rule 4 (outline, case digest & fulltext)

8/11/2019 Rule 4 (Outline, Case Digest & Fulltext)

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Outline: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE

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Lesson for August 9, 2014

Saturday

Venue

- The Manila Railroad Co. v. The Attorney General , G.R. No. L-6287, December 1, 1911

Venue versus jurisdiction

- Dacoycoy v. IAC , G.R. No. 74854, April 2, 1991

- Nocum v. Tan , G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005

- Santos v. Northwest Orient , G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

Venue of real actions

- Go v. UCPB , G.R. No. 156187 - Infante v. Aran Builders , G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007

Venue of personal actions

- Claridades v. Mercader , G.R. No. L-20341, May 14, 1966 - Davao Abaca Plantation v. Dole Philippines , G.R. No. 134431, December 1, 2000- Marcos-Araneta v. CA , G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008

Venue of actions against non-residents

- Baritua v. CA , G.R. No. 100748, February 3, 1997

When the rules on venue do not apply

- Gonzales v. Lopez , G.R. No. 48068, April 15, 1988- Polytrade v. Blanco , G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969

Effects of stipulations on venue

- Sps. Lantin v. Hon. Lantion , G.R. No. 160053, August 28, 2006- Uniwide Holdings Inc. v. Cruz , G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007


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Case Digest: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE

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VenueTHE MANILA RAILROAD CO. vs THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

G.R. No. L-6287, December 1, 1911

Facts:The plaintiff, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in the

CFI of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain realestate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the

Province of Tarlac. It is for the construction of a railroad line "fromPaniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purposeof condemning lands for the construction of such line that thisaction is brought. The land sought to be condemned is 69,910square meters in area. The complaint states that before beginningthe action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search inthe office of the registry of property and of the tax where the landssought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged.As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the landsin question were located in the Province of Tarlac.

The defendants in one action are all of the differentowners of or persons otherwise interested in the 69,910 square

meters of land to be condemned. After filing and duly serving thecomplaint the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending finaldetermination of the action, took possession of and occupied thelands described in the complaint, building its line and putting thesame in operation.

On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to thedefendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be madeto the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the courthad no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just beenascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemnedwas situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Provinceof Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint.

Trial court- Granted the motion to dismiss and dismissedthe action on the ground that CFI Tarlac had no jurisdiction.

Issue:Whether or not CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take

cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in anotherprovince.

Held:

Yes. CFI Tarlac has power and authority to takecognizance of the case.

Section 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine

Commission confer jurisdiction upon the CFI of these islands withrespect to the real estate. It was the intention of the PhilippineCommission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfectand complete jurisdiction possible over the subject mattersmentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made todepend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal.

It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Courtof First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province,may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an actionarising in another province or of an action relating to real estate

located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may atthe time be assigned.

Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority.Other provide for the procedure by which that power or authority isprojected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of theCourt in the real and substantive sense; the other with theprocedure by which such powers are put into action.

The power or authority of the court over the subject

matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given causebegan. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority;it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justlyexercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercisedin conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, thecourt attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.

After jurisdiction over real property in the Islands has beenconferred so generally and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to bepresumed or construed that the legislature intended to modify orrestrict that jurisdiction when it came to frame a Code of CivilProcedure the object of which is to make that jurisdiction effective.

Such modification or restriction should be held only by virtue of theclearest and most express provisions.

It is to be observed that the section contains no expressinhibition against the court. It provides simply that certain actionsaffecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where theland, or some part thereof, is situated." The prohibition here iclearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the

venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing todo with either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done doesthe section begin to operate effectively so far as the court isconcerned. The prohibition is nor a limitation on the power of thecourt but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to take something

from the court but to grant something to the defendant. Its wordingclearly deprives the court of nothing which it had, but gives thedefendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights which he did nothave. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject,after, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touches convenience, not substance. Itsimply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, tohave the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, allof his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial.

We, therefore, hold that the terms of section 377providing that actions affecting real property shall be brought in

the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part

thereof, is located, do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of FirstInstance over the land itself but relate simply to the personal riof parties as to the place of trial.

Furthermore, we hold that section 377 of the Code of CivilProcedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations tocondemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendantsexpress or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in anyprovince selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendantswhose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may,by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or,if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province wheretheir or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the


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defendants not objecting would continue in the province whereoriginally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendantsand ordered continued before the court of the appropriate provinceor provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it cannotaffect the decision in the case before us for the reason that thedefendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for achange thereof. They have not only expressly submitted themselvesto the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that

jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff toremove it.

Venue versus jurisdictionDACOYCOY vs IACG.R. No. 74854, April 2, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta,Rizal, filed before the RTC, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaintagainst private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for theannulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of ricelandsituated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Before summons could be served on private respondent asdefendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an orderrequiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judgeon the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial courtdismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found,based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action isa real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated

deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subjectparcel of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which isoutside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

IAC- dismissed Petitioners appeal and affirmed the orderof dismissal. Hence this appeal.

Petitioners arguments: The right to question the venue of an action belongs solely

to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate does notpossess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that thevenue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable.

Petitioner asserts that, without the defendant objecting

that the venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless todismiss the case motu proprio .

Respondents arguments: The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is proper because

the same can "readily be assessed as (a) real action."He asserts that "every court of justice before whom a civil

case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the defendant to raisethat venue was improperly laid. The court can take judicial noticeand motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated as real actionand improperly filed before it. .

Issue: Whether or not the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a

complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Held:No. The court held that the motu proprio dismissal of

petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court on the ground ofimproper venue is erroneous, obviously attributable to its inability

to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are

basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is saidthat the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Itrelates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather thanthe subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relationbetween the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the courtand the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction,touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than thesubstance of the case.

Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide acase on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place

where the suit may be had.Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue

is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of theproceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in thecourts of first instance, may be waived expressly or impliedly. Wheredefendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismissas provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allowsthe trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot onappeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly thewrong venue, which is deemed waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venuein a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been

improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue,though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties forwhose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to theimproper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

Venue versus jurisdiction

NOCUM vs TANG.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005

Facts: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand

Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC ofMakati ,seeking moral and exemplary damages for the allegedmalicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article .

INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that: (1) the complainfailed to state a cause of action; (2) the defamatory statementsalleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factualpremises; (3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true


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report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figureand therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their partwas negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiffs orPALs side of the dispute with the pilot s union.

ALPAP and UMALI alleged therein that: (1) the complaintstated no cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3)plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest.

It appeared that the complaint failed to state the

residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commissionof the offense and the place where the libelous article was printedand first published.

RTC- dismissed the complaint on the ground of impropervenue

Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration ofthe dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par.2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article wasprinted and first published in the City of Makati" and in par. 2.04.1,that "This caricature was printed and first published in the City ofMakati"

RTC- after having dismissed the case for improper venue,

admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside theprevious order of dismissal. Petitioners appealed the RTC Decision tothe CA.

CA- dismissed the appeal of petitioners and affirmed RTC;MR likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC Makati had acquired jurisdiction overthe case upon filing of the original complaint

Held:Yes. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based

on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises aconcise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff'scauses of action. In the case at bar, after examining the originalcomplaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the casewhen the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof,respondents cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC.

Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A formercolleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdictionand venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear anddetermine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heardor tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue , of

procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between thecourt and the subject matter; venue , a relation between plaintiff anddefendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction isfixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may beconferred by the act or agreement of the parties.

In the case at bar, the additional allegations in theAmended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printedand first published in the City of Makati referred only to thequestion of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegationswould neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondentsfailure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lowercourt of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondents failure to allege

these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by aparty, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was notproperly laid.

It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to dowith jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venuewere properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, thatwould be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civilcases, venue may be waived.

Petitioners argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege theplace where the libelous articles were printed and first publishedwould have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. Thefailure of the original complaint to contain such information wouldbe fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes intothe territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because thecase before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.

Venue versus jurisdictionSANTOS vs NORTHWEST ORIENTG.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

Facts:

This case involves the Proper interpretation of Article 28(1)of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be

brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of oneof the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of

the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place ofbusiness, or where he has a place of business throughwhich the contract has been made, or before the court atthe place of destination.The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines.

Petitioner is represented by his father. Private respondentNorthwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation withprincipal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business andmaintain a branch office in the Philippines.

Petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in SanFrancisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila viaTokyo and back.

On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at theNOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduleddeparture to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for hisflight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.

Then, petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC ofMakati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lackof jurisdiction. Citing the above-quoted article, it contended that thecomplaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the HighContracting Parties, before:1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;2. the court of its principal place of business;


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3. the court where it has a place of business through which thecontract had been made;4. the court of the place of destination.

Private respondent NOA contended that Philippines wasnot its domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neitherwas the petitioner's ticket issued in this country nor was hisdestination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.

RTC- granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case

CA- affirmed the RTC; MR of petitioner was likewisedenied.

Petitioners arguments: He claims that the lower courterred in not ruling that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is arule merely of venue and was waived by defendant when it did notmove to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

Issue:

Whether Article 28(1) refers to venue or jurisdiction.

Held:Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international,

the same being from the United States to the Philippines and back tothe United States, it is subject to the provisions of the WarsawConvention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the fourplaces where an action for damages may be brought.

Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters.Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon thecourt which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statutemay be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection thatthe plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived bythe failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In eithercase, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction

can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties,whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.

A number of reasons tends to support the characterizationof Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision.

First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the placeswhere the action for damages "must" be brought, underscores themandatory nature of Article 28(1).

Second, this characterization is consistent with one of theobjectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniformmanner the conditions of international transportation by air."

Third, the Convention does not contain any provisionprescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which

means that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1)as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to the will of theparties regardless of the time when the damage occurred.

In other words, where the matter is governed by theWarsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept.Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established inaccordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, followingwhich the jurisdiction of a particular court must be establishedpursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question ofwhich court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be

taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of thecourt to which the case is submitted.

In any event, we agree that even granting arguendo thatArticle 28(1) is a venue and not a jurisdictional provision, dismissal ofthe case was still in order. The respondent court was correct inaffirming the ruling of the trial court on this matter, thus:

Santos' claim that NOA waived venue as a ground of itsmotion to dismiss is not correct. True it is that NOA averred in its

MOTION TO DISMISS that the ground thereof is "the Court has nosubject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint" whichSANTOS considers as equivalent to "lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter . . ." However, the gist of NOA's argument in itsmotion is that the Philippines is not the proper place where SANTOScould file the action meaning that the venue of the action isimproperly laid. Even assuming then that the specified ground of themotion is erroneous, the fact is the proper ground of the motionimproper venue has been discussed therein.

Venue of real actionsGO vs UCPBG.R. No. 156187

Facts:Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-

owners of Noahs Ark International, Noahs Ark Sugar Carriers,

Noahs Ark Sugar Truckers, Noahs Ark Sugar Repacker, Noahs ArkSugar Insurers, Noahs Ark Sugar Terminal, Noahs Ark Sugar

Building, and Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery. Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko applied for

an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent United CoconutPlanters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine Hundred Million(P900,000,000) Pesos, and was favorably acted upon by the latter.

The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgagesover parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)No. 64070, located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837square meters, and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCTNo. 3325, also located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 14,271square meters, registered in the name of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.

The approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to

petitioner was subsequently cancelled by respondent UCPB. As aconsequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded from UCPB thereturn of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by RealEstate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the sameand proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgagesand caused the registration thereof before the Registry of Deeds ofMandaluyong City.

Respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk oCourt and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicialforeclosure of real estate mortgage covered by TCT No. 64070, fornonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result,


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the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11April 2000 and 03 May 2000.

Petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation ofReal Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, againstrespondent bank and its officers with the Regional Trial Court ofPasig City, Branch 266.

Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss based, among

other things, on the following grounds: 1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper filingand docket fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue.

TRIAL COURT: granting petitioners application for a writof preliminary injunction; denied responde nt banks motion todismiss. COURT OF APPEALS: set aside trial courts decision basedon improper venue

Issue:Whether or not petitioners complaint for cancellation of

real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose ofdetermining venue.

Held:In a real action , the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real

property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is anaction affecting title to or possession of real property, or interesttherein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosureof mortgage on, real property. The venue for real actions is thesame for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the courtwhich has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the realproperty or any part thereof lies .

Personal action is one brought for the recovery ofpersonal property, for the enforcement of some contract or

recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damagesfor the commission of an injury to the person or property. Thevenue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional andmunicipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff orany of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant orany of the principal defendants resides, at the election of theplaintiff , as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.

In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estatemortgage filed by herein petitioner was primarily an action tocompel private respondent bank to return to him the propertiescovered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank hadalready initiated foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation

by the said respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July1997. The prime objective is to recover said real properties.Respondent bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosureproceedings, and were it not for the timely issuance of a restrainingorder secured by petitioner Go in the lower court, the same wouldhave already been sold at a public auction.

In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage,subject of the instant petition, is a real action, considering that a realestate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An actionfor cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an actionaffecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action

which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, theplace where the subject property lies .

Venue of real actions

INFANTE vs ARAN BUILDERSG.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007

Facts:Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City was an

action for revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders,Inc. (private respondent) against Adelaida Infante (petitioner).

The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by theRegional Trial Court of Makati City, which became final andexecutory, in an action for specific performance and damages. The judgment rendered was in favor of Adelaida Infante.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival

of judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue wasimproperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.

The Muntinlupa RTC issued an order dismissing theMotion.

Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specificperformance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personalaction and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is alsopersonal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the actionfor revival of judgment is either Makati City or Paraaque City whereprivate respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at theelection of private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent maintains that thesubject action for revival judgment is quasi in rem because it

involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property;and that, consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where theproperty is situated.

The CA ruled in favor of herein private respondentreasoning that the judgment sought to be revived was rendered inan action involving title to or possession of real property, or interesttherein, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the placewhere the real property is located.

Issue:Whether or not the complaint for revival of

judgment is an action in rem which was correctly filed withthe RTC of the place where the disputed real property islocated .

Held:

Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule4 provide:

Section 1. Venue of real actions . -Actions affecting title to or possession of realproperty, or interest therein, shall be


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commenced and tried in the proper court whichhas jurisdiction over the area wherein the realproperty involved, or a portion thereof, issituated.

Section 2. Venue of personalactions . - All other actions may be commencedand tried where the plaintiff or any of theprincipal plaintiffs resides, or where the

defendant or any of the principal defendantsresides, or in the case of a non-residentdefendant where he may be found, at theelection of the plaintiff.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination ofwhether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action ora personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue , if theaction for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of realproperty, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must befiled with the court of the place where the real property is located .If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is

then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the placewhere the plaintiff or defendant resides.

The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a finaland executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute adeed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision infavor of herein private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes inconnection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registryof Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of titleissued in the name of private respondent. The same judgmentordered private respondent to pay petitioner the sum ofP321,918.25 upon petitioner's compliance with the aforementionedorder. It is further alleged that petitioner refused to comply with

her judgment obligations despite private respondent's repeatedrequests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file theaction for revival of judgment.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared privaterespondent's right to have the title over the disputed propertyconveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondenthas an established interest over the lot in question; and to protectsuch right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive theprevious judgment. The sole reason for the present action to reviveis the enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights over apiece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a realaction, for it affects private respondent's interest over real

property.The present case for revival of judgment being a real

action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional TrialCourt of the place where the realty is located.

NOTE:Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

Sec. 18. Authority to defineterritory appurtenant to each branch . - TheSupreme Court shall define the territory overwhich a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall

exercise its authority . The territory thusdefined shall be deemed to be the territorial

area of the branch concerned for purposes ofdetermining the venue of all suits, proceedingsor actions, whether civil or criminal, as well asdetermining the Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit TrialCourts over which the said branch may exercise

appellate jurisdiction. The power herein grantedshall be exercised with a view to making thecourts readily accessible to the people of thedifferent parts of the region and making theattendance of litigants and witnesses asinexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of tRegional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over aparticular territory defined by the Supreme Court . OriginMuntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction of the MakatiCourts. However, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An

Act to Amend Section Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, tookeffect on September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the creation ofa branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is nowthe Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and processesconcerning real property within Muntinlupa City.

Venue of personal actionsCLARIDADES vs MERCADERG.R. No. L-20341, May 14, 1966

Facts:Petitioner, Dr. Simeon S. Claridades brought this action

against Vicente C. Mercader and Perfecto Fernandez for thedissolution of a partnership allegedly existing between them and anaccounting of the operation of the partnership, particularly afishpond located in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, which was the main assetof the partnership, from September 1954, as well as to recover

moral and exemplary damages, in addition to attorney's fees andcosts.

In their answer the defendants admitted the existence ofthe partnership and alleged that its operation had been so farunproductive. By way of special defense, they alleged, also, thatthere is an impending auction sale of said fishpond due todelinquency in the payment of taxes owing to lack of funds andplaintiff's failure to contribute what is due from him. Defendants,likewise, set up a counter-claim for damages, by reason of theinstitution of this action, and for attorney's fees and costs.

Guillermo Reyes was allowed to intervene for the purposeof recovering a sum of money allegedly due him for services


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rendered as foreman of said fishpond, plus damages. Later, oneArmando Asuncion succeeded in intervening as the alleged assigneeof the interest of defendant. Mercader in said partnership andfishpond. Thereafter, on plaintiff's motion, the lower courtappointed a receiver of the fishpond. Upon the other hand, AlfredoZulueta and his wife Yap Leding sought permission to intervene, stilllater, alleging that they are the owners of said fishpond, havingbought one-half ()of it from Benito Regencia, who, in turn, had

acquired it from Asuncion, who had purchased the fishpond fromdefendant Mercader, and the other half having been assigned tohim directly by Asuncion.

Despite plaintiff's opposition thereto, said permission wasgranted in an order . Soon thereafter, the Zuluetas filed a motion todismiss upon the ground that the complaint states no cause ofaction; that venue has been improperly laid; and that plaintiffcomplaint is moot and academic.

Acting upon the motion, the lower court granted the sameupon the ground of improper venue.

Issue:

Whether or not this action should have been instituted,not in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, but in that ofMarinduque, where the aforementioned fishpond is located.

Held:Plaintiff's complaint merely seeks the liquidation of his

partnership with defendants Fernandez and Mercader. This isobviously a personal action , which may be brought in the place ofresidence of either the plaintiff or the defendants . Since plaintiff isa resident of Bulacan, he had the right to bring the action in thecourt of first instance of that province. What is more, althoughdefendants Fernandez and Mercader reside in Marinduque, they did

not object to the venue. In other words, they waived whateverrights they had, if any, to question it.

The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of thepartnership, including the fishpond in question, did not change thenature or character of action, such sale being merely a necessaryincident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should precedeand/or is part of its process of dissolution. Neither plaintiff'scomplaint nor the answer filed by defendants Fernandez andMercader questioned the title to said property or the possessionthereof.

Venue of personal actionsDAVAO ABACA PLANTATION vs DOLE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 134431, December 1, 2000

Facts:Petitioner Davao Abaca Plantation Company, Inc. [DAPCO

for brevity] brought a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manilaagainst respondent DOLE Philippines, Inc.[DOLE], which reads:

Two (2) Lease Agreements (hereinafter 1985 LeaseAgreements), one covering 839 hectares and the other 165 hectares

or a total of 1,004 hectares were executed. The lease period forboth contracts was ten (10) years from February 7, 1984 to February7, 1994 renewable for another six (6) years at the sole option ofDOLE. It was also agreed that if no agreement is reached by theparties on the rental or other terms and conditions of the lease atthe end of the original period, DOLE shall be automatically granted agrace period of two (2) years viz., until February 7, 1996 withinwhich to wind up its operations on the land.

After the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) tookeffect in 1988, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) deferred

subjecting the land to CARL coverage but later reversed itself.Nevertheless, CARL precludes early coverage of private land leased,held or possessed by multinational corporations such as DOLE.

DOLE exercised its sole option and renewed the lease upto December 31, 2000 pursuant to paragraph 1 of the 1985 LeaseAgreements.

Since DOLE had rights under the Lease RenewaAgreement which had to be represented or protected in the DARproceeding, DAPCO formally requested DOLE to intervene in the saidproceeding in a letter of December 27, 1993.

DOLE replied to DAPCO by letter that it chose not tointervene in the DAR proceeding. DOLE in the letter further

underscored the obligatory force of the contracts between theparties until December 31, 2000 and assured that DOLE will honorand faithfully comply in good faith with our contracts and otherobligations.

DOLE wrote DAPCO asking the latter for its intentionregarding the lease agreements in view of the pendency ofproceedings subjecting the leased area to CARL.

DAPCO replied to DOLE that it would honor and defendthe lease agreements and emphasized that by DOLEs own

representation, DOLE chose not to be a party to the DARproceeding, in order that it could not be bound by any decisionrendered by DAR. DAPCO demanded that DOLE abide with the lease

contracts, pay base rental and make an accounting of the productionfor 1994 so that the base rental can be computed. Under theagreements, the rental for 1995 was to paid on or before January15, 1995.

In an apparent attempt to cover up its own wrongdoingsas will be shown hereafter, DOLE, in a letter, answered DAPCOclaiming that: the acts of the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines in implementing R.A. 6657 are already fait accompthat Governments complete taking of the leased premises andistribution of the same to ARB association made it legallyimpossible for DAPCO, Inc. to perform its obligation to maintain thelessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the things leased; and


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that the actions of the Government amount to caso fortuito. DOLEfurther stated that STANFILCOs obligation to pay DAPCO, Inc. the

rentals stipulated in the Lease Agreements ceased.DOLEs letter surprised DAPCO because it represented a

total reversal of DOLEs former legal position, pro mises,representations, written and other assurances of contractual fidelityto DAPCO.

When the hearing ensued on the basis of the foregoing

complaint, DOLE filed with the Court of Appeals [CA] a petition forcertiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtquestioning, among others, the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The CA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint filedby DAPCO on the ground of wrong venue. Thus, it held that thecomplaint filed by DAPCO is actually a real action, DAPCOs mainobjective being to assert ownership and recover possession of theland in dispute. Such being the case, venue lies not in Manila but inSouth Cotabato where the property in dispute is located.

Issue:Whether or not the nature of the complaint filed by

DAPCO is a real action.

Held:DAPCO is enforcing the lease contract against DOLE. A

breach of contract is a cause of action either for specificperformance or rescission of contracts. It cannot be said that themain objective of DAPCO in filing the complaint is to recover theland leased to DOLE because DAPCO neither denied the fact that thelands were subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformProgram. What is being asserted was the rental payment for theyear 1995 and the succeeding annual rentals until the expiration ofthe lease.

The question as to whether DOLE was bound by the termsof the lease and is liable for damages should be discussed andsettled by the trial court in accordance with the evidence submittedby both parties. The Court of Appeals holds that the venue lies inSouth Cotabato where the property is situated. Granting that thecomplaint is a real action, the venue is not in South Cotabato but isin Davao del Norte where the property is situated as described inthe lease agreement. However, considering that the complaintbelow is in the nature of a personal action, the rules on venue at thetime the complaint was filed governs. When the complaint was filedon March 15, 1995, venue for personal actions is in the place wherethe defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or

where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election ofthe plaintiff. Since DAPCO has its principal office in Manila, it cannotbe said that DAPCO, in exercising its option by filing the suit inManila, committed a breach of the rules.

Venue of personal actionsMARCOS-ARANETA vs CA

G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008

Facts:Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his

business associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managersand Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC)

respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege,both corporations were organized pursuant to a contract orarrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name andin the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks ofFEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and theirfruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% ofsuch shares. Several years after, Irene, through her trustee-husband,Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65%stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.

In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTCtwo similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accountingand receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).The second sought the recovery to the extent of 65% of

FEMII shares held by Benedicto and the other defendants namedtherein.

Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino, Benedicto'sdaughter, filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 3341-17, followedlater by an Amended Motion to Dismiss. Benedicto, on the otherhand, moved to dismiss the case filed, adopting in toto the fivegrounds raised by Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss.Among these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate disputeover which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the RTC,has jurisdiction; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) the complaint

failed to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation thereinthat plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted thetrust created in her favor. Upon Benedicto's motion, both caseswere consolidated.

During the preliminary proceedings on their motions todismiss, Benedicto and Francisca, by way of bolstering theircontentions on improper venue, presented the Joint Affidavit ofGilmia B. Valdez, Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco who allattested being employed as household staff at the Marcos' Mansionin Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintainresidence in said place as she in fact only visited the mansion twicein 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections;

and that she was staying at her husband's house in Makat i City.Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene

presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC) issued on"11/07/99" in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her claimedresidency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.

In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died andwas substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca.

RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these partlyconstituted "real action," and that Irene did not actually reside inIlocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid.

Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration,Irene filed a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint), attaching


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therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint in which the names ofDaniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin appeared asadditional plaintiffs. As stated in the amended complaint, the addedplaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new trustees.Parenthetically, the amended complaint stated practically the samecause of action but, as couched, sought the reconveyance of theFEMII shares only.

RTC admitted such amended complaint.

Later developments saw the CA issuing a TRO and then awrit of preliminary injunction enjoining the RTC from conductingfurther proceedings on the subject civil cases. It further rendered aDecision, setting aside the assailed RTC order and the amendedcomplaint.

Issue:Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case

on the ground of improper venue.

Held:It is the posture of Julita and Francisca that the venue was

in this case improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of areal action involving real properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac.

This contention is not well-taken. In a personal action , theplaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcementof a contract, or the recovery of damages . Real actions, on theother hand, are those affecting title to or possession of realproperty, or interest therein.

In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, thevenue of real actions shall be the proper court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or aportion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is the

court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,

or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,at the election of the plaintiff .

In this case, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trustarrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. The fact thatFEMII's assets include real properties does not materially change thenature of the action, for the ownership interest of a stockholderover corporate assets is only inchoate as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. It is only upon theliquidation of the corporation that the stockholders, depending onthe type and nature of their stockownership, may have a real

inchoate right over the corporate assets, but then only to the extentof their stockownership.

The amended complaint is an action in personam , it beinga suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented byJulita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability toIrene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. Theyare not actions in rem where the actions are against the realproperties instead of against persons.

We point out at the outset that Irene, as categorically andperemptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident ofBatac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. The Court perceives nocompelling reason to disturb, in the confines of this case, the factual

determination of the trial court and the premises holding ittogether. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action,contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint.As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rulesof Court adverts to as the place "where the plaintiff or any of theprincipal plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amendedcomplaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 issued sometime inJune 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her

address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. Letalone the fact that one can easily secure a basic residence certificatepractically anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer'soffice and dictate whatever relevant data one desires entered, Ireneprocured CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to her motionfor reconsideration following the RTC's pronouncement against herbeing a resident of Batac.

There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the disputedtrust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of thepresent suit. It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio,Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were

included as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's newdesignated trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mererepresentatives of Irene.

Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there ismore than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences ofthe principal parties should be the basis for determining propervenue . Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the realparty-in-interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil casesought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Ireneresides.

Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes

Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac,Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have severalresidences, if such were the established fact.

Venue of actions against non-residentsBARITUA vs CAG.R. No. 100748, February 3, 1997

Facts:Private respondent filed with the RTC Pangasinan a

complaint against petitioner as owner and operator of J.B Bus Linesto recover damages after a bus owned by petitioner rammed privaterespondents car.

Private respondent in his complaint, alleged that he is aresident of Pangasinan before he went to United States where henow lives and that he is being represented by his attorney in fact.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint forimproper venue alleging that since respondent was not a resident ofthe Philippines, the complaint should be filed in pet itioners residewhich is in Sorsogon.


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Full Text Cases: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE

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G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,vs.THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the Insular Government, etal., defendants-appellants.

W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan, for appellant. Antonio Constantino, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance ofthe Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion ofthe plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction ofthe subject matter of the controversy.

The question for our consideration and decision is the power andauthority of a Court of First Instance of one province to takecognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnationof real estate located in another province.

In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in theCourt of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for thecondemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in hiscomplaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in thecomplaint that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct arailroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and itis for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of suchline that this action is brought. The land sought to be condemned is69,910 square meters in area. The complaint states that beforebeginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thoroughsearch in the office of the registry of property and of the tax where

the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom theybelonged. As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged thatthe lands in question were located in the Province of Tarlac. Thedefendants in one action all of the different owners of or personsotherwise interested in the 69,910 square meters of land to becondemned. After filing and duly serving the complaint the plaintiff,pursuant to law and pending final determination of the action, tookpossession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint,building its line and putting the same in operation. During theprogress of the action a commission to appraise the value of thelands was duly appointed, which, after taking oral testimony,amounting to 140 typewritten pages when transcribed, and aftermuch labor and prolonged consideration, made a report consistingof about 55 typewritten pages, resolving the question submitted to

it. On the coming in of this report the court, by order entered the27th of September, 1909, set the 11th day of October following forthe hearing thereon.

On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to thedefendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be madeto the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the courthad no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just beenascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemnedwas situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Provinceof Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and,after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon

the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said judgment of dismissal.

The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely upon theproposition, already referred to, that in condemnation proceedings,and in all other proceedings affecting title to land, the Court of FirstInstance of a given province has no jurisdiction, power or authoritywhere the land is located in another province, and that no suchpower, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties.

Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commissionconfer jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of these Islandswith respect to real estate in the following words: 1awphi1.net

SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance . jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds:

1. Original; and

2. Appellate.

SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction . Courts of First Instanshall have original jurisdiction: .

x x x x x x x x x

2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possessionof real property, or any interest therein, or the legality ofany tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcibleentry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.

It is apparent from the wording of these sections that it was theintention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of FirstInstance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible overthe subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is nosuggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. Nor do theprovisions of sections 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52 at all militate against theuniversality of that jurisdiction. Those provisions simply arrange forthe convenient and effective transaction of business in the courtsand do not relate to their power, authority, or jurisdiction over thesubject matter of the action. While it is provided in these sectionsthat a particular court shall hold its sessions in any other province(except under certain specified conditions), the assertions isnevertheless true that the jurisdiction of a particular court is in nowise and in no sense limited; and it is nowhere suggested, much lessprovided, that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularlysitting in said province, may not under certain conditions takecognizance of an action arising in another province or of an actionrelating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of theprovince to which it may at the time be assigned.

Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Otherprovide for the procedure by which that power or authority isprojected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of theCourt in the real and substantive sense; the other with theprocedure by which such powers are put into action. The one is thething itself; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferredfrom the court to the parties. The whole purpose and object ofprocedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely


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available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devisedis that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfectexercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set bynatural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the mostperfect opportunity for the powers of the courts to transmutethemselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties beforeit. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdictionof the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility inrighteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient

objection which can be urged against procedure to-day is that it sorestricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that thepart of its authority effective for justice between the parties is manytimes an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose ofprocedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate theapplication of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It wascreated not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote theadministration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself whichcourts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as themeans best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is ameans to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the courtare made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character ofthe one and takes on that of the other the administration of justicebecomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave

criticism.

The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair andconvenient hearing to the parties with complete justice betweenthem as a result. While a fair hearing is as essential as thesubstantive power of the court to administer justice in the premises,and while the one is the natural result o the other, it is different inits nature and relates to a different thing. The power or authority ofthe court over the subject matter existed and was fixed beforeprocedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter orchange that power or authority; it simply directs the manner inwhich it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certaincases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with theprovisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting toexercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not meanthat it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply thathe may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgmentmay thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essentialto sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction betweenperson and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to thesubject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court overdiminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall beremoved. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none butthe legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction ofthe court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend onthe consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties orany of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may beconferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by anobjection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it hasattached.

In the light of these observations, we proceed to a consideration ofthose provisions of the law which the plaintiff claims are decisive ofhis contention that a Court of First Instance of one province has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action by a railroad companyto condemn lands located in another province. The plaintiff relies forthe success of its cause upon section 377 of the Code of CivilProcedure and upon the special laws relating to the condemnationof lands railroad corporations. We take up first the section of theCode of Civil Procedure referred to.

The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at onceraises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merelya matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant. If theirinterests are best subserved by bringing in the Court Instance of thecity of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of IlocosNorte, there is no controlling reason why such a course should notbe followed. The matter is, under the law, entirely within the controlof either party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such

selection is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant maymake timely objection and, as a result, the venue is changed to meetthe requirements of the law. It is true that this court has more thanonce held than an agreement to submit a controversy to a courtwhich, under the procedural law, has not been selected as theappropriate court, generally speaking, to hear such controversy, cannot be enforced. This means simply that either party to such acontract may ignore it at pleasure. The law will not compel thefulfillment of an agreement which deprives one of the parties to it ofthe right to present his cause to that court which the law designatesas the most appropriate. But the principle asserted in the caseswhich hold thus is no authority for the proposition that two personshaving a controversy which they desire to have decided by acompetent tribunal may not, by appropriate procedure, submit it t

any court having jurisdiction in the premises. In the one case therelation is contractual to be enforced over the objection of one ofthe contracting parties. In the other relation is not contractualbecause not between the parties; but, rather, between the partiesand the court. In the one case it is a contract to be enforced; in theother, a condition to be met.

This being so, we say again, even though it be repetition, that after jurisdiction over real property in the Islands has been conferred sogenerally and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to be presumedconstrued that the legislature intended to modify or restrict jurisdiction when it came to frame a Code of Civil Procedure theobject of which is to make that jurisdiction effective. Suchmodification or restriction should be held only by virtue of theclearest and most express provisions.

The wording of that section should be carefully examined. It reads asfollows:

SEC. 377. Venue of actions . Actions to confirm title real estate, or to secure a partition of real estate, or tocancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to realestate, or to obtain possession of real estate, or to recoverdamages for injuries to real estate, or to establish anyinterest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for thecondemnation of real estate for public use, shall bebrought in the province were the lands, or some part

thereof, is situated; actions against executors,administrators, and guardians touching the performanceof their official duties, and actions for account andsettlement by them, and actions for the distribution of theestates of deceased persons among the heirs anddistributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shallbe brought in the province in which the will was admittedto probate, or letters of administration were granted, orthe guardian was appointed. And all actions not hereinotherwise provided for may be brought in any provincewhere the defendant or any necessary party defendantmay reside or be found, or in any province where theplaintiff, except in cases were other special provision is


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made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor thedefendant resides within the Philippine Islands and theaction is brought to seize or obtain title to property of thedefendant within the Philippine Islands and the action isbrought to seize or obtain title to property of thedefendant within the Philippine Islands, the action shall bebrought in the province where the property which theplaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated or isfound: Provided , that in an action for the foreclosure of a

mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon thedefendant is not personal, but is by publication, inaccordance with law, the action must be brought in theprovince where the land lies. And in all cases process mayissue from the court in which an action or specialproceeding is pending, to be enforced in any province tobring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decreesof the court. The failure of a defendant to object t thevenue of the action at the time of entering his appearancein the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of allobjection to the place or tribunal in which the action isbrought, except in the actions referred to in the firstsixteen lines of this section relating to real estate, andactions against executors, administrators, and guardians,

and for the distribution of estates and payment oflegacies.

Leaving out of discussion for the moment actions and proceedingsaffecting estates of deceased persons, they resting upon a differentfooting being governed by special laws, it is to be observed that thesection contains no express inhibition against the court. It providessimply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be brought inthe province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." Theprohibition here is clearly directed against the one who begins theaction and lays the venue. The court, before the action iscommenced, has nothing to do with either. The plaintiff does both.Only when that is done does the section begin to operate effectivelyso far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nor a limitationon the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is notto take something from the court but to grant something to thedefendant. Its wording clearly deprives the court of nothing which ithad, but gives the defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rightswhich he did not have. It establishes a relation not between thecourt and the subject ,after, but between the plaintiff and thedefendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touchesconvenience, not substance. It simply gives to defendant theunqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place wherehis land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its objectis to secure to him a convenient trial. If it had been the intention ofthe law-makers by section 377 to put a limitation to the jurisdictionof the court, how easy it would have been to say so squarely. "NoCourt of First Instance shall have or take jurisdiction of an actiontouching title to or interest in real property lying wholly in aprovince other than that in which such court is authorized to holdsessions," or a similar provision, would have been sufficient. Thiswould have been clearly a limitation on the court rather than theparty. There would have been no room for doubt. The legislature,however, did not do so. It, rather, chose to use language whichimposes a limitation on the rights of the plaintiff.

In saying this we do not desire to force construction. 1awphil.net Courts should give to language its plain meaning, leaving thelegislature to take care of the consequences. The PhilippineCommission having, in fullest phrase, given the Courts of FirstInstance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Islands by

Act No. 136, we are of the opinion that the jurisdiction ought not tobe held to be withdrawn except by virtue of an Act equally express,or so clearly inconsistent as to amount to the same thing. The factthat section 377 is not such Act, that it is found in code of Procedurerather than in the substantive law, that it deals with the relativeprocedural rights of parties rather than the power of the court, thatit relates to the place rather than to the thing , that it composes thwhole of a chapter headed simply "Venue," lead us to hold that theCourt of First Instance of Tarlac had full jurisdiction of the subject

matter of this action at the time when it was dismissed.

That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties isindisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usualcourse of practice that is, by the process of the court but by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itselfto the jurisdiction by beginning the action. (Ayers vs. Watson, 1U.S., 594; Fisher vs. Shropshire, 147 U.S., 133.) The defendants arenow in this court asking that the action be not dismissed butcontinued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of thecourt but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose ofmaintaining that very jurisdiction over them.

Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearlyguilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if theland does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts. It alleged in itscomplaint:

4. That, according to the information secured after aminute investigation in the offices of the land registry andof the land-tax record of the municipalities within whose jurisdiction lie all the parcels composing the tract of land inquestion, the owners and occupants of the same, withtheir names as they appear on the plan, are as follows.

At the time it commenced the action it was possessed of every factwhich a complete knowledge of the location of the lands sought to

be condemned required. It had the map of its entire line fromPaniqui to Tayug, showing the provinces and the variomunicipalities through which it runs. Not only that: Before beginningits action it had to know the name of every necessary defendant, theland he owned, and the extent of that portion to be condemned.The investigation required to ascertain these facts would ofnecessity force into plaintiff's mind the knowledge required to bringthe action in the proper court. That the plaintiff at the time itcommenced this action did not know in what province its proposedstations and terminals were is difficult to believe. That it did notknow in what province the land lay which it was about to make thesubject of so important a proceeding is still more difficult to believe.In spite of all this, however, it deliberately laid the venue in aprovince where no part of the land lay, took possession of the landin controversy, constructed its line, switches, and stations, and afternearly two years of litigation, accompanied with great trouble to thecourt and trouble and expense to the parties, calmly asks thedismissal of the case for the reason that it did not know where itsown railroad was located. Under such circumstances a dismissal ofthe action over the objection of the defendants ought not to bepermitted expect upon absolute necessity and then only onpayment of the costs and expenses of the defendants and of theactin. (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra .)

There is no equitable ground, then, upon which the plaintiff mayclaim that it has not yielded itself to the jurisdiction of the court.Nor, as we have seen, is there a legal ground. As we have already


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said, the plaintiff, having brought the action, of necessity submitteditself to the jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage of thesituation it itself created to take possession of the lands described inthe complaint, construct its lines, switches, stations, yards andterminals, and to carry the cause through two years of expensivelitigation. It now attempts to make all this go for naught alleging itsown negligence as a reason for such attempt. (Ayers vs. Watson andFisher vs. Shropshire, supra .)

While the latter part of section 377 provides that "the failure of adefendant to object to the venue of the action at the time ofentering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver onhis part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action isbrought," except, a month other things, in actions affecting realestate, we apprehend that it was not intended that a defendant cannot waive such objection in such excepted cases. Nor we do believethat such provision is controlling in this case. In the first place, theapplication is restricted to " the time of entering his appearance inthe action ." It might well have been in the mind of the lawmakersthat, at the time of entering his appearance in the action, thedefendant would not ordinarily be fully informed of all the facts ofthe case, at least not sufficiently to warrant his being held to awaiver of important rights; whereas, later in the cause, as when hefiles his answer or goes to trial, being fully informed, he might justlybe held to have waived his right to make such objection. for thisreason it might well be that the Legislature purposely refrained fromextending the time for his protection beyond the "time of enteringhis appearance in the action." Moreover, there is, in said clause, noprohibition against an express waiver of his rights by the defendant.The general rule of law is that a person may renounce any rightwhich the law gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibitedor the right conferred is of such a nature that its renunciation wouldbe against public policy. This right of renunciation is so thoroughlyestablished, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code ofCivil Procedure, that its exercise by a defendant in relation to thevenue of the action will not be held to have been abridged bysection 377 without very clear provision therein to that effect. Thereis no part of that section clear enough to warrant such a holding.Even though the terms of said section were much clearer than theyare in this respect, we should still hold, if they were much short ofexpress, that the right of renunciation is not abridged, foundingourselves not only upon the principles already laid down but alsoupon the proposition of general law embodied in section 294 of thecode of Civil Procedure which provides that:

When a statute or instrument is equally susceptible of twointerpretations, one in favor of natural right and the otheragainst it, the former is to be adopted. itc-alf

Moreover, it should be noted that this prohibition, if it be such,

against waiver refers exclusively to the defendant. The plaintiff isgiven no rights respecting it. Yet it is the plaintiff who is here callingfor the application of the provision even against the declared will ofthe person who is expressly named as the sole beneficiary. We willnot by interpretation extend this provision so as to contravene theprinciples of natural rights. We will not construed it so as to includedin its terms nor named as its beneficiary. But even if the plaintiffwere entitled to invoke the aid of the provision he is estopped fromso doing. (Wanzer vs. Howland, 10 Wis., 7; Babcock vs. Farewell, 146Ill. App., 307; White vs. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Dill (U.S.), 183;Shuttle vs. Thompson, 15 Wall., 159; Beecher vs. Mill Co., 45 Mich.,103; Tomb vs. Rochester R. R. Co., 18 Barb., 585; Ferguson vs. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.), 230; State vs. Mitchell, 31 Ohio State, 592;

Counterman vs. Dublin, 38 Ohio State, 515; McCarthy vs. Lavas89 Ill., 270; Ricketts vs. Spraker, 77 Ind., 371; Strosser vs. City of Wayne, 100 Ind., 443). Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedurereads:

Conclusive presumptions . The following presumptioor deductions, which the law expressly directs to be madefrom particular facts, are deemed conclusive:

1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, oromission, intentionally and deliberately led another tobelieve a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,he can not, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,act, or omission, be permitted to falsity it.

(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. Rep., 67; 69; Municipality of OasRoa, 7 Phil. Rep., 20, 22; Trinidad vs. Ricafort et al., 7 Phil. Rep., 44453; Macke et al vs. Camps, 7 Phil. Rep., 553, 555.)

The fact is, there are very few rights which may not be renounced,expressly or impliedly. (Christenson vs. Charleton, 34 Atl., 226, 2269 Vt., 91; Donahue vs. Windsor County Ins. Co., 56 Vt., 9

Donahaue vs. Windsor Ins. co., 33 Atl., 902, 904, 66 Conn., 21, 40;Fitzpatrick vs. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116, 134, 17Atl., 411, 7 Am. St. Rep., 288; Lewis vs. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,Conn., 72, 91; State vs. Hartley, 52 Atl., 615, 617, 75 Conn., 104; FirsNat. Bank vs. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn., 22, 44; JohnsonSchar, 70 N.W., 838, 839, 9 S. D., 536; Corey vs. Bolton, 63 NSupp., 915, 917, 31 Misc. Rep., 138; Mason's Supply Co. vs. JonesN. Y. Supp., 806, 809, 58 App. Div., 231; Monroe Waterworks Co.City of Monroe, 85 N.W., 685, 688, 100 Wis., 11; Fraser vs. Aetna Ins. Co., 90 N.W., 476, 481, 114 Wis., 510; Cedar Rapids Water Co.vs. Cedat Rapids, 90 N.W., 746, 749, 117 Iowa, 250; KennedyRoberts, 75 N.W., 363, 366, 105 Iowa, 521; Shaw vs. Spencer, Mass., 382, 395, 97 Am. Dec., 107, 1 Am. Rep., 115; West vs. P127 Mass., 367, 367, 372; Fulkerson vs. Lynn, 64 Mo. App., 649, 65

Michigan Savings & Loan Ass'n. vs. Missouri, K & T. Trust Co., 73 MApp., 161, 165; Perin vs. Parker, 18 N. E., 747, 748, 126 Ill., 201, L.R.A., 336, 9 Am. St. Rep., 571; Keller vs. Robinson & Co., 38 N.1072, 1075, 152 Ull. 458; Star Brewery Co. vs. Primas, 45 N.E., 1148, 163 Ill., 652; United Firemen's Ins. Co. vs. Thomas (U.S.),Fed., 406, 408, 27 C.C. A., 42, 47 L.R.A., 450; Rice vs. FidelitDeposit Co. (U.S.), 103 Fed., 427, 43 C.C.A., 270; Sidway vs. MissLand & Live Stock Co. (U.S.), 116 Fed., 381, 395; able vs. UnStates Life Ins. Co. (U.S.), 111 Fed., 19, 31, 49 C.C.A., 216L PeninsularLand Transp., etc., Co. vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va., 666, 676, 1S.E., 237; Dey vs. Martin, 78 Va., 1, 7; Liverpool & L.& G. Ins. Co.T.M. Richardson Lumber Co., 69 Pac., 938, 951, 11 Okl., 585; Liveseyvs. Omaha Hotel, 5 Neb., 50, 69; Cutler vs. Roberts, 7 Nebr., 4, 14, 2Am. Rep., 371; Warren vs. Crane, 50 Mich., 300, 301, 15 N.W., 465Portland & R.R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Oreg., 587, 592, 32 Pac., 688689; First Nat. Bank vs. Maxwell, 55 Pac., 980, 982, 123 Cal., 360, 69Am. St. Rep., 64; Robinson vs. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 38 Atl., 32322, 90 Me., 385; Reed vs. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61 Pac., 21, 2Utah, 295; Dale vs. Continental Ins. Co., 31 S.W., 266, 269, 95 Tenn.,38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 829, 95 Tenn., 38Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 827, 78 Miss., 525Bucklen vs. Johnson, 49 N.E., 612, 617, 19 Ind. App., 406.)

We have delayed until this moment the citation of authoritiesrelative to the proposition that venue is not jurisdictional as tosubject matter and that defendant's rights in respect thereto aresuch that they may be waived, expressly or by implication, for the


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reason that we desired that the principles which rule the caseshould first be discussed and presented in the abstract form. In thecase of First National Bank of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U.S., 141), itwas held that the exemption of national banks from suits in Statecourts in counties other than the county or city in which theassociation was located was a personal privilege which could bewaived was located was a personal privilege which could be waivedby appearing in such brought in another county, but in a court of thesame dignity , and making a defense without claiming the immunity

granted by Congress. the court said:

This exemption of national banking associations from suitsin State courts, established elsewhere than in the countyor city in which such associations were located, was, we donot doubt, prescribed for the convenience of thoseinstitutions, and prevent interruption in their business thatmight result from their books being sent to distantcounties in obedience to process from State courts. (FirstNat. Bank of Bethel vs. National Pahquioque Bank, 14Wall., 383, 394; Croker vs. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass.,240.) But, without indulging in conjecture as to the objectof the exemption in question, it is sufficient that it wasgranted by Congress, and, if it had been claimed by thedefendant when appearing in the superior court ofCleveland County, must have been recognized. Thedefendant did not, however, choose to claim immunityfrom suit in that court. It made defense upon the merits,and, having been unsuccessful, prosecuted a writ of errorto the supreme court of the State, and in the lattertribunal, for the first time, claimed the immunity grantedto it by Congress. This was too late. Considering the objectas well as the words of the statute authorizing suit againsta national banking association to be brought in the properState court of the county where it is located, we are ofopinion that its exemption from suits in other courts of thesame State was a personal privilege that it would waive,and, which, in this case, the defendant did waive, and,which, in this case, the defendant did waive, by appearingand making defense without claiming the immunitygranted by Congress. No reason can be suggested why onecourt of a State, rather than another, both being of thesame dignity, should take cognizance of a suit against anational bank, except the convenience of the bank. Andthis consideration supports the view that the exemption ofa national bank from suit in any State court except one ofthe county or city in which it is located is a personalprivilege, which it could claim or not, as it deemednecessary.

In the case of Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369), the court said:

The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a personmay be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction ofthe courts. It is rather in the nature of a personalexemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which hemay waive. If the citizenship of the parties is sufficient, adefendant may consent to be sued anywhere he pleases,and certainly jurisdiction will not be ousted because he hasconsented. Here, the defendant companies have providedthat they can be found in a district other than that inwhich they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding isadopted, and they have been so found. In our opinion,

therefore, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the causes,and should proceed to hear and decide them.

In the case of St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. vs. McBrid(141 U.S., 127), the court used the following language:

The first part of section 1 of the Act of 1887, as amendedin 1888, gives, generally, to the circuit courts of the UnitedStates jurisdiction of controversies between citizens ofdifferent States where the matter in dispute exceeds thesum of two thousand dollars exclusive of interest andcosts. Such a controversy was presented in this complaint.It was therefore a controversy of which the circuit courtsof the United States have jurisdiction. Assume that it istrue as defendant alleges, that this is not a case in which jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that thecontroversy is between citizens of different States, butthat it comes within the scope of that other clause, whichprovides that "no civil sit shall be brought before either ofsaid courts, against any person, by any original process orproceeding, in any other district than that whereof he isinhabitant," still the right to insist upon suit only in the onedistrict is a personal privilege which he may waive, and hedoes waive it by pleading to the merits. In Ex parteSchollenberger (96 U.S., 369, 378), Chief Justice Waitesaid: "The Act of Congress prescribing the place where aperson may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of apersonal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is onewhich he may waive." The Judiciary Act of 1789 (sec. 11,Stat., 79), besides giving general jurisdiction to circuitcourts over suits between citizens of different States,further provided, generally, that no civil suit should bebrought before either of said c

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