Romanian

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of of of of

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Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2008

EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF ROMANIA

Founding Director Nicolae Idu

Director Gabriela Drăgan

Editor-in-Chief Oana Mocanu

Associate Editors Gilda Truică Mădălina Barbu Mihai Sebe

Editorial Board Farhad Analoui – Professor in International Development and Human Resource Management, the Center for International Development, University of Bradford, UK Daniel Dăianu – Member of the European Parliament, Professor, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, former Minister of Finance Eugen Dijmărescu – Vice Governor of the National Bank of Romania Gabriela Drăgan - Director General of the European Institute of Romania, Professor, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest Andras Inotai - Professor, Director of the Institute for World Economics, Budapest Mugur Isărescu - Governor of the National Bank of Romania Alan Mayhew – Jean Monnet Professor, Sussex European Institute Costea Munteanu - Professor, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest Jacques Pelkmans - Jan Tinbergen Chair, Director of the Department of European Economic Studies, College of Europe - Bruges Andrei Pleşu - Rector of New Europe College, Bucharest, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Minister of Culture Cristian Popa - Vice Governor of the National Bank of Romania Tudorel Postolache - Member of the Romanian Academy Helen Wallace - Professor, European University Institute, Florence

Romanian Journal of European Affairs is published by the European Institute of Romania 7-9, Regina Elisabeta Blvd., Bucharest, Code 030016, Romania Tel: (+4021) 314 26 96, 314 26 97 Fax: (+4021) 314 26 66 E-mail: rjea@ier.ro, ier@ier.ro, http://www.ier.ro/rjea.html

ISSN 1582-8271

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CONTENTS MULTILATERALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF ‘MINILATERALISM’ IN EU PEACE OPERATIONS Fulvio Attinà 5 EU AND RUSSIA IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: INCREASINGLY COMPETING INTERESTS? Niklas Nilsson 25 ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE? SCOTLAND ONE YEAR AFTER THE SNP ELECTION VICTORY Eberhard Bort 40 SECURING FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES IN THE BALKANS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION Geoffrey Pridham 56 LOBBYING OPPORTUNITIES, CONFUSIONS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Andreea Vass 71 THE ROLE OF ETHNIC PARTIES IN THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS – The Romanian Experience Sergiu Gherghina, George Jiglău 82

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Introduction* Multilateralism is the cornerstone of the

global action of the European Union (EU), and peace operations and crisis management are the ascribed goal of the European defence policy. EU engagement in peace operations takes place at the time peacekeeping is the most favoured practice of multilateral security, and important changes occur in the * Fulvio Attinà is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Catania. His research interests cover European Union politics and democracy; global politics and the long-term change of political institutions; security cooperation practices, and regional arrangements. Author of several books and journal chapters, in the past years he served as executive board member, and chair of national and international political science associations. attinaf@unict.it

organisation and conduct of peace operations. This paper is about European attachment to the culture of multilateralism and the appearance of minilateralism in the practice of peace operations. In part one, multilateral security is defined, and controversial issues like the uncertain nature of the legitimacy of intervention, the scanty efficacy of peace missions, and the rising of minilateralism are examined. In part two, the engagement of the European Union in peacekeeping is analyzed. In particular, knowledge on the propensity of states to participation in peacekeeping is used in order to assess the convergence of European states and international organisations on multilateral security. In the last section, the attention of the reader is drawn to the appearance of minilateralism in

MULTILATERALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF ‘MINILATERALISM’ IN EU PEACE OPERATIONS Fulvio Attinà*

Abstract. In recent years, the multilateral practice of peacekeeping and peace support operations has been growing as legitimate instrument to interrupt violence, strengthen security, and protect against gross human rights violations. Invented by the United Nations, peace operations have passed through a process of change that has given new features to multilateral security. Since the late 1980s, the number of UN-authorized peace operations has been growing. Also regional organisations have engaged themselves in an unprecedented number of peace support operations. Recently, the European Union has entered into the practice of peacekeeping, and put multilateralism at the centre of its presence in the world political system. This paper reviews political science knowledge on peace operations (especially, the legitimacy and efficacy issues), and examines the hypothesis of the appearance of minilateralism as the consequence of the engagement of regional organisations and actors, like the EU, in peace operations. The hypothesis is tested by comparing the data of the peace missions of three European organisations (EU, OSCE, and NATO) with those of the United Nations. The paper conclusion is that the European states are developing a preference for selective engagement (i.e. minilateralism) in peace operations, and the EU is capable of playing both as multilateral and minilateral security provider.

Key words: European security, peacekeeping, multilateralism, minilateralism

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peacekeeping and the role of EU in this change. The hypothesis of the preference of European states for minilateralism and selective engagement in peace operations is supported by the data analysed in this chapter♦.

MULTILATERALISM AND THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING Multilateralism is a step down the road of

civilizing politics among states. It is truly so, especially if one overlooks the common meaning of multilateralism as the acting together of several states, and sides with the political science view of multilateralism as the conduct founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action (see, especially, Caporaso, 1993; and Ruggie, 1993). Regarding security, the key principles of multilateral security are the principle of no aggression, no use of armed force at the exception of self-defence, no gross violation of human rights, no use of terrorist practices, no violation of disarmament and arms control treaties. Preventing the violation of principles and restoring peace and security when prevention fails are the goal of the rules and mechanisms that make multilateral security active in international politics. In the UN Charter, two mechanisms are set down as available to the member states in order to

♦ This chapter is part of the research project on Italy and Multilateralism conducted at the Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, as a PRIN (Research Project of National Interest) funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research (contract no. 2005144341_003). The project created ADISM, an electronic archive that contains the data of 126 peace and security missions of the United Nations, NATO, OSCE, and European Union, in the years 1947-2007. ADISM data are available on-line at http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm.

induce compliance to multilateral security principles. They are the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions, and the intervention in the territory of the states that are responsible for violating security principles. This chapter is about the latter mechanism, which is commonly known as peacekeeping and today also as peace support operations or missions. In legal terms, peace operations are defined as limited because (a) they extinguish when pre-selected objectives are achieved; (b) are authorized and organized by an international organization, and conducted by military and civil personnel contributed by the member states of the international organisations; and (c) are set under the military command of a multinational structure in order to ensure impartiality to the parties in conflict. During the last twenty years, multilateral

security operations have been given mandates that were not present at the time the United Nations introduced this type of intervention in international politics. In addition to interposition missions for controlling truces and cease-fires (Chapter 2 of the UN Charter), and interrupting aggression and violence among states in conflict (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter), missions have been deployed to crisis and conflict areas in order to interrupt domestic violence, and stop the serious violation of human rights perpetrated either by repressive governments or in conditions of no effective government. In the years from 1947 to 1988, only 2 out of the total number of 15 peace operations were dispatched by the United Nations to a single country in order to stop domestic conflict, namely Congo in 1960, and New Guinea in 1962-63. In the following years, missions mandated to solve domestic problems under the aegis of the United Nations were far more numerous than other forms of mission. Later on, the mandate of peace missions widened in terms of tasks and

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goals. Therefore, three types of multilateral missions were distinguished according to mandate: peacekeeping, i.e. interposition missions mandated to watch over truce and crease-fire agreements; peace building, i.e. missions mandated to stop domestic violence and accomplish further assignments like protecting minorities, transferring refugees, and reconstructing the political, civil and administrative structure of the target state; and peace enforcement, i.e. missions mandated to stop violence, interpose between warring parties, disband irregular military forces, and reconstruct civil life conditions. However, in many cases, it is difficult to recognize the mission type on the ground because various tasks are commonly assigned to the same mission by the intervening organisation. Very often, the military and civil personnel carry out military, political, civil, administrative and police tasks at the same time. Therefore, experts coined the phrase ‘hybridization of peacekeeping’. Actually, this phrase applies to a wide set of changes, including the joining of different actors in the conduct of a single mission. This chapter aims at ascertaining one change in particular, namely the emergence of what is hereafter called minilateralism in peacekeeping. Economists make use of the concept of

minilateralism in order to study regionalism and other forms of trade and economic cooperation between groups of countries. Minilateral agreements are represented by governments as instruments complementary, and not opposite, to the existing multilateral trade regime. However, analysts are concerned with the effect that trade and financial agreements between restricted groups of countries have on the multilateral practices and rules issued by the world economic institutions. According to different schools of thought, minilateralism is either

neutral, harmful, or inoffensive to the goals and benefits of multilateral economic regimes (see Kono, 2007). Similarly, concern should exist on the effect of minilateralism on the multilateral security practices shared by the states of the world political system. In peacekeeping, minilateralism takes the form of peace support operations organized by regional organisations and ad hoc coalitions (known today also as coalitions of the willings). While multilateralism is defined by universal principles, equal participation, and no discrimination, minilateralism is not precisely defined. However, it differs from multilateralism in two respects, namely participation and, consequently, discrimination. Participation is not equal in the sense that is deliberately restricted to the states of a region and coalition. Discrimination ensues in as much as the group of the states of a minilateral agreement adopt practices that discriminate other states. In peace operations, for instance, they can decide intervention according to their own interests and special principles. Actually, also principles of action may characterize minilateralism as far as the governments of a minilateral agreement add special principles to the universal ones. Peacekeeping intervention and state sovereignty

Hybridization of peacekeeping is

consistent with the current culture of global governance, in particular with the principle of responsibility to protect that has been recently added to the existing principles of global politics. Consequently, acquaintance to intervention in order to stop the gross violation of peace and security is present in the current culture of global governance. In addition to the humanitarian principle of responsibility to protect, it is recognized also that, under the pressure of interdependence, domestic

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problems drop from one country into neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. Therefore, domestic problems are recognized as influencing the stability of the world system, and become the object of the responsibility of the world political institutions. Actually, sovereignty has been reshaped in the contemporary world system but this change raises controversies. Intervention to protect the victims of human rights violations, even under authorization by the UN Security Council, raises the problem of the slippery slope, as Semb (2000) calls the problem of the threshold between legitimacy and no legitimacy of intervention. As Bellamy (2003) reminds to us, the problem consists in choosing between pluralism and solidarism. To the supporters of pluralism, intervention is unacceptable because violates the principle of sovereignty and state self-organization that is valued as the fundamental good of the world system. Pluralist thinkers remind to us also that, since the violation of sovereignty is normally at the advantage of the most powerful states, only the consent of the government of the target state can legitimise multilateral intervention and on condition that consent is given under no external pressure. To the supporters of solidarism, instead, avoiding human suffering is good reason for putting off the principle of no intervention. Today, the solidarity argument is boosted by the principle of responsibility to protect from power abuse all the individuals, i.e. also the citizens of the state in which the government, for reason of failure, negligence, and interest, does not protect all its citizens as is expected to do. Lastly, the problem of the actor that holds the responsibility to protect is no controversial issue to solidarist thinkers. They believe that institutions, like the United Nations and regional organizations, hold this responsibility. When the decision rules of these organizations give place to no

intervention, some thinkers believe that responsibility to protect passes on to the great powers, and even unilateral intervention is legitimate action (see, for example, Brown, 2004). The 1992 Anglo-American intervention to protect the Kurdish community in Northern Iraq is often cited as case in point. However, while objective criteria are lacking in the present culture of global security governance, it is admitted that the empirical probability of success and the economic sustainability of intervention are conditions to authorize peace intervention by armed and civilian forces that are multilaterally organized. The growth and partial efficacy of peace missions

The practice of multilateral security and

growth in number of peace operations owe much to the mass media. In the present communication society, they play an important role in placing multilateral intervention high on the world agenda. Actually, the mass media portray intervention as a viable instrument against violent, inefficient and repressive governments. Jakobsen (2000) represents the role of the mass media in this field as ‘the CNN effect', but claims that they are responsible also of distorting the public perception of intervention, and sometimes wrongly influencing the decision of governments. However, in order to explain the formation of the intervention culture, and the growth in number of multilateral operations since the late 1980s, attention must be drawn also to other factors and contexts. The transformation of world politics at the

end of the cold war, in 1989, is endorsed by analysts as the most important cause of the rising number of interventions in domestic and international conflicts that the two superpowers had blocked in the previous years. At the time the United States and

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Russia decided to reduce aid to the parties in conflict in the countries that had become irrelevant to their foreign policies, these countries turned themselves into customers of multilateral missions because of the shortage of funds they faced with in order to keep on with war actions. In addition, the end of the strategic rivalry in Europe gave to West European countries new resources to build up military and civil capabilities of crisis management, and organize the European security and defence policy (ESDP), admittedly for the crisis management goal. On their side, the East European countries did as much as they could on the same line of action in order to earn merit to their application to NATO and the European Union. However, at odds with the cold war end interpretation, data on conflicts, like those of the COW, UCDP/PRIO, and other archives, signal that the number of violent conflicts began to grow during the bipolar age, more exactly in the mid 1970s. Therefore, Jakobsen (2002) proposes a different explanation, and charges responsibility on the conditionality clause of the aid programs that the world economic institutions, with the support of the governments of the American coalition, have issued starting on the early 1980s. The programs of economic adjustment and democratic reform that were imposed on countries in need of economic aid, worsened the condition of economic backwardness and social conflict of those countries. Thus, violent domestic conflicts invited multilateral intervention in order to contain the diffusion of disorder and violence to the rest of the world. Another factor pushing the culture of

multilateral intervention upward is the propensity of regional organizations of all the continents, at the exception of Asia and the Middle East, to engage in local conflict management (see more in the last part of this chapter). Lastly, as explained here later,

democratic states contribute enormously to today’s multilateral security culture because peace and abstention from violence have been associated to democracy and respect of human rights. With the support of the public opinion and mass media, this theme became priority to the foreign policy of many democratic countries. Consequently, governments decide to join in to military intervention, legitimated by the UN Security Council, also in areas distant from their national territory. The democratic countries that more contribute to security missions are also wealthy ones. Therefore, it can be said also that they defend economic interests when they intervene in violent conflicts that put their interests at risk. However, statistics do not sustain the economic motivation of the UN peace operations. Conflict severity, measured by the number of victims – so, a humanitarian reason - is, instead, the best figure of statistical prediction of the decision of the UN Security Council to deploy peace missions to countries anguished by civil war. Moreover, statistics do not support the thesis that the United Nations intervene more frequently in raw materials exporting countries than in others (see Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). Briefly, both demand and supply factors

stimulate the growth of the number of multilateral missions, and strengthen the global culture of intervention. Resuming, these factors are 1. the increased number of violent conflicts since the 1970s when destabilization hurt the structure of government of the world system;

2. the worsening of social conflicts in countries anguished by economic backwardness, political repression and social quarrels that occurred in the 1980s and the following years because the world economic institutions imposed structural economic

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adjustment policies on the receiving countries;

3. the devolution of violence control to the United Nations and regional organizations after the Soviet-American rivalry came to an end, and the two principal countries of the global power competition restrained their aid policy to governments and groups in armed conflicts;

4. the principle of humanitarian protection that the political classes and publics of the democratic states of the dominant coalition were inclined to carry on by taking on themselves both the responsibility to protect and the largest portion of the cost of multilateral operations also in order to sustain the stabilization of the world economy

All these factors explain the growth of

multilateral security but do not inform us about the final outcome, i.e. the expected effect of the stabilization of the receiving countries. Appraising the output of peacekeeping is hard and controversial task because operations take place in serious and difficult conditions. Actually, in the receiving states, minimal security conditions are lacking; governments are unable to exercise authority but use force to repress opposition; mutual trust is missing among social groups; and no party is stronger than the others. These conditions induce the parties to converge on accepting external intervention but hinder the formation of the agreement to solve the conflict. Moreover, the agreement of third parties important to the fate of the conflict, like states concerned with the conditions of the geographical area of the receiving states, is also needed. In addition, intervention can have unwanted effects like the introduction of new forms of crime and the breakdown of the social structure of the target state (see, as example, the study of the

Somali case in Coyne, 2006). Lastly, missions are usually under-resourced and short in duration to cause the change wished for, and bring lasting peace, order and stability. In conditions like these, intervention can hardly achieve other objectives than the immediate one, i.e. the interruption of large violence. All such problems notwithstanding,

researchers have drawn lessons out of their analysis, and hinted at the conditions that make the interruption of violence to last enough to introduce democracy and social order. In the seminal analysis of 124 civil wars, which occurred from 1944 to 1997, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) got the lesson that constructing peace, order and stability is highly probable only if the conflict source is not ethnic and religious, civil war is not particularly costly in human lives, the economy of the country is relatively good, and multilateral operations give large financial aid to the receiving countries. In the analysis of 38 civil wars concluded between 1945 and 1998, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) demonstrate that prior democratic experience, conflict time length, the introduction of territorial autonomy, and multilateral intervention are all positively correlated to enduring the restoration of peaceful conditions. Fortna’s (2004) analysis of 111 civil wars from the end of the Second World War to 1999, finds no strong statistical correlation of the positive end of intervention to variables like the cause of conflict (ethnic, religious, etc.), the interruption of violence (victory of one party, peace agreement, armistice), and the economic development of the contenders, but confirms that the probability of lasting peace is higher when multilateral forces intervene rather than not. By comparing the data of the unilateral intervention of France, Great Britain and the United States and those of multilateral UN-authorized operations for the sake of

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democratizing the target country in the period of time 1946-1996, Pickering and Peceny (2006) demonstrate that the success rate of UN-authorized intervention is higher than that of unilateral intervention. They explain that United Nations intervention takes place under favourable conditions because all the parties in conflict consent to external intervention. Lastly, Mukherjee (2006) maintains that the reconstruction of political, civil and administrative structures of receiving state depends on inducing the parties in conflict to adopt the parliamentary rather than presidential regime, and the proportional rather than majority electoral system, because the former ones create the correct relation that must exist between majority and minority groups. Achievement of this result, however, is rarely possible because peace missions do not last enough time to build that constitutional solution. On the whole, these analyses recognize that multilateral intervention normally achieves the goal of interrupting large violence. At the same time, they invite to caution regarding the long-term result of stabilizing the target country because very long time is needed to produce this result. EU ENGAGEMENT IN PEACE MISSIONS During the last ten years, ESDP, the

security and defence policy of the European Union, has been put in place, and military and civilian capabilities for crisis management

have been made operational by the member states. These actions are consistent with the goal of effective multilateralism and robust intervention that the European Security Strategy, in 2003, declared as the main goal of the European Union in the global governance of security (Attinà and Repucci, 2004; Biscop and Andersson, 2008; Lindstrom, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 20065; Ojanen, 2006; Toje, 2005). So far, the European Union has been able to engage itself in 21 peace and security operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. To 20 ESDP operations, the monitoring mission in Bosnia (ECMM/EUMM), launched in 1991 when ESDP was not yet in place, is added to the list of European Union peace and security operations (see list in the Appendix to this chapter). EU operations are truly multilateral in

nature when the EU military and civil personnel participate in missions organized by the United Nations together with the personnel of other states. This is the case of about half the number of all EU operations. In few cases, operations are conducted by EU and NATO forces. In one case, the operation in Sudan, the EU mission has been arranged in agreement with the African Union. The remaining number consists of minilateral operations, i.e. interventions decided by the Union with the consent of the government, and/or parties in conflict, of the state where the operations are deployed (see Table 1).

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Table 1

EU’s Peace Operations Name Initiative and organization

ECMM / EUMM - European Community Monitoring Mission/European Union Monitoring Mission

EU

EUSEC - EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

EU

AMM - Aceh Monitoring Mission EU EUPOL-COPPS - EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories EU EU BAM Rafah - EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories

EU

EUPT - EU Planning team in Kosovo EU EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine . EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

EU

EUJUST Themis - EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia EU EUJUST Lex - EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq EU EUSR BST - Border team Georgia EU EUPOL RD Congo - EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo EU AMIS II Darfur - EU Support to AMIS II EU-AU EUPM - EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina UN EUFOR RD Congo - EU Military Operation in RD CONGO UN Artemis - EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo UN EUPOL Kinshasa - EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) UN Concordia - EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia UN-NATO EUFOR-ALTHEA - EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina UN-NATO Proxima EUPOL - EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

UN-NATO

EUPAT - EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia UN-NATO EUPOL Afghanistan - EU Police mission in Afghanistan UN-NATO

All of the EU missions carried/carry out

various tasks and functions, like truce monitoring, border control, rescue actions, humanitarian protection, and political, social and administrative reconstruction. Few of them were short term missions, i.e. few months long. As of December 2007, seven EU missions completed their mandate. The personnel employed by all the operations is counted in

more than 10 thousand units. However, in more than 50% of the cases, the number of personnel units is below one hundred; only in three missions is over one thousand. Balkan and Eastern Europe receives the largest number of ESDP operations, followed by Africa. Also duration of operations in Europe is the highest, followed by that in the Middle East (see Graphs 1 and 2).

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Graph 1

EU new, closed, and active operations

1

4 4

7

4

22 23

1

5

7

1415

14

1991 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

New operations Closed operations Active operations

Graph 2

EU operations: areas (number and duration)

6

23

10

4

1

3

6

1,70,9

2,73,6

Africa Asia Middle East Europe

EU operations: total number EU active operations Mean duration (year)

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All ESDP missions have been deployed starting in 2003. Therefore, the number of EU active operations has been growing very fast in the short period of time thereafter. Over the years, the number of active operations has been growing equally in and out of Europe (see Graphs 3 and 4). This signals the increasing capability of the European Union to act both as a regional (Europe) security organization, and a global security player. At the same time, attention is drawn here to the hypothesis, which is discussed later in this chapter, that by

organising and conducting peace operations all alone, although under the authorization of the United Nations, the European Union is reinforcing minilateralism, both as regionalization and decentralization. In other terms, EU acts as peacekeeping organization in its own region, and the member states act as a coalition that supplement/replace the world system institution, the United Nations, when this one faces the problem of building an agreement on deploying multilateral missions in places out of Europe.

Graph 3

EU active operations: In- and Out-of-Europe

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1991 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Out-of-Europe In-Europe Total

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Graph 4

EU new operations: In- and Out-of-Europe

0

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2

3

4

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1991 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Out-of-Europe In-Europe Total

The analysis of this topic takes us to

further analyze two critical issues of global security governance, namely the reason why democratic and rich states, like the EU member states, are disposed to intervention, and whether ESDP operations can be interpreted as a case of minilateralism, i.e. of the current practice of peacekeeping regionalization and emerging decentralization of the agency of intervention. State Propensity to Engagement in Peace Operations

State propensity to engage in multilateral

operations can be explained by egoistic and altruistic motivations, i.e. both selfish interest and commitment to defend public goods and humanitarian values. In principle, the two drives are not incompatible to one another. In reality, it is difficult to separate one from the other. In participating in multilateral operations, states pursue national/individual as much as system/collective interests.

Stability in areas of concern, enhancement of the national army, and promotion of the state position in the structure of the world government are examples of the national interest that the state defends by participating in multilateral operations. Peace, security, law and humanitarian principles in the world system, instead, are examples of the public goods the state defends by participating in multilateral operations. Furthermore, every time state interests are pursued by taking part in such operations, multilateralism is reinforced as normal structure of action, and becomes the constitutive part of the foreign policy culture of the participating states. A different question on state propensity to

participate in multilateral operations, however, is that about the attributes that make some states ready to take part in peace operations more than others. Researchers answered to this question by sustaining that data demonstrate that democracy makes states disposed to take part in peace operations more than other state regimes (Andersson,

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2002, 2006; Daniel and Caraher, 2006; Lebovic, 2004). Actually, despite the very recent increase of the number of not democratic countries that take part in peace operations, the preponderance of democratic states remain strong. In the table here below, all the states contributing troops to the Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) of the United Nations in the year 2007 are distinguished

according to the Freedom House classification of the political status of the state, i.e. Free or democratic, Partially free or quasi-democratic, and Not free or not democratic (see www.freedomhouse.org). Two on three democratic countries and almost all quasi democratic states contribute troops to UN PKOs as against one on three not democratic countries (see Table 2).

Table 2

STATUS Free Partially free Not free States in PKOs (2007) 58 42 19

Total number of states (2007) 89 44 59

One can interpret these data, and the

evidence provided by the analysts, as suggesting that democratic states have qualities that are congenial to engagement in multinational security mechanisms, namely (a) institutional and cultural attributes, which provide for adhesion to norms and procedures of mediation and negotiation as means of conflict solving; (b) foreign policy culture attributes, which sustain state conformity to the legal use of force in international relations and the respect for human rights and democracy; (c) attributes of economic-technical efficiency, which make democratic states both more capable than others to pay the costs of intervention, and more able to put in action military and civil personnel for crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. However, it is also true that democracy may hinder participation in peace operations. The institutional and political actors of democratic countries have at their disposal many instruments for defending contrasting opinions on the benefits and costs of military intervention. Party competition negatively influences decisions on taking part in peace missions, and constrains governments to abandon membership in missions that causes

victims to national armed forces. Lastly, the probability that democratic states reduce their propensity to participate in multilateral operations is high when they are rich, more exactly when they have a high gross national product and, consequently, a lower rate of incidence of financial contribution to missions on the gross national product. This happens because the spill over of benefits of peacekeeping is distributed to all the states. Consequently, small contributors and free riders get from peace missions more benefits than great contributors do. In these circumstances, rich countries may count the benefits they draw from, and the public good they offer with, participating in peace missions as exceedingly disproportionate to the cost they bear. Consequently, as Shimizu and Sandler (2002) remark, it is probable that rich countries become selective. Rather than joining in as member of truly multilateral operations under the United Nations command, rich countries will prefer to engage themselves in minilateral operations, i.e. operations conducted by regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions because they can control better the objectives and costs of these operations. This observation is

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relevant to assess the emerging European way of taking part in peacekeeping. European operations and peacekeeping minilateralism In this last section, European contribution

to the regionalization and decentralization of

peacekeeping in global security governance is analysed. Analysis is made on three European international organizations, NATO, OSCE, and the EU. From 1991 to 2007, these organizations entered into 66 peacekeeping operations either on United Nations authorization or on their own initiative (see Graph 5).

Graph 5

New PKOs (1991-2007)

61

913

44

0

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20

30

40

50

60

70

UN NATO OCSE EU

Difference in the three organisations

approach to peacekeeping notwithstanding, their involvement in peace operations has the same impact on the present state of peacekeeping, i.e. altogether it presses ahead regionalisation and decentralization within the current practice of multilateral security. Before going into checking this topic, information on the contribution of NATO and OSCE to peacekeeping is given here to complete the information on European organizations’ involvement in multilateral security. In June 1992, at the Oslo meeting of the

NATO Council, the member countries decided to widen the collective defence mission of the Organisation, and authorized the creation of peacekeeping capabilities in order to make NATO forces able to accomplish military and

civilian crisis management tasks. The decision changed NATO into a minilateral coalition on stand to carry out security missions either by its own or within a multilateral set. Since 1992, NATO has carried out 9 security operations, 2 of them authorized by the United Nations. In the last seven years, at least three NATO security operations have been active each year. All the NATO missions have been deployed to Europe, namely the Balkans, but one to Asia, Afghanistan, and a small one to the Middle East with the mandate restricted to training Iraqi armed forces. Intervention in Afghanistan was decided for the sake of containing the threat of Al-Qaeda to the security of the world system, and punishing terrorist organizations for the 9/11 attack. Interventions in the Balkans, instead, are

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considered as humanitarian because violence was encapsulated within the borders of the former Yugoslavian states (Matlary, 2002). The Organisation for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has a membership of 55 states, and a mission encompassing activities in security, economic, political, communication, and national and territorial affairs. The successor to the Helsinki Process and the European Conference for Security and Cooperation (ECSC), OSCE has been particularly active in facilitating the closing of the division of Europe, and rebuilding East European and former Soviet Union countries after the end of the cold war. Notwithstanding the role of ECSC/OSCE in fostering dialogue between the two parts of Europe, and building the European security partnership, governments did not show much concern to enhance OSCE activities because this could harm the role of NATO and the EU in the continent. Nevertheless, OSCE actions for peace and security are manifold and important. In particular, the civilian and also military personnel of OSCE’s Long-term missions (LTMs) are active in member countries when serious crises and low-violence conflicts may lead to open civil war. In the past 15 years, up to 10 LTMs have been active each year in European and Asian member countries. To some analysts, the organization of

peace operations by regional and sub-regional organizations, like the European ones, is not a new phenomenon. Peacekeeping regionalization is just a process of natural selection rather than intelligent design, shaped by the proliferation of institutional frameworks (Gowan and Johnstone, 2007:3). Moreover, hybridization of peace operations does not set aside the United Nations, which remain the principal institution in charge of peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). However, though the contribution of regional organizations to peace and security

operations is frequently authorized by the United Nations, their presence in peacekeeping, which has been increasing impressively in the last decade, is connected to other important change in the world system. Consequently, some analysts, censuring regional organizations for leaning toward conducting peacekeeping operations in their own region (see more here below), call attention to the growing separation of Western from non-Western operations (Sidhu, 2006), and blame on regional organization operations to be ad hoc coalition operations (Wilson, 2003). Notwithstanding the continuous importance of UN peacekeeping and the still uncertain nature of regional peacekeeping, the last part of this chapter aims at enlightening the additional, and not necessarily opposite, phenomenon of peacekeeping decentralization from the United Nations to European/Western regional organization, and sustain the hypothesis that minilateralism is siding with multilateralism in global security governance. Let us check first the quite uncontested

hypothesis of regionalization. It must be said that this is not general and uniform in nature. It is very much advanced in Europe, as data presented here above demonstrate. It is not practiced at all in Asia, though Asian countries contribute many troops to UN operations, and the Middle East, where peacekeeping personnel is contributed by countries of other parts of the world. In America, especially in Central and Caribbean America, it is scarcely present on the initiative of the Organization of the American States. But in Africa, peacekeeping regionalization has been growing fast in past years on the initiative of the African Union and sub-regional organisations. The effort to build up the Peace and Security Council of the African Union is important contribution to the Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa. Assistance given to the creation of this security mechanism by the

MULTILATERALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF ‘MINILATERALISM’ IN EU PEACE OPERATIONS

19

United Nations and Western actors, namely the European Union, the United States, and the G8, is worth noting here. In particular, on the initiative of the United States, the G8 launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and created in Rome the Centre of Excellence for Police Stability Units that within 2010 will train 75000 soldiers, above all from African countries, to run peace operations. The African sub-regional organizations’ involvement in peacekeeping is exemplified by the operations of ECOWAS (the Organization for economic cooperation of the countries of Western Africa), SADC (Southern Africa Development Community), IGAD (the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development), and CEMAC (the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa). In addition, intervention of single states like South Africa and Nigeria, and not African ones like France and Great Britain, is present in the African continent. Is the growing involvement of the

European international organizations in multilateral security to count as normal case of peacekeeping regionalization? Granted that, at present, the three above mentioned organizations are active predominantly in Europe (see here below), is the Europeanization of peacekeeping in Europe to count as twin to the Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa, though better equipped and capable than the latter? Or is the European attachment to multilateral security to count also as the symptom of something different, which is boiling up in the global security governance, i.e. the decentralization of the peacekeeping agency? In the past fifty years, Africa and Asia

received the largest number of UN peace and security missions (see Graph 6). By going into the peacekeeping business, the three European organizations changed the geographical distribution of the whole set of

peace missions. Though collection of data on the Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa is in progress, it can be said that the absolute number of peace missions in Europe is close to that in Africa but the number of violent conflicts and wars in Africa is much higher than the number of violent conflicts in Europe. This opposite match is explained here as it follows. The number of domestic and international conflicts in Africa does not go with the number of African security operations because, in addition to Africa’s shortage of economic and military capability of crisis management, in the past years, Africa did not progress as much as Europe did towards collective security culture. Only recently, African Union started building up its own collective mechanism for conflict and crisis management. On the contrary, since the time of the Helsinki Process, the European states have been developing a preference for collective crisis management. Therefore, Europe has been able to form the most advanced regional security partnership. Elsewhere (Attinà, 2006 and 2007), regional security partnership is defined as the region arrangement that originates from inter-governmental agreements to cooperate on enhancing security, stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of agreements, instruments and mechanisms such as formal treaties, rules of the game, international organizations, joint actions, trade and economic treaties, political dialogues, and agreements on confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy measures, and also measures of cooperation on domestic problems. In this perspective, peacekeeping regionalization fits to the current practice of security regionalization, and the more the partnership model is adopted by governments to manage security at the region level, the more peacekeeping regionalization will grow.

FULVIO ATTINÀ

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Graph 6

36

30

6

23 20

3

42

12

30

1612

49 9

0

Africa Asia Europa Middle East America

UN, NATO, OSCE, EU Operations - Area (1947-2007)

Total number UN operations NATO, OSCE, EU operations

Let us now check the additional

hypothesis, i.e. the incoming decentralization of peace missions in global security governance, by looking, first, at the available data. The growing contribution of the European organisations to the rising trend of multilateral intervention is apparent by confronting the number of new and active operations of the United Nations and European organizations (see Graph 7). From 2002 to 2007, the number of European organizations’ missions is greater than that of UN missions just as, in the years from 2004 to 2007, the number of active operations of the three European organizations is greater than the number of UN active missions. In addition to evidence provided by

numbers, further information on the European contribution to peacekeeping decentralization is given by facts like the following ones. The NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 was

deployed under no authorization by the UN Security Council. Thus, this is a case of peacekeeping decentralization. The NATO’s ISAF mission and EU’s EUPOL mission, which have been dispatched to Afghanistan on demand of the UN Security Council, can be counted as peacekeeping decentralization given that the Security Council decision is the outcome of Western diplomatic pressure. Similarly, the EU diplomacy obtained from the United Nations and African Union authorization to intervene in the Sudan area. Lastly, participation of European countries in ad hoc coalitions under the leadership of the United States is a further case in point, participation in the coalition of the willings in Iraq included. However, it is here recognized that further study is needed to forward the decentralization of peacekeeping agency hypothesis.

MULTILATERALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF ‘MINILATERALISM’ IN EU PEACE OPERATIONS

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Graph 7

UN, NATO, OSCE, EU new and active operations, 1988-2007

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

UN new operations NATO, OSCE, EU new operation

UN active operations NATO, OSCE, EU active operations

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, European attachment to the

practice of peacekeeping reinforces peacekeeping minilateralism, both as regionalization and decentralization. European security organizations have deployed to their own region 30 out of a total of 43 missions because the European states are rich and military capable enough to deal with their own security problems, and have developed a strong cooperative security culture. At the same time, NATO and the European Union have deployed missions to other parts of the

world, and this case sustains the decentralization of peacekeeping practice on the assumption that the European countries are taking into serious consideration the problem of balancing the costs of participation in peacekeeping with the benefits of controlling security and peace missions by holding on themselves all the operation aspects. In other words, the UN authorization of European missions notwithstanding, it can be said that the European governments are moving towards becoming able to play on all the tables of global security governance, the multilateral and minilateral alike.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY • Andersson Andreas (2002), United Nations Intervention by United Democracies? State

Commitment to UN Interventions 1991-99, in “Cooperation and Conflict”, 37, 4, 363-386. • Andersson Andreas (2006), Democracy and susceptibility to UN intervention, in

“International peacekeeping”, 13, 2, 184-199. • Attinà Fulvio (2006), The Building of Regional Security Partnership and the Security-Culture

Divide in the Mediterranean Region, in Adler Emanuel et al., eds., The convergence of civilizations. Constructing a Mediterranean Region, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 239-265.

• Attinà Fulvio (2007), The European Security Partnership: a comparative analysis, in Foradori Paolo, Rosa Paolo and Scartezzini Riccardo, eds. (2007), Managing multi-level foreign policy. The EU in international affairs, Lanham, Lexington Books, 87-109.

• Attinà Fulvio and Repucci Sarah (2004), ESDP and the European regional security partnership, in Holland Martin (ed), Common foreign and security policy. The first ten years, London, Continuum, 58-77.

• Bellamy Alex J. (2003), Humanitarian intervention and the three traditions, in “Global Society”, 17, 1, 3-20

• Bellamy Alex J. and Williams Paul (2005), Who’s keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace operations, in “International Security”, 29, 4, 157-195

• Biscop Sven and Andersson Jan Joel, eds. (2008), The EU and the European Security Strategy, London, Routledge.

• Brown Chirs (2004), Do great powers have great responsibilities? Great powers and moral agency, “Global Society”, 18, 1, 5-20.

• Caporaso James A. (1993), International Relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations, in Ruggie John G. (ed), Multilateralism matters. The theory and praxis of an institutional form, New York, Columbia University

• Coyne Christopher J. (2006), Reconstructing weak and failed states: foreign intervention and the Nirvana fallacy, in “Foreign Policy Analysis”, 2, 4, 343-360.

• Daniel D.C.F. and Caraher Leigh C. (2006), Characteristics of troop contributors to peace operations and implications for global capacity, in “International peacekeeping”, 13, 3, 297-315.

• Doyle, Michael. W. and Sambanis Nicholas (2000) International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, in “American Political Science Review”, 94, 4, 779–802.

• Fortna Virginia P. (2004), Does Peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil wars?, in “International Studies Quarterly”, 48, 2, 269-292

• Gilligan, Michael and Stedman Stephen J. (2003), Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?, in “International Studies Review”, 5. 4, 37–54.

• Gowan Richard and Ian Johnstone (2007), Challenges for peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the “War on Terror”, New York, Intenational Peace Academy, “Coping with crises Working papers series”.

• Hartzell Caroline, Hoddie Matthew, Rothchild Donald (2001), Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War, in “International Organization”, 55, 1, 183–208.

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• Kono Daniel Y. (2007), When do trade blocs block trade?, in “International Studies Quarterly”, 51, 1, 165-182.

• Jakobsen Peter Viggo (2000), Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect, in “Journal of Peace Research”, 37, 2, 131-143.

• Jakobsen Peter Viggo (2002), The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s: Adding Globalization to the Conventional 'End of the Cold War Explanation', in “Cooperation and Conflict”, 37,3, 267-282.

• Lebovic James H. (2004), Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations peace operations after the Cold War, in “Journal of Conflict Resolution”, 48, 6, 910-937.

• Lindstrom Gustav (2007), Enter the EU battlegoups, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paer 97.

• Matlary Haaland Janne (2002), Intervention for human rights in Europe, London, Palgrave.

• Merlingen Michael and Ostrauskaite Rasa (2006), European Union peacebuilding and policing. Governance and the European security and defence policy, London, Routledge.

• Mukherjee Bumba (2006), Does third-party enforcement or domestic institutions promote enduring peace after civil wars? Policy lessons from en empirical test, in “Foreign Policy Analysis”, 2. 4. 405-430.

• Ojanen Hanna (2006).The EU and Nato: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy, in JCMS 44., 1, 57–76.

• Pickering Jeffrey and Peceny Mark (2006), Forging democracy at gunpoint, in “International Studies Quarterly”, 50, 3, 539-560.

• Ruggie John G. (1993), Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution, in Ruggie John G. (ed), Multilateralism matters. The theory and praxis of an institutional form, New York, Columbia University Press, 3-47.

• Semb Anne J. (2000), The New Practice of UN-Authorized Interventions: A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference? Journal of Peace Research, 37, 4, 469-488.

• Shimizu, H., and T. Sandler (2002), Peacekeeping and burden-sharing,1994-2000, in “Journal of Peace Research”, 39, 6, 651-668.

• Sidhu Waheguru Pal Singh (2006), Regionalisation of Peace Operations, in Espen Barth Eide ed., Effective Multilateralism:Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalized UN, Foreign Policy Centre, British Council, 32-37.

• Toje Asle (2005), The 2003 European Union security strategy: a critical appraisal, in “European Foreign Affairs Review”, 10, 1, 117-134.

• Wilson Gary (2003), UN authorized enforcement: regional organizations versus “coalitions of the willing”, in “International peacekeeping”, 10, 2, 89-106.

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Appendix: European Union peace and security operations (December 2007)

Acronyme Area Countries Starting date End Years* Personnel Fatalities

1 ECMM / EUMM Europe Bosnia 1991, July active 16,5 59 0

2 EUPM Europe Bosnia 2003, January active 5,0 202 0

3 Concordia Europe FYROM 2003, March 2003, December

0,8 358 0

4 Artemis Africa Democratic Republic of Congo

2003, June 2003, September

0,3 1800 0

5 Proxima EUPOL Europe FYROM 2003, December 2005, December

2,0 200 0

6 AMIS II Darfur Africa Darfur, Sudan 2004, January active 4,0 40 0

7 EUJUST Lex Middle East

Iraq 2004, February active 3,9 12 0

8 EUJUST Themis

Europe Georgia 2004, July 2005, July

1,0 10 0

9 EUFOR-ALTHEA

Europe Bosnia 2004, December active 3,1 5949 0

10 EUPOL Kinshasa

Africa DRC 2005, March active 2,3 30 0

11 EUSEC Africa DRC 2005, June active 2,6 32 0

12 EUPAT Europe FYROM 2005, June 2006, December

1,5 30 0

13 EUSR BST Europe Georgia 2005, September active 2,3 20 0

14 AMM Asia Indonesia 2005, September 2006, December

1,3 80 0

15 EU BAM Rafah Middle East

Palestinian Territorities

2005, November active 2,2 70 0

16 EU BAM Moldova and Ukraine

Europe Moldova and Ukraine

2005, December active 2,1 103 0

17 EUPOL-COPPS Middle East

Palestine Territorities

2006, January active 2,0 33 0

18 EUPT Europe Kosovo 2006, April active 1,7 35 0

19 EUFOR RD Congo Africa

Democratic Republic of Congo

2006, April 2006, November 0,6 2800 0

20 EUPOL Afghanistan

Asia Afghanistan 2007, May active 0,7 172 0

21 EUPOL RD Congo Africa

Democratic Republic of Congo

2007, July active 0,5 39 0

ROMANIAN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS Vol. 8, No. 2, 2008

25

Introduction* The EU has over the last few years

increasingly become a geopolitical player in the Black Sea region, with growing abilities to project its interests in its South-Eastern neighbourhood. While the EU’s policies towards the region were long pursued in an ad hoc manner, treating the region as peripheral and cautious not to challenge Russian interests, preparations for the 2007 enlargement with Romania and Bulgaria brought a gradual realization of the region’s importance to European security. However, EU interests in the region in several instances contradict those of the region’s major player, Russia, which defines its economic, political,

* Niklas Nilsson is a researcher at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. The author is grateful for the comments of Dr. Svante E. Cornell, Co-Director of the ISDP. nnilsson@silkroadstudies.org

and security interests in the region in a manner that is in many instances incompatible with the emerging strategy of the EU. Therefore, increasing and deepening EU involvement in the region will likely give rise to increasing competition with Russia over soft power and influence in the regional states.1 This article examines two aspects of geopolitical competition in the Black Sea region to which, it is argued, the EU is increasingly becoming part. These are, first, the increasing competition for energy transportation routes in light of the EU’s efforts of diversifying its supply sources and, second, the need for EU involvement in the conflict resolution processes of the region’s unresolved conflicts.

1 See discussion in Bruce P. Jackson, “The Soft War for Europe’s East”, in Ronald D. Asmus (Ed.), Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006.

EU AND RUSSIA IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: INCREASINGLY COMPETING INTERESTS? Niklas Nilsson* Abstract. This article examines two fields of geopolitical competition in the Black Sea region, in

which an increasing EU involvement is increasingly challenging Russian interests. First, the EU’s effort to diversify its energy sources through new transportation routes is meeting competition in the form of Russian-sponsored projects. The EU has realized the partial incompatibility of Russian and EU interests in this regard; however, the lack of cohesion within the EU prevents the formation of common external energy policies. Second, the EU is increasingly recognizing its interest in engaging with conflict resolution in the region. This also runs contrary to Russian strategy, which strives to maintain the status quo in the conflicts rather than working for solutions, in order to maintain Russian leverage over the South Caucasus and Moldova. In this field, the EU has yet to officially recognize its interest conflict with Russia. However, due to the intertwinement of the conflict resolution processes with the EU’s deeper policy goals in the Black Sea region, namely the promotion of a stable, secure and democratic European neighborhood, the EU will likely find it increasingly difficult to pursue its key interests in the region, while simultaneously maintaining a passive stance towards Russian policies in the region.

Key words: Black Sea, energy strategy, South Caucasus, Russia

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An Evolving Regional Strategy and the Interconnections between EU Interests The increasing strategic significance of the

Black Sea Region for European security has highlighted the relevance of regional approaches to several of the challenges that the regional states and the EU are facing in the region. This was not least manifested through the initiatives taken toward engaging with the non-EU Black Sea states and Central Asia during the Finnish and German EU presidencies in 2006-2007. Previous EU policies toward the regional states have included three strategies: enlargement with Romania and Bulgaria with prospects for the eventual inclusion of Turkey, the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) including Ukraine, Moldova and the three South Caucasian states. These strategies have all been largely bilateral in nature; however, the EU’s post-enlargement abilities to function as a geopolitical player in the region have provided the rationale for a set of regional cooperation initiatives on part of the EU, envisioned as “Black Sea Synergy” and released on April 11, 2007. The document outlines key sectors which require coordinated action on a regional level as energy, transport, environment and security.2 The initiative was not envisioned as an “EU strategy” toward the Black Sea region, but rather as complementary to current policies, in areas where regional approaches are deemed as beneficial. The EU’s emerging strategic thinking on

the Black Sea region evolves from a realization that meeting several of the EU’s security concerns, broadly understood,

2 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, Brussels, 11 April 2007, p 2.

necessitates a deeper engagement with the regional states, on a bilateral as well as a multilateral basis. These concerns range from energy security and resource access, the risk of flare-ups and spill-over of the region’s unresolved conflicts, combating organized crime and terrorism and promoting a stable and secure European neighbourhood, through encouraging democratization processes and the integration of the regional states with European and Transatlantic cooperation structures. However, regarding several of these

security interests, the EU is increasingly facing a dilemma of engaging with the region and pursuing its security interests without simultaneously challenging those of Russia, especially considering the direction in which Russia’s policies toward the region have developed over the last several years. It is in this sense increasingly clear that EU and Russian approaches to the region are incompatible in several areas. Subsequent sections will examine two particular areas where EU and Russian interests contradict each other, and where increasing EU engagement with the regional states will compete with Russian interests. The specific areas examined are energy diversification and conflict resolution. So far, energy diversification is the field where the EU has most clearly realized this conflict of interest, while it has been reluctant to challenge Russian interests regarding the unresolved conflicts, Transnistria being a partial exception. These are key areas of EU involvement, which are also closely tied to the EU’s abilities of pursuing its deeper objectives in the region, regarding the development of a stable, secure, and democratic European neighbourhood. The interconnections between these EU

interests in the Black Sea region should be underlined. While the stability of the Black Sea

EU AND RUSSIA IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: INCREASINGLY COMPETING INTERESTS?

27

region has due to its geographical proximity become central to European security, all EU strategies for diversifying its energy supply through access to resources in the Caspian region are also dependent on the existence of a chain of stable, Western-oriented states in the European neighbourhood, through which these resources will transit. Thus, the EU’s engagement in the Black Sea region for boosting energy security cannot be disconnected from the resolution of the region’s conflicts, which constitutes a key precondition for the consolidation of stability and sound state building processes in the region. These processes are in turn linked to another challenge to Russian interests, namely the integration of the Black Sea states within European and Transatlantic institutions, which is nevertheless a precondition for providing security and prospects for democratization to the regional states. Moscow has reacted with suspicion towards the democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia and does not wish to see similar developments elsewhere. Rather, it prefers the consolidation of authoritarian and Russia-oriented regimes which it can control; making EU and Russian interests incompatible also when considering EU interests not only in a stable, but also in a democratic neighbourhood. In this regard, the development of infrastructure for energy transit and export independent from Russia, as was achieved with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines, serves to anchor producer and transit states in the Black Sea region more firmly to the West, and to reinforce the independence of especially Azerbaijan and Georgia.3

3 S. Frederich Starr and Svante E. Cornell (Eds.), “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2005.

Conversely, the resolution of the region’s conflicts and the consolidation of stability, statehood and democratization in the region require a firm EU involvement in these processes, an involvement which is, in addition to the EU’s overall interest in a stable and secure neighbourhood, also motivated through the EU’s pursuit of energy security. While the EU’s increasing energy dependence on Russia may also allow Russia the leverage to make EU states think twice about their level of involvement in those Black Sea states Russia considers as within its orbit, the diversification of energy sources may allow the EU increased room for maneuver regarding its other policy goals in the region. Thus, a key challenge for the EU’s

engagement with the Black Sea region, given the interconnections between these interests, is therefore to balance these against each other in the development of a broad and coherent strategy toward the region, taking advantage of the opportunities offered through each possible form of engagement, while not allowing one to take precedence over another.4 Energy Security and the EU’s Struggle for Diversified Energy Sources With an already high and rising European

import demand for oil and gas, securing a safe supply of energy can be termed one of the EU’s primary security concerns. The EU currently receives close to half its natural gas imports and 30% of its oil imports from Russia.5 Due to a lack of investment in

4 See Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, “The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, June 2006, p 23-24. 5 Ariel Cohen, “Europe’s Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy”, Heritage Foundation, November 5, 2007.

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production and infrastructure, it is doubtful whether Russian production will in the future be able to meet European demand. This fact has put high hopes to the exploration and development of gas fields in Turkmenistan and oil fields in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and it seems that energy from these countries will provide an important share of Europe’s future energy supply. The significance of the Black Sea region in this regard is in large part due to the region’s potential for constituting a transit area for Caspian energy resources to Europe. The focus of geopolitical competition

between on the one hand Russia, on the other the U.S. and the EU over energy transit through the region is above all the question of which routes will supply Caspian energy to the European market. In this regard, the U.S. and the EU are seeking to construct transit routes which will ensure access to Caspian supplies without reliance on the Russian pipeline network. The perceived need for “diversifying” European energy supply gained increased vigor with the Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2006, and subsequent occasions where Russia has utilized its monopoly position as energy supplier for geopolitical leverage against the Baltic States, Belorussia and Georgia. This has made several EU states increasingly concerned over the implications of depending too heavily on Russia as an energy supplier. The EU has thus increased its efforts of developing a common external energy policy, stressing the need for diversifying supply sources and for EU members to coordinate their energy policy objectives through “developing a common external policy approach”.6 The European Commission’s document “An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests” of 2006, 6 Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council 23/24 March 2006: Presidency Conclusions”, May 18, 2006, 7775/1/06, p. 14.

identifies risks to European energy security as reliance on suppliers in unstable regions, producers who use energy as a political lever, and external actors neither adhering to market rules, nor facing competition on domestic markets.7 These formulations do identify import dependence on Russia and the Middle East as risks to European energy security.8 The “An Energy Policy for Europe” document of September 2007 underlines that while the EU hopes to develop its energy relationships with the traditional suppliers Russia and Algeria, the EU must “promote diversity with regard to source, supplier, transport route and transport method”.9 The EU has in accordance sought to

revitalize its strategies for diversifying its energy supply through developing the “East-West Energy Corridor” to the Caspian region through Turkey and the South Caucasus. In order to diversify EU energy supply, it is vital that infrastructure for energy transport is developed which allows energy to be transported from the Caspian region without relying on Russia’s pipeline network. For oil, the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in May 2005 represented a milestone in providing European access to Caspian oil from Azerbaijan, and the pipeline can also be fueled through transports of Caspian oil by tanker across the Caspian Sea. The construction of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) between Baku and Erzurum and the Turkey-Greece Interconnector will in a similar manner provide Europe with Caspian gas, however in limited volumes. Substantial 7 EU Commission, “An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests”, European Union, S160/06, 2006, p 1. 8 Robert Larsson, “Tackling Dependency: The EU and its Energy Security Challenges”, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), October 2007, pp 20-21. 9 EU Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament: An Energy Policy for Europe”, COM (2007), September 1, 2007, p 10.

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access to Caspian gas, however, requires the construction of new transportation infrastructure. The main EU project in this regard is the Nabucco pipeline, initiated in 2002. If built, the pipeline will transport gas from Turkey to Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. In order to come forth as economically rational, it however also requires securing Caspian gas in Iran or Turkmenistan, where access in the latter case is largely dependent on the future of the U.S.-backed Trans-Caspian pipeline project. The divergence of Russian and EU

interests, and the competition between these, however lies in how these resources are to reach Europe. In this regard, the Black Sea Region is increasingly becoming the focal point for EU-Russian competition for the control over energy transit and infrastructure. Russia’s energy security strategy strives to as far as possible secure European energy demand, through controlling as large a part of upstream resources, transportation infrastructure, and downstream markets as possible. Recent agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on pipeline construction along the East Caspian coast served to secure the export of large quantities of oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through Russia’s pipeline network, and reducing supplies available for Nabucco.10 Russia has also engaged in several

projects designed to compete with new gas infrastructure to Europe. The most recent effort in this regard is the South Stream pipeline, which was initiated in June 2007 as a joint venture between Gazprom and Italy’s ENI. The pipeline will, if built, run under the Black Sea coast from Russia to Bulgaria. It will also reduce Russia’s dependence on transit states

10 “Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Sign Caspian Gas Pipeline Deal”, International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2007.

such as Turkey and Ukraine.11 South Stream constitutes serious competition to Nabucco, and Russian efforts to promote the pipeline since summer 2007 have rendered several successes in the Nabucco partner countries. Bulgaria officially joined the project on January 18 and Hungary on February 28, 2008.12 On January 25, 2008, Austrian OMV and Gazprom also agreed to turn the gas distribution site at Baumgarten, planned to be the arrival point of gas through Nabucco, into a joint venture.13 While Serbia is not a Nabucco partner, its inclusion into the South Stream project enables the pipeline to access Hungary from the South14 and circumvent Nabucco’s staunchest supporter, Romania. While it is evident that EU and Russian

strategies for energy security increasingly compete in the Black Sea region, the EU seems unable to meet Russian challenges to its energy diversification strategy. This is in large part due to a lack of cohesion within the EU and discrepancies in the external energy strategies of the EU and several of its member states, and of Brussels’ inability to coordinate EU efforts of diversifying energy supply. Unresoved Conflicts in the South Caucasus: Toward Increasing Instability? EU and Russian interests also

increasingly conflict regarding the unresolved, or “frozen”, conflicts in the Black Sea region.

11 Pavel Baev, “Putin and Medvedev Open the Bulgarian Gate for Gazprom”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 22, 2008. 12 “Bulgaria and Russia Sign Pipeline Deal”, International Herald Tribune, January 18, 2008; “Hungary Officially Joins South Stream Project”, RIA Novosti, February 28, 2008. 13 Vladimir Socor, “OMV Joins with Gazprom to Undercut Nabucco”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 25, 2008. 14 Vladimir Socor, “Nabucco Project Facing a Cascade of Defections”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 28, 2008.

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The region was among the most seriously affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union, with conflicts erupting in Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Mountainous Karabakh. All conflicts remain unsettled along unsteady cease-fire lines, and remain the key security challenges to the regional states affected. The conflicts also pose significant security concerns to the EU. After the 2007 enlargement with Romania and Bulgaria, the Transnistrian conflict is located just off the EU’s border, while the South Caucasian conflicts are sited just across the Black Sea. Especially regarding the South Caucasian

conflicts, the term “frozen conflict” is inaccurate, since all three conflicts have over the last decade displayed increased risks of relapses into violence. Situations that came very close to renewed full scale conflict occurred in Abkhazia in 1998 and 2001, and during a Georgian attempt to reassert control over South Ossetia in 2004. In Mountainous Karabakh, the situation has remained relatively stable; however, skirmishes have occurred along the Contact Line between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops, most recently on March 4-5 in the wake of the turmoil following the Armenian presidential election.15 The strategies followed by the states involved in the conflict over Mountainous Karabakh provide for a logic which may well lead to renewed confrontation on a larger scale in the future, as both sides deem time to be on their side and thus display little interest in negotiated solutions.16 Azerbaijan is increasingly confident that its

15 Lada Yevgrashina and Hasmik Mkrtchyan, “Azerbaijan, Armenia Spar over Karabakh Shootout”, Reuters, March 5, 2008. 16 International Crisis Group, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War”, Europe Report No 187, November 14, 2007.

rapid oil-propelled growth, allowing for a buildup of both military and economic strength, will gradually improve its position in negotiations on the conflict and, if negotiations fail to produce results, grant it a capacity to retake the region by force.17 Simultaneously, Armenia estimates that with time, acceptance will increase within the international community for a status of Mountainous Karabakh as separate from Azerbaijan, hopes which are reinforced by the Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, and its international recognition. An additional strain on the prospects for successful negotiations is the recent political instability in Armenia, which has eroded the legitimacy of, and seriously weakened, the Armenian leadership. This has likely further undermined the ability of the Armenian government both to negotiate on the conflict, and to sell potential solutions domestically. Thus, the deadlock over Nagorno-Karabakh is as severe as ever. As time passes, the parties are actually moving closer to confrontation, rather than conflict resolution. The situation in Abkhazia and South

Ossetia has been closely dependent on Georgian-Russian relations ever since their inception, due to Russia’s involvement in the conflicts on the side of the leaderships of these regions, and its subsequent support for their assertion of de facto statehood. Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 and the pronounced Western orientation of the new leadership marked a downturn of the country’s relations with Russia which had an obvious effect on the conflicts. These relations reached an all time low during 2006, manifested in Russia’s boycott of Georgian wines and mineral water and, following Georgia’s arrest of four Russian officers 17 See statements in “Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan Up For a Fight, But Armenia Unbowed”, RFE/RL, February 8, 2008.

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accused of espionage, the imposition of an economic blockade, cutting all direct air, land and sea communications between the two countries. Limited air traffic was resumed in March 2008. During 2006, Georgia also became more vocal in its calls for internationalization of the peacekeeping formats in the two conflicts and drastically increased its defense spending, which has been understood as preparations for a resumption of armed conflict by the separatist leaderships. Georgia’s reassertion of control over the Upper Kodori gorge in Abkhazia in July 2006 effectively ended all official contacts between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz leadership and hawkish rhetoric by then Minister of Defense Irakli Okruashvili forecasted a military solution to the South Ossetian conflict. After parallel presidential elections and independence referenda in the South Ossetian- and Georgian controlled parts of South Ossetia in November 2006, Georgia established an alternative government on the South Ossetian territory it controls,18 and has intensified its efforts of investing in and providing assistance to its parts of South Ossetia, in order to establish an attractive alternative to the de facto authorities. Both the de facto South Ossetian authorities and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have termed this alternative government a puppet of Tbilisi which risks destabilizing the region and derailing the peace process.19 The increase in tensions in both conflict

zones can further be noticed through regularly recurring skirmishes between Georgian troops and South Ossetian militias in South Ossetia,

18 Molly Corso and Elizabeth Owen, “Georgia’s South Ossetia: One Unrecognized State, Two Unrecognized Governments”, Eurasianet, 13 November 2006. 19 Kahka Jibladze, “Tensions Rise over Alternative Government in South Ossetia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 16 May 2007.

and occasional clashes between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian police in Abkhazia.20 A helicopter attack on Georgian controlled villages in Upper Abkhazia in March 2007, and the dropping of a missile in close proximity of South Ossetia in August the same year, convincing evidence pointing towards Russian involvement in both incidents, severely added to existing tensions.21 In addition, Kosovo’s declaration of independence has, like in Mountainous Karabakh, provided the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with new hopes for international recognition, a fact that has further reduced their interest in negotiated solutions. Events during 2006 and onwards, coupled with Georgia’s deeply troubled relations with Russia, point to the fragility of the present status quo, and have made obvious that the prospects for a future resumption of violence in the conflicts cannot be ruled out. EU-Russian Interests and Prospects for Conflict Resolution The EU’s interest in helping bring forward

sustainable solutions to these conflicts stems from, first, the risks attached to the presence of unresolved and increasingly unstable conflicts in the EU’s immediate neighborhood, which may in a worst case scenario be moving closer to resumed large scale hostilities. Such a development would have significant implications for European security. Confrontation in either conflict zone would hold severe consequences for the entire

20 See for example “Confrontation in Ganmukhuri”, Civil Georgia, October 30, 2007. 21 See Svante E. Cornell, David J. Smith and S. Frederick Starr, “The August 6 Bombing Incident in Georgia: Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Region”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, October 2007.

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region, due both to significant risks of spillover and to the likelihood of this taking the form of interstate conflict, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Mountainous Karabakh and possibly between Georgia and Russia in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Under such a scenario, the EU would be obliged to deal with significant refugee flows and take an active part in mediation and peacekeeping. Second, the conflicts pose significant obstacles to the realization of other EU objectives in the region, as their persistence clearly hinders stability and sustainable economic development in the affected states, and constitute free zones for smuggling and organized crime. However, in spite of the EU’s legitimate

and increasingly recognized interests in engaging with these conflicts and seeking ways to bring forth sustainable solutions, the EU has yet to address one of the primary obstacles to conflict resolution in these cases, namely the role Russian strategic interests play in the conflict dynamics, and their incompatibility with EU interests. Russian engagement in the unresolved

conflicts is an important component of its overall strategies toward the South Caucasus and Moldova, which is aimed at maintaining these within the sphere of Russian influence and preventing their integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Control over the South Caucasus is also perceived as necessary for maintaining stability in Russia’s North Caucasian republics.22 In this regard, Russian control over the conflicts serves as leverage over the affected states, keeping them dependent on Russia and functioning as a rationale for maintaining a Russian military

22 See Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, “The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe”, Washington and Uppsala: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, June 2006, p 49ff.

presence within their borders in the form of peacekeepers. Thus, Russia is interested in maintaining the status quo in the conflicts, rather than working constructively for their peaceful solutions. This tendency can especially be observed

in Russia’s relations with Georgia, where the conflicts are frequently utilized for counteracting Georgia’s efforts of gaining NATO membership. The most recent example is Moscow’s attempts to influence NATO’s decision on granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan through the conflicts. In this regard, Moscow reinforced its support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, insisting on Kosovo’s importance as a precedent for other ethnopolitical conflicts.23 In March 2008, Russia withdrew from the 1996 CIS treaty imposing economic sanctions on Abkhazia and has held discussions in the state Duma on the possible recognition of the independence of the two regions. Moscow then moved to directly connect this decision to the issue of Georgia’s prospects for obtaining a MAP. Russia’s envoy to NATO on March 11, 2008, claimed a positive verdict on a MAP risked resulting in the final secessions of these regions from Georgia, and that Russia might in this case see itself as obliged to recognize their independence.24 This line of reasoning on part of Moscow seemed quite successful during the NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2-4, 2008. In direct reference to the conflicts, Germany took the lead in opposing Georgia’s MAP at the summit, followed by France and the BeNeLux

23 C.J. Chivers, “Russia Warns It May Back Breakaway Republics in Georgia”, The New York Times, February 16, 2008. 24 Russia’s NATO envoy says offering Georgia membership track would bolster separatists, International Herald Tribune, March 11, 2008.

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states. Especially Germany’s position was clearly influenced by its consideration of Russia’s position on the issue, deeming offering MAPs to both Georgia and Ukraine as unnecessary provocations to Russia.25 In the end, the Bucharest summit did commit to NATO’s open door policy, granting both Georgia and Ukraine clear prospects for future membership. Still, the rejection of MAPs for these states displayed Russia’s ability to indirectly affect NATO’s decision-making process, not least through its control over Georgia’s unresolved conflicts. Russia’s control over the conflicts,

especially in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, is manifested in negotiation- and peacekeeping formats, which to date largely reflect realities on the ground in the early 1990s. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has seen more international engagement, largely due to the fact that it constitutes a conflict between two states, with its conflict resolution process under the mandate of the OSCE Minsk group, co-chaired by Russia, the U.S. and France. Cooperation between the Minsk group co-chairs has nevertheless often been extremely difficult, not least due to incompatible strategic interests on part of the co-chairs. Russia has been able to utilize the conflict and its role in the negotiation process for both maintaining its close ties with Armenia and applying political pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively, however the credibility of the U.S. and France as mediators has also been questioned. The Minsk group has accomplished very little and especially Azerbaijan displays increasing frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations. A recent controversy developed around the passing of a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on March 14, 2008, 25 See “NATO’s Eastward Expansion Rift to Dominate Summit”, Deutsche Welle, April 2, 2008.

demanding the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territory. The fact that all three Minsk group members voted against this resolution, rather than abstaining from voting, fueled annoyance in Azerbaijan, leading many to question both the neutrality on part of the co-chairs, and the legitimacy of the Minsk Group as a conflict resolution format.26 In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the UN

and OSCE respectively, are formally mandated to lead the conflict resolution processes. However, the Russian veto rights in these organizations grants it the ultimate control over their activities. The Joint Control Commission (JCC), responsible for monitoring the South Ossetian cease-fire effectively leaves Georgia against Russia, South Ossetia and the Republic of North Ossetia, thus constituting the least internationalized negotiation format in any of the regional conflicts. Russia has hosted all negotiations and there is no established role for the OSCE or other international bodies in these. Peacekeeping in South Ossetia is conducted by a Joint Peacekeeping Force, consisting of Russian, Ossetian and Georgian battalions. In Abkhazia, the UN has an established presence through the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), however limited due to Russian opposition to UN peacekeeping on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The UNOMIG presence in Abkhazia consists of 134 unarmed observers and 18 police.27 The deployed CIS peacekeeping force, however, solely consists of Russian soldiers. Georgia has over the last few years increasingly advocated the internationalization of these

26 Fariz Ismailzade, “Azerbaijan’s Relations with Minsk Group Hit New Low”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 26, 2008. 27 Figures as of November 30, 2007. Available at UNOMIG’s webpage: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ missions/unomig/facts.html.

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negotiation and peacekeeping formats. The strongest proclamation in this regard so far came in early March, 2008, as Tbilisi announced its withdrawal from the JCC and proposed a new negotiation format, involving the Tbilisi-backed provisional government of South Ossetia, as well as reinforced international presence in the form of EU and OSCE representation.28 Tbilisi also in late March put forward a series of proposals for the resolution of the Abkhazian conflict, including internationalization of the peacekeeping format.29 The negotiation and peacekeeping

formats of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are seriously flawed, above all due to the fact that Russia is an obvious party to the conflicts which it has exclusively taken on the task of resolving. Russia has in an increasingly open fashion supported these regions politically, economically and militarily. It has seconded security personnel to their leaderships, has supplied Abkhazian and South Ossetian militias with arms and training, and has provided inhabitants of these regions with Russian citizenship. Furthermore, the Russian peacekeeping forces in these regions regularly fail to display neutrality and have in several cases sided with the breakaway regions in the event of increasing tension.30 While the format for Mountainous Karabakh is more internationalized, it still displays serious deficiencies and its lack of progress is

28 See Niklas Nilsson, “Tbilisi Withdraws from the Joint Control Commission; Proposes New Format for South Ossetia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 19, 2008. 29 “Saakashvili Outlines Tbilisi’s Abkhaz initiatives”, Civil Georgia, March 28, 2008. 30 See Svante Cornell, Anna Jonsson, Niklas Nilsson, and Per Häggström, “The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging hub in European Security”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, December 2006, pp 57-59.

seemingly bringing Armenia and Azerbaijan closer to a resumption of hostilities. Overall, neither conflict resolution process is in its current state viewed as legitimate by the conflicting parties, providing for increasing frustration and arguably risks of renewed confrontation. While the EU has still to address the

problematic conflict resolution processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, more engagement can be observed in the case of Transnistria. At large, the Transnistrian conflict resolution format displays the same problems as that of South Ossetia. A tripartite peacekeeping force is deployed, consisting of Russian, Transnistrian and Moldovan troops. The negotiation process takes place within a five-sided format, consisting of Russia, Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine and the OSCE, albeit the format has since 2005 seen increased international presence, due to its inclusion of the EU and US as observers. In this case, the EU has pursued an increasingly active role since 2004, when Moldova was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Subsequently, the EU has, together with the U.S., gained observer status in the five-sided negotiation format over Transnistria, appointed a special EU representative for Moldova mandated to take the lead in forming EU policy toward the conflict, and engaged in discussions on creating an internationalized peacekeeping force. Furthermore, the 2005 success in establishing the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine and Ukraine’s introduction of a customs regime on its border with Transnistria implied important contextual changes to the conflict.31 Russia has reacted negatively to what it perceives as

31 See International Crisis Group, “Moldova’s Uncertain Future”, Chisinau/Brussels: Europe Report no 175, 17 August 2006.

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external meddling in the conflict, including officially criticizing the EU and the U.S. for obstructing the negotiating process, and vocal condemnation of the customs regime as a blockade of Transnistria, claiming that this in turn constitutes an infringement on legitimate Russian interests.32 While EU engagement in Transnistria has so far not been sufficient to stimulate any breakthrough, its increased involvement nevertheless signals an increasing realization of the flaws of the current conflict resolution process, and of the EU’s legitimate interest in asserting a role for itself therein. A similar EU engagement with the South Caucasian conflict resolution processes would go a long way to grant these processes renewed legitimacy, considering the EU’s positive image in the region and its capability to come forth as a credible mediator. The persistence of these conflicts not only

constitutes threats to the EU’s security through the risk of renewed warfare. They also constitute a core obstacle to the development of strong, stable and democratic statehood for the states of the South Caucasus and Moldova, the promotion of which is one of the EU’s primary goals in the region. However, while the resolution of these conflicts constitutes a precondition for the realization of the EU’s deeper interests in the region, an increased EU involvement in these would also contradict Russian strategy toward the affected states. As the EU’s increasing involvement with the region would logically bring about increased engagement with the conflicts in some form, as envisioned by the Black Sea Synergy document, it is conceivable that EU and Russian interests will see increasing competition also in this area.

32 Vladimir Socor, ”Russia-West Standoff in Transnistria: Overall Post-Soviet Order at Stake”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 24 March 2006.

Obstacles to the Pursuit of EU Interests In the policy fields discussed, Russian

strategies and interests pose serious challenges to a deeper EU engagement, an engagement which would require not only consensual approaches to areas where EU and Russian policy differ, but also, where required, principal stances against Russian strategies where this is motivated. This would include stances against unjust Russian competition on the energy market and Russia’s use of energy as a geopolitical instrument, against Russia’s utilization of the unresolved conflicts for leverage over the regional states, and the means applied by Russia to stall democratization processes and Western integration of the regional states. Ultimately, the EU may well see itself increasingly struggling to find ways of a deeper engagement with the region, capable of developing a constructive relationship with Russia, while at the same time ensuring that such a relationship does not sacrifice the EU’s own legitimate interests. The prospects for such a deepened EU

role in the Black Sea region face serious obstacles, above all ones emanating from within the EU itself. The EU’s governing institutions, above all the Commission, have taken on a leading role in promoting deepened relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, through advocating a more comprehensive European Neighbourhood Policy, coordinated EU energy policies, and asserting a multilateral EU role in Black Sea regional cooperation. Moreover, EU special representatives have been appointed for both the South Caucasus and Central Asia. However, the existing divisions within the EU on the preferred nature of the Union’s engagement in the region provide for immense difficulties in realizing these policies.

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A rift can be observed within the EU on the desired level of engagement in the Black Sea region, in which the newer EU members, with the Baltic States and Romania as the most active examples, are generally the most energetic supporters of a proactive EU engagement with the post-Soviet states in its neighbourhood. These are accompanied by the Scandinavian members Sweden, Finland and Denmark which, in spite of their small size and geographical distance from the region in question, have become increasingly active in their lobbying for increased engagement with the Black Sea region at the EU level. The United Kingdom generally supports these policy goals, but takes few initiatives of its own on the issue. Against these proponents of increased integration of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood into Euro-Atlantic cooperation structures stand a grouping of ‘skeptics’, consisting of the ‘old EU’; Germany, France, Italy, and the BeNeLux countries. It is in the states where the ‘enlargement fatigue’ is most intensely felt, and where engagement in the Black Sea region is considered desirable only insofar as it does not infringe on these states’ relationship with Russia. The disagreement on which approaches should be applied in engaging with Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood between these heavyweight EU-members and the more active members in the EU’s North and East, is continually hampering the EU’s capability for becoming a geopolitical player, and securing the EU’s interests in the Black Sea region. The lack of cohesion is similarly troubling

regarding the EU’s prospects for successful energy diversification. Recent developments in this field accounted for above, with Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria seemingly abandoning diversification efforts through Nabucco, indicate an ever larger Russian influence in the energy field in Central and

Southeast Europe through the prospects for gas supply presumably made available through the South Stream project. The same can be said for Germany’s eagerness to receive direct gas deliveries through the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea. These developments are logical from the perspective of national energy security of these states, but are at the same time directly contradicting the EU’s interests in energy supply diversification. The rift within the EU stemming from these diverging perceptions of energy security will also have clear implications for the EU’s abilities of deeper engagement with the Black Sea states. The more dependent individual EU states become on energy supply from Russia, the less they will be inclined to support EU involvement in the Black Sea region in areas where this would contradict Russian interests, such as taking part in conflict resolution processes. Preconditions for a Deepened EU Engagement in the Black Sea Region The outlined divergences between EU and

Russian interests in the Black Sea region sets obvious limits to a more proactive EU engagement with the region. As mentioned in the previous section, one precondition for a sustained EU role is the coordination of the EU members’ foreign policies toward their Southeastern neighborhood. The success of EU policies toward the Black Sea region is however also dependent on their synchronization with those of other key players in the region. An opportunity that could be better utilized

is the possibilities offered through the Transatlantic link for cooperation. EU and U.S. interests in the region are largely identical, and improved coordination with U.S. policies in order to maximize synergies and taking

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advantage of complementary strengths would also boost the EU’s role in the region. Regarding European energy security, the U.S played a key role in the realization of the BTC and SCP pipelines and has long been a staunch supporter of EU coordination around projects such as Nabucco. Moreover, a strengthened role for the EU in the region’s conflict resolution processes would provide these with renewed legitimacy, and would be supported by the U.S. A second issue decisive to the EU’s

abilities for realizing its interests in the Black Sea region is its capability of offering two of the region’s main players, Turkey and Ukraine, real prospects for integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Turkey indeed has the potential for constituting the EU’s main partner in stabilizing the region; however, the outcomes of the prolonged and difficult discussion on its EU membership may prove decisive to its role as a regional player. If the EU fails to offer Turkey a clear membership perspective, Turkey may well opt more whole-heartedly for consolidating its already well-developed partnership with Russia. Such a development would be devastating both to the EU’s room for maneuver concerning the region’s conflicts, and to the prospects for Turkey as a transit hub for Caspian energy resources through networks independent from Russia. Rather, further Turkish/Russian reapprochement would allow these powers to dominate the region, and to a large extent limit the involvement of Western powers. As for Ukraine’s future role in the region, several questions are raised by its domestic divisions on foreign policy orientation. Nevertheless,

Ukraine’s size and strategic location grants it immense importance in the region, and from the EU’s perspective, accomplishing its objectives in the Black Sea region is dependent on Ukraine’s increased incorporation into Western institutions. This refers both to its bid for NATO membership, and in the longer term perspective, its prospects for integration with the EU. Ukraine’s strategic importance for the EU is further underlined through its role as a key transit state for Russian and Caspian energy to Europe, as well as for suggested alternative transports routes for Azerbaijani oil. In addition, the active participation of Ukraine will be crucial in any resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. Finally, any EU strategy in the Black Sea

region must keep an open door to cooperation with Russia, and avoid alienating Russia from regional development processes. Such cooperation may well develop smoothly on less controversial themes, such as fighting organized crime and terrorism. However, as this article has argued, EU and Russian interests are in several instances incompatible regarding tackling the region’s main security concerns. Consequently, if the EU is to pursue its legitimate interests in the region, it must also be prepared to face increasing Russian competition. The EU must of course as far as possible seek to develop a constructive relationship with Russia in the region, however, it is of great importance for both the EU and the regional states that this does not entail sacrificing the EU’s key interests regarding stability, democratization, energy security and conflict resolution.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY • Baev, Pavel, “Putin and Medvedev Open the Bulgarian Gate for Gazprom”, Eurasia Daily

Monitor, January 22, 2008. • Chivers, C.J., “Russia Warns It May Back Breakaway Republics in Georgia”, The New

York Times, February 16, 2008. • Civil Georgia, “Confrontation in Ganmukhuri”, October 30, 2007. • Civil Georgia, “Saakashvili Outlines Tbilisi’s Abkhaz initiatives”, March 28, 2008. • Cohen, Ariel, “Europe’s Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy”, Heritage Foundation,

November 5, 2007. • Cornell, Svante E., Jonsson, Anna, Nilsson, Niklas, and Häggström, Per, “The Wider

Black Sea Region: An Emerging hub in European Security”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, December 2006.

• Cornell, Svante E., Smith, David J. and Starr, S. Frederick, “The August 6 Bombing Incident in Georgia: Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Region”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, October 2007.

• Cornell, Svante E. and Starr, S. Frederick, “The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, June 2006.

• Corso, Molly and Owen, Elizabeth, “Georgia’s South Ossetia: One Unrecognized State, Two Unrecognized Governments”, Eurasianet, 13 November 2006.

• Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council 23/24 March 2006: Presidency Conclusions”, May 18, 2006, 7775/1/06.

• Deutsche Welle, “NATO’s Eastward Expansion Rift to Dominate Summit”, April 2, 2008. • EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European

Parliament, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, Brussels, 11 April 2007. • EU Commission, “An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests”, European

Union, S160/06, 2006. • EU Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the

European Parliament: An Energy Policy for Europe”, COM(2007), September 1, 2007. • International Crisis Group, “Moldova’s Uncertain Future”, Chisinau/Brussels: Europe

Report no 175, 17 August 2006. • International Crisis Group, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War”, Europe Report No 187,

November 14, 2007. • International Herald Tribune, “Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Sign Caspian Gas

Pipeline Deal”, December 20, 2007. • International Herald Tribune, “Bulgaria and Russia Sign Pipeline Deal”, January 18, 2008. • Ismailzade, Fariz, “Azerbaijan’s Relations with Minsk Group Hit New Low”, Eurasia Daily

Monitor, March 26, 2008 • Jackson, Bruce P., “The Soft War for Europe’s East”, in Ronald D. Asmus (Ed.), Next

Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006.

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• Jibladze, Kahka, “Tensions Rise over Alternative Government in South Ossetia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 16 May 2007.

• Larsson, Robert, “Tackling Dependency: The EU and its Energy Security Challenges”, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), October 2007.

• Nilsson, Niklas, “Tbilisi Withdraws from the Joint Control Commission; Proposes New Format for South Ossetia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 19, 2008.

• RFE/RL, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan Up For a Fight, But Armenia Unbowed”, , February 8, 2008.

• RIA Novosti, “Hungary Officially Joins South Stream Project”, February 28, 2008. • Socor, Vladimir, “Nabucco Project Facing a Cascade of Defections”, Eurasia Daily

Monitor, February 28, 2008. • Socor, Vladimir, “OMV Joins with Gazprom to Undercut Nabucco”, Eurasia Daily Monitor,

January 25, 2008. • Starr, S. Frederick and Cornell, Svante E. (Eds.), “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil

Window to the West”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2005. • Socor, Vladimir, ”Russia-West Standoff in Transnistria: Overall Post-Soviet Order at

Stake”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 24 March 2006. • Yevgrashina, Lada and Mkrtchyan, Hasmik, “Azerbaijan, Armenia Spar over Karabakh

Shootout”, Reuters, March 5, 2008.

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I. Introduction* 1 Since the elections on 3 May 2007 we

have seen “a tale of two parties”2 unfold at Holyrood, the seat of the Scottish Parliament: the Scottish National Party on a roll, flying high in the polls, Labour, the main opposition party, in disarray. A few weeks

* Eberhard Bort is the Academic Coordinator of the Institute of Governance and a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Edinburgh. His teaching has included Scottish Society and Culture, Contemporary Irish Politics and British Studies. He also is Book Reviews Editor of Scottish Affairs. Among his publications are Networking Europe: Essays on Regionalism and Social Democracy (ed., with Neil Evans Liverpool University Press, 2000); The Frontiers of the European Union, (with Malcolm Anderson, Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Commemorating Ireland: The History, Politics and Culture of Commemoration (ed., Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2004). E.Bort@ed.ac.uk 1 Ron Davies, Devolution: A Process Not an Event, Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1999. 2 The phrase comes from Henry McLeish, former Labour First Minister, on Politics Now, STV, 26 June 2008.

after the SNP minority government under First Minister Alex Salmond could celebrate its first anniversary in office, a dramatic parliamentary year ended with a double whammy when, on 28 June 2008, the Labour leader at Holyrood, Wendy Alexander, resigned, followed four days later by the Lib Dem leader Nicol Stephen. These latest developments come on top of

a decade of fundamental change in the United Kingdom. Anyone who would have predicted in 1997 that, ten years on, the Labour Party would be in its third term at Westminster, that Devolution had led to a Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition in Wales, a Nationalist minority government in Scotland and a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland, led by the Democratic Unionists and Sinn Féin, would surely have been called an illusionist, a dreamer or worse. Was the SNP victory in May 2007 a victory

for independence, or rather the ‘coming of

ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE? SCOTLAND ONE YEAR AFTER THE SNP ELECTION VICTORY Eberhard Bort*

Abstract: In 2007, marking both the tercentenary of the Anglo-Scottish Union and the tenth anniversary of the successful Devolution Referendum, the May elections caused a political earthquake, breaking the nearly five decades of hegemony of Scottish Labour at the national and, even more emphatically, at the local government level and ushering in an SNP (Scottish National Party) minority government at Holyrood. Was this the proof that devolution did not, as George Robertson had claimed, “kill Nationalism stone dead”, proof that it was, rather, a stepping stone, or a “staging post”? If the latter, where to? Just underlining that devolution, pace Ron Davies, was a process rather than an event,1 part of what Henry McLeish calls the “evolution of devolution”? Towards greater autonomy or towards regaining Scottish independence as a sovereign nation-state?

Key words: Scotland, devolution, Scottish National Party

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age’ of devolution?3 Have the “devolution dullards … had their day”,4 or have the voters cast Alex Salmond and the SNP as the better devolutionists? How did Labour, with their new leader Wendy Alexander, react to the defeat? What effect does the new Scottish dispensation have on internal UK relations, between the devolved territories and between the Scottish and the UK governments? Is the notorious ‘West Lothian Question’ provoking an English ‘Nationalist’ reaction, at a time when the Scots provide not only the UK Prime Minister, but also a number of important ministers in Brown’s cabinet? And what are the implications of these developments in the broader European context? After 300 years, the Union between

Scotland and England seems to have “moved from a constitutional fixture to a constitutional option,”5 but has it reached its sell-by date, as Tom Nairn, Chris Harvie et al. have been arguing, or can it be renewed, as Gordon Brown, Wendy Alexander, Henry McLeish and David Steel would maintain?6 Eight years into

3 Eberhard Bort, ‘Election 2007: Devolution Come of Age?, in Gilles Leydier (ed.), La dévolution des pouvoirs à l'Écosse et au pays de Galles, 1966-1999,, Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 2007 (also: www.institute-of-governance. org/onlinepub/election2007_devolutionofage.html). 4 Rob Brown, ‘Introduction’, in R Brown (ed.), Nation in a State: Independent Perspectives on Scottish Independence, Dunfermline: Ten Book Press, 2007, p.24. 5 Allan I Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.326. 6 See Tom Nairn, After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland, London: Granta, 2000, updated in Nairn, Gordon Brown: The Bard of Britishness, Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2006, and ‘Beyond Redemption: Why Britain cannot be saved’, in Rob Brown (ed.), Nation in a State, pp.25-43; Christopher Harvie, ‘Drop the dead shark!’ http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/christopher_harvie/2007/08/drop_the_dead_shark.html;

Devolution, there is still not clear whether the present constitutional arrangement is the ‘settled will of the Scottish people’ or an unsustainable and therefore transitory ‘half-way house’. With not one, but two rival constitutional discourses on the go (the ‘National Conversation’ of the SNP government, and the ‘Constitutional Commission’ of the Scottish Parliament under Lord Calman), the status quo (Devolution ’99) seems unsustainable. But whether ‘Devolution plus’ (aka ‘Devolution Max’ or ‘Devolution Mark II) or Independence will be the outcome of the process is still an open question, and is most likely to be settled, sooner rather than later, in a Scottish referendum. II. After the Earthquake Following the election results (see Table),

a coalition between the SNP and the Liberal Democrats was widely expected. But as the Lib Dems set as a precondition that the Nationalists drop their plan for an independence referendum, which Alex Salmond refused, coalition talks never even started. The SNP had ruled out working with the Tories (and the Tories had ruled themselves out for any coalition), while the Lib Dems had no intention of continuing with Labour, and power-sharing between Labour and the SNP was a non-starter (even if Ian Paisley can tango with Martin McGuinness, and Rhodri Morgan with Ieuan Wyn Jones, it is difficult to imagine such a cohabitation in Scotland between Labour and the SNP). Thus, there remained only the prospect of a minority government. Tom Brown and Henry McLeish, Scotland: The Road Divides, Edinburgh: Luath, 2007; Sir David Steel, The Steel Commission: Moving to Federalism – A New Settlement for Scotland, Edinburgh: Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2006.

EBERHARD BORT

42

Consultation and consent were the only

way for a minority government of 47 out of 129 seats to achieve anything. Alex Salmond made that clear in his first few days as First Minister. A government far short of a majority needs to “assemble a broader base of support for its measures,” as Michael Keating put it: “A new phase of devolution is beginning.”7 With the ever-present possibility of a no-confidence vote, the Parliament’s role in finding consensual decisions is being enhanced. Transcending the Labour-designed and Labour-led blueprint granted devolution, in Peter MacMahon’s words, a “new lease of life”.8 The first measures of the SNP

government were populist and consensual, at least among a majority in the Parliament – steps to prevent ship-to-ship oil transfers in the Firth of Forth, the abolition of the graduate endowment tax, the scrapping of the Forth and Tay bridge tolls. Media commentators heaped praise on the new administration, and especially on Alex Salmond. Joyce McMillan

7 Michael Keating, ‘Policy Convergence and Divergence in Scotland under Devolution’, in Gilles Leydier, La devolution des pouvoirs à l’Écosse et au pays de Galles, 1966-1999, Paris: ellipses, 2007, p.157. 8 Peter MacMahon, ‘The “blueprint” for devolution suddenly has new lease of life’, The Scotsman, 11 May 2007.

talked about “a smile on the face of the nation, and a spring in its step”: …people seem energised, hopeful, even excited, as if some dead hand of cramped thinking and low expectation had been lifted at last, and it’s a mood that has spread across the whole field of Scottish public life, from politics and business to public service and the media.9 Iain Macwhirter commented just before

the summer recess: “The SNP hasn’t so much hit the ground running as lapped the political field on an almost daily basis. Opposition MSPs have been blown away at what has been happening.”10 He compared Salmond’s start with that of Blair in 1997: the same flurry of dramatic statements of intent changing the climate of public affairs. But, he reminds us, Blair did it with a huge majority, Salmond with a party that has never before been in government and holds only a minority of seats. “Where the SNP has been unexpectedly lucky is in being a minority government. It has allowed ministers to act

9 Joyce McMillan, ‘SNP’s ascension has given us renewed hope’, The Scotsman, 1 September 2007. 10 Iain Macwhirter, ‘The SNP didn’t just hit the ground running, they lapped the political field’, Sunday Herald, 24 June 2007.

Table 1 Election Results (Percentage/Seats)

Party Constituency MSPs Regional MSPs Total Seats SNP 32.9 / 21 31.0 / 26 47 Labour 32.1 / 37 29.2 / 9 46

Conservatives 16.6 / 4 13.9 / 13 17 Lib Dems 16.2 / 11 11.3 / 5 16 Greens 0.1 / 0 4.0 / 2 2

Independent 2.1 / 0 10.6 / 1 1

Total 100 / 73 100 / 56 129

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swiftly,” according to George Kerevan (himself an aspiring SNP candidate for Westminster), “with discipline and with a proactive media strategy.”11 Crises like the outbreak of Foot & Mouth disease and the terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow saw the Scottish government acting promptly, responsibly and in full accord with the UK government. The phasing out of prescription charges

over three years was announced. A Broadcasting Commission was installed, to look at the funding, the output of Scottish broadcasting (including the ‘Scottish Six’12) and the responsibility for media policy. The abolition of the unpopular council tax took its first hurdle, as the Lib Dems shared the SNP’s general intent.13 Moreover, in a concordat with Scotland’s local councils the government achieved agreement on a three-year freeze of the council tax. But there is a limit to what can be done

consensually, and the vote on the Edinburgh transport schemes (introduction of a tam system and a railway link to the airport) was an early crunch point. On 27 June 2007, Cabinet Secretary John Swinney accepted the first resounding defeat for the government – the SNP had wanted to scrap the schemes;

11 George Kerevan, ‘The London media (and Brown) just don’t get it’, The Scotsman, 21 June 2007. 12 Paul Hutcheon, ‘Salmond to demand a “Scottish Six” and call for broadcasting to be devolved’, Sunday Herald, 5 August 2007. A Scottish Six would be, as the BBC’s Brian Taylor explained in his blog, “a TV news programme, made in Scotland, which covered global, UK and Scottish news. Contrary to some comments, it would not focus exclusively on Scottish news.” (Brian Taylor, ‘Broadcasting Scotland’, BBC Blog, 8 August 2007, www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/briantaylor/2007/08/08/index.html). 13 But, as their model of a local income tax is substantially different from the SNP’s, and the Green’s, it is difficult to see a replacement gaining a majority in the Chamber.

Labour, the Lib Dems and the Tories were in favour of keeping the Edinburgh tram project on track and reviewing the airport rail link until the autumn. In the end, the government decided to accept defeat and respect the will of Parliament and act accordingly, thus avoiding the threat of a no-confidence vote.14 Relations with London came under strain.

Salmond was called Gordon Brown’s “worst nightmare”?15 But it was not just a clash between Brown’s ostentatious ‘Britshness’ and Salmond’s ‘Scottishness’. There was the old Scottish claim to £23 mill which London saved when the Scottish Parliament introduced free personal care for the elderly. The Barnett formula for the distribution of revenues across the UK came under pressure, both from politicians in England who think that Scotland gets more than a fair share, and from the SNP who accuses London of short-changing Scotland. Salmond wrote to London demanding a share of the windfall of rising oil prices to establish his oil fund in and for Scotland – an initial £500 mill would do.16 A conflict was brewing about the closure of post offices. And there are ongoing tensions concerning the representation of Scotland at the European level. Brown and Blair’s childish delay in even

acknowledging Salmond’s election to the post of First Minister played into the hands of the SNP-leader. As did the ‘stushie’ about Blair’s memorandum of understanding with Colonel Gaddafi on the extradition of prisoners, without having bothered to consult the Scottish Government beforehand (the most prominent Libyan prisoner in the UK sits in a 14 Douglas Fraser, ‘Tram scheme goes ahead after SNP defeat’, The Herald, 28 June 2007. 15 Nicholas Leonard, ‘Independent Scotland is Gordon Brown's worst nightmare’, Irish Independent, 15 January 2007. 16 ‘Salmond reiterates oil fund call’, BBC News online, 5 June 2008.

EBERHARD BORT

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Scottish prison – the convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset ali Mohmed al-Megrahi).17 Salmond pledged to revive the institution

of joint ministerial committees which had last met in October 2002, in order to better coordinate policies between the UK and Scotland. These could either become battlegrounds – or a stabilising factor, if Richard Lochhead’s dictum of “partnership and co-operation” should prevail.18 The first meeting took place in June 2008. The first ‘foreign’ visit of Alex Salmond

saw him in Belfast, on the sofa with Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness. The Celts ganging up against London?19 Could there be a concerted demand for a lower corporate tax for the ‘Celtic’ regions and nations, perhaps joined by Rhodri Morgan on behalf of Wales (particularly with Plaid Cymru as part of his government)? An enhanced role for the British-Irish Council, as Tom Nairn had announced a tad prematurely at the turn of the century?20 Did the visit indicate, as an Irish newspaper implied, “loosening ties in the centralised UK state, and the possibility of new relationships developing between the constituent parts (and indeed across national boundaries) as the regions, with new-found confidence, begin to flex their muscles.”21 For Labour, the defeat (locally even more

decisively than nationally22) was a bitter pill.

17 Hélène Mulholland, ‘Scottish ministers attack No 10 over Lockerbie bomber’, The Guardian, 8 June 2007. 18 See Tim Reid, ‘Westminster v Holyrood, round one’, BBC News Online, 8 June 2007. 19 Douglas Fraser, ‘A new union … without London?’, The Herald, 19 June 2007. 20 See Tom Nairn, After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland, London: Granta, 2000, pp.278, 305. Nairn revisited the idea in his Gordon Brown: The Bard of Britishness, Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2006, pp.27-29. 21 ‘Scottish neighbour Salmond may well be a friend in disguise’, Irish Independent, 27 June 2007. 22 The number of councils in which Labour holds a ruling majority dropped from 13 to 2. Labour lost 160

“The party has been shocked rigid by the loss of power,” Ian Bell observed, “and its response has been a mixture of defiance, denial and incoherence.”23 Jack McConnell announced his resignation as Labour leader in August. Wendy Alexander was the only candidate for the post and became leader in mid-September. She had a wobbly start as opposition leader, and by the end of November became engulfed in a scandal about illegal donations to her leadership campaign24 which led to massive pressure on her to resign.25 On the last day of the parliamentary term, the Parliament’s Standards Committee controversially recommended a one-day ban from Parliament for her over the non-declaration of campaign donations as ‘gifts’ in the MSPs’ register. Although the Parliament was to vote on that recommendation at the start of the new term in September, Wendy Alexander resigned on 28 June 2008, which plunged Scottish Labour into renewed turmoil – and a leadership contest over the summer. III. A Never-ending SNP Honeymoon? With the main opposition party stumbling

ever deeper into crisis, the Tories veering between co-operating with Salmond’s government and opposing it, and the Lib Dems in their self-imposed wilderness, councillors; the SNP gained 182. For the first time, the SNP has more councillors (363) than Lanbour (348). See H M Bochel and D T Denver, Scottish Council Elections 2007: Results and Statistics, Lincoln: Policy Studies Research Centre (University of Lincoln), 2007. 23 Ian Bell, ‘Can we plot a fourth way for Scotland?’, The Guardian, 8 December 2007. 24 The culpable donation of £950 came from Jersey-based property developer Paul Green. It was illegal as only people registered to vote in the UK are entitled to donate money to political parties. Jersey is a crown dependency but not part of the UK. 25 Douglas Fraser, ‘What now for Wendy Alexander?’, The Herald, 3 December 2007.

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accentuated by the surprise resignation of Nicol Stephen at the beginning of July, the SNP minority government’s honeymoon has shown no signs of ending yet. Despite some criticisms, the general verdict after one year of SNP government in May 2008 was overwhelmingly positive. “The honeymoon will end,” stated Brian Taylor in his BBC blog: “Right now, though, the first minister is able to mark the anniversary of his election victory with signs of continuing popular support.”26 Scotland on Sunday summed up “a good

year for Scotland”, asserting that the record of the SNP's first year in power is impressive. Policies such as freezing Council Tax, cutting prescription charges, scrapping bridge tolls, scrapping the graduate endowment and saving some local hospital units from downgrading have struck a chord with wide sections of the Scottish electorate. These were solid, tangible policies with a material effect on people's lives, and they left much of the electorate feeling that this was a Government that could get things done. It disagreed with some key policies of

the SNP: Its plans to scrap Council Tax and replace it with a Local Income Tax represent an unwelcome new burden on the Scottish middle classes. And we disagree with the SNP's aim of complete independence from the rest of the United Kingdom; a far more sensible – and popular – course of action would be to negotiate more powers for the Holyrood Parliament, especially the financial levers necessary to inject some dynamism into the Scottish economy.

26 Brian Taylor, ‘Making New Friends’ (Blether with Brian), BBC News online, 2 May 2008. http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/briantaylor/2008/05/making_new_friends.html

But it hailed the effect Alex Salmond and his government has had on the “general mood of the Scottish people”; Today, Scotland feels more comfortable with itself than it was a year ago. There is a welcome air of confidence and ambition in the country that must, in some part, be the result of a new spirit in Scottish public life. For that reason alone, this has been a good year for the Scottish Government, and a good year for Scotland.27 Any opposition and media criticism

seemed to pale in the face of success – none more impressive than getting the budget through Parliament,28 which was seen as John Swinney and Alex Salmond triumphantly outmanoeuvring and humiliating the opposition.29 Under Salmond, the party presented an absolutely coherent image – no sign of internal cracks or feuds which used to characterize the SNP in the past. Then came Wendy Alexander’s astonishing

“shock U-turn”30 on the independence referendum. When Wendy Alexander gave Scottish politics that “surreal turn”,31 announcing her conversion to an independence referendum live on the BBC’s ‘Politics Show’ on 4 May, one of the strangest weeks in Scottish politics ensued, “with the situation becoming more bizarre by the minute.”32

27 Leader Comment, ‘A good year for Scotland’, Scotland on Sunday, 12 April 2008, http://news.scotsman.com/ scotland/A-good-year-for-Scotland.3976753.jp 28 Hamish Macdonell, ‘A total triumph and an utter defeat’, The Scotsman, 7 February 2008. 29 Leader Comment, ‘Salmond’s triumph’, The Herald, 7 February 2008; Magns Gardham, ‘Victory for Alex Salmond as budget is passed’, Daily Record, 7 February 2008. 30 Douglas Fraser, ‘Alexander backs independence referendum in shock U-turn’, The Herald, 5 May 2008. 31 Gordon Brewer on BBC Newsnight Scotland, 6 May 2008. 32 David Perry, ‘Wendy defiant in referendum row’, The Press and Journal, 8 May 2008.

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Brian Taylor saw Labour’s “new-found support for a referendum” driven by “calculation and fear.”33 Fear of electoral defeat, calculation that being blamed for not letting the Scottish people have a say could rebound on the party in the 2011 election and that, at least for the time being, the Scots would reject the independence option in a referendum. “Wendy Alexander’s backing of an early referendum on independence is hugely significant, ‘editorialised the Scottish Daily Mail: It signals the Labour Party’s first signs of life in a year. And it presents Alex Salmond with a dilemma. How does he oppose a referendum without damaging the validity of his party’s claims that increasing numbers of Scots favour wrecking the Union?34 The Daily Telegraph, too, was prepared to

give Miss (sic) Alexander “some credit” for her “tacit acknowledgement that Labour has been wrong-footed,” but called her move “bluffing for base political advantage” and “dangerous tinkering with the constitutional settlement.”35 Wendy’s new departure had, quite

obviously, created a “major headache for Brown”.36 Coming in the immediate wake of the local electoral disaster for Labour in England and Wales, it looked as if Brown had “lost patience with Ms Alexander,” as he refused to give her demand for a referendum his backing at Prime Minister’s Question Time: “Far from endorsing her standpoint, he went

33 Brian Taylor, ‘Calculation and fear’ (Blether with Brian), BBC News online, 5 May 2008 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ blogs/thereporters/briantaylor/2008/05/calculation_and_ fear.html 34 Leader Comment, ‘Labour is alive again. But it may be too late’, Sotish Daily Mail, 7 May 2008. 35 Leader Comment, ‘Union put in peril by Labour’s welectoral games’, The Daily Telegraph, 7 May 2008. 36 Bill Jamieson, ‘Wendy’s cry brings on major headache for Brown’, The Scotsman, 9 May 2008.

out of his way to dilute it.”37 That Alexander insisted on her demand when appearing at First Minister’s Question Time at Holyrood the following day, led the Scotsman to ask whether Brown was “losing his grip on Scotland”.38 The Scottish Sun found Wendy Alexander,

not for the first time, “woefully underprepared”.39 and commented: The Press and Journal saw her coming “within an inch of landing a blow, of sorts, on Salmond,” only to be “pulled out of the ring by Gordon Brown.”40 The paper conceded, “ it might have been the master stroke,” but now “it looks like Mr Salmond will come out of the fight better off, again, and continue with his policy of a referendum in 2010.” Brian Taylor added, “The manner of executing this plan, if such a description can be used, has been utterly abominable.”41 Her leadership, long overshadowed by the

illegal donations row,42 only temporarily relieved by the Electoral Commission’s clearance of her (branded a “whitewash’ by SNP MSP Alex Neil),43 had come under attack 37 Brian Taylor, ‘Where’s your referendum now?’(Blether with Brian), BBC News online, 7 May 2008. http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/briantaylor/2008/05/wheres_your_referendum_now.html 38 David Maddox, ‘Losing his grip on Scotland’, The Scotsman, 9 May 2008. 39 Leader Comment) ‘A total mess’, The Scottish Sun 9 May 2008. 40 Leader Comment, ‘Referendum announcements’, The Press and Journal, 8 May 2008. 41 Brian Taylor, ‘Not jut any referendum’ (Blether with Brian), BBC News online, 8 May 2008 http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/briantaylor/2008/05/ not_just_any_referendum.html 42 Campbell Gunn, ‘Wendy’s woes are not going away’, The Sunday Post, 13 January 2008; Leader Comment, ‘Wendy’s refusal to go has left Scottish politics in cold storage’, Sunday Herald, 3 February 2008. 43 Ian Swanson, “MSP says ruling on Wendy donation is “a whitwash”’, Edinburgh Evening News, 8 February 2008; Joyce McMillan, ‘With Wendy’s house in order, now it’s time to act’, The Scotsman, 9 February 2008; Iain Macwhirter, ‘Wendy’s in the clear, but the real winners are the SNP’, Sunday Herald, 10 February 2008.

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long before that shambolic manoeuvre. In a widely noticed leader back in January, the (usually) Labour-supporting Daily Record had been scathing about the leadership of the Scottish Labour leader. These are very difficult times for Scots Labour leader Wendy Alexander. (…) During her reign, she has so far failed to land a blow on First Minister Alex Salmond. (…) Labour's first year in opposition was always going to be tough. But no one could have predicted how far their fortunes would slump in just nine months.44 Wendy Alexander seemed to have made

some progress by the time of the Labour conference in March. Eddie Barnes commented that she “appears to have found a clearer message to sell to the party”, and “she has bought herself some time.”45 Hamish Macdonell’s verdict was: “The Scottish Labour Party landed itself in a pretty big hole last May. It ‘s not out of it yet, but at least it has stopped digging.”46 The Calman Commission was, albeit with

some caveats,47 widely welcomed as “timely”,48 and Brown’s support for the “review” was noted,49 particularly after Scotland Office

44 Leader Comment, ‘Alexander yet to score point’, Daily Record, 28 January 2008. 45 Eddie Barnes, ‘It may sound cuckoo, but Labour thinks spring has sprung’, Scotland on Sunday, 30 March 2008. 46 Hamish Macdonell, ‘Still in a hole, but they might have found a way out’, The Scotsman, 1 April 2008. 47 Hamish Macdonell, ‘They want to save the Union but have they set a course for independence?’, The Scotsman, 26 March 2008. 48 Leader Comment, ‘Devolution revisited’, The Herald, 26 March 2008. 49 Douglas Fraser, ‘Brown promises extensive review of devolution’, The Herald, 25 March 2008; Simon Johnson, ‘Brown backs review on Scots taxation’, The Daily Telegraph, 26 March 2008; Bill Mackintosh, ‘Brown opens door to Holyrood tax powers’, Sunday Herald, 17 February 2008.

minister David Cairns’s dismissal of more tax powers for Holyrood being only of interest to the “McChattering classes”.50 But the Calman Commission seemed to be totally sidelined by Labour’s referendum U-turn. For Ewan Crawford, thus, Scottish Labour’s call for a vote on independence was “the biggest miscalculation in recent British politics.”51 The Scottish Daily Express saw Labour in “meltdown”52 and contended: “Mr Brown and Ms Alexander have lost so much confidence within their own party that they surely can have no future as leaders of their party.”53 Well, Wendy Alexander bowed out on 28 June… And Gorden Brown’s next nightmare could be the Westminster by-election in Glasgow’ East on 24 July. This would be deemed, at any other time a safe Labour bastion, but not with a Labour government plummeting to a new all-time low in public opinion.54 IV. The Referendum Question A referendum seems now a question of

when and how, rather than if. With the demise of Wendy Alexander as Labour leader, it is unclear what the Labour position will be. Just before her resignation she had repeated her demand to ‘Bring it on!’, but the party had qualified it: no blank cheque, support depended on the type of referendum (yes/no rather than multi-option) and the wording of the question. The SNP remained adamant that it would stick to its timetable of holding

50 Michael Settle, ‘Minister dismisses more tax power for Holyrood’, The Herald, 12 February 2008. 51 Ewan Crawford, ‘Bluff or Blunder’, The Guardian, 7 May 2008. 52 Kerry Gill and Paul Gilbride, ‘Humiliation as Wendy is “hung out to dry” by PM’, Scottish Daily Express, 8 May 2008. 53 Leader Comment, ‘Dithering duo’s days at the top are numbered’, Scottish Daily Express, 8 May 2008. 54 Andrew Grice, ‘Poll: This is the least popular Labour government ever’, The Independent, 3 July 2008.

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the referendum in 2010, one year before the next scheduled Scottish Parliament elections. How would the Scots vote in a

referendum? The general gist of opinion polls over the past year is that the current popularity of the SNP is not matched by a surge for the independence option. Devolution plus continues to be the most popular option (see Table 2). Table 2 Constitutional Preferences

Independence Devolution

Plus Status Quo

Scottish Social Attitudes

Survey 2007

24 54 8

MRUK Cello/ Sunday Times

March 2008

23 45 22

You Gov / Daily

Telegraph April 2008

19 38 34

Source: John Curtice, ‘Public Attitudes and Elections’, Devolution Monitoring Report, Scotland May 2008, The Constitution Unit, University College London. www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/devolution/ MonReps/ Scotland_May08.pdf How would the SNP deal with a defeat in a

referendum? Would it accept to become a devolutionist party? Alex Salmond has indicated that a No-vote in a referendum would settle the question for a generation.55 With or without a referendum, how would some ‘fundamentalist’ SNP-MSPs act if they sensed that devolved government was

55 BBC Newsnight, 25 April 2007.; See Kevin Schofield, ‘Independence referendum is now “once in a generation”’, The Herald, 26 April 2007.

gradually changing their party, turn it perhaps into a Catalan-style nationalist party, content to govern a devolved Scotland, albeit with substantially increased parliamentary powers? Or can Salmond steer a course which both embraces pragmatic devolution and keeps the flame of independence alive? That seems to be part of the strategy

behind the ‘National Conversation’ which Salmond started with the presentation of a White Paper and the launch of a dedicated website in August 2007.56 Although it was not just a proposal for independence, but a review of all constitutional options, outlining the three main options – small extension of devolved powers; radical redesign of devolution and greatly enhanced powers; independence – its publication drew a good deal of criticism in the media, seeing that there was, then, no chance of a parliamentary majority for the referendum envisaged in it. Reflecting on the conundrum that the SNP

was riding high in the opinion polls, but that this was not matched by the independence option (with 23 per cent in last year’s Scottish Social Attitudes Survey at its lowest point since 1997), Iain Macwhirter pointed out what, in his view, could be Labour’s “most effective challenge to the Nationalists”: Why…does Scotland need independence when it has political autonomy under devolution? In a sense, the SNP’s effective performance in government rather undermines the Nationalists’ own case. The inventory of the first 100 days is pretty impressive – bridge tolls, hospitals, prescription charges, tuition fees, even doubling the subsidy to the Edinburgh

56 Scottish Executive, Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation, Edinburgh, 2007. www.anationalconversation.com By December 2007, the website had counted more than 40,000 hits, over 7000 downloads of the White Paper, and thousands of comments.

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Festival. If Salmond can do so much with the powers of the Parliament, what’s the point of independence?57 The SNP’s Peter Wishart MP warned that

in the ‘national conversation’ “independence has become just an option when it should, of course, be the option.” He warned his party to be “careful that this key choice does not become obscured in a plethora of other options.”58 A first result of the SNP government’s

White Paper was the coming together of the three main opposition parties in an agreement to develop devolution within the UK.59 Wendy Alexander’s plan to develop devolution through an independent Scottish Constitutional Commission, endorsed by the Scottish Parliament,60 marked an important constitutional U-turn for Scottish Labour, revising the position Jack McConnell had adopted before the elections. It also seemed to acknowledge that, as the Scotsman had argued after the election, “Labour lost votes in May because – for the first time – it refused even to discuss more powers for Holyrood, thus conceding the constitutional debate to the SNP.”61 Alexander singled out the strengthening of

the financial accountability of the Parliament, including a review of the Barnett formula with

57 Iain Macwhirter, ‘’Why we haven’t the constitution to go it alone’, The Herald, 6 Auguyst 2007. 58 Peter Wishart, ‘Independence or nothing’, The Sunday Times, 16 September 2007. 59 Kevin Schofield, ‘Why the unionists finally got together’, The Herald, 14 August 2007. See also Eddie Barnes, ‘Unionists team up to steal SNP thunder over Holyrood powers’, Scotland on Sunday, 26 August 2007. 60 Douglas Fraser, ‘Alexander calls for tax powers to replace the Barnett formula’, The Herald, 1 December 2007. 61 Leader Comment, ‘Labour fails to get the message’, The Scotsman 22 June 2007.

a view to diminish the role of the block grant from Westminster through shared and assigned taxes, thus increasing the fiscal responsibility of the Scottish Parliament. But the Commission, endorsed by a parliamentary majority (the “grand, if informal, Unionist coalition”62) on 6 December 2007, specifically excludes the independence option.63 On the other hand, it allows for discussion of wider areas of UK constitutional reform, with the aim of strengthening both Devolution and the Union. The SNP sticks by the government’s ‘National Conversation, which is limited to Scotland. But are two separate and competing public consultations really the best way forward? While the SNP’s abstention from the

original Constitutional Convention aided the consensual process in the lat 1980s and early 1990s, the dual approach now evolving “for crude partisan ends” is divisive and confusing. “All the parties are agreed that the experience to date with devolution has to be reviewed,” wrote the Scotsman: But instead of finding common ground to conduct such a review in a rational manner, and thus present a united face to Westminster – the only body that can introduce constitutional change – we are left with rival projects.64 For the SNP the ‘Constitutional

Commission’ heads in the right direction – more powers for the Parliament. Eddie Barnes is not alone in thinking that the “Unionist pact may not just be seen in later years as a

62 Ian Bell, ‘Can we plot a fourth way for Scotland?’, The Herald, 8 December 2007. 63 Louise Gray, ‘Parties join forces to bulldoze SNP’, The Scotsman, 7 December 2007. 64 Leader Comment, ‘Dual approach to devolution debate can’t succeed’, The Scotsman, 7 December 2007.

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historic moment for devolution,” but also as “the moment when a referendum on independence became inevitable.”65 It could well be a three-way referendum, the options being the status quo, greater autonomy (‘Devolution Max’) and independence. V. Towards Independence? We have seen the end of a beginning.

Whether we have also witnessed the beginning of the end of the Union is less clear. 2007 brought the electoral break-through for the SNP. And perhaps they have found it difficult to believe how long their honeymoon period has lasted. Indeed, if Labour remains “mired in sleaze and incompetence”, it could leave the SNP “as the dominant force in Scottish politics for the foreseeable future.”66 But would that lead to independence? “Mr Salmond and his colleagues have got off to a good start in convincing the public the SNP can provide good government,” John Curtice commented: But, contrary to the SNP's hopes, demonstrating that the party can govern is evidently doing nothing to persuade Scots of the case for independence. Rather, it may be persuading Scots that devolution can, in fact, be made to work effectively in Scotland's interests after all.67 The SNP’s notion that increased

devolution brings Scotland automatically closer to independence may have seductive

65 Eddie Barnes, ‘Unionist pact to debate devolution may hasten independence vote’, Scotland on Sunday, 9 December 2007. 66 Iain Macwhirter, ‘Long journey into night’, The Guardian, 6 December 2007. 67 Quoted in Andrew Picken, ‘Support grows for SNP but not for independence’, Edinburgh Evening News, 10 August 2007.

charms, but it is empirically unproven. At the moment it looks as if the Scottish voters, in their wisdom, relish having the SNP in the driving seat, not of an independent, but a devolved Scotland. But that could change, depending on political decisions at the Holyrood, Westminster and European levels. The big lacuna in the whole devolution

process has been England. Prime Minister Brown’s announcements of further constitutional reform did not offer a solution for this “constitutional elephant in the room”.68 Could a functioning Northern Ireland assembly, and an invigorated Scottish Parliament, and the increased powers of the National Assembly for Wales trigger new attempts at rolling out devolution to the English regions?69 It looks unlikely and, of course, only if those regional assemblies had legislative powers, would they go towards solving the West Lothian Question. 70 Malcolm Rifkind’s suggestion, apparently

also favoured by his leader David Cameron, of an English Grand Committee consisting of all English MPs, proposing English law which would then, by force of convention, be accepted by Westminster, would de facto create an English Parliament and a two-tier system of Westminster MPs, as would Kenneth Clarke’s plan of banning Scots MPs from voting on laws that only affect England (which he said would tackle "the last anomaly"

68 George Kerevan, ‘Out with spin – and in with smoke and mirrors”, The Scotsman, 5 July 2007. 69 After the abysmal failure of the referendum in the North-East of England on 4 November 2004 (with only one in five voters in favour of a regional assembly). 70 The fact that Scottish MPs at Westminster can vote on English laws, while English MPs cannot vote on devolved legislation for Scotland, first raised by Tam Dalyell, then Labour MP for West Lothian, in the run-up to the 1979 referendum.

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of devolution).71 As Arthur Aughey has shown, there is no clamour for such an English Parliament in England (yet). If English regionalism is “the dog that never barked”72, English Nationalism is, as Aughey says, still a mood, rather than a movement.73 But as soon as a Westminster government lacked an English majority and had to rely on Scottish MPs to drive through legislation on English education, health, transport, etc – areas which in Scotland are decided by the Scottish Parliament – the ‘English Question’ could loom a lot larger. English nationalism could pose a bigger threat to the Union than the SNP challenge. The only clear-cut answer to the ‘English

Question’ would be independence for the constituent nations of the UK. Everything else will, of necessity, involve untidy, asymmetrical arrangements. On the other hand, asymmetries are something the UK has lived with for centuries, and something that is not specific to the UK alone.74 Both the Welsh First Minister Rhodri Morgan, visiting Edinburgh in December 2007, and UK Tory leader David Cameron, also in Edinburgh, a few days later, expressed that asymmetry was not the main issue. For Morgan “the union’s asymmetry and flexibility … can be a source

71 ‘Senior Conservative Kenneth Clarke wants Scots MPs banned from voting on English laws’, The Daily Record, 2 July 2008. 72 Christopher Harvie, ‘English regionalism: the dog that never barked’, in Bernard Crick (ed.), National Identities: Constitution of the United Kingdom (Political Quarterly Special Issue), Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp.105-19. 73 See Arthur Aughey, The Politics of Englishness, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007. See also Robert Haszell (ed.), The English Question, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006. 74 See Archie Brown, ‘Asymmetrical Devolution: The Scottish Case’, Political Quarterly 69 (3), 1998, pp.215-23; also: Michael Keating, ‘Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating Europe’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 29 (Winter 1999), pp.71-110.

of strength;”75 and Cameron preferred “an imperfect Union” to “some perfect constitutional construct that would threaten the Union.”76 For Alex Salmond, the solution to the

‘English Question” is clear: amicable repeal of the Union: The 18th-century Union is past its sell-by date. It's gone stale for both our nations. What we both need now are the political and economic powers to make our nations work, to tailor policies to suit our different circumstances, and to speak for ourselves in Europe and the wider world - while acting together where our interests converge.77 Murray Pittock has argued that, in Britain,

“metropolitan attitudes have barely changed, while Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish politics and culture have all shifted radically in their different ways.” He concludes: A loosely federated UK with clearly distinct locales for control of politics, culture and society and their representation through the media could be the most stable solution the Union can now enjoy […] However, serious doubts must remain that this will be recognized by Westminster in time, or that English politics can change enough to accommodate a multinational polity.78

75 Douglas Fraser, ‘Funding “will be next step in UK devolution”’, The Herald, 8 December 2007. 76 Ian Swanson, ‘Cameron says “Union comes first” at party rally in Capital’, Edinburgh Evening News, 10 December 2007. 77 Alex Salmond, “Only Scottish independence can solve the 'English Question'’, The Daily Telegraph, 20 March 2007. 78 Murray Pittock, The Road to Independence?, London: Reaktion, 2008, pp.182-83.

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Will Hutton argued for ‘Devolution-max”, which would “in effect create a Scottish state within Britain rather like Alberta or Ontario within Canada.” He contended that globalisation demanded management by “bigger units”. Independence would therefore be “a 19th century response to 21st century dilemmas.”79 Also, independence would not end the presence of an economically, politically, culturally and socially powerful neighbour. ‘In bed with an elephant’ was, after all, coined for independent Canada and its sharing a continent with the United States of America.80 The European context is important. Would

an independent Scotland automatically be (remain) a member of the EU? The SNP says yes, but constitutional lawyers are not so sure.81 Other member states with independence movements and parties within their borders – France, Spain, Italy – might not be very sympathetic to smoothen Scotland’s path to ‘independence in Europe’. But Scotland is also an example how constitutional issues can be discussed and decided in an absolutely non-violent and democratic way. The EU constitutional process, rocked by

the popular votes in France, Holland and, most recently, in its pared-down form of the Lisbon Treaty, in Ireland, has led to a very limited recognition of sub-state governance, which does not help those arguing for a strong

79 Will Hutton, ‘How Scotland could end up with best of both worlds’, The Herald, 15 August 2007. 80 Pierre Trudeau coined the phrase in a speech at the Washington Press Club in 1969 when he said, that Canada’s relationship with the United States was like that of “a mouse in bed with an elephant…no matter how friendly the beast…one is affected by every twitch and grunt.” 81 See Jo Eric Murkens with Peter Jones and Michael Keating. Scottish Independence: A Practical Guide, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.

regional tier of governance in Europe. An intergovernmental EU tends to be a strong argument for ‘Independence in Europe’, particularly if Scotland feels under- or misrepresented by the UK (given the extreme London-centricity of the British polity and the lack of a British constitution); while real participation of sub-state regions and nations in European policy-making could be a powerful argument for the principle of devolution.82 In a contribution to the ‘national

conversation’, Labour’s Henry McLeish and Tom Brown promoted their idea of a ‘New Union’, a Union which must adapt to survive.83 The ‘national conversation’, they contended, must not be restricted to Scotland and increased powers for Holyrood alone. Interestingly, the SNP’s Michael Russell and Dennis McLeod also argued for a ‘New Union’,84 where some remaining reserved matters could be shared at a UK level. In 1992, the SNP adopted Jim Sillars’ ‘Independence in Europe’ as its slogan – is it now time for ‘Independence in Britain’ or, in McLeish’s parlance, “small-i-independence”?85 As David McCrone noted, “we live now in [a] very different kind of world – a world of federations and confederations of autonomous nations within states within the European Union. Self-government is a question of degree, not of kind.”86

82 See Eberhard Bort, ‘'Scotland and Europe, or: Room at the Top for "Constitutional Regions"', Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol.4, No.2, 2004, pp.55-64. 83 Tom Brown and Henry McLeish , Scotland: The Road Divides, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2007. 84 Michael Russell and Dennis McLeod, Grasping the Thistle: How Scotland Must React to the Three Key Challenges of the Twenty First Century,, Glendaruel: Argyll Publishing, 2006. 85 BBC News at Ten, 14 September 2007. 86 David McCrone, ‘Semi-detached’, Holyrood, 162, 15 January 2007, p.45.

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VI. Conclusion Devolution ’99 was clearly not the last

word on constitutional change in the UK. It was a staging post. Wales has moved on. Scotland accrued additional powers over the past two sessions of parliament (e.g. over railways). The fiscal powers of the Scottish Parliament have increasingly been perceived as insufficient. There is, as Wendy Alexander said, “unfinished business”.87 And all the parties at Holyrood “are now united as never before on the need to give Holyrood more oomph.”88 On the 300th anniversary of Westminster’s

signing of the Act of Union, the Edinburgh Evening News had drawn its own conclusions: What is clear is that the devolution deal delivered in 1999 is far from the settled will of the Scottish people, but neither has it been proved to be the start of the inexorable slide towards independence. There is plenty of room for change, and giving Holyrood proper responsibility for raising the money it spends or answering the West Lothian question should not be regarded as the next stop to divorce.89 So, how will things look in ten year’s time?

Lacking a crystal ball, all we can say is: different. Alex Salmond has promised Scottish independence by then, Gerry Adams has promised a united Ireland by 2016 (to mark, as it were, the centenary of the Dublin Easter

87 Quoted in Ian Swanson, ‘Alexander commits Labour to increasing Holyrood’s powers’, Edinburgh Evening News, 30 November 2007. 88 Iain Macwhirter, ‘Finally, we all agree: devolution is a process, noit an event’, Sunday Herald, 9 December 2007. 89 Edinburgh Evening News (editorial), ‘”We need to give devolution time to be a success”’, 16 January 2007.

Rising),90 Wales will have had a referendum on primary legislative powers for its National Assembly, and maybe, just maybe, Scotland will have had a vote on independence. Will the English Question be settled, one way or the other? Will there, perhaps, be a written constitution, eventually – as hinted at by Gordon Brown and expected by Rhodri Morgan? Or will we have witnessed the ‘break –up of Britain’?91 Will the integration process of the European Union find a way out of the Lisbon impasse? “This is an unprecedented era for new

momentum,” Douglas Fraser reflected in his backward glance at 2007, “new alliances, new thinking and new possibilities.”92 The Scottish Parliament has become the place where Scotland’s future is forged. With or without a referendum, the next few years will be decisive. For the time being, at least, all parties may feel justified in believing that they still have all to play for.

90 BBC News Online (Northern Ireland), ‘Adams predicts united Ireland’, 14 January 2000 http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/601115.stm. 91 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, London: New Left Books, 1977. 92 Douglas Fraser, ‘An extraordinary year of blistering political change’, The Herald, 11 December 2007.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY • Arthur Aughey, The Politics of Englishness, Manchester: Manchester University Press,

2007. • H M Bochel and D T Denver, Scottish Council Elections 2007: Results and Statistics,

Lincoln: Policy Studies Research Centre (University of Lincoln), 2007. • Eberhard Bort, ‘Election 2007: Devolution Come of Age?’, in Gilles Leydier (ed.), La

dévolution des pouvoirs à l'Écosse et au pays de Galles, 1966-1999,, Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 2007.

• Eberhard Bort, ‘'Scotland and Europe, or: Room at the Top for "Constitutional Regions"', Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol.4, No.2, 2004.

• Archie Brown, ‘Asymmetrical Devolution: The Scottish Case’, Political Quarterly 69 (3), 1998

• Rob Brown, ‘Introduction’, in R Brown (ed.), Nation in a State: Independent Perspectives on Scottish Independence, Dunfermline: Ten Book Press, 2007.

• Tom Brown and Henry McLeish, Scotland: The Road Divides, Edinburgh: Luath, 2007. • Ron Davies, Devolution: A Process Not an Event, Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1999. • Christopher Harvie, ‘English regionalism: the dog that never barked’, in Bernard Crick

(ed.), National Identities: Constitution of the United Kingdom (Political Quarterly Special Issue), Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.

• Robert Haszell (ed.), The English Question, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.

• Michael Keating, ‘Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating Europe’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 29, 1999.

• Michael Keating, ‘Policy Convergence and Divergence in Scotland under Devolution’, in Gilles Leydier, La devolution des pouvoirs à l’Écosse et au pays de Galles, 1966-1999, Paris: ellipses, 2007.

• Allan I Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

• David McCrone, ‘Semi-detached’, Holyrood, 162, (15 January), 2007. • Jo Eric Murkens with Peter Jones and Michael Keating. Scottish Independence: A

Practical Guide, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002. • Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, London: New Left Books, 1977. • Tom Nairn, After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland, London: Granta, 2000. • Tom Nairn, Gordon Brown: The Bard of Britishness, Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs,

2006. • Tom Nairn, ‘Beyond Redemption: Why Britain cannot be saved’, in R. Brown (ed.), Nation

in a State, 2007. • Murray Pittock, The Road to Independence?, London: Reaktion, 2008. • Michael Russell and Dennis McLeod, Grasping the Thistle: How Scotland Must React to

the Three Key Challenges of the Twenty First Century,, Glendaruel: Argyll Publishing, 2006.

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• Scottish Executive, Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation, Edinburgh, 2007. (www.anationalconversation.com).

• Sir David Steel, The Steel Commission: Moving to Federalism – A New Settlement for Scotland, Edinburgh: Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2006.

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Introduction * Regional stability in the Balkans has

remained since the wars of 1991-95 a powerful concern of the outside powers and international organisations, as shown in the underlying fear that discord in one or other of the countries (such as Macedonia or also Kosovo) might have negative spill-over effects on the rest of the region. It is for this reason that an on-balance priority has been given at times to the interests of stability over other

∗ Geoffrey Pridham is Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Fellow in European Politics at Bristol University. He has written widely in recent years on problems of the EU's political conditionality including "Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Central & Eastern Europe" (Palgrave, 2005). Articles on the same theme have been published, among others, in "Comparative European Politics", "Journal of Common Market Studies", "Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics", "Government and Opposition", "Acta Politica" and "Europe-Asia Studies". G.Pridham@bristol.ac.uk

considerations including democracy promotion. Nevertheless, from the long-term perspective, regional security and democratic consolidation in the Balkans are closely related.* The special and rather salient feature of

post-dictatorial regime change in the Balkans is this very relationship. The post-1989 democratisations in the former Yugoslavia were negatively affected by the war which not only interrupted the democratisation process but also created new legacy burdens for subsequent regime change, as seen still for instance in the cumbersome and fragile efforts at reconstructing the state in Bosnia and in the ∗∗ This article draws on a research conducted for an ESRC Fellowship 2004-07 on “Europeanising Democratisation: EU Accession and Post-Communist Politics in Slovakia, Latvia and Romania” as well as for a Senior Research Fellowship held at Bristol University from 2007. It is a shortened version, adapted for the journal of the keynote address to the Conference on Challenges to Balkan Security and the Contribution of International Organizations, held in Izmir, Turkey, in May 2008.

SECURING FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES IN THE BALKANS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION Geoffrey Pridham∗∗∗∗

Abstract∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗. The European Union faces unprecedented difficulties in its integration of the

Western Balkans in terms of the requirements for change by countries in that region wishing to join. In order to meet this challenge, the EU’s political conditionality has moved significantly beyond its demands made on the post-Communist entrants of 2004 and 2007. But its effort to bridge the gap between the ability or political will of Balkan countries to adapt to European modernisation and uncertainties about EU commitment created by “enlargement fatigue” among Member States is vulnerable to weak consensus on both sides. Accordingly, the dynamic behind further enlargement is not comparable with the historic drive that impelled the enlargement of 2004. At the same time, there are strong geopolitical arguments on grounds of stabilising the Balkans for going ahead with integrating the Western half of this region. Key words: Western Balkans, EU political conditionality, democratic consolidation, EU

enlargement

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slow and laborious business of trying to overcome the effects of the Milosevic regime in Serbia as well as to deal with problems of new statehood in Montenegro and Kosovo. In all this systemic transformation, outside

powers and international organisations have played a crucial if at times reluctant role. This is emphasized today by the presence of protectorate structures in Bosnia and Kosovo involving several IOs to handle problems of statehood. But outside intervention of this kind may create its own problems for regime change as in producing a reaction to this or a dependency factor or even a vicious circle situation. Such problems are underlined by the 2005 report of the International Commission on the Balkans, with respect to the role of the EU. It refers to the dangers from “the integration trap”: “The consensus uniting governments and peoples in the Balkans is that the region cannot achieve prosperity and stability outside the process of European integration. At the same time, it is quite clear that the dysfunctional states and protectorates that characterise the region actively hinder the inclusion of the Balkans into the European mainstream. In this sense, the status quo is a problem because it is blocking the road to EU accession1.” The report’s main message is that there is

a need for the Balkans to move on from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage of EU accession. In the past couple of years since that report, that movement has begun to happen albeit slowly; but there is still a long way to go before the integration of these countries has a significant impact on 1 International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future (Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, 2005), p. 12.

their domestic systems. Meanwhile, attention is increasingly on the role of the EU among international organisations in overcoming the obstacles to democratic consolidation in the region – and it is on the EU’s role that the following discussion concentrates. In doing so, the main attention will be to the Western Balkans – which is now since 2004 the focus of further EU enlargement – with some reference back to the two Eastern Balkan countries that joined in 2007. Since the still somewhat problematic countries of Romania and Bulgaria feature several of the recognised difficulties facing Balkan countries in democratisation (such as corruption and organised crime, though less the difficulties surrounding statehood), some reference to these will be included. The structure of the discussion is,

therefore, as follows: firstly, a brief overview of democratisation problems in the Balkan region (more neutrally known as South-East Europe); secondly, a summary of the EU’s policy of democracy promotion through political conditionality in the light of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements; thirdly, the evolution of and changes in that policy with respect to the Western Balkans; fourthly, reference to the scope and limitations of the EU’s political role in transforming the Balkans as well as responses there to this conditionality and problems of implementation; and conclusions on the European future of the region. The main argument is that, on the one hand, the EU’s approach to democratisation via political conditionality is an extension and modification of previous enlargement policy and, on the other hand, the EU is facing unprecedented tasks, such as over statehood problems, and doubts that it has the capacity to deal with them – all this against the background of “enlargement fatigue” within the EU.

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Difficult democratisation in the Balkans Looking back at the period of over a

decade since the EU first really began to embrace a strategic approach towards the Balkans following the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, it is useful to consider the main events or turning-points in regime change. These include the return to democratisation in Croatia and Yugoslavia following the death of Tudjman in 1999 and the fall of Milosevic in 2000, the resolution largely under international supervision of the ethnic conflict in Macedonia in 2001, the EU-guided agreement on reconstituting Serbia-Montenegro in 2003 and the final move to independence by Montenegro in 2006 while the status of Kosovo came to a head with its declaration of independence in early 2008. Significantly, while the first two events

were familiar cases of a positive redirection in regime change, all the other examples illustrated problems of statehood. This reminds us that regime change in the Balkans has continued up to the present time to revolve around primary problems of political change, suggesting that in most cases these countries are still somewhat engaged in democratic transition (or an extended phase of this) with open prospects for eventual democratic consolidation. Indeed, it was long regarded in democratisation studies that the state and its boundaries were a stable given or precondition for transition. Since this has in a significant number of cases not been so in the Western Balkans, there has existed in this region not only a special heavy burden for new democracies but also an uneasy potential for destabilisation. This has to be combined with problems in integrating ethnic minorities and the persistence of illiberal political forces and nationalist tendencies. By any comparative account, therefore, the Balkan countries may be collectively described as

difficult democracies in terms of their legacy problems imposed on regime change, their actual functioning as political systems, the extraordinary effort required to construct and maintain domestic consensus behind political reform and, of course, the magnitude of socio-economic problems with an obvious potential for political impacts. Much nearer in time, Western Balkan

countries are either moving towards accession or – in most cases – are still in the early stage of an associate relationship with the EU. However, uncertainty has remained over whether at least some of these countries in the region are capable of achieving eventually democratic consolidation, thus raising doubts about EU chances for influencing regime change in a positive direction. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index has provided a fairly recent standardised survey of the countries in the Western Balkans. This made for rather sober reading for further enlargement in the region, with only one country (Croatia) having so far acquired a positive dynamics where improvements in democratisation were connected to increased cooperation with external actors2. Overall, the Western Balkans were otherwise marked by widespread disaffection with democratic performance where some observers saw a crisis of democracy in the region. Consequently, reformist political actors have suffered from a weak societal basis making transformation not very sustainable. There was a significant gap in political and economic transformation between the Western Balkans and East-Central Europe, with the former showing some similarities with difficulties of democratisation in Latin America. Countries in the Western Balkans could therefore still be

2 M. Brusis, `Assessing the state of democracy, market economy and political management in Southeastern Europe’ in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2006, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 67.

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fairly easily categorised as defective democracies, especially as regards progress with stateness, the rule of law, institutional stability and political integration3. The persistence of such fundamental

problems was not so surprising given their depth and historical roots, for it was unrealistic to expect large-scale improvement in less than a decade. All the same, this meant that the EU was faced with an unprecedented challenge in engaging with these countries even while the membership perspective is now seriously voiced. The prospects for the EU, now regarded as the foremost international actor in the Balkans, in producing real political transformation there appear restricted. In any case, handling the accession path with them is going to be a more formidable task than has been the case with the now new member states from East-Central Europe and even more so than with the two Balkan candidate countries of Romania and Bulgaria, with which the EU is still finding some serious difficulties over meeting conditionality and accession requirements. The EU’s political conditionality and post-communist regime change By the time the Western Balkans became

the focus of enlargement policy in 2004, the EU had already for a decade developed a political conditionality policy that was focussed, had an elaborate procedure and utilised its leverage over candidate countries. Its salient and relevant features need to be highlighted in order to contextualise the discussion that follows.

3 M. Brusis and P. Thiery, `Comparing political governance: Southeastern Europe in a global perspective’ in Southeastern European and Black Sea Studies, 2006, vol. 6, no. 1.

Firstly, it took some years for conditionality to be pressed in the case of countries from Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) that had abandoned Communist rule. By the time political conditionality came to be applied systematically from 1997-98 with EU membership prospects in mind – beginning with the Commission’s avis on applicant states and the first of the annual progress reports – the CEE countries in question were already well down the road of democratisation although far from achieving democratic consolidation. Therefore, conditionality policy over the following decade was essentially focussed in its own way on underpinning and encouraging democratic consolidation in candidate countries. This meant that with the entrants of 2004 this policy did not essentially confront transition tasks of securing new democratic institutions; nor did it choose to confront legacy problems from the Communist period except insofar as they affected in practice specific conditions, such as resistance to judicial reform. Conditionality policy was concerned with `the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy’, however they had developed in transition, and not with providing any systemic models. Secondly, the scope of the EU’s

conditionality expanded from the mid-1990s significantly beyond the (somewhat bland) formal democracy criteria utilised in previous decades into areas of substantive democracy. The Copenhagen criteria as defined in 1993 covered as themes the stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law and human and minority rights. Since then, the EU has also specified the strengthening of state capacity, the independence of judiciaries, the pursuit of anti-corruption measures and the elaboration of a series of particular human and minority rights. Conditionality policy thus became more demanding and ambitious and hence

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conceivably more difficult to satisfy. But taken together, it did not embrace the full range of democratic consolidation tasks, party systems and civil society as a whole being major exceptions; nor did it present an integrated approach to its diverse political demands even though “democratic consolidation” (undefined) was regularly identified as the ultimate objective. Thirdly, a new priority was granted

political conditionality as it became locked procedurally into the accession process. One feature of the Commission’s new conditionality approach in the 1990s was to insist that democratic standards are met before accession takes place, and that the original Copenhagen criteria of 1993 are met before membership negotiations are opened. This strict requirement was influenced on the EU’s side by anxiety among member states over the future effects of enlargement on its own capacity and cohesion4. It was buttressed by tight monitoring procedures detailing the satisfaction of the political conditions by candidate countries, notably by means of the Commission’s annual Regular Reports on each applicant. This change much enhanced the EU’s leverage over conditionality matters, especially as progress between stages of accession depended on satisfying these (especially the political conditions) in Brussels’ eyes. Altogether, these various major changes

strengthened the EU’s political conditionality from the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the outcome by the actual accession in May 2004 was one of incomplete implementation. This was due to the top-down fashion in which political conditionality was pursued but also to the relatively short time span in which

4 H. Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 29.

Brussels exerted pressures on the CEE countries before 2004. It produced most success with formal responses by candidate countries. Thus, results were evident for example in the creation of new anti-corruption agencies and in introducing new judicial structures in line with the principle of judicial independence. But consolidating such changes through eradicating corruption and furthering a new democracy-compatible culture among the traditional judiciary was much slower in coming. Rather more difficult to implement, therefore, were those conditions, which depended on significant behavioural changes involving essentially respect for the law that was crucial to achieving democratic consolidation. These deficiencies in conditionality

implementation were the occasion within the European Commission for a firm reappraisal soon after the May 2004 enlargement and once the new Barroso Commission was installed at the end of that year with a change in Enlargement Commissioner. A different approach was adopted which was much less prepared than before to compromise for the sake of meeting enlargement deadlines. This harder line, influenced among other things by difficulties over Romania’s accession and certain conditionality matters, was first in evidence over the final stage of the two remaining candidate countries of Romania and Bulgaria which were regarded as less stable, prosperous and dynamic than the East-Central European and Baltic candidate countries5. However, the time for decision on their actual entry to the EU arrived very shortly after the Barroso Commission came into office. Given strong doubts about closing

negotiations with these two countries, 5 D. Papadimitriou, `The EU’s Strategy in the Post-Communist Balkans’ in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 1/3, September 2001, pp. 72-73.

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especially on the part of the Commission, a compromise was agreed whereby the negotiations were closed but a form of extended conditionality would be operated by means of a “safeguard clause” during the remaining period before the entry of Romania and Bulgaria, with the actual date of that undetermined but with a choice presented between January 2007 and January 2008. In other words, entry could be delayed by one year if there were `serious shortcomings’ in meeting certain `commitments and requirements’; and, there would be further monitoring reports by the Commission in the meantime. This clause was unprecedented, as previously conditionality had been applied up to but never beyond the agreement on the invitation to become a new member state. Despite some scepticism, the operation of

the safeguard clause did serve to speed up reform efforts as national prestige was seen as at stake if entry were delayed6. A form of motivation in meeting conditionality targets was maintained although some critics argued that the EU’s leverage could not be the same as before since membership had already in effect been granted. In Romania’s case, progress was made over judicial reform – which had stalled – primarily because of the reformist commitment of the new Justice Minister who came into office when a centre-right government replaced the Socialists in power at the end of 2004. New efforts were made over high-level corruption but with rather less success. When after the final monitoring report was issued in September 2006, and the entry date of 2007 was chosen, it was nevertheless decided to continue with applying conditionality to Romania and Bulgaria in the first years of their membership

6 G.Pridham, `The Scope and Limitations of Political Conditionality: Romania’s Accession to the European Union’ in Comparative European Politics, December 2007, pp. 360-61.

by means of a new programme of benchmarks and sanctions (including the freezing of EU funds) in the event of relapses. This was again unprecedented in the history of EU conditionality for no new member state had previously been subjected to such a monitoring regime7. Monitoring reports have been issued on

these two new member states from the Balkans in June 2007 and February 2008. The latter report for Romania concluded that in the first year of membership continued efforts had been made to `remedy weaknesses that would otherwise prevent an effective application of EU laws, policies and programmes’ but `in key areas such as the fight against high-level corruption convincing results have not yet been demonstrated’ 8. It is significant that resentment in Bucharest among the political elite at EU pressures over fighting high-level corruption expressed itself shortly after Romania’s entry when the reformist Justice Minister – who had been brazen towards political corruption over the previous two years and alienated many parliamentarians in the process – was ejected from office during a government crisis. This caused sceptical shockwaves in Brussels, confirming opinion, such as in the European Parliament, that Romania – the perennial “laggard” of the enlargement process up till that time – should not have been admitted. As it was, Bulgaria turned out to be the more difficult case in the final year before accession because of failures in dealing with the serious problem of organised crime in that country. There were various lessons from the 2004

and especially 2007 enlargements that provided pointers to conditionality policy in the near future. Firstly, the Commission had

7 Ibid, p. 361. 8 European Commission, Interim Report on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (Brussels), 14 February 2008, p. 7.

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especially in the Romanian case been unusually interventionist and tough-minded in pressing for the satisfaction of conditionality and other accession requirements. This was due primarily to persistent problems and frustrations in dealings with public authorities in Bucharest both in terms of political will but also bureaucratic efficiency. On two occasions during accession, in spring 2001 and early 2004, there had been pressure from the European Parliament to interrupt membership negotiations (the ultimate threat) because of Romania’s lack of progress over specific political conditions9. Secondly, a key factor in achieving

progress over conditionality matters was the existence of a sufficiently committed and stable group of both political and bureaucratic reformists in national capitals who in cooperation with Brussels – and playing the EU card effectively – could drive through change10. Problems were particularly met with the Social Democrats in office during 2000-04 and therefore during nearly the whole of the negotiations period. Party interest was obviously behind resistance to serious change over both fighting corruption and real judicial reform. Thirdly, and finally, it has to be said again

that aside from the matter of will and efficiency that some of the political conditions were intrinsically difficult to implement because they involved deep or widespread behavioural change. This was notably true of corruption that was rather common in post-Communist societies as well as being rooted in the political class, which had not resisted the temptations arising from the privatisation

9 Pridham, `The Scope and Limitations of Political Conditionality’, pp. 358-59. 10 This point is emphasised in W. Jacoby, `Inspiration, Coalition and Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations’ in World Politics, July 2006, pp. 623-51.

process. Similarly, judicial reform also ran up against legacy problems from the Communist period by virtue of the preponderance of judges trained under non-democratic rule who found it difficult to adapt to new, more open procedures as well as embrace unfamiliar areas of law now required by Brussels. Also, it goes without saying that instilling respect for minority rights encountered difficulties that tended to have fairly long historical roots. Altogether, therefore, the experience of

the 2004 and 2007 enlargements to Post-Communist countries demonstrated in the end the limitations of the role and power of Brussels. To some extent, such limitations related to the fact that conditionality was applied to these countries when they were already beyond the stage of regime transition and therefore when their systemic merits and faults were in play. But, it was also clear, producing real change was unrealistic in such a short period as less than a decade notwithstanding the high pressure as well as leverage exerted on candidate countries by the EU. The Commission itself took the view that it was the manner in which conditionality policy was applied that mattered; and, it accordingly made changes when it came to confront the applicants from the Western Balkans. However, as we shall see, this region presented a challenge far greater than the problems that simply new procedures could resolve.

EU conditionality and the Western Balkans Notwithstanding the emergence of

“enlargement fatigue” after the 2004 mega-enlargement to CEE, further enlargement to other post-Communist countries has not essentially been halted. During this recent period, membership negotiations have been opened with Turkey and Croatia (in late 2005)

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and further Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) have been pursued with various countries in the Western Balkans. The Commission’s DG Enlargement has for some years now been deeply engaged in South-East Europe (SEE) and an escalator effect has already been created, so that - should these countries continue to satisfy the various requirements of Brussels - the prospect of further accessions begins to acquire some probability. Already, Croatia is as the frontrunner of the Western Balkans likely to join in a few years; while the next decade might turn out to be the period of SEE Enlargement to encompass the Balkans as a whole, although Turkey’s accession prospects still face uncertainty. And, then, there is growing pressure from further East – notably, from Ukraine and to a lesser extent Georgia and Moldova – to jump the barrier to associate status, with these additional countries voicing ambitions to join as full members. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) does, in fact, represent a stalling attempt by Brussels to call at least a temporary halt to further enlargement; but that does not apply to the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans, a term officially

adopted by the EU at its Vienna European Council in 1998, is applied to former Yugoslav republics (minus Slovenia that became a member state in 2004) together with Albania. In late 2005, The Economist argued in line with the enlargement dynamic that opening to these countries was compelling because the alternative would be more costly in the long run: “Despite resistance in some quarters, EU policy-makers seem to have decided that it is better to have these countries inside the club rather than causing trouble outside. A look at the map explains why. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria are due to join the EU, although that date may slip to

2008. The remaining Balkan countries will then be encircled by the EU. Unless they have a genuine prospect of membership, that could have serious consequences. With some 22m people penned inside a kind of poor Balkan reservation, inter-ethnic conflict, smuggling and organised crime would be certain to flourish. Compared with the cost of all that, EU membership might look quite cheap11.” In truth, the EU had been evolving a

strategy towards the Balkans from the mid-1990s featuring the Royaumont Process of 1996, the Regional Approach of 1997 and the Stability Pact of 1999. The Balkan wars were a powerful stimulant in forcing the EU, specifically the Commission, to recognise the need for a sustained involvement, having previously been absorbed with East-Central Europe (ECE) insofar as enlargement affairs were concerned12. A commitment to consider future membership for the Balkans began to emerge at the Zagreb European Council in 2000 which recognised these countries as `potential candidates’, while in 2003 the Thessaloniki Declaration made the proclamation that `the future of the Balkans is within the EU’, a phrase that has been repeated on several official occasions since. Thus, there is some similarity with the

2004 enlargement process a decade and more ago, when the escalator effect created a dynamic that gradually required the EU to offer membership provided that the countries in question met Brussels’ rigorous demands. But the internal difference for the EU compared with the mid-1990s in the case of

11 The Economist, 5 November 2005. 12 Papadimitriou, `The EU’s Strategy in the Post-Communist Balkans’; M. Turkes and G. Gokgoz, `The European Union’s Strategy towards the Western Balkans: Exclusion or Integration?’ in East European Politics & Societies, vol. 20, no. 4, 2006.

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ECE is that there has not emerged a clear and strong consensus among member states over the prospect of Balkan enlargement13. And, it is here that “enlargement fatigue” is significant. The persistent doubts, especially among some member states, over the admission of Romania and Bulgaria reflected this problem. At the same time, this lack of real consensus made it even more likely that the EU would adopt a more severe conditionality policy than ever before – an option already favoured by the new Barroso Commission. The EU’s fundamental objective for the

Western Balkans was `to create a situation where military conflict is unthinkable – expanding to the region the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom established over the last 50 years by gradual European integration’ 14. This echo of the Schuman Declaration of May 1950 about making war impossible put the new insistence on proper observation of conditionality – whether political, economic or administrative – into a wider or geopolitical context. It also explained new themes of conditionality such as regional cooperation to enhance the security environment, of which political conditions like furthering ethnic and religious reconciliation and fighting organised crime formed an integral part15. Furthermore, the EU’s political conditionality entered new domains compared with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Firstly, it confronted sensitive and

politically charged issues relating to the past, like the insistence on “full cooperation” with the International Criminal Tribunal for the

13 Turkes and Gokgoz, `The European Union’s Strategy towards the Western Balkans’, p. 659. 14 http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations/article-129607, dated 21 September 2004. 15 G. Pridham,`Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach and Priorities’ in Democratization, June 2007, pp. 458-59.

former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over handing over alleged war criminals. Rather than as previously handling the past in a pragmatic or functional way, this amounted to a principled demand. It was regarded in EU circles as a symbolic matter indicating the willingness of prospective candidate countries to move on in time and embrace a European future, namely as being relevant to respect for the rule of law16. Secondly, the EU was in devising a strategic approach to the Western Balkans compelled to embrace also basic problems of stateness. For some years now, it has insisted on police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an indicator of state reorganisation as a necessary condition before concluding that country’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement. And, on a grander scale, the EU has been a central actor in dealing with relations between Montenegro and Serbia during 2003-06 and of course with the problem of the status of Kosovo. The latter may be described as a high-political issue that is interlinked with prospects for Serbia’s own SAA. The significance of these stateness questions for the EU’s political conditionality was that previously this had assumed the existence and stability of the state as a given. Now it was required to confront first-order systemic problems and hence matters relating to regime transition. This underlines how much the stakes for political conditionality had been raised. The SAAs, a variation on the Europe Agreements for the ECE countries in the mid-1990s, originally adopted a form of political conditionality influenced by the latter. As the Thessaloniki Declaration of 2003 had stated, the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) would `remain the framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their future 16 Author interview with Reinhard Priebe, Head of Western Balkans Directorate, DTG Enlargement, European Commission, in Brussels, October 2005.

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accession’ and `the process and the prospects it offers serve as the anchor for reform in the Western Balkans in the same way the accession process has done in Central and Eastern Europe’17. Its political conditions included the usual emphasis on democratic principles and a range of specific demands like opposition to ethnic divisions and protection of minority rights as well as fighting organised crime and corruption for strengthening the rule of law – not to mention full cooperation with the ICTY - while there was a provision for political dialogue and mechanisms for this. But, in effect, conditionality concerns have expanded since the inauguration of the SAP. This also happened during the 2004 enlargement process, moving conditionality into new areas of substantive democracy; but in this more recent case conditionality was now engaging with primary systemic problems. In doing so, the EU was risking

conditionality overstretch. On the one hand, the more strict approach adopted by the Commission following the 2004 enlargement was being put into practice; and, this aimed at preventing or reducing conditionality failures in the future. Various new mechanisms were introduced to improve implementation by making progress with accession more tightly and procedurally geared to conditionality results. Now, an element of immediacy was created by adopting new mechanisms `taking account of the experience of the fifth enlargement process’18. They included: applying benchmarks for provisionally closing and also opening negotiation chapters (thus allowing each member state `veto points’), the introduction of safeguard clauses to extend monitoring and a more routine procedure for suspending negotiations. These provisions

17 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/see/decl.htm 18 European Council briefing, December 2005, pp. 6-7.

were written into the negotiating frameworks for Croatia and Turkey which commenced their membership talks in autumn 2005. While these measures were mainly aimed

at securing the adoption of the acquis, they also allowed for conditionality problems to reach the agenda of the EU more readily, making it easier procedurally to suspend negotiations. As the two negotiating frameworks made clear on the political conditions, `to ensure the irreversibility of progress … and its full and effective implementation, notably with regard to fundamental freedoms and to full respect of human rights, progress will continue to be closely monitored by the Commission, which is invited to continue to report regularly on it to the Council’19. The Commission had already made clear in its 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper that it `is prepared to recommend the suspension of progress [with accession] in case of a serious breach of the EU’s fundamental principles or if a country fails to meet essential requirements at any stage’20. Finally, to further tighten up on implementation, some of the conditions were given added procedural force by being written into the acquis, including judicial reform (linked to chapter 24) and human rights (now written into chapter 23 drawing on the Charter of Fundamental Rights). Other lessons drawn from the pre-2004

conditionality experience included a recognition of the need for strengthening the credibility of conditionality by, if necessary, example setting – to show that Brussels meant business when it came to infractions of the conditions. This was much easier to follow since 2004 as further enlargement would be phased, so that being

19 European Council, Negotiating Framework for Croatia, Brussels, 2005, p. 1. 20 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM (2005) 561 (Brussels, 9 November 2005), p. 3.

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`tough’ with one candidate country could be used as an indicator for another further down the line of accession. This thinking was present in the Commission 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper: “There is no further enlargement with a large group of countries…in view. Accession negotiations with Turkey are a long-term process. The Western Balkans contains smaller countries at different stages of their road towards the EU. Future enlargements will go at the pace dictated by each country’s performance in meeting the rigorous standards, to ensure the smooth absorption of new members21.” The first occasion when this idea was

applied was in March 2005 over the issue of starting negotiations with Croatia, for Zagreb had failed to deliver the war criminal Ante Gotovina. A decision was taken to postpone negotiations both to put intense pressure on the Croatian government (a clear case of direct EU leverage) but also to demonstrate to Western Balkan countries – especially Serbia-Montenegro – that Brussels refused to countenance any undermining of EU support for international law22. On the other hand, it was evident this

stricter approach to political conditionality would not work if governments in the Western Balkans simply lacked the will or capacity or domestic consensus to meet Brussels’ requirements. Given the atmosphere of “enlargement fatigue” within the EU, this suggested a potential gap emerging between defective response in the country in question and accession commitment in Brussels. Furthermore, the Commission no longer dominated conditionality matters as during the 2004 enlargement process, with member

21 Ibid, p. 3. 22 European Voice, 10-16 March 2005.

states now playing a more proactive role than before over conditionality matters through the European Council while the European Parliament was beginning to assert itself more over enlargement policy as from the time of the accession decision over Romania and Bulgaria 23. This made for more complicated decision-making, with new opportunities for individual EU actors to halt or inhibit further enlargement. At the same time, there were strong

geopolitical arguments that emphasised Balkan stability, pressing for urgent attention to the Balkans’ integration future, and that criticised the EU’s slow and in the eyes of some lethargic approach. From 2005, warnings began to surface that the integration process in that region could come unstuck. In June, the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) remarked that the current `lack of clarity’ about enlargement prospects made it `more and more difficult’ to promote reforms in candidate and applicant countries: `We need to make the whole process of reforms in Eastern Europe sustainable; without the process of EU accession, that is very difficult – what happens now if we talk to Turkey or to Serbia and they get the impression in these discussions that they are no longer welcome in Europe?’24. The seriousness of this risk was also underlined by the International Commission on the Balkans in 2005 which observed `a growing trend of public pessimism and dissatisfaction with the direction of political and economic developments’ in the Western Balkans which was dangerous25.

23 Pridham, `Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality’, pp. 465-67. 24 Euractiv, 24 June 2005. 25 International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future, p. 11.

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The EU’s role in political transformation of the Balkans: responses and problems of implementation From the above discussion, it is clear

there are unprecedented circumstances surrounding the integration process involving the Western Balkans. Not only are the conditionality demands greater and in some cases more onerous than those before 2004, but also the political and institutional capacity of Western Balkan countries to meet them is weaker compared with the then candidate countries. EU leverage had worked with the 2004

entrants, and to some lesser extent with those of 2007, because there was sufficient commitment and consensus on both the EU side and the candidates’ side, with a dynamic that gave momentum and direction to the process as well as a capacity to deliver in both the EU sense of fulfilling the promise of membership and with the candidates of carrying through change. This undoubted achievement in bringing in so many post-Communist countries into the EU and requiring them to embrace political and economic change – at perhaps a faster face than they would otherwise have adopted – is however not so easily repeated with the Western Balkan countries. This is because the conditions favouring EU leverage, described above, are much less present in these countries. As a consequence, the outcome of the present integration process in that region remains uncertain and rather open, with unsettling prospects for political conditionality. For, despite official statements about the Balkans’ future as lying within the EU, there is a combination of circumstances that could dictate why this may not happen. During the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, there

developed a gradual inevitability about the outcome. With the one exception of Croatia, that has not happened over the Western Balkans not least as negotiations for full membership – which accelerate the dynamic of integration in embracing new countries – have not yet commenced elsewhere; but for this to happen would require some qualitative leap in domestic reforms that is not yet in the offing. This combination of circumstances is as follows, drawing on the discussion above. Firstly, the motivation to join the EU is

certainly present among the elites in the Western Balkan countries. Motives have included, on the international front, a desire to escape from the troublesome historical pattern of the Balkans and to join the European mainstream, allowing thereby greater scope for international influence; and, on the domestic front, the benefits as prospective poor member states from welcome EU funds to buttress programmes of socio-economic modernisation. The latter motive may be given a somewhat special twist as there is a dependency factor which underlies it. However, there are points of qualification about this motivation. Expectations to join the EU have remained high and impatient which does not fit with the new more laboured and bureaucratically more constrained accession process. Moreover, this elite commitment to join is compromised by the incidence of nationalism, which is far greater than in ECE although cross-nationally variable. It is especially pronounced in its impact on EU relations in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In its 2006 report on Serbia, for instance, the Commission warned that country that it should focus on the “European future” rather than on “the nationalist past”26.

26 Frankfurter Allgemeine, 9 November 2006.

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Secondly, the preconditions for integration success are rather less favourable than with the 2004 enlargement and even the 2007 one, even though some of the problems facing EU relations with the Western Balkans were already present in the latter case (such as those of political will to reform and of state capacity). The burden of political (and also economic) change is much greater than before, above all because there remain and persist various primary questions relating to regime transition. The EU has in the Western Balkans been compelled to be more interventionist and thereby ambitious in its democracy promotion if only because not doing so could lead to worse problems – as encapsulated in Commissioner Patten’s apt remark that “either Europe exports stability to the Balkans or the Balkans export instability to the rest of Europe”. Thirdly, there is missing the kind of

driving dynamic that characterised the 2004 enlargement process and was marked by a sense of historical opportunity over re-uniting Europe. The understood trade-off between the promise of EU membership and the satisfaction of conditionality and other accession requirements – which was present in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (and only temporarily called in doubt during enlargement setbacks or moments of loss of confidence by one candidate country or other) – is far less clear. While it is understandable that the Commission should introduce tighter procedures, the risk involved in this weaker credibility is to undermine the will to reform. It has a special effect since in the past reform-committed leaders in candidate countries had been able to use a domestic leverage over recalcitrant domestic actors with the argument that they were threatening their countries’ chances of

joining the EU; but now this is less persuasive. There have even been attempts by some Balkan leaders to direct this problem back towards Brussels. A warning from Bosnia at the end of 2006 that EU hesitation about enlargement could undercut reform efforts in the Balkans as `the countries of the EU are playing around with the strongest political instrument that they have’ 27 is just one example. In other words, there is some danger of pre-accession limbo which, if it persists, could weaken the prospects of success in the Western Balkans’ integration process. Fourthly, to complement problems of

consensus within the EU over a full-scale Balkan enlargement, there are serious difficulties of achieving a viable consensus within the Balkan countries. The latter is a vital factor because it provides a reliable guarantee that governmental responses to EU requirements will be underpinned domestically. One potential vulnerability here is that these two patterns might interact negatively as when EU doubts or even tough demands weaken domestic consensus. One sign of this happening was when membership negotiations with Croatia were postponed for half a year in spring 2005 because Zagreb failed to deliver the alleged war criminal Ante Gotovina; and there followed a sharp decline in public support in that country for EU membership. Obviously, the chances of this negative scenario are especially present in Turkey’s more extended and more controversial negotiations for membership. The issue here is not simply one of public support for integration for it involves deeper problems, as noted by the European Commission in its March 2008 report on the Western Balkans: 27 European Voice, 14-20 December 2006.

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“Public opinion in the Western Balkans is largely favourable to EU integration. All governments have committed themselves to this objective and are implementing reforms. However, societies remain divided on a number of key issues related to the co-existence and integration of different communities and, in some cases, constitutional reform. Further efforts are needed to achieve consensus on such issues, to avoid harmful displays of nationalism, and to press on with the necessary political and economic reforms 28.” The domestic backdrop for EU-committed

leaders in the Balkans is decidedly more difficult than was the case with their predecessors in the 2004 enlargement process. Indeed, this problem has been noted in past years with the inability of reformists to gather sufficient and firm support for EU purposes, as in the Bertelsmann Transition Index on the Western Balkans29. It has at times been highlighted by the new conditionality issue of handing over alleged war criminals who, like Ante Gotovina in Croatia and Ratko Mladic in Serbia, have enjoyed a measurable degree of support as national heroes in patriotic circles in these countries. But there is also a problem of conflicts among the political class over major priorities, as notably in Serbia today where the issue of losing Kosovo has a significant symbolic meaning and weighs in the balance 28 European Commission, Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective, Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 5 March 2008, p. 2. 29 See references 2 and 3 above; also, Papadimitriou, `The EU’s Strategy in the Post-Communist Balkans’, p. 83.

of political considerations in Belgrade over the country’s European strategy. Altogether, therefore, the Western Balkans

represent the most difficult set of prospective accession countries so far encountered by the EU. The EU has, in spite of “enlargement fatigue”, found itself drawn into this process for similar reasons as with earlier post-Communist accession countries; but it has hardly developed adequate instruments to deal with this more challenging task. Accordingly, there is a strong likelihood of major mishap along the way and even the occasional accession disaster should the combination of four circumstances, discussed above, acquire an unstoppable negative dynamic.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Brusis, Martin: Assessing the state of democracy, market economy and political management, Southeastern Europe in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 2006.

• Brusis, Martin and Thiery, Peter: Comparing political governance: Southeastern Europe in a global perspective in Southeastern European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 2006

• Grabbe, Heather: The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006

• Jacoby Wade: Inspiration, Coalitionand Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations in World Politics, July 2006.

• Papadimitriou, Dimitris: The EU’s Strategy in the Post-Communist Balkans in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 1/3, September 2001.

• Pridham, Geoffrey: Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach and Priorities in Democratization, June 2007.

• Pridham, Geoffrey: The Scope and Limitations of Political Conditionality: Romania’s Accession to the European Union in Comparative European Politics, December 2007.

• Turkes, Mustafa and Gokgoz, Goksu: The European Union’s Strategy towards the Western Balkans, in East European Politics & Societies, vol. 20, no. 4, 2006.

• The Economist, 5 November 2005. • Euractiv, 24 June 2005. • European Council briefing, December 2005. • European Voice, 10-16 March 2005. • European Voice, 14-20 December 2006. • Frankfurter Allgemeine, 9 November 2006. • http://www.euractiv.com • http://europa.eu.int • 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005)

561, Brussels, 9 November 2005. • The Balkans in Europe’s Future, International Commission on the Balkans, Centre for

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, 2005. • Interim Report on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification

Mechanism, European Commission, Brussels, 14 February 2008. • Negotiating Framework for Croatia, European Council, Brussels, 2005. • Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective, Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 5 March 2008.

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Public policy making would be very poor*

without the contribution of the directly interested parties who owns the necessary expertise and practical experience. The lobbyists working practices call to disclose their fees and their names on a mandatory public list. In US this is a compulsory rule for years, but the debates in EU has developed towards these targets only very recently. The intelligence of interest and pressure groups requires compliance with ethical and transparent rules to avoid hypocrisy, ∗ Andreea Vass is a PhD researcher within the Institute of National Economy (November 2001 – to date), the Romanian Academy and a collaborator with the Faculty of International Business and Economics of the Academy of Economic Studies. Andreea was an adviser with the Economic and Social Policies Department of the Presidential Administration (January 2005 - July 2007). Since December 2007 she is an advisor within the European Parliament. andreea_vass@yahoo.com

populism, electoral frenzy, smart guys and tricksters. Otherwise, their influence over the decision-making process may quickly translate into bias and infringement upon democratic principles. Lobby and advocacy versus misuse of authority Jack Abramoff, a famous leader of a lobby

group close to the Republicans and a former director of a think-tank1, was a central figure in a high-profile political scandal in 2005, when he was accused of having defrauded his customers and having bribed US officials. One year later, he received an almost six-year sentence for three counts of fraud, for favours granted by politicians to third parties in

1 National Center for Public Policy Research

LOBBYING OPPORTUNITIES, CONFUSIONS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Andreea Vass∗

Abstract. Lobby activities are often likened to the misuse of authority and bad practices. Such parallels generate problems that easily spiral down into crises and conflicts, and the symbiosis of politics and business turns into an ambiguous platform. Why should we look into the core of the suspicions regarding the intertwining and overlapping interests of political and business communities? The answer: because in Romania public interest is often defined in a private or personal framework, whereas private interests are defined in markedly public terms. Confusion sets us clearly apart from the effective Israeli, American, British, Czech, Polish or Magyar lobbyists. The same confusion has a damaging effect: we are unable to efficiently handle institutional relations and public-private relations, be they national or international, that is, European. To what extent is the politics-business relationship deemed appropriate in US andEU? Which are its constraints, prerequisites and possible sanctions? These are the questions which accompany our dilemmas that we clarify in this paper. We conclude with proposals on what can be done in promoting efficiently the Romanian private interests within the European institutions. Key words: interest groups, NGOs, lobbying pressures, advocacy, EU public-policy making JEL classification: H10, L31, L38

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exchange for electoral campaign funds. He was ordered to repay USD 21.7 million. A large-scale anti-corruption investigation also resulted in the sentencing of former Republican group leader in the Chamber of Representatives, Tom DeLay and of his fellow party member and Representative Bob Ney, alongside two White House officials and nine other lobbyists. The example is quite relevant. The misuse

of authority involves making a request, a promise or acceptance of an offer conditional on some remuneration. Whether influence is actually exerted or not, and whether or not it yields the desired result, the misuse of authority or manipulation is subject to criminal prosecution2. But lobby should not be mistaken for such activities. As such, it ought not to be downplayed in public information or awareness-raising campaigns. Lobbying involves a lot more. Its ethical code requires proficiency in the legitimate pursuit of a private interest. The very core of professionally communicating this interest is related to a refined legislative and technical expertise, to rhetorical strategies and abilities focusing on decision-makers. Hence, the misuse of authority, lobby and

advocacy are three distinct activities. Confusions are frequent as regards the latter concepts. Any awareness-raising activity addressing the public or decision-makers, and regarding actions or decisions that directly affect people’s lives or the society as a whole, may be defined as advocacy. Lobby practices are aimed at actually influencing the governmental decision-making, rather than simply at raising awareness. Therefore, advocacy is a constant component of lobbying, but the former does not necessarily imply lobbying.

2 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Strasbourg, 1999 – ratified in Romania under Law No. 27/2002.

Lobbying in USA and EU So far the EU has not experienced similar

scandals. The reason is quite simple. The host of European pressure groups, unlike the American ones, thrive in the absence of information on clients, revenues and fees charged. The fragmented nature of European institutions, but also their sharing responsibilities with Member States, makes the European lobby arena less transparent, ampler, more intricate and subtle.

Corporate giants like Boeing and Airbus, DuPont and Dow Chemical or newcomers British Petroleum and Philip Morris have their own lobby offices in Brussels’ Rond-Point Schuman. The paths of many other employers’ associations and federations, trade companies and PR firms, think-tanks and NGOs meet in this junction with Rue de la Loi, which hosts the European Commission and European Council “fortresses”. Opening into the same Brussels junction is also Avenue de Cortenbergh, with the head offices of multinationals in the foodstuff industry - Unilever, the German chemicals industry - BASF, the French weapon and electronics manufacturer - Thales or of the energy giant E.ON, famous law firms Hill & Knowlton and the controversial Burson-Marsteller, or AmCham itself3. The American society sees things

differently. The key axiom in the theory and practice of American pluralism, as phrased by Robert Dahl, says that “there is no one centre of sovereign power, but multiple centres of power, none of which is or can be fully sovereign.”4 The first attempts to regulate

3 Corporate Europe Observatory, Brussels - the EU quarter. Explore the corporate lobbying paradise, July 2005. 4 Robert Dahl is a Professor emeritus of political science at the Yale University and a former president of the American Political Science Association. Regarded as one

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lobbying in the USA were made in the early 20th Century. In 1946, the first normative act was endorsed5, modified half a century later in the “Lobbying Disclosure Act” (1995). The Law defines lobbying as any oral or written communication addressing any official in the legislative or executive powers. It must be done on behalf of a client and seeks the drawing up, modification or enactment of a particular federal legislation or regulation, executive order, political programme or position of the US Government6. But first of all, lobbyists must be registered with the Senate and Chamber of Representatives administrative offices, and are to submit activity reports every six months.

The American lobby market was officially put at USD 1.5 billion in 2000, picking up to 2.6 billion in 2006. Patton Boggs LLP, Cassidy & Assoc and Akin, Gump et al. are the most powerful groups which have been influencing decisions relevant to the business environment for the past ten years. Major clients include the American Chamber of Commerce (which spent USD 338 million in 1998 – 2007), followed by General Electric (USD 161 million) and American Medical Assn (USD 157 million). By economic sectors, the market is primarily supported by pharmaceutical holdings, financial groups and IT&C corporations. There are no corresponding data for the European market.

of the most distinguished political scientists, his seminal works: Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City – published in 1961, Democracy and Its Critics – published in 1989, How Democratic is the American Constitution? – published in 2002 or On Political Equality – published in 2006, were harshly criticised by C. Wright Mills, G. William Domhoff or Charles Blattberg. 5 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 1946 6 It may also be aimed at the implementation or completion of a federal policy or programme, or at the nomination or confirmation of an individual to a position that requires Senate endorsement.

Unlike the Anglo-Saxon space, in continental Europe the modern political thought developed in a different vein. The European—particularly French—theory and practice has regarded interest groups and their lobby practice in a rather negative manner. It was only in 1989, when a MEP disclosed instances of abuse by such groups, that some light was shed on the multiple problems related to the growing number of interest groups and lobbyists around European Union decision-making structures. A number of MEP reports followed (Galle – 1992, Ford or Nordmann – 1994) as well as monitoring measures by the European Commission. For instance, in January 1997, European Commission (EC) first published a catalogue of the groups of interests operating at a European level, after defining guidelines for EU lobbying in 19967. In exchange for the Parliament access permit, lobbyists are bound to register and sign a code of conduct8 similar to the American one. But there is no telling exactly how many

lobby companies operate in Brussels. There are roughly 3,000 groups registered with the European Parliament and headquartered in Brussels. The European decision-making system comes under the pressure of over 15,000 voices hired by lobby groups to promote private interests.

The strongest lobby firms seem to be: WeberShandwick, APCO Europe, Hill & Knowlton International Belgium, GPC

7 The main European regulations include the following: MEPs are required to submit statements regarding their professional and other paid activities; relevant gifts must be declared before debates take place; MEPs are bound to turn down financial or other support which is conditional on the outcome of a lobby activity. 8 In order to avoid discriminating against European citizens who support a cause, but do not come in touch with Parliament on a regular basis, the “frequent contact” was defined (more than 5 days a year) as distinct from “occasional contact” (which does not require registration).

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International – Government Policy Consultant, Burson-Marsteller and Blueprint Partners9. Unsurprisingly, their distribution favours

economic themes (98%) at the expense of social ones (2%). The interests promoted are primarily related to the European trade federations (35%), trade consultants (15%), private companies (13%), NGOs in areas such as healthcare, environment or human rights (13%), private business and trade union sectors (10%), regional representatives (8%), international organisations (5%) and think-tanks (1%). Adding to these are the official delegations of another 150 national governments, plus national lobby platforms (e.g. Dutch European Affairs Platform or the recently launched Czech House).

A recent national lobby hub initiative was the launch on October 11, 2007 of a centre named the Czech House, which hosts employers’ organisations and specialised interest groups (CzechTrade, CzechTourism or Czech Business Representation), as well as companies (Czech Airlines or power company ČEZ). It obviously precedes the Czech Republic Presidency of the European Union in 2009. The Prague Post (17.10.2007) described the scope of the event which coagulates the interests of a majority of Czech groups in Brussels. Exceptions include, for instance, the groups of interests of the 8 (out of 14) development regions which chose to retain their original offices in Brussels. This is also the case with the representatives of the Central Bohemian Region, famous for their successful capitalisation of interests in the 2007-2013 Regional Development Programme.

9 V. Marziali, “Lobbying in Brussels Interest Representation and Need for Information”, Center for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper C155, 2006.

Machiavelli in Brussels As mentioned above, the European

institutional structure is fragmented and it encompasses multiple channels for influencing decisions, through the European Commission, Council and Parliament. The former has a monopoly on legislative initiatives, and as such it is the primary target of pressure groups. The Council arena is slightly more complex. First of all, lobbyists indirectly pursue national delegations in Brussels; secondly, they target the host of expert working groups; thirdly, direct influence may be wielded through national governments themselves. The European Parliament (EP) is another

level that pressure groups target. The co-decision procedure, which brings together the EP and the European Council, defines the development of European policies. The first specific objectives of lobbying are to contact committee chairs and the appointed rapporteurs. The latter draw up the answers to the legislative proposals made by the Commission, as well as the EP amendments. Consequently, the arguments put forth by the groups of interests may accompany the comments and proposals made by the EP on the European Commission draft legislation, during plenary committee meetings. Then, the major part played by the EP in drawing up and endorsing the EU budget lends special undertones to the lobby activity. Not least, parliamentary group leaders often instruct group members on how to vote, both at an expert committee level and in parliamentary meetings. European public policies swing between

two poles of interest: national versus European and public versus private. Decision-making vectors may therefore emerge from specific national public or private interests which may be broadened to a European public or private level, or the other

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way round. Breaking down the eight influence vectors seems easy to do. But in fact they become a lot more volatile, as lobby groups may form hybrid bodies10. This is how new types of actors emerge,

which pursue particular interests, under the form of public-private agencies known under the acronym GONGO (governmental organised NGOs) or GINGO (governmental interested NGOs). The European Commission spends over EUR 1 billion a year on developing the expertise of non-governmental organisations and on encouraging them to participate in the European decision-making (e.g. in the healthcare or environment sector) to make up for the much discussed information shortage in the European decision-making process.

One of the most “grotesque” examples of such funding was the allocation of over half of the European Commission budget for Friends of the Earth Europe, which purportedly promotes European interests in ending the global warming. At the opposite pole there are the BONGO

(business organised NGOs) and BINGO (business interested NGOs) actors. The combination of multiple influence vectors by a sophisticated lobby group will depend on the awareness of the respective topic, on the timing of the information campaign, on the debate medium, on the particular political and economic risks and opportunities. Experts view this art as coming down to the “interplay of the three P’s”: people, positions and influencing procedures. Reality unveils combination patterns that

work on the assumption of a Brussels which “governs.” A lot more important for us, as a new Member State, is to identify means to

10 Rinus van Schendelen, Machiavelli in Brussels. The Art of Lobbying the EU, Amsterdam University Press, 2005.

influence the EU decision-making from a national level. The most difficult part seems to be to coordinate the national private sector influence on the European public sector. This is where private lobby firms come into play most often, alongside private sectoral representatives in specialised European committees. The symphony of private lobby firms,

which are nonetheless at odds with each other in many cases, is tough and truly pan-European. For instance, in 1986 Philips obtained protection of its compact disks by putting forth the “young industry” principle; pharmaceutical companies managed to get the EU Directive on cigarettes enacted in 2001, at the expense of the tobacco industry; oil giant ExxonMobile is a skilled promoter of Euro-pessimism in drawing up European policies on the climate change, and a fierce opponent of the endorsement of the Kyoto Protocol by the USA11. Research on EU interest intermediation

still lacks analysis of what kind of influence and under which conditions interest groups actually exert influence. Michalowitz (2007) addresses this question concentrating on the degree of conflict, structural conditions of interest exertion and the type of interest pursued, as main conditions for the degree to which interest groups manage to change legislative acts. Three case studies of decision-making in the fields of IT and transport in the EU justify her conclusion that the technical influence is dominating over directional influence. More than that she highlights the crucial role of the decision-makers’ initial interests12.

11 Corporate Europe Observatory - CEO, 2006. 12 I. Michalowitz, What determines influence? Assessing conditions for decision-making influence of interest groups in the EU, Journal of European Public Policy 14:1, January 2007, p. 132–151.

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The black box of European lobbying: misrepresentations The recent exposure of suspicious

agreements between chemical or energy industry lobbyists raised new questions in Brussels. More often than not, “key groups” claiming to represent citizens proved to be funded by the consulting agencies of corporations with precise interests. Many other risks associated to lobbycracy have recently emerged in the European space13:

� Privileged access – this refers particularly to corporate giants or employer associations represented in expert groups. The European Commission policy on biofuel innovation is the outcome of recommendations drawn up by BIOFRAC (Biofuels Research Advisory Council). Its membership soon proved to favour the four oil companies and another four biofuel companies, at the expense of only one representative for the foodstuff industry, one for the wood industry, one for the energy sector, one farmer, eight academics (most of them working closely with oil companies and biotech companies) and, not least, for EuropaBio, the largest lobby association representing biotechnology producers. The absence of at least one representative of the environment pressure groups reflected in

13 ALTER-EU Brochure, Brussels, 23 May 2006, http://www.alter-eu.org/en/system/files/publications/ COE_Broschure_07-WEB.pdf . The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation is a coalition of over 140 civil society groups, trade unions, academics and public affairs firms concerned with the increasing influence exerted by corporate lobbyists on the political agenda in Europe, the resulting loss of democracy in EU decision-making and the postponement, weakening, or blockage even, of urgently needed progress on social, environmental and consumer-protection reforms.

the contents of the BIOFRAC report: "Biofuels in the European Union – A Vision for 2030 and beyond," published in June 2006, and which became an official EC document. The fact is that all European legislation is based on the work of approximately 1,350 expert groups, organised similarly to BIOFRAC.

� Revolving doors – personal contacts and inside information are vital ingredients of efficient lobbying. Their intensity increases with the speed of revolving doors between European institutions and interest groups. Jean-Paul Mingasson, former Director General of DG Enterprise and Industry (2002 – 2004) and DG Budget (1989 – 2002), left the European Commission in 2004 to become General Adviser for BusinessEurope (the confederation of European business - former UNICE). Thus, prior to 2004, he had personally taken part in drawing up European regulations on the chemical industry, and after 2004 he set out to challenge them. Similar examples can be found with most European public policies (e.g. incumbent non-executive director of British Nuclear Fuels, James Currie, a former head of DG Environment and in charge with Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection in 1997-2001).

� Dubious methods and the pretence of independence – the actual agenda of interest groups is often hidden, as lobbyists claim to represent not-for-profit organisations or “independent experts.” In 2005 the world was yet to learn that an organisation that had launched the “Campaign for Creativity” (C4C), allegedly representing artists, musicians, designers, software developers and other creative professionals, was actually coordinated by a PR company, Campbell

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Gentry. An active lobbyist with the European Parliament, it encouraged the endorsement of tight protection measures for software patents, which obviously worked to the benefit of relevant multinationals. The campaign, apparently backed by creatives, was actually financed by Microsoft, SAP and industry association CompTIA. The issue has never been settled. Indeed, the direct request for clarifications by C4C as regards funding and true clients failed to yield clear results. The regulation of this “black box” of the

European lobby market, starting with the voluntary or compulsory registration in an interest group registry to moving on to revenue transparency, still sparks fiery disputes. The public affairs management that tries to untangle this web revolves around three major poles: The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER EU), the Society of European Affairs Professionals (SEAP) and the European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA). While the former campaigns for the compulsory monitoring of pressure groups, the latter associations stubbornly defend the privilege of secrecy and self-regulation. European transparency initiative The European Parliament acknowledges

groups of interests as a positive fact in itself, and generally supports appeals to bind such groups to make public data on their activity. But certain voices in Parliament complain over the weakness generated by the heavy dependence on lobby group recommendations, and support, on the contrary, the employment of additional staff in expert committees. Alexander Stubb, the author of a recent EP report on the topic, stated convincingly, “European Deputies are

smart enough to realise that the information they get is subjective.” A concrete initiative was only launched in

late 2006, when EC vice-president Siim Kallas proposed the publication of a European registry of lobby groups. SEAP members were no late in upholding the voluntary registration procedure. But many others believe that a voluntary registration system cannot work efficiently: it is precisely the controversial groups and people which will avoid this option. This is exactly why the idea was put forth of introducing clear benefits and advantages for those who choose to register. Thus, on 21 March 2007 the Commission

adopted the Communication “Follow-up to the Green Paper ‘European Transparency Initiative’ "14 that includes the decision to establish a framework for its relations with interest representatives. Four stepts were drafted and accepted: o Create and launch a new voluntary

Register for interest representatives in spring 2008;

o Draft a Code of Conduct. Respect for the Code will be a requirement for entry in the Register and will be monitored by the Commission;

o Establish a monitoring and enforcement mechanism for the Code and the Register;

o Increase transparency through reinforced application of the Commission’s consultation standards based, in particular, on a standard website for internet consultations. Debates further heated up as the

European Commission proposed that financial information be made public, in an October 8, 2007 seminar organised by the Constitutional Affairs Committee. But the supporters of this initiative make it conditional on its application

14 COM(2007) 127 final

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to all groups of interests. As long as registration is voluntary, the result can only be a distortion of competition. Its most fierce opponents claim, on the other hand, that the disclosure of customers comes against confidentiality rules and may entail criminal penalties. In spite of such initiatives, transparency is

still a goal. Only in the spring of 2008 groups of interests are able to voluntarily enter their data in an official European registry. On March 2008, further clarifications about the transparency measures progress have been provided by the Commission, as well as a Code of Conduct established following a public consultation15. o On one hand more information is needed

on the activities and operators included in the definitions of “interest representation” - activities for which registration is expected, and “interest representative” - entities which are expected to register.

o On the other hand, given the number of groups which threaten to boycott the registration, a compulsory registration system is likely to be introduced in the near future. After all, chances are the disclosure of details regarding specific interest carriers, the funds allocated, the revenues and expenditure of lobby companies will not become compulsory sooner than in 2009.

Nevertheless, the European inter-institutional approach is fragmented. Thus, the invitation to register and to accept the Code of Conduct will apply for interest representatives in their dealings with the European

15 COM(2008) 323 final, Communication from the Commission European Transparency Initiative: A framework for relations with interest representatives (Register and Code of Conduct) {SEC(2008) 1926}, Brussels, 27.5.2008, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/ docs/323_en.pdf

Commission only. The voice of any group of interests should however be channeled in EU trough an inter-institutional one-stop-shop register and code. A closer cooperation in this area is expected from the Commission, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee.

Lobbying in Romania: what may be done? Lobbycracy is yet to be clearly regulated in

Romania as well. Professionalisation of interest groups on the basis of best practice codes, as a form of self-regulation, must be followed by the recognition of the lobbyist profession, i.e. its introduction in the National Occupations Classification List16. And, why not, regulations of the field should result in a distinct law, as only Georgia (1998), Lithuania (2001) and Poland (2005) have in Central and Eastern Europe. Some civil society members criticised a

prospective lobby act, on grounds such as: the emergence of a privileged class (the lobbyists); generation of unilateral benefits for the better informed groups of interests; hindering citizens’ access to elected representatives or public institution officials; discouraging citizens’ direct participation in decision making; the existence of laws which already include provisions likely to facilitate civil participation etc. We should keep in mind however that the

lobby regulation is both a normative, and an institutional matter. At a normative level, we may choose between legislating on lobbying activities and registration of interest groups. But, as mentioned from the very beginning, a

16 The current CAEN Code 7414 (Business and management consulting activities), although rather vague, seems acceptable for professional lobbying.

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clear-cut distinction must be made between advocacy and lobbying. At an institutional level, the monitoring of actors in the lobby arena may be entrusted to a self-regulation committee (an ethics committee, as requested by certain civil society organisations). The committee activity should be regulated so as to clarify aspects related to the registration, investigation and disciplinary procedures available to the committee, to ensure its financial autonomy, its independence and objectivity etc. But drawing up a basic code of conduct,

comprising the central principles that guide lobby activities, is without doubt the first necessary step. It is aimed at ensuring the transparency and legitimacy of lobbying, based on the constitutional rights to petition, to freedom of opinion and of association; the non-exclusive nature of lobbying; the responsibility of all stakeholders; the fair competition between interests supported by various groups, and so on. The Romanian lobby market certainly has

huge development potential, although active players are less visible. Central Europe Consulting Government Relations is the first Romanian private lobby company17. It looks like obvious that the strong multinational companies do have their own lobbying departments, but the SMEs need this kind of assistance. We still lack a Romanian Business Centre in Brussels that should provide professional consultancy services in the field of European affairs. No active voice is heard within the European institutions. No team to offer Romanian clients consultancy services by using theoretical knowledge in different

17 Since May 2007 it has been operating under a new name, Candole Partners, based in Prague. The EU accession offered the company a wider consulting area, targeting clients from all the six EU Member States in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

areas of community policies and practical experience in the field of EU institutions. The number of Romanian experts working within the European Council, the Commission and the Parliament is to increase from 150 to 1500 persons. Ireland, Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, Spain, Croatia or even Malta has this kind of business offices. Relations with the European partners take

place rather on a sectoral or association basis. It is the case, for example, of UNPR´s affiliation to the European Builders Confederation18 and to the SME Union of EPP19 or that of PFR (Romanian Pharmacists Patronage) to PGEU20 (The Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union). On the contrary, the National Wine Association (Patronatului National al Vinului - PNV) is not yet promoting their interests at the EU level and lost relevant shares on these markets. Let´s call for a particular case relevance.

The European Commission has set up a "High Level Expert Group on Administrative Burdens". There are no real entrepreneurs in this expert group and no representatives from the new member countries from Eastern Europe. In response, the SME Union of EPP decided to set up a "low" level group to fight administrative burdens comprised of small and medium entrepreneurs who have suffered from bureaucratic obstacles first-hand. Their group will present the results after 6 months and will not spend millions of Euros for consultants. They will be able to speak from their own experience. Still, good contacts to the European Commission and to the European Parliament members help to shape the EU policy and legislation in a more friendly way. Another example from the civil society is

18 http://www.eubuilders.org/ 19 http://www.sme-union.org/ 20 http://www.pgeu.eu/

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“EUROLINK” House of Europe, which launched a government-supported integrated information, training and consulting project, offering free of charge services to the business community and the local communities which are to contract local/regional projects financed by EU funds21. A Bruxelloise Romanian diaspora initiative

materialized into the "Romanian-EU Club"22, a non-political, non-governmental and self-sustained financially think-tank. Its main goal is the promotion of the Romanian image in the European environment and the dissemination of the European principles and values in Romania. Regional lobbying is still at an early,

amateur stage in Romania. Since January 1, 2007, Romanian local and county authorities have had the unique opportunity to take part in EU consultation mechanisms and to promote their interests in the European arena. But this unfamiliar situation for us requires the existence of specialised structures to facilitate the access to the European decision making as efficiently as possible. Representatives of Romanian counties and cities are thus seeking ways to promote their projects, using their own means or jointly with other agencies. However, while the representation of sub-national interests is entrusted to county authorities, most large-scale projects as well as the EU regional policy strategy focus on the eight development regions. In Romania’s case, the eight development regions currently lack legal personality and, as such, international representation rights. Notwithstanding this

21 A second component of the EUROLINK lobbying is aimed at enhancing the competition discipline in the Romanian market, at the rapid management adjustment of companies before or after mergers/acquisitions, as well as at streamlining the European fund absorption. 22 http://www.euro-club.org/despre-noi.html, established in 2003

particular situation, counties have learned that they must work together, both as regards the contact with European authorities, and in accessing major project funding. To enhance the consistency and improve

the management of lobby and information activities, Romanian officials either work together in the Capital of Europe, within the Office of the National Union of the Romanian County Councils, or have set up their own information and lobby offices. The most important structure which fosters the interests of Romanian local authorities is the National Union of Romanian County Councils (UNCJR), established in 200423. Precisely, in order to better cover as wide areas as possible, in both geographic and thematic terms, County Councils are organised within the Union both on an individual basis, and as associations, by regions or common interests. At the launch of the new Office formula, in

October 2005, UNCJR president Liviu Dragnea (Teleorman County Council), presented the goal and importance of the bureau: “We compete with dozens of other European regions, which have a tradition in accessing structural funds. This is why we need experts who are thoroughly familiar with the problems in the county that they represent and who can present projects in Brussels which may be financed. It will be tough, but not impossible, because we have already made the first step towards this money: we are here. Unless you are in Brussels, you don’t exist." But before having strong institutions, what

we need above all is clearly defined rules and procedures. We are yet to develop a framework to enable political players and institutions to relate, and, when necessary, to

23 UNCJR is registered as a non-governmental organisation, which brings together, on a voluntary consent basis, the 41 County Councils in Romania, as legal entities.

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apply sanctions. The tardy or inadequate reactions of institutions to various crises are sound proof of these flaws, inadequacies and failures to adjust. Paradoxically, while there is an

overabundance of normative acts in Romania, procedures come in short supply - particularly when it comes to institutional relations. There

are forms without a substance, we set up new bodies but we are hardly concerned with the causes of and solutions to the problems that we discuss. Becoming aware of our own interest and pursuing it with the help of specialised lobby companies is a necessary solution: a new principle, a new value, a compromise accepted in order to move on.

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*The fall of the Communist regimes in the

Central and Eastern European (CEE) states marked the beginning of transition periods from centralized planned economies to capitalism, but also from political dictatorship to a multi-party system with free competitive elections. For the new political forces that took over the power in these states, establishing economic and political relations with Western European states and institutions was a logical step, since there were two dominant alternatives, discussed within the Round Table Talks1: to turn West or to remain a part

∗ Sergiu Gherghina holds an MA in Political Science, Central European University Budapest, currently enrolled in the MPhil Program of Institutional Analysis at Leiden University, Department of Political Science. sergiulor@yahoo.com George Jiglău holds an MA in Political Science, Central European University Budapest, currently he is MA candidate at “Babeş-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca. george.jiglau@yahoo.com 1 Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, 1998, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

of the Eastern, pro-Russian bloc. The results of these constitutional discussions on the eve of the transition show that throughout the region adopting/copying Western institutional models, laws, and standards was preferred.2 The transitions to democracy and

capitalism faced numerous challenges. One of them was the re-emergence of ethnic identities. During Communism, the CEE nations were united by one single identity, imposed and maintained through propaganda and repressive means. After the fall of Communism, people sought to rediscover themselves and to find new ideas and values to shape their identity. This is why ethnic feelings re-emerged in the

2 This is what Grabbe calls “mimetism in institutional and law models”. See Heather Grabbe, 2003. “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU accession process”. In The Politics of Europeanization, eds. Featherstone and Radaelli, Oxford University Press, pp. 312-314. See also Wade Jacoby, 2004. “Introduction: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe” (1-19) and “Emulation as Embedded Rationalism” (20-40). In The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe. Cambridge University Press.

THE ROLE OF ETHNIC PARTIES IN THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS - The Romanian Experience Sergiu Gherghina∗∗∗∗ George Jiglău

Abstract. This paper aims to show how ethnic parties can become influential actors in the process of Europeanization of post-Communist countries, by conducting a case-study of Romania. We consider Europeanization of Romania as the dependent variable of the two hypotheses we put forward. First, we test if the presence of ethnic parties in government led to an acceleration of the Europeanization process. Second, we are interested in seeing if the European dimension of ethnic parties’ political activity led to additional challenges for domestic governments in the Europeanization process. Thus, we show that the moderation of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) had both positive and negative consequences for the process of Europeanization in Romania.

Key words: ethnic parties, DAHR, Europeanization, transition, democratization

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beginning of the 1990’s, together with all the remnants of the conflicts and territorial disputes that took place in the decades and centuries before Communism. This raised great problems to many CEE states, because in most of them significant ethnic minorities were present. The most relevant cases that were seen as potential sources of conflict in the region and, implicitly, as challenges to democracy, were the Hungarians in Romania, the Turks in Bulgaria, the Hungarians in Slovakia, the Russians in the Baltic states, and the complex ethnic puzzle in Yugoslavia. However, with the significant exception of the war in Yugoslavia, in none of these states did ethnic relations turn violent on a significant and persistent scale.3 By using a single-case study approach, a

particular focus on Romania, this paper aims to provide a new and challenging answer to the following research question: Why did post-Communist states in the CEE succeed on their way to democracy, managing to integrate ethnic minorities on their territories and to prevent the outburst of ethnic conflicts? The existing literature provides several answers to this question. The most common emphasize the positive role of European institutions’ leverage over CEE states trying to become members of these institutions.4 We provide an in-state perspective over the relation among national minorities, home states, kin states and European institutions,5 bringing into

3 There have been clashes between rival ethnic groups, such as the street clashes between Hungarian and Romanian groups in March 1990, in the Transylvanian town of Targu-Mures. 4 For instance see Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East…” or Milada Anna Vachudova, 2001. “The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States: Eastern Europe and the European Union”. European University Institute, Working Paper No. 2001/33. 5 Rogers Brubaker proposed the “triadic nexus” model for the analysis of inter-ethnic relations, formed by the

discussion what have been seen so far as secondary actors in the processes of transition: ethnic parties. In this respect, we test two hypotheses. The main one is that the presence of ethnic parties in government led to an acceleration of the Europeanization process. The secondary hypothesis is that the European dimension of ethnic parties’ political activity led to additional challenges for domestic governments in the Europeanization process. Thus, by using process-tracing, we show that the moderation of the DAHR had both positive and negative consequences for the process of Europeanization in Romania. We do not show that ethnic parties might be a solution in all states with ethnic minorities on their territory or that the accommodation of ethnic minorities and the inclusion of ethnic parties in the higher levels of the decision making process are specific means to ensure Europeanization and integration in the European institutions. We emphasize that ethnic parties are meaningful actors that have a significant influence, combined with other actions of governments, over the Europeanization efforts. We proceed by presenting an

encompassing theoretical framework touching upon the main concepts and issues that are taken into consideration in the literature. Also, we present the case selection criteria. Then, we present the internal and international context which shaped the inter-ethnic relations in Romania during the 1990s and, consequently, the actions of the ethnic party discussed in the paper. We then go into detail in presenting the internal and external actions of the DAHR, permanently referring to the issue of Europeanization, as it is defined in the theoretical framework. Finally, we draw national minority, the home state and the kin state. See Rogers Brubaker, 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. University of California: Los Angeles.

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conclusions and present the possibilities of further research opened by this study.

Theoretical and methodological framework Democracy and the State

The variation in the achieved outcomes

of the post-Communist transitions illustrate that some regimes have chosen and completed a transition to democracy, others have been “arrested” at some point on their path to democracy and regressed to the authoritarian type they had before or chose a different type of authoritarianism, while others still fight between democracy and their Communist past. In the attempt to narrow down the concept of democracy, we should bear in mind that it is a form of governance where the demos has to be involved and no modern polity can become a democracy unless it is first a state.6 When speaking about state, we target the three basic elements highlighted in the Weber’s definition: population, territory, and legitimate use of force. In this respect one should avoid the confusion with Rechtsstaat, based on limitation of power, rule of law, the prevalence of authorities and norms and respect for procedures. When the latter concept is achieved, a relatively high degree of democracy is present. Lipset defines democracy “as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and a social mechanism that permits the largest possible part of the population to influence 6 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 7.

major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office”.7 Dahl approaches the concept by emphasizing its main features and, thus, providing dimensions on which measurement can be conducted. At a general level, he sees as a main characteristic of a democracy the “continuous responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals”.8 In order to stress more the necessity of government’s receptiveness and the equal possibility of the people to formulate their preferences, Dahl proposes a model with two axes (public contestation and participation). By establishing four ideal-types of political systems – competitive oligarchies, closed hegemonies, inclusive hegemonies, and polyarchy – Dahl enumerates the necessary attributes for a political system to become polyarchic: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right to candidacy; alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for ensuring responsiveness.9 Adding to Dahl’s work, Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990, 6–7) use the term “democracy” to define a system of government where three conditions are essential: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals in organized groups at regular intervals and excluding the rule of force, inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, as well as a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to insure the integrity of political competition and participation. 7 Seymour-Martin Lipset, 1960, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, New York: Doubleday, p. 45. 8 Robert Dahl, 1971, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 1. 9 Ibid. p. 3.

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All these definitions emphasize basic features of democracy that provide the useful ground for an appropriate conceptualization of democratization. By studying transition countries, Linz and Stepan provide a useful differentiation and a definition of the democratization process. Building on the idea that democracy should be seen as “the only game in town”, they consider it to be composed by behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional features. The first tackles the non-existence of a significant political group in the state to overthrow the democratic regime, whereas the second assumes that even when facing severe crises, the vast majority of the people consider further changes to emerge still within the democratic framework created. At a constitutional level, the conflict has to be solved according to the norms and regulations already established, their violation being costly and inefficient.10 In this respect, democratization is considered to be the process in which agreement is reached about political procedures that lead to an elected government, wherein the government comes to power as a result of a free and popular vote, when the government has de facto power to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power do not have to share power with other bodies de jure.11 All these procedural aspects imply the substantive elements of civil liberties and political rights of the citizens that have the power to determine the representatives meant to govern them. As a result of all these definitions and conceptualizations, democratization is the transformation process of authoritarian (including totalitarian and semi-authoritarian) regimes to democracy, being both a matter of existence or non-existence, and one of speed. 10 Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 5. 11 Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 3.

Ethnicity and ethnic groups

The usual definitions given to ethnicity refers to the common features defining a group of people, whether they refer to religion, language, culture, mythology, physical resemblance, or combinations of the above. Closely tied to ethnicity is the concept of nation, defined by Kymlicka as “a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture.”12 Ethnic minorities are sometimes also referred to as “sub-nations.”13 An ethnic group is, according to Weber, a

group that has a shared collective identity, built on the features of ethnicity.14 Kymlicka, on the other hand, sees this as a more appropriate definition for (ethnic) national minorities, usually associated with the existence of a kin-nation, while ethnic groups do not have this sense of common identity, being formed usually of immigrants or their descendants.15 However, Kymlicka’s definition does not accurately capture the phenomenon of re-emerging identities in second or third generation immigrant communities, a good example in this respect being the Turkish community in Germany. Gurr defines ethnic groups as “people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and on shared

12 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 11. 13 Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989), 133. 14 Max Weber, Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Rothand Claus Wittich. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978). 15 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 30.

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experiences and cultural traits.”16 Also, he views ethnic identities as “enduring social constructions that matter to people who share them.”17 Thus, Gurr also shares a constructivist approach to ethnicity and emphasizes, as Weber does, the importance of shared beliefs. Moreover, Gurr sees ethnicity as a developmental process. He also introduces the term “ethno-nationalist groups,” which are politically mobilized groups, seeking to improve their social status. Schermerhorn regards ethnic groups from two perspectives: size and power,18 while Chandra focuses on membership, defining ethnic identity as “nominal membership in an ascriptive category, including race, language, caste, or religion.19 Offe defines the ethnic minority as “a group that, due to its «constitutive characteristics» and «shared identity», will always remain a minority, although its members used their «individual rights to a maximum extent» and which is also treated in an unjust manner by the majority.”20 Therefore, we are dealing with a structural identity of the minority, based on features acquired at birth and that cannot be changed, with the exception of forced assimilation.21

16 Ted Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 5. 17 Idem. 18 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 17. 19 Chandra, “Ethnic Parties…,”, 236. 20 Claus Offe, “Ethno-Nationalized States of Eastern Europe: Is There a Constitutional Alternative?”, Studies in East Europe Thought, No. 54 (1998), 126. 21 This is what distinguishes collective rights, and minority rights in particular, and social rights. We are not dealing with a structural identity when it comes to social rights, because there rights are given to individuals only temporarily, each individual being a potential right bearer of a social right during his lifetime. For instance, the right

In post-Communist states, nations were defined primarily in primordial terms and this view was imposed by the constitutions, as Dimitrijevic points out.22 Thus, the supreme laws “nailed” the supremacy of the titular nation over the territory, while minorities were either not mentioned at all or specifically excluded, as in Latvia or Estonia. In other cases, ethnic minorities were recognized only as part of the titular nation. Territorial concentration has an important

impact on the behavior of ethnic minorities. Territorially concentrated minorities are usually the traditional inhabitants of a particular territory and their identity is organically tied to it. The members of the minority, as well as the nation to which it belongs, claim primordial feelings and try to justify their “ownership” over the territory, as Geertz underlines.23 While for territorially dispersed minorities it

is rather difficult to claim more than cultural autonomy, territorially concentration brings with itself territory-related claims as well. The triadic nexus – the importance of

the kin-state

An important tool in analyzing inter-ethnic

relations is Brubaker’s triadic nexus,24 which captures the importance of kin-states in the mobilization of an ethnic minority. The triadic nexus is formed of the home-state, the ethnic to healthcare. No one enjoys this right permanently, but only when s/he is ill. 22 Nenad Dimitrijevic, “Ethno-Nationalized States of Eastern Europe: Is There a Constitutional Alternative?” Studies in East Europe Thought, No. 54 (2002). 23 Clifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. (New York: Free Press, 1963). 24 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

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minority and the kin-state of the minority. The essence of this tool is the interdependency existing between the three actors; if one of them acts, the others will react. The intervention of a kin-state to help its co-nationals abroad is considered an incentive for the political mobilization of the minority. Besides official declarations of support, the most effective way for the government of a kin-state to help its co-nationals is by funding. Funding is much easier to absorb if there is a strong organization, with a solid infrastructure. Also, the kin-state and the ethnic party of the minority might effectively act as partners to determine the government of the homeland to improve its policies regarding the minority. The concept of ethnic parties has been

repeatedly tackled at the theoretical level by many authors. As a definition of parties is necessary before providing a conceptual framework for analysis, we rely on Sartori’s minimalist definition according to which “A party is any political group that presents at elections and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office”.25 Horowitz defines an ethnic party as “a party that derives its overwhelming support from an identifiable ethnic group and serves the interests of that group”.26 Moreover, he sees ethnic parties as a danger for the good governance of a country.27 Bugajski considers ethnic parties to be “parties [that] act as

25 Giovanni Sartori. 2005. Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 57. 26 See Donald Horowitz, 2000. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. University of California Press, p. 291. This definition has its own shortcomings. “Overwhelming” is a vague term, while the expression “serves the interests of that group” is too idealistic. Nevertheless, it is a good working definition for the purpose of this paper. 27 Ibid., p. 294.

special interest groups, which focus on issues of direct and often exclusive concern to a distinct segment in society”.28 Several works also look at the role of

ethnicity in the beginning of transition. If Toka and Pasquino argue that political parties (including ethnic parties) play a minimal role in the post-communist transitions,29 Lewis sees the ethnic cleavage in the CEE states as the only one that emerges and persists during the transition processes, together with the ethnic parties forming along it.30 Bugajski identifies five possible tendencies in ethnic politics in CEE states after the fall of Communism, depending on the size of the ethnic group and on its level of political mobilization: cultural revivalism (for small groups), political autonomy (for former majorities in former states), territorial self-determination (large, well-organized, territorially compact groups, majoritarian in certain regions), separatism (where large compact groups have a history of statehood), and irredentism.31 He also differentiates between political and cultural autonomism.32 This differentiation is particularly significant for the situation in the three cases taken into discussion in this paper, because cultural autonomy is one of the main demands of minorities in CEE states, as we point out in this paper. The role of ethnic parties in the

Europeanization process is approached by Kelly, but they are not at the center of her study, which focuses mainly on the role of 28 See Janusz Bugajski, 1994. Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, p. li. 29 Quoted in Paul Lewis, 2001. Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. Routledge, p. 20. 30 Ibid., p. 143. 31 See Bugajski, Ethnic Politics…, pp. li-lii. 32 Ibid., p. xviii.

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international institutions.33 However, this is an important step in acknowledging the role of ethnic parties in the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in CEE states. Europeanization is defined by Grabbe as “the processes (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies”.34 When we speak about the Europeanization of a CEE state, we mean the process of integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE. An important tool in analyzing inter-ethnic

relations is Brubaker’s triadic nexus,35 which captures the importance of kin-states in the mobilization of an ethnic minority. The triadic nexus is formed of the home-state, the ethnic minority and the kin-state of the minority. The essence of this tool is the interdependency existing between the three actors; if one of them acts, the others will react. The intervention of a kin-state to help its co-nationals abroad is considered an incentive for the political mobilization of the minority. Besides official declarations of support, the most effective way for the government of a kin-state to help its co-nationals is by funding. Funding is much easier to be absorbed if there is a strong organization, with a solid

33 See Judith Kelly, 2004. Ethnic Politics in Europe: the Power of Norms and Incentives. Princeton University Press. 34 See Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East…”, p. 309. 35 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

infrastructure. Also, the kin-state and the ethnic party of the minority might effectively act as partners to determine the government of the homeland to improve its policies regarding the minority. Case selection In order to test these hypotheses, we use

a qualitative approach, conducting an in-depth case analysis on Romania. There are two arguments to be brought in favor of Romania being a representative case for other states in the Central and Eastern European region. First, it was ruled by a Communist dictatorship (“sultanistic” in the words of Linz and Stepan) from the end of the World War II until the end of 1989.36 Second, its population is not heterogeneous: while Romanians form the largest ethnic group in the country, with a proportion of almost 90%, there is a significant Hungarian community living on its territory.37 According to the 2002 census,38 Hungarians had a proportion of 6.6% (about 1.5 million people) within the population of Romania, whereas the Roma community represented 2.46%.39 The very large majority of 36 The Communist regime was thrown out of power following a bloody revolution, unlike the other states in the region, where the Communist rulers and the opposition reached agreements in a peaceful manner. 37 Another important community in all the three states, besides those mentioned in the analysis, is the Roma community. However, we leave it out because the level of political mobilization within this community is usually low. There are Roma parties in these states, but they are not successful, not even among the members of the communities. 38 All the data on the ethnic structure of the Romanian population is based on the 2002 census. Its results can be found at [http://www.edrc.ro/recensamant.jsp?language=0], accessed on December 24th, 2006. 39 There is a wide acceptance of the fact that this is not an accurate measurement of the Roma community and that it is very difficult to find out precisely how many Roma people are actually living in Romania. There are

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Hungarians live in the center of Romania, where they form the largest ethnic group in three counties (Mureş, Harghita and Covasna), in the Western regions on the border with Hungary and in the large Transylvanian towns, such as Oradea, Cluj-Napoca or Satu Mare. Taken together, they form about 20% of the population of Transylvania. Following the fall of the Communist

regime, Romania started the transition to democracy and a free market economy, staging the first free elections in May 1990. However, in the first six years of transition it was ruled only by successors of the former Communist Party, with limited reforms taking place within the circle of people which ensured the transition from the formal regime to the post-Revolution one and which adopted a pronounced nationalistic discourse. This has been seen as one of the reasons for the delay in the economic and democratic reforms, which placed Romania at the bottom of the list of potential members of Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as NATO or the EU.40 The issue of minorities and the Euro-Atlantic institutions Western states and institutions saw the

issue of national minorities in CEE as a two main reasons for this. First, many of them are not registered at birth and therefore so not have any official ID from the Romanian authorities; they do not exist legally. Second, when asked about their nationality, many of them declare themselves to be Romanian (or Hungarian, if they live in regions where Hungarians predominate), because of the negative feelings of the majority towards Roma people. 40 Bunce, for instance, underlines the impact of the first elections over the speed of transition. See Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience”. World Politics, Volume 55, Number 2, January 2003, pp. 167-192.

potential source of conflict in the beginning of the 1990’s. For all major institutions (i.e. the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe) rights for minorities was set as a basic criterion for accession. The EU did not include minority protection as a criterion for accession in the acquis. Nevertheless, it was among the first conditions that states had to fulfill, in order to begin negotiations.41 The Council of Europe followed a maximal approach, issuing several Recommendations or drafting Conventions that urged member states to give extensive rights to national minorities on their territories. NATO had an intermediary approach; although it is a military organization, it combined criteria related to the military with political criteria for candidate countries, such as good relations with neighboring states and the absence of any cause of conflict within the state. Therefore, the issue of minorities, especially in the context of the war in former Yugoslavia, was very significant, though not explicitly pursued as a criterion for accession.42 The positions of these institutions with respect to minorities are relevant, because, in its bid for membership in all three of them, Romania had to change its attitude towards minorities, due in part to these very criteria. Moreover, we show later in the paper that the Hungarian ethnic party used the standards set by the Council of Europe and the EU to promote and internationalize their policies, as well as to force the hand of the Romanian government.

41 It was included in the Copenhagen criteria, adopted in 1993. 42 Johns argues that these international institutions have double standards with respect to minority protection. See Michael Johns, 2003. “Due as I Say, Not as I Do? The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights”. East European Politics and Societies 17:682-689.

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The inter-ethnic context in the first years of transition The evolution of ethnic relations in

Romania can be divided into two periods: 1990-1996 and 1996 onwards. The first period was the most tensioned period for ethnic relations after the fall of Communism. In this section, we emphasize the two main challenges that aroused during this period: the violent clashes between Romanian and Hungarians in March 1990 and the drafting of the first post-Communist constitution. During the Romanian revolution, in

December 1989, the Hungarians formed their own political movement – the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR).43 Together with the social democrats, they have been the only ones that gained seats in every parliamentary election since 1990. Right after the National Salvation Front

(NSF) took over power in December 1989, the DAHR was included in the National Unity Committee, formed in January 1990. Several decrees were issued by the new government, granting minimal facilities for the minorities in Romania, regarding education in their own languages. However, more radical demands of the DAHR were rejected; for instance, the recognition of Hungarian language as the second official language in the Romanian state. Despite these early signs of cooperation,

the inter-ethnic relations in Romania soon turned violent. Following the celebrations of a Hungarian national holiday on March 15th in several Transylvanian towns and villages, 43 The DAHR is not a political party, according to the Romanian law, but an organization representing the Hungarian minority. Similar organizations exist for the other minorities as well – Italians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Bulgarians etc. From the perspective of this paper, we will consider DAHR to be a regular party. It behaves as one: it runs in elections, it is part of governing coalitions, it has a political program, and appoints people for offices at the national and local level.

Romanian ultranationalist organizations staged counter-manifestations, claiming that Hungarians, led by the DAHR, are acting to break away Transylvania and to re-unite it with Hungary. These slogans were fuelled by the nationalistic rhetoric of the new democratic government in Hungary, which immediately adopted a protective attitude towards Hungarian communities across its borders. Violent clashes between Romanian nationalists and Hungarian groups led by prominent DAHR leaders left behind numerous dead and wounded people. However, with the exception of the 10 days in which these clashes broke out, there has been no sign of other significant violence in any town or village with mixed population, even though the relations between Romanian and Hungarian communities and between their elites remained tense at that time. Drafting the new Constitution was another

challenging moment from the perspective of the inter-ethnic relations in Romania. In May 1990, the first free elections were held. The new Parliament had as its main goal the drafting of the new Constitution. The DAHR was the second party in Parliament, with over 7% of the seats, while over 70% were held by the NSF.44 In the context of the above mentioned violence and what was perceived as an aggressive attitude of the government of Hungary,45 the NSF, which gathered many former communists and ultranationalists, managed to introduce in the first article of the

44 See [http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/electer/ro_er_nl.htm], accessed at December 26th, 2006. 45 The first right-wing Hungarian government passed a Constitution in which the Hungarian state declares itself responsible for the faith of Hungarian communities living across the borders. Moreover, important politicians at that time asked for the annulment of the Trianon Treaty, signed after World War One, which led to massive territorial losses for Hungary, including Transylvania, parts of Vojvodina (in Serbia) and what is today Southern Slovakia.

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new Constitution provisions that were clearly aimed to deny any kind of autonomist or secessionist intention of the Hungarian minority,46 despite the opposition of the DAHR, which rejected the Constitution in Parliament and asked the Hungarian minority to vote against it in the referendum. The violent clashes from 1990 and the

drafting a “nationalist” constitution shaped the actions and strategy of the DAHR and were one of the reasons that sent Romania to the bottom of the list of potential members in Euro-Atlantic institutions. The evolution of the DAHR in domestic politics Between 1990 and 1992, Romania was

ruled by a NSF-led government, while between 1992 and 1996 the NSF formed a coalition with three nationalist parties: the Greater Romania Party (GRP), the Socialist Labor Party (SLP) and the Party of Romanian National Unity (PRNU). All these parties, especially the GRP and the PRNU, had strong ties with ultranationalist movements involved in the March 1990 violence in Transylvania (especially the “Romanian Cradle” – Vatra Romaneasca). These were single-issue parties,47 which frequently appealed to anti-Hungarian and anti-Roma slogans, calling the DAHR “an extremist organization” and accusing it of “genocide” against the Romanians in the regions where Hungarians are the majority. Consequently, the rhetoric of the NSF (renamed PDSR) also became anti-

46 The first article of the Romanian Constitution is “Romania is a nation state, sovereign and independent, unitary and indivisible”. The italics are not employed in the original text. 47 A single-issue party is a party that approaches one central subject in its political program, often representing the interests of one single group in the society. A good example in this respect is the Green parties.

Hungarian, in order to satisfy its allies, which ensured its support in Parliament. Meanwhile, the discourse of the DAHR was also perceived as extremist. The broad alliance of the opposition forces, called the Democratic Convention, rejected the inclusion of the DAHR candidates in 1995, because of the radical positions adopted by the Hungarian party.48 Despite the signing of the bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary in 1996, Romania was left out of the first group that joined NATO in 1997 and its chances of rapidly opening negotiations with the EU, as most of the other CEE countries had, were slim. The troubled relation of the Romanian state with the minorities living on its territory was one of the reasons frequently mentioned by these bodies. Moreover, Hungary now had the upper hand, with respect to Romania, in relation with both the EU and NATO and could easily point their attention to the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The turning point in the evolution of inter-

ethnic relations in Romania was 1996. The Democratic Convention won the elections, committing to a more vigorous effort towards joining the EU and NATO. As a sign of reformist intentions, the Convention and its social-democratic allies49 formed a government together with the DAHR, although they already had a majority in Parliament. This signal was very important for Romania’s Western ambitions. In July 1997, the US President Bill Clinton visited Bucharest, to re-assure Romania that NATO enlargement will go on, despite not including it in the first wave of new member states. Clinton gave a clear sign that the inclusion of the DAHR in the governing coalition was a wise move, calling 48 See See Janusz Bugajski, 2002. Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post-Communist era. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, p. 848. 49 It was an alliance formed by two smaller leftist parties, not the NSF (FDSN, PDSR, PSD).

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Romania “a model of minority accommodation in CEE”.50 In 1999, the EU opened their negotiations with Romania. This signified that Romania now fulfilled all the political criteria included established in 1993, including those related to minority protection. From 1996 the DAHR was permanently an

ally of the governing parties. The Democratic Convention lost the elections in 2000, in favour of PDSR.51 The discourse of this party with respect to the Hungarians had changed, together with adopting a more pro-European attitude. Because PDSR did not have majority on its own, it formed a parliamentary alliance with the DAHR; the Hungarian party opted to stay out of government. However, PDSR was opened to compromise with the DAHR, not only on issues related to minority protection, but also on regular pieces of legislation. After the 2000 elections, PDSR had the

option of forming a governing coalition with its old ally, the GRP. However, the context was very different from that of 1992-1996. Romania received a clear commitment from NATO that it would be in the next wave of enlargement. In 1999, the EU began negotiations with Romania, on the basis that all the afore-mentioned political criteria, including good inter-ethnic relations and satisfactory rights for minorities, had been fulfilled. Meanwhile, the president of the GRP had reached the second round of presidential elections in 2000, causing major concerns among Western states. Allying with the GRP would have been a disastrous step of the new social-democratic government, which had the difficult task of carrying-on the

50 Bill Clinton’s speech, given on July 11th, 1997, in the University Square in Bucharest. 51 The NSF broke into two – PD and FDSN. The latter then changed its name into PDSR and was again renamed PSD in 2001, following several mergers with smaller parties. Throughout the paper, NSF, FDSN, PDSR and PSD stand for the same party.

negotiations with the EU. An alliance with the DAHR was a much wiser move. In the 2000-2004 period there has been no significant complaint regarding the issue of minorities coming from Euro-Atlantic institutions. Moreover, Romania was invited to join NATO in 2002 and it was again referred to as an example for minority accommodation, relevant for a region facing the crisis in Kosovo and in Macedonia at that time. However, this alliance of former

Communists and Hungarian parties would not have been possible without a change in discourse from the DAHR as well. This party should be regarded as an umbrella for several Hungarian movements. From the beginning, it was meant to unite various political streams, both left and right, with the goal of representing the interests of the Hungarians both from the perspective of their particular ethnic background, as well as from an ideological perspective.52 The result was a formation that defines itself as a center-right party. But more important, it should also be regarded as a mix of radicals and moderates, with respect to the interests of the Hungarian minority. In the beginning of the transition period, the DAHR was dominated by radicals. One of its most prominent figures was bishop Tokes Laszlo, which was acting as honorary president of the party and had a radical approach, frequently calling for territorial and political autonomy for the regions where Hungarians were the majority.53

52 See Bugajski, Ethnic Politics…, p. 218. 53 Tokes was very popular in Romania, even within the Romanian majority, as he was the center of the outbreak of the 1989 Revolution. He lived in Timisoara and was placed under house arrest in the fall of 1989, for preaching against Ceausescu. Both Romanian and Hungarians came at his residence and shouted anti-Ceausescu slogans, which led to the mobilization of army troops on December 16th. That was the beginning of the Romanian revolution.

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This attitude served the interests of Romanian ultranationalists and was one of the arguments of those who supported the drafting of the first article of the Constitution in its mentioned form. A change in the discourse of the DAHR was noticed in 1993, when moderate Marko Bela became president of the party. Under his leadership, the calls for autonomy were toned down. Instead, the DAHR started to call for greater administrative decentralization, although self-determination on an ethnic basis, as a political objective, was not taken out of the political program. The DAHR’s new attitude made it possible for it to be considered as a potential partner for the Democratic Convention in 1996. The European dimension of the DAHR’s political actions The DAHR gained an important European

voice after its successful bid to become a member of the European People’s Party (EPP). It applied for membership in 1998 and it received the statute of Associate Member in 1999.54 In Bulgaria, the Turkish MRF joined the European Liberal party, while in Slovakia the Hungarian SMK is also a member of the EPP. The European dimension of the DAHR’s

political activity has been very significant. In its demands for greater rights, it constantly appealed to European bodies, such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE. In trying to convince the Romanian authorities of the need to grant further rights for minorities, the DAHR constantly appealed to “European norms and standards”, pointing out the different models of minority accommodation 54 See [http://www.epp.eu/memberdetail.php?partieID= 27&landID=31], accessed on December 27th, 2006. Associate Membership is the statute given to parties from countries outside the European Union. When Romania becomes member of the EU, the DAHR, as the other two Romanian parties affiliated to EPP, will automatically become full members.

across Western states. The most frequently used examples were the Southern Tyrol region in Italy, the Aaland Islands in Finland or the type of territorial decentralization employed in the UK. The DAHR was very active also within

the Council of Europe. Romania joined this organization in 1993. Since then, it is represented in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) by a delegation, consisting of members of the Romanian Parliament. The DAHR representatives, who currently lead the delegation, have been very active in drafting recommendations and conventions issued by the PACE, with respect to national minorities. Two examples stand out. In 1995, the Framework Convention for National Minorities was adopted, asking member states to give both individual and collective rights to national minorities.55 The DAHR representatives were active in drafting the Convention and then used it as an argument in Romanian domestic politics to ask for more rights. In the same time, the Convention and the DAHR involvement in drafting it fuelled anti-Hungarian feelings among the nationalist coalition that was leading Romania at that time.56

55 For instance, article 3, paragraph 2, says that “[p]ersons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in community with others”. See [http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/ Html/157.htm], accessed on December 28th, 2006. 56 To make the Convention, the government of a member state had to sign it and ratify it. Although numerous states in CEE had objections with respect to the provisions of the Convention, most European states signed and ratified the Convention, taking advantage of ambiguous expressions such as “where it is possible” or “where this is the case,” which left room for interpretation. However, France and Turkey did not sign and did not ratify the Convention, while Belgium and Greece signed it, but did not ratify it.

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The second example is a more recent one. On the 26th of January, 2006, the PACE adopted Recommendation 1735,57 which refers to the concept of “nation”. The text of the Recommendation was drafted by the sub-committees for Human Rights and National Minorities, under the supervision of Frunda Gyorgy, a DAHR senator and the current president of the Romanian delegation at the PACE. The Recommendation defines nations on ethnic basis and “invites” all member states to modify their constitutions to include clear references to minorities living on their territories. In this way, every state that defines itself as a “nation state,” like Romania, should remove this expression from its constitution. The adoption of the Recommendation sparked many protests in Romania from several parties, not only nationalistic ones, but also from the parties that are allied with the DAHR in the governing coalition. They accused Frunda Gyorgy of betrayal and asked him to resign from the PACE delegation. The Romanian Parliament has had on

their agenda for two years now a controversial law regarding the statute of national minorities. In 2006, the DAHR persuaded the government to include in the law project provisions, which granted the national minorities “cultural autonomy”.58 While the criticism was scarce at the time of the debates in government, in Parliament two of the governing parties disagreed regarding this measure. They argued that giving cultural

57 The recommendations issued by the PACE are not obligatory for member states, unless they are adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 58 “Cultural autonomy” is also requested by the MRF in Bulgaria and has been asked by the Hungarian parties when the Slovakian Constitution in 1992. This would mean, in essence, self-governing only on issues related to education or cultural activities in the language of minorities.

autonomy to minorities is against the Constitution, because the state would lose control over some aspects concerning the minorities and, implicitly, part of its sovereignty. The DAHR had a strong lobbying activity within the EPP, counting on the support of the right-wing nationalistic Hungarian party FIDESZ, which is also a member of this European party. In the context of the vivid debates in Romania, FIDESZ MEP Gyorgy Schopflin argued in the European Parliament that the Romanian authorities are willingly assimilating the ceangai population, which has a Hungarian ethnic background, bringing with him a short movie as evidence. Furthermore, in the country report on Romania issued by the European Parliament in the spring of 2006, the EPP MEP’s managed to impose an amendment urging Romania to take concrete action in order to protect and extend the rights of minorities, explicitly mentioning the need to grant them cultural autonomy. The DAHR immediately took advantage of this amendment to put pressure on the Romanian Parliament in the phase of final efforts to finish the necessary preparations for the EU accession in 2007. Conclusions on the first hypothesis The existence of ethnic parties and their

involvement in governing coalitions has had a positive influence. The evolution of the DAHR on the Romanian political stage can be divided in two periods: 1990-1996 (the “radical” years) and from the elections of 1996 onwards (the “moderate” years). The first period overlaps with Romania’s efforts to enter the Council of Europe, which was successful in 1993, and its efforts to join NATO, which failed. The second period coincides with Romania’s successful –

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although slower – bid to join the EU and with the successful admission into NATO. In the first period, Romania was ruled by nationalists, experienced inter-ethnic violence, while the DAHR was isolated, even by the opposition parties. In the second period, the relations between Hungarians and Romanians were considerably improved and the DAHR was part of all three government coalitions formed since then. The only tensed moment from the 1996 was witnessed in 2006, following the debates on the law regarding the statute of minorities, the demand of Hungarian professors in the mixed Transylvanian town of Cluj-Napoca to have a state university in Hungarian,59 the call for administrative autonomy of DAHR leader Marko Bela for territorial and administrative autonomy of the regions where Hungarians are the majority and the protests of Romanian parties over the DAHR’s involvement in the adoption of Recommendation 1735 by the PACE. This article does not show nor does it try

to prove the existence of causal relationships between the presence of the Hungarian ethnic party in government and the fulfilment of Romania’s strategic goals, set from the beginning of the 1990’s. Causality is hard to be assessed in the conditions of multiple endogenous and exogenous variables that

59 In Cluj-Napoca, before the Communist period, there was a Romanian University, “Victor Babeş”, and a Hungarian University, “Bolyai Janos”. The Communists merged the two universities, and the new university was named “Babeş-Bolyai” that exists today, with three lines of teaching: Romanian, Hungarian and German. A group of Hungarian professors within this university have asked for its division, according to the pre-communist models, while others have asked for the maintenance of the current arrangement, as a positive sign of a multi-cultural university, but also for the creation of a new state university for Hungarians. Both demands have been rejected by the government and by the heads of the Babes-Bolyai University.

can lead to an increased level of “Europeanization” in Romania: the democratic performances, the elites’ status, the solving of the simultaneity dilemma or the connections established at international level. However, it is obvious that there is association between the presence of the DAHR in governing coalitions and the “Europeanization” of Romania. This is not a coincidence. Western leaders, such as US President Bill Clinton, sent clear signals that the presence of the DAHR in government proves Romania’s commitment to reforms and minority protection. Moreover, the Euro-Atlantic institutions, whose membership Romania was aiming to attain – the EU and NATO – no longer used the issue of minorities to justify a reserved approach towards Romania’s bid for membership. Moreover, the presence of minorities in the decision-making process and the joint efforts of majority and minority populations toward EU accession provided a solid basis for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria with respect to minorities’ rights. Furthermore, a high degree of DAHR involvement in the government after 1996 coincides with the modification of the Hungarian government and officials’ positions towards Romania at the international level, declarations such as that of Tom Lantos (where he blamed Romania in 1996 for problems regarding minority rights being heard little -if any- afterwards). Therefore, our main hypothesis finds support in the Romanian case. Conclusions on the second hypothesis However, the influence of ethnic parties

was not always positive. This relates to our second hypothesis, concerning the European dimension of the DAHR’s political activity. The

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DAHR became active within European organizations following the accession of Romania in the Council of Europe in 1993, but became a more significant actor after its accession in the EPP, in 1999. Within the PACE, the DAHR representatives had a significant role in the drafting of Recommendation 1735 by the PACE.60 As a result, Romania was put on the spot by Western politicians, especially within the EPP, although the EU as a whole did not get involved in the debate. The DAHR was also very active in persuading EPP MEP’s to ask the Romanian authorities to grant cultural autonomy for Hungarians and other national minorities.61 Romania was often put on the spot within the EU and had to give explanations regarding the issue of their minorities, although it was caught in crucial negotiations which initially did not include this problem. This evidence supports our secondary hypothesis. The evidence brought in favour of the two

hypotheses shows that the role of ethnic parties in the transition process has been primarily a positive one, but also had negative consequences. During the “radical” years, the DAHR, rather than being a credible partner for discussion as a representative of the Hungarian community, contributed to the continuous inter-ethnic

60 The recommendations of the PACE regarding fields such as minority protection, the environment or human rights usually become minimal criteria to be fulfilled by candidate countries. 61 One should not overlook the importance of signals coming from the EPP. Leaving aside extremist parties across Europe, the most vocal opponents with respect to the admission of Romania and Bulgaria in the EU in 2007 came from within the EPP and the affiliated parties in member states. The German Christian-Democrats or the British Conservatives are the most prominent examples. Moreover, the EPP is currently forming the largest group in the European Parliament.

tensions that dominated the Romanian political life in the first years of the transition. The moderation of the DAHR’s discourse led to its being co-opted by the Romanian reformist governments, which hastened the Europeanization of Romania. However, moderation on the domestic political scene coincided with continuous efforts of the DAHR on the international scene to pressure the Romanian government, with the help of international organizations, to implement more pro-minority legislation. Further research Romania is one of the cases that can be

used to test this hypothesis. There are two other similar cases in CEE: Slovakia and Bulgaria. There is solid ground for conducting a comparative study in a “most similar systems design” on these three states. Both of them are former communist states. In Bulgaria, there is a wide Turkish minority, representing 9.4% of the population, concentrated in Western Bulgaria,62 while in Slovakia there is a Hungarian minority of 9.7%, concentrated in the South of the country, along the border with Hungary.63 They both faced difficult beginnings in

their transitions. Bulgaria faced political and economical instability, while in Slovakia the beginning of transition was dominated by the disputes that led to the separation of Czechoslovakia and started its evolution as an independent state only in 1993, under the rule of left-wing ultranationalist Vladimir Meciar. In comparison with what Vachudova and Hooge 62 These data is based on the 2002 census in Bulgaria. See [https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ bu.html#People], accessed at December 24th, 2006. 63 These data is based on the 2001 census in Slovakia. See [https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ lo.html#People], accessed on December 24th, 2006.

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call the “frontrunners” in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration – Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic64 – Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia have experienced in the beginning of their transitions a combination of challenges posed by the existence of minorities on their territories and political domination of nationalist and former communist parties. In both Bulgaria and Slovakia, minorities

formed their own political movements. In Bulgaria, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was formed in January 1990 and is representing the Turkish minority.65 In Slovakia, there have been four Hungarian parties forming after the fall of the communist regime: the Co-existence, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (HCDM), the Hungarian Civic Party (HCP) and the Hungarian People’s Party. They united into a one single movement in 1994, called the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia (SMK).66 As in Romania, the ethnic parties in

Bulgaria and Slovakia were not present in governing coalitions in the early years of transition. However, the presence of the SMK in the Slovakian government from 1998 to 2006 and the presence of the MRF in the Bulgarian government from 2001 to 2005 coincide with the most successful periods of

64 See Milada Anna Vachudova and Liesbet Hooge. “Post-Communist Politics in a Magnetic Field. How Transition and EU Accession Structure Party Competition on European Integration”. Vienna, May 2005. Available at [www.unc.edu/~hooghe/downloads/Vachudova%20+%20Hooghe%20Transition%20+%20Accession.pdf], accessed on December 26th, 2006. 65 Due to the fact that it failed to register a Party for Freedom and Rights, the MRF appealed also to other minorities, such as the Pomak population, to show that it is not just a Turkish party and, therefore, can participate in elections. See Bugajski, Ethnic Politics…, p. 250. 66 See Janusz Bugajski, 2002. Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post-Communist era. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 343-346.

these two states, with respect to their Europeanization. Such a comparative study, after taking into consideration other variables, could go as far as establishing if there is a causal link between the presence of ethnic parties in government and the speeding up of the Europeanization processes, by using the QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) methodology. One very important aspect that should not

be overlooked in future research is that the position of the “traditional” ethnic parties, such as the DAHR in Romania and the MRF in Bulgaria, is now challenged from within their own communities. New ethnic parties try to form in each state. This leads to a paradox. If the number of parties representing the minority increases, they could actually end up with no representation at all. The DAHR constantly scored around 7%, always gaining the votes of the Hungarian electorate. As the threshold for gaining seats in Parliament is 5%, a division within the minority could mean the absence of any Hungarian party in the legislative body and, consequently, in governing coalitions. Although the conclusions of this case-

study are particular, it provides two advantages. On the one hand, being the first to establish the relationship between Europeanization and ethnic parties, this article can be used as a documentation basis for further research. On the other hand, its scope can be broadened to other states in the new EU-27, especially to those who have joined recently. Besides Bulgaria, with explicit references within our text, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia are also relevant cases for analysis due to the existence of ethnic parties.

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