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Civilian power meets instinctive atlanticist:

comparing German and Polish European Security

and Defence Policies

Cornelia Frank*

Paper prepared for the Conference Role Theory Research inInternational Relations: Conceptual Challenges and Political Promises,

European Academy Otzenhausen, September 28-October 1, 2008

Panel 3: Role Theory and Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis

_______________________________________________________

*Cornelia Frank, M.A., Chair of International Relations and ForeignPolicy, University of Trier, [email protected]


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Civilian power meets 'instinctive' atlanticist:comparing German and Polish European Security and Defence Policies

Introduction:

After the Polish parliamentary elections in October 2007, the liberal party Civic

Platform under the leadership of Donald Tusk came into power, the representatives

of which set much friendlier tones towards Western Europe and Germany than the

former government under Jarosaw Kaczynski. Moreover, we can oberserve a new

realism in the Polish U.S. Policy.1 This new realism stands for a more self-confident

policy that acts towards maximizing Polands own ends like we could see during the

Polish-American negotiations on the deployment of the U.S. ballistic missile defence

shield on Polish territory. On the one hand, this new realism is reflected in a more

self-assured way of communication with the American government. On the other

hand, it is reflected in the Polish decision-makers behaviour who show that they are

not willing to make concessions any more.2 This kind of foreign policy was

characteristic for Polands behaviour within the EU during previous years, where it

frequently strove for its national interests very harshly, using its veto as a

sledgehammer if necessary.3 Beside its role as a solidary egoist (Lang 2006: 3),

who demanded solidarity of its partners while practising a solidarity la carte, Poland

has been considered as an instinctive atlanticist (Longhurst/Zaborowski 2003:

1010), who constantly emphasizes the overriding importance of the transatlantic

bond, demanding the ESDP being closely linked to NATO. At the same time Polands

President Lech Kaczynski suggested building up a 100,000 man strong European

Army. Although Warsaw has called for a militarily strong EU on the one hand, it has

taken a sceptical outlook towards the introduction of military convergence criteria and

political integration on the other. Apart from these ambivalencies in Polands ESDP,

there is need of an explanation for its modifications, particularly with regard to the

structured cooperation within ESDP, which Polish politicians rejected decisively in the

beginning.

Germanys position towards ESDP is characterized by comparable ambivalencies.

On the one hand Berlin stressed repeatedly that the development of a European

1This new evaluation of the Polish-American relationship is reflected e.g. in the interview with

Polands foreign minister Radosaw Sikorski in Dziennik, 12.3.2008.2

See Dylla (2008) for an analysis of the Polish negotiation strategy.3We could see this, for example, with regard to discussions about the renewal of the energy policy

partnership between Russia and the EU in the end of 2006.


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pillar is aimed at strengthening the NATO, whereas unnecessary duplication of

European and Transatlantic decision and planning structures should be avoided

(Overhaus 2004: 37). In contrast to this German decision-makers simultaneously

supported the development of the very such structures that are already existent in

NATO, like the establishment of an autonomous, permanent strategic Headquarter of

the EU besides SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). Furthermore

an affirmative rhetoric in respect to the European integration with the ESDP being an

indispensable part of it, is inconsistent with exclusive Mini-Summits like those

between France, Luxembourg and Belgium in Brussels, April 2003. Finally in both

Germany and Poland exist discrepancies between their commitments within ESDP

and their insufficient domestic readiness to fulfil them by using armed forces reforms.

With regard to these ambivalencies and modifications the question is arisen: What

knowledge do we need to understand Germanys and Polands ESDPs? Refering to

Sprout and Sprout (1957: 328) I argue that decisive is how the policy-maker

imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is. In order to understand German and

Polish decision-makers patterns of perception, valuation, and behaviour, role theory

as an actor-centered approach is especially appropriate.

I will bring forward the argument that the divergent and convergent interests ofGermany and Poland, as well as the ambivalencies and modifications of their

European Security and Defence Policies, can be traced back to their national role

concepts. These role concepts constitute the frame within which Germany and

Poland define theirs interests and goals within ESDP, as well as preferred strategies

and instruments to realize them.4 The central question will be answered over three

stages: First, the foreign policy role concepts of a civilian power and an instinctive

atlanticist will be elaborated. Subsequently, Germanys and Polands role behaviour

within ESDP will be compared along central dimensions that are deduced from the

transatlantic conflict lines regarding the ESDPs realization. Third, I will analyze

whether the two role concepts provide a convincing explanation for Germanys and

Polands position towards the ESDP. Finally, I would like to offer some tentative

considerations with regard to Polands beginning role transformation from an

4

Although neither Germanys nor Polands political decision-makers or governments can beunderstood as monolithic actors, in both countries there are central foreign, security and defencepolicy beliefs and practices that are significantly consistent across-the-parties.


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instinctive atlanticist to a maybe realist atlanticist, and discuss briefly, whether

we can expect an increasing harmonization of both states positions towards ESDP.

2 Germanys and Polands foreign policy role concepts

National role concepts affect interests and foreign policies in three ways: They

prescribe, which wills, goals, and actions are perceived as appropriate and proscribe,

which are unacceptable. Thirdly, they induce a certain foreign policy style (Krotz

2002: 8-9). As all role concepts, the German role concepts of a civilian power and

the Polish one of an instinctive atlanticist are domestically standardized by the

ego-partthat is the foreign policy makers collective self-conception and the alter-part

which means the external actors expectations of the national role holders

appropriate behaviour (Holsti 1970: 238-9; Kirste/Maull 1996: 289).5 As a rule, foreign

policy decision-makers have internalized several roles within the national role

concept, which reflect theirs relationships in different contexts (Holsti 1970: 277;

Elgstrm/Smith 2006: 5). The markedness of different situation roles within a foreign

policy role concept occasionally causes ambivalent role behaviour. This also applies

to tensions between different role segments or their altered hierarchy within the

national role concept. The role holders actual behaviour in concrete situations, like

the ESDP, is called role behaviour (Kirste/Maull 1996: 290).

Before comparing Germanys and Polands ESDPs, theirs role concepts will be

elaborated. Theirs central elements can be revealed by analysing national decision-

makers statements of the proper role and purpose of theirs own state as a social

collectivity in the international arena (Krotz 2002: 2).

2.1 Germanys role concept of a civilian power

Concerning the German national role concept the one of a civilian power was

developed (Maull 1992; Kirste/Maull 1996; Kirste 1998; Harnisch 2000b). This refers

to a foreign policy role concept and role behaviour, that is bounded to values, goals,

principles, modes of influencing and exercising of power, which aim at civilizing

international relations (Kirste/Maull 1996: 300; Maull 2006: 418). Although the

parameters of acceptable behaviour for Germany in the security realm have been

considerably strechted (Hoffmann/Longhurst 1999: 162) after the end of the cold

5

The German and Polish foreign policy elite are perceived as crucial national role holders in thispaper. See Aggestam (1999; 2004) for the overriding importance of the national decision-makers asrole holders.


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war, the role concept of a civilian power hasnt been questioned fundamentally, even

though it has been modified (Maull 2000; Philippi 2001).6 The German foreign policy

is still characterized by: multilateralism; sceptical attitude towards using military

power; support of supranationalisation within the EU; engagement for civilization and

institutionalization of international politics, even if it doesnt correspond to national

interests in the short term (Kirste 1998: 460-62).

These foreign policy practices can be traced back to the guidelines Never alone

again (multilateralism), Never ever again Auschwitz (claim for civilization) and the

culture of restraint. The foreign policy culture of restraint (Berger 1998) refers to

behaviour patterns of German decision-makers, whereby striving for national

interests and claim of leadership is avoided in favour of close cooperation with theirspartners within institutional contexts. Based on the principle Never alone again, the

so called Sowohl-als-auch-policy is one further feature of Germanys foreign policy,

in the course of which different external expectations shall be reconciled. As the

German role concept of a civilian power, the Polish one of an instinctive (or rather

transforming) atlanticist7 is shaped by historical experiences and the way of

interpreting them.8

2.2 Polands role concept of an instinctive atlanticist

Polands instinctive atlanticism (Longhurst/Zaborowski 2003: 1010) in its foreign

policy traces back to the historically traumatic experiences of the Polish society which

was confronted with the question of to be or not to be several times during the last

centuries. Particularly the three divisions of the Polish state in the 18 th century have

shaped the collective consciousness: One can definitely not think of a more severe

damage, which can inflict on a mature ethnic community than the one, which results

from the elimination of its state. After all four generations of Poles lived under the

6These modifications concerned in particular the military dimension of security policy

(normalization), certain aspects of the new German foreign policy (re-nationalization), alteration ofthe foreign policy rhetoric and the foreign policy style. It is controversial, to what extent the Germanforeign policy after reunification is still compatible with the concept of a civilian power. The mostsubstantiell criticism was expressed by Hellmann (2005), who predicted a power-politicalresocialization of German foreign policy, whereas Risse (2004) explained the dispute between thered-green government and the U.S. about the conflict in Iraq by clinging to the role concept as acivilian power.7

To what exent the term instinctive atlanticist is still an adequate one for the Polish role concept will

be discussed in chapter 5.8See Breuning (1997) for the influence of historical experiences on the development of national role

concepts, e.g. the ego part.


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divisions (Tazbir 1995).9 The centuries long struggle for survival leads to a strongly

distinct security need, from which the guideline Maxim of national security in the

Polish foreign policy results. Closely connected to the fixation of the countrys

geopolitical location is the militarily dominated understanding of security that is

equated with territorial defence. Regarding their foreign policy, the Polish decision

makers positive attitude towards the use of military means in foreign policy is due to

the fact that Poland repeatedly fell prey to its neighbouring states military aggression

(Malinowski 2006: 42). From the experience that superior states betrayed Polish

interests in international arrangements several times results the guideline No victim

of foreign decisions.10 From the Polish perspective these two foreign policy

guidelines can only be realized through a close connection to the U.S. Due to the

perceived own military weakness a specific understanding of security prevails within

the Polish decision-makers whereby the belief is security is something to take not to

give (Osica 2002a: 83). Correspondingly, Poland is dependent on being under

powerful states or alliances protection. According to the Polish point of view a

forcefull alliance under American leadership is the only possibility to reliably fulfill its

traditional security needs. This is because only the U.S., whose strong presence in

Europe is ensured via NATO, meet with its capacity to act Warsaws criteria of the

credibility of allies. The majority of Polands political elite has a sceptical position

towards multilateral security institutions NATO being an exception

(Longhurst/Zaborowski 2003: 1014). Against this background we can understand the

overriding importance of the transatlantic relationship within Polands security

conception: It is considered as the Polish assurance policy. This conviction is

reflected in the foreign policy guideline Primacy of the transatlantic bond.

Beside the role segments as a (military and political) victimand a security consument

the Polish role concept consists of the role segment as a regional power. Polands

self-perception as a regional power traces back to its former status as an Eastern

European great power in the 15th and 16th century and the rise of the Polish-

Lithuanian Aristocratian Republic as a political and military leading power in Eastern

Europe in the 16th to 18th century. From this golden age comes the guideline The

9Translation by the author.

10The incantation Nic o nas bez nas is literally translated Nothing about us without us.


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Polish voice must always be listened toand Warsaws claim of being at eye level with

the West European heavyweights.11

These, maybe at the first glance contradictionary role segments, which have

occasionally led to an apparent contradiction in Polands foreign policy, have theirsources in the deep-rooted changes in Polish history.12 The heoric history (Breuning

1997: 110) of Poland as a leading power in the golden age and a pioneer of freedom

and democracy in the 1980s, the ambivalent Polish founding of the state (Breuning

1997: 110-11) and the turning point events (Breuning 1997: 112) in connection with

the Second World War and the end of the Cold War have produce a tense ego-part.

This ego-part is characterized by the tension of the coexistence of divergent role

segments: the role segment as a victimand the one as a regional power. What JerzyMakw once called the messianism of the subjugated (1998: 116) and the

megalomaniac messianism (1998: 117) are the two sides of the same coin they

are caught in a loop, where one self-perception powers the subsequent which then in

turn powers the original.13 This was especially evident with regard to the communist

era, in which the Poles were suppressed on the one side and perceived themselves

embodied in the freedom movement solidarno as pioneer of freedom and

democracy on the other.14

After a short overview of the development of the ESDP I will analyze, which interests

Germany and Poland are striving for within ESDP and to what extent their behaviour

can be traced back to theirs national role concepts of a civilian power and an

instinctive (or rather transforming) atlanticist.

3. Germanys and Polands role behaviour within ESDP

Under the spell of Europes military inability to act in the Kosovo conflict and the

uncertainty of Americas willingness to intervene in the European periphery, the EUs

head of state defined a military headline goal on their European Council summit in

Helsinki in December 1999. The intention of this European Headline Goal (EHG) is to

11The self-perception as regional power manifested itself especially in the notorious Nice or death-

thesis, that was brought forward by Polish politicans in connection with the proportion of notes in theEuropean Council of Ministers according to the European constitutional contract.12

See Frank (2003; 2005) for the influence of Polish history on the countrys foreign, security anddefence policy.13

Translation of the author.14The self-perception as a pioneer is reflected in the battle cry Dla naszej i wayzej wolnoci, which

means For our and your freedom.


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build up a quickly available European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), that consists of

60,000 soldiers, which can be on duty for one year. With it the EU should be enabled

to independently carry out the so called Petersberg Tasks, which include

humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping operations as well as robust crisis

management. The EUs members complemented the military headline goal with a

package of civilian crisis management measures during their summits in Feira, June

2000, and Gothenburg, June 2001, which was specified by the Civilan Headline Goal

(CHG) in December 2004.15 Moreover, the EU-states established the PSC (Political

and Security Committee), the EUMC (EU Military Committee), the EUMS (EU Military

Staff) and the CIVCOM (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Managements) as

institutional prerequisites for decision-making and deployment planning within ESDP.

After having realized the EHG in quantitative terms in 2003, the Council of Ministers

passed a new European Headline Goal (EHG 2010) in May 2004, aimed at fullfilling

the military capabilities gaps.16 Although amibitous plans like building a European

Army are not capable of obtaining a majority at present, through foundation of the

European Defence Agency (EDA) Europes armament basis shall be improved

together with the europeanization of the national armaments procurements (Varwick

2007: 3). Another central element of the EHG 2010 are so called battle groups,

initiated by Germany, France and Great Britain, which are 1,500 men strong and are

qickly operational as EU-units for crisis management (Schmalz 2005: 52).

Furthermore, the EUs member states passed the European Security Strategy (ESS)

in December 2003, which stresses global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, regional conflicts, state failing and organized crime as central security

threats (Solana 2003).17 Although the ESS represents the furthest reaching

document of the EU-memberstates common security and defence interests

formulation, beyond this miniature the national positions towards ESDP show

significant divergencies, like we see with Germany and Poland.

The following analysis of Germanys and Polands role behaviour within ESDP will be

carried out along central dimensions that are deduced from the transatlantic conflict

15The package of civilan crisis management measures within the fields of police, rule of law,

administration and disaster control was complemented by demobilization and reform of the securitysector, a more rapid reaction time and an improved interlocking of the Commissions, the Councilsand the member states crisis management instruments. See Dembinksi/Wagner (2006).16

The qualitative capabilities gaps refer to strategic transport, strategic reconnaissance and military

command, that should be filled by new instruments like role specialization and pooling. See Fritschen(2005).17

See Berenskoetter (2005); Duke (2004); Toje (2005) for substantial analysis.


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lines regarding the ESDPs realization. Frequently, consolidating points are the

relationship towards NATO; the prioritization of military and civilian instruments; the

geographical radius of action and the spectrum of tasks; the structured cooperation;

as well as the EUs finality on the field of security and defence.

3.1 Relationship between ESDP and NATO from the German and Polishperspective

Traditionally, Germanys attitude towards the ESDP is shaped by the endeavour to

foster relationships confidently with both France and the U.S., avoiding having to

decide between the French claim of independence and the American claim to the

leadership. Striving for this interest, Berlin has supported the development of the

ESDP as a bridge between the European integration process on the one hand, and

the security policy cooperation with the U.S. within NATO on the other (Overhaus

2004: 38). According to the Defence Policy Guidelines(2003: 8), the ESDP shall not

substitute, but rather complement NATO. Whereas NATO still occupiesa position of

pre-eminence in territorial defence and military crisis-management compared with the

ESDP, the EU is especially qualified for carrying out civil-military operations (White

Paper 2006: 48).

Although the official German policy rates the close coordination with Washingtonhighly (White Paper 2006: 29) and has frequently sworn wanting to avoid

unnecessary duplications with NATO (Coalition Contract, 11.11.2005), there have

already been created duplications by the establishment of the PSC, the EUMC, the

EUMS and the European Command Cell. Claiming the development of a European

Security and Defence Union (e.g. Defence Policy Guidelines 2003: 12), within the

traditional Sowohl-als-auch-Policy a shift towards Europe i.e. France has already

taken place. Compatible with the German view point, the further development of the

ESDP is motivated by the desire to reduce the security policy dependency from the

U.S. and to gain more influence towards Washington, which goes beyond its function

as a bridge (Rudolf 2006: 140).

According to the guideline Primacy of the transatlantic bond, the reference point of

Polands position to the ESDP is the still valid American claims, which are commonly

known as 3 Ds.18 Refering to this, Polands former foreign minister, Daniel Rotfeld,

18According to the former American foreign minister, Madeleine Albright: Unacceptable is a removal of

European decision-structures from NATOs decision structures (no decoupling); the duplication of


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claimed, the ESDP should neither replace NATOs functions and tasks nor duplicate

them (Rotfeld 2004), because we [the Poles] do not want to choose, we want to

have two complementary insurance policies, explained Polands foreign minister

Radoslaw Sikorski (Sikorski 2008). Consequently, Warsaw rejected the

establishment of a European Commando Cell outside of SHAPE (Osica 2004a: 312).

According to Polands National Security Strategy(2007: 12), the decisive question is,

how a permanent and institutionalized cooperation between NATO and the EU can

be developed in order to ensure, that the strenghtening of the ESDP does not

weaken NATOs coherence. This is because NATO is for Poland the most important

form of multilateral cooperation in a political and military dimension of security and a

pillar of stability on the European continent, as well as the main ground of

transatlantic relations (NSS 2007: 10).19

3.2 Prioritization of military and civilian instruments

According to its culture of restraint, Berlin has emphasized the primacy of the civilian

dimension in the development of the ESDP. During its presidency in 1999, the red-

green Federal Government spoke out in favour of formulating a civilian goal besides

the military task force, after which police units, judges and public prosecutors can be

sent to crisis regions (Wagner 2007). Moreover, the report annex of the civilian crisismanagement capabilities, which the EU members accepted on their summit in Nice in

December 2000, is essentially owed to German proposals (Schmalz 2001: 569).20

This lies in the role concept of a civilian power, in which the use of military force is not

excluded, but only accepted as a last means (Maull 1992: 779).

In contrast to this, the extent of the ESDP delivering a defence territorial surplus is

decisive from the Polish perspective. Although official documents and statements

constantly underline that Warsaw doesnt feel threatened by any state, among thePolish decision-makers dominate the assessment, whereby there is however no

guarantee, that a black scenario would not materialise in 10 or 20 years time

(Onyszkiewicz 2002: 218). Compared with Germany, whose security policy thinking

armed forces planning, commando structures and procurement (no duplication); or an insufficientparticipation of non-EU-NATO-states (no discrimination), see Albright (1998).19

Furthermore, Polands endeavour for close cooperation between NATO and the EU is aimed atusing the available resources most effectively, not least because of the financial burden in connection

with the armed forces transformation.20For a detailed analysis of the red-green governments engagement for the improvement of the civil

dimension within ESDP, see Chang (2007).


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is shaped by the absence of a clear external threat and a deep trust in its neighbour

countries, the Polish security policy thinking has hardly been influenced by both of

these factors (Reiter 2001: 42). Concerning the absence of an external threat and the

trust in adjoining countries, large circles of Polish politicans are far more sceptical,

like we can see with regard to the present Russian-Georgian conflict. Poland, due to

geography and history, believe in a Hobbesian world, rather than a Kantian paradise

(Osica 2004a: 310). Consequently, the use of military force if necessary with

disregard of international law has been perceived far less critically in the Polish

capitol than in Germany (Osica 2003).

Beyond these divergent interests regarding the prioritization of military and civilian

instruments, the German and Polish role behaviour within ESDP have something incommon: There is a significant gap between commited obligations on the one side,

and supply of financial and military resources on the other. With regard to Germany,

explanation attempts, which point out to budget states or domestic constraints, hardly

convince. Rather, the allocation of public money indicates established prioritites,

which again refer to the rating of military means in the foreign policy (Overhaus 2004:

45). Refering to the cost-intensive adaptation of Polands armed forces to the NATO-

standards, many Polish politicians declared the countrys difficulties in being able to

contribute adequately to the ESDP (Grka-Winter/Posel-Czik 2001: 133). The

argument, that the cooperation between NATO and ESDP must most effectively use

the available resources (National Security Strategy 2007: 12), has to be seen in this

context. Whereas the slow proceed of the armed forces reform in Poland in the first

place goes back to the financial stringency (Frank 2005: 26f.), the German Forces

are confronted with two problems: Firstly, the insufficient willingness to place financial

resources; secondly, the culture of restraint, which set limits to the participation of

Germanys armed forces in out-of-area-operations (Meiers 2005: 153).

3.3 Geographic action radius and the spectrum of tasks

Both in the constitution convent and in the formulation of the EHG 2010, Germany

belonged to those states, which supported the expansion of the tasks spectrum

beyond the conventional Petersberg-Tasks (Aposkitis 2006: 82f.). Certainly, the

Defence Policy Guidelines do not refer directly to German Forces participation in

ESDP-operations, but future ones can neither be limited to their intensity nor theirgeography (DPG 2003: 13). During the ERRFs contribution conferences Germany


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commited itself to 13,500 ground forces by which it exeeded all other EU-members

numerically (Giegerich/Wallace 2004: 174). However, there is no shortage of ground

forces with regard to the EHG. Germany contributes nothing worth mentioning in

order to fulfill the qualitative capabilities gaps, which refer to strategic transport,

strategic reconnaissance and military command. Rather, the German armed forces

primarily participate in EU-missions, which are categorized in the lower spectrum of

the Petersberg-Tasks and thus correspond to the more civilian orientated German

security understanding (Overhaus 2004: 46). Among those are: EUs military

operation in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) with initially 2,400 German

soldiers); EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM) with up to 90 policemen;

EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFG) with roughly 40 persons; and the

European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) will be supported by up to 180

policemen.21

Poland commited itself to transfer to EU forces 1,500 soldiers (Miszczak 2007: 19).

Until recently, in the European crisis management Warsaw primarily had the territory

of the former UdSSR in its eye, according to its regional security interests

(Osica/Trzaskowski 2005: 2). Poland demonstrated its will to contribute to the ESDP

through its participation in most of civil and military operations of the EU (Miszczak

2007: 22f.), even to those, which took place outside of Europe. Among those

important are: EUFOR Althea, in which Poland participated with up to 190 soldiers;

EULEX with a Polish special police unit (ca. 120 persons); the EU-UN cooperation

for supervising the election process in the Democratic Republik of Congo, to which

Poland contributed one of the most numerous military contingents (ca. 130 persons);

and the participation in the EUs mission in Chad with roughly 400 Polish soldiers.

Although Warsaw had a sceptical outlook towards the concept of the EUs battle-

groups in the beginning, because it feared competition between them and NATOs

Response Force (NRF), it gave its support to this initiative. Poland will act as

framework-nationwithin one of the EUs battle groups in 2010, in which Germany,

Lithuania, Letvia and Slovakia participate, too. Furthermore, Poland will take over the

function as a lead nationwithin the battle group II/2012 in the format of the Weimar

Triangle.

21See www.zif-berlin.org for Germanys contributions to civil and military ESDP-missions.


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However, at the sight of Polands commitements to the NRF the question has to be

called, which commitements will be rated higher if necessary. All relevant documents,

like the National Security Strategy, stress the overriding importance of NATO for the

Polish security. Moreover, Polish politicans frequently demand the ESDP having to

strengthen the transatlantic security partnership. In contrast to this, Germanys former

foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, and former defence minister, Peter Struck, put

their governements support for the NRF under the condition, that there should be no

collision with the ERRF. This was in fact a remarkable departure from the traditional

German policy which had always based on the principle NATO first(Overhaus 2007:

21).

3.4 The EUs finality: Civilian power or junior partner of the U.S.?

The discussions about the EUs security and defence political finality circle around

the question: Who is this actor actually, who should and can it be? The role model

discussion has to be examined in connection with the ESS, the structured

cooperation within ESDP and the collective defence.

With the intergration of the clause of mutual assistance in the Treaty of Lisbon (Art.

42 7 EUT), the EU constitutes itself at least formally as a defence alliance.22

Following the evolution clause, the European Council can gradually lay down a

common defence policy (Art. 24 1), which might lead to a common defence.

Across-parties, the German decision-makers consider the ESDP as a process, which

might lead to a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) with a common army

and a common defence, in the course of which restrictions of sovereignty would be

accepted (Griegerich 2006: 132). Certainly, the inclusion of a clause of mutual

assistance is in line with Polands security interests (Miszczak 2007: 20), but it rejects

the idea of a European Defence Union, because NATOs traditional defence functioncould be eroded (Malinowski 2006: 51). Rather, from the Polish point of view the

military capabilities of the EU should be developed in utmost harmony and

convergence with NATO (Sikorski 2006). Against this background, Warsaw criticizes

that the importance of NATO and the transatlantic bond isnt sufficiently stressed in

the ESS (Osica 2004b: 13).

22This interpretation goes back to Roman Schmidt-Radefeldts (2005) argumentation with regard to

the EUs Constitutional Treaty.


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Moreover, Germanys endeavour for deepening the ESDP is consistently opposed by

Poland. The creation of supranational structures in the EU, which would marginalize

the role of nation-states, as well as make the EU a super-state doesnt tie up with

Polands security conception (Miszczak 2005: 105). In contrast to Germany, Polish

decision-makers initially objected all forms of flexibility within ESDP (Olechowski

2004). The structured cooperation was perceived as a French-German instrument to

exclude the pro-American, new EU-members from vital decision-making within the

EU by establishing military convergence criteria, which they cant fulfill (Osica 2004a:

316). Poland rejected according to the former foreign minister, Daniel Rotfeld the

idea of a European Directorate or a nucleus Europe vehemently (Rotfeld 2004).23

Although Warsaws attitude towards the structured cooperation within ESDP has

changed remarkably during the last three years and has been accepted so far,

passing resolutions by qualified majority within the field of security and defence policy

still is rejected. In contrast to this, Berlin is in favour of extending the qualified

majority to the ESDP, too.

Germanys engagement for the ESDPs deepening is favoured by its strongly

Europeanized national identity. Across-parties, the German interests are perceived

as almost fused with the European interests, which is why foreign policy isnt to be

made purely on a national level any longer.24 Corresponding to the EUs ability to

develop to an effective international crisis manager, the Polish stance is much more

sceptical. In the way of this stands the insufficient military capabilities and the

important EU members lack of willingness to enter into a political-military conflict with

Russia, if necessary (vel Grajewski urawski 2005: 105). Ever since the Western

European attitude towards Russia has been the litmus test for the Polish politicans

views of the European foreign policy. Warsaw criticized the ESS as it solely refers to

Russia as a partner, but not as a source of potential threats, even though the stated

security threats, like bad governance, hold true for Russia, too (Osica 2004b: 12).

Further factors, which impede the ESDPs effectiveness from the Polish point of view

are the missing European leading power, the EU-members heterogeneous priorities

in the field of securitiy and defence policy, the lack of european patriotism and

Europes insufficient solidarity.

23

Translation by the author.24That there arent distinctions between national and European interests, shows Wagner (2002) with

his analysis of parliamentary debates about foreign, security and defence policy questions.


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4. National role concepts as explaining factor for Germanys and PolandsESDPs

Let us conjure up the initial questions: Which interests have Germany and Polandstrived for with regard to the relationship towards NATO, the prioritization of military

and civilian instruments, the geographical radius of action and the spectrum of tasks,

the structured cooperation, and the EUs finality? Can their ESDPs be explained by

their foreign policy role concepts?

4.1 Explaining differences and similarities in Germanys and Polands rolebehaviour

Corresponding to the relationship between ESDP and NATO, the interests of bothstates show the greatest convergence. Based on the guideline Never alone again,

the German policy of equidistance between Paris and Washington supported the

development of the ESDP as a bridge between the European integration process on

the one hand, and the security policy cooperation with the U.S. within NATO on the

other. In contrast to its lip services regarding the compatibility of ESDP and NATO,

the actual priorities have been towards Europe, i.e. France. This has been shown by

the demand of an European Security and Defence Union or the claim, whereby the

NRF has to be developed in close coordination with the ERRF. Berlin found itself

confronted with divergent expectations from France and the U.S., whose strictly

atlantic orientated variation of the ESDP stands in sharp contrast to the gaullistic

option. By taking into consideration external actors expectations through the alter-

part, role theory offers a convincing explanation for Germanys sometimes ambivalent

behaviour within ESDP. Even stronger than Berlin, Warsaw claims the ESDP has to

strengthen the transatlantic partnership and has to be developed in close

coordination with the U.S. In comparison to Germany, in Poland there is no

discrepancy between the verbal commitment to an atlantic orientated ESDP and its

operational security policy. Rather the practice of standing shoulder to shoulder with

the U.S. has dominated within the Polish ESDP, which traces back to its role concept

as an atlanticist. That Warsaws position towards ESDP is almost congruent with

those Washingtons cant be put down to external expectations on the part of the

U.S., but is rather motivated intrinsically. In comparison with Germany, Poland seems


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to be a rather introverted state, which leans against the only reliable security

guarantor due to its historically embossed self-perception as a victim.25

With regard to the prioritization of military and civilian instruments in the ESDP we

can ascertain interest divergences between Germany and Poland. Whereas Germanpolicy-makers have especially aspired towards the development of the civilian crisis

management capacities within ESDP, the EU has been assessed for its military

actionability and its defence political surplus by the Polish politicians. Understandable

is this difference with recourse to the role concepts: As a civilian power, Germany

accepts the use of military force only as ultimo ratio. According to its guideline Never

ever Auschwitz again, it advocates civilization within the EU, wanting it to be(come) a

civilian power, too. In contrast, due to Polands repeated loss of statehood, the Polishrole concept focuses on external threats and its defence, which includes a positive

attitude towards the use of military force (Malinowski 2006: 42).

The greatest interest divergencies between Germany and Poland are found with the

structured cooperation within ESDP and the EUs finality. Berlin has spoken out in

favour of a supranationalization within ESDP, which Warsaw has rejected. In

contrast to Berlin, which follows the model of the EU as a federal state, Warsaw

aspires to Europe being a confederation of states. Comprehensible are these interestdivergences, if one opens their eyes to the different understandings of states and

institutions in Germany and Poland. Whereas the German governments after the

end of the Cold War have followed the leitmotif Security through integration, the

Polish governments have applied to Security through sovereignty (Miszczak 2005:

105). According to the guideline No victim of foreign decisions, Warsaw insists on

intergovernmental cooperation within ESDP, which leaves the memberstates full

control: The EU should carry out common operation, but the foreign policy should

stay in the hands of the single states, stated President Kaczynski (Gazeta

Wyborcza, 24.10.2005).26 Moreover, Poland claims for a militarily strong EU,

whereas its further integration is perceived as subordinated.27 Orientating themselves

towards the guideline Never alone again, the German role holders are shaped by a

25Volkan (2003) has pointed out that traumatas have a deeper and longer lasting influence on group

identities than glorious chapters, because closely connected to traumata chapters is theunconsciously set task to compensate for the ancestors suffering.26

Translation by the author.27See, for example, the speech of Polands former Foreign Minister, Anna Fotyga, in the Sejm on 11

May 2007 (www.msz.gov.pl).


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reflexive commitment to institution building (Meiers 2005: 162), which implies a

deepening of the European integration.

4.2 Explaining change in Polands role behaviour: From a subjugated to a

director?In compliance with the guideline No victim of foreign decisions, Poland rejected the

idea of structured cooperation within ESDP initially, because it was afraid of being left

in the back row due to other members nucleus building. Polands complex of

conspiracy (Osica/Zaborowski 2002: 14) was nourished at the sight of the emerging

EU-3. From the Polish perspective the so-called EU-3 is a manifestation of the

frightened two-tier-Union. Meanwhile Polish politicians have rethought their attitude

towards the idea of structured cooperation: What has prompted the turnabout? There

are three factors: Firstly, Polands stance began to change as soon as it realized that

it itself could play in Europes premier league due to its prominent role in Iraq

(Longhurst/Zaborowski 2007: 55). At the same time, though often irritated by

Polands behaviour, other member states started to perceive it as natural member of

a European vanguard. Finally, the more positive Polish attitude towards structured

cooperation within ESDP and its higher importance in Polands security conception is

owed to its lovesickness because of the U.S. Despite standing shoulder to shoulder

with Washington in Iraq, Warsaws expectation of climbing in the first league of

Americas allies has not been fulfilled.28 Rather, the expected dividend failed to

materialize at all. Polands disappointment was nourished from several sources:

Firstly, there hasnt come any anticipated alleviation for the American visa

requirement of Polish citizens (Gadzinski 2004). Furthermore, the promised offset-

investments in connection with the purchase of the american F-16-fighter aircrafts

came in a slow trickle (Osica 2004c). Thirdly, the change of mood goes back to the

fact, that Polish companies got much fewer contracts in the course of Iraqs

reconstruction than expected (Whitmore 2003).29

At the sight of these modifications of the Polish role behaviour and the differences

between Germanys and Polands ESDPs, two questions arise: How can we explain

changes in foreign policy from a role theoretical perspective? Is a (further)

harmonization of Polands and Germanys positions towards the ESDP likely?

28

According to Zbigniew Brzeziski, former U.S.-security advisor, Poland has even been relegated tothe third league of Americas allies.29

For the change of mood within the Polish elite and society, see Meyer/Zdrada (2006); Dylla (2008).


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5. Civilian power meets transforming atlanticist: (in)compatibility of nationalrole concepts and sources of change

According to role theoretical approaches, an increasing convergence of German and

Polish role holders behaviour is expected, if the national role concepts adjust. Since

foreign policy role concepts are embodied in the societies foreign policy cultures,

they change only slowly and partially (Maull 2006: 418). Corresponding to the

reconstruction process of a foreign policy role, refering to Harnisch (2000: 21) three

causal influence paths can be distinguished. The reconstruction of a role can stem

from external origin, i.e. altered role expectations of allies and/or international

institutions; from internal origin, i.e. altered role expectations of the society; or from

interactions between external and internal altered expectations. To what extent

Germanys and Polands role concepts will adapt in the long term, relies on the will

and the ability of adaptation and social learning in foreign policy.

Tentative considerations: Poland as a transforming atlanticist

With regard to Poland we can observe a starting role transformation from the

instinctive atlanticist, which strove for becoming Americas new modell ally (Dunn

2003: 63), to a realist atlanticist, whose foreign policy isnt characterized any

longer by standing shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. reflexively. Rather, we can

observe a new realism in the Polish U.S. Policy on the one side, and a more

constructive attitude towards the ESDP on the other.

How can this change in Polands role behaviour and this tendency of role

transformation be explained? Can these modifications be traced back to adaptation

or social learning? Or are they merely the results of extended knowledge and getting

used to the EU? Who is the impulse generator? Is the change initiated by the ego-

part(which ego)? Or the alter-part(which alter)? Or the result of interactions between

internal and external altered role expectations?

In my opinion, the Polish foreign policy goals havent changed at all. Maximizing

Polands own ends, in particular the countrys security and influence in european and

international politics, is still of overriding importance in the foreign policy. However,

the strategy to realize these goals has changed. Until recently, among the Polish

decision-makers dominated the conviction, whereby the keys to Brussels are to find

in Washington. Warsaw wanted to gain ground on the European parquet via the

White House. Meanwhile Poland pursues the opposite strategy by seeking to


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increase its influence in Washington via Brussels, using the EU as a kind of power

multiplier for national interests.

This change has several sources: (1) disappointed love with regard to the U.S.; (2)

sense of belonging to the EU (the us [the Poles] and them paradigm hasdiminished; (3) increasing knowledge about the former them, e.g. objectives,

processes etc of the ESDP; (4) altered hierarchy of role segments (the role segment

of the victimhas become less dominant, though Polands distrust towards Western

Europe in security matters hasnt completely disappeared); (5) increasing importance

of the EU as an affirmative alter for Polands self-perception as a regional power or at

least regional leader.

Tentative considerations: harmonization of Germanys and Polands rolebehaviour and role concepts

The Weimar Triangles revitalisation in the course of this year has raised hope, that

both states position towards the ESDP might farther converge in the future. Indeed,

we could observe and can expect a more constructive cooperation between

Germany and Poland concerning security matters than during previous years.

However, I dont expect any harmonization with regard to the EUs substantial

question: The EUs finality. This is because German and Polish decision-makers

have across-parties a completely divergent understanding of the character of

statehood and international institutions. Maximizing security by retaining far-reaching

sovereignty is a sine qua noncondition in Polands foreign policy a belief, which is

contrary to Germans endeavour for communization within ESDP. If at all, bridging

this gap will take a long time: Under which conditions central beliefs change and can

be changed? Impulses for changing the Polish decision-makers attitude towards

sovereignty could come from society, whose majority is in favour of a European

Security Policy in place of a national security policy.


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