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M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.,

Risk Assessment Report- 1-

RISK ASSESSMENT 7.1 INTRODUCTION The pharmaceutical and bulk drug industries are generally associated with use of raw materials and chemicals which are hazardous in nature. The process activities of these industries are also associated with certain risks. Therefore Hazop analysis and risk assessment are addressed in detail as additional studies. Apart from the above studies air pollution dispersion modeling using US EPA approved AERMOD software has been used to predict the profile of dispersion and associated impacts within the project study area. 7.2 HAZOP ANALYSIS Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a highly structured and detailed technique, developed primarily for application to chemical process systems. A HAZOP can generate a comprehensive understanding of the possible ‘deviations from design intent’ that may occur. However, HAZOP is less suitable for identification of hazards not related to process operations, such as mechanical integrity failures, procedural errors, or external events. HAZOP also tends to identify hazards specific to the section being assessed, while hazards related to the interactions between different sections may not be identified. However, this technique helps to identify hazards in a process plant and the operability problems. It is performed once the engineering line diagrams of the plant are made available. It is carried out during or immediately after the design stage. The purpose of the study is to identify all possible deviations from the way the design/operation is expected to work and all the hazards associated with these deviations. A multidisciplinary team was constituted with chemical, mechanical and instrumentationengineers, R&D chemist and production manager. It is important to keep the team smallenough to be efficient, while retaining a sufficient spread of skills and disciplines for all aspects of the study to be covered comprehensively. The group discussion is facilitated by a Chairman and the results of the discussion are recorded by a Secretary. Every investigation must be led by Chairman who is familiar with the HAZOP study technique, which is primarily concerned with applying, controlling the discussions and stimulating team thinking. The preparative work for HAZOP studies consisted of four stages i.e., obtaining the data, converting into usable form, planning the sequence of the study and arranging the necessary meetings. The documents referred to for the study include process description, process flow diagrams, P&I diagrams plant layout, operating manuals including startup & shutdown, safety instructions etc., The parameters such as temperature, pressure, flow, level were investigated for deviation and hazard situations are identified.



Some basic definitions of terms frequently used in HAZOP studies are deviation, causes, consequences and guide words etc., Deviations are departures from the design intent which are discovered by systematically applying the guide words. Causes are the reasons why deviations might occur. Consequences are the reasons why deviations should they occur. Guide words are simple words used to understand a particular plant section in operating condition in order to guide and simulate the creative thinking process and so discover deviations. NO, less, more, as well as, part of, reverse, other than are guide words used. Potential problems as represented by the consequences of the deviation should be evaluated as they arise and a decision reached on whether they merit further consideration or action. Except for major risk areas where a fully quantitative assessment is required this decision is made semi-quantitatively on the consequence (usually scaled as trivial, important or very probable).

Detailed step-wise hazop analysis studies describing process, operation, possible hazard failure and remedial actions for each of the product manufactured is given in the table 7.1 as under.

Table 7.1 HAZOP ANALYSIS

Sl.No PRODUCTS

1 Bromazepam

2 Cinnarizine

3 Clonazepam

4 Dothiepine Hydrochloride

5 Doxepin Hydrochloride

6 Flunarizine

7 Nitrazepam



7.2.1 Bromazepam

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Bromazepam product

1st

Stages Process Operation

Possible Hazards / failures

Remedial Action

Step -1

Dissolution of Ammonia in solvent Methanol in SS reactor

Preparation of ammonia solution

Bottom valve opened

Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed prior to charging Methanol.

a) Charging of Methanol

Fire hazard due to static electricity

Methanol addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided, vacuum sucking with negative pressure is done to avoid spillages. Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof.

b) Purging of Ammonia

Ammonia escape Ammonia is slowly passed with cooling and checking the scrubber vent periodically for ammonia escape. Ph paper test. Ensured No Ammonia should escape.

Step-2 Reaction of bromo chloro compound in SS Reactor

Reaction

a) charging of bromo chloro benzophenone

Irritant to eyes & skin

SS scoop is used to prevent static electricity while charging the solid. Hand gloves & goggles should be used.

b) Heating the reaction mass

Escape of solvent Ammonia escape

The temperature is raised by slow heating till Required temperature is achieved; good condenser to prevent solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser. In case of overheating and pressure development rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up and the mass will come out of the reactor and will be separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L which is kept outside the plant.



Centrifuging to remove the Byproduct. Separation of solid and liquid.

c) To remove the by-product amm. chloride

Fire hazard due to static electricity, operator hazard if any loading / unloading activity carried out in a running centrifuge

The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge, Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 36 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls. Collect the mother liquor for isolating the product. This is sucked back to the SS reactor for recovery & isolation.

Isolation of Bromazepam

d) Distillation of Methanol from the filtrate of the reaction mass

No specific hazard

Slow heating by passing steam in the jacket & Chilled water is circulated in the condenser.



Recover ~200L methanol ,cool to <15*C.

Centrifuging to isolate the product. Separation of solid and liquid.

To isolate the product Bromazepam


The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge; Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. This is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls The MLR is taken for solvent recovery.

Recovery Solvent recovery (MLR)in SS reactor

Charging of MLR Haz. waste after distillation

No specific hazard All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid spillages and through the SS pipe lines.



Distilled to recover Methanol. Un distilled which is remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz Waste.

Drying operation Separation of solvents from the product

Drying of the product in FBD

No specific hazard Irritant to eyes & skin

FBD is fitted with flame proof motors.SS scoops are employed while charging and unloading. Hand gloves & goggles should be used.



SAFETY DATA

Name of the product 1) Bromo chloro acetylaminoBenzophenone.

2) Methanol (RM)

Chemical name 5-bromo 2-chloroacetylamino phenyl pyridine ketone

Methyl alcohol

CAS NO: 67-56-1

MW: 353.0 32.0

Physical appearance Yellowish coloured solid Colorless liquid

Odour Pungent, hygroscopic acidic like Characteristic

Melting point 135-140* C --

Boiling point --- 65*C

Health hazards Irreversible effects if swallowed.

Danger of very serious effect on eye& harmful if absorbed through the skin. Slow absorption.

Very serious effect on inhalation.

Irreversible effects if swallowed.



First aid measure Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.

Induce vomiting & make him drink ethanol.

Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Get medical aid.

Ingestion: Get medical aid.

Inhalation: Remove fromexposure and move to fresh air immediately mouth to mouth respiration if required.

Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.

Induce vomiting & make him drink ethanol .



Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to fresh air immediately mouth to mouth respiration if required.

Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing apparatus. Do not use water spray directly on the fire. Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.

As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing apparatus. Do not use water spray directly on the fire. Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.

Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store, as per Rules ,away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store, as per Rules ,away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Hazards Highly flammable, flashpoint 11*C.Electrostatic charge possible.

Highly flammable, flashpoint 11*Celectrostatic charge possible.

Incompatibility Avoid contact with water, ammonia, alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents et.

Avoid contact with water, ammonia, alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents etc.

Hazardous decomposition product

Hazardous decomposition products in the event of fire.


Carcinogenetic Not reported in OSHA Disposal Not reported in OSHA Disposal

Disposal Dispose in a manner according to State and Federal laws

Dispose in a manner according to State and Federal laws



Name of the product 3) Ammmonia 4) Bromazepam( FG)

Chemical name Gas liquefied under pressure. 1,3-Dihydro-7-bromo-5-(pyridine2-yl) 2h-1,4-Benzodiazepin-2-One

CAS NO: 7664-41-7 1812-30-2

MW: 17.0 316.

Physical appearance Liquid, colorless Yellow, crystalline powder

Odour Pungent Odourless

Melting point -77.7*C : about – 2370 C.

Boiling point -33.5* C ---

Health hazards Will cause eye burns. Risk of blindness.

Harmful if swallowed. May be harmful if absorbed through the skin; cause skin irritations.

May cedemass in the respiratory tract.

Harmful if swallowed.

May cause eye irritation.

May be harmful if absorbed through the skin

May cause respiratory tract irritation. Effects central nervous system.

First aid measure Eyes: rinse with plenty of water for at least 10 min& get medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.

If swallowed drink lot of water & induce vomiting. Call doctor.

Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Dab with PEG 400 remove contaminated clothing.

Inhalation: Remove fromexposure and move to fresh air immediately. Calldoctor

Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of water. Get medical help



Inhalation: remove from exposure &move to fresh air immediately

Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing apparatus. Not combustible. Do not use water. Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.

As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing apparatus. Use water spray, dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.

Storage Store in a dry cool place, protected from light in tightly closed containers.

Store in a dry cool place, protected from light in tightly closed containers.

Hazards Not reported. Stable

Incompatibility Incompatible with various metals.

Avoid strong oxidizing agents etc.


Nitrogen oxides generate. In event of fire . Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, Nitrogen oxide

Carcinogenetic Not reported . Not reported





7.2.2 Cinnarizine

Hazop Analysis - Process – for CINNARIZINE product

1st Stages Process Operation Possible Hazards / failures

Remedial Action

Step -1

Reaction of Benzhydryl piperizine& Cinnamyl alcohol acid in solvent Toluene in SS reactor

Charging of Benzhydrylpiperizine Cinnamyl alcohol& Toluene

Bottom valve opened

Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed prior to charging Toluene.

a) Charging of Toluene


Toluene addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages. Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof .

b) Charging of Benzhydrylpiperizine

Irritation to skin. SS scoops are used to avoid static electricity. Using hand gloves & goggles.

Charging of Cinnamyl alcohol

Irritation to skin. Vacuum sucking into the DOSING TANK The tank is earthed by conducting wires Using hand gloves & goggles

d) Refluxing the reaction mass

Escape of solvent

The temperature is raised by slow heating till Reflux; good condenser to prevent solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser. The water is co distills along with Toluene which is separated during the reaction. After complete removal of water, the reaction is complete. In case of overheating and pressure development rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up and the mass will come out of the reactor and will be separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L which is kept outside the plant.



e) cooling the reaction mass

No specific hazard Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

2) Isolation of product.


To isolate the product Cinnarizine


The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge, Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls The MLR is taken for solvent recovery. The wet product is sent for drying.



No specific hazard

All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid spillages and through the SS pipe lines. Distilled to recover Toluene. Un distilled which is remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz Waste.

Drying operation

Separation of solvents from the product


No specific hazard FBD is fitted with flame proof motors. SS scoops are employed while charging and unloading. Hand gloves & goggles should be used.



SAFETY DATA

Name of the product 1) Benzhydryl piperizine 2) Toluene

Chemical name 1 diphenyl-piperizine Toluene

CAS NO: 108-88-3

MW: 252 92.0

Physical appearance Pale yellow coloured solid Colorless liquid

Odour Amine like Aromatic pungent smell.

Melting point 72-76*C*C -

Boiling point -- 111*C

Health hazards Harmful if swallowed. Effects central nervous system

May cause eye irritation. May cause corneal damage.


May cause respiratory tract irritation. On inhalation.


Vapors cause eye irritation.


May cause respiratory irritation& arrest on inhalation.

First aid measure Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of water. Get medical help



Inhalation: remove from exposure &move to fresh air immediately.


Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Remove contaminated cloth. Get medical aid.



Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing apparatus. Use water spray, dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.

As in any fir, use a self-contained breathing apparatus. Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam. DONOT USE WATER.


Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store. as per Rules, away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Hazards Stable. Flammable , flash point 4* C

Incompatibility Avoid strong oxidizing agents. Avoid strong oxidizing agents.


Hazardous decomposition products. Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, oxides of nitrogen.

Hazardous combustion gases &vapors in the event of fire.

Carcinogeneticity Not classified as a human carcinogen.. Not reported in OSHA

Disposal Dispose in a manner according to state & federal laws.

Dispose in a manner according to state & federal laws.



Name of the product 3) Cinnamylalcohol 4) Cinnarizine

Chemical name 3-phenyl 2-propene-1-ol 1-diphenyl 4-cinamyl pyperizine

CAS NO: 104-54-1 298-57-7

MW: 134.0 368.0

Physical appearance Colorless liquid. White powder

Odour Mint fragrant. Odorless

Melting point 30-33*C 1180 C To 1200 C

Boiling point 250*C --

Health hazards Harmful if swallowed.

Vapors irritate eyes

Dryness of skin

Causes irritation to respiratory tract, causes headache & dizziness


Serious to eye.


May cause respiratory irritation on inhalation

First aid measure Eyes: rinse with plenty of water. Get medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.

Drink lot of water.No milk risk of aspiration on swallowing.Get medical aid.

Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Remove contaminated cloth

Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to fresh air immediately. Give mouth to mouth respiration if required.


Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Remove contaminated cloth. Get medical aid.

Ingestion: wash out mouth with lot

of water. .Get medical aid.

Inhalation: remove from exposure &move to fresh air immediately. Give artificial respiration


Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam. As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing apparatus

Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid, store as per Rules,away from naked flame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Store in a dry cool place, protected from light in tightly closed containers

Hazards Highly flammable, flashpoint low, electrostatic charge possible.

Not reported

Incompatibility Avoid contact with water, ammonia, alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents etc.





Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA disposal Not reported in OSHA disposal





7.2.3 Clonazepam

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Clonazepam product

1st Stages Process Operation Possible Hazards / failures Remedial Action

Step -1 Dissolution of Ammonia in solvent Methanol in SS reactor


Bottom valve opened Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed prior to charging Methanol



Methanol addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages. Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof.


Ammonia escape

Ammonia is slowly passed with cooling and checking the scrubber vent periodically for ammonia escape. Ph paper test. No Ammonia should escape.

Step-2 Reaction of nitro dichloro compound in SS Reactor

Reaction

a) charging of nitro dichloro benzophenone

Irritant to eyes & skin SS scoop is used to prevent static electricity while charging the solid. Hand gloves & goggles should be used.

b) Heating the reaction mass Escape of solvent Ammonia escape





c) To remove the by product amm. chloride



Isolation of clonazepam


No specific hazard

Slow heating by passing steam in the jacket & Chilled water is circulated in the condenser. Recover ~200L methanol ,cool to <15*C.




To isolate the product Clonazepam.


The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge; Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls The MLR is taken for solvent recovery.



No specific hazard

All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid spillages and through the SS pipe lines. Distilled to recover Methanol. Un distilled which is remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz. Waste.




FBD is fitted with flame proof motors. SS scoops are employed while charging and unloading. Hand gloves & goggles should be used



SAFTY DATA

Name of the product 1) 2’Chloro,5-Nitro 2-chloro acetylaminoBenzophenone.(nitro dicloro benzophenone)

2) Methanol (RM)

Chemical name 2’chloro, 5-nitro 2chloroacetylamino benzophenone.

Methyl alcohol

CAS NO: 67-56-1

MW: 353.0 32.0

Physical appearance Yellow coloured solid Colorless liquid

Odour Pungent hygroscopic acidic Characteristic

Melting point 176-186*C --

Boiling point --- 65*C


Danger of very serious effect on eye & harmful if absorbed through the skin. Slow absorption.



Danger of very serious effect on eye.& harmful if absorbed through the skin. slow absorption.

very serious effect on inhalation.





Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to fresh air immediately, give mouth to mouth respiration if required.

Eyes: rinse out with plenty of water. Get medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.




Inhalation: Remove fromexposure and move to fresh air immediately; give mouth to mouth respiration if required.



Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules,away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules,away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.


Highly flammable, flashpoint 11*C.Electrostatic charge possible.






Carcinogenetic Not reported in OSHAdisposal Not reported in OSHA disposal





Name of the product 3) Ammmonia 4) Clonazepam(FG)

Chemical name Gas liquefied under pressure. 1,3-Dihydro-7-nitro-5-(o- chlorophenyl)-2h-1,4-Benzodiazepin-2-One

CAS NO: 7664-41-7 1622-61-3

MW: 17.0 : 315.72.

Physical appearance Liquid, colorless Yellow, crystalline powder. Odorless

Odour Pungent Odourless

Melting point -77.7*C : about – 2400 C.

Boiling point -33.5* C ---


Harmful if swallowed. May be harmful if absorbed through the skin, cause skin irritations.





May cause respiratory tract irritation. Effects central nervous system.

First aid measure Eyes: rinse with plenty of water for at least 10 min& get medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.



Inhalation: Remove fromexposure and move to fresh air immediately. Call doctor










Incompatibility Incompatible with various metals. Avoid strong oxidizing agents etc.


Nitrogen oxides generate. In event of fire. Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, Nitrogen oxide

Carcinogenetic Not reported. Not reported





7.2.4 Dothiepine hydrochloride

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Dothiepine hydrochloride product 1st

Stages Process Operation

Possible Hazards / failures

Remedial Action

Step -1 Dissolution of HCL as in solvent acetone in GL reactor

Charging of Acetone Bottom valve opened Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed prior to charging Acetone.

a) Charging of Acetone


Acetone addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages. Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof .

b) Purging of HCL gas.


The gas is passed through the gas trap containing sulphuric acid and empty trap to prevent back suck. The dry gas coming out from the trap is connected to the dip pipe of the GL Reactor which is dipped in the solvent. The gas is passed till required sp. gravity and assay is achieved. The outlet of the reactor is connected to the scrubber where alkali is circulated. Using hand gloves & goggles.

Step-2 Reaction of dothepine base with acetone- HCL in GL Reactor

a) Charging of dissolved base


Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the required pH has been achieved. Using hand gloves & goggles

c) Heating the reaction mass

Escape of solvent & Hcl

The temperature is raised by slow heating till Required temperature is achieved; good condenser to prevent solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser. The acidic fumes are scrubbed in alkali scrubber. In case of overheating and pressure development rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up and the mass will come out of the reactor and will be separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L which is kept outside the plant.



d) cooling the reaction mass



To isolate the product Dothepine hydrochloride.


The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge, Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls The MLR is taken for solvent recovery.



No specific hazard

All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid spillages and through the SS pipe lines. Distilled to recover Acetone. Un distilled which is remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz Waste.



No specific hazard, irritant to eyes & skin

FBD is fitted with flame proof motors. Hand gloves & goggles should be used



SAFETY DATA

Name of the product 1) Dothiepine base 2) Acetone

Chemical name 3-Dibenzo [b,e]thiepin-11(6H)-ylidene-N,N-dimethyl-1-propanamine

Dimethyl ketone

CAS NO: 67-64-1

MW: 295.0 58.0

Physical appearance Pale yellow colored viscous liquid Colorless liquid.

Odour Amine like Mint fragrant.

Melting point -- --

Boiling point ~200*C at 0.5mm 57*C



May be harmful if absorbed through the skin.

May cause respiratory tract irritation.


Vapors irritate eyes

Dryness of skin







Drink lot of water .No milk risk of aspiration on swallowing.Get medical aid.


Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to fresh air immediately, give mouth to mouth respiration if required.

Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-containedbreathing apparatus. Use water spray, dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.



Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules,away from naked flame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Hazards Stable flash point notavailable. Highly flammable, flashpoint low.Electrostatic charge possible.

Incompatibility Avoid acids bases & strong oxidizing agents. Avoid contact with water, ammonia, alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents etc.




Carcinogenetic Not classified as a human carcinogen. Not reported in OSHA disposal





Name of the product 3)HCl GAS 4)Dothiepine HCL(FG)

Chemical name Hydrogen chloride 3-Dibenzo [b,e]thiepin-11(6H)-ylidene-N,N-dimethyl-1-propanamine hydrocloride

CAS NO: 7647-01-0 897-15-4

MW: 36.5 331.91

Physical appearance Colorless liquid,fuming with acid White crystalline solid.

Odour Characteristic Pungent , acidic

Melting point -- : 218-221°

Boiling point ----







May cause respiratory tract irritation

Effects CNS.





Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to fresh air immediately mouth to mouth respiration if required.







Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules,away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Store in a dry cool place, protected from light in tightly closed containers.


Stable.


Avoid strong bases & oxidizing agents etc.



Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, oxides of nitrogen.

Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA. Disposal Not reported





7.2.5 Doxepin hydrochloride

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Doxepin hydrochloride product


Remedial Action

Step -1 Dissolution of HCL as in solvent acetone in GL reactor

Charging of Acetone Bottom valve opened Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed prior to charging Acetone

a) Charging of Acetone


Acetone addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages. Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof .




Step-2 Reaction of Doxepin base with acetone- HCL in GL Reactor



Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the required pH has been achieved. Using hand gloves & goggles


Escape of solvent & HCl

The temperature is raised by slow heating till Required temperature is achieved; good condenser to prevent solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser. The acidic fumes are scrubbed in alkali scrubber. In case of overheating and pressure development rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up and the mass will come out of the reactor and will be separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L which is kept outside the plant.






To isolate the product Doxepin hydrochloride.


The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge; Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls The MLR is taken for solvent recovery.


Charging of MLR Haz waste after distillation

No specific hazard








SAFETY DATA

Name of the product 1) Doxepin base 2) Acetone

Chemical name 1-propylamine-3-dibenz(be)oxepine-11(6H)ylidine-NN-dimethyl base

Dimethyl ketone

CAS NO: 67-64-1

MW: 279.0 58.0



Melting point -- --

Boiling point 180-190*C at 0.5mm 57*C






Vapours irritate eyes

Dryness of skin







Drink lot of water .No milk risk of aspiration on swallowing.get medical aid.


Inhalation: Remove from

exposure and and move to

fresh air immediately mouth to mouth respiration if required.




Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store. as per Rules ,away from naked flame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Hazards Stable flash point notavailable. Highly flammable, flashpoint low.electrostatic charge possible.







Carcinogenetic Not classified as a human carcinogen.. Not reported in OSHA. Disposal



Name of the product 3) HCL ( gas) Doxepin hydrochloride (FG)

Chemical name Hydrogen chloride 1-propylamine-3-dibenz(be)oxepine-11(6H)ylidine-NN-dimethyl hydrocloride

CAS NO: 7647-01-0 [1229-29-4]

MW: 36.5 315.8

Physical appearance Colorless liquid,fuming with acid White crystalline Solid.

Odour Characteristic Pungent acidic

Melting point -- Above 185-191 0 C

Boiling point 65*C -----








Effects CNS. First aid measure Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get

medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.

Induce vomiting & make him drink ethanol .



Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to fresh air immediately; give mouth to mouth respiration if required.







Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules, away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Store in a dry cool place, protected from light in tightly closed containers with good


Stable


Avoid base,strong oxidizing agents etc.




Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA Disposal Not reported





7.2.6 Flunarizine

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Flunarizine hydrochloride product


Remedial Action

Step -1 Dissolution of HCL as in solvent acetone in GLreactor

Charging of Acetone Bottom valve opened Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed prior to charging Acetone.

a) Charging of Acetone Fire hazard due to static electricity

Toluene addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages. Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof.




Step-2 Reaction of flunarizine base with acetone- HCL in GLReactor


Irritant to eyes & skin Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the required pH has been achieved. Using hand gloves & goggles


Escape of solvent & HCl

The temperature is raised by slow heating till required temperature is achieved; good condenser to prevent solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser. The acidic fumes are scrubbed in alkali scrubber. In case of overheating and pressure development rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up and the mass will come out of the reactor and will be separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L which is kept outside the plant.






To isolate the product Flunarizine Dihydrochloride.


The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge, Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls The MLR is taken for solvent recovery.


Charging of MLR Haz waste after distillation

No specific hazard








SAFETY DATA

Name of the product 1) Flunarizine base 2) Acetone

Chemical name 1-bis fluorophenyl methyl 4-cinamyl piperizine

Dimethyl ketone

CAS NO: 67-64-1

MW: 404 58.0



Melting point -- --

Boiling point ~200*C at 0.5mm 57*C






Vapours irritate eyes

Dryness of skin







Drink lot of water.No milk risk of aspiration on swallowing.Get medical aid.






Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store. as per Rules ,away from naked flame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Hazards Stable flash point notavailable. Highly flammable, flashpoint low.Electrostatic charge possible.





Carcinogenetic Not classified as a human carcinogen. Not reported in OSHA disposal





Name of the product 3) HCL ( gas) 4)Flunarizine HCL(FG)

Chemical name Hydrogen chloride 1-bis fluorophenyl methyl 4-cinamyl piperizine di hydochloride

CAS NO: 7647-01-0 30484-77-6

MW: 36.5 477.0

Physical appearance Colorless liquid,fuming with acid White colored solid

Odour Characteristic Pungent acidic, hygroscopic

Melting point -- ~208*C with decomposition

Boiling point 65*C -----







May cause respiratory tract irritation

Effects CNS.












Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules,away from naked flame & hot elements and ignition sources.



Stable.


Avoid strong bases & oxidizing agents etc.




Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA Disposal Not reported





7.2.7 Nitrazepam

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Nitrazepam product


Remedial Action

Step -1 Dissolution of Ammonia in solvent Methanol in SS reactor


Bottom valve opened

Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed prior to charging Methanol.



Methanol addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages. Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof.


Ammonia escape

Ammonia is slowly passed with cooling and checking the scrubber vent periodically for ammonia escape. Ph paper test. No Ammonia should escape.

Step-2 Reaction of nitro chloro compound in SS Reactor

Reaction

a) charging of nitro chloro benzophenone

Irritant to eyes & skin SS scoop is used to prevent static electricity while charging the solid. Hand gloves & goggles should be used.

b) Heating the reaction mass

Escape of solvent Ammonia escape





c) To remove the by product amm.chloride



Isolation of nitrazepam


No specific hazard

Slow heating by passing steam in the jacket & Chilled water is circulated in the condenser. Recover ~250L methanol (50%),cool to <15*C.




To isolate the product Nitrazepam.


The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires. The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge; Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this is a four point suspension machines which are put on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a variable frequency drive and the feeding of the centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking system is provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the limits switches and the safety interlocking switches are flame proof including the VFD controls The MLR is taken for solvent recovery.



No specific hazard

All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid spillages and through the SS pipe lines. Distilled to recover Methanol. Un distilled which is remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz Waste.




FBD is fitted with flame proof motors.SS scoops are employed while charging and unloading. Hand gloves & goggles should be used



SAFETY DATA

Name of the product 1) Nitro chloro acetylamino Benzophenone.

2) Methanol (RM)

Chemical name 5-Nitro-2-chloroacetylamino benzophenone Methyl alcohol

CAS NO: 67-56-1

MW: 318.0 32.0

Physical appearance Yellow colored amorphous powder Colorless liquid

Odour Pungent hygroscopic, strong acidic. Characteristic

Melting point 170-172*C --

Boiling point ---- 65*C
















Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to Fresh air immediately; give mouth to mouth respiration if required.



Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules,away from naked flame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid store as per Rules ,away from naked fame & hot elements and ignition sources.


Highly flammable, flashpoint 11*C.Electrostatic charge possible.






Carcinogenetic Not reported in OSHA. Disposal Not reported in OSHA. Disposal





Name of the product 3) AMMMONIA 4) Nitrazepam(FG)

Chemical name Gas liquefied under pressure. * 1,3-Dihydro-7-Nitro-5-Phenyl-2h-1,4-Benzodiazepin-2-One

CAS NO: 7664-41-7 146-22-5

MW: 17.0 281.3

Physical appearance Liquid, colorless Yellow crystalline powder, odourless

Odour Pungent odourless

Melting point -77.7*C 2240 C – 2260 C.

Boiling point -33.5* C


Harmful if swallowed. May be harmful if absorbed through the skin cause skin irritations.





May cause respiratory tract irritation. And effect Central nervous system

First aid measure Eyes: rinse with plenty of water for at least 10 mts & Get medical help immediately. Do not allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed.



Inhalation: Remove from exposure and move to fresh air immediately. Calldoctor






As in any fir, use a self-contained breathing apparatus. Use water spray, dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.


Store in a dry cool place, protected from light in tightly closed containers with good


Incompatibility Incompatible with various metals.

Avoid strong oxidizing agents et.


Nitrogen oxides generate. In event of fire. Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, Nitrogen oxide

Carcinogenetic Not reported. Not reported





7.3 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF HYDROGEN GAS AND CARBON The following are the safety precautions adopted while handling hydrogen gas &carbon 1. It is ensured that all the equipments have earthing and bondings. 2. It is ensured that the mechanical seal pressure is +2.0 kg/cm2 with operating pressure. 3. Care is taken to see that there are no leackages in the mechanical seal. 4. Cleanliness of autoclave reactor and it is surroundings is maintained. 5. Before charging pressure test of autoclave is taken; only if it is ok proceed further otherwise leak

should be rectified. 6. Hydrogen lines and availability of required cylinders near header is ensured. 7. All the cylinders are tied with chain and it is ensured that there are no leackages in the manifold. 8. All the gauges are calibrated. 9. Presence of water in autoclave vent receiver is ensured. 10. Availability of suitable rupture disc & its connection to the dump vessel is ensured. 11. Use the necessary PPE’s before batch charging i.e., 3M cartridge mask, safety goggles, safety helmets,

safety shoes & safety gloves. 12. Availability of fire fighting equipments nearby is ensured. 13. ERT (Emergency Response Team) is available in case of emergency. 14. Hydrogen Gas detector is on. 15. 50% Pd/C making slurry with suitable solvent under nitrogen blanketing with proper earthing by

holding the vacuum into the receiver. 16. Vacuum is released with nitrogen pressure only through vent line. 17. Hydrogen gas 0.2 kg/cm2 is slowly applied and flushed out. The process is repeated once again. 18. Hydrogen gas 4.0-4.5 kg/cm2 is slowly applied and pressure is maintained as per BPR. 19. All necessary PPE’s i.e., 3M cartridge mask, safety goggles, safety helmets, safety shoes & safety gloves

are used during filtration. 20. Nitrogen blanketing in the nutch filter is added and slowly filtration into the nutch filter is started. 21. Main filtration is completed and the spent Carbon cake is washed with suitable solvent under nitrogen

blanketing until absence of the product. 22. Water and HCl are charged into the reactor for decomposing of left over traces of spent Carbon; the

mass is unloaded and transferred to EHS department for further disposal. 23. Wet spent Carbon is unloaded from Nutsche filter and packed under nitrogen blanketing & transferred

to WH for recovery.



7.4 RISK ASSESSMENT 7.4.1 BACKGROUND The manufacture of fine chemicals by M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd., involves use and storage of certain solvents which may cause hazards/risks in case of accidental spill/leakage. Also the operation of DGs, boilers& thermic fluid heater requires the use and storage of diesel and fuel oil which can be a source of hazard in case of accidental spill/leakage.Therefore a methodology has to be developed for identifying and evaluating the potential risks and preparation of intervention plans to reduce and prevent the associated risks. Identification analysis and assessment of hazards and risks provide vital information to the risk management, that what should be the type & capacity of any on-site and off-site emergency plan & what type of safety measures and maintenance is required. Risk and consequence analysis is carried out considering storage and handling of various hazardousraw materials, intermediates and product as well as manufacturing process. The above factors have necessitated preparation of risk assessment report for M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd., 7.4.2 INTRODUCTION This chapter presents the risk assessment study results for the plant operations, transportand storage of raw materials, and identifies maximum credible accident scenarios to drawthe emergency management plan addressing various credible scenarios identified. Environmental risk analysis deals with the identification and quantification of risks the equipment and personnel are exposed to, from the hazards present in the area. Risk analysis follows hazard analysis (Risk = Hazard x Probability of occurrence). It involves identification and assessment of risks to the plant personnel and neighboring populations. This requires a thorough knowledge of failure probability, credible accident scenario, vulnerability of population etc. Much of this information is difficult to procure. Consequently, the risk analysis is confined to maximum credible accident studies. The subsequent sections shall address the identification of various hazards and risks in the operations, which will give a broad identification of risks involved. 7.4.3 OBJECTIVE & SCOPE The objective of the study is to carry out risk analysis and prepare disaster management plan/emergency preparedness plans

The risk analysis/assessment study covers the following:

(a) Identification of potential hazards associated with the solvent storage and their usage. (b) Identification of potential hazard due fuel storage. (c) Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and impact zones from the

accident scenarios. (d) Suggestions and recommendations on the minimization of the accident possibilities.



7.4.4 METHODOLOGY Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a means of making a systematic analysis of the risks from

hazardous activities, and forming a rational evaluation of their significance, in order to provide input to

a decision-making process. The term ‘quantitative risk analysis’ is widely used, but strictly this refers to

the purely numerical analysis of risks without any evaluation of their significance. The study has been

conducted based on the premises of a traditional Quantitative Risk Assessment. The key components of

a QRA are explained and illustrated in Figure 7.1 below.

Fig 7.1 METHODOLOGY



The purpose of Risk Assessment is to develop mitigation measures for unacceptable generators of risk,

as well as to reduce the overall level of risk to As Low as Reasonably Practical. The alarp principle is given

in the fig 7.2 below.

FIG 7.2 ALARP PRINCIPLE

In order to help assess the viability of Risk Reduction Measures (RRM), the economic costs of the

measures can be compared with their risk benefits using Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).

7.4.5 STORAGE AND HANDLING OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

The details of storage of Hazardous chemicals along with measures taken during storage are given in

Table 7.2 and properties of chemicals is detailed in the table 7.3.



Table 7.2 STORAGE DETAILS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Sr. No.

Name of the Maximum Mode of Actual State & Possible type

Hazardous Substance Storage Storage Storage Operating

of Hazards pressure & temperature

1

THF 20000 Drums 20000 RT ATMP

Flammable liquid Industrial solvent

2 ACETONE 15KL TANK/DR

UMS 15KL RT ATMP


3 TOLUENE 15KL TANK 15KL RT ATMP


4 METHANOL 15KL TANK 25KL RT

ATMP Flammable liquid Industrial solvent

5 HYDROGEN 10 Cylinders 5 RT 150kg Fire/Explosion

6 IPA 20KL Drums 20KL

RT ATMP


7 Hydrochloric Acid 1000kg TANK 1000Kg RT Corrosive

8 Sodium Methoxide 1000 Kg Poly bags 1000 Kg RT Corrosive, Water

reactive

9 DMF 3000Kg DRUMS 3000Kg RT Flammable liquid

Industrial solvent

10 Chloro acetyl chloride 316 Carboys 316 RT Corrosive, Water

reactive

11 Sodamide 312 Bags 312 RT Corrosive, Water

reactive

12 N-Butanol 34000 Drums 34000 RT Flammable liquid

Industrial solvent

13 Cyclohexanone 1800Kg Drums 1800Kg. RT Flammable liquid

Corrosive

14 Chlorobenzene 560 Drums 560 RT Flammable liquid

Industrial solvent



TABLE 7.3 PROPERTIES OF CHEMICALS

SR. NAME OF THE

RAW HAZARD

FP

BP °C

SP.GR. VD

SOLUBILITY VP TLV

LEL% UEL%

LD50 ORAL

LD50

LC 50 mg/L

°C 20° C

WITH WATER mm Hg

DERMAL

NO. MATERIALS VS air

ppm

mg/kg at 20°C 20C mg/kg

1. Isopropyl alcohol Flammable 11.6 82.5 0.78 2.07 Miscible 4.4kpa 400 2.5 12 5045 12800 ---

2. Ethyl acetate Flammable 24F 77 0.89 3.04 Miscible 100 400 2.2 11 5620 16000

3. Hydrochloric acid Corrosive NA 108 1.6 1.267 Soluble 3.8kpa 5 NA NA 900 NA 4701

4. THF Flammable -14.5

65 0.88 2.5 Partly 19.3kpa

590 2 11 1650 NA 24000

5. Toluene Flammable 4.44 110 0.86 3.1 Immiscible 3.8kpa 1.1 7.1 636 14100 440

6. Butanol Flammable 28.9 117.2 0.81 2.55 Immiscible 0.6kpa 50 1.4 11.2 790 3400 8000

7. Methanol Flammable 12 64.5 0.79 1.11 Miscible 12.3kpa

6 36 5628 15800 64000

8. Sodium Methoxide Corr./ Wat.R

NA NA NA NA Decompose NA 3 7.3 36 2037 NA NA

9. Hydrogen Explosive Gas Gas 0.07 0.07 Immiscible Gas NA 4 75 NA NA NA

10 Sodamide Flammable Solid

NA NA NA Reacts Solid DNA NA NA DNA DNA DNA



7.4.6 FACILITIES / SYSTEM FOR PROCESS SAFETY, STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM AND EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES TO BE ADOPTED 1. Process Safety: Flameproof equipment’s and fittings will be provided for handling of hazardous chemicals.

Tanks and all pump motors will be earthed.

Road tanker earthing lines will be provided near the unloading pumps.

Independent dykes will be provided for hazardous chemicals storage to contain leakages. Floors of the

dyke area have impervious finish.

Housekeeping of the plant will be carried out regularly. Floors, platforms, staircases, passages will be kept

free of any obstruction.

All hazardous operations will be explained to the workers. They are periodically trained on the hazardous

processes.

Dedicated supply of firewater will available in the plant. Only authorized

persons will be allowed inside the plant.

All instrument and safety devices will be checked and calibrated during installation. They will be also

calibrated, checked at a frequent interval. Calibration records will be maintained.

All electrical equipment’s will be installed as per prescribed standards.

All the equipment’s of the plant are periodically tested as per standard and results will be documented.

All equipment’s undergo preventive maintenance schedule.

Hydrant system will be pressured with a Jockey Pump. Flame arrestor will

be provided on each tank.

Pressure gauge will be provided on each tank.

In addition to fire hydrant system, nos. of fire extinguishers will be installed at different locations within

premises as per requirement.

Retention basin will be provided to collect the contaminated water used during fire fighting.

Adequate ventilation arrangement will be provided for safe and better working in the plant as per the

standard.

Process, equipment’s, plant involving serious fire hazards will be designed as per prescribed guideline.



2.For underground and above ground storage tank farm: Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank

as per petroleum rules.

Tank farm will be constructed as per explosive department requirement and separation distance will be

maintained.

Static earthing provision will be made for road tanker as well as storage tank. Flame arrestor with

breather valve will be provided on vent line.

Road tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented.

Fire load calculation will be done and as per fire load Hydrant System will be provided as per NFPA std.

and Fire extinguishers will be provided as per fire load calculation.

Spark arrestor will be provided to all vehicles in side premises. Flame proof type

equipment’s and lighting will be provided. Lightening arrestor will be provided for

all buildings and structures as per IS-3029.

Trained and experience operator will be employed for tank farm area.

NFPA label (hazard identification) capacity and content will be displayed on storage tank.

Solvents will be transferred by pump only in plant area and day tank will be provided. Overflow line will

be return to the storage tank or Pump On-Off switch will be provided near day tank in plant.

Jumpers will be provided on solvent handling pipe line flanges.

Flexible SS hose will be used for road tanker unloading purpose and other temperature connection.

For Drum Storage area: Some chemicals will be received at plant in drums by road truck and stored in a separate drum storage

area.

FLP type light fittings will be provided where flammable materials are stored. Proper ventilation will be provided in ware house.

Proper label and identification board /stickers will be provided in the storage area. Conductive drum

pallets will be provided.

Drum handling trolley / stackers/fork lift will be used for drum handling.

Separate dispensing room with local exhaust and static earthing provision will be made.

Materials will be stored as per its compatibility study and separate area will be made for flammable,



corrosive and toxic chemical drums storage.

Smoking and other spark, flame generating item will be banned from the Gate. 3.Transportation Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank

as per petroleum Act & Rules.

Road tanker unloading procedure will be in place and will be implemented for safe unloading of road

tanker.

Static earthing provision will be made for tanker unloading.

Earthed Flexible Steel hose will be used for solvent unloading from the road tanker. Fixed pipelines with

pumps will be provided for solvent transfer up to Day

4.Tanks/reactors:

Double mechanical seal type pumps will be installed. NRV provision will be made on all pump discharge

line.

Transportation, Unloading and handling procedure for chemicals and solvents given in the table 7.4 below.



Table 7.4 Transportation, Unloading and handling procedure for Chemicals and solvents

No Activity Scenario Mitigation measures 1. Unloading and storing of

drums Leaks, splash or fire

Unloading ramp Drum cushioning Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Checking compatibility before storing. Availability of eye wash/shower facility nearby.

Charging to reactors and service tanks

Leaks, splash or fire

SOP for activity Precautions against ESD Leak containment facility Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Availability of eye wash/shower facility nearby.

Unloading to tankers and vessels.


SOP for activity Tanker loading and unloading permit. Precautions against ESD Leak containment facility Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Availability of eye wash/shower facility nearby.

2. Unloading and storing of chemicals


Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Checking compatibility before storing



Availability of eye wash/shower facility near by

Charging to reactors and service tanks


SOP/BMR for activity Precautions against ESD Leak containment facility Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Availability of eye wash/shower facility nearby.

7.4.7 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM: Occupational Health is a branch which examines the relationship between work and health and effects

of work on the health of the worker. Occupational health service is operated to achieve the statutory

declared aim of occupational health by medical and technical measures. Its role is mainly preventive

and to give first aid and emergency treatment. It is certainly useful in early detection of any

occupational or non-occupational disease or any man-adjustment of the man-job relationship.

1.OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM:

1. Medical examinations: Pre-employment, periodic and others. 2. Supervision of the working environment industrial hygiene, safety, job analysis and adaptation of

the job to the worker in good working conditions. 3. Advice to management and worker. 4. Health education and training. 5. Health statistics. 6. Medical treatment-first aid, emergency and ambulatory treatment. 7. Health counselling-individual. 8. Nutrition. 9. Co-operation with other services in the undertaking. 10. Collaboration with external services.



Other purposes of industrial medical services are:

I) Identifying the Hazards II) Preventing or minimizing the Hazards III) Curative treatment in case of exposure IV) Determining the Compensation for damages

Expected Occupational Health & Safety Hazards

• Physical Hazards: Noise, Heat, Dust, • Chemical Hazards: Corrosive, Toxic Substances, Irritants, Carcinogens, Chemical emissions • Psychological hazards resulting from stress and strain • Hazards associated with the non-application of ergonomic principles, for example badly designed

machinery, mechanical devices and tools used by workers, improper seating and workstation

design, or poorly designed work practices.

Expected chemical hazards in work environment is given in the table 7.5 below.

Table 7.5 Expected chemical hazards in work environment

Name of Chemical Health Hazard due to exposure to these chemicals Hydrogen Asphyxiating agent Sodium methoxide Highly corrosive and water reactive. Severe burns on skin and

eyes. Acids (HCl) Corrosive, Irritant. Causes severe eye burns. Dimethyl amine Toxic by inhalation, skin absorption.

Solvents Hazardous in case of skin contact (irritant, permeator), of eye contact (Irritant), of ingestion, of inhalation

Sodamide Corrosive, water reactive, causes severe burns on skin contact.

THF Solvent, hazard of forming explosive peroxides on exposure to air.

Mitigation Measures for OSH: It is proposed to formulate and implement a structure for Occupational Safety and Health with following aims…

• To keep air-borne concentration of toxic and hazardous chemicals below PEL and TLV. • Protect general health of workers likely to be exposed to such chemicals • Providing training, guidelines, resources and facilities to concerned department for

occupational health hazards.



• It is proposed that this EMP be formulated on the guidelines issued by Bureau of Indian

Standards on OH&S Management Systems: IS 18001:2000 Occupational Health and Safety

Management Systems • Proposed EMP will be incorporated in Standard Operating Procedure also.

The proposed EMP will also include measure to keep air-born concentration of toxic and hazardous chemicals below its PEL and TLV, like… – Leak Surveys – Separate storage for toxic chemicals – Exhaust Ventilation – Proper illumination – On-line detectors toxic chemicals – Close processes to avoid spills and exposures – Atomization of process operations to hazards of manual handling of chemicals – Supply of proper PPEs like Air mask, breathing canisters, SCBA sets and On-line breathing

apparatus at the places where there is possibility of presence of toxic chemicals – Decontamination procedure for empty drums and carboys. – Regular maintenance program for pumps, equipment, instruments handling toxic and corrosive

chemicals – Display of warning boards – Training to persons handling toxic and corrosive chemicals

7.4.8 DETERMINING SIGNIFICANCE

Determining Significance is evaluation of the significance of the risk estimation and each of the

components of the risk assessment process, including elements of risk perception and cost/benefit

consideration.



7.5 RISK MANAGEMENT

M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. will manage the economical and social aspects of risk. Improvement in

scientific and factual basis for risk assessment is necessary for better risk management decisions and

public creditability of those decisions. M/s RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. Will be considering the Risk management strategies including all the specific

activities. First step involves taking a decision about the whether any actions are necessary and if so,

what nature of the action should it be.

The fatality probability is function of:

• Probability of occurrence of hazardous events • Probability of weather condition, wind direction • Probability of number of persons exposed which depends on the severity of the consequences • Lethality factor • Probability of ignition source

Probability exposed weather conditions; wind directions, ignition sources and lethality factors cannot be

changed or controlled. The only factor possible to reduce is the probability of occurrence of hazardous

event. M/s RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. could be achieved by reducing the failure probabilities of system

components through proper maintenance or in some cases providing redundancies and also providing

adequate safety measures in the form of protective system such as alarms, trips, sprinkles etc.

7.6 RISK ACCEPTANCE The acceptance of risk by individuals and collectively by society in M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. is affected

by many parameters. Some people may accept the risk voluntarily while some may do so involuntarily.

The general public acceptance also depends on their understanding and knowledge of risks. Finally each

individual has a different perception for risk acceptance. The lowest level for involuntary uses is set by

the risk of death from natural events such as lightening, flood, earthquakes, etc. M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt.

Ltd. is carried out survey of risks in this range which is shown in Table 7.3 below.



Fig 7.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment



7.6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS AREAS

The procedure for QRA starts with identification of major risk areas in the installation. Operation carried

out in pesticide Industries usually come under certain board, general categories. In M/s. RL fine chem.

Pvt. Ltd. Major risk areas will storage tank area, plant area and utility area.

• Bulk storage of liquids (e.g. HCl, Solvents etc.) area in M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. at ambient

temperature and atmospheric pressure. • Process Plant involving pumping, transportation, reactors, distillation, heating, cooling, centrifuge

operations etc. • Bulk loading from storage tanks into road tankers. • Drum Storage Area. 7.6.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE CASES FOR HAZARDOUS AREAS

Release due to catastrophic failure of storage tanks or process vessels.

Rupture of connected pipe with storage tank or process vessels.

Continuous release at significant rates for long durations transfer pipelines caused by sudden,

major break of the pipeline.

Continuous release at low rate through small holes or cracks in piping and vessels, flange leaks,

and leakage from pump glands and similar seals.

Fire and explosion scenarios due to deviation from set parameters during chemical processing.


Environmental Impact Assessment Report- 51-

7.7 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS In a plant handling hazardous chemicals, the main hazard arises due to storage, handling

& use of these chemicals. If these chemicals are released into the atmosphere, they may

cause damage due to resulting fires or vapour clouds. Blast Overpressures depend upon

the reactivity class of material and the amount of gas between two explosive limits.

7.7.1.Operating Parameters

Potential gas/vapour release for the same material depends significantly on the

operating conditions. Especially for any flammable gas, the operating conditions are

very critical to assess the damage potential.

7.7.2 Inventory

Inventory Analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short

listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the potential

hazard. Larger the inventory of a vessel or a system, larger the quantity of potential

release. The potential vapour release (source strength) depends upon the quantity of

liquid release, the properties of the materials and the operating conditions (pressure,

temperature). If all these influencing parameters are combined into a matrix and vapour

source strength estimated for each release case, a ranking should become a credible

exercise.

7.7.3 Loss of Containment

Plant inventory can get discharged to Environment due to Loss of Containment. Certain

features of materials to be handled at the plant need to the clearly understood to firstly

list out all significant release cases and then to short list release scenarios for a detailed

examination. Liquid release can be either instantaneous or continuous. Failure of a

vessel leading to an instantaneous outflow assumes the sudden appearance of such a

major crack that practically all of the contents above the crack shall be released in a very

short time. The more likely event is the case of liquid release from a hole in a pipe

connected to the vessel. The flow rate will depend on the size of the hole as well as on

the pressure, which was present, in front of the hole, prior to the accident. Such

pressure is basically dependent on the pressure in the vessel. The vaporisation of

released liquid depends on the vapour pressure and weather conditions. Such

consideration and others have been kept in mind both during the initial listing as well as

during the short-listing procedure. In the study, Maximum Credible Loss accident

methodology is to be used, therefore, the largest potential hazard inventories have been

considered for consequence estimation.

7.7.4 DAMAGE CRITERIA



In consequence analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate the

physical effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the damage

(lethality, injury, material destruction) of the effects. The calculations can roughly be

divided in three major groups: a) Determination of the source strength parameters; b) Determination of the consequential effects; c) Determination of the damage or damage distances. The basic

physical effect models consist of the following. Source strength parameters Calculation of the outflow of liquid, vapour or gas out of a vessel or a pipe, in case of

rupture. Also two-phase outflow can be calculated. Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evaporation and of the

dimensions of the remaining liquid pool. Calculation of the evaporation rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool

dimensions and wind velocity. Source strength equals pump capacities, etc. in some cases. Consequential effects Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength,

relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical situation of the

surrounding area. Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a fire or a BLEVE, as a function of the

distance to the source. Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of

evaporated chemical.

The latter can be either explosive or toxic.

It may be obvious, that the types of models that must be used in a specific risk study strongly depend upon the type of material involved:

- Gas, vapour, liquid, solid

- Inflammable, explosive, toxic, toxic combustion products

- Stored at high/low temperatures or pressure Selection of Damage Criteria



The damage criteria give the relation between extent of the physical effects (exposure)

and the percentage of the people that will be killed or injured due to those effects. The

knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the exposure. For

instance, much more is known about the damage caused by heat radiation, than about

the damage due to toxic exposure, and for these toxic effects, the knowledge differs

strongly between different materials.

In Consequence Analysis studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous

effects are distinguished:

- Heat radiation, from a jet, pool fire, a flash fire or a BLEVE. - Explosion

- Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.

In the next three paragraphs, the chosen damage criteria are given and explained. 7.7.5 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LOSS ACCIDENT SCENARIOS A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterised as the worst credible

accident. In other words: an accident in an activity, resulting in the maximum

consequence distance that is still believed to be possible. A MCA-analysis does not

include a quantification of the probability of occurrence of the accident. Another aspect,

in which the pessimistic approach of MCA studies appears, is the atmospheric condition

that is used for dispersion calculations. As per the reference of the study, weather

conditions having an average wind speed of 7.0 m/s have been chosen. The Maximum Credible Loss (MCL) scenarios have been developed for the Facility. The

MCL cases considered, attempt to include the worst “Credible” incidents- what

constitutes a credible incident is always subjective. Nevertheless, guidelines have

evolved over the years and based on basic engineering judgement, the cases have been

found to be credible and modelling for assessing vulnerability zones is prepared

accordingly. Only catastrophic cases have been considered and not partial or small

failures (as is the case in Quantitative Risk Assessment where contributions from low

frequency - high outcome effect as well as high frequency - low outcome events are

distinguished). The objective of the study is emergency planning; hence only holistic &



conservative assumptions are used for obvious reasons. Hence though the outcomes

may look pessimistic, the planning for emergency concept should be borne in mind

whilst interpreting the results.

7.7.6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS The Consequence Analysis has been done for selected scenarios. This has been done for

weather conditions having wind speed 7.0 m/s. In Consequence Analysis, geographical

location of the source of potential release plays an important role. Consideration of a

large number of scenarios in the same geographical location serves little purpose if the

dominant scenario has been identified and duly considered.

7.7.7 SOFTWARE USED FOR CALCULATIONS Aloha contains all the discharge, dispersion, effects and risk models you will need to

accurately assess all your major hazards and associated risks. Aloha Consequence

provides you with comprehensive hazard analysis facilities to examine the progress of a

potential incident from the initial release to its far-field effects.

7.7.8 TOXIC AND FLAMMABLE IMPACT It calculates the initial discharge, as the material expands from its storage conditions to

atmospheric, through dispersion, as the material mixes with air and dilutes, and the

subsequent toxic or flammable effects. Aloha includes a wide range of models for

discharge and dispersion as well as flammable, explosive and toxic effects.

Discharge

• Aloha requires basic information about storage or process conditions and material

properties in order to perform discharge calculations

• The software comes with an integrated material property database containing

more than 1,600 pre-defined pure component chemicals

• Various discharge scenario options have been implemented to represent common

process failures, and model their behaviour. These include: Leaks and line ruptures from long & short pipelines

Catastrophic rupture Dispersion



The dispersion models within Aloha are able to model the following phenomena

• Dispersion of gas, liquid and two-phase releases • Liquid droplet thermo dynamics calculations and liquid droplet rainout • Pool spreading and vaporization • Building wake dispersion effects for vapour releases

7.7.9 FLAMMABLE EFFECTS For releases of flammable material Aloha calculates

• Radiation profiles and contours from a range of fire scenarios including pool fires,

flash fires, jet fires and fire balls, including cross-wind effects on a jet fire

• Vapour Cloud Explosion modelling using industry standards.

7.8 TOXIC EFFECTS

• Graphs of toxic concentration profile

• Indoor and outdoor toxic dose prediction 7.8.1 ALOHA RISK Aloha Risk allows you to combine the flammable and toxic consequences from each

scenario in your QRA model with their likelihood to quantify the risk of fatalities. Phase

Risk allows you to take account of local population distribution, sources of ignition, land

usage and local prevailing weather conditions. It is designed to perform all the analysis,

data handling and results presentation elements of a QRA within a structured

framework.

Aloha Risk allows you to quickly identify major risk contributors so that time and efforts

can be directed to mitigating these highest risk activities. Based on effects calculations

and population vulnerabilities, Aloha Risk can integrate over all scenarios and weather

conditions to estimate the total risk. The established individual and societal risk

indicators are predicted by Aloha Risk across your facility and surrounding area using

the classical QRA methodology. Risk ranking reports can be produced at points of

strategic importance to show the relative influence of the various failure scenarios and

their contribution to both the individual and societal risk metrics.

A key benefit of Aloha Risk is the ability to identify major risk contributors and

differentiate these from incidents with worst case consequences which might otherwise



dominate the safety reviews. Whilst medium scale incidents have lesser consequences,

they may have a higher frequency, which, when combined with their hazardous effects,

generate a higher level of risk. Time and effort directed to mitigating high consequence

but often low frequency events may not be well spent. Aloha Risk helps you direct this

effort more effectively.

Aloha Risk also provides facilities to help you manage large quantities of input data,

including scenarios, parameters, wind roses, ignition and population, and combine these

in many ways. This is critical when looking at sensitivity analyses and assessing the

merits of a range of risk reduction measures.

Benefits • Facilitates cost reduction in terms of losses and insurance • Allows optimization of plant and process design • Assist in compliance with safety regulators • Enables quicker response to hazardous incidents • Improve engineer’s understanding of potential hazards • Regular software upgrades incorporate industry experience and expertise, and

advances in consequence modelling technology 7.8.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 1.INTRODUCTION In this, the source terms for each defined failure cases are presented, including

calculated release rate, release duration and total released mass of fluid. Subsequently

consequence results from selected failure cases are also presented in order to give

overview on the extent of impact from potential major accident scenarios. Five types of

consequences are presented, i.e. jet fire, pool fire, flash fire, explosion and toxic impact.

Consequence Distances Pool Fire, Fire ball, Flash Fire

The extent of the consequence of a Pool fire is represented by the thermal radiation

envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.:

2 kW/m2; pain within 60 sec. 0: lethality.

10 kW/m2; potentially lethal within 60 sec. 37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality as outlined above.



2. DETAILED SUMMARY OF RESULTS: Detailed Results of the consequence analysis of above-mentioned scenarios have

been given below:

Toluene release from road tanker in solvent yard. 1.8.3 Scenario # 1A: Toluene release from tanker and catching fire.

Results indicate:

Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Tank Diameter: 2.236 meters Tank Length: 4.980 meters Tank Volume: 19.6 cubic meters Tank contains liquid Internal Temperature: 30° C Chemical Mass in Tank: 11.1 tons Tank is 60% full Circular Opening Diameter: 2.5 inches Opening is 0 meters from tank bottom Max Flame Length: 11 meters Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Burn Rate: 153 kilograms/min Total Amount Burned: 9,068 kilograms Note: The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed a burning puddle. The puddle spread to a diameter of 6.3 meters. THREAT ZONE: Threat Modelled: Thermal radiation from pool fire Red : 12 meters --- (37.5 kW/ (sq m)) Orange: 19 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq m) potentially lethal within 60 sec) Yellow: 32 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq m) pain within 60 sec) THREAT AT POINT: Thermal Radiation Estimates at the point: Downwind: 75.8 meters Off Centreline: 28.2 meters Max Thermal Radiation: 0.191 kW/ (sq m)

Results of Toulene release from tanker and catching fire is given in the table 7.6 below and severity mapping of toluene is given in the fig 7.4 below.

Table 7.6 Results of Toulene release from tanker and catching fire

Radiation level Distance in meters

Injury type Remarks

2 kW 32 Pain within 60 sec. Safe zone beyond 32M

10 kW 19 potentially lethal within 60 sec

Avoid human presence within 19M

37.5 kW 12 100% fatal Avoid human and



property presence within 12M

Fig 7.4 SEVERITY MAPPING OF TOULENE

7.8.4 Scenario # 1B: IPA release from tanker and catching fire. Results indicate:



Max Thermal Radiation: 0.191 kW/ (sq m) Chemical Mass in Tank: 13.4 tons Tank is 80% full Circular Opening Diameter: 2.5 inches Opening is 0 meters from tank bottom Max Puddle Diameter: Unknown Max Flame Length: 8 meters Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Burn Rate: 145 kilograms/min Total Amount Burned: 8,500 kilograms Note: The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed a burning puddle. The puddle spread to a diameter of 9.1 meters. THREAT ZONE: Threat Modelled: Thermal radiation from pool fire Red : 11 meters --- (37.5 kW/ (sq m)) Orange: 16 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Yellow: 26 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq m) = pain within 60 sec)

Results of IPA release from tanker and catching fire is given in the table 7.7 below and severity mapping of IPA is given in the fig 7.5 below.

Table 7.7 Results of IPA release from tanker and catching fire


Injury type Remarks




37.5 kW 11 100% fatal Avoid human and property presence within 11M

Fig 7.5 SEVERITY MAPPING OF IPA



7.8.5 Scenario # 1C: Acetone release from tanker and catching fire.



Results indicate: Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Tank Diameter: 2.236 meters Tank Length: 4.980 meters Tank Volume: 19.6 cubic meters Tank contains liquid Internal Temperature: 30° C Chemical Mass in Tank: 10.1 tons Tank is 60% full Circular Opening Diameter: 2.5 inches Opening is 0 meters from tank bottom Max Flame Length: 9 meters Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Burn Rate: 146 kilograms/min Total Amount Burned: 8,585 kilograms Note: The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed a burning puddle. The puddle spread to a diameter of 7.8 meters. THREAT ZONE: Threat Modelled: Thermal radiation from pool fire Red : 10 meters --- (37.5 kW/ (sq m)) Orange: 17 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Yellow: 26 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq m) = pain within 60 sec) Results of Acetone release from tanker and catching fire is given in the table 7.6 and severity mapping is shown in the fig 7.6 below.

Table 7.8 Results of Acetone release from tanker and catching fire


Injury type Remarks




37.5 kW 10 100% fatal Avoid human and property presence within 10M

Fig 7.6 SEVERITY MAPPING OF ACETONE



7.8.6 Scenario # 2: Process reactors/equipment



FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX REFERENCE: DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX HAZARD CLASSIFICATION GUDE Seventh Edition -AIChE MANUAL PUBLISHED BY American Institute of Chemical Engineers The index has been widely used in Dow and outside of Dow. It is the leading hazard index recognized by the chemical industry. The F&EI provides key information to help evaluate overall risk from fire and explosion. The F&EI is one of the tools used for evaluation of realistic fire, explosion and reactivity potential of process equipment and its contents. For the assessment purpose we have chose hydrogenation, Grignard reactions and centrifuge operations which involved use of highly flammable and explosive gas like Hydrogen, considerable quantities of Flammable solvent Toluene and high rotation equipment like centrifuge. Results of fire and explosion index with risk and its control measures is given in the table 7.9 below.

Table 7.9 FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX Sn Process Material MF F&EI Area of

exposure In Sq.M

Risk Controls

1 DULOX.Hydrogenation Hydrogen 21 127.12 33.3 Intermediate

Improved solvent handling and spill containment

2 AMTRIP.HCL Toluene

Grignard.Re. 16 119.9 31.41 Intermediate


3. ALIMEMAZINE.TAR. THF 16 114.2 29.92 Intermediate


4. CENTRIFUGATION TOLUENE 16 72.28 18.9 Moderate


7.8.7 Scenario-3Rupture and leak of Ammonia cylinder. SOURCE STRENGTH:



Direct Source: 3.89 kilograms/min Source Height: 1.2 meters Release Duration: 15 minutes Release Rate: 3.89 kilograms/min Total Amount Released: 58.4 kilograms Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow. Use both dispersion modules to investigate its potential behaviour. THREAT ZONE: Model Run: Gaussian Red : 51 meters --- (300 ppm = IDLH) Orange: 161 meters --- (35 ppm) Yellow: 193 meters --- (25 ppm) Results of ammonia is depicted in the table 7.10 as under.

Table: 7.10 Results of Ammonia Contamination level

Distance in meters

Injury type

25 ppm 193 No adverse effect for 8hrs.

35 ppm 161 No adverse effect for 15 minutes.

300 ppm 51 Immediately dangerous to life or health.

Measures to be taken to prevent such accident:

• Priority will be given to Tanker to immediately enter the storage premises at site and

will not be kept waiting near the gate or the main road.

• Security person will check License, TREM CARD, Fire extinguisher condition, Antidote Kit,

required PPEs as per SOP laid down. Following precautions will be adopted during unloading

• Wheel stopper will be provided to TL at unloading platform.

• Static earthing will be provided to road tanker.

• Tanker unloading procedure will be followed according to check list and implemented.

• Flexible SS hose connection will be done at TL outlet line.

• The quantity remaining in the hose pipeline will be drained to a small underground

storage tank, which will be subsequently transferred by nitrogen pressure to the

main storage tank thus ensuring complete closed conditions for transfer from road



tanker.

• All TL valves will be closed in TL.

• Finally earthing connection and wheel stopper will be removed.

• Only day time unloading will be permitted. Following precautions will be adopted Storage of such chemicals

• Storage tank will be stored away from the process plant.

• Tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented.

• Caution note and emergency handling procedure will be displayed at unloading area and

trained all operators.

• NFPA label will be provided.

• Required PPEs like full body protection PVC apron, Hand gloves, gumboot, Respiratory

mask etc. will be provided to operator.

• Neutralizing agent will be kept ready for tackle any emergency spillage.

• Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit will be provided in acid storage area.

• Material will be handled in close condition in pipe line. • Dyke wall will be provided to all storage tanks, collection pit with valve provision.

• Double drain valve will provided.

• Level gauge will be provided on all storage tanks.

• Safety permit for loading unloading of hazardous material will be prepared and

implemented.

• TREM CARD will be provided to all transporters and will be trained for transportation

Emergency of Hazardous chemicals.

• Fire hydrant system with jockey pump as per TAC norms will be installed. For Storage tank farm area:

• Under N2 pressure storage.

• Safety valve provided and storage facility to ensure safe release of HC in case of over

pressure.

• Dyke with separate fencing area is provided.

• SOP prepared

• Road tanker unloading procedure prepared



• Work permit followed

• PPEs used

• Safety shower, eye wash provided.

• NFPA labelling system adopted for storage tanks.

• Level indicator at local.

• Alarm for high level & high pressure.

• Automatic fire fighting indication provided for around the storage area

• Sprinkler system will be provided 7.8.8 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION SAFETY GUIDELINES 1.INTRODUCTION Transportation typically involves carrying of small amounts of materials over short

distances transportation does, however, pose significant risks from the frequency of the

activity and the lack of observance of prescribed regulations. The hazardous materials

should be packaged, based on the composition in a manner suitable for handling,

storage and transport. Labelling and packaging is required to be easily visible and be

able to withstand physical conditions and climatic factors. These guidelines are issued

to facilitate safe transportation of the hazardous material in compliance of the

regulations. In view of the stringent product quality requirement, various complex

processes are introduced involving the handling of hazardous chemicals. These

chemicals pose various types of hazards like flammability, toxicity, explosives, corrosives

etc. Inadequate awareness about the hazardous properties of these chemicals may lead

to serious accidents which will affect the men at work and the environment.

Scope This document applies to the vehicular transportation, within geographically

contiguous, of hazardous materials, substances, and wastes. Hazardous materials

include chemical materials, substances or wastes. Transportation shall be performed in

a manner which minimizes risk to the health and safety of employees, the public and

the environment.

Guidelines for

Transportation General



It will be ensured that during the transportation contents are not spilled, packaging is

not damaged and personnel are properly trained to generate, transport and receive

such materials. The maximum speed limit is 16 KMPH. TREM (Transport Emergency)

cards are to be provided to the drivers.

Packing The containers must be able to withstand normal handling and retain integrity for a

minimum period of six months. In general, packaging for hazardous substances must

meet the following requirements:

- All packaging materials including containers shall be of such strength, construction

and type as not to break open or become defective during transportation.

- All packaging materials including containers shall be so packaged and sealed those

spillages of hazardous materials / substances are prevented during transportation

due to jerks and vibrations caused by uneven road surface.

- Re-packaging materials including that used for fastening must not be affected by the

contents or form a dangerous combination with them.

- Packaging material should be such that there will be no significant chemical or

galvanic action among any of the material in the package.

- Ensure that any cushioning or absorbent material used for packaging is also compatible with the hazardous material.

The containers when used for packaging of the hazardous Material shall meet the following requirements:

- Modes of packaging, like collection in 200-litre plastic drums, cardboard cartons, PP and

HDPE/LDPE containers etc., also work for variety of materials. However, all such container

should be amenable to mechanical handling.

- It should be leak proof.

- Use drums that are in good condition and free of rust and major dents.

- Ensure that drums are not leaking or overfilled before transporting them.

- Ensure that drum bungs are tight.

- Carefully inspect pallets before they are loaded.

- Do not use pallets with cracked or broken slats.

- Use a drum dolly to place drums on pallets.

- Secure all drums to the pallet with appropriate strapping material.



In general, the containers for liquid HM should be completely closed, in fact sealed. There

should be no gas generation due to any chemical reaction within the container, and,

hence, there should not be any need for air vents; expansion due to increase /decrease

in temperature normally does not need air vents.

- Container should be covered with a solid lid or a canvas to avoid emissions of any sort

including spillage, dust etc. and to minimize odour generation both at the point

of loading as well as during transportation.

- Container used for transportation of Material should be able to withstand the shock

loads due to vibration effect/undulations of pavements etc.

- Container should be easy to handle during transportation and emptying.

- As far as possible, manual handling of containers should be minimized. Appropriate

material handling equipment is to be used to load, transport and unload

containers. This equipment includes drum, dollies, and forklifts, drum handling

equipment, lift gates and pallets. Drums should not be rolled on or off vehicles.

- Where two-tier or three-tier storage is envisaged, the frame should have adequate

strength to hold the containers.

- One-way containers are also allowed. The multi-use containers should be re-usable

provided it should be cleaned and free from deterioration or defects.

- Loads are to be properly placed on vehicles. HM containers are not to overhang,

perch, lean or be placed in other unstable base. Load should be secured with straps,

clamps, braces or other measures to prevent movement and loss. Design of the

container should be such that it can be safely accommodated on the transport

vehicle.

- Dissimilar materials shall not be transported in the same container. Labelling

There are two types of labelling requirements:

i. Labelling of individual transport containers [ranging from a pint-size to a tank], and ii. Labelling of transport vehicles.

- All hazardous Material containers must be clearly marked with current contents. The

markings must be waterproof and firmly attached so that they cannot be removed.



Previous content labels shall be obliterated when the contents are different. Proper marking of containers is essential.

- Colour code is to be provided to the tanker to indicate the type of material present in

that.

- Containers that contain HM shall be labelled with the words "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL"

in Kannada, Hindi / English. The information on the label must include the code number

of the Material, the Material type, the origin (name, address, telephone number of the

supplier and receiver), hazardous property (e.g. flammable, corrosive), and the symbol

for the hazardous property.

- The label must withstand the effects of rain and sun. Labelling of containers is important. The following are the requirements for labelling: Emergency contact phone numbers shall be prominently displayed viz. the phone

number of concerned Regional Officer of the SPCB, Fire Station, Police Station and other

agencies concerned.

Unloading of Tank

- Before the tanker enters the industry premises, the tanker is to be inspected for

authorized entry and safe & sound condition of the tanker, its contents and that of the

prime mover.

- Tankers entering plant are to be fitted with flare arresters on their exhaust.

- The quality of the chemical in the tanker should be ascertained before unloading to

avoid contamination of chemical already at storage.

- In case of flammable chemicals, the prime mover (engine) should be kept of. The tanker

should be properly blocked from movement before connections are made for unloading

hazardous chemicals.

- In case of flammable chemicals, the unloading point should be located at a safe distance

outside the storage dyke.

- Pressurizing with air / inert gas for unloading should be avoided. It is recommended to

use pumps / vacuum systems for unloading. Pumps should preferably be of seal less

type and valves should be of glandless types. Solid chemicals in bulk should be handled

with lifting machines and conveyors.

- Coupling used for connecting hose to tanker must be leak proof. Flange connections are



preferred. Where threaded connections are used, the threaded portion should be

properly preserved against corrosion / wearing of threads and thoroughly inspected

before connections are made.

- The unloading hose should be devoid of cracks & blisters and should be capable of

withstanding whatever pressure developed during unloading operation. The hose

should be hydro-tested at a frequency guided by experience. Proper records of hydro-

test should be maintained.

- Same hose should not be used for unloading different chemicals. Hoses for different

chemicals should be marked with different colour stripes for easy identification.

- For flammable chemicals, the tanker and the hose are to be properly earthed before

starting unloading operation.

- Unloading should preferably be done in day time.

- Unloading should be done under personal supervision of responsible staff authorized by

the management.

- The operating staff must use suitable personal protective clothing /equipment. Suitable

breathing canisters and first aid box must be available at site for use in case of

emergency.

- Provision of sample quantity of water / neutralizing medium to take care of leakage /

spillage must be made. Also steam and inert gas hose stations must be available at

unloading point.

- There must be adequate illumination at site. Flame proof fittings should be used

wherever necessary.

- The unloading systems should have facility to vent / drain the remaining chemical in the

hose to a suitable safe point. The hose should be kept blinded when not in use. Thermal

safety valve discharging to safe disposal or handling facility should be provided.

- Before starting unloading, the silage of the receiving tank should be checked. Care

should be taken to avoid overflow of tanks. Gas / chemical leak detection system to

sound an alarm at the control room/site may be provided wherever possible, so that

quick remedial measures can be taken. Wherever necessary, quick/remote isolation

valves should be provided.



Fire fighting facility commensurate with the chemical – as mentioned in the data sheet

should be provided at the unloading point. Effective communication system like telephone must be available for communicating

with the control room / fire station / health unit.

Unloading of Drums / Containers Manual handling of drums / containers should be minimized. It is preferable fork-lifters

and suitable cradles are used to handle drums. Carboys containing hazardous chemicals should not be subjected to impact. Suitable protective clothing should be used while handling drums / containers and the

operators should position him such that he is in the upwind direction so that even in

case of accidental release of chemical, he is safe.

2.RECOMMENDATIONS The following actions are particularly recommended to be implemented in order to ensure

ALARP (As Low As reasonably practical) performance in the operation: Maintain and

ensure effectiveness of all the safety measures, among others through the following

actions:

Raw Material Storage Area (Ware House I&II)

The raw material storage area, i.e. ware house, should be declared as a prohibited area

and should be provided having at least two exits, “No Smoking” and “Prohibited Area”

display boards, as applicable should be provided at site. - Regular inspection of drums containing raw material to be done to take care. - Periodic site inspection should be carried out to ensure that there is no leakage from

any of the drums in the ware house. - Fire hydrant system needs to be provided in ware house area as per standards. - Smoke detector and fire alarm systems need to be provided. - Provision of fire doors in ware house area.

3.FIRE ACCESS FOR TANK FARM AREA AND WARE HOUSES

- Fire access roads should be provided to storage area. The storage tanks / area



should have suitable fire protection and fire fighting facility.

The following features are also important for the project by taking the layout into consideration:-

• Hinged doors swing outward in an explosion. • Window panes (if installed) are shatterproof or plastic in frame. • Floors, walls and ceilings are designed and installed to limit the generation and

accumulation of static electricity. • All doors must be fire resistant. Floors, walls and ceilings are designed for at least 2

h of fire resistance. • Walls or partitions are continuous from floor to ceiling, and securely anchored. • Integrity of the wall should be ensured i.e. blast wall not to be broken or drilled as

that can leads to weak spots.

• The building is constructed of non-combustible materials, on a substantial frame. • Restrained deflagration vent panels are present. • There is adequate ventilation, and any heating in rooms is limited to steam, hot

water, or other indirect means. Electrical Safety for Whole Facility • Electrical Safety: All cables and electric fittings shall be constructed, installed,

protected, operated and maintained in such a manner so as to prevent risk of open

sparking.

7.8.9 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 1.DEFINING THE NATURE OF EMERGENCY

1. Hazop study will be conducted before setting up of the plant.

2. Onsite Emergency Plan is to be up graded and mock drills will be conducted.

3. Emergency Response Team (ERT) activities will be continued.

4. Training to be imparted to all employees on safety and health aspects of chemicals

handling. 2.LEVEL OF EMERGENCY CAN BE CLASSIFIED IN THREE CATEGORIES.



LEVEL - 1: The leakage or emergency, which is confinable within the plant, premises. It

may be Due to -

a) Small fire in the plant

b) Low toxic gas release for short duration.

c) Collapsing of equipment that do not affect outside premises. LEVEL - 2: The emergency, which is confinable to factory premises. It may arise due to -

a) Major fire inside the factory premises.

b) Medium scale explosion confined to the factory premises.

c) Heavy toxic / flammable gas leakage for short duration. LEVEL - 3: The emergency, which is not confinable to factory premises and general

public in the vicinity likely to be affected. It may arise due to -

a) Explosion of high magnitude affecting the adjacent area

b) Heavy / Profuse leakage of toxic / flammable gases for a long duration.

3.OBSERVER

DUTIES OF OBSERVER Any person noticing a fire, leakage of chemicals or an unusual occurrence will contact

the security personnel a main gate and Plant Supervisor by: 1. Giving a telephone message 2. Sending message through a messenger 3. Rush personally While giving the message, he will: 1. Identify himself 2. State briefly type of emergency 3. Location of Incident / accident 4. Severity of emergency



After giving message, he will return to the scene / area of emergency by taking all

personnel protection measures, if possible and awaits instructions from Plant

Supervisor (Incident Controller).

4.CHIEF EMERGENCY CONTROLLER Responsibility of Site Main Controller Immediately when he is aware of the emergency, the Site Main Controller will proceed

to the Emergency Control Room, where he will meet Communications Officer, Liaison

Officer and Safety Officer.

1. The Site Main Controller will assess the magnitude of the situation, in consultation

with the Incident Controller and decide if staff needs to be evacuated from their

roll call points. He will announce the emergency through Messenger or via

Intercom line and will give an order for evacuation.

2. Ensure that outside emergency services are called. (Fire Brigade, Police, Doctors, etc.)

3. Ensure that KEY PERSONNEL are called.

4. Exercise direct operational control of those parts of the works, outside the affected

area.

5. Maintain a speculative continuous review of possible developments and assess

these to determine the most probable course of events.

6. Ensure that the emergency is intimated to District Emergency Authorities

7. Issue authorized statements to the news media. Where appropriate, inform the

seniors.

8. Ensure that proper consideration is given to the preservation of evidence.

9. Control rehabilitation of affected areas on cessation of emergency.

10. Determine what investigations and reporting should be carried out, and by whom, to determine cause and (if appropriate) prevention of recurrence.

1.9 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The major hazards are described below. Toxic hazard due to leakage of hazardous chemicals like Ammonia. Fire and Explosive hazard due to leakage of chemicals like THF, IPA, Methanol and



Toluene etc. from storage tank, drums and reactors. Fire hazards due to contact of water with water reactive materials like Sodium methoxide, Potassium methoxide and Sodamide. Fire hazards due to leak and ignition of flammable gas like hydrogen during hydrogenation and handling hydrogen gas. Corrosive hazard due to leakage of chemicals like HCl, chloro acetyl chloride etc. from containers. Electrical hazards due to the electrical major equipment/ machinery, operations,

welding, motors, and heavy lift devices, cabling, human intervention (short circuit

possibility), maintenance work (due to machinery breakdown etc.), plant lighting related

electrical hazards. Possibility of human injury due to working with rotating machines, manual handling etc. Possibility of injury during chemicals handled, during operations and due to intoxication. Major dropped objects hazard due to large number of physical handling steps /

operations involved with crane/ overhead lifting/ hoisting equipment. Fires in any part of the plant working areas – there is a possibility of rapid escalation if it

is not brought under control quickly. Possibilities of fire hazards at transformers, switch gear and other electrical equipment

etc.

The Hazard identification process must identify hazards that could cause a potential major accident for the full range of operational modes, including normal operations, start-up,shutdown, and also potential upset, emergency or abnormal conditions. Employersshould also reassess their Hazard identification process whenever a significant change inoperations has occurred or a new substance has been introduced. They should also consider incidents, which have occurred elsewhere at similar facilities including within the same industry and in other industries.The technique used for the hazard identification is Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis, which allows identification of an accident with probable maximum damage distance.

Hazard identification and risk assessment involves a critical sequence of informationgathering and the application of a decision-making process. These assist in discovering what could possibly cause a major accident (hazard identification), how likely it is that a major accident would occur and the potential consequences (risk assessment)



and what options there are for preventing and mitigating a major accident (control measures). These activities should also assist in improving operations and productivity and reduce the occurrence of incidents and near misses. The chemical and process industries have been using a variety of hazard identification techniques for many years, ranging from simple screening checklists to highly structured Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis. Each technique has its own strengths and weaknesses for identifying hazards. It is impossible to compare hazard identification techniques and come to any conclusion as to which is the best. Each technique has been developed for a specific range of circumstances taking many factors into account including the resources required to undertake the analysis, expertise available and stage of the process. While HAZOP is primarily a tool for hazard identification, the HAZOP process can also include assessment of the causes of accidents, their likelihood and the consequences that may arise, so as to decide if the risk is acceptable, unacceptable or requires further study.. Moreover, a formal guidance for applying this technique isavailable. Collaboration between management and staff is fundamental to achieving effective and efficient hazard identification and risk assessment processes. After identifying hazards through a qualitative process, quantification of potential consequences of identified hazards using simulation modeling is undertaken. Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its consequences form the basis of quantification of risk in terms of damage to property, environment or personnel. Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of release of a toxic or flammable substance have to be identified in order to estimate its damaging effects, the area involved, and the possible precautionary measures required to be taken. Considering operating modes of the facility, and based on available resources the following hazard identification process chosen are: a) Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FETI) Approach; b) HAZOP studies; c) Maximum Credible Accident and Consequence Analysis (MCACA); d) Classification of Major Hazard Substances; e) Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 (GOI Rules, 1989); f) Identification of Major Hazardous Units. The physical properties of solvents used in the process which forms the basis for identification of hazards during storage and interpretation of the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 (GOI Rules, 1989). The interpretation of “The Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous chemicals” issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOI, which guides the preparation of various reports necessary for safe handling and storage of chemicals shows that the



present project requires preparation of safety reports before commencing operation and risk assessment is not mandatory Apart from the solvents, diesel fuel and fuel oil will also be stored in plant premises. The solvent storage tanks are designed as per the safety norms of Hazardous Storage Guidelines of Institute of Fire and Safety Engineering, Nagpur. Apart from the tanks small quantities of solvents are stored in flame proof barrels in the designated storage area. Storage tank sizes and quantity of solvent is planned as per the storage capacity of respective solvents. The probable hazards in the plant is shown in the table 7.11 below.

Table 7.11: Probable hazards in the plant

Hazard type Description

Solvent use Spillage of chemicals while handling. Spillage of chemicals or baths into trench.

Fuel storage Diesel and furnace oil spill and fire. Tank failure and fire.

The drawing indicating the areas earmarked for storage of solvents and fuel is shown in the appended plant layout of the industry. Hazardous raw materials with their schedule numbers according to the 19th January 2000, Schedule I, Part II is shown in table 7.12 as under.

Table 7.12: Hazardous raw materials

Hazardous raw material

Sl. No. as per Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 19th January 2000, Schedule I, Part II

Hydrochloric acid 313

N- Butanol 412

Sodium Hydroxide 571

Magnesium 350

Potassium hydroxide

522

Methanol 377

Ammonia 31

Toulene 628

Iso Propyl Alcohol 334

Formaldehyde 295

Dimethyl Amine 215

Acetone 4

Chloroacetyl Chloride

124

Acetic anhydride 45

Cyclohexanone 161

Hydrogen peroxide 318



7.9.1 EXPOSURE TO SOLVENTS As per the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazard Chemicals Rules, 1989, and further amendments in 2000, these solvents possess risk to the health and safety and the user must be aware of the safe handling procedures, health risk involved and safety arrangements. Severity mapping with their mitigation measures for the various solvents used is detailed in the table 7.13 below.

M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.

- 79 -

Table 7.13: Severity mapping

Sl. No.

Solvent Severity Precautionary measures proposed Mitigation measures proposed Less severe Moderate Severe

FIRE

1 Acetone - Flammable - Storage: Non-corrosive in the presence of glass.

Stored in segregated and approved area. Kept in cool, well-ventilated areas in tightly closed and sealed containers.

Stability and reactivity: Slightly explosive in the presence of open flames, sparks, oxidizing materials and acids. Forms explosive mixtures with hydrogen peroxide, acetic acid, nitric acid, chromic anhydride etc. Reactive with oxidizing agents, reducing agents, acids and alkalis.

Fire fighting measures: As in any fire, use of a self-contained breathing apparatus is recommended. Use of dry chemical, carbon dioxide, water or chemical foam.

2 Isopropyl alcohol - - Highly flammable

Storage:Stored in drums as per flammable liquid store, as per Rules, away from source of naked flame & hot elements and ignition sources.

Incompatibility:Heat, flame, strong oxidizers, acetaldehyde, acids,

Fire fighting measures: Water spray, dry chemical, alcohol foam, or carbon dioxide. Water spray may be used to keep fire exposed containers



chlorine, ethylene oxide, hydrogen-palladium combination, hydrogen peroxide-sulfuric acid combination, potassium tert-butoxide, hypochlorous acid, isocyanates, nitroform, phosgene, aluminum, oleum and perchloric acid. Carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide may form when heated to decomposition.

cool, dilute spills to nonflammable mixtures.

3 Toluene - Flammable - Storage: Stored in a segregated and approved area in a cool well-ventilated area in tightly closed and sealed containers away from all possible sources of ignition.

Stability and reactivity: Stable under normal conditions. Can become instable when exposed to conditions of heat and ignition sources.

Incompatible with strong oxidizers, silver perchlorate, sodium difluoride, tetranitromethane, uranium hexafluoride.

Frozen bromine trifluoride reacts violently with toluene at – 800C Reactive with oxidizing agents.

Fire fighting measures: Dry chemical powder,water spray or fog can be used as fire extinguishing media.



Reacts chemically with nitrogen oxides or halogens to form nitrotoulene, nitrobenzene and nitrophenol and halogenated products respectively.

Toluene forms explosive reaction with 1,3-dichloro-5,5-dimethyl-2,4-imidazolididione, dinitrogen tetrachloride.

Non-corrosive in the presence of glass.

4 Diesel - - Highly flammable

Storage: Should be kept away from flame, sparks, excessive temperatures and open flame.

Incompatibility: High temperatures, open flames, sparks, welding, smoking and other ignition sources. Should be kept away from strong oxidizers. Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and non-combusted hydrocarbons (smoke) are the hazardous decomposition products that may be formed.

Fire fighting measures: Water spray, fog or fire fighting foam. Water may be ineffective for fighting the fire, but may be used to cool fire-exposed containers.

5 Fuel oil - - Highly flammable

Storage:Should bekept away from flame, sparks, excessive temperatures and open flame.

Fire fighting measures: Dry chemical, foam, carbon dioxide and



(stable under

normal conditions)

Incompatibility:May react with strong acids or oxidizing agents. Heated vapor or mist and may form explosive mixture with air.

Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and low molecular weight hydrocarbons, acidic gases, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides and other toxic contaminants are the hazardous decomposition products that may be formed.

water spray or fog. Water may be ineffective for fighting the fire, but may be used to cool fire-exposed containers.

Sl. No.

Raw material Severity Precautionary measures proposed

Mitigation measures proposed

Less severe

Moderate Severe

SPILLAGES

1 Acetone Less toxic

- - EXPOSURE CONTROLS AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION:

Engineering controls: Exhaust ventilation to be provided to prevent accumulation above the exposure limit.

Personal protection: Splash goggles, lab coat, vapor respirator, gloves,

FIRST AID MEASURES:

After inhalation: Removed to fresh air. If not breathing, artificial respiration to be given. If breathing is difficult, oxygen to be given. Physician should be called immediately. After skin contact: Remove contaminated clothing and flush affected areas with water. Cover contaminated skin with an emollient. Seek medical attention.



safety goggles or glasses, boots etc to be provided.

After eye contact: Flush eyes immediately with water for at least 15 minutes. Cold water may be used. A physician should see the patient promptly. After ingestion: DO NOT INDUCE VOMITING unless directed to do so by medical personnel. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person. Loosen tight clothing such as collar, tie, belt or waist-band. Get medical attention if symptoms appear.

2 Isopropyl alcohol

- Moderately toxic

- To be handled carefully with the usual precautionary measures.

The product should not be allowed to reach the groundwater, water bodies or sewerage system in large quantities.

FIRST AID MEASURES:

Eyes & Skin: In case of contact, eyes are immediately flushed with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes. Medical aid is obtained immediately.

Inhalation: Removed to fresh air. If not breathing, artificial respiration to be given. If breathing is difficult, oxygen to be given. Physician should be called immediately.

Ingestion: Large amounts of water to be given to drink. An unconscious person should not be given anything by mouth. Medical attention should be sought immediately.

2 Toluene - Moderately toxic

- EXPOSURE CONTROLS AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION:

FIRST AID MEASURES:

After inhalation: Remove to fresh air. If breathing stops provide artificial respiration. If breathing is



Engineering controls:Exhaust ventilation should be provided.

Personnel protection: Splash goggles, lab coat, vapor respirator, gloves.

Personnel protection in case of large spill: Splash goggles, full suit, vapor respirator, boots, gloves, self-contained breathing apparatus.

difficult oxygen should be administered. Get medical attention. After skin contact: Wash with a disinfectant soap and cover contaminated skin with an anti-bacterial cream. Seek immediate medical attention

After eye contact: Remove contact lenses. Immediately flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes. Obtain medical attention. After ingestion: DO NOT INDUCE VOMITING unless directed to do so by medical personnel. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person. Loosen tight clothing such as collar, tie, belt or waist-band.

3 Diesel - Moderately toxic

- To be handled carefully with the usual precautionary measures.


Runoff to sewer may cause fire or explosion hazard.

FIRST AID MEASURES:

Eye & Skin:In case of contact, eyes are immediately flushed with clean, low-pressure water for at least 15 min. Eyelids are held open to ensure adequate flushing. Medical attention is obtained if irritation or redness develops in skin.

Ingestion: VOMITING SHOULD NOT BE INDUCED. Liquids should not be given.

Inhalation: The person should be removed to fresh air. If person is not breathing artificial respiration to be provided. If necessary,



additional oxygen to be provided once breathing is restored if trained to do so. Medical attention to be sought immediately.

4 Fuel oil - - Highly toxic

To be handled carefully with the usual precautionary measures.


FIRST AID MEASURES:

Eye & Skin:In case of contact, eyes are immediately flushed with clean, low-pressure water for at least 15 min. Eyelids are held open to ensure adequate flushing. Medical attention is obtained if irritation or redness develops in skin.

Ingestion: VOMITING SHOULD NOT BE INDUCED. Liquids should not be given.

Inhalation: The person should be removed to fresh air. If person is not breathing artificial respiration to be provided. If necessary, additional oxygen to be provided once breathing is restored if trained to do so. Medical attention to be sought immediately.



7.9.2 FIRE HAZARDS

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX (F & EI)

The Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis System is a step-by-step objective evaluation of the

realistic fire, explosion and reactivity potential of process equipment and its contents. The

quantitative measurements used in the analysis are based on historic loss data, the energy

potential of the material under study, and the extent to which loss prevention practices are

currently applied.

The purpose of the F&EI system is to:

1. QUANTIFY the expected damage of potential fire, explosion and reactivity

incidents in realistic terms.

2. IDENTIFY equipment that would be likely to contribute to the creation or escalation

of an incident.

3. COMMUNICATE the F&EI risk potential to management.

The most important goal of the F&EI System is to make the engineer aware of the loss

potential of each process area and to help the engineer identify ways to lessen the severity

and resultant rupee loss of potential incidents in an efficient and cost effective manner.

The F&EI is used in the Dow Risk Review Process. Determination of the F&EI is done in

conducting a Process Hazard Analysis or Level I Risk Review.

The Dow F&EI system attempts to determine the realistic maximum loss that can occur to a

process plant (or process unit) or related facility - a loss that could actually be experienced

under the most adverse operating conditions. The calculation is based on quantifiable data.

Finite spill rates, process temperature in relation to material flash points and boiling points

and reactivity are just a few of the many contributors to a probable incident.

The system can be applied if handling a minimum of approximately 454 kg of a flammable or

reactive material.

2.PROCEDURE FOR RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS

Procedure for risk analysis calculations is shown in the fid 7.7 below as under.

Fig 7.7: Procedure for risk analysis calculations



3. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Fire and Explosion Index system assumes that a process unit handles a minimum of

2268 kg, or about 2.27 m3 of a flammable, combustible or reactive material. If less material

is involved, generally the risk will be overstated. However, F&EI calculations can provide

meaningful results for pilot plants if they handle at least 454 kg or about 0.454

m3 of combustible or reactive material.

B. Careful consideration is needed when equipment is arranged in series and the items are

not effectively isolated from each other.

4.CALCULATION OF F & EI FOR THE STORAGE AREA OF M/S. RL FINECHEM PVT. LTD.,.

The warehouse/storage area is considered for the calculation of the fire & explosion index.

The solvents & fuels are stored in large quantities in the factory premises. The calculation of

F & EI is shown in the following stages.

Selection of pertinent process unit

Determination of Material Factor

Calculation of General Process Hazards

Factor (F1)

Calculation of Special Process Hazards

Factor (F2)

Determination of Process Unit Hazards Factor

F3 = F1 x F2

Determination of F&EI F&EI = F3 x Material Factor



Step 1: Determination of material factors (MF)

Step 2: Determination of general process hazards factor (F1)

Step 3: Determination of special process hazards factor (F2)

Step 4: Determination of process unit hazard factor (F3)

F3 = F1 x F2

Step 5: Determination of Fire & Explosion Index (F & EI)

F & EI = F3 x material factor (MF)

Step 6: Determination of degree of hazard potential

The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the

criteria given in the following table 7.14 as under.

Table 7.14: Degree of hazard

F&EI range Degree of hazard

1 - 60 Light

61 - 96 Moderate

97 - 127 Intermediate

128 - 158 Heavy

159 - up Severe

Following table 7.5 provides the details of the identified potential hazards and the systems

suggested to minimize the hazards in the industry.

Table 7.15: Preventive systems provided in the plant

Unit Hazard identified

Provision

Solvent use and

mixing

Spill of solvents

Fire

Health hazard

Eye wash / Shower rooms.

Adequate firefighting equipment is

provided at all storage areas and in

various parts of the plant.

MSDS sheets are available.

Use of PPE while handing the

solvents.



Diesel and furnace

oil

Fire CO2, extinguishing powder or water

jet, alcohol - resistant foam.

Factory fire bridge.

Unloading trucks Fire/Explosion

Factory fire bridge and fire fighting

systems.

7.9.3 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT (MCA) ANALYSIS

The MCA scenarios were short-listed based on the storage quantities and properties of the

chemicals, (hazard identification). MCA analysis studies were conducted for following scenario

"Pool fire due to rupture/leakage and accumulation of solvents and fuel".

7.9.4 FIRE DAMAGE

A flammable liquid in a pool will burn with a large turbulent diffusion flame. This release of

heat is based on the heat of combustion and the burning rate of the liquid. A part of the heat

is radiated while the rest is convected away by the rising hot air and combustion products.

The radiation may heat the contents of a nearby storage or process unit to above its ignition

temperature and thus result in the spread of fire. The radiation may also cause severe burns

or fatalities of workers or fire fighters located within a certain distance. Hence, it will be

important to know beforehand the damage potential of a flammable liquid pool likely to be

created due to leakage or catastrophic failure of a storage or process vessel. This will help to

decide the type of protective clothing for the workers/fire fighters, the time they can be in

vicinity of the fire (without any significant danger to life and health), the fire extinguishing

systems needed and the protection needs for the nearby storage/process vessels. The

following table 7.16 & 7.17 presents the damage effect on equipment at different thermal

radiation levels &Radiation exposure and lethality.

Table 7.16 :- Damage due to incident radiation intensities

Sl.

no.

Incident radiation

(kW/m2)

Type of damage intensity

Damage to equipment Damage to people

1 37.5 Damage to process

equipment

100% lethality in 1 min.

1% lethality in 10 s.

2 25.0 Minimum energy required to

ignite wood at indefinitely

long exposure without a

flame.

50% lethality in 1 min.

Significant injury in 10 s.

3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation

intensity allowed on

thermally unprotected

adjoining equipment.

-



4 12.5 Minimum energy to ignite

with a flame; melts plastic

tubing

1 % lethality in 1 min.

5 4.5 - Causes pain if duration is

longer than 20 s; however

blistering is un-likely (first

degree burns)

6 1.6 - Causes no discomfort on long

exposures.

Table 7.17 :- Radiation exposure and lethality

Radiation intensity

(kW/m2)

Exposure time

(s)

Lethality

(%)

Degree of burns

1.6 - 0 No discomfort even

after long exposure.

4.5 20 0 1st

4.5 50 0 1st

8.0 20 0 1st

8.0 50 <1 3rd

8.0 60 <1 3rd

12.0 20 <1 2nd

12.0 50 8 3rd

12.5 60 1 3rd

25.0 60 50 3rd

37.5 60 100 3rd

For tank storage, it is assumed that the fuel leaks due to tank failure or rupture develops into a

pool and gets ignited (pool fire). Pool fire can also take place in case of pipeline rupture and

accumulation of solvents or fuels.

Following are the assumptions of the MCA analysis

no fire detection and mitigation measures are initiated;

secondary containment (dykes) that will confine flow of liquid and liquid absorption into

the ground is not considered;

secondary fire at public road and building is not likely to happen, since they are far away

from the storage area;

the effect of smoke on reduction of source radiation intensity has not been considered;

therefore hazard distances calculated tend to be conservative;

shielding effect of intervening trees or other structures has not been considered.

Adequate fire detection and protection systems needs to be installed to handle such

emergencies as suggested in the following table 7.18 as under.



Table 7.18: - Fire protection system proposed for M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.,

Suggested system

1. For unloading area (solvents and fuel), automatic detection system and manually

operated medium velocity water spray system along with foam system should be

provided.

2. An adequate number of portable chemical fire extinguishers will be installed at suitable

locations throughout the plant area. The extinguisher will be used during the early

stages of fire to prevent spreading while handling flammable solvents.

3. Hydrant system covering the entire plant including all important auxiliaries and

buildings will be installed. The system will be complete with piping, valves,

instrumentation, hoses, nozzles, hydrants valves etc.

4. All electrical fittings in hazardous area should be of flame-proof type.

7.9.5 SALIENT FEATURES OF RISK AUDITING AND ASSESSMENT

The risks associated with the Aromatic Chemicals manufacturing industry are commensurate

with their rapid growth and development. Apart from their utility, chemicals and the raw

materials used in their production have their own inherent properties and hazards. Some of

them can be flammable, explosive, toxic or corrosive etc. The whole lifecycle of a chemical

should be considered when assessing its dangers and benefits. Though many of chemical

accidents have a limited effect, occasionally there are disasters like the one in Bhopal, India,

in 1984, where lakhs of people were affected and LPG explosion in Vizag refinery where huge

property damage in addition to 60 deaths was experienced. Therefore chemicals have the

potential to affect the nearby environment also.

Design and pre-modification review: Improper layout like location of plant in downwind

side of tank farm, fire station near process area, process area very close to public road

and wrong material of selection had caused severe damages to the work and outside

environment.

Chemical risk assessment: Not assessed for new chemicals from the point of view of

compatibility, storage, fire protection, toxicity, hazard index rating, fire and explosion

hazards.

Process safety management: HAZOP, FTA, F&E Index calculation, reliability assessment

of process equipment, incorporating safety trips and interlocks, scrubbing system, etc.

not done before effecting major process changes, lack of Management of Change

procedure (MoC), etc.

Electrical safety: Hazardous area classification, protection against static electricity,

improper maintenance of specialized equipment like flameproof etc. were ignored.



Safety audits: Periodical assessment of safety procedures and practices, performance of

safety systems and gadgets along with follow up measures were not carried out.

Emergency planning: Lack of comprehensive risk analysis indicating the impact of

consequences and specific written down and practiced emergency procedures along

with suitable facilities had increased the severity of the emergency situations.

Training: Safety induction and periodical refresher training for the regular employees

and contract workmen were not carried out.

Risk management & insurance planning: Thorough identification and analysis of all risks

and insurance planning were not done so that interruption risks and public liability risks

could also be managed effectively.

7.9.6 FIRE PROTECTION

1.Indian Standards

IS 2189 - Standard for automatic fire detection and alarm system. IS 2190 - Code of practice for selection, installation and maintenance of first aid fire

extinguishers. IS 3844 - Code of practice for installation and maintenance of internal fire hydrants and

hose reels. IS 6382 - Carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system - fixed design and installation.

2.Oil Industry Safety Directorate

OISD 117 - Fire Protection Facilities for Petroleum Depots and Terminals. OISD 142 - Inspection of firefighting equipment and systems. OISD 158 - Recommended Practices on Storage and Handling of Bulk Liquefied

Petroleum Gas.

3.NFPA Standards

NFPA 12 - Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishing Systems. NFPA 654 - Prevention of Fire & Dust in Pharmaceutical Industries. NFPA 1600 - Disaster Management. NFPA 921 - Fire & Explosion Investigation. NFPA 45 - Fire protection for Laboratories using Chemicals.

4. OHS (OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY)



IS 14489 - Code of Practice for Occupational Safety & Health Audit. NFPA 101 - Life Safety Code.

5.ER (ELECTRICAL RISK)

Hazardous Area Classification (base standard: IS 5572) Selection of Electrical Equipment for Hazardous Areas (base standard: IS 5571) Lightning Protection (base document: IS: 2309 /NFPA 780 /BS 6651) NFPA 70 B - Recommended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance NFPA 70 E - Standard for Electrical Safety in Employee Work places

7.9.7 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) studies Failure Tree Analysis (FTA) Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Primary Hazard Analysis (PHA) using Dow Index Risk Assessment (with risk ranking technique)

7.9.8 ELECTRICAL RISK ASSESSMENT Review of Hazardous Area Classification Lightning Protection Risk Assessment Identification & Control of Electro-Static Hazards Review of electrical Preventive Maintenance System Electrical Risk Assessment (fire, shock explosion) using Semi-Quantitative Risk Ranking

(SQRR) technique.

7.9.9 FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT Identification & assessment of fire risks during operations in receipt, storage, transfer

and handling of chemicals (raw materials and finished products). Identification & control of ignition sources in areas where flammable chemicals are

stored / handled / transferred. o Review of chemical compatibility in storage areas and to suggest appropriate fire

loss control measures. o Review of fire detection measures adopted in the plant & to suggest suitable

improvement measures. o Review of the various active (fire hydrant, sprinkler, portable fire extinguishers)

and passive fire protection requirements for chemical storage and handling areas and to suggest improvements as necessary.

o Review of contractor safety awareness (chemical spill, fire fighting, emergency communication, knowledge of plant hazards & safety regulations) and to recommend suitable improvement measures to enhance contractor safety.

o Review of safety awareness and safety training requirements (training identification and efficacy) of plant employees with respect to hazards present in the plant.

Fire risk assessment will be carried out based on techniques like Matrix method, Hani Raafat Risk Calculator. The consequence, likelihood and exposure of each hazard are arrived using a



systematic approach and will help to determine the relative importance of hazard and focus on significant risks. 7.10 RISK ANALYSIS & EMERGENCY PLAN

Identification of scenarios of potential disasters / emergencies leading to loss of life, property damage etc. and qualitative assessment of their likelihood.

Quantitative risk assessment for selected scenarios of major credible events. Recommendations for risk control measures wherever applicable. Preparation of onsite emergency preparedness plan.

7.10.1 RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE PLANNING

Identification of all major internal and external risks including the natural risks and analysis of the impact of above risks.

Review of existing risk control measures and offering comments.

Scrutiny of all existing major insurance policies in respect of:

o Rationalization of basic rate of premium and widening of covers. o Applicability / eligibility of discounts in premium. o Application of suitable clauses, warranties and conditions.

Identification of possible areas for refund of premium and suggestions regarding procedure for the same.

Selection of insurance coverage on the basis of risk analysis.

Providing guidelines for fixation of sum insured and illustrating the same on selected equipment.

Evaluation of business interruption exposure due to identified risks.

Providing guidelines on documentation requirements, procedures for claims under various policies, evaluation of insurers.

7.10.2 RISK MANAGEMENT TRAINING

Specialized and focussed training, if imparted effectively, can contribute significantly to Risk Management. Expert faculty, carefully selected training module, interactive and participate approach, useful training material, case studies and syndicate exercises could help in having effective risk management system in place.

The training topics for bulk drug industry could be:

Chemical safety Safety with compressed gases Solvent safety Hazard identification techniques Industrial risk management Fire prevention and protection Electrical risk management



Emergency preparedness Safety management system Accident prevention Personal Protective Equipment

7.10.3 GENERAL GUIDELINES TO BE ADOPTED BY THE UNIT FOR MINIMIZING ASSOCIATED RISKS AT M/S. RL FINECHEM PVT. LTD.,

The plant should draft an environmental health and safety policy and work adhering to it.

1. The study is based on assumptions that the storage are designed, constructed and operated in accordance with the safe engineering practices and standards. It is recommended that strict adherence to the standards, accepted practices and operating maintenance & safety procedures are followed not only during the installation of the plant but also throughout the life of the plant.

2. Wind direction plays a major role in case of chemical releases. Hence adequate wind socks are to be provided at strategic locations for people to notice and take appropriate actions in case of an emergency.

3. Non essential personnel should be located away from the main plant area. These include office staff, administration, accounts etc. and they should be restricted to the administrative building.

4. The main plant area within the plant premises should be marked as high safety zone and only operation and maintenance personnel and authorized staff/visitor should be allowed to enter in this area. Any person entering this area, be it visitor or plant personnel must be equipped with safety gadgets and must be made aware of the assembly points.

5. The safety instructions and safe operating conditions (for the plant and machinery) recommended by the manufacturers / vendors should be strictly followed.

6. Maintenance plays a vital role in proper upkeep of the plant. An equally important function is monitoring of health of equipment, pipelines and machinery. The following systems will be adopted thickness survey (including supports), maintenance history cards, preventive maintenance practices

These will not only improve plant performance but also safety. It should be pointed out that the failure rates of equipment and pipes are influenced by the maintenance practice followed. When the plant starts aging, it is suggested that due attention be given to this aspect when formulating a maintenance strategy. 7.10.4 ACCIDENT REPORTING 1. INTRODUCTION



An accident is an unplanned event that results in injury, damage to property or some other loss. The law requires that certain work-related accidents are reported to the local authority or the Health and Safety Executive.

All accidents to employees, however minor, should be recorded. This is a requirement under social security legislation. As a result of a workplace injury an employee may need to claim for benefits in the future, and the relevant checks will be made to confirm that the accident occurred at work.

Reporting and recording procedures vary. Employers need to be sure that they satisfy all legal reporting requirements for employees and non-employees, and take measures to monitor accidents. As part of the reactive monitoring process, accident records are needed to assess whether the existing controls are adequate or to identify if trends are developing and to implement new procedures. 2. ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT The following actions are to be taken in the event of an accident/incident Area to be made safe if necessary or possible. First-aider to be contacted if there is an injured person. Alternatively, Security can be

contacted for first-aid assistance. Report accident/incident to the relevant manager and/or safety officer. The safety

officer must investigate the accident recording corrective actions,sign the form and forward a copy to the safety office within 4 days.

3. REPORTS TO BE GENERATED IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENTS The following reports have to be generated

Accidents involving employees, including minor injuries. Accidents involving non-employees e.g visitors. Incidents where no one is injured but there is a potential for injury. Physical assaults or verbal abuse of employees. Dangerous occurrences such as fires, gas leaks or explosions, chemical spillages,

damage to materials, failure or collapse of equipment etc. Work-related ill-health from use of chemicals, occupational asthma, musculo-skeletal

pain etc.

4. THE REPORTING OF INJURIES, DISEASES AND DANGEROUS OCCURRENCES REGULATIONS The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 1995 requires the Industry to notify certain work related injuries, illness and “dangerous occurrences” (summarized below) to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) at the earliest practicable time after the event. This reporting responsibility will be with the safety office staff or the duty manager in the absence of safety personnel. Any incident that results in a serious injury to an employee including



A break or fracture of any bone except those of the fingers or toes; Any amputation; Dislocation of the shoulder, hip, knee or spine; Loss of sight (whether temporary or permanent); Chemical or hot burn to the eye or any penetrating injury to the eye; An injury resulting from electric shock or electrical burns; An injury that leads to a loss of consciousness or requires resuscitation; An injury resulting in an employee being unable to perform regular duties or being

away from work for 3 days or more; An injury that requires the injured employee to be hospitalised for more than 24 hours. Any accident or incident, connected with or arising out of the industrial work activity,

that results in a 'non-employee', i.e someone who is not a industry employee, being taken from the scene of the accident to hospital for treatment. This is regardless whether or not they are admitted into hospital.

Any dangerous occurrence such as fires. Specified diseases associated with certain work activities, or exposure to certain

substances. 5. RESPONSIBILITIES 1. Employees It is the responsibility of individual employees to report accidents/incidents to their heads of process as soon as possible. In most cases, individual employees will complete their own accident report form but it is important that this form is forwarded to the safety officer. 2. Safety officer Safety officer must ensure that all accidents are investigated to identify underlying causes, the accident/investigation report form is completed and the original is forwarded to the safety office within 4 days of the accident. The safety officer should recommend appropriate corrective actions and ensure that risk assessments are revised if necessary. 3. Managers Managers must ensure that corrective actions are implemented and communicated to all relevant persons. If an employee is absent as a result of an accident then the manager or safety officer must complete the form on his/her behalf. 4. Safety office Maintaining records:record of incidents and investigations reports will be maintained by the Safety Office according to statutory requirements.



Investigating: The safety office will investigate all serious incidents/dangerous occurrences/near misses/diseases. Monitoring: The safety office will monitor the details and information provided on the accident investigation report form, follow-up on corrective actions and report trends to the safety officer. The incident and accident investigation and reporting procedure will be audited as part of each area’s Health and Safety Management audit.

6. Incident/accident reporting and investigation flow chart for work-related accidents/incident and near misses

*Work-related accidents/incidents involving employees

Accidents/incidents involving non-

employees i.e visitors

Major injury ** orfatalit

y

Over 3 days incapacity or absence from work



7.10.5 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDIES CARRIED OUT FOR M/S. RL FINECHEM PVT. LTD., The risk assessment studies carried out for the industry, M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.,has covered various aspects encompassing hazard identification, severity mapping for fire and spillages, MCA analysis studies etc. Based on the above it can be concluded that there are ample risks associated with the handling of various solvents and fuel as elucidated in the severity matrix studies. Suitable fire protection system and general guidelines to be adopted by theindustry and preventive systems provided to prevent or reduce the hazards have been proposed. The management of M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd., is committed to the implementation of the recommendations of the risk assessment report in true spirits.

No

Fatality or taken from the scene

of accident to hospital

for

treatment

Contact process head or

manager on duty immediately

Investigate and send completed accident form to

safety office within 4 days

All other accidents

including acts of violence against staff and near

misses

Yes

*Work-related accidents, near misses and illnesses are those that are attributed to work activity, equipment and substances, condition of the premises or the level of supervision.

**Major injuries include fractures (except fingers and toes), amputations, loss of sight, 24 hrs hospitalization etc.



7.10.6 AIR POLLUTION DISPERSION MODELING STUDIES 1. INTRODUCTION Atmospheric dispersion modeling is the mathematical simulation of how air pollutants disperse in the ambient atmosphere. It is performed with computer programs that solve the mathematical equations and algorithms which simulate the pollutant dispersion. The dispersion models are used to estimate or to predict the downwind concentration of air pollutants emitted from sources such as industrial plants and vehicular traffic. Such models are important to governmental agencies tasked with protecting and managing the ambient air quality. The models are typically employed to determine whether existing or proposed new industrial facilities are or will be in compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) in the United States and other nations. The models also serve to assist in the design of effective control strategies to reduce emissions of harmful air pollutants.

In the present study prediction of impacts on the air environment has been carried out employing U.S. EPA AERMOD dispersion model, 1996 – 2009 Lakes Environmental Software, Version 7.1.0 and designed for multiple sources for predicting the maximum ground level concentration (GLC). 2. MODEL INPUT DATA The major air emissions at the site of M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd. are SPM, SO2 and NOx from boilers and DGs. The Proponents have proposed to install column scrubbers & dust collectors to the process section stacks. Also the manufacturing process involves reactions in completely closed reactors and therefore no emissions are anticipated. The site specific details considered as input data for the software (AERMOD view by Lakes Environmental) to predict the impacts on the air environment are given in the following tables. Data considered for calculation of GLC is given in the table 7.19 as under.

Table 7.19: Data considered for calculation of GLC

Particulars Sources

DG SET (500 KVA)

Boiler (3 TPH)

Boiler (3 TPH)

Stack height, m 7 ARL 30 AGL 30 AGL

Stack diameter, m 0.22 0.49 0.49

Flue gas temperature, 0C 194 105 105

Gas exit velocity, m/s 8.58 7.97 7.97

Emission rate, g/s

PM10 0.00149 6.72 0.0106

SO2 0.02734 0.49 0.0490

NOx 0.0447 0.36 0.0360



CO 0.3874 0.32 0.0320

Acid mist/VOCs - - -

7.10.7 METEOROLOGICAL DATA Data recorded at the site for one year period (2015) for wind speed, direction and temperature has been used for computations. In order to conduct a refined air dispersion modeling short term air quality dispersion models, the site specific hourly meteorological data measured at the site is pre-processed using U.S. EPA AERMET program. 1. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS The simulations were made to evaluate incremental short-term concentrations due to proposed project. In the short-term simulations, the incremental concentrations were estimated to obtain an

optimum description of variations in concentrations within study area of 10 km radius. The

predicted results are tabulated in the following table.

Table 7.20 shows the Predicted incremental short-term concentrations due to the proposed project. Fig 7.8 shows Suspended Particulate Matter (PM10) isotherms for the proposed project for i) 24 hours – 1st highest value, ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile, iii) Annual Fig 7.9shows the Sulfur di-oxide (SO2) isotherms for proposed project for i) 24 hours – 1st highest value, ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile, iii) Annual Fig 7.10shows the Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) isotherms for proposed project for i) 24 hours – 1st highest value, ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile and iii) Annual. Fig 7.11shows the Carbon monoxide (CO) isotherms for proposed project for i) 1 hour – 1st highest value, ii) 1 hour – 98 percentile, iii) 8 hours – 1st highest value, iv) 8 hours – 98 percentile. The predicted incremental short term concentrations due to the proposed project with the the Resultant maximum 24 hourly concentrations is shown in the table 7.20 as under.

Table 7.20: Predicted incremental short-term concentrations due to the proposed project

Time Maximum predicted concentrations, µg/m3

Direction and distance of occurrence

24 hour Annual 24 hour Annual

1st highest values

98 percentile

1st highest values

98 percentile

PROPOSED



Suspended Particulate

Matter (PM10)

0.47569 0.35737 0.06317 Site Boundary

Site Boundary

Site Boundar

y

Sulfur di-oxide (SO2)

9.06439 6.74192 1.3740 0.156 km – North

West

Site Boundary

0.33 km – North West

Oxides of nitrogen

(NOx)

14.81998 11.02281 2.0104 Site Boundary

Site Boundary

Site Boundary

Carbon monoxide

(CO)

1 hr – 1.2544 8 hr – 1.6896

1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

0.1362 Site Boundary

Site Boundary

Site Boundary

Fig 7.8: Suspended Particulate Matter (PM) isotherms for the proposed project

i) 24 hours – 1st highest value



ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile



iii) Annual



Fig 7.9: Sulfur di-oxide (SO2) isotherms for proposed project




iii) Annual



Fig 7.10: Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) isotherms for proposed project




iii) Annual



Fig 7.11: Carbon monoxide (CO) isotherms for proposed project

i) 1 hour – 1st highest value



ii) 1 hour – 98 percentile



iii) 8 hours – 98 percentile



iv) Annual



2. COMMENTS The maximum short-term incremental ground-level concentrations are superimposed on the baseline data to get the likely resultant levels after the establishment of the proposed project and resultant maximum 24 hourly concentrations is given in the table 7.21 as under.

Table 7.21: Resultant maximum 24 hourly concentrations

Pollutant Incremental concentrations, µg/m3

Max. baseline concentrations, µg/m3

Resultant concentrations, µg/m3

Limits as per MoEF, µg/m3 for industrial areas (24 hrs)



PROJECT SITE (A1)

PM10 0.35737 24 24.35737 100

SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80

NOx 11.02281 8.53 19.55281 80

CO 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

Nil 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

4,000 – 1 hr 2,000 – 8 hrs

A2-thumakunta

PM10 0.35737 32 32.35737 100

SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80

NOx 11.02281 9.7 20.72281 80

CO 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

Nil 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

4,000 – 1 hr 2,000 – 8 hrs





(A3) ramachandra puram

PM10 0.35737 28.66 29.01737 100

SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80

NOx 11.02281 7.76 18.78281 80

CO 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

Nil 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

4,000 – 1 hr 2,000 – 8 hrs

(A4) huchodanahalli

PM10 0.35737 32.33 32.68737 100

SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80

NOx 11.02281 9.73 20.75281 80

CO 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

Nil 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

4,000 – 1 hr 2,000 – 8 hrs





(A5) gollapuram

PM10 0.35737 30.33 30.68737 100

SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80

NOx 11.02281 9.23 20.25281 80

CO 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

Nil 1 hr –0.84605 8 hr – 1.16715

4,000 – 1 hr 2,000 – 8 hrs

A1: Project site; A2: Thumakunta; A3: Ramachandrapura; 4: Huchodanahalali; 5: Gollapuram;



According to MoEF air quality standards (as per the notification dated 16th November 2009 for industrial, residential & rural areas) 24 hourly or 8 hourly or 1 hourly monitored values, as applicable, shall be complied with 98% of the time in a year; 2% of the time, they may exceed the limits but not on two consecutive days of monitoring. Therefore the 98% values are considered for estimation of the incremental concentration. The above table indicates that the cumulative resultant ambient air quality after proposed project operation will be within the ambient air quality limits specified by MoEF as per the notification dated 16th November 2009 for industrial, residential & rural areas. 7.10.8 PUBLIC CONSULTATION The proposed project comes under notified industrial area. The public hearing was already conducted for this notified industrial area (for the Development of Industrial area Ohase I & II at Gowribidanur in district Chikkaballapur (Karnataka) by Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board) and its reference number: Terms of Reference (TOR) Letter F.No. 21-65/2012-IA.III and F.No. 21-66/2012-IA.III vide letter dated 10/10/2013. Therefore public hearinh is exempted for the proposed project. 7.10.9 SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, R&R ACTION PLANS The proposed project is establishment of API’s manufacturing industry with R & D activity. The land is sufficient for the proposed proposal & therefore no re-settlement &re-habilitation is envisaged.

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