risk assessment report -...

1

RISK ASSESSMENT REPORTfor

“PROPOSED EXPANSION OF BULK DRUGS,INTRERMEDIATES AND R&D PRODUCTS”

at

M/s. SAI LIFE SCIENCES LTD

KIADB INDUSTRIAL AREAVillage : KOLHAR

Taluk : BIDARDistrict : BIDAR

State : KARNATAKA(Project termed under Schedule 5(f), Category B, Synthetic

Organic Chemicals)

PREPARED BYHUBERT ENVIRO CARE SYSTEMS (P) LTD

CHENNAI

MARCH 2017

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................4

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT ...................................................................................................... 4

1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................................4

1.3 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED .................................................................................................... 4

2 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ...........................................................................................5

2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS & RELEASE SCENARIOS ...............................................5

2.1.1 FACTORS CONSIDERED FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS ...............................5

3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS...........................................................................................................11

3.1 SCENARIOS POSSIBLE ...........................................................................................................11

3.2 WEATHER PROBABILITIES...................................................................................................11

3.2.1 WIND VELOCITY & STABILITY CLASS......................................................................11

3.2.2 WEATHER INPUT ............................................................................................................11

3.3 ACCIDENT SCENARIOS FOR THIS PROJECT.....................................................................12

3.3.1 Consequence analysis for solvent storage tank ...................................................................12

3.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS.............................................................108

4 MITIGATIVE MEASURES.............................................................................................................109

4.1 SUMMARY OF RISK ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS............................................................109

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING SAFETY..........................................................109

3

LIST OF TABLESTable 2.1 Chemical properties and classification .........................................................................................6Table 2.2 Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation ..........................................................................8Table 2.3 Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity.................................................................................9Table 3.1 Pasquill – Giffard Atmospheric Stability....................................................................................11Table 3.2 Atmospheric data (Manual Input for the worst scenario) ...........................................................12Table 3.3 Input details of solvent storage tank ...........................................................................................12Table 3.4 Consequence analysis for Solvent Storage Tanks.......................................................................13Table 3-5 Chemical flowing from underground Storage tank to reaction tank pipeline details .................68Table 3-6: Estimated distance due to failure of Storage tank pipeline........................................................69

4

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

The purpose of the study is to identify and assess those hazards and risks arising from

Proposed Expansion of Bulk Drugs, Intermediates and R&D Products at plot no. 79/B, 80A,

80B, 81A & 82, and Sy. No. 280, Kolhar Industrial Area, KIADB, Bidar District, Karnataka

State.

1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis including identification, screening of scenarios,

consequence analysis of the various risk scenarios, recommendation and preparation of

reports and relevant drawing showing damage and risk contours.

The scope of the study mainly involves:

Identifications of Hazards

Consequence modelling

Flammable area of Vapour cloud explosion modelling

Jet Fire

Pool fire analysis

Dispersion of vapour cloud analysis

Impact limits identifications

Contour mapping of the risk on the layouts.

Mitigating measures for handling and storage to reduce impacts & prevent incidents.

1.3 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED

The Risk Assessment is been carried out by using the ALOHA software (Aerial Locations

of Hazardous Atmospheres) & PHAST.

5

2 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS & RELEASE SCENARIOS

A technique commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks,

ruptures and fractures of all process pipelines and vessels/tanks. The following data were

collected to envisage scenarios:

Solvent Tank conditions (phase, temperature, pressure) and dimensions.

Pipelines connected from storage tanks to reaction process

2.1.1 FACTORS CONSIDERED FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS

In any installation, main hazard arises due to loss of containment during handling of

flammable and toxic chemicals. The Chemicals are classified according to the properties and

hazard class given by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is responsible for 300

consensus codes and standards intended to eliminate death, injury, property and economic

loss due to fire, electrical and related hazards.

NFPA classification for Health, Flammability & Reactivity of a chemical is on a scale from

0-4 least to worst. As per the NFPA Rating on the scale from 0-4 the chemicals having 3 &

4 are considered are highly hazardous and considered for analysis.

Health Fire

0-No hazard 0-will not burn

1-can cause significant irritation 1- must be preheated before ignition occur

2-can cause temporary incapacitation or

residual injury

2-must be heated or high ambient temperature

to burn

3-can cause serious or permanent injury 3- can be ignited under almost all ambient

4-can be lethal 4-will vaporize and readily burn at normal

temp

The proposed chemicals list are mentioned in Table 2.1:

6

Table 2.1 Chemical properties and classification

S.No Tank

Name

Solvent Boiling

Point

(°C)

Flash

point

(°C)

NFPA Rating

Fire Health Reactivity

1 T 1 Hexane 68 -22.5 3 1 0

2 T 2 IsoPropylAlcohol 82 12 3 1 0

3 T 3 Cyclo Hexane 80.55 -20 3 1 0

4 T 4 Methanol 64.7 12 3 1 0

5 T 5 Acetone 56.11 -17.8 3 1 0

6 T 6 Dichloromethane 39.78 - 1 2 0

7 T 7 Ethyl acetate 77.22 -3.0 3 1 1

8 T 8 Toluene 110.55 7 3 2 0

9 T 9 N-Heptane 98.33 -3.9 3 1 0

10 RS 01 Ethanol 78.33 40 3 2 0

The fire hazard is considered for all the solvents except the Dichloromethane in which the

fire hazard is minimum. The health hazard is not observed in any solvent.

2.2 TYPES OF OUTCOME EVENTS

In this section of the report we describe the probabilities associated with the sequence of

occurrences which must take place for the incident scenarios to produce hazardous effects

and the modelling of their effects.

Considering the present case the outcomes expected are

- Jet fire

- Flash Fire

- Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

- Pool Fire

JET FIRE

Jet fire occurs when a pressurized release (of a flammable gas or vapour) is ignited by any

source. They tend to be localized in effect and are mainly of concern in establishing the

potential for domino effects and employee safety zones rather than for community risks.

7

The jet fire model is based on the radiant fraction of total combustion energy, which is

assumed to arise from a point slowly along the jet flame path. The jet dispersion model

gives the jet flame length.

FLASH FIRE

A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapour cloud resulting from a release of

flammable material into the open air, which after mixing with air, ignites. A flash fire results

from the ignition of a released flammable cloud in which there is essentially no increase in

combustion rate. The ignition source could be electric spark, a hot surface, and friction

between moving parts of a machine or an open fire. Part of the reason for flash fires is that,

flammable fuels have a vapour temperature, which is less than the ambient Temperature.

Hence, as a result of a spill, they are dispersed initially by the negative buoyancy of cold

vapours and subsequently by the atmospheric turbulence. After the release and dispersion of

the flammable fuel the resulting vapour cloud is ignited and when the fuel vapour is not

mixed with sufficient air prior to ignition, it results in diffusion fire burning. Therefore the

rate at which the fuel vapour and air are mixed together during combustion determines the

rate of burning in the flash fire.

The main dangers of flash fires are radiation and direct flame contact. The size of the

flammable cloud determines the area of possible direct flame contact effects. Radiation

effects on a target depend on several factors including its distance from the flames, flame

height, flame emissive power, local atmospheric transitivity and cloud size.

VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (VCE)

Vapour cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent

dispersion phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapour cloud. Turbulence is the

governing factor in blast generation, which could intensify combustion to the level that will

result in an explosion. Obstacles in the path of vapour cloud or when the cloud finds a

confined area, as under the bullets, often create turbulence. Insignificant level of

confinement will result in a flash fire. The VCE will result in overpressures.

It may be noted that VCE’s have been responsible for very serious accidents involving

severe property damage and loss of lives.

8

POOL FIRE

This represents a situation when flammable liquid spillage forms a pool over a liquid or

solid surface and gets ignited. Flammable liquids can be involved in pool fires where they

are stored and transported in bulk quantities. Early pool fire was caused when the steady

state is reached between the outflow of flammable material from the container and complete

combustion of the flammable material when the ignition source is available. Late pool fires

are associated with the difference between the release of material and the complete

combustion of the material simultaneously. Late pool fires are common when large quantity

of flammable material is released within short time.

2.3 Heat Radiation

The effect of fire on a human being is in the form of burns. There are three categories of

burn such as first degree, second degree and third degree burns. The consequences caused

by exposure to heat radiation are a function of:

The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];

The exposure duration [sec];

The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).

The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for second-

degree burns are given in the table below:

Table 2.2 Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation

Exposure Duration Radiation energy

(1% lethality,

kW/m2)

Radiation energy for

2nd degree burns,

kW/m2

Radiation energy for

first degree burns,

kW/m2

10 sec 21.2 16 12.5

30 sec 9.3 7 4

9

Table 2.3 Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity

INCIDENT RADIATION

– kW/m2

TYPE OF DAMAGE

0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation

1.6 No discomfort for long exposure

4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first

degree burns are likely)

9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. second degree burns after

20 sec.

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood,

melting plastic tubing’s etc.

37.5 Heavy Damage to process equipment

TYPE OF DAMAGE

The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the models

arising out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor and others. The

radiative output of the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent of mixing with air and

the flame temperature. Some fraction of the radiation is absorbed by carbon dioxide and water

vapour in the intervening atmosphere. Finally the incident flux at an observer location would

depend upon the radiation view factor, which is a function of the distance from the flame surface,

the observer’s orientation and the flame geometry.

Assumptions made for the study (As per the guidelines of CPR 18 E Purple Book)

The lethality of a jet fire is assumed to be 100% for the people who are caught in the flame.

Outside the flame area, the lethality depends on the heat radiation distances.

For the flash fires lethality is taken as 100% for all the people caught outdoors and for 10%

who are indoors within the flammable cloud. No fatality has been assumed outside the flash

fire area.

10

Explosion

In case of vapour cloud explosion, two physical effects may occur:

_ A flash fire over the whole length of the explosive gas cloud;

_ A blast wave, with typical peak overpressures circular around ignition source.

For the blast wave, the lethality criterion is based on:

A peak overpressure of 0.1bar will cause serious damage to 10% of the housing/structures.

Falling fragments will kill one of each eight persons in the destroyed buildings.

The following damage criteria may be distinguished with respect to the peak overpressures

resulting from a blast wave:

Peak Overpressure Damage Type Description

0.30 bar Heavy Damage Major damage to plant equipment

structure

0.10 bar Moderate Damage Repairable damage to plant

equipment & structure

0.03 bar Significant Damage Shattering of glass

0.01 bar Minor Damage Crack in glass

Assumptions for the study (As per the guidelines of CPR 18 E Purple Book)

Overpressure more than 0.3 bar corresponds approximately with 50% lethality.

An overpressure above 0.2 bar would result in 10% fatalities.

An overpressure less than 0.1 bar would not cause any fatalities to the public.

100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within the cloud proper.

11

3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

3.1 SCENARIOS POSSIBLE

As large number of failure cases can lead to the same type of consequences, representative

failure cases are selected for this analysis. The failure cases are based on conservative

assumptions. The scenarios are discussed one at a time.

3.2 WEATHER PROBABILITIES

3.2.1 WIND VELOCITY & STABILITY CLASS

As per CPR 18E there are 6 representative weather classes:

Table 3.1 Pasquill – Giffard Atmospheric Stability

S.No. Stability Class Weather Conditions

1 A Very unstable - Sunny, light wind

2 A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy

3 B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy

4 B/C Moderately unstable – moderate sunny and moderate wind

5 C Moderately unstable – very windy / sunny or overcast / light wind

6 C/D Moderate unstable – moderate sun and high wind

7 D Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast / windy night

8 E Moderately stable – less overcast and less windy night

9 F Stable – night with moderate clouds and light / moderate wind

10 G Very stable – possibly fog

3.2.2 WEATHER INPUT

The details of the risk assessment is given below

12

Table 3.2 Atmospheric data (Manual Input for the worst scenario)

Average Wind speed (m/s) 1.5

Stability Class 1.5/F, 5/D and 1.5/D

Wind Direction South West to North East

Temp (Celsius) 31.6

Humidity (%) 66

Source IMD

3.3 ACCIDENT SCENARIOS FOR THIS PROJECT

3.3.1 Consequence analysis for solvent storage tank

Table 3.3 Input details of solvent storage tank

S. NoDia(m)

length(m)

Volume(m3)

InternalTemperature

(0c)Solvents

1. 2.6 4.0 20 32 Hexane

2. 2.6 4.0 20 32 Iso Propyl Alcohol

3. 2.6 4.0 20 32 Cyclo Hexane

4. 2.6 4.0 20 32 Methanol

5. 2.6 4.0 20 32 Acetone

6. 2.6 4.0 20 32 Ethyl Acetate

7. 2.6 4.0 20 32 Toluene

8. 2.6 4.0 20 32 N - Heptane

9. 2.3 3.2 12 32 Ethanol

13

Table 3.4 Consequence analysis for Solvent Storage Tanks

S.No Description Event Impact criteria Consequence Distance (m)

Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

1 Leak of n-Hexane Storagetank

Dispersion of vaporcloud (VCE)

5250 ppm 27 11.19 29.16

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 17.32 14.61 17.36

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 13.07 14.11 13.12

Flash Fire 5250 ppm 26.99 13.75 29.15

Late Explosion worstcase radii

0.02068 bar 66.91 30.34 56.58

2 Catastrophic rupture of n-Hexane Storage tank

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 75.79 99.4 75.34

3 Leak of Isopropyl alcoholStorage tank


10000 ppm 63.46 29.81 63.33

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 21.69 19.07 21.88

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 49.65 51.38 49.65

Flash Fire 10000 ppm No explosion 29.45 63.21

14


Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

4 Catastrophic rupture ofIsopropyl alcohol Storagetank


10000 ppm 56.68 35.15 65.02

Flash Fire 10000 ppm 65.73 59.46 78.05

5 Leak of Methanol Storagetank


36500 ppm 55.16 18.39 36.86

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 29.39 25.31 29.63

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 43.19 44.72 43.19

Flash Fire 36500 ppm 55.97 22.89 35.98

6 Catastrophic rupture ofMethanol Storage tank


36500 ppm 85.74 28.56 45.11

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 90.56 93.81 90.36

7 Leak of Acetone Storagetank


13000 ppm 50.05 29.05 52.78

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 23.77 20.08 23.83

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 27.58 29.04 27.59

Flash Fire 13000 ppm 50.02 28.92 52.75

15


Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

8 Leak of Toluene Storagetank


6000 ppm 42.13 24.81 43.09

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 9.85 8.42 9.9

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 27.77 29.87 27.79

Flash Fire 6000 ppm 42.11 24.8 42.75


0.02068 bar 58.26 27.82 49.8

9 Catastrophic rupture ofToluene Storage tank


6000 ppm 55.89 31.89 59.58

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 81.69 104.13 81.59

Flash Fire 6000 ppm 60.27 56.79 72.23

10 Leak of N-HeptaneStorage tank

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 24.18 21.7 24.35

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 35.89 39.76 35.93

Flash Fire 5000 ppm 83.18 39.91 85.98

11 Catastrophic rupture of N-Heptane Storage tank


5000 ppm 81.83 49.07 81.58

16


Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

Flash Fire 5000 ppm 86.95 71.56 110.83

12 Leak of Ethanol Storagetank


21500 ppm 45.24 18.69 42.29

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 19.92 17.22 20.07

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 44.92 46.53 44.94

Flash Fire 21500 ppm 44.88 18.74 42.27

13 Catastrophic rupture ofEthanol Storage tank


21500 ppm 43.01 21.81 48.02

Flash Fire 21500 ppm 46.73 44.67 58.4

17

S.No Scenarios Event Impact Conc. Distance covered

by Solvent Tank

(m)

Effects

14 Leak of Cyclo Hexane

Storage tank

Thermal

radiation from

Pool Fire

Red (High) 10 Kw/(sq.m) <10 Potentially Lethal within 60sec

Orange

(Medium)

5 Kw/(sq.m) 13 2nd degree burns within 60sec

Yellow (Low) 2 Kw/(sq.m) 23 Pain within 60sec

Dispersion of

vapor cloud

(VCE)

Red (High) 10000 ppm 17 PAC-3

Orange

(Medium)

1700 ppm 44 PAC-2

Yellow (Low) 300 ppm 113 PAC-1

15 Catastrophic rupture of

Cyclo Hexane Storage

tank

Thermal

radiation from

Pool Fire

Red (High) 10 Kw/(sq.m) 71 Potentially Lethal within 60sec

Orange

(Medium)



Flammable

area of vapor

cloud

Red 7800 ppm 66 60% LEL = Flame Pockets

Yellow 1300 ppm 174 10% LEL

16 Leak of Ethyl acetate

Storage tank

Dispersion of

vapor cloud

(VCE)

Red (High) 10000 ppm 22 PAC-3

18

S.No Scenarios Event Impact Conc. Distance covered

by Solvent Tank

(m)

Effects

Orange

(Medium)

1700 ppm 57 PAC-2

Yellow (Low) 1200 ppm 69 PAC-1

Flammable

area of vapor

cloud



Thermal

radiation from

Pool Fire

Red (High) 10 Kw/(sq.m) <10 Potentially Lethal within 60sec

Orange

(Medium)



17 Catastrophic rupture of

Ethyl acetate Storage

tank

Flammable

area of vapor

cloud



Thermal

radiation from

Pool Fire

Red (High) 10 Kw/(sq.m) 42 Potentially Lethal within 60sec

Orange

(Medium)



19

CONTOUR MAPS

Scenario -1: Leak of n-Hexane storage tank

Case- 1 Dispersion of vapor cloud (VCE)

20

Case- 2 Jet Fire

21

Case- 3 Pool fire

22

Case- 4 Flash Fire

23

Case- 5 Late Explosion worst case radii

24

Scenario - 2: Catastrophic rupture of n-Hexane Storage tank

Case- 1 Pool fire

25

Scenario - 3: Leak of Isopropyl alcohol Storage tank


26

Case- 2 Jet Fire

27

Case- 3 Pool fire

28

Case- 4 Flash Fire

29

Scenario - 4: Catastrophic rupture of Isopropyl alcohol Storage tank

Case 1 Dispersion of vapor cloud (VCE)

30

Case 2 Flash Fire

31

Scenario - 5: Leak of Methanol Storage tank


32

Case 2 Jet Fire

33

Case 3 Pool fire

34

Case 4 Flash Fire

35

Scenario - 6: Catastrophic rupture of Methanol Storage tank


36

Case 2 Pool fire

37

Scenario - 7: Leak of Acetone Storage tank


38

Case 2 Jet Fire

39

Case 3 Pool fire

40

Case 4 Flash Fire

41

Scenario 8: Leak of Toluene Storage tank


42

Case 2 Jet Fire

43

Case 3 Pool fire

44

Case 4 Flash Fire

45

Scenario 9: Catastrophic rupture of Toluene Storage tank


46

Case 2 Pool fire

47

Case 3 Flash Fire

48

Scenario – 10 : Leak of N-Heptane storage tank

Case 1 Jet fire

49

Case 2 Pool fire

50

Case 3 Flash fire

51

Scenario – 11 : Catastrophic rupture of N-Heptane storage tank


52

Case 2 Flash fire

53

Scenario – 12 : Leak of Ethanol storage tank


54

Case 2 Jet fire

55

Case 3 Pool fire

56

Case 4 Flash fire

57

Scenario – 13 : Catastrophic rupture of Ethanol storage tank


58

Case 2 Flash fire

59

Scenario - 14: Leak of Cyclohexane Storage tank

Case 1 Toxic area of vapor cloud

60

Case 2 Pool fire

61

Scenario - 15: Catastrophic rupture of Cyclohexane Storage tank

Case 1 Flammable area

62

Case 2 Pool fire

63

Scenario - 16: Leak of Ethyl acetate storage tank

Case 1 Toxic area of vapor cloud

64


65

Case 3 Pool fire

66

Scenario – 17 : Catastrophic rupture of Ethyl acetate storage tank


67

Case 2 Pool fire

68

Table 3-5 Chemical flowing from underground Storage tank to reaction tank pipelinedetails

S.No PipeNo./Name

PipelineSize dia

(m)

Pipelinelength (m)

OperatingTemperature(oc)

Chemical flowing

1 T 1 0.0381 100 m 32 Hexane

2 T 2 0.0381 100 m 32 Isopropyl Alcohol

3 T 3 0.0381 100 m 32 Cyclo Hexane

4 T 4 0.0381 100 m 32 Methanol

5 T 5 0.0381 100 m 32 Acetone

6 T 6 0.0381 100 m 32 Dichloromethane

7 T 7 0.0381 100 m 32 Ethyl Acetate

8 T 8 0.0381 100 m 32 Toluene

9 T 9 0.0381 100 m 32 N - Heptane

10 RS 01 0.0381 50 m 32 Ethanol

69

Table 3-6: Estimated distance due to failure of Storage tank pipeline


Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

1 Rupture of n-HexaneStorage tank pipeline(Pipe No. T1)


5250 ppm 36.67 26.38 40.13

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 20.1 17.03 20.34

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 17.4 19.37 17.4

Flash Fire 5250 ppm 36.66 26.37 40.11


0.02068 bar 135.8 60.04 136.47

2 Rupture of Isopropylalcohol Storage tankpipeline

(Pipe No. T2)


10000 ppm 13.88 10.32 16.18

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 5.19 4.53 5.35

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 18.13 19.61 18.14

Flash Fire 10000 ppm 13.88 10.32 16.18


0.02068 bar 53.82 24.69 45.59

70


Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

3 Rupture of MethanolStorage tank pipeline

(Pipe No. T4)


36500 ppm 14.63 7.02 12.32

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 8.11 6.01 8.3

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 15.15 16.53 15.17

Flash Fire 36500 ppm 14.59 7.05 12.31


0.02068 bar 42.93 Noexplosion

34.88

4 Rupture of AcetoneStorage tank pipeline

(Pipe No. T5)


13000 ppm 29.41 19.19 31.25

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 11.23 9.45 11.51

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 17.75 19.48 17.76

Flash Fire 13000 ppm 29.39 19.19 31.23


0.02068 bar 102.21 36.53 109

71


Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

5 Rupture of TolueneStorage tank pipeline

(Pipe No. T8)


6000 ppm 14.31 11.18 16.99

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 4.85 4.24 4.97

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 20.16 22.17 20.20

Flash Fire 6000 ppm 14.3 11.15 16.99


0.02068 bar 58.26 27.82 49.8

6 Rupture of N-HeptaneStorage tank pipeline

(Pipe No. T9)


5000 ppm 16.27 13.94 20.26

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 5.79 5.05 5.94

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 18.63 20.67 18.68

Flash Fire 5000 ppm 17.26 13.91 20.22


0.02068 bar 67.24 34.47 69.51

72


Category1.5/F

Category5/D

Category1.5/D

7 Rupture of EthanolStorage tank pipeline

(Pipe No. RS01)


21500 ppm 11.6 7.34 13.04

Jet Fire 4 kW/m2 6.09 5.26 6.27

Pool fire 4 kW/m2 19.03 20.43 19.03

Flash Fire 21500 ppm 11.58 7.35 13.04


0.02068 bar 49.74 Noexplosion

40.83

73

CONTOUR MAPS

Scenario -1: Rupture of n-Hexane storage tank pipeline (Pipe No. T1)


74

Case 2 Jet fire

75

Case 3 Pool fire

76

Case 4 Late explosion worst case radii

77

Case 5 Flash fire

78

Scenario -2: Rupture of Isopropyl alcohol storage tank pipeline (Pipe No. T2)


79

Case 2 Jet fire

80

Case 3 Pool fire

81


82

Case 5 Flash fire

83

Scenario -3: Rupture of Methanol storage tank pipeline (Pipe No. T4)


84

Case 2 Jet fire

85

Case 3 Pool fire

86


87

Case 5 Flash fire

88

Scenario -4: Rupture of Acetone storage tank pipeline (Pipe No. T5)


89

Case 2 Jet fire

90

Case 3 Pool fire

91


92

Case 5 Flash fire

93

Scenario -5: Rupture of Toluene storage tank pipeline (Pipe No. T8)


94

Case 2 Jet fire

95

Case 3 Pool fire

96


97

Case 5 Flash fire

98

Scenario -6: Rupture of N-Heptane storage tank pipeline (Pipe No. T9)


99

Case 2 Jet fire

100

Case 3 Pool fire

101


102

Case 5 Flash fire

103

Scenario -7: Rupture of Ethanol storage tank pipeline (Pipe No. RS01)


104

Case 2 Jet fire

105

Case 3 Pool fire

106


107

Case 5 Flash fire

108

3.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS

The Consequence analysis study is carried out for the storage tank and found no impacts

on neighbouring villages.

As per the NFPA rating the solvents such as Methanol, Toluene, Iso Propyl alcohol and

Acetone exhibits fire hazard.

The Consequence analysis study is carried out for Hexane, Isopropyl alcohol, Cyclo

Hexane, Methanol, Acetone, Ethyl acetate, Toluene, N-Heptane and Ethanol storage tank

and found the most of the impacts are within plant boundary.

The consequence analysis is carried out for pipeline connected from Hexane, Isopropyl

alcohol, Methanol, Acetone, Toluene, N-Heptane and Ethanol storage tank to reaction tank

and found that impact is within plant premises.

109

4 MITIGATIVE MEASURES

4.1 SUMMARY OF RISK ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

1. All statutory appurtenances requirement with reference to safety and fire protection have

been incorporated in the design.

2. Necessary preventive and protective measures are proposed for storage tanks and

handling.

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING SAFETY

The following measures are considered for enhancing the safety standards at site:-

1. Operator training and retraining should be a continuous effort and Mock Drills should be

carried out regularly on identified scenarios.

2. Work Permit System should be strictly enforced and should not be allowed to be

circumvented.

3. Hoses should be inspected and tested every six monthly for the recommended test

pressure.

4. Static protection and integrity of explosion proof equipment should be ensured through

regular inspection. Every electrical equipment and lighting features should meet

explosion proof requirement, in classified area.

5. Smoking and carrying smoking material are to be strictly prohibited.

6. Interlock to be provided to prevent compressor when High Level Alarm is active.

7. Earth link may be connected to pump circuit to ensure startup only after providing tank

earth - connection.

8. Safety Procedures and Do’s and Don’ts should be prepared and displayed in handling and

storage area.

9. Conveyor sides should have plastic guide strips in preference to metallic strips to prevent

friction and consequent hazards.

10. Periodic inspection of Pipelines and painting to be done to avoid corrosion and

subsequent leak.

110

11. The Plant commissioning has an important role to ensure long term safety. Proper

cleaning and flushing of the system should be ensured in storage area and fire hydrant

system to avoid possible hold up of welding slag’s, bolts, nuts etc. which could hamper

smooth operation.

12. All the solvents are being distributed across the production plants through closed pipe

lines and transfer pumps that will minimize fugitive loses.

13. Work place monitoring in the process areas and also in the storage areas is being

monitored for the storage concentration at regular intervals with the help of VOC meter

& personal monitoring instruments

14. The VOC monitoring is carried out regular intervals and is being submitted to the Board.

15. The Environment team are trained on industrial hygiene and sampling / testing

techniques.

16. The local exhaust ventilation is provided at storage locations which are connected to the

scrubbers.

4.3 Risk Assessment for storage and handling of hazardous chemicals/solvents. Action plan

for handling & safety system to be incorporated.

1. Risk Assessment is performed for storage handling of hazardous chemicals/ solvents. The

risk identified is categorized based on the severity and probability.

2. Sai Life Science has installed a full-fledged automatic fire suppression system in the

solvent storage facility.

a. The foam water spray system supported by a dedicated Aqueous Film Forming

Foam (AFFF) tank.

b. The Automatic spray is enabled through the deluge valve assembly.

3. Vapor detection system is installed for early detection of emergencies like spills/ releases

of hazardous chemicals.

4. The main solvent storage tank in centralized tank farms is equipped with continuous

Nitrogen padding facility which helps in maintaining inert conditions inside the tanks.

The tanks are equipped with an integrated safety device consisting of flame arrestors,

breather valves, Vacuum relief system and Back Pressure Relief Valve (BPRV) systems.

111

5. We have provided dyke walls at all the solvent storage areas also provided Unloading bay

with RCC platforms with dyke wall.

6. We have provided Earth interlocking system to solvent storage tanks and also provided

Double body earthing to the pump and solvent tanks, we also provided earth Jumpers at

flange to flange.

7. We have provided Lightening arrestors at strategic locations.

8. Safety interlocks are provided with High level trip and Alarm and Low level trip and

Alarm to the solvent tank.

9. All electrical fixtures are configured to flame proof requirements.

10. All solvent are transferred through closed pipelines and maintained day tanks to avoid

open handling.

4.4 Arrangement for ensuring Health and Safety of workers engaged in handling of toxic

materials.

The Risk Assessment is carried for all the critical processes and the safety instructions is

incorporated into the Batch Production Records. Also the Periodical Training programs is

followed to all the employees and also the Personnel Protective Equipment’s (PPE's) like

Helmet, Respirator Masks, Breathing Air suits, Goggles and Full face mask is provided to

all the employees who are handling the hazardous Raw materials. As an engineering

control we made it as a practice that handling of toxic materials is done in closed

conditions and we make sure that no process is carried out in open conditions.

4.5 Storage and safety measures taken in the solvent storage area

1. The turbo ventilators are provided in the solvent storage area.

2. Sai Life Science Ltd has installed a full-fledged automatic fire suppression system in the

solvent storage facility. The foam water spray system supported by a dedicated Aqueous

Film Forming Foam (AFFF) tank. The Automatic spray is enabled through the deluge

valve assembly.

3. Low level ventilation system is provided

112

4. In the hydrogenation area provided suitable safety relief device to the hydrogenator. All the

fittings are as suitable for the hydrogenator process and it is constructed in a way that 3 sides of

the walls are constructed with 300 mm thick Reinforced Cement concrete walls and the fourth

side and the roof are equipped with collapsible weak wall and roof.

risk assessment report -...

Documents