyrespected.SuccessstoriesthathighlightthecompetenceandlethalityofUSmilitaryforcesalsoenhanceothermeansofUScompetitionwithRussialikeForeignMilitarySalesandsecuritycooperationinitiativesintheregion.

Military

TheUSmilitaryhasseveraleffectivewaystocompetewithRussia“belowthelevelofarmedconflict”intheMiddleEast.Securitycooperationprogramsarevaluableforstrengtheningpartnershipsandattracting new partners – a focal point of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. These programsprovidealevelofassurancetoexistingpartners,andservetodeveloppartnermilitarycapacityandcapability.Fromamilitarystandpoint,thisallowsregionalpartnerstobetterdefendagainstviolentextremistorganizations(VEOs)anddominationbyaforeignpowernotfriendlytotheUnitedStates.Partner cooperation alsoprovides a venue for the exportationofUS soft power, for example, bycultural exchanges and International Military Education and Training. These programs oftenfacilitatesalesofUSmilitaryequipmentinlieuofRussianequipment,andprovidetheUnitedStateswithbothpeacetimeandcontingencyaccesstobasingandinfrastructureinpartnernations.Securitycooperation programs and exercises with partners are ways to show commitment and interestbeyondwhatRussia isable todo.TheUnitedStatescurrentlyprovidesabouthalfof themilitaryhardwarefortheMiddleEast,generatingagreatdealofrevenuefortheUnitedStates(Macias,2018).OverwhelmingForeignMilitarySalesputtheUnitedStatesinamoreadvantageouspositionwhenitcomes to leveraging influence, as military sales deals often come with long-term training,maintenancecontracts,andmonitoringprovisions.WhileForeignMilitarySalesisaDepartmentofStaterunprogram,theDepartmentofDefenseisthefacilitatorandexecutorofanyagreementsmade.US military equipment is generally preferred over Russian equipment. However, the high cost,supportrequirements,andlegalandbureaucraticprocessesrequiredtoattainUSmilitaryhardwarearesometimesahinderancetobuyers.IncontrastRussianmilitaryequipmentisoftenofferedwithnostringsattachedaswellaslessrobustmaintenanceandlogisticsrequirements.



Economic

TheUSpossessesuniqueeconomictoolstocompetewithRussia intheMiddleEast.Ofthese, thealreadyactiveCounteringAmerica’sAdversariesthroughSanctionsActisthemostforcefulpieceofeconomicleverageagainstRussiaintheMiddleEast.WhileseveralMiddleEasternstatescurrentlyhavedealsinplacetobuyRussianmilitaryequipment,therehasnotbeensignificantmovementonthesedeals(Gaouette,2018).Levyingsanctions,orthethreatofsanctions,fordoingbusinesswithRussiaisbothalegitimateUSresponsetoRussianmalignactivity,andonethatmayencouragesomeMiddleEasterncountriestodefertotheUnitedStateswhenmajordealsarerequired.Notonlydoesthis have net economic benefit for theUnited States, it keeps theUS involved in the region andimpacts Russia’s bottom line. Russia has several business ventures in the Middle East, focusedprimarilyonoil,gas,andnuclearpower(Sly,2018).Theseprojectsareexpectedtobe incrediblylucrativeforRussia,butonlyifMiddleEasternstatesarefullybehindthem.TheUnitedStatescanexerciseitsdiplomaticandeconomicleverstodelaythesedealsandthreatenadditionaleconomichardship for Russia. Since Russia is already stagnating economically, this can impact Russia’sstrategiccalculus.

Russian “Redlines” and Escalation

Russia has clearly defined redlines that are either mentioned in policy documents or werehighlightedinthepastbyRussianleadership.TheseredlinesincludefurtherenlargementofNATO,threats to the current regime, loss of influence in the Russian near abroad, and actions or animbalancethatwouldvoidtheirnucleardeterrent(Delpech,2015)SomeoftheseredlineshavebeentestedandreceivedastrongRussianresponse.However,atothertimesactionsfromotherstatesthatnormally could be perceived as crossing a “redline” elicited no response from Moscow. TheseinstancesincludeColorRevolutionsthatoccurredintheearly2000s,aswellasnumerousformallySovietorEasternEuropeanstatesjoiningNATObefore2010.Sincethen,Russiahasescalatedseveraltimesasa response toperceivedviolationsof their statedredlines.ThiswasdemonstratedmosteffectivelybyrecentRussianincursionsintoGeorgia,Ukraine,andSyria(RadinandReach,2017).ThereissomerelativeinconsistencywithregardstoRussianactionsontheirclaimedredlines.ThismaybebestexplainedbypointingoutthatleaderslikePutinmaymakeopportunisticorpoliticallyfueleddecisionsbasedonperceptionsinthatmomentratherthanadecisionbeingbasedonalongtermstrategicplan(Sladden,Wasser,Connable,2017).

Strategic Implications for US Actions

Thereare strategic implications forwhat theUnitedStatesdoesordoesnotdo to competewithRussiaintheMiddleEast.Continued,calculatedactionsthattheUnitedStatestakesintheMiddleEastwillservetomaintainvitalnationalinterestsinthelongterm.KeyinterestsoftheUnitedStatesin the region includemaintaining economic and basing access, preventing terrorist groups fromattackingtheUnitedStatesorallies,andspreadingAmericaninfluence(NationalSecurityStrategy,2018).WhileitisapparentthatRussiahasincreasedinfluenceintheMiddleEast,itdoesnotappearto want hegemonic dominance (Economist, 2017). Since neither side wants armed conflict,competitionbelow the level of armed conflictwill likelypersist in the region long term, and theUnitedStatesshouldbeveryselectiveinprioritizingthetypeandlocationofcompetitionwithRussiaintheMiddleEast.ThemethodsthattheUnitedStatesusestocompeteshouldalwaysbealignedwiththe ultimate objective of preserving these vital interests, assuring stability, and achieving anequilibriumofinfluencethatfavorstheUnitedStates.PerceivedneglectbypartnersmayleadtoevenmorerelianceonanewlyaccessibleRussia,potentiallyleadingtogovernmentsintheregionshifting



tosupportRussianinterestsoverUSinterests.IntheMiddleEast,theUnitedStatescanachieveanidealscenarioifitcanmaintainafavorable,stableequilibriumwithRussia.AfavorableequilibriumfortheUnitedStatesisonethatallowsittopreserveitsvitalnationalinterestsintheregionwhileapplyingminimal resources to thatend. In theworst-case scenario, theUnitedStateswould loseinfluenceintheregiontothepointthatvitalnationalinterestswerethreatened.Alternatively,theUnitedStatescouldoverinvestintheregion,wastingresourcesoncompetitioneffortsthatdolittletoimproveitsstandingwithpartnersorthathaveasignificanteffectonRussia.

References

Cook,S.A.(2018,March16).RussiaIsintheMiddleEasttoStay.RetrievedMarch13,2019,fromhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/16/the-middle-east-needs-a-steady-boyfriend/

Delpech,T.,(2012)Nucleardeterrenceinthe21stcentury:LessonsfromtheColdWarforaneweraofstrategicpiracy(MG-1103-RC)SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,pp.131-134

Gaouette,N.(2018,February08).RussiasanctionsmayforceU.S.topunishkeyallies.RetrievedMarch14,2019,fromhttps://www.cnn.com/2018/02/08/politics/us-allies-russia-sanctions/index.html

Gray,C.(2006,October31).Outofthewilderness:Primetimeforstrategicsulture.RetrievedMarch27,2019,fromhttps://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-out.pdf

“IntheMiddleEast,Russiaisreassertingitspower.”(2017,March25).TheEconomist.RetrievedMarch14,2019,fromhttps://www.economist.com/europe/2017/03/25/in-the-middle-east-russia-is-reasserting-its-power

Kirkpatrick,D.D.(2017,December01).InsnubtoU.S.,RussiaandEgyptmovetowarddealonairbases.TheNewYorkTimes,RetrievedMarch20,2019,fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/middleeast/russia-egypt-air-bases.html

Lantis,J.andHowlett,D.(2013),StrategicCulture.InJ.Baylis,J.Wirtz,andC.Gray(Eds.),StrategyintheContemporaryWorld,4thed.,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,p.77

Macias,A.(2018,December12).LedbySaudiArabia,MiddleEasterncountriesarethebiggestbuyersofU.S.militaryequipment.RetrievedMarch20,2019,fromhttps://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/12/middle-eastern-countries-are-biggest-buyers-of-us-military-equipment.html

Malsin,J.(2019,January21).RussiaflexesitsmuscleintheMiddleEast.RetrievedMarch25,2019,fromhttps://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-flexes-its-muscle-in-the-middle-east-11548070200

Mattis,J.(2018).Summaryofthe2018NationalDefenseStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica.WashingtonDC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense.

Mathews,J.(2018,March06).RussiareplacesAmericaasthepowerplayerintheMiddleEast.RetrievedMarch21,2019,fromhttps://thehill.com/opinion/international/376929-russia-



replaces-america-as-the-power-player-in-the-middle-east

Miles,T.(2018,May04).RussiaseescloserIrantiesifU.S.exitsnucleardeal:Official.RetrievedMarch26,2019,fromhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-russia/russia-sees-closer-iran-ties-if-u-s-exits-nuclear-deal-official-idUSKBN1I516Z

Radin,A.andReach,C.Russianviewsoftheinternationalorder(RR-1826-OSD)RAND,SantaMonica,CA,pp.69-70.

Rugh,W.(2017,January10).AmericansoftpowerandpublicdiplomacyintheArabworld.”NatureNews,NaturePublishingGroup,RetrievedMarch27,2019,fromwww.nature.com/articles/palcomms2016104.

Sladden,J.,Wasser,B.,Connable,B.,andGrand-Clement,S.(2017)RussianStrategyintheMiddleEast(PE-236-C)SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorp.,p.4

Sly,L.(2018,December05).IntheMiddleEast,Russiaisback.RetrievedMarch20,2019,fromhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-the-middle-east-russia-isback/2018/12/04/e899df30-aaf1-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff902_story.html?utm_term=.a9d345faef13

TheWhiteHouse.(December2017).UnitedStatesNationalSecurityStrategy.


Siegle APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 117

Chapter 22. Recommended US Response to Russian Activities in Africa

Dr.JosephSiegleAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies,NationalDefenseUniversity

[email protected]

Abstract

RussiahassignificantlyexpandeditsengagementsinAfricainrecentyearsinresponsetoperceivedopportunitiestoaccessnaturalresources,expandweaponssales,andelevateitsgeopoliticalposturein a regionwith rapidly developing emergingmarkets and considerablepromise for growth andtrade. These engagements often take the form of propping up embattled and isolated autocraticleadersofcountriesthatarerichinnaturalresources.ThisprovidesMoscowconsiderableleveragewiththeseleadersandtheabilitytounderminepreviouslynegotiatedpoliticalsettlements,accessnatural resourcesunderopaque agreements, andweakendemocratic governance standards.TheUnited States can draw a distinction with Russia’s destabilizing role by pursuing a positiveengagement strategy in Africa. This should be coupled with an assertive policy of sanctioningindividualsandentitiesthatarefacilitatingillicitresourcediversions,deployingmercenaries,andunderminingdemocraticprocesses,whilecallingoutthelackoflegitimacyandconflictsofinterestfacing leadersthatMoscowhascompromised.TheUnitedStatesmustavoidtheColdWartrapofcompetingwithRussiafortheaffectionsofcorrupt,autocraticleadersinAfrica,however,assuchapolicywouldbedisastrousforAfricawhilenotadvancingUSinterests.

Countering the Destabilizing Fall-Out of Russia’s Pivot to Africa

Russia’s“PivottoAfrica”(Foy,Astrasheuskaya,&Pilling,2019)hasbeguntotakeshape.In2018,MoscowswoopedintoBangui,CentralAfricanRepublic(CAR)witharmsandmercenariesinordertopropuptheweakgovernmentofPresidentFaustin-ArchangeTouaderainexchangeformineralrights. A former Russian intelligence officer is now national security advisor and Moscow isconsideringopeningupamilitarybase in theCAR. In theprocess,Russiaundermined the fragilediplomatic efforts of the United Nations and France that had brought the competing factions inBangui back from years of instability toward a path to peace. Opportunistically, Russia hassimultaneouslynegotiatedforaccesstomineralrightswiththreerebelgroupscontestingTouadera’sgovernment(Plichta,2018).Meanwhile,threeRussianjournalistswhowereinvestigatingtheroleofRussianmercenariesweremurderedinatargetedkillingwhiledrivinginruralCARinJuly2018.

InSudan,Russiaprovideddiplomatic,financial,andarmssupporttothebeleagueredgovernmentofOmaral-Bashirwho,overseeingeconomicmismanagementandrapidlyrisinginflation,wasoustedinamilitarycoupinApril2019followingwidespreadproteststohis30yearsinpower.Tellingly,itwastheBashirgovernmentthathostedthealternatediplomaticprocesspromotedbyMoscowintheCAR.KhartoumhostedasimilarlyincongruousrevisedpeaceagreementamongthemainrivalactorsintheconflictofSouthSudan,whichgivenitsoilwealthisofinteresttobothSudanandRussia.

TheseepisodesrevealapatternofRussiansupportforembattledAfricanleadersofnaturalresourcerichcountries(Burger,2018).Subsequentnaturalresourceaccessagreementsarehighlyopaque.Acombinationofarms,diplomaticcover,andhelpinorchestratingelectoraloutcomeswhiletoutingadisdainforhumanrightsandtransparencystandardshaveendearedMoscowtoleadersinahostofcountriesincludingZimbabwe,Egypt,Libya,andtheDemocraticRepublicofCongo.



Russia’soutreachtoAfricaismorethanshort-termopportunism,however(Giles,2013).Moscowhasalsostrategicallypursuedmineralaccess,weaponsales,negotiatedsecuritycooperationagreements,nuclearpowerdevelopment,andtraderelationshipsinselectedcountriesinAfrica.ThishasresultedinasteadygrowthofRussia’stradewithAfricaoverthepastdecade,amountingtojustunder$20billion. Targeted countries include old Cold War partnerships, mineral-rich Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC) countries, and countries with large populations and growingmarkets(seetable).

Table 2. Targeted Russian Initiatives in Africa

Initiative KeyAfricanTargetCountries

NaturalResources Angola,Botswana,Cameroon,CentralAfricanRepublic,Egypt,Ghana,Guinea,Mozambique,Libya,Nigeria,Sudan,Zambia,Zimbabwe

ArmsSales Algeria,Angola,BurkinaFaso,Cameroon,CentralAfricaRepublic,Egypt,Ethiopia,Libya,Nigeria,Sudan,Uganda,Zambia,Zimbabwe

SecurityCooperation Angola,CentralAfricanRepublic,Egypt,Madagascar,Mozambique,Somalia,Somaliland,SouthAfrica,Sudan

Counter-Terrorism Chad,Nigeria,Somalia

NuclearPowerTechnology Angola,Egypt,Ethiopia,Namibia,Rwanda,SouthAfrica,Sudan,Zambia

HydropowerConstruction Angola,EquatorialGuinea,Namibia,Zambia

RailwayConstruction Angola,Guinea,Nigeria

Inshort,Russia’sintentionsinAfricaaremultifaceted.IncertaincircumstancesitispursuingviabletradeandinvestmentopportunitiesinAfrica(suchasforengineeringandpowergenerationprojects)asdootherexternalinterlocutors.Inthisway,Russiapresentsitselfasareliablepartnerandsupplierofneededtechnicalexpertise.RussiaishostinganAfricaleaders’summitinSochiinOctober2019andisgoingallouttoensuremaximumparticipation.Yet,inothercontexts,Russiaresemblesarogueactor, embracing pariah leaders, deployingmercenaries, bypassing arms embargos, and activelyundermining existing internationally-brokered peace agreements so as to advance Moscow’sleverage(Luhn&Nicholls,2019).Insomecases,LibyaandCARforexample,Russiaappearstobeapplying some of the lessons from its experience in Syria where support to an isolated leaderestablishes a dependency relationship that gives Russia enormous regional influence that couldprovehighlylucrative.



Respond to Russia’s Disruptive Engagements by Reinforcing the Rule of Law

Russia’svariedengagements inAfricacall foramulti-tieredpolicyresponse.Tobeclear, it is thedestabilizing elements of Russia’s actions that are most concerning, especially those that areundermining establishednormsof accountable governance and theupholdingof the rule of law.Importantly,then,theresponsefromtheUnitedStatesshouldnotbereflexivelyanti-Russian.RussiaandAfricangovernmentsmayreasonablywishtopursuecooperativepartnerships.Rather,anyfocuson curbing Russian actions in Africa should be aimed at the destabilizing activities that RussiapursuesinAfrica’sweakstatesoftenwithillegitimateleaders.

Tounderscorethisdistinction,theUnitedStatesshouldmakerespectfortheruleoflawaprominentthemeofitspolicyguidanceinAfrica.Thisthemeshouldbearecurringmessageinpublicstatementsand should steer US priorities in Africa, recognizing that this principle has not always beenconsistentlyapplied.Governmentsthatarelegitimatelyelected,respecttermlimits,andupholdtheruleoflawshouldgaingreaterdiplomatic,development,andsecuritycooperationsupportfromtheUnitedStates.DoingsoestablishesaclearandpositiveframeworktoguideUSengagementsinAfrica.ItalsoreinforcesthemessagethattheUnitedStatespursuespartnershipsonthecontinentfortheirmutuallybeneficialmerit.

SuchapolicyframeworkalsobuildsonalegacyofpositiveAmericaninitiativesthathaveenhancedstabilityandimprovedthequalityoflifeonthecontinent,includingsuchpopularprogramsastheAfrica Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief(PEPFAR),PowerAfrica,andtheMillenniumChallengeCorporation.Inaddition,theUnitedStateshas been the world leader for years in commitments of development assistance, support forpeacekeeping,foreigndirectinvestment,andexpandingaccesstoinformationandcommunicationstechnologyinAfrica.

A policy framework upholding the rule of law is not only consistentwith US values, it also hascontributedtobettergovernanceandthusgreaterstabilityandwell-beingonthecontinent.Notably,sincetheendoftheColdWar,Africa’sdemocracieshaveconsistentlyrealizedeconomicgrowththatisathirdfasterthanthenormonthecontinent,beenpartofjustafractionofconflicts,andaretargetsofhigherlevelsofforeigndirectinvestmentasinvestorsseekemergingmarketsthatarestableandrespecttheruleoflaw.

Inshort,legitimacymatters.BymakingthisanoperatingprincipleofUSengagementsinAfrica,theUnitedStateswouldbealigningitselfwiththehopeful,stable,andrules-basedfuturetowhichthevast majority of Africans aspire. Doing so can also more clearly juxtapose the extralegal anddestabilizingactionstakenbyRussia.

Raise the Costs to Russia for its Destabilizing Actions

ItisthedestabilizingelementsofRussia’sengagementsinAfricathatwarrantmostattention.Russiaisaconsistentsupporterofautocraticgovernments,opaquenaturalresourcecontracts,andarmsshipmentstoalreadyunstableregionsinAfrica.Thishasperpetuatedtheruleofrepressiveleaders,who have fostered institutional corrpution, societal disparities, long-running conflict, and recordlevelsofrefugeesandpopulationdisplacementonthecontinent.

RussiahaspersistedandexpandeditsdestabilizingactivitiesinAfricabecauseMoscowbearsfew,ifany,costsfordoingso.Itisahighbenefit-lowriskcalculation.CurbingMoscow’sbehavior,therefore,



ispredicatedon changing this calculusby increasing the costsMoscow faces for itsdestabilizingactionsinAfrica.Thesecostscantakemultipleforms.

The first is reputational.Russia’sproppingupofunpopular regimes that are resistant topower-sharing(suchasinAlgeria,SouthSudan,Sudan,andZimbabwe)shouldbepublicizedforbothAfricanand international audiences. These governments are using coercivemeans to hold on to poweragainst thewishes of their youthful populations that are demandingmore say over the nationaldecisionsaffecting their lives.Russiandiplomatic, financial, andmilitaryassistanceenables theseleaderstoremaininplace.Yet,thecostsofthesepolicies–heavy-handedgovernment,stagnantlivingconditions,elitecorruption–arebeingpaidforbyAfricancitizensthanks,inpart,toMoscow.TheRussian link to instability and exclusionary regimes needs to be conveyed to African citizens –throughmultiplechannels, includingtrustedmedia,civilsociety,andsocialmedianetworks.Thisawareness-raisingwillcreateadditionalpressureoncomplicitnationalleaderswhileestablishingareputationalcostforRussia.Beyondthecountriesinquestionthisreputationaleffectwillspillacrossborders and affectRussia’s ability to negotiate trade, investment, and security cooperationdealselsewhereonthecontinent.

Inadditiontoreputationalcosts,changingthepoliticalcalculusforRussiawillentailincreasingthefinancial costs it bears for its destabilizing actions in Africa. Those individuals or organizationsinvolved in Russia’s opaque natural resource deals on the continent should be considered forsanctions and investigation under the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) with the aim ofdenyingtheseactorsandtheirintermediaries’accesstotheUSfinancialsystem.TheUnitedStateshasbroadjurisdictioninsuchcasescoveringanytransactionthattransitsthrough,drawsonabankaccountin,orinvolvescorrespondencebasedintheUnitedStates.ImplementedbytheDepartmentof Justice and the Security andExchangesCommission, the FCPAhas previously been applied toorganizationsoperatinginRussia,Nigeria,Angola,andGhana,amongothers.

The United States should also consider applying provisions of the 2017 Countering America’sAdversariesthroughSanctionsActfordestabilizingRussianactionsinAfrica.Thelawestablishesthescope for US sanctions against any country involved in transactions with Russia’s defense andintelligencesectors.ThismayentailRussia’srelianceonprivatesecuritycontractors(suchas theWagnerGroupintheCAR)orthird-partyarmsdealers.SuchgroupsprovideRussiaameasureofplausibledeniability,however,echoingpracticesithasemployedintheUkraine.Consequently,analternativeapproachtowardthesegroupsistotreatthemasorganizedcriminalsyndicatesandapplytherelevantprotocols(especiallywithregardtotraffickinginfirearms)undertheUnitedNationsConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrimeaswellasthelegaltoolsembodiedinthe2017USPresidentialExecutiveOrderonEnforcingFederalLawwithRespecttoTransnationalCriminalOrganizations and Preventing International Trafficking. The United States and other rules-basedinternationalactorsshouldalsocontinuetosupportarmsembargosinunstablecontextswhere,attimes,illegitimateleadershaveusedviolenceagainstcivilians(e.g.DemocraticRepublicofCongo,Sudan,SouthSudan,andZimbabwe).Bysodoing,theUnitedStatescannarrowthelegalspacethatRussiacanexploittopropupthesegovernments(andmaintainitsleverage.)

Thedeploymentofmercenaries,evenifcalledadvisersandsentwiththetacitassentofanAfricanleader, contravenes the Organization for African Unity’s 1972 Convention for the Elimination ofMercenaries in Africa. In fact, Africa was one of the earliest adopters of such a ban given thedestabilizing effects that these foreign fighters have had on the continent historically. Upholdingthesenormsshouldcontinuetobeapriority.



IncreasingthecoststoRussiandecision-makersfortheirinitiativesthatunderminesuchnorms,andsecuritymoregenerally,cancreate incentives forMoscowtodialback itsdestabilizingactions inAfrica.

Increase the Costs for Russia’s African Enablers

Russiagainsleverageforthesedestabilizingactionsthroughthecomplicityofoftenunelectedandisolated African interlocutors who, lacking legitimacy, turn to Moscow for financial support ormilitary assets. In sodoing, these individualsmaybenefit politically or financially, though to thedetrimentoftheirsocietiesthatfacegreaterinstabilityandcompromisedsovereignty.AnextensionofthepolicyincreasingthecoststoRussiaforitsexploitativeactionsistosanctionAfricanindividualswhofacilitateRussia’sdestabilizingactions.Inparticular,theUnitedStatesshouldconsiderimposingtravelbansandassetfreezesonindividualsidentifiedasresponsibleforcooperatingwithMoscowonillicittransactions,actionsthatresultinhumanrightsviolationsagainsttheircitizens,oractivelyunderminedemocraticprocessesorinstitutions.

AsRussiatendstoleverageitsinfluencethroughillegitimateAfricanleaders,theUnitedStatesandotherrules-basedactorsintheregionshouldalsoselectivelyconsidernotrecognizingtheseleadersas the rightful headof state.This iswhat theUnitedStates and50other countrieshavedone inVenezuelafollowingthefraudulentelections,coerciveuseofstatesecurityforcesagainstcivilians,andgrossmisgovernancethere.Thethreatofthisactionwillhighlightthetenuousclaimofpublicauthoritytheseleaderswieldaswellastheliabilitytheirlackoflegitimacyposes.Whilenottobetakenlightlyandrequiringclearguidelines,onceestablished,thisdeterminationalsoprovidesabasisfromwhichtoobviateinternationalrecognitionofpubliccontractsthattheseleadershavesigned.Ineffect,suchadesignationwouldsignifythatthesecontractsaresignedwithindividualsratherthanstate authorities. A further effect of this action is to raise the risk premium for external actorsattemptingtogainaccesstoastate’ssovereignassetsthroughthesecompromisedindividuals.

ImplicitinthisapproachisavoidingtheimpulsetocompetewithMoscowfortheaffectionsoftheseillegitimateandunaccountableleaders.DoingsoprovidesunwarrantedleveragefortheseleaderswhocaneasilyplayRussianandAmericaninterestsoffoneanother.SuchanapproachwouldbeareplayoftheColdWaroutcomesobservedinAfricathatweremarkedbyrecordlevelsofconflictandrepressivegovernance.Inshort,theonlywinnersinsuchacompetitionaretheseillegitimateleadersthemselves.Undersuchcircumstances,itisnotevenclearthatRussia,whichmaygainaccesstosomeresourcesandasenseofprestige,comesoutahead.ThecostsofmaintainingsuchkleptocraticandunstableclientscaneasilysurpasswhatevergainsMoscowmayrealize.

Sustaining Engagements with an Emerging Africa

Givenitsemergingmarkets,naturalresourcewealth,strategiclocation,andgrowingimportanceininternationalfora,interestinAfricaisgrowingamongmultipleexternalactors,notjustRussia.Over350 new embassies and consulates have been established in Africa by a wide range of foreigngovernmentssince2010.Bybuildingon itssolid foundationofengagements inAfrica, theUnitedStatesiswell-positionedtobeapartoffurthermutuallybeneficialpartnershipsinthefuture.Todoso, however,will require sustained engagements. Such engagements can help set a bar for goodgovernance and the rule of law that has direct benefits for stability, development, and ongoinginvestment in Africa. It simultaneously provides a clear juxtaposition with destabilizing actionsundertakenbyRussia.ThisalsoshiftsthebasisofcompetitiontothearenaofgoodgovernanceonwhichMoscowdoesnothaveanappealingmodelandawayfromthepracticesofopaquecontractingandproppingupofauthoritariangovernmentsinwhichRussiahastheadvantage.



References

Burger,J.(2018,November).TheReturnofRussiatoAfrica.TheNewAfrican,pp.14-21.

Foy,H.,Astrasheuskaya,N.,&Pilling,J.(2019,January22).Russia:VladmirPutin'sPivottoAfrica.TheFinancialTimes.

Giles,K.(2013).RussianInterestsinSub-SaharanAfrica.Carlisle,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute.

Luhn,A.,&Nicholls,D.(2019,March3).RussianMercenariesBackLibyanRebelLeaderasMoscowSeeksInfluenceinAfrica.TheTelegraph.

Plichta,M.(2018,November28).FranceandRussiaFiddleWhiletheCentralAfricanRepublicBurns.WorldPoliticsReview.


KovenandKamp APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 123

Chapter 23. Weaponizing Peace: Colombia’s Demobilized FARC as a Lever of Russian Influence

Dr.BarnettS.KovenandMs.AbigailC.KampNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)

[email protected]|[email protected]

Abstract

Russia has routinely engaged in operations in the gray zone—the space between overtmilitaryconflict and normal peacetime competition—in furtherance of its revisionist aims. While theseactions have been most readily apparent in Russia’s near abroad, their reach is in fact global.Nonetheless,thewaysinwhichRussiaexertsitselfinareasfartherafield,whereitcannoteffectivelyproject military force and/or leverage ethnically Russian local populations, are distinct. ThiscontributionbeginsbyexplainingwhyRussiawouldbeinterestedininterveninginColombia,givenits extremely close security and economic relationswith theUS, aswell as its desire to retaliateagainsttheUSforitsperceivedmeddlinginRussia’straditionalsphereofinfluence(e.g.Ukraine).Itthen examines howRussiamay shift from tacitly supporting Colombia’s FARC insurgents on thebattlefieldtoexploitingfissuresrelatingtothepeaceprocessattheballotbox.

Introduction

Inrecentyears,Russiahasroutinelyengagedinoperations inthegrayzone–thespacebetweenovertmilitaryconflictandnormalpeacetimecompetition– in furtheranceof itsrevisionistaims.TheseactionshavebeenmostreadilyapparentinRussia’snearabroad.Forexample,in2014,RussiaskillfullyleveragedallelementsofnationalpowertoquicklyannexCrimea,whilealsoengaginginaless well executed campaign in Donbas, eastern Ukraine (Vasilyeva, 2018). Nevertheless, theseactivities are not limited to Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. For example, Russia alsoattempted to sway public opinion and otherwise influence the outcome of pivotal electionsthroughoutWestern European and North American democracies. These attempts have includedattempts to compromise electronic voting systems, as well as sophisticated disinformationcampaigns(DiResta,etal.,2018).

ElectoralmeddlingoffersRussiaaninexpensivewaytoeffectivelyimposeasymmetriccostsinpartsoftheworldwhereRussiacannota)effectivelyprojectmilitaryforceorb)leveragethesupportoflargeethnicallyRussianandpotentiallysupportivelocalpopulations.Indeed,Russia’sdisinformationcampaigntoinfluencethe2016USpresidentialelectionclearlyexplicatesthispoint.Irrespectiveofif(ortowhatextent)Russianeffortsswayedtheoutcomeoftheelection,theyundoubtedlyhad(andcontinuetohave)astrongpsychologicalimpactonAmericanvotersandhavegeneratedsignificantpoliticalcontroversy(DiResta,etal.,2018).

BeyondtargetingtheUSandWesternEuropeandemocracies,RussiahasstrongincentivestopursuesimilarcampaignsinLatinAmerica.ByassertingitspresenceinahistoricallyUS-dominatedarea,Russia’sinfluencecampaignsfitintoitsoverallstrategyofreducingAmerica’sglobalinfluenceandcreatingamoremultipolarinternationalparadigm.Indeed,theformerCommanderofUSSouthernCommand,GeneralJohnKelly(2015)testifiedbeforeCongress,thatRussiais“attempt[ing]toerodeUSleadershipandchallengeUSinfluenceintheWesternHemisphere”(p.8-9).ItmayalsobethecasethatRussiaisincentivizedtomeddleinLatinAmericanaffairsasretributionforUSinvolvementinEastern Europe, and particularly in Ukraine. To this end, the Director General of the Russian



InternationalAffairsCouncil,AndreyKortunov,recentlystated,“thatifyoumessinourbackyard,youshouldkeepinmindthatwecanmessinyourbackyardaswell”(“OnGPS,”2019).

Wehave also already seenRussian efforts to influence the outcomesofMexico’s 2018 elections.Mexico’s2018electionwasoneofthelargestelectionsinMexicanhistory,withover3,400positionsopenatthefederal,stateandlocallevels(Ngo,2018).Inthepresidentialrace,theRussiancampaignfavoredAndrésManuelLópezObrador–commonlyknownbyhisinitials,AMLO–aleftistcandidatewhomadecommentsperceivedasanti-Americanduringtheprimary.USofficialsraisedconcernsabout the potential for disinformation and hacking of the election by nefarious actors. FormerNationalSecurityAdvisor,LieutenantGeneralH.R.McMasterisquotedasstating,“we’veseenthisreallysophisticatedefforttopolarizedemocraticsocieties…You’veseenactuallyinitialsignsofitintheMexicanpresidentialcampaignalready”(Richardson,2018).Intherun-uptotheelection,botsand trolls circulateddisinformation– suchas the rumor thatMexican citizenswouldhave to re-registertovoteintheelections–onsocialmedianetworks.Russianmedia,suchasRT,ranextensivecontent thatwashighly favorable forAMLO in themonthspreceding the election (Ghitis, 2018).WhileAMLOwonthepresidencybya30-pointmargin,thisoutcomewaslikelymoreareflectionofvoters’discontentwithrecordlevelsofviolenceandcorruptionversusRussianmeddling(RibandoSeelkeandGracia,2018;Ngo,2018).Nevertheless,MexicowasanextremelylogicaltargetforRussiagiventhatit istheUS’ssecond-largestexportmarket,third-largesttradingpartner,andoneof itsmostimportantregionalsecuritypartners,tosaynothingoftheborderthatthetwostatesshare.ShouldweexpectsimilarmeddlinginColombia?

Colombia

SincethestartofPlanColombiain1999,theUSandColombiahavemaintainedanexceedinglyclosepartnership. Indeed, Colombia is considered the hallmark of US efforts to build partner capacity(Ramsey,2009).SomuchsothattheUShasleveragedColombiantrainersandColombianfacilitiesto build partner capacity in dozens of third countries, a process known as triangulated securitycooperation(Tickner,2014,p.1).Moreover,theUSandColombiamaintaincloseeconomicties.

Consequently, it isnotsurprisingthatRussiahashistoricallytriedtoexert influenceinColombia.Previously, Russia pursued influence in Colombia through at least tacit, indirect support to theRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia;FARC).TheFARCemergedin1964androsetobecomeColombia’slargestMarxist-Leninistinsurgency.Atitsheight,theFARCnumberedjustunder21,000armedcombatantsandcontrolledapproximately40 percent of Colombian territory – an area roughly the size of Switzerland (McCaughan, 2001;UniversidadMilitarNuevaGranada,2010).RussianarmsdealersprovidedextensivesupporttotheFARC.Indeed,perhapstheworld’smostfamousarmsdealer,ViktorAnatolyevichBout,wasarrestedaspartofaUSDrugEnforcementAgencyundercoveroperationlaunchedafterlearningthattheFARCwas seeking to acquire Russian made surface-to-air missiles (Falconer, 2008). Following theoperation,RussianForeignMinister,SergeiLavrovpubliclyintervenedtodeclareBout’sinnocenceandtoattempttopreventhisextraditiontotheUS.Boutwaspreviouslyinvolvedinahighprofilecase wherein Peruvian military aircraft were used to airdrop 10,000 Kalashnikov’s into FARCcontrolledterritoryintheColombianjungle(Graham,2011).

UnfortunatelyforRussia,continuingto–atleasttacitlysupport–armingtheFARCisnolongeranoption.In2016,afteryearsoftryingnegotiations,theFARCandthegovernmentofColombiareachedapeaceagreement.Thatsaid,thepeacedealhasgeneratedfissuresinColombianpolitics,whichcanbeeasilyexploitedbyRussiandisinformationcampaigns.First,thepublicreferendumonthepeaceaccordfailedbyarazorthinmargin(49.8%infavor,50.2%opposed).Thiswasprincipallydueto



concernsregardingtheextremelyweaknatureof thetransitional justiceregimeandthe fact thatformer FARC fighterswould not only be allowed to run for political office, butwould in fact beguaranteed seats in Colombia’s congress (Koven, 2016). The formerCommandingGeneral of thePeruvianArmy,OttoGuibovich,whohasstudiedtheissueclosely,pontificatedthattheFARChadmanaged to reverseClausewitz’ oft citedquote that “war is the continuation of politics by othermeans,” noting that “politicswould be the continuation of their [the FARC’s]war through othermeansthatbeginwithcongressmenanddelegatesintheparliament”(O.Guibovich,interviewwithauthor, October, 17, 2016). A minimally revised agreement was ultimately ratified not by theColombianpeoplebutbythelegislatureandsupremecourt.

The divisive nature of the peace process affords Russia three avenues for continued leverage inColombia.First,electoralmeddlinginsupportoftheFARC’spoliticalambitions.Indeed,formerUSdefenseofficialssuggestedthatRussiadidattempttomeddleinColombia’s2018elections.Moreover,inJanuary2018,then-Colombianpresident,JuanManuelSantosstatedthatColombiawaspreparingfor cyberattacks from abroad related to the elections (El Colombiano, 2018). Before theCongressionalelectionsinMarch2018,ColombianDefenseMinisterLuisCarlosVillegasannouncedthat four cyberattacks aimed to shut down Colombia’s National Voter Registry (DW, 2018).Colombianintelligenceagenciesalsodocumentedalmost60,000attacksagainsttheNationalCivilRegistryWebsite, the agency responsible for identifying and issuing identification documents toColombiancitizens.

AnotherpotentialavenueforprovidingelectoralsupporttotheFARCismisinformation.Tothisend,RussiaTodayenEspañol(RT)launchedin2009andSputnikmedialaunchedaSpanishchannelin2014. One source estimates that RT and Sputnik have region-widemedia penetration (Fonseca,2018).Forexample,RTalonemaintainsagreementswithwellover300cableTVprovidersintheregion(ibid.;Farah&EustaciaReyes,2016).

Second,andrelatedly,eveniftheaimisnotspecificallytoadvancethepoliticalplightoftheFARC,thedivisivenatureofthepeaceprocesscontinuestobeakeycampaignissue.RussiancanuseitsmediapenetrationandsocialmediapresencefordisinformationcampaignsdesignedtokeepthesedivisivenarrativesattheforefrontduringfutureColombianelections.

Third,thenewadministrationofPresidentIvánDuquevowedthatitwouldmodifythepeacedeal.Whetherornotitisabletodosoremainstobeseen,butevenslow-rollingimplementation–whichis certainly possible – could undermine the agreement (Felbab-Brown, 2018). Doing so wouldincentivizethousandsofformerFARCfighterstoagaintakeuparms.ItisalreadythecasethattheFARC’s 1st Front vowed not to demobilize and to continue the fight (Koven, 2016). In addition,Colombia’s last remaining leftist insurgency, theNationalLiberationArmy(EjércitodeLiberaciónNacionalorELN),aswellastransnationalcriminalorganizations,suchastheFirstCapitalCommandareeagertowelcomeformerFARCguerrillasintotheirranks.Ifthepeacefailsdramatically,RussiacouldalwaysreturntotacitlysupportingtheprovisionofweaponsandothermaterialsupporttoColombiansubversives.

Options for US Response

RecognizingthatRussiahasstrongincentivestocontinuetoleveragetheColombianpeaceprocesstointerveneinColombiandomesticpolitics,whatavenuesexistforaUSresponse?Intheshort-term,USpolicymakersshouldbealerttotheimpactofpotentialdisinformationcampaignsonnationswithclose, polarized elections, like Colombia. Russia may try to manipulate the media environment,particularly socialmedia, and hack into election systems if possible. Depending on the country-



specificcontext,theUScouldoffertoshareinformationaboutpotentialcyberthreatsandprovidetechnical assistance to secure information infrastructure. In this case, given the close securitycooperationbetween theUSandColombia, this is especially likely tobeanoption.The threatofdisinformation on social and traditional media networks is more insidious. The best long-termstrategy against disinformation is to foster robust traditional media and credible governmentorganizationsthathavetheauthoritytodebunkdisinformationthatspreadsonsocialmedia.

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Semple,K.&Franco,M.(2018,May01).BotsandTrollsElbowIntoMexico’sCrowdedElectoralField.NewYorkTimes.Retrievedfrom



https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/world/americas/mexico-election-fake-news.html

Tickner,A.(2014).Colombia,theUnitedStates,andSecurityCooperationbyProxy.WashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica.Retrievedfromhttps://www.wola.org/analysis/colombia-the-united-states-and-security-cooperation-by-proxy/

UniversidadMilitarNuevaGranada,InstitutodeEstudiosGeoestratégicosyAsuntosPolíticos.(2010,September01).“Evaluacióndelapolíticadedefensayseguridaddemocrática,2002–2010.”

Vasilyeva,N.(2018,November26).Russia'sconflictwithUkraine:Anexplainer.MilitaryTimes.Retrievedfromhttps://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/11/26/russias-conflict-with-ukraine-an-explainer/

Zissis,C.(2018,June27).PollTrack:Mexico’s2018PresidentialElection.AmericasSociety/CounciloftheAmericas.Retrievedfromhttps://www.as-coa.org/articles/poll-tracker-mexicos-2018-presidential-election


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PART V. WHAT CAPABILITIES DOES THE US NEED TO EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES?

Chapter 24. Defining the Competitive Zone to Aid Identification of Critical Capabilities

Dr.BelindaBraggNSI,Inc.

[email protected]

Abstract

ThischaptersummarizesthefindingsfromanearlierSMAeffortfocusedongrayzoneconflicts.Oneoftheinitialconclusionsofthisprojectwastheimportanceofestablishingaconsensusdefinitionofthegray(orcompetitive)zone,beforemovingontoexaminationofindicatorsandwarning(I&W)andcapabilities.Withoutasharedoperationaldefinitionoftheproblemspace,coordinationbetweenthe varied groupsworking this problem, and the development of doctrine is not possible.WhenconsideringthecapabilitiestheUSrequirestorespondeffectivelytoactionsinthecompetitivezone,many of the teams highlighted the central role of populations in the success or failure of grayactivitiesandstrategies.Theysuggestthatsuccessinthegrayzonehingesontheabilitytoinfluencepopulations, and state and non-state actors, andminimze the influence of actors inimical to USinterests. Consequently, a better understanding of the human / cognitive domain, enabling thecreationofeffectivenarratives,isidentifiedascriticaltoUSsuccess.

Responding to Russian Gray Zone Activities

In2016,UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand(USSOCOM)requestedaStrategicMultilayerAssessmenteffort“todeterminehowtheUSGovernment(USG)canidentify,diagnose,andassessindirectstrategies,anddevelopresponseoptionsagainstassociatedtypesofgrayzoneconflicts.”Thispiecesummarizesthefindingsfromthatproject8thattouchonthecapabilitiestheUSneedstorespondeffectivelytograyzoneactivities.Tosetthesefindingsincontext,however,wemustfirstbrieflyconsiderbothhowgrayzonewasdefined,andwhatmotivatesactorssuchasRussiatooperateinit.

Why Defining the Gray (Competitive) Zone Matters

WecannotadvanceourunderstandingofgrayzonechallengesifwecannotintegratetheworkthatisgoingonacrossthevariouscommandsandDoDoffices.Thisrequiresacarefullycraftedandwidelyaccepteddefinitionofwhatisin,andwhatisout,ofthegrayzone.DevelopingearlyI&Walsorequiresthevariousgroupsworkingthisproblemtosystematicallyandconsistentlymeasuregrayactivitiesagainstasharedoperationaldefinition.Finally,doctrinedevelopedtoaddressgrayzonechallengeswill be most effective if it is based on a consistent definition. Before the question of necessary

8IndividualteamreportsandtheintegrationreportforSMA’s“GrayZoneConflicts,Challenges,andOpportunities:AMulti-AgencyDeepDiveAssessment”canbefoundontheSMApublicationspage.



capabilitiescanbeaddressed,therefore,aconsensusdefinitionofthegrayzone,specificenoughtoguidefurtherworkinthisarea,isrequired.

TheSMAteamdefinitionofthegrayzone,ofgrayzonestrategiesandgrayzoneactivities(above)focusesonclearlyarticulatingtheupperandlowerthresholdsofthegrayzone.Thatis,thethresholdbeyondwhichsteadystateoracceptablecompetitionbecomesagrayzoneaction,andthepointorconditionsthatsignalthatgrayactionshavecrossedoverintodirectmilitaryconflict.Distinguishingbetweengrayactionsandgraystrategieswasshowninworkfromthisefforttobecriticalbothinidentifyingandrespondingtograyzonechallenges.

GrayZoneActivityAn adversary's purposeful use of single ormultiple elements of power to achieve security objectives byway ofactivitiesthataretypicallyambiguousorcloudattribution,andexceedthethresholdofordinarycompetition,yetintentionallyfallbelowthelevelofopenwarfare.

In most cases, once significant, attributable coercive force has been used, the activities are no longerconsideredtobeinthegrayzonebuthavetransitionedintotherealmoftraditionalwarfare.While gray zone activities may involve non-security domains and elements of national power, they areactivitiestakenbyanactorforthepurposeofgainingsomebroadlydefinedsecurityadvantageoveranother.

GrayZoneStrategiesAseriesofactionsbyastateornon-stateactorthatchallengeorviolateinternationalcustoms,norms,andlawsforthepurposeofpursuingoneormorebroadly-definednationalsecurityinterestswithoutprovokingdirectmilitaryresponse.Grayzonestrategiescanoccurinthreewaysrelativetointernationalrulesandnorms.Theycan:

Challenge common understandings, conventions, and international norms while stopping short of clearviolationsof international law(e.g.,muchofChina'suseof theChineseCoastGuardandChineseMaritimeMilitia);Employviolationsofbothinternationalnormsandlawsinwaysintendedtoavoidthepenaltiesassociatedwithlegalviolations(e.g.,RussianactivitiesinCrimea);orConsistofstatesusingviolentextremistorganizations(VEOs)andnon-stateactorsasproxiesinanefforttointegrateelementsofpowertoadvanceparticularsecurityinterests.

NatureoftheGrayZoneThegray zone is a conceptual spacebetweenpeaceandwar,whereactivitiesare typicallyambiguousor cloudattributionandexceedthethresholdofordinarycompetitionyetintentionallyfallbelowtheleveloflarge-scaledirectmilitaryconflict.

Figure 2: SMA Gray Zone Definition



Why Is Russia “Going Gray”?

Wecannotassumethatallpowerfulstatesaresatisfiedwiththestatusquo.Theuseofgrayactionsandstrategiescanbetakenasasignalthatanactorisdissatisfiedwithanaspectoftheinternationalsystemthatthosenormsreflectandsupport.Normsandnormsviolationsemergeascentraltohowweconceptualizethegrayzone,andwhyweseemtofindtheseactionsandstrategiessoresistanttoUScurrentdeterrentandresponsestrategies.Russiahasshownthroughmilitaryactionsin Ukraine and Crimea, and wider political influenceoperations, itswillingness toopenly flout international rulesandnormstoachieve itsstrategicgoals. Inother instances ithas challenged the assumed universality of internationalnormssupportingcivilrightsandlibertiesandpositioneditselfasthechampionofruleoflaw.SuchwasthecasewithRussia’scriticism of US support for the Arab Spring and other pro-democracy social movements, andevocationofsovereignlegitimacyinitssupportoftheAssedRegimeinSyria.

TotheextentthatexistinginternationalnormsreflecttheinterestsoftheUSandWesternEuropeanstates,violationsofthesenormscouldsignalintenttodecreaseUSinfluenceovertheactionsofotherstateandnon-stateactors.Indeed,Russiaseemstobeinterestedinestablishinganentirelydifferentsetofrulesofthegame9.Inadditiontoawillingnesstounequivocallyviolateexistinginternationalrulesandnorms,Russiahasattemptedtoestablishalternativeinternationalinstitutions,especiallyeconomic,tocounterthedominanceofexistingWesterninstitutions,suchastheEuropeanUnion.

How Should the US Respond?

TheSMAprojectteamsidentifiedseveralfactorsthatcancontributetoeffectiveUSresponsetograystrategiesandactivities.

Determine Intent to Avoid Unintended Consequences

Understandingwhyactorsareviolatingnorms(e.g.,boundarytesting,systembreakage)reducestheprobabilityofunintendedescalationandinformsthedevelopmentofdeterrentmeasures.Intentandattributionareinherentlyproblematicinthegrayzone.However,mistakenlyattributingaggressiveintentwhen an action is taken in ignorance of the consequences, or in self-defense,may lead tointerpreting an action incorrectly as gray and thus potentially threatening. A response based onfaultyinterpretationmaybeperceivedasaggressiveaswellasunprovokedandincreasetensionsandtheprobabilityofunwantedescalation.Conversely,interpretingasbenignanactionthatisinfactpartofagraystrategyrisksmissingthewindowofopportunityforderailingthatstrategybeforeitbecomesadonedeal.

Stay Engaged and Respond Early

Inactioninthefaceoflow-levelgrayactionscan,overtime,createa“newreality”thatthreatensUSinterestsandsecurity.Atthatpoint,reversiontothestatusquoantewilllikelyrequiremuchgreater,andmorecostlyactions,andmaynotbepossiblewithouttheuseofmilitaryforce.PartofthereasonRussiaischoosingtooperateinthegrayzoneisitsperceptionthattheUSwillnotrespondtolower 9MoredetaileddiscussionofRussia’sworldviewandattitudetowardtheUSandthewestcanalsobefoundinthe2016SMAprojectDriversofConflictandConvergenceinEurasiaintheNext5-25YearsIntegrationReportandteamreports.

"[W]ehaveRussiaasacompetitorthatiswilling,anddid,breakinternationallaw,"...and"IthinkRussiawillcontinuetopressagainsttheinternationalnorms.”Gen.CurtisM.Scaparrotti,commanderofUSEUCOMandSupremeAlliedCommanderofNATOAlliedCommandOperations,March2017,HouseArmedServicesCommittee



levelactionsforfearoftriggeringescalation.USfailuretodevelopearly,effectiveresponseoptionsreinforcesthisperception.Anenduring,proactivepresenceandconsistentmessagingacrossallUSGagencies is a significantly superior approach to taking select actions in response to Russianaggression.Thisapproachwouldbeaidedby theDoDexpanding itsdefinitionsofmaneuverandobjectivestobetteraccountforthehumanaspectsofmilitaryoperations.

What Capabilities Does the US Need?

Engagment with population across multiple arenas(economic, political, media and others) is a definingcharacteristic of many gray actions and all graystrategies. Gray zone actors are consistently engagingwith populationswithin and outside their borders, ineffortstoeffectivelysetthenarrativeforboththeirownactionsandmotivations,andthoseoftheUS.UnlessanduntiltheUSdoesthesame,itwillbeatadisadvantagein

addressinggrayzonechallenges.Acrossall aspectsof grayzone identificationand response,onecentralthemeemergesfromtheworkdoneforthisproject:TheUSneedstothinkmorebroadlyanddeepenourunderstandingofthehuman/cognitivedomain.Wecannotaffordtoignorepopulations,orengagewiththemonlyonceacrisishaserupted.

AricherunderstandingoftheoperationalenvironmentprovidestheessentialcontextforidentifyingthoseactorsthatarelikelytoengageinbehaviortheUSconsiderstobegray,andapotentialthreatto US and/or partner nation interests. Understanding the drivers and buffers of stabilitywithinspecific regionsandcountriescanhelpanalystsandplanners identifyactors thatare likely tobevulnerabletoanotheractor’sgrayactionsandstrategies.Itcanalsohelpidentifytheactorstheyarevulnerable to in specificareas (e.g.domesticpoliticalinfluence by Russia, oreconomic pressure orrewardfromChina).ForanyresponseordeterrentactiontakenbytheUSandpartnernations to be effective, wealso need to be able toanticipate with greateraccuracy the likelypopulation response (at thegrouplevel,notjustthestatelevel)toouractions.Figure2highlights the aspects of thegrayzoneonwhichtheSMAteam analyses indicated theUSandpartnernationsshouldbuildunderstanding.Italsoshowstheareasinwhichtheanalysessuggest theUSshould furtherdevelop inorderto improvebothI&Wandresponsestograyzonechallenges.

Intoday'sinformationage,wemustrecognizethattheessentialkeyterrainisthewillofahostnation'spopulation...[This]permitsustogainthetrustofskepticalpopulations,thusfrustratingtheenemy’seffortsandsuffocatingtheirideology.”

GenJ.N.Mattis,USMC,ForewordtoOperationalCulturefortheWarfighter:PrinciplesandApplications2008

Figure 3: US Capability Gaps for Addressing Gray (Competitive) Zone Challenges



Deeper Understanding of the Human/Cognitive Domain

Whenconsideringcapabilitiesinthecontextofgrayzonechallenges,weneedtothinkfirstintermsof information. Information provides a richer understanding of the operating environment andemphasizesthehuman/cognitivedomain.Specifically,theUSmust:

• Broaden its understanding of the strategic and operational environments to betterincorporatethehuman/cognitivedomain

• Considerthenon-militaryarenasandnon-statelevel(seeFigure2)ofthegrayzonewhendeveloping I&W, and deterrence and responseoptions

• Thinkbeyondpurelykineticresponsesanddevelopways to shape the international environment toreducethemotivationforactorstoengageingrayactivities in the first place. This will requireaddressingthebroadquestionofthesustainabilityof a global system built on norms that are notimplicitlyacceptedbyallmajorpowers

• Buildtrustandcredibilitywithpartnernationstoenablegreatercoordinationofeffort incollectivegrayzonedeterrenceandresponseactivities,aswellasearlierI&Worgrayzoneactivityagainstvulnerablepartners

• Narrativesarenottheonlytoolforbuildinginfluence.Exploreother(non-military)leversofpowertheUScanusetoincreaseitsinfluencewithoutviolatingorundermininginternationalnorms

Develop Clear and Compelling Strategic Narratives

• TheUSlacksacompelling“story”topresentasacountertocompetingnarratives.WeneedtobetterarticulateUSinterestsandstrategytobothourselvesandothers

• EstablishtheextenttowhichthetargetpopulationtruststheUS,andhaveinplacestrategiestobolsterthattrustwhenitislow,priortoengaginginanynarrativemessaging

• USmessaging(andobjectives)mustbeconsistentacrosstheUSGagenciesworkinginspecificregionsandcountries.Thiswillrequirecoordinationandcommunicationacrossagencies

Conclusion

ThefindingsfromtheSMAGrayZoneProjectsuggestthatthecapabilitiestoeffectivelyrespondtograyactivitiesare,insomeways,asfluidasthoseactivitiesthemselves.Russia’sgrayactivitiesandstrategycontinuetoevolveandadapt,soanycapabilitytorespondmustitselfbeadaptable.Ratherthanfocusonspecificmeans(whichwillcontinuetochange),UScapabilitiesshouldfocusonendssuchascontainingRussian influenceandmaintainingan internationalsystemconsistentwithUSinterests.

“Combiningadeepunderstandingoftheenvironmentandarealisticappraisaloftherelevantpartnerrelationshipswiththepolicyaim,allowscommandersandstaffstoderive…feasible,productivemilitaryoptionsthatleadtosustainableandacceptableoutcomes.”JointConceptforIntegratedCampaigning,13Apr2017draft



Towardthisend,muchoftheSMAteams’discussionandfindingsregardingresponseoptionsinthegrayzonecoalescearoundtheroleofinfluence.Inparticular,howtheUScanincreaseitsabilitytoinfluenceinternationalstateandnon-stateactors,andminimizetheinfluenceofactorspotentiallydetrimentaltothestatusquo,ortoUSinterestsspecifically.Forthis,weneedabetterunderstandingof the human / cognitive domain, which can only be achieved with a combination of richerinformationandconceptualmodelsandframeworkstoguidesearchandinterpretation.


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Chapter 25. Required US Capabilities for Combatting Russian Activities Abroad

Mr.JasonWerchanUSEUCOMStrategyDivision&RussiaStrategicInitiative(RSI)

[email protected]

Abstract

Russia’sverticaldecisionformofgovernancegivesitbothsignificantflexibilityandacompetitiveedgeovertheUSwhenitcomestoconductinggrayzoneactivities.Toeffectivelycountertheirefforts,itisimperativetheExecutiveBranchidentifiesaleadfederalagencyforcomprehensivegrayzoneactivitiestogenerateatruewhole-of-governmenteffort.Thisleadagencywouldberesponsiblefortheoverallplanning,coordination,execution,andassessmentofcomprehensiveUSactions inthegrayzone.TheDepartmentofStateBureauofEuropeanandEurasianAffairsisanidealcandidate.Inadditiontoclearlyoutlininginter-agencygrayzonerolesandresponsibilities,theUSmustredoubleefforts to reduce European dependence on Russian energy and discourage future Sino-RussianalliancebydevelopingarobustcapabilitytofosterdistrustanduneasebetweenRussiaandChina.

Understanding Russian Gray Zone Efforts

The chief capability the United States needs in competing with Russia in the gray zone isunderstandingitsverticaldecision-makingandhowtoeffectivelycompetegiventhederiveddistinctadvantages of that structure. Russia’s closed approach provides President Putinwith significantflexibilityinimplementingactivitiesinthegrayzone.Russia’scurrentgovernancearrangementsdonotallowforopendiscussionofforeignanddomesticpolicyalternatives,anditisunlikelytoenactthestructuralandconstitutionalchangesneededtoaddressenduringeconomicandsocialdeficits.Russia defines activities in the gray zone as zero-sum.These activities include threatening otherstatesmilitarily,orcompromisingtheirsocieties,economies,andgovernmentsbyemployingarangeofmeansandmethods to includepropaganda,disinformation,andcultural, religious, andenergycoercion.WhilefurtherforeignadventuresmayhavelimitedappealtotheaverageRussiancitizen,theKremlin’sactionsintheKerchStraitinNovember2018demonstrateditswillingnesstoactboldlyevenwithoutpopularsupportoreliteconsensus.Russiaactivelypursuesinfluenceinallregionsoftheworld. It is executing active and at times aggressive foreign and security policies in its self-proclaimed near aboard, Afghanistan, and Syria. It has a growing capacity to exercise maligninfluenceinEuropeandabroad,includingintheUnitedStates.

WhiletheUnitedStateshasextensiveexperienceincontributingtoEuropeansecuritybymaintainingclose relationshipswith ourEuropean allies andpartners, it still lacks a broadunderstanding ofRussia’sgrayzonecapabilitiesandintentionsastheyarepursuedaroundtheglobeandinmultipledomains below the level of armed conflict. The US Government should support not only theproductionofadditionalanalyticcapability,butprogramsthatproducethelinguistic,cultural,andhistoricknowledgethatunderliegoodpolicyasitappliestoRussianactionsandinterestsinthegrayzone.TheUSGovernmentmustcontinuetostudytheseissuesandpromoteinnovativeapproachestoRussian actions below armed conflict. Thiswill enable leaders across all elements of nationalpowertobettershape,execute,andassessstrategicchoicesbasedonacommonunderstandingofRussiandecisionmakingtoachievetheirgrayzonestrategicobjectives.



Whole of US Government Response

ArguablythegreatestweaknessoftheUSGovernmenttoeffectivelycompetewithRussiabelowthelevel of armed conflict is the lack of a coherent and unifiedwhole-of-government effort. TheUSdemocratic, federal systemof government hinders the ability to effectively plan, coordinate, andexecuteacomprehensivestrategyacrossallfederalgovernmentagencieswithequitiesinsucceedingthegrayzone.Toaccomplishthistypeofplanningandstrategydevelopmentwouldrequiredecisionstobemade,andfundingtobecoordinated,acrossallbranchesofthefederalgovernment.Asafirststep,italsowouldrequirebureacraticchanges.

The Executive Branch must choose a lead federal agency responsible for the overall planning,coordination,execution,andassessmentofUScomprehensiveactionsinthegrayzone.GiventhatRussiangrayzoneactivities,bydefinitionoccurbelowthelevelofarmedconflict,andthoughglobalinnature,centeraroundEuropeandnationsintheirnearabroad,itfollowsthattheU.S.DepartmentofState’sBureauofEuropeanandEurasianAffairs(DoS/EUR)shouldbedesignatedasthatidealleadfederal agent. Beyond this designation, the Executive Branch would also need to empower theDoS/EURwithappropriateauthoritiesandfundingtoachievethismandate.

Once designated as the lead agency for overseeing planning and execution of comprehensiveUSoperations,activities,andinvestmentsbelowthelevelofarmedconflictDoS/EURcancoordinateaninclusivestrategyforidentifying,countering,andcompetingwithRussiainthegrayzone.Astheleadfederalagency,theStateDepartmentcouldfacilitatedevelopmentofacomprehensivestrategyforcoordinatingthenumerouselementsoftheUSGovernmentwithequitiesincompetingwithRussiabelowthelevelofarmedconflict,aswellasaninclusiveunderstandingofthefunding,diplomatic,andtechnologicalrequirementstoexecutethatstrategy.

Akeyelementofthisapproachshouldincludeadvancingtheauthorities,funding,andcharteroftheRussia Influence Group (RIG). The RIG is an interagency network co-led by DoS/EUR and USEuropeanCommand(USEUCOM).ItIsdedicatedtounderstandingandcounteringRussianinfluenceoperationsinEuropebyusingawhole-of-governmentapproach.BeyondtheStateDepartmentandUSEUCOM,theRIGhasexpandedtoincludeparticipationfromotheragenciestoincludetheFBI,USCyber Command, various agencies of the Intelligence Community, the Broadcasting Board ofGovernors,andtheGlobalEngagementCenter(GEC).WhiletheRIGsupportsa largerUSnationalstrategy of information operations, its current efforts are limited to the European theater ofoperations. The RIG hasmade significant progress in addressing and countering Russianmaligninfluence by synchronizing efforts to compete in the information space inways inwhich theUSGovernmenthasnotalwaysbeeneffective.Asaresult,theefforts,mandate,funding,andauthoritiesoftheRIGshouldbeexpandedtoallowittoeffectivelycounterRussianmaligneffortsinthegrayzonebeyondtheEuropeantheater.ThisshouldincludeconsiderationofexpandingtheRIGgloballyforacoordinatedUSwhole-of-governmentefforttocounterRussiangrayzoneefforts.

Discouraging a Grand Sino-Russian Alliance

BothRussiaandChinaviewtheUnitedStatesasalargerthreatthaneitherviewsthethreatfromtheother.TheUnitedStatesmusthavethetoolstodisruptadeepeningpartnershipbetweenthenations,andspecifically,thesharedgoalsandaspirationstheyseekthroughgrayzoneactivities.Asaresultof its geopolitical isolation,Russia has turned toChina as a growing andnecessary key strategicpartner.Thedriversofthisgrowingpartnershipincludecommonobjectivesandvalues;perceivedsharedvulnerabilitiesinthefaceofUSandWesternpressures;andperceivedopportunitiesforthetwopowerstoexpandtheirinfluenceattheexpenseoftheUSandalliedpowersseentobeindecline.



RussiaandChinashareafearof,andcommonhostilitytowardtheUSanditssystemofalliances.Theyshareanaffinityforauthoritarianstability,andalignedviewsonopposinginternationalnormsregardinghumanrights,cyber,andspace.RussiaandChinaalsoshareoverlappingapproachestothegrayzoneintendedtoleverageasymmetrictoolstocounterUSmilitarysuperiority.

TocounterwhatappearstobeagrowingalignmentofChineseandRussianstrategicinterests,theUSmusthavethecapabilitytoeffectivelyfosterdistrustanduneasebetweentheRussiaFederationandChina.ThisincludestheabilitytofosterinherentRussiandistrustofChina’sexpandingpowerhighlightedbyBeijing’sBeltandRoadInitiativeofeconomic,commercial,andinfrastructureprojectsinAsia,Africa,theMiddleEast,andEurope.ThisshouldincludeaspecificfocusonpromotinguneasewhereChineseeconomicgrowtheffortschallengeRussiandominanceintheirperceivednearabroad.Asaspecificexample,awholeofgovernmenteffort to fosterRussiandistrustofChina’sgrowinginterestsandexpansionintheArcticcouldresultinfissurestoRussian/Chineserelations.

European Dependence on Russian Energy

TheUnitedStatesrequiresincreasedauthoritiesandresourcestocounterRussianenergyextorsionoftheEuropeannationsmostreliantonRussianoilandgasexports.Theseauthoritiesandresourcesshouldpriortizesecuringshippinglanesandcommercegloballytoallowforthefreeflowofcrudeoil, liquid fuels, coal, and greater quantities of liquid natural gas (LNG). AlthoughDepartment ofDefense operational units are not dependent upon Russian energy, several European allies andpartners are alarmingly reliant onRussia as a source of energy, and are subject to coercion andharassment by theKremlin tomeet Russian operational and strategic interests. Overall, RussianenergysuppliesmeetmorethanathirdofEurope’stotalnaturalgasdemand,withEasternEuropeanandBalkancountriesgenerallymostreliantonRussia.ThirteenEasternEuropeancountriesrelyonRussiatoprovide75%ormoreoftotalnaturalgasimports,andmanyofthesecountrieshavenodomesticnaturalgasproduction.RussiaalsoprovidesEuropewithroughly32%ofitstotalenergyimports,withfivecountries(Belarus,Bulgaria,Finland,Lithuania,andPoland)reliantonRussiaformorethan70%oftheirtotalimports.RussiahasusedthisdependenceasatooltoaffectUSpartnerandallydecision-making,orasapunitiveresponsetodecisionsmadebynationsnotalignedwithRussianinterests.Russianpresence,marketshare,andownershipinEuropeanenergysectorsareoftenfollowedbyillicitactivities,bribery,andcorruption.


APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE 138

BIOGRAPHIES

LTG Theodore D. Martin

Lieutenant General Theodore D.Martin assumed duties as DeputyCommandingGeneral/ChiefofStaff,UnitedStatesArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,March5,2018.

TheMartin family’smilitary heritage harkens backmore than tengenerationsto1776whenPrivateDanielMartinenlistedinthe1stNew Jersey Infantry Regiment and fought the British during theAmericanRevolution, including service at Valley Forge. LieutenantGeneralMartingraduatedfromtheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademyin1983 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of Armor. HismilitaryeducationincludestheArmorOfficerBasicCourse(CavalryTrack), the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, theNaval College ofCommandandStaff,andtheArmyWarCollege.HeholdsaMaster’sDegreeinNationalSecurity&StrategicStudiesfromtheNavalWar

College,aMaster’sDegreeinStrategicStudiesfromtheArmyWarCollege,andaMaster’sDegreeinBusinessfromWebsterUniversity.

HiscommandexperienceincludesCommander,CCompany,2dBattalion,64thArmorRegiment,3dInfantry Division, Federal Republic of Germany; Commander, 1st Squadron, 10th US CavalryRegiment(BuffaloSoldiers),4thInfantryDivision,FortHood,TexasandOperationIraqiFreedominIraq; Commander, 1stHeavyBrigade Combat Team, 4th InfantryDivision, FortHood, Texas andOperationIraqiFreedominIraq;Commander,OperationsGroup(COG),NationalTrainingCenter,FortIrwin,California;Commandant&45thChiefofArmor,U.S.ArmyArmorSchool,FortBenning,Georgia;the73rdCommandantofCadetsattheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint,NewYork; the Commanding General National Training Center & Fort Irwin, California; and theCommandingGeneral2dInfantryDivision(Combined),RepublicofKorea.

Beyondcommand,LieutenantGeneralMartinhasservedinawidevarietyofstaffandleadershipassignmentsincludingdutyinthe1stArmorTrainingBrigade,FortKnox,Kentucky;theCombinedArms Command-Training, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Advisor to the ImamMohammed bin SaudBrigadeandlaterthePrinceSa’adbinAbdulRahmanBrigade,KingdomofSaudiArabia;DeputyChiefof Staff, G3, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq; JointImprovisedExplosiveDevice-DefeatTaskForceastheIraqFieldTeamLeader,Baghdad,Iraq;andHumanResourcesCommand,Alexandria,Virginia,asArmorBranchChiefandChiefofCombatArmsDivision.



RDML Jeffrey J. Czerewko

RearAdmiralJeffreyCzerewkoisanativeofSaginaw,MichiganandagraduateoftheUSNavalAcademy.Healsoholdsamaster’sdegreefromtheNationalWarCollege.

At sea,hedeployedaboardUSSEnterprise (CVN65)withAttackSquadron -75 (VA-75) flying A-6E Intruders. He flew F/A-18CHornetsonUSSDwightD.Eisenhower(CVN68)withStrikeFighterSquadron-81 (VFA-81), USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) and USSGeorge Washington (CVN 73) with VFA-136. He deployed twicewithUSSJohnC.Stennis(CVN74)ascommandingofficerofStrikeFighter Squadron146 (VFA-146).He flewF/A-18Cs, F/A-18E/Fsand EA-18Gswhile serving as commander of Carrier AirWing 2(CVW-2)whileassignedonUSSRonaldReagan(CVN76)asstrikewarfarecommanderforCarrierStrikeGroup9.

Ashore, Czerewko’s tours include VFA-106 as a fleet replacement squadron instructor pilot andassistantsafetyandassistanttrainingofficer;electronicwarfarebranchchiefwiththeJointStaff,J39deputy director for Global Operations; resource sponsor for Naval intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance(ISR)capabilitiesasdirectorofbattlespaceawareness(N2N6F2);actingdirectoroftheDigitalWarfareOfficeontheNavyStaffandmostrecentlychiefofstaffforCommander,NavalAirForces.

AdditionaltoursofdutyincludeatourwiththeNavalSpecialWarfareDevelopmentGroupandasbattledirectorfortheCombinedAirandSpaceOperationsCenter,AlUdeid,Qatar.

HeistherecipientofvariouspersonalawardsandunitdecorationsandreceivedtheNavyandMarineCorpsLeadershipawardin2002and2004.

Dr. John Arquilla

Dr.JohnArquillaisaDistinguishedProfessorofDefenseAnalysisattheNavalPostgraduateSchoolwherehehastaughtintheirregularwarfareprogramsince1993.Heisbest-knownforhavingpredicted,backinthemid-‘90s, the rise of terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminalnetworks.Hisbooks includeNetworksandNetwars(2001),TheReaganImprint (2006), and Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits (2011). HecontributesregularlytoTheNewYorkTimes,ForeignPolicy,andPolitico.



Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya

Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute,focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East. She is also a Ph.D.candidate atGeorgeMasonUniversity. In addition, she is a fellowat theEuropeanFoundationforDemocracy.ShewaspreviouslywiththeAtlanticCounciland thePeterson Institute for InternationalEconomics.A formeranalystforaUSmilitarycontractorinAfghanistan,shehasalsoservedascommunicationsdirectorattheAmericanIslamicCongress.HeranalysisispublishedwidelyinpublicationssuchasForeignAffairs,TheHill,TheNewCriterion, and theMiddle East Quarterly. Until recently she conductedtranslationandanalysisfortheU.S.Army'sForeignMilitaryStudiesOfficeand its flagshippublication,OperationalEnvironmentWatch, andwroteaforeignaffairscolumnforForbes.She is theauthorof theFebruary2016Institutemonograph,RussiaintheMiddleEast.

Her areas of expertise areRussia'sMiddleEast policy,US-Russian relations, andRussian foreignpolicy. SheholdsaM.A. from JohnsHopkinsUniversitySchoolofAdvanced International Studies(SAIS)andaB.A.fromtheStateUniversityofNewYorkatGeneseo.

Dr. Belinda Bragg

Dr.BelindaBragg isaPrincipalResearchScientist forNSI.ShehasprovidedcoresupportforDoDJointStaffandSTRATCOMStrategicMulti-layerAnalysis (SMA)projects for thepast six years. Shehasworkedonprojectsdealingwithnucleardeterrence,statestability,US–ChinaandUS-Russiarelations,andVEOs.Dr.Bragghasextensiveexperience reviewing and building social science models andframeworks.Sheisoneofthetwodesignersofastabilitymodel,(theStaM) that has been used analyze stability efforts in Afghanistan,statestabilityinPakistanandNigeria,andatthecity-leveltoexplorethedriversandbuffersofinstabilityinmegacities,withacasestudyofDhaka. Prior to joiningNSI, Dr. Braggwas a visiting lecturer in

InternationalRelationsatTexasA&MUniversityinCollegeStation.Herresearchfocusesondecision-making,causesofconflictandpoliticalinstability,andpoliticalusesofsocialmedia.Dr.Braggearnedher Ph.D. in political science from Texas A&M University, and her BA from the University ofMelbourne,Australia.



Mr. Pavel Devyatkin

PavelDevyatkinisaResearchAssociateatTheArcticInstitute,where his research areas include Russia's Arctic strategy,extractive industries, defense and security, and maritimeshipping. Between 2017 and 2018, hemanaged the Institute'sflagshippublication,TheArcticThisWeek,whichisreadweeklybythousandsinoverninetycountries.

Devyatkin'sexpertopiniononRussia'sArcticstrategyhasbeencitedandquotedinnumerousacademicandmediapublications.HisrecentresearchisontheinclusionoftheArcticinChina'sBeltandRoadInitiative.

Prior to joining The Arctic Institute, Devyatkinworked as an analyst of environmental issues inEastern Europe and Central Asia at the United Nations. Devyatkin holds a master's degree inInternationalDevelopmentfromtheLondonSchoolofEconomics.DevyatkinisalsoagraduateofUniversityCollegeLondon,wherehestudiedRussianpoliticsandeconomics.Devyatkin isaNewYorkerofRussianancestry.

MAJ Adam Dyet

StrategicAnalyst:SouthAsia/CentralAsia,China/Russia

MAJDyetassumedhisdutiesasastrategicanalystwithintheStrategy,Plans,andPolicyDirectorateinAugust2017.

He is a former logistics officer, transferring to Functional Area 59(ArmyStrategist)in2016.Hehasover12yearsoftotalactivedutyservice,withcommandatthecompanylevel inacavalrysquadron.Othernotableassignmentsinclude:ProvincialReconstructionTeamSharana S4, Operations/Logistics Officer for Joint Task Force-PortOpeningoperationsinsupportofoperationsinHaitiandDiegoGarcia,andBrigadeS4forthe1stStrykerBrigadeCombatTeam.MAJDyet’soverseas experience includes deployments in support Operation

ENDURINGFREEDOM,Afghanistan,OperationUNIFIEDRESPONSE,Haiti,OperationSpartanShield,Kuwait, steadystateoperations inSouthKorea, andOperationENDURINGFREEDOMfromDiegoGarcia.

MAJDyet’smilitaryeducationincludestheTransportationOfficerBasicCourse,CombinedLogisticsCaptain’s Career Course, Command and General Staff College, Defense Strategy Course, BasicStrategicArtProgram,andtheJointForcesStaffCollege.Thisishisfirstlongtermjointassignmentatthestrategiclevel.HepreviouslyservedwithjointstaffssupportingtransmodalmovementofaStrykerbrigadetoAfghanistaninDiegoGarciain2009,andduringearthquakereliefeffortsduringOperationUNIFIEDRESPONSEin2010.

MAJDyet’scivilianeducationincludesaBachelorofArtsinPoliticalSciencefromtheUniversityofArizonaandaMasterofArtsinInternationalAffairsfromtheUniversityofCaliforniaSanDiego.



Dr. R. Evan Ellis

Dr.EvanEllisisaresearchprofessorofLatinAmericanStudiesattheU.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudies Institutewitha focusontheregion’srelationshipswithChinaandothernon-WesternHemisphereactors,aswellas transnationalorganizedcrimeandpopulism in theregion.

Dr.Ellishaspublishedover240works,includingthe2009bookChinain Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, the 2013 book TheStrategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America, the2014book,ChinaontheGroundinLatinAmerica,andthe2018book,TransnationalOrganizedCrimeinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.

Dr. Ellis has presented his work in a broad range of business andgovernment forums in 27 countries four continents. He has given testimony on Latin AmericasecurityissuestotheUSCongressonvariousoccasions,hasdiscussedhisworkregardingChinaandotherexternalactorsinLatinAmericaonabroadrangeofradioandtelevisionprograms,andiscitedregularlyintheprintmediainboththeUSandLatinAmericaforhisworkinthisarea.

Dr.Ellishas alsobeenawarded theOrderofMilitaryMerit JoséMaríaCórdova by theColombiangovernmentforhisscholarshiponsecurityissuesintheregion.

Dr.EllisholdsaPhDinpoliticalsciencewithaspecializationincomparativepolitics.

Mr. Daniel J. Flynn

Mr.DanFlynnwasselectedtobethefirstDirectorofICNetAssessmentsintheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceinAugust2018.Inthis position, Mr. Flynn is responsible for developing forecasts andcomparative assessments to identify emerging challenges andopportunitiesforUSintelligencecapabilities.

Priortohiscurrentassignment,Mr.FlynnwastheDirectoroftheGlobalSecurity Program for the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s)Strategic Futures Group. In this position, he led national-levelassessmentsoflong-termandcrosscuttingmilitary-securityissuesforseniorUSpolicymakers anddefense officials.Hiswork informed thedevelopmentofUSnationalsecurityanddefensestrategies,includingthe2018NationalDefenseStrategy.Healsowasanadvisortoseveral

DefenseScienceBoardstudies.

Mr.FlynnalsoparticipatedinwritingseveraloftheNIC’sGlobalTrendsreports,includingthe2017GlobalTrends:ParadoxofProgress.

From2004to2005,Mr.FlynnservedasaseniorstaffmemberforThePresident'sCommissionontheIntelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. His dutiesincludedleadingtheCommission'sresearchonthecapabilitiesoftheICtosupportfutureUSmilitaryoperations,performstrategicassessments,andconductscientificandtechnicalanalysis.



Mr. Flynn is a “Distinguished Graduate” of the NationalWar College earning anM.S. in NationalSecurityStrategy.HealsoearnedaB.S.inAerospaceEngineeringfromBostonUniversity.Mr.FlynnisanODNI“PlankHolder.”

Dr. Daniel Goure

Dr. Goure is SeniorVice President with the Lexington Institute, anonprofit public-policy research organization headquartered inArlington,Virginia.Heisinvolvedinawiderangeofissuesaspartoftheinstitute’snationalsecurityprogram.

Dr.GourehasheldseniorpositionsinboththeprivatesectorandtheUS Government. Most recently, he was a member of the 2001DepartmentofDefenseTransitionTeam.Dr.Gourespenttwoyearsinthe US Government as the director of the Office of StrategicCompetitiveness in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He alsoservedasasenioranalystonnationalsecurityanddefenseissueswiththe Center for Naval Analyses, Science Applications InternationalCorporation,SRSTechnologies,R&DAssociatesandSystemPlanningCorporation.

Priorto joiningtheLexingtonInstitute,Dr.GourewastheDeputyDirector, InternationalSecurityProgramattheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies.AtCSIS,Dr.Gourewasresponsibleforanalysesof:USnationalsecuritypolicy,thefutureofconflictandwarfare,theinformationrevolution,counter-proliferation,anddefenseindustrialmanagement.HedirectedanalysesofemergingsecurityissueswithaspecialemphasisonUSmilitarycapabilitiesinthenextcentury.

Dr.Gourealsohasdoneextensiveconsultingandteaching.From1990to1991heledastudyfortheUSInstituteofPeaceondeterrenceaftertheINFTreaty.Dr.GourehasconsultedfortheDepartmentsofState,DefenseandEnergy.HehastaughtorlecturedattheJohnsHopkinsUniversity,theForeignServiceInstitute,theNationalWarCollege,theNavalWarCollege,theAirWarCollege,andtheInter-American Defense College. From 2001-2007, Dr. Goure was an adjunct professor in graduateprogramsat theCenter forPeaceandSecurity Studies atGeorgetownUniversity, andanadjunctprofessoratNationalDefenseUniversityfrom2002-2009—teachingaHomelandSecuritycourseatboth.

Dr.Goureisawell-knownandrespectedpresenceinthenationalandinternationalmedia,havingbeen interviewed by all the major networks, CNN, Fox, the BBC, The New York Times, TheWashingtonPost,TheWallStreetJournal,TheChristianScienceMonitor,theChicagoTribuneandtheLosAngelesTimes.Hehasbeenpublishedextensivelyinovertwodozenjournalsandperiodicals.HeisalsoanNBCnationalsecuritymilitaryanalyst.

Dr.GoureholdsMastersandPh.D.degreesininternationalrelationsandRussianStudiesfromJohnsHopkinsUniversityandaB.A.inGovernmentandHistoryfromPomonaCollege.



Ms. Abigail C. Kamp

AbigailKamp is aResearchAssistant for thePolitical Instability,Counterterrorism and Gray Zone Portfolio at the NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START), located at the University of Maryland (UMD). In hercurrent role, she studies a wide range of topics including US–ColombiarelationsduringthedevelopmentandexecutionofPlanColombia,misalignmentofUScounterterrorismeffortsacrosstheinteragency, and community-based violence prevention andinterventionefforts.

Priortograduateschool,shesupportedavarietyoffederalclientsas a consultant atBoozAllenHamilton.While there, shedraftedtwo Congressional reports on military personnel issues and

managedthecoordinationprocesstoensuretimelydeliverytoCapitolHill.ShewasalsoaresearchassistantontheImmigrationandHomelandSecurityteamattheBipartisanPolicyCenterwhereshewrote extensively about US immigration and border security policies. Ms. Kamp holds a BA inInternationalRelationsfromtheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityandwasaFulbrightEnglishTeachingAssistantinNatal,Brazil.Currently,sheisaRobertsonFellowpursuingamaster’sdegreeatUMD’sSchoolofPublicPolicy,whereherresearchfocusesontheevolutionofUSsecurityassistanceinAfricaandLatinAmerica.

Dr. Roger Kangas

Dr.RogerKangasistheAcademicDeanandaProfessorofCentralAsian Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for StrategicStudies,aU.S.DepartmentofDefenseregionalcenter.PreviouslyDr.KangasservedasaProfessorofCentralAsianStudiesattheGeorge C. Marshall Center for European Security in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; Deputy Director of the Central AsianInstitute at Johns Hopkins University School of AdvancedInternational Studies; Central Asian Course Coordinator at theDepartmentofState’sForeignServiceInstitute;ResearchAnalystonCentralAsianAffairsfortheOpenMediaResearchInstituteinPrague,CzechRepublic;andasanAssistantProfessorofPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofMississippi.

Dr. Kangas has been an advisor to the Combatant Commands, NATO/ISAF, and various USgovernmentagenciesonissuesrelatingtoCentralandSouthAsia,Russia,andtheSouthCaucasus.Hehaswrittenrefereedarticlesandbookchapters,aswellaslecturedtoarangeofaudiences,onthesetopics.HeisalsoanAdjunctProfessoratGeorgetownUniversityandaVisitingFellowattheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies.Dr.KangasholdsaB.S.F.S.inComparativePoliticsfromtheEdmundA.WalshSchoolofForeignServiceatGeorgetownUniversityandaPh.D. inPoliticalSciencefromIndianaUniversity.



Dr. Mark N. Katz

MarkN.Katz(Ph.D.,MIT)isaprofessorofgovernmentandpoliticsat the George Mason University Schar School of Policy andGovernment. He has written primarily about Russian foreignpolicy,especiallytowardtheMiddleEast,forover35years.During2017,hewasavisitingscholarfirstattheArabGulfStatesInstituteinWashington(January-March),andthenattheFinnishInstituteof International Affairs in Helsinki (April-September). During2018, he was a Fulbright Scholar at the School of Oriental andAfricanStudies(SOAS)inLondon(January-March),andwasthenthe2018SirWilliamLuceFellowatDurhamUniversityintheUK(April-June). Links to many of his publications can be found atwww.marknkatz.com.

Dr. Barnett S. Koven

Barnett S. Koven is the Training Director, a SeniorResearcher, and the Political Instability, CounterterrorismandGrayZonePortfoliosLeadattheUniversityofMaryland’s(UMD)NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponses to Terrorism (START), a U.S. Department ofHomelandSecurity(DHS)CenterofExcellence.HeisalsotheFounder and CEO of BSK Consulting, L.L.C., a boutiqueconsultancy specializing in practitioner education andmixed-methods (quantitative and qualitative) research insupportofnationalsecuritypractitionersandpolicy-makers.Inaddition,KovenisaFellowattheJackD.GordonInstitutefor Public Policy at Florida International University, aProfessorial Lecturer in Political Science & InternationalAffairsattheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity(GWU),anAssociateMemberoftheGraduateFacultyand a Lecturer in Public Policy at the UMD, an Adjunct Presenter at the U.S. Air Force SpecialOperationsSchoolandaQuantitativeSocialScientistatPerformanceSystems,LLC.HereceivedhisPh.D.,M.Phil.andM.A.inPoliticalScience,aswellasaB.A.inInternationalAffairsandLatinAmericanandHemisphericStudiesfromtheGWU.KovenalsoholdsaCertificateinConflictAnalysisfromtheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeaceandaCertificateinAdvancedSecurityintheFieldfromtheUnitedNationsSystemStaffCollege.

Koven has conducted extensive overseas research in conflict and post-conflict zones. His workemploys cutting-edge quantitative and qualitative methods to answer pressing defense andhomeland security questions. Specifically, he focuses on issues pertaining to counterinsurgency,counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, counter-narcotics, gray zone conflict, securitycooperation, organized criminal violence, weapons availability and conflict onset, post-conflictreconstruction,and thematerialandnon-material sourcesofmilitarypower.KovenhasreceivedresearchfundingfromtheU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DoD),theU.S.DepartmentofState,theDHSandtheNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration,aswellasfromtheHorowitzFoundationforSocialPolicy, the GWU and the UMD. A complete list of journal articles, book chapters and policypublicationscanbefoundonhispersonalwebsite:barnettkoven.weebly.com.



In addition to his aforementioned academic affiliations, Koven regularly instructs CombatingTerrorismSeminarsattheFederalLawEnforcementTrainingCenterinCharleston,SC.Hehasalsolectured during Joint Special Operations University’s Special Operations Forces InteragencyCollaborationCourse,theDefenseIntelligenceAgency’sAdvancedCounterterrorismAnalystCourseand overseas as part of the Diplomatic Security Service’s Global Anti-terrorism TrainingAssistance/SpecialProgramforEmbassyAugmentationandResponseExecutiveForumonForeignTerroristFightersConsultation.Inaddition,KovenhastaughtattheNationalReconnaissanceOfficeas part of the ExecutiveMaster of PublicManagement Program.Moreover, he is also a frequentpresenter during the various lecture series and conferences curated by the StrategicMulti-layerAssessmentBranchoftheDoD,aswellastomyriadotherUSgovernmentanduniversityaudiences.Finally,Kovenroutinelyprovidesterrorismanalysisonnationalandinternationalmediabroadcasts.

Beyond academia, Koven is the Vice President and Director of Events at the Godparents of theChildrenofInstitutoMundoLibre,anon-profitorganizationprovidingsafehousing,rehabilitationandvocationaltrainingtohomelesschildreninPeru.Inaddition,KovenisaBoardMemberatMindot,anon-profiteducationalplatformfordevelopingthenextgenerationoflocalleadersandagentsofsocialchange.Finally,heisanAdvisoratConcordia,anon-profitorganizationdedicatedtoexpandingpublic-privatepartnerships.

Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux

JeremyW.Lamoreauxisaprofessorofinternationalstudiesandpoliticalscience at BrighamYoungUniversity – Idaho.His research focuses onrelationsbetweentheWestandRussia,specificallyasplayedoutinNATOandtheEU.Geographically,hisfocusisprimarilyontheBalticStates.Hehas published in European Security, European Politics and Society,Geopolitics,JournalonBalticSecurity,JournalofBalticStudies,PalgraveCommunications, andwithRoutledge andRodopi. His current researchfocusesontheEU-Russiarelationshippost-Brexit.

Dr. Marlene Laruelle

Marlene Laruelle, Ph.D., is an Associate Director and ResearchProfessorattheInstituteforEuropean,RussianandEurasianStudies(IERES),ElliottSchoolofInternationalAffairs,TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Dr.LaruelleisalsoaCo-DirectorofPONARS(ProgramonNewApproachestoResearchandSecurityinEurasia)andDirectorofGW’sCentralAsiaProgram.ShehasbeenworkingonCentralAsia’sregional environment, China’s presence in the region, and the“Eurasian” dimension of Russia’s foreign policy for the past twodecades. She is currently a co-PI on athree-year project,Russian,Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects onUnited StatesFavorabilityPerceptions inCentralAsia, fundedby theU.S.DepartmentofDefenseandtheU.S.ArmyResearchOffice/ArmyResearchLaboratoryunderthe



MinervaResearchInitiative.Shewillrelease“EnvisioningOpportunitiesforUS-RussiaCooperationinandwithCentralAsia,”co-authoredwithAndreiKortunov,asaHarvardUS-RussiaWorkingGrouppaperinApril2019.

Dr. Christopher Marsh

Dr.MarshisaseniorfellowattheJointSpecialOperationsUniversity,USSOCOM,whereheconductsresearchonglobalspecialoperationsforceswithaparticularfocusonRussianSOF,includingstrategyandforeign policy. He also serves as the president of the SpecialOperations Research Association and editor of Special OperationsJournal,publishedbyRoutledge.Prior to joining JSOU,MarshwasaProfessorofNationalSecurityandStrategicStudiesattheU.S.ArmySchoolofAdvancedMilitaryStudies (SAMS).Before that,Dr.Marshtaught irregularwarfare, global terrorism, andCOIN at theU.S. AirForceSpecialOperationsSchool,HurlburtField,Florida.From1999-2011Dr.MarshtaughtatBaylorUniversity,movinguptheranksfromassistant professor to full professor. Dr. Marsh holds the Ph.D. inpolitical science from the University of Connecticut, in addition to

havingcompletedgraduatestudyatMoscowStateUniversity.HeconductedmuchofhisdissertationresearchattheRussianAcademyofScience,andlaterwasapost-doctoralfellowattheInstituteonCulture,Religion, andWorldAffairs atBostonUniversity.Dr.Marshwas also a visiting fellow atTsinghuaUniversity(Beijing)in2001,whereheconductedresearchonpoliticalandsocialchangeinChina.Dr.Marshistheauthoroffivebooks,includingRussianForeignPolicy:Interests,Vectors,andSectors,co-authoredwithNikolasGvosdevoftheNavalWarCollege.Dr.Marshhasalsopublishedmore than60 journalarticlesandchapters ineditedcollections, aswell asediting–withRuslanPukhov–EliteWarriors:SpecialOperationsForcesfromAroundtheWorld.HeiscurrentlywritingabookonRussiangrandstrategy.

Dr. Robert Person

Dr.RobPersonisanAssociateProfessorofInternationalRelationsat theUnited StatesMilitaryAcademyinWest Point,NewYork,where he teaches courses in Russian and post-Soviet politics,international relations, and comparative politicsintheDepartment of Social Sciences. Additionally, he serves asDirector of Curriculum for West Point's International AffairsProgram,aswell asDirectorofResearch for theDepartmentofSocialSciences.Dr.Person’sresearchfocusesontheforeignanddomesticpoliticsofRussiaand the formerSoviet states.Hehaspublished extensively on regime support, mass mobilization,hybridwarfare,andtheinternationalrelationsofthepost-Sovietstates. His currentbook project, in progress, examines Russiangrandstrategyinthe21stcentury.Dr.PersonholdsaPh.D.inpoliticalsciencefromYaleUniversityandanMAinRussian,EastEuropean,andEurasianStudiesfromStanfordUniversity.HeisalsoatermmemberoftheCouncilonForeignRelationsandaResidentFellowatWestPoint'sModernWarInstitute.VisitDr.Person’swebsiteathttps://www.robert-person.com/andfollowhimonTwitter@RTPerson3



Ms. Nicole Peterson

NicolePetersonisanAnalystwhoassistsinqualitativeresearchandstrategic analysis in support of Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment(SMA) efforts primarily focused on national security issues andDepartmentofDefense(DoD)concerns.ShehascontributedtoNSI’sVirtualThinkTank(ViTTa®)anddiscourseanalysesduringhertimeatNSI.NicolecoordinatesSMA’sspeakerseries,whichencompassesabroadrangeoftopicsfromradicalizationofpopulationsandviolentextremist organizations to artificial intelligence. She is also thepublisher of SMA’s weekly newsletter, which summarizes SMAspeaker sessions, outlines upcoming events, and disseminatesrelevant publications. Nicole began her career at NSI as anundergraduate intern for its commercial sector and wassubsequently promoted to an associate analyst for its government

sectorin2016.ShegraduatedwithhonorsfromtheUniversityofSanDiegowhereshereceivedaBAinappliedmathematicsandaminorinaccountancy.

Mr. Roman “Comrade” Pyatkov

RomanPyatkov is theRussia SubjectMatterExpert andSeniorAnalyst atHeadquartersAirForce,Checkmateat thePentagon.Hiswork focusesonprovidinganalysis, coursesof actions, andrecommendationstotheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceonhowtoemployAirpowerinsupportoftheNationalDefenseStrategyandNational Military Strategy. Prior to joining Checkmate, he wasworking on the Joint Staff Russia team as a political-militaryplannerforavarietyofRussiafocusedstrategicdocuments.HeisaformerF-16pilotandhasanM.A.inInternationalRelationsandConflictResolution.

Dr. John Schindler

Dr.JohnR.Schindlerisahistorian,strategistandformerintelligenceofficial.HeservedformorethanadecadewiththeNationalSecurityAgencyasbothaGScivilianandasaU.S.Navyofficer,asaseniorintelligenceanalystandasacounterintelligenceofficerspecializingin Russia and Eastern Europe. He worked extensively on theoperational connections between counterespionage and RussianActive Measures. He was technical director of NSA’s largestoperational division and received numerous awards for hisintelligencework.Hewasalsoaprofessorofstrategyat theNavalWarCollegefornearlyadecade.HeisanationalsecuritycolumnistforTheObserver andSpectatorUSA. APh.D. inhistory (McMaster,1995), Dr. Schindler is currently writing on his fifth and sixthmonographsandhaspublishedwidelyinbothscholarlyandpopular



fora on intelligence andmilitary affairs. He is active on social media, including the well-knownTwitter feed@20committee,devoted to intelligenceandsecurity issues,withmore than270,000followers.

Ms. Malin Severin

MalinSeverinisaSwedishanalystcurrentlysecondedbytheSwedishArmedForcestotheUKMoD’sthinktankDevelopment,ConceptsandDoctrineCentre,DCDC.AspartoftheDCDCFuturesTeamsheworkswithStrategicForesight,coveringtrendsanddevelopmentsinEurope,Russia,aswellasissuesrelatingtothefutureofgovernance.Priortojoining DCDC sheworked at the Swedish Defence Research Agency,FOI,whereshefocusedherresearchonissuesrelatingto‘greyzone’challenges,earlywarningandTotalDefence.Malinhasabackgroundin journalismandpolitical risk analysis, andhas alsoworked at theSwedishEmbassyinWashington,DC.

SheholdsaMAinWarStudiesfromKing’sCollegeLondon,aMScinPoliticalSciencefromLundUniversity,andaMAinJournalismfromUppsalaUniversity.

Dr. Thomas Sherlock

ThomasSherlockisaprofessorofpoliticalscienceattheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademyatWestPointandhasservedasprogramdirectorofcomparative politics 2005-2007 and 2011-2012. He received hisdoctorate in political science from Columbia University and teachescoursesoncomparativepolitics,democracyanddemocratization,andthepoliticsofthepost-Sovietregion.Hisbook,HistoricalNarrativesinthe SovietUnionandPost-SovietRussia,waspublished in2014 in anexpanded,translatededitionin2014byRosspen(Moscow),theleadingacademic publisher. He is the co-author ofThe Fight for Legitimacy:Democracyvs.Terrorismandtheco-editoroftwovolumes:WhatIstheWorstthatCanHappen?ThePoliticsandPolicyofCrisisManagement;and Confronting Inequality. Wealth, Rights, and Power. Thom hascontributedchapters to several editedvolumesandhisarticleshave

appeared in numerous journals, including Comparative Politics, Washington Quarterly, NationalInterest,ProblemsofCommunism,AbImperio,CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies,Prepodavanieistorii i obshchestvovedeniia v shkole (Russia),Rossiia v global’noi politike (Russia), andZovnishnispravy:ZS(Ukraine).

Thom’sopinionpieceshaveappearedintheNewYorkTimes(internationaledition),theWashingtonPost(theMonkeyCage)andothernewsoutlets.HehasservedasaconsultantorprojectmanagerfortheCarnegieCouncil,theRussianAcademyofSciences,theOpenSocietyFoundations(Ukraine),andEUROCLIO in The Netherlands, among other institutions. He has given invited presentations atColumbiaUniversity,YaleUniversity,WesleyanUniversity,TRADOC,theU.S.AirForceAcademy,theUSEuropeanCommand(EUCOM)andotheracademicandgovernmentinstitutions.Thomfrequentlyconductsfieldresearchinpost-Sovietspace,includinglarge-NnationalsurveysandfocusgroupsinRussia.Hiscurrentresearch,whichissupportedbygrantsfromtheMinervaInitiative,examinesthecharacterofRussiannationalism;popularandeliteassessmentsofRussianhistory;andthequalityofdemocraticvaluesinRussia.



Dr. Joseph Siegle

Dr.JosephSiegleistheDirectorforResearchattheAfricaCenter for Strategic Studies at the National DefenseUniversity inWashington, D.C. In this capacity he tracksAfrica wide security trends. His research focuses on thepolitical economy of security and development and thechallengesofpoliticaltransitions.PriortojoiningtheAfricaCenter, Dr. Siegle was the Douglas Dillon Fellow at theCouncilonForeignRelations,aseniorresearchscholarattheUniversityofMaryland’sCenter for InternationalandSecurityStudies,andasenioradvisorattheinternationalconsultingfirm,DAI.HehasalsoservedinvariousfieldcapacitiesinAfrica,Asia,andtheBalkanswiththeinternationalNGO,WorldVision,andwasaPeaceCorpsVolunteerinLiberia.

Dr. Robert Spalding III

Dr.RobSpaldingisanaccomplishedinnovatoringovernmentandanationalsecuritypolicystrategist.HehasservedinseniorpositionsofstrategyanddiplomacywithintheDefenseandStateDepartmentsformorethan26years.Hewasthechiefarchitectoftheframeworkfor national competition in the Trump Administration’s widelypraisedNationalSecurityStrategy(NSS),andtheSeniorDirectorforStrategytothePresident.Dr.Spaldingisgloballyrecognizedforhisknowledge of Chinese economic competition, cyber warfare andpoliticalinfluence,aswellasforhisabilitytoforecastglobaltrendsanddevelopinnovativesolutions.

Dr.Spalding’srelationshipwithbusinessleaders,fosteredduringhistimeasaMilitaryFellowattheCouncilonForeignRelations,allowedhimtorecommendpragmaticsolutions tocomplex foreignpolicyandnationalsecurityissues,whicharedrivingpositiveeconomicoutcomesforthenation.Dr.Spalding’sgroundbreakingworkoncompetitioninSecure5Ghasresettheglobalenvironmentforthenextphaseofcybersecurityintheinformationage.

Dr.Spaldingisaskilledcombatleader,promoteroftechnologicaladvancestoachieveimprovedunitperformance, and a seasoned diplomat. Under Dr. Spalding’s leadership, the 509th OperationsGroup—thenation’sonlyB-2StealthBomberunit—experiencedunprecedentedtechnologicalandoperationaladvances.Dr.Spalding’sdemonstratedacumenforsolvingcomplextechnologicalissuestoachieveoperationalsuccess,wasdemonstratedwhenheledalow-costrapid-integrationprojectforasecureglobalcommunicationscapabilityintheB-2,achievingtremendousresultsatalmostnocosttothegovernment.Ascommander,heledforcesintheairandonthegroundinLibyaandIraq.DuringtheUUVIncidentof2016,Dr.SpaldingavertedadiplomaticcrisisbynegotiatingwiththeChinesePLAforthereturnoftheUUV,withouttheaidofatranslator.

Dr.Spaldinghaswrittenextensivelyonnationalsecuritymatters.Heiscurrentlyworkingonabookconcerningnationalcompetitioninthe21stCentury.HisworkhasbeenpublishedinTheWashingtonPost, The Washington Times, Foreign Affairs, The American Interest,War on the Rocks, FedTechMagazine,DefenseOne,TheDiplomat,andothereditedvolumes.HisAirPower JournalarticleonAmerica’sTwoAirForcesisfrequentlyusedintheWestPointcurriculum.



Dr.SpaldingisaSeniorFellowattheHudsonInstituteandaLifeMemberoftheCouncilonForeignRelations. He has lectured globally, including engagements at the Naval War College, NationalDefense University, AirWar College, Columbia University, S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies in Singapore, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and other ProfessionalMilitaryEducationalinstitutions.Dr.SpaldingreceivedhisBachelorofScienceandMasterofSciencedegreesinAgriculturalBusinessfromCaliforniaStateUniversity,Fresno,andholdsadoctorateineconomicsandmathematicsfromtheUniversityofMissouri,KansasCity.HewasadistinguishedgraduateoftheDefenseLanguageInstituteinMonterey,andisfluentinChineseMandarin.

Dr. Richard Weitz

RichardWeitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center forPolitical-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His currentresearch includes regional security developments relating toEurope,Eurasia,andEastAsiaaswellasUSforeignanddefensepolicies.

Before joining Hudson in 2005, Dr. Weitz worked for shorterterms at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Center forStrategic and International Studies, Defense Science Board,HarvardUniversity’,andotherresearchinstitutions,andtheU.S.Department of Defense, where he received an Award forExcellencefromOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense.

Dr.WeitzisagraduateofHarvardUniversity(Ph.D.inPoliticalScience),OxfordUniversity(M.Phil.inPolitics),theLondonSchoolofEconomics(M.Sc.inInternationalRelations),andHarvardCollege(B.A.withHighestHonorsinGovernment),wherehewaselectedtoPhiBetaKappa.HeisproficientinRussian,French,andGerman.

Dr.Weitzhasauthoredoreditedseveralbooksandmonographs,includingAssessingtheCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganization(2018);PromotingUS-IndianDefenseCooperation(2017);Enhancingthe Georgia-US Security Partnership (2016); Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises (2015);ChinaandAfghanistanAftertheNATOWithdrawal(2015);ReformingUSExportControlsReforms(2015);Turkey'sNewRegionalSecurityRole:ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates(2014);RebuildingAmerican Military Power in the Pacific (2013); Global Security Watch—China (2013); War andGovernance:InternationalSecurityinaChangingWorldOrder(2011);TheRussianMilitaryTodayand Tomorrow (2010); Global Security Watch—Russia (2009); China-Russia Security Relations(2008);MismanagingMayhem:HowWashingtonRespondstoCrisis(2008);TheReservePoliciesofNations(2007);andRevitalisingUS–RussianSecurityCooperation:PracticalMeasures(2005);andtwovolumesofNationalSecurityCaseStudies(ProjectonNationalSecurityReform,2012and2008).

Dr.WeitzhasalsopublishedinsuchjournalsasSurvival,Jane’sIntelligenceReview,Jane'sIslamicAffairsAnalyst,TheWashingtonQuarterly,TheNationalInterest,NATOReview,GlobalAsia,ArmsControl Today, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Defense Concepts, Pacific Focus, Asan Forum,JournalofDefenceStudies,SmallWarsJournal,WMDInsights,Parameters:U.S.ArmyWarCollegeQuarterly,NavalWarCollegeReview,WorldAffairs,ChinaBrief,PoliticalScienceQuarterly,JournalofStrategicStudies,andYaleJournalofInternationalAffairs.

ThecommentariesofDr.WeitzhaveappearedintheInternationalHeraldTribune,BaltimoreSun,TheGuardian,ChristianScienceMonitor,WashingtonTimes,Forbes,WallStreetJournal(Europe),



JapanTimes, andmany Internet-basedpublications such asWashingtonPost.com, ForeignPolicy,YaleGlobal,TheDiplomat,EurasiaNet,ProjectSyndicate,RealClearDefense,TheHill,RollCall,MiddleEastTimes,EurasiaDailyMonitor,Apostrophe,andWorldPoliticsReview.HehasalsobeenquotedinTheNewYorkTimes,TheWashingtonPost,ChristianScienceMonitor,TimeMagazine,SundayExpress,ScienceMagazine,andotherprominentnewspapersandmagazines.

Mr. Jason Werchan

JasonWerchanisaStrategyProgramManagerfortheStrategyDivisionandRussiaStrategicInitiative(RSI)assigned to the Headquarters of the United StatesEuropean Command (USEUCOM). He was theCommand’s primary liaison for the StrategicMultilayerAssessmentstudiesonRussiaandtheGrayZone. His duties include developing the USEUCOMCommander’s Theater Strategy, Campaign Plan, andannual Congressional Posture Statement. He is theCommand’s primary inject for inputs into variousDefenseDepartment strategic documents to includethe National Military Strategy, National DefenseStrategy, and Contingency Planning Guidance. Mr.

WerchanenteredCivilServiceinJanuary2015afterretiringasaColonelfromtheUSAF.InhislastassignmentheservedastheChiefofStrategyforUSEUCOM.HeenteredtheAirForceinMayof1989afterreceivingacommissionthroughtheReserveOfficerTrainingCorpsatTexasA&MUniversity.DuringhisAFcareer,heservedasaninstructorandevaluatornavigatorintheRC-135,E-8CandT-1Aaircrafts.HehasalsobeenastudentandaninstructorattheU.S.Army’sCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeandwasafullyqualifiedJointStaffOfficer.HehasheldmultiplestaffpositionsatthePacificAirForcesand theAirEducationandTrainingCommandHeadquarters to includeBranchChiefforStrategicPlansforEducationandTrainingandISROperationsinthePACOMAOR.Healsoserved as Chief of the Education and Training Command’s Future Learning Division, and as theDeputyCommanderforthe479thFlyingTrainingGroupatPensacolaNASoverseeingtheAF’snewCombatSystemsOfficer(CSO)trainingpipeline.In2011heservedasthedeputycommanderoftheKabulInternationalAirport(KIAI)ISAFbaseinstallation.Heholdsabachelor’sdegreeinPoliticalScience fromTexasA&M and amaster’s degree inmanagerial economics from theUniversity ofOklahoma.HismilitaryawardsincludetheDefenseSuperiorServiceMedalandDefenseMeritoriousServiceMedalwithoneoakleafcluster.