[G.R. No. 136426.August 6, 1999]E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD.,petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati City and IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondent.D E C I S I O NGONZAGA-REYES,J.:Before this Court is a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated August 5, 1998 and November 20, 1998 of the public respondent Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 and praying that the public respondent court be ordered to desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 98-824.Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units.They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein.[1]Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City[2]but the Sheriffs Return of Service[3]stated that the summons was duly served upon defendant E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons.On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss[4]alleging that on May 6, 1998, summons intended for defendant was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of defendant at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City.Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.Defendant contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made.Meanwhile, on June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default[5]alleging that defendant has failed to file an Answer despite its receipt allegedly on May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriffs Return.On June 22, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss[6]allegingthat the records show that defendant, through its branch manager, Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually received the summons and the complaint on May 8, 1998 as evidenced by the signature appearing on the copy of the summons and not on May 5, 1998 as stated in the Sheriffs Return nor on May 6, 1998 as stated in themotion to dismiss; that defendant has transferred its office from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro to its new office address at Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and that the purpose of the rule is to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.On August 5, 1998, the trial court issued an Order[7]denying defendants Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.Defendant was given ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading.The trial court stated that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.On August 19, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8]alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word manager was changed to general manager, secretary to corporate secretary, and excluding therefrom agent and director.On August 27, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to defendants Motion for Reconsideration[9]alleging that defendants branch manager did bring home to the defendant-corporation the notice of the filing of the action and by virtue of which a motion to dismiss was filed; and that it was one (1) month after receipt of the summons and the complaint that defendant chose to file a motion to dismiss.On September 4, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Reply[10]contending that the changes in the new rules are substantial and not just general semantics.Defendants Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Order dated November 20, 1998.[11]Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners motions to dismiss and for reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because the summons intended for it was improperly served.Petitioner invokes Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Private respondent filed its Comment to the petition citing the cases of Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. vs. NLRC[12]wherein it was held that service upon a construction project manager is valid and in Gesulgon vs. NLRC[13]which held that a corporation is bound by the service of summons upon its assistant manager.The only issue for resolution is whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.When the complaint was filed by Petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was already in force.[14]Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureprovides that:When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. (underscoring supplied).This provision revised the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that:SEC. 13.Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president,manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. (underscoring supplied).Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on statutory constructionexpressio unios est exclusioalteriusand argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.We agree with petitioner.Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager[15]; a corporations assistant manager[16]; ordinary clerk of a corporation[17]; private secretary of corporate executives[18]; retained counsel[19]; officials who had charge or control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager[20]; or the corporations Chief Finance and Administrative Officer[21].In these cases, these persons were considered as agent within the contemplation of the old rule.[22]Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.The cases cited by private respondent are therefore not in point.In the Kanlaon case, this Court ruled that under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the party himself; if the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent, summons shall be served on such person.In said case, summons was served on one Engr. Estacio who managed and supervised the construction project in Iligan City (although the principal address of the corporation is in Quezon City) and supervised the work of the employees.It was held that as manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner such that summons for petitioner was validly served on him as agent and authorized representative of petitioner.Also in the Gesulgon case cited by private respondent, the summons was received by the clerk in the office of the Assistant Manager (at principal office address) and under Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule), summons may be made upon the clerk who is regarded as agent within the contemplation of the rule.The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.The rule now states general manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent, or any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:[23]x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations,especially the word agent of the corporation.The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of serviceof summons but whose very appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, isan illustration of the need for this revised section with limited scope and specific terminology.Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an independent practitioner. (underscoring supplied)Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, stated that (T)he rule must be strictly observed.Service must be made to one named in (the) statute x x x.[24]It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined.In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing,[25]the Court held:Astrict compliancewith the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation.The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient.x x x.The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.In other words, to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. x x x.The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.x x x. (underscoring supplied).Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper.[26]Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firms branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at the firms principal office.In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Dizon,[27]it was held that the service of summons on the general manager of the insurance firms Cebu branch was improper; default order could have been obviated had the summons been served at the firms principal office.And in the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al.[28]the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (on Priorities in modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper.Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person.There is no question that the defendants voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.[29]Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.[30]This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[31]which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules.Section 20 now provides that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons.Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.There being no proper service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.[32]WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.The assailed Orders of the public respondent trial court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.Thepublic respondent Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 98-824, and all its orders and issuances in connection therewith are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.

PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR.,G.R. No. 170943Petitioner,Present:PUNO,C.J.,Chairperson,CARPIO,-v e r s u s-CORONA,AZCUNA andLEONARDO-DE CASTRO,JJ.PNOC EXPLORATIONCORPORATION,Respondent.Promulgated:September 23, 2008x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:This is a petition for review[1]of the September 22, 2005 decision[2]and December 29, 2005 resolution[3]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 69262, sought to collect the amount ofP698,502.10 representing petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan[4]advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication.Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate[5]and an affidavit of service of respondents employee[6]to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address.When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case be set for the reception of its evidenceex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated September 11, 2003.Respondent proceeded with theex partepresentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondents evidenceex partebe stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted.Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on service by publication. Moreover, pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes, particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity and justice.During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to payP698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit.[7]Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision[8]sustaining the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied reconsideration.[9]Thus, this petition.Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely, lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the September 11, 2003 order and preference for technicality rather than justice and equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actionsin rem, not actionsin personamlike a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not respondents messenger.The petition lacks merit.P R O P R I E T YO FSERVICE BY PUBLICATIONSection 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 14.Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.In any actionwhere the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, orwhenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulationand in such places and for such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied)Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.Petitioner invokes the distinction between an actionin remand an actionin personamand claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an actionin rem. Petitioner is wrong. Thein rem/in personamdistinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable.[10]Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule toin remactions only.[11]This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies[i]n any actionwhere the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies toanyaction, whetherin personam,in remorquasi in rem.[12]Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19,[13]Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons bypublicationis complemented by service of summons byregistered mailto the defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective,the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the actionagainst him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:SEC. 20.Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer.[14]This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.E N T I T L E M E N TT ONOTICE OFPROCEEDINGSThe trial court allowed respondent to present its evidenceex parteon account of petitioners failure to file his answer within the prescribed period. Petitioner assails this action on the part of the trial court as well as the said courts failure to furnish him with copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings.The effects of a defendants failure to file an answer within the time allowed therefor are governed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court:SEC. 3.Default; declaration of.If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.SEC. 4.Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedingsbut not to take part in the trial. (emphasis supplied)If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to file his answer on time. That was in fact why he had to file an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration andto Admit Attached Answer. But respondent moved only for theex partepresentation of evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the trial court stated:The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that despite and notwithstanding service of summons by publication, no answer has been filed with the Court within the required period and/or forthcoming.[]Effectively[,] that was a finding that the defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in default for failure to file an answer or any responsive pleading within the period fixedin the publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be found and for which reason, service of summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of the summons. In other words, it was reasonable to expect that the defendant will not receive any notice or order in his last known address. Hence, [it was] impractical to send any notice or order to him.Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear out that a copy of the order of September 11, 2003 was mailed to the defendant at his last known addressbut it was not claimed. (emphasis supplied)As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to permitting respondent to present its evidenceex partebut in effect issued an order of default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party.[15]Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have been issued.To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be sentto him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not requirethat the impossible be done.[16]Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.[17]Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.[18]Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in default, he could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was nonethelessstill mailed to petitioner at his last known address but it was unclaimed.C O R R E C T N E S SO FNON-ADMISSION OF ANSWERPetitioner failed to file his answer within the required period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the admission of his answer had he filed it on time. Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission.Petitioners plea for equity must fail in the face of the clear and express language of the rules of procedure and of the September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement.[19]Equity may be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

LEAHPALMA,Petitioner,-versus-HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO,Respondents.G.R. No. 165273Present:CORONA,J., Chairperson,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,PERALTA, andMENDOZA,JJ.Promulgated:March 10, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONPERALTA,J.:Assailed in this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Orders datedMay 7, 2004[1]andJuly 21, 2004[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofIloiloCity, Branch 24, granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent Psyche Elena Agudo and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.On July 28, 2003, petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequentlyfound, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same washers as the label therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them.OnFebruary 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private respondent was out of the country.[3]OnMarch 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer[4]stating that he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of the country and the Answer was already due.OnMarch 15, 2004, private respondent's counsel filed a Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer,[5]and stating that while the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to private respondent for her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate inIreland; thus, the counsel prayed for another 20 days to file the Answer.OnMarch 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[6]on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.Petitioner filed her Opposition[7]to the motion to dismiss, arguing that a substituted service of summons on private respondent's husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service,i.e., by personal or substituted service.Private respondent filed a Comment[8]on petitioner's Opposition, and petitioner filed a Reply[9]thereto.OnMay 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss.It found that while the summons was served at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her by publication.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order datedJuly 21, 2004.Petitioner is now before us alleging that the public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that:I. Substituted service of summons upon private respondent, a defendant residing in thePhilippinesbut temporarily outside the country is invalid;II. Section 16, Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the mode of service of summons upon a defendant residing in the Philippines, but temporarily outsidethe country, exclusively to extraterritorial service of summons under section 15 of the same rule;III. In not ruling that by filing two (2) motions for extension of time to file Answer, private respondent had voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, hence, equivalent to having been served with summons;IV. The cases cited in his challenged Order of May 7, 2004 constitutestare decisisdespite his own admission that the factual landscape in those decided cases are entirely different from those in this case.[10]Petitioner claims that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Section 16, Rule 14, limits the service of summons upon thedefendant-resident who is temporarily out of the country exclusively by means of extraterritorial service,i.e., by personal service or by publication, pursuant to Section 15 of the same Rule. Petitioner further argues that in filing two motions for extension of time to file answer, private respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.In her Comment, private respondent claims that petitioner'scertiorariunder Rule 65 is not the proper remedy but a petition for review under Rule 45, since the RTC ruling cannot be considered as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion; that the petition was not properly verified because while the verification was dated September 15, 2004, the petition was dated September 30, 2004. She insists that since she was out of the country at the time the service of summons was made, such service should be governed by Section 16, in relation to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; that there was no voluntary appearance on her part when her counsel filed two motions for extension of time to file answer, since she filed her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction within the period provided under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.In her Reply, petitioner claims that the draft of the petition and the verification and certification against forum shopping were sent to her for her signature earlier than the date of the finalized petition, since the petition could not be filed without her signed verification.Petitioner avers that when private respondent filed her two motions for extension of time to file answer, no special appearance was made to challenge the validity of the service of summons on her.The parties subsequently filed their respective memoranda as required.We shall first resolve theprocedural issues raised by private respondent.Private respondent's claim that the petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 is a wrong remedy thus the petition should be dismissed, is not persuasive.A petition forcertiorariis proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.[11]There is grave abuse of discretion when public respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only from a final orderthat completely disposes of the case;that no appeal may be taken from(a) an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution;(g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;or (h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice.In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65.In this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings against her, but itfalls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these defendants is still pending.[12]Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil action forcertiorariis proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal.[13]Anent private respondent's allegation that the petition was not properly verified, we find the same to be devoid of merit.The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative.[14]In this instance, petitioner attached a verification to her petition although dated earlier than the filing of her petition. Petitioner explains that since a draft of the petition and the verification were earlier sent to her inNew Yorkfor her signature, the verification was earlier dated than the petition forcertiorarifiled with us. We accept such explanation.While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the petition forcertioraribe verified, this is not an absolute necessity where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions raised are mainly of law.[15]In this case, the issue raised is purely of law.Now on the merits, the issue for resolution is whether there was a valid service of summons on private respondent.In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former.[16]Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of thePhilippinesat the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides:Sec. 16.Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within thePhilippines, but who is temporarily out of it, servicemay,by leave of court, bealsoeffected out of thePhilippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied)The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:SEC. 15.Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of summons may be made only by publication.We do not agree.InMontefalcon v. Vasquez,[17]we said that because Section 16 ofRule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of thePhilippines.Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14;(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.[18]InMontalban v. Maximo,[19]we held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suitin personamagainst residents of thePhilippinestemporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant.In the same case, we expounded on the rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of thePhilippines.x x xA man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up.If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.[20]Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which reads:SEC. 7.Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.[21]It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.[22]Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.[23]In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf.Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place where the summons was served was her residence, though she was temporarily out of the country at that time, and that Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to file answer submitted by private respondent's counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff's Return by stating that private respondent was out of the country and that his service was engaged by respondent's husband.In his motion for another extension of time to file answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a draft of the answer had already been prepared, which would be submitted to private respondent, who was in Ireland for her clarification and/or verification before the Philippine Consulate there.These statements establish the fact that private respondent had knowledge of the case filed against her, and that her husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her counsel.In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC hadindeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file answer be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.[24]When private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in her motions for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise.[25]Considering the foregoing, we find that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Orders.WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED.The Orders datedMay 7, 2004andJuly 21, 2004of theRegionalTrialCourtofIloiloCity, Branch 24, are herebySET ASIDE.Private respondent isDIRECTEDto file her Answer within the reglementary period from receipt of this decision.SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES DANTE andG.R. No. 167230MA. TERESA L. GALURA,Petitioners,Present:PUNO,C.J., Chairperson,CARPIO,- versus -CORONA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBERSAMIN,JJ.MATH-AGRO CORPORATION,Promulgated:Respondent.August 14, 2009x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a petition[1]for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.The petition challenges the 25 January and 28 February 2005 Resolutions[2]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88088 dismissing the petition[3]for annulment of judgment and final order and denying the motion[4]for reconsideration, respectively, filed by Dante and Ma. Teresa L. Galura (Spouses Galura).The Spouses Galura sought to annul the 27 June 2001 Decision[5]and 10 November 2004 Order[6]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 3, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 473-M-2000.The FactsIn March 1997, the Spouses Galura purchased broiler starters and finishers worthP426,000 from Math-Agro Corporation (MAC).The Spouses Galura paid MACP72,500.Despite several demands, they failed to pay theP353,500 unpaid balance.MAC engaged the services of a certain Atty. Ronolfo S. Pasamba (Atty. Pasamba) for the purpose of collecting theP353,500 unpaid balance from the Spouses Galura.In his letter[7]dated 13 November 1998 and addressed to the Spouses Galura, Atty. Pasamba stated:Ang kinatawan ng aming kliyente na Math Agro Corporation na may tanggapan sa Balagtas , Bulacan, ay lumapit sa aming tanggapan at kinuha ang aming paglilingkod bilang manananggol kaugnay sa inyong natitirang pagkakautang sa kanila na halagangP353,500.00, na hanggang sa ngayon ay hindi pa ninyo nababayaran.Dahilan dito , kayo ay binibigyan namin ng limang (5) araw mula sa pagkatanggap ng sulat na ito upang bayaran ang aming nabanggit na kliyente, pati na ang kaukulang tubo nito.Ikinalulungkot naming sabihin sa inyo na kung hindi ninyo bibigyang pansin ang mga bagay na ito, mapipilitan na kaming magsampa ng kaukulang dimanda sa hukuman laban sa inyo upang mapangalagaan namin ang karapatan at interes ng aming nabanggit na kliyente.Inaasahan namin na bibigyang pansin ninyo ang mga bagay na ito .In its complaint[8]dated 21 June 2000 and filed with the RTC, MAC prayed that the RTC order the Spouses Galura to pay theP353,500 unpaid balance andP60,000 attorneys fees and litigation expenses.In the complaint, MAC stated that defendants are both of legal age, spouses, and residents of G.L. Calayan Agro System Inc., Bo. Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac, and/or 230 Apo St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, where they may be served with summonses and other processes of this Honorable Court.Clerk of Court Emmanuel L. Ortega issued the corresponding summons[9]dated 15 August 2000 requiring the Spouses Galura to file their answer within 15 days, otherwise judgment by default would be taken against them.On 17 September 2000, Court Process Server Faustino B. Sildo (Sildo) went to 230 Apo Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, to serve the summons.There, Dante Galuras father, Dominador Galura, told Sildo that the Spouses Galura were presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City.On 22 September 2000, Sildo went to G.L. Calayan Agro System, Inc. in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac to serve the summons.Sildo learned that the property had been foreclosed and that the Spouses Galura no longer resided there.On 26 September 2000, Sildo went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, to serve the summons.Sildo served the summons on Teresa L. Galuras sister, Victoria Lapuz (Lapuz).In his return of service[10]dated 4 October 2000, Sildo stated:THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on September 22, 2000 the undersigned went to the given address of the defendant at G. Bo. Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac for the purpose of serving the summons, issued in the above-entitled caseThat the defendants is [sic] no longer residing at the given address and their property was foreclose [sic] by the Bank,That on September 17, the undersigned went to the given address of the defendants at 230 Apo St., Sta Mesa Heights, Quezon City;That the defendants is [sic] not residing at the given address as per information given by Mr. Dominador Galura father of the defendants.That Mr. Dominador Galura give [sic] the address of the defendant where they are presently residing at Tierra Fura [sic] Subd. at Tandang Sora, Quezon City.That on September 26, 2000 the undersigned went to Tandang Sora where the defendants presently residing [sic] Tierra Fura [sic] Subd. for the purpose of serving the summons, complaint together with the annexes,That Ms. Victoria Lapuz sister-in-Law of Dante Galura received the copy of said summons, as evidence [sic] by her signature appearing on the face of original summons.The Spouses Galura failed to file their answer.In its Order dated 23 January 2001, the RTC declared the Spouses Galura in default and allowed MAC to present its evidenceex parte.In its 27 June 2001 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of MAC and ordered the Spouses Galura to pay theP353,500 unpaid balance,P30,000 attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation.The RTC stated:Based on the facts and findings established above, the Court is of the considered view that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is in order.Likewise, this Court strongly believes that the failure of the defendants or their refusal to file any answer to the complaint is a clear admission on their part of their obligation to the plaintiff.It may even be safely presumed that by their inaction, defendants have no valid defense against the claim of the plaintiff such that under the circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to pass judgment on the issued [sic] based on the evidence on record.The award of attorneys fees in the amount ofP30,000.00 is justified under the premises in view of the courts finding that the defendants acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the following:1.The sum ofP353,500.00 representing the unpaid purchase price of the poultry products plus interest of 6% per annum accruing from the date of defendants receipt of the first demand letter on October 18, 1998 until full payment is made;2.The sum ofP30,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and3. The costs of suit.SO ORDERED.[11]In its Order dated 10 November 2004, the RTC issued a writ of execution to implement the 27 June 2001 Decision.The RTC stated:In support of the motion, it is alleged among others that on June 27, 2001, the Decision was rendered in the above-entitled case, has become final and executory on August 1, 2001 and was duly recorded in the Book of Entry of Judgment.On the other hand, the fifteen (15) days period given to the defendants, from receipt of the order of the Court dated November 11, 2003 had already lapsed without complying therewith, hence his right to file comment on the Motion for Execution filed by the plaintiff was waived.For reasons heretofore made apparent, the Court resolves to grant the motion for execution.[12]On 13 December 2004, the Spouses Galura received from their parents-in-law a copy of the 10 November 2004 Order.On 6 January 2005, the Spouses Galura filed with the Court of Appeals a petition[13]for annulment of judgment and final order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ortemporary restraining order.The Spouses Galura claimed that the RTCs 27 June 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order were void for two reasons: (1) the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the substituted service of summons was invalid, and (2) there was extrinsic fraud because MAC made them believe that it would not file a case against them.The Spouses Galura stated:The assailed decision dated June 27, 2001 and the order of execution dated November 10, 2004, issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 473-M-2000, should be annulled pursuant to Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Court.1.The assailed decision and order of execution are null and void having been rendered and issued despite failure of the court a quo to first acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners, on account of the improper service of summons upon them.2.The assailed decision and order of execution were rendered with extrinsic fraud in attendance.The owner of Math-Agro and herein petitioners had an existing agreement for the settlement of their obligation, and herein petitioners were complying with the agreement.Math-Agro, despite the commitment of its owner not to file the complaint, did so. Such an act on the part of Math-Agro and its owner constitutes extrinsic fraud, as it prevented petitioners from defending themselves in the action lodged with the court a quo.[14]The Court of Appeals RulingIn its 25 January 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.The Court of Appeals held that there was a valid substituted service of summons, that the allegation of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable, and that the Spouses Galura should have first availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief.The Court of Appeals stated:1.Petitioners make no denial that insofar as known by the respondent Math-Agro Corporation, their address at the time of the filing of the complaint on July 25, 2000 was at G.L. Calayaan Agro System Inc., Bo. Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac and/or 230 Apo St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.They likewise do not deny the proceedings taken byCourt Process Server Paulino Sildo as narrated in his Return of Service dated October 4, 2000 x x x.Under the circumstances, we believe, and so hold, that there was a valid substituted service of summons on the petitioners as defendants in the case.To begin with, the petitioners never took the bother of informing the creditor Math-Agro Corporation that they were leaving their address known to the latter and were moving on to another place of residence, so the process server took it upon himself to diligently trace the whereabouts of the petitioners until he was able to effect service of the summons on Victoria Lapuz, a sister-in-law of petitioner Dante Galura at Tierra Fura Subdivision in Tandang Sora, Quezon City, where the defendants were then residing.What they claim is that substituted service was immediately resorted to without the process server first exhausting all opportunities for personal service which is improper.x x xFar frombeing improper, the actuations taken and the efforts exerted by the process server are highly commendable for he started looking for the petitioners in the addresses given by them to their creditor and alleged by the latter in the complaint.Finding them not to be there, he methodically traced their whereabouts until he came upon their latest address at Tierra Fura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, as given by Dominador Galura, father of petitioner-husband, Dante Galura.Quite conspicuously, the petitioner do not deny that they were residing at that place when service of the summons was made on petitioner-husbands sister-in-law, Victoria Lapuz.x x x x2.Petitioners posturing that they are at the receiving end of extrinsic fraud because they had an existing payment arrangement with their creditor, Math-Agro Corporation, that the latter would not resort to judicial action for as long as payments are being made by them and that they had been paying their obligation until July, 2004 is hard to be believed in.This is but a bare and vagrant allegation without any visible means of support for nowhere in their petition, as well as in their joint affidavit of merit, did they attach copies of the corresponding receipts of their payments.x x x3.Prescinding from the foregoing records also show that contrary to Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners have not availed themselves first of the ordinary remedies of a motion to lift order of default, new trial, appeal, petition for relief before resorting to this extra-ordinary action for annulment of judgment.[15]The Spouses Galura filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 February 2005.In its Resolution dated 28 February 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.Hence, the present petition.The IssuesIn their petition dated 8 April 2005, the Spouses Galura raised as issues that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that (1) there was a valid substituted service of summons; (2) the allegation of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable; and (3) they should have availed first of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief.In its Resolution[16]dated 27 April 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Court of Appeals from implementing its 25 January and 28 February 2005 Resolutions.The Courts RulingThe petition is meritorious.The Spouses Galura claim that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the substituted service of summons was invalid.They stated:The resort of the process server to what purports to be a substituted service, when he left the summons with Ms. Victoria Lapuz is clearly unjustified, as it was premature.He could still serve the summons personally upon herein petitioners had he exerted efforts to do so.Unfortunately, he did not, and he immediately resorted to a substituted service of the summons.Clearly, the acts of the trial courts process server contravenes the rulings espoused by the Honorable Supreme Court that summons must be served personally on the defendant as much as possible.x x x xThe process server, in his return of service above, did not state that his attempts to serve the summons by personal service upon the petitioners at the Tierra Pura Subdivision address failed, and that the same could not be made within a reasonable time.He likewise failed to state facts and circumstances showing why personal service of the summons upon the petitioners at the said address was impossible.Finally, he also failed to state that Ms. Victoria Lapuz, the person with whom he left the summons, was a person of sufficient age and discretion, and residing in the said Tierra Pura address.[17]The Court agrees.Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that, Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.Section 7 states:SEC. 7.Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.InSandoval II v. HRET,[18]the Court enumerated the requisites of a valid substituted service: (1) service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant; (3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendants place of residence; and (5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of service.InSandoval, the Court held that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed.In the present case, there is no showing that personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible.On 17 September 2000, Sildo went to230 Apo Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, to serve the summons.There, Dominador Galura told him that the Spouses Galura were presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City.Despite being told of the Spouses Galuras correct address, Sildo still went to G.L. Calayan Agro System, Inc. in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac to serve the summons, only to find out that the property had already been foreclosed and that the Spouses Galura no longer resided there.On 26 September 2000, Sildo went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, and, without any explanation, served the summons on Lapuz.In his 4 October 2000 return of service, Sildo stated:That on September 26, 2000 the undersigned went to Tandang Sora where the defendants presently residing [sic] Tierra Fura [sic] Subd. for the purpose of serving the summons, complaint together with the annexes,That Ms. Victoria Lapuz sister-in-Law of Dante Galura received the copy of said summons, as evidence [sic] by her signature appearing on the face of original summons.Whenever practicable, the summons must be served on the defendant in person.Substituted service may be resorted to only when service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible.Impossibility of prompt service should appear in the return of service the efforts exerted to find the defendant and the fact that such efforts failed must be stated in the return of service.InKeister v. Judge Navarro,[19]the Court held:Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person.In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void.This process is solely for the benefit of the defendant.Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.The summons must be served to the defendant in person.It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed.This statement should be made in the proof of service.This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.It has been held that this method of service is in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him.In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served, was of suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in the residence of the Spouses Galura.Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Galura, and thus the Spouses Galura are not bound by the RTCs 27 June 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order.[20]The Spouses Galura claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that they should have first availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief.The Spouses Galura stated:In the case at bar, the assailed decision was rendered in June 27, 2001.More than three years have passed since the said decision, clearly the remedies for a motion to lift order of default, new trial, appeal, petition for relief, have already prescribed.Herein petitioners, therefore, are left only with the remedy of a petition for the annulment of judgment.[21]The Court agrees.When a petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the petitioner does not need to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of his or her own.InAncheta v. Ancheta,[22]the Court held:[T]he Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the amended petition.This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her.While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jursdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.In a case where a petition for annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondentor over the nature or subject of the action,the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own.This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order an any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.(Emphasis supplied)WHEREFORE, the Court (1)GRANTSthe petition, (2)SETS ASIDEthe 25 January and 28 February 2005 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88088, (3)MAKES PERMANENTthe temporary restraining order issued on 27 April 2005, and (4)SETS ASIDEthe 27 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 3, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 473-M-2000.SO ORDERED.

CONSTANTINO A. PASCUAL,substitutedbyhisheirs, represented byZENAIDA PASCUAL,Petitioner,-versus-LOURDESS. PASCUAL,Respondent.G.R. No. 171916Present:CORONA,J.,Chairperson,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:December 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of summons.Before this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking to annul the Decision[1]dated June 29, 2005 and the Resolution[2]dated March 14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) nullifying and vacating the Decision[3]dated December 3, 2002 and Order[4]dated April 4, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan.The facts, as found in the records, are the following:Petitioner filed a Complaintfor Specific Performance with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against respondent. The process server, in his Return of Service[5]datedMay 21, 2002, reported, among others that:The undersigned Process Server of this Honorable Court went at defendant's given address atNo. 4 Manikling St.,TalayanVillage,Quezon CityonMay 20, 2002to serve the summons and copy of the Complaint together with the annexes thereto in connection with the above-entitled case.At the time of the service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and only her maid was there who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the insistence of the undersigned.The undersigned, upon his request with the Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a certification that he really exerted effort to effect the service of the said summons but failed due to the above reason. (Annex A).The following day,May 21, 2002, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to have her receive the subject summons but again the above defendant was not at her house.WHEREFORE, the original summons and copy of the complaint is hereby returned to the Honorable CourtNOT SERVED.Malolos, Bulacan,May 21, 2002.Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC and, onMay 29, 2002, the following report was submitted:The undersigned, onMay 29, 2002, made a 3rdattempt to serve the alias summons issued by theHon. Courtrelative with the above-entitled case at the given address of the defendant.The undersigned, accompanied by the barangay officials of the said place, proceeded at defendant's residence but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and was given information by her maid that the defendant was not there.The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her neighbors revealed that the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said summons and probably did not want to show-up when her maid informed her of undersigned's presence.WHEREFORE, the undersigned court process server respectfully returned the alias summons datedMay 29, 2002issued by theHon. CourtUNSERVED for its information and guidance.Malolos, Bulacan,May 30, 2002.[6]Subsequently, onAugust 14, 2002, the process server returned with the following report,[7]stating that a substituted service was effected:This is to certify that on the 14thday of August, 2002, I personally went at Dr. Lourdes Pascual's residence at#4 Manikling Street,TalayanVillage,Quezon City, to serve the copy of the Summons datedAugust 12, 2002, together with a copy of the Complaint and its annexes thereto.Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons and only her housemaid was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter who is at the age of reason but refused to sign the same.WHEREFORE, the undersigned respectfully return the service of summonsduly servedfor information and guidance of the Honorable Court.Malolos, Bulacan,August 14, 2002.For failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading, petitioner, onSeptember 17, 2002, filed a Motionto Declare Defendant in Default[8]to which the petitioner filed an Opposition/Comment to Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant in Default[9]datedOctober 1, 2002,claiming that she was not able to receive any summons and copy of the complaint.The RTC, in its Order[10]datedOctober 30, 2002, declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to file his evidenceex-parte.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11]datedNovember 18, 2002seeking to set aside the above-mentioned Order datedOctober 30, 2002. However, the said motion was denied by the RTC in its Order[12]datedNovember 27, 2002.Consequently, onDecember 3, 2002, the RTC, in its Decision,[13]found in favor of the petitioner.The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Constantino A. Pascual, and against Lourdes S. Pascual, ordering the latter as follows:a. to CEASE AND DESIST from further intervening with the corporate and internal affairs of Rosemoor Mining Corporation, consisting of acts and omissions prejudicial and detrimental to the interest of the said corporation resulting to irreparable injury to herein plaintiff;b. to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos(P100,000.00), for and by way of moral damages;c. to pay the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for and by way of Attorney's fees; andd. to pay the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.Respondent then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default[14]datedDecember 13, 2002, with the argument of non-service of summons upon her.This was denied by the RTC in its Order[15]datedApril 4, 2003; and on the same day, a Certificate of Finality and Entry of Judgment was issued.Eventually, respondent, onApril 28, 2003, filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16]of the Order datedApril 4, 2003, which was denied by the RTC in its Order[17]datedJune 23, 2003.Finally, onJune 26, 2003, a Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the Decision datedDecember 3, 2002of the RTC.Aggrieved, respondent filed with the CA a Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which was granted by the same Court in its Decision[18]datedJune 29, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The said Decision, as well as the Orders and the processes on which this is premised, are NULLIFIED and VACATED.SO ORDERED.Petitioner comes now to this Court through a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, on the following grounds:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS AN INVALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON THE RESPONDENT AND, HENCE, THE COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENT.IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION WHEN FROM THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, THE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO INTERPOSE AN APPEAL OR TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT CLEARLY BARS THE INSTITUTION OF THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FORCERTIORARIUNDER RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.Petitioner insists that there was a valid substituted service of summonsand that there should be a presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.He also avers thatcertiorari, which was filed by the respondent with the CA, does not lie when the remedy of appeal has been lost.In her Comment with Motion to Cite for Contempt[19]datedAugust 29, 2006, respondent raises the following issues:1. SHOULD THE PETITION BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN FILED IN VIOLATION REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713 IN RELATION TO ART. 5 OF THE CIVIL CODE?2. ARE THE PETITIONER AND HIS COUNSEL PUNISHABLE FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR KNOWINGLY MISLEADING THIS HONORABLE COURT?3. WAS THE ALLEGED SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON THE ILLITERATE MAID EFFECTIVE TO CONFER JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT BEFORE THE RTC OF MALOLOS, BULACAN?4. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS VALID, WAS THE ORDER DECLARING THE DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?5. WAS THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO LIFT AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?6. IS THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING?7. WILL THIS HONORABLE COURT ALLOW THE NULL AND VOIDDECEMBER 3, 2002DECISION OF THE RTC TO BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND OBLITERATE THE CRIMINAL ACT OF FALSIFICATION, THEREBY REWARDING THE AUTHOR OF THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE?In addressing the above issues, the respondent argues that the CA decision became final by operation of law because the present petition is null and void for being a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6712, in relation to Article 5 of the Civil Code, the counsel for petitioner having filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review and, thereafter, the Petition for Review itself. She also claims that there was no proper service of summons as the maid who was purportedly served a copy thereof was illiterate and has denied being served in a sworn statement executed before a notary public and, thus, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.According to her, assuming that the summons were indeed served, the RTC was guilty of grave abuse of discretion for declaring her in default and for refusing to lift the order of default because it deprived her of her right to present evidence in support of her defense. She further disputes the argument of the petitioner that the Decision dated December 3, 2002 became final because it did not become the subject of appeal by stating that the said principle can only be applied to valid judgments that were rendered in accordance with law and not to void judgments rendered without jurisdiction or in excess thereof. In addition, she avers that petitioner made a deliberate and malicious concealment of the fact that at the time he filed the case for specific performance, as well as during the time it was being heard, he was already being investigated in administrative proceedings before the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice and the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, involving the same subject matter, issues and parties; hence, he violated the law against forum shopping.Lastly, respondent points out that the CA Decision datedJune 29, 2005is a permanent injunction against the implementation of the contested Orders and Decisions of the RTC; therefore, there is an urgent necessity to enforce the said judgment.OnJune 30, 2008, this Court granted[20]the substitution of the respondent by his heirs as represented by his wife Zenaida Pascual, after the Manifestation[21]datedJune 12, 2008was filed informing this Court of the demise of the same respondent.After a careful study of the records of this case, this Court finds the petition bereft of any merit.Clearly, the main, if not the only issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not there was a proper and valid substituted service of summons, the resolution of which, will determine whether jurisdiction was indeed acquired by the trial court over the person of the petitioner.In a case where the action isinpersonamand the defendant is in thePhilippines, the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. The provisions state:Section 6.Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.Section 7.Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.A plain and simple reading of the above provisions indicates that personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted service.This Court gave an in-depth discussion as to the nature and requisites of substituted service inManotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.:[22]We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:(1)Impossibility of Prompt Personal ServiceThe party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.[23]Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a reasonable time to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. Reasonable time is defined as so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party.[24]Under the Rules, theserviceofsummons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if theserviceofsummons has failed.[25]What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, reasonable time means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, reasonable time means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time with regard to personal service on the defendant.Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on theserviceofsummons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evadeserviceofsummons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substitutedserviceofsummons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.(2) Specific Details in the ReturnThe sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.[26]The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.[27]Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 datedNovember 9, 1989requires that impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts, which should be made in the proof of service.(3) A Person of Suitable Age and DiscretionIf the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.[28]A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. Discretion is defined as the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed.[29]Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the relation of confidence to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons.