rickaby, j. - general metaphysics

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"HURST PHI" ?H!CAL SERIES

iTAPHYSlCS



SOLEMN

Distribution of Prizes

ST. MICHAEL S COLLEGE

TORONTO

g

June, .2=&JL 1906 ".



ST. MICHAEL S COLLEGETORONTO, CANADA

LIBRARY

PRESENTED BY

Rt. Rev. William A. Egan



STONYHURST PHILOSOPHICAL SERIES.




GENERAL METAPHYSICS

JOHNRICKABY, S.J.

THIRD EDITION (1898).

REISSUE.

LONGMANS. GREEN. AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDONNEW YORK AND BOMRAY

IQOI



PREFACE,

(i) THERE is in England a plain-spoken proverb

which says,"

Give a dog a bad name and hang

nim ;

"

and there is, moreover, in England a bad

name attaching to Metaphysics, with the result that

our countrymen incline to treat that science after

the manner in which they would treat the dog under

a similar imputation. The ill-fame is in part due

to ignorance, which not in every case produces the

aggrandizing effect expressed by the words Omnc

ignotum pro magnifies, but sometimes, as in the

present msfanr^ acts in the contrary way, and has

the vilifying effect signified in the adage,"

Ignorance

is the mother of prejudice.*1

Metaphysics are sop-

posed by the ignorant to be essentially what manywriters have made them to be by abuse a wild

dance of unintelligible speculations in the air.

Again, there is a prejudice against them because no

immediate results in pounds, shillings, and pence

come of Metaphysics. Not only is it that a book



PREFACE.

published on the subject brings in no large returns

to the author, but the science itself contrasts un

favourably with many branches of physical science,

which, so far at least as concerns material comforts,

have done very much, in recent generations, to

make our earth a more desirable place of habitation

than it used to be.

In reply it has to be answered that Metaphysics

certainly need not extravagate into meaningless

jargon : for, dealing with notions that enter into

every sentence which we intelligibly utter, the science

is quite able to single out these fundamental ideas

and to explain their rational significance. Next, we

answer that, though Metaphysics do not serve the

uses that are not proper to their nature, yet they

do serve even nobler uses than those of material

comfort, and form in themselves a worthy end of

pursuit not,of course, man s ultimate and

adequateend, but still a good end. It was the great work of

Socrates to go about questioning people as to what

they meant by the generalized terms in constant use

among them, and to show them that they needed to

make their notions much more precise ;no one can

deny that this was a worthy occupation for the life

of a philosopher.

(2) From the student of General Metaphysics

no great genius is necessarily demanded, but only



PREFACE. vii

that he should be a steady worker one who thinks

often and patiently, who takes pains to be clear to

himself, and who does not rest till he has acquired

an easy familiarity in dealing with the most abstract

and most general of human conceptions. The

meanings which he must affix to terms are sub

stantially matters settled by the very nature of the

case, yet not so that no room is left for free arrange

ment. When, however, a convention has been fixed

upon, care should be taken not to forget the fact.

To be thoroughly at home with the whole phrase

ology, both conventional and otherwise, as it is one

of the great difficulties of the study, so also is it one

of the prime requisites. The bewilderment that

disheartens the Metaphysician in his early struggles

is comparable to that of a stranger in a house with

many rooms, passages, and landings ; to move about

easily in such a place is a matter of habituation.

Not sublime intellect, but repeated traversings of

the several departments, with an attentive eye to

notice their exact forms and their mutual bearings

these are the means to be employed. Think often,

think clearly, think connectedly : here is the motto

for a beginner in Metaphysics.

While insisting that a Metaphysician need not

Ijea genius, but should be a patient, plodding

thinker, who makes sure of each step as he proceeds,



viM PREFACE.

we may add that not unfrequently mischief befalls

genius misdirected where mediocrity would have

been safe. Hume, Kant, and Reid have concurred

in expressing the judgment that the creative imagi

nation of the genius may be a great snare to him

when he is dealing with philosophy ;so that it is not

enough to urge, in answer to the very severe con

demnation of some systems, that their authors have

been exceedingly clever men. All the worse that

they were clever, if it was cleverness misapplied ;

many a work fails because "it is too clever by

half."

(3) In appreciating the magnitude of the task

before us, there are two opposite extremes to be

avoided : one is to suppose that the notions with

which we have to deal are so simple as to require

no study, and that they can be confused only by a

preposterous attempt to force them into a long

scientific system, such as a text-book on Meta

physics displays ;and the other is to imagine that

the notions are so minute, so fluxional and evanes

cent, as to defy anything like fixity of signification.

The fact is, the ideas are simple, and carry along

with their simplicity some of its greatest difficulties.

As a man may have"

the faults of his virtues," so

a study may have the difficulties of its easiness.

Nor do Metaphysics stand alone in the enforcement



PREFACE. ix

of the lesson that it is hard to be simple, that there

is much art in simplicity.

As all the notions we have to deal with are so

elementary, it will not be surprising that often in

the explanation of them the larger part of the dis

course goes to setting aside misconceptions, and

that when these have beenremoved, comparatively

little space is required for the statement of the true

doctrine. The importance of the positive teaching

must not be judged by the proportion of the words

devoted to it, but rather by its own intrinsic merit.

In the early days of French juries it is reported that

the instruction had to be given to them, that they

must weigh witnesses rather than count them;and

the same is true of the paragraphs in a book, espe

cially if that book is about"

FirstPhilosophy,"

where most of the terms to be expounded are too

simple to admit of definition, and most of the pro

positions to be defended are too self-evident to allow

of demonstration by principles more fundamental

than themselves. In these cases, to clear away

false impressions is often the larger part of the task

which lies before one who would carry home to his

readers a conviction of the truth.



CONTENTS.

BOOK I. BEING, AND THE IDEAS MOST CLOSELYCONNECTED WITH BEING.

PAGE

CH iPTER I. NATURE AND NEED OF METAPHYSICS . . i

II. THE NOTION OF BEING . . . ix

,, III. ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE . . -59IV. THREE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING, NAMELY, UNITY,

TRUTH, AND GOODNESS . . -93V. THB POSSIBILITIES OF BEING . . . 166

,, VI. THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING . 189

BOOK II. EXPLANATION OF SOME NOTIONS NEXTIN POINT OF GENERALITY TO TRANSCENDENTAL

BEING.CHAPTER I. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT . . .221

,, II. SUBSTANCE AS HYPOSTASIS AND PERSONALITY 279

M III. CAUSALITY ..... 298

M IV. RELATION, SPACE, AND TIMB . . . 352



T\\m



GENERAL METAPHYSICS.

BOOK I.

BEING, AND THE IDEAS MOST CLOSELY

CONNECTED WITH BEING.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND NEED OF METAPHYSICS.

Synopsis.

(1)The subject-matter of General Metaphysics or Ontology.

(2)With the reality of this science, the other sciences stand or

fall.

(3) Moderation in a metaphysical treatise compatible with

thoroughness.

(i) WHAT is the subject-matter of the science of

General Metaphysics ? Is it true that, according to

the old sarcasm which is repeated with many varia

tions, when Metaphysics is being discussed, teacher

and learner can only put on a look of wisdom andpretend to a mutual understanding, but really have

no precise idea what they would be at, with all

their high-sounding phrases ? There are, no doubt,

some schools claiming the name of metaphysical

that merit the contempt thus poured upon them ;

B



BEING.

but the fault is in their treatment of the subject, not

in the subject itself,which admits of most accurate

and intelligible statement.

To learn what the metaphysical is we must start

with an explanation of the physical. By things

physical are very commonly understood, though not

universally, the material objects around us, which,

appealing to the senses, form the first and proxi-

mately proportionate objects of human intelligence;

and this, at present, shall be our sense of the term.

Whatever was the original meaning of that other

word metaphysical, Metaphysics as a science now

implies a passing beyond the physical, which passage

may be effected with different degrees of thorough

ness. Even the physical sciences themselves sofar transcend or overstep physical conditions, that

they go beyond the individual differences between

things, and formulate laws for a whole class at a

time. This much generality every science must

have according to the maxim,"

There is no science

of singulars."The mathematician advances a step

further; out of all material properties he retains

only one, that of quantity or extension.1

In a well-

developed language there are numerals which, in their

present state, bear no noticeable reference to anything

beyond abstract quantity; though in their original

force they have appeared as largely" immersed in

matter." We may contrast, for example, suchconcrete measures as a nail, palm, hand, span, foot,

cubit, with the more abstract metre and its multiples;

J How quantity comes afterwards to be applied to things

Spiritualwill appear in chapter jv,



NATURE AND NEED OF METAPHYSICS. 3

or, better still, some Hindu symbols with our

more perfect numerals. Mr. Tylor tells us that in

the former the sun or the moon stands numerical]};

for one ; a pair of eyes, wings, or jaws for two ; fire,

with its supposed triplicity of qualities for three,

and so forth. Similarly we find the ruder tongues

betraying their imperfect power of abstracting

numerals from the matters numbered in suchphrases as,

"

boy five-man," for "five boys ;

"" man

five-fingers,"for "five men." Now the process of

abstraction once begun in Physics and in Mathe

matics, needs but to be continued and it carries us

to Metaphysics. It was a remark made by Hegel,

that the Pythagorean attempt to apprehend the

universe as number, was the first step to Meta

physics. In this latter science we reach not merely

pure extension as an idea, but leaving even this

remnant of materiality behind us, we arrive at

conceptions such as Being, Existence, Essence,

Unity, Substance, Accident, Action, which may be

applied either to matter or to spirit indifferently, for

they contain no necessary reference to one order

rather than to the other. Here in fact we have got a

real Metaphysics, and indeed the most metaphysical

part of Metaphysics, such as Kant and our English

empirics have declared to be impossible. But

ab esse ad posse valet illatio"

the inference from

actual result to its possibility is valid."

The illustrations we have given belong to what is

known under the name of General as distinguished

from Special Metaphysics, the requirement for the

former being that it should abstract from every



BEING.

character which is peculiar either to spirit or to

Tnatter. In the strict sense it should be an Ontology,

treating only of what is common to all Being ;and if

ever this rigour is relaxed, it must be understood to be

a relaxation, such as occurs in certain sections that

apply to all created Being, but not to the Uncreated.

The various treatises of Special Metaphysics con

sider properties, some distinctly material, others

distinctly spiritual ;but they keep up the claim to

their title of Metaphysics, because they go beyond

Physics in the narrow meaning of the word. Prac

tically Physics trespass on the metaphysical territory ;

but if they remained within their closest bounds they

would confine themselves to formulating the laws of

sequence and co-existence among sense-phenomenawithout entering into the questions of substance,

cause, and so forth. Very laudably physical treatises

employ a little Metaphysics. Mathematics, also, we

sometimes call metaphysical, not because they

really soar beyond all that is sensible, but because

the one sensiblequality

whichthey retain,

is

considered by them under a supersensible aspect,

as the most abstract form of extension or quantity.

It would seem that Logic should come under

Special Metaphysics ;but because, while on the one

hand Metaphysics deals with the real, Logic, on the

other hand, is very largely concerned with what we

shall soon have to speak about as"

second inten

tions," for this reason, the logical is often contrasted

with the metaphysical. For a different reason some

would not rank Moral Science as a branch of Special

Metaphysics. And yet the word metaphysical, if



NATURE AND NEED OF METAPHYSICS. 3

applied to Logic and Morals, might retain the

meaning we have attached to it; for these are

engaged upon considerations beyond the physical

or sensible order. It is merely one out of many

instances, where a word successively widens and

narrows its signification.

(2) After broadly characterizing the study of

Metaphysics,

wemay

nowgo

further and contend,

that not only has General Metaphysics a position

by the side of the other sciences, but that no other

science can be real if General Metaphysics is not so.

For obviously if Being, Substance, Cause, and such

like notions are unreal, then no concrete fact can be

seized in its reality and put into a real science.

We do not say that there exists any object which is

simply Being, or Substance, or Cause in general;

but we do say that if these general notions are

invalid, no notion of the singular and concrete

object can be valid, for with the general is

indissolubly bound up the fate of the particular.

Hence it is worth the while of those whoindulge

in

a deal of cheap wit about the superior security of

Physics over Metaphysics, to remember that the

two causes are not opposite, nor even independent,

but most strictly interconnected. No Physics with

out Metaphysics ;no Metaphysics without at least a

sufficient starting-ground in Physics. It follows

that Metaphysics has, not only the other require

ments of Comte for"

positive"

knowledge, namely

"reality," "certainty,"and

"precision,"but also

"

utility,"if we raise the meaning of the term above

its lower level of gross materialism.



BEING.

And here Metaphysics has distinctly suffered

from some metaphysicians of course bad ones

who have broken up the essential union of things.

They have spoken of"empty Being,"

or more

correctly,"

Being in its most abstract form," as

though it had a sort of distinct existence from

physical nature, or entered as a really distinct

componentinto concrete

objects.Hence the

magnificent utterance magnificent in its simplicity"

I am Who am," has been taken to signify

that the origin of all things should be regarded as

a Being quite indeterminate to start with, having

no attributes, no concrete essence, but a bare

existence, which is the existence of nothing in

particular. We, at any rate, disclaim all pretence

to assert for every metaphysical abstraction of the

mind a corresponding distinction in things them

selves : we go on the principle that whether a

mental distinction has its counterpart also in reality,

is a point to be settled on the merits of each case in

detail. We are satisfied if the character abstracted

by the metaphysician is real, and we leave it to

further investigation whether it is a reality complete

in itself, or only one real character intrinsically

bound up with other real characters, which together

with it constitute a unity, not really divisible but

only mentally distinguishable.

2 Thus weguarantee

that objects are really Beings ;we do not say that

mere Being can be the whole of any reality, or even

an actually distinct part.

2 When we treat of distinction we will explain the doctrine here

briefly indicated.



NATURE AND NEED OF METAPHYSICS. J

(3) Metaphysics, then, in the proper under

standing of the term, we have pronounced to be an

essential for the foundation of all real science.

Whereupon we fancy that we hear the plaintive

appeal, If Metaphysics we must have, of course we

will submit ; but at least let us have Metaphysics in

moderation, by which we mean mainly two things :

first, that only positive doctrine, not controverted

opinions, be presented to us, and secondly, that the

positive doctrine confine itself to substantiate, with

out making excursions into the nooks and corners

that skirt the way, simply for the sake of peering

into curious recesses.

Replying to the latter demand first, we promise

that we will try to keep chiefly to the principal

terms, such as Being, Essence, Existence, Substance,

Cause, and explain them; next, as to the avoidance

of controversy, that cannot be wholly attained

without most serious loss. The man who will

not listen to the main difficulties against a true

theory, often fails to acquire a spirit of due caution ;

he has no fear of committing himself, no sufficient

sense of the need of qualifications in statements, no

thoroughness such as the real student always wants,

and distinctly misses where it is not present.

When, however, it comes to the question, Which

are the adverse views which it will be profitable to

notice ? opinions are sure to differ, if only because

of the differences of interest that have been aroused.

One man who sees no reason why Hegel should be

mentioned, remembers sufficient of Mansel s lectures

to feel a deficit when points raised by him are



BEING.

passed over without notice. Another man declares

that Mansel s day is over, and perhaps ought never

to have been;but that Hegel is a living power in

the country, and ought decidedly to be reckoned

with. Thus what to one is a very interesting

quotation, to another is a vexatious impertinence.

Without any offence we may be permitted the two

remarks,that

professedmoderation of

appetite

for

variety in philosophical opinions, may easily be a

cloak for sluggishness a part of that shrinking

from labour which is so common in intellectual

undertakings; and next, that with an increasing

breadth of knowledge there is an increasing need

felt for yet wider information. The stream of Greek

thought often flowed very clear and straight, but

then it was, for the most part, a narrow stream;the

current of modern thought, in its best examples, is

also clear and makes straight for its purpose, but

its broader expanse requires a greater range of

vision in him who would watch its course, and a

weak-eyed observer may easily fancy thatit is

butan aimless waste of waters. The honest critic will

try to make sure that he is right, before he ventures

to say that a complex line of discussion is wanting

in closeness of reasoning.

In the effort to keep controversy within bounds

we shall regard the aberrations of our native school

of thought the school of Hume as calling for our

most explicit notice;

with some of its errors we

must distinctly grapple. About Hegelianism we

shall say less, but we cannot afford quite to ignore

it, because it has a strong foothold in the Univer-



NATURE AND NEED OF METAPHYSICS. *

sities and in the recent edition of the British

Encyclopedia; read, for instance, the article entitled,

Mctaphysic. Just because we are not going expressly

to combat Hegel, at the several points where we

come into conflict with his theories, it is fitting, at

the outset, to declare our general mode of opposition

to him, which is one for the most part of indirect

encounter. The matter which we treat in Metaphysics he gives in what he calls Logic. For, declar

ing the Logical Idea to be the Unity and Totality

of Things, or God, and identifying Thought and

Thing, he has consequently no separate place for an

Ontology as distinguished from Logic. Accordingly

the three divisions of his Logic are, the Doctrine oj

Being, the Doctrine of Essence, the Doctrine of the

Notion. If the theory of knowledge already defended

in another volume of this Series, First Principles, is

correct, then Hegelianism is radically wrong and

needs no further confutation : the doctrine of Ideal

Realism, which identifies the Real and the Ideal,

falls to the ground. If, however, we must here give

some explicit reason why we reject the Metaphysics

of Hegel, we may put in the plea of a laudable

"

impenetrability to his ideas" of an almost utter

unsusceptibility ;his doctrines

"

pass by as the idle

wind which we regard not." For he fails in pre

senting for our

acceptancepropositions in them

selves sufficiently intelligible to be assented to with

an intellectual assent;he fails in giving us clear

reasons why his several propositions should be

accepted, even as mysteries beyond comprehension,

yet credible on extrinsic grounds ;he fails in the



to BEING.

very fact that he appeals to a Reason (Vermmft)

which is above the plain Understanding (Verstand)

and contrary to it. As to the last particular, we

fully admit the limitations and the imperfections of

the understanding ;the many distinctions it has to

make which are only mental and not real ; its

inversions of the order of nature in its own order of

discovering the facts of nature ; but our means of

meeting these deficiencies is to recognize them and

allow a proportionate discount for them, not to

assume the existence of a higher function of mind,

which shall set at defiance what are commonly

regarded as essential laws of thought. We com

pletely reject a Reason which contradicts the plain

Understanding, and which, under pretence of supre

macy over it, tries to impose upon us much un

meaning phraseology as though it were highest

wisdom. Such is a brief statement of our case

against Hegel on general grounds; in detail we shall

occasionally make mention of his doctrines by way

of specimen, or contrast, or suggestion.

We hope, therefore, on the plan laid down, to

secure a certain degree of comprehensiveness in our

treatment without passing the bounds of modera

tion;to present a course to our reader which will

call for a steady effort of attention, but not for a

strain that is

excessive;to write

something morethan a compendium, or humdrum text-book, but

not * disquisition painful in its minutiae.



CHAPTER II.

THE NOTION OF BEING.

Synopsis.

(1)In face of the very great confusion tha.t prevails on the

subject, it is needful to determine on some clear significa

tion of the word Being.

(2) A settlement of this meaning, (a) Being is whatever is

capable of actual existence, whether it exist or not : quod

aptum est ad existendum : it means an essence, a thing, a

something, in the most abstract sense of the term.

(b) This use of the word Being is partly a convention,

but a legitimate convention, (c) Being, so understood,

is always real;and the understanding of this reality is

important in view of various errors.

(3) Being may be regarded as neither a generic, nor a universal

notion.

(4) Three first principles springing straight from the idea oi

Being.Notes and Illustrations.

(i) A WHOLE chapter devoted to the elucidation

of so simple a notion as that of Being, must seem to

some " Much Ado about Nothing," and quite enough

at the opening of a book to condemn it of triviality.

"OfBeing,"

writes Mr. M Co-sh,1

"verylittle can

be said;

the mistake of metaphysicians lies in

saying too much. They have made assertions

which have, and can have, no meaning, and landed

themselves in self-created mysteries, or in contra-

1 Intuitions of the Mind, Pt. II. Bk. I. c. ii. s. ii. p. 161.



BEING.

dictions. So little can be said of Being, not

because of the complexity of the idea, but because

of its simplicity. We can find nothing simpler

into which to resolve it/ On the other hand,

there are writers who seem to suppose that Being

is an idea too abstruse for human investigation :

and we find both Voltaire and Goethe indulging in

the thin witticism, that in regard to Being theyunderstood about as much as their teachers, which

was very little.

Not because a notion is simple is it therefore

beyond the need of accurate determination by

reflexion;and not because a notion is the most

fundamental of all, is it, therefore, a mystery above

our powers of research. Being calls for our investi

gation, to which call we are competent to respond,

nor are we so contemptuous as to withhold the

answer in disdain. Therefore, lest anybody should

be inclined to persist in the opinion, that every one

who has come to the use of reason must sufficiently

understand what Being is, without going to Metaphysics ;

or in the opposite opinion that Being is a

notion too subtle for human comprehension, we will

set about the refutation first of the one error, and

then of the other. A mere assertion may make

little impression, but assertion backed by prooi

ought to leave its mark. We do not want the

reader to fathom the meaning of all the passages

we are about to cite; we only want him to gather

from them a deep-felt conviction, that the term

Being has been involved in sad confusion. The

point can be established only in one way, and that




is by the quotation of instances, to which we at

once proceed.

Sparing ourselves the relation of how Hegel

manages to identify Being with not Being, we will

begin with an author whom we have often to

encounter in the course of this treatise. Hume 2

says,"

Any idea we please to form is the idea of a

Being, and the idea of a Being is any idea weplease to form." This is very liberal

;but others

try to find an opposition between Being and some

other term. One common antithesis is set up

between Being and Thought, so that the former

stands for every object of thought, or as it has

been styled, das reine Gegeniiber, mere "

over-

against-ness,"or the non-ego as set over against

the thinking Ego. Hereupon people begin to

inquire whether the opposition is complete, or

whether thought itself is not Being; and then,

perhaps, they venture on the suggestion that the

true antithesis to Being is, not thought, but non

entity or nothing. Meantime Being is not ex

plained.

Another device is to regard Being as the same

with actuality or existence."Being," says Mill,

3

"

is originally the present participle of a verb, which

in one of its meanings is exactly equivalent to the

verb exists, and therefore suitable even by its

grammatical formation to be the concrete of the

abstract existence. But this word, strange as the

fact may appear, is still more completely sp

2Treatise, Bk. I. Pt. II. s. vi.

?Logic, Bk. I. c. iii. s, 2.



BEING.

for the purpose which it seemed expressly made

for than the word thing. Being is by custom exactly

synonymous with substance, except that it is free

from a slight taint of a second ambiguity, being

applied impartially to matter and to mind, while

substance, though originally and in strictness

applicable to both, is apt to suggest in preference

the idea of matter. Attributes are never called

Beings, nor are feelings. A Being is that which

excites feelings and possesses attributes." In

another place4 he surmises that a distinction

which, in spite of many prior claimants,5 he puts

down to the credit of his father, will rid us of an

ambiguity, while against certain philosophers whom

he accuses of having brought about darkness where

they professed to be shedding light, he has strong

denunciations to make."

Many volumes might be

filled with the frivolous speculations concerning

the nature of Being (TO ov, ovcria, ens, entitas, essentia,

and the like), which have arisen from overlooking

the double meaning of the word to be; from

supposing that when it signifies to exist and when

it signifies to be some specified thing, as to be a man,

to be Socrates, to be seen or spoken of, or even to

be a non-entity, it must still at bottom answer to

the same idea, and that a meaning must be found

for it that shall still suit all the cases."

Mill is not exactly leading us to a definite

4Logic, Bk. I. c. iv. s. i.

5St. Thomas, In Aristotelis Peri Herm, Lib,, II.

;In Sentent. Lib.

, III.,Dist. vi. qusest. ii. a. ii.; Quodlib. ix. a. iii. et xij. a. i. ; Sum. \,

. ad 2.



THE NOTION OF BEING. 15

settlement of terms, but he is showing us, and

exemplifying in his own practice, the vagueness of

usage. Let us take him up at the point where he

declares, that"

Being is suitable, even by its

grammatical formation, to be the concrete of the

abstract existence." Then, it means an existent

thing, or an actual object ;and what we want next

to see is, how far Mill agrees with his friend, Mr.Bain, as to the meaning of Being as the same with

existence.

Against Mill Mr. Bain contends, that because

ideas are knowable only in opposite pairs, and

because there is no positive opposite to existence,

but only the negation, non-existence, therefore there

is no distinct and peculiar idea, existence. "The

word existence, in its most abstract form, refers to a

supposed something, attaching alike to the object

and to the subject, over and above Quantity, and

Succession, and Co-existence, which are the attri

butes common to both. The only meaning of the

word is the object together with the subject, for

which addition we also employ the synonymous

words, Universe, Being, Absolute, Totality of

Things. To predicate existence of matter or mind

is a pure tautology. Existence means matter, or

mind, or both, as the case may be. The only use

of the word is to express Object or Subject indis

criminately, there being occasions when we do not

need to specify either."6

Furthermore, he con

tinues,"

from the predicate existence there springs

no science or department of logical method. Indeed

Logic, Vol. II. Bk. VI. c. iv. p. 390.



16 BEING.

all propositions containing this predicate are more

or less elliptical: when fully expressed they fall

under co-existence or succession. When we say

there exists a conspiracy for a particular purpose,

we mean that at the present time a body of men

have formed themselves into a society for a

particular object; which is a complex affirmation,

resolvable into propositions of co-existence andsuccession. The assertion that the dodo does not

exist, points to the fact that this animal, once

known in a certain place, has disappeared or

become extinct, is no longer associated with the

locality; all which may be better stated without

the useof

theverb exist." Instead of

" Does ether

exist ?"

Mr. Bain gives as the more correct form,"

Are heat and light, and other radiant influences

propagated by an ethereal medium diffused in

space?"7

If, therefore, Being is taken to mean existence,

Mr. Bain tells us that existence either has no meaning

or it must be taken as synonymous with some other

words less abstract in character. Mr. Spencer,

while agreeing that we have no clear idea of abstract

existence, yet contends that we have, in regard to

it, an obscure consciousness." We come face to face

with the ultimate difficulty how can there possibly

be constituted a consciousness of the unformed and

7 Kant too holds that Existence is no real predicate. (Critique oj

Pure Reason, Max Muller s translation, Vol. II. p. 516.) Dr.

Martineau reckons it an "

important fallacy"

in Descartes, to have

regarded"

the existence of a thing as one of its attributes, and not

as that which all the attributes presuppose,*




the unlimited, when by its very nature consciousness is possible only under forms and limits ? Such

consciousness cannot be constituted by any single

mental act, but is the product of many mental acts.

In each concept there is an element which persists.

It is alike impossible for this element to be absent

from this consciousness and for it to bepresent

in consciousness alone;

either alternative involves

unconsciousness, the one for want of substance, the

other for want of form. But the persistence of this

element under successive conditions necessitates a

sense of it as distinguished from the conditions, and

independent of them. This consciousness is not

the abstract of any one group of thoughts. That

which is common to them all and cannot be got rid oj

is what we predicate by existence."8

In order that so prominent a body as the

Kantians may not be robbed of due acknowledg

ment for the share they have had in making a

regular puzzle of the term Being, we will quote a

few words from the master himself. He speaks

differently of Thing and of Being : for while he uses

the latter for what is actual or existent, of the

former he says :

9 " The one concept which a priori

represents the empirical contents of phenomena is

the concept of Thing in general ;

and the synthetical

knowledge which we may have of a Thing a priori

can give us nothing but the mere rule of synthesis to

be applied to what perception may present to us

a posteriori, but never an a priori intuition of a real

8 First Principles, Pt. I. c. iv.

Critique of Pure Reason. Max Mullet s Translation, p. 617.

C



BEING.

object."

Thatis, Thing

is an apriori, subjective

form of the mind in accordance with which, as a

rule for our thought, we must think whenever we

direct our minds to objects of experience ;but we

cannot assign to our notion Thing any corresponding

reality beyond thought. So much for Thing: we

append a sentence on Being, which has won for

itself notoriety.10

Being is not a real predication

that can be added to a concept of a Thing. It is

merely the admission of a Thing, and of certain

determinations in it. ... The real does not contain

more than the possible : a hundred real dollars do

not contain a penny more than a hundred possible

dollars. The conceived hundred dollars do not in

the least increase through their existence, which is

to be outside the mind." Here it is plain that Kant

makes Being stand for Existence, and he dis

tinguishes it from Thing, which he makes to be

an a priori form. Our sense of Being will be found

to make it synonymous with Thing.Not much more need be done in the way of

enforcing, by examples, the conviction that about

the notion of Being men s ideas are unsettled;but

two instances of a simpler order may usefully be

added. First, Mr. Matthew Arnold, whose protest

it was that he was nophilosopher,

took theetymo

logical route to the discovery of what Being means;

and he found contrary to what Cousin had imagined,

that in different languages the verb to be had borne

such original concrete meanings as to breathe, or to

grow, or to dwell, or to stand. Thus he fancied that

10Critique of Pure Reason, p. 515.




he had taken the mystery out of the word Being.

Next, in behalf of the positivist religion, Mr.

Frederick Harrison had to meet the assertion that

collective humanity is not a Being, and therefore

cannot become the object of a cult;he argued his

case in the following dialogue, as P, against C.

P." What do

youunderstand

bythe word

Being?"

C."

O, a palpable, living personality."

P."

Gently, do you mean that the Deity is

palpable, or that an elephant is not a Being?"

C. "Well, then, a Being is a living organism."

P."

Quite so;and what constitutes an organism

in the scientific sense ?"

C."

O, pardon me;

I make no pretensions to

be a biologist. We are discussing religion, not

Physics."

P."

In other words, when you reiterate that

humanity is not a Being, you are not very clear

what a Being is. Let us see what according to

science really constitutes an Organism orBeing."

No doubt every organism is a Being; but we

can hardly make a simple conversion of the proposi

tion and say, Every Being is an organism. What

seems to have been lurking in Mr. F. Harrison s

mind was, that if he could prove that humanityformed one organic whole he would establish a

right to call it a Being a single Being; but with

this truth he at least has put on all the appearances

of mixing up something untrue and giving it explicit

utterance, namely, that Being simply means

organism,

or is its convertible term,



20 BEING.

We repeat that we do not wish the reader, at

the present stage, to consider minutely what the

foregoing quotations mean : their purpose is fully

answered if they simply compel assent to the pro

position, that Being is not a notion which everybody

has clearly before his mind. We are going to claim

rather close attention to a lengthened exposition of

the sense which we are about to attach to Being ;

and in order that our claims might not be pooh-

poohed on the score of needlessness, we have taken

the rather painful course of inflicting on the reader

a number of passages, which in themselves he is

not likely to have found very entertaining. But the

discipline was salutary, and let us hope that its

purpose is gained. We now positively lay down

our own account of Being.

(2) a. Being is either actual or possible ;but we

will begin with the former, because it pre-eminently

is Being, and is called by the schoolmen, ens parti-

cipii, Being as the participle. For the force of the

present participle is to signify the actual exercise of

that which the verb means. Thus intelligere means

to understand, and the force of intelligent, as a

participle, is such that homo intelligent must be

taken to be "a man in the very act of using his

intelligence :

"

whereas homointelligent,

when intelli

gent stands as a noun-adjective, is the same as our

"intelligent man," who is so called, though at present

he may be asleep, or narcotized, or under temporary

insanity. Again, when we distinguish between an

agent that is hereafter to do something and its

future agency orcausality, we evidently employ the



THE NOTION OF BEING, si

former term, not as a participle, agens, that which

is in the process of acting, but as a noun, that

thing which has a power to act, whether it be

now using it or not.

Similarly, when we deal with Being, it might

mean an actually existent thing; or it might

mean simply whatever is capable of an existence,

whateverpresents

an actualizablecontent,

whatever

is an existible; or lastly, it might mean existence in

the abstract, as when we speak of the Being that is

given to some possible essence. The second of

these several meanings is found most eligible,

when we want to assign Being its place as "the

formal object"

or special subject-matter of Ontology.

Being, then, we do not define, for it is too simple a

notion to admit of strict definition, but we explain

it to mean whatever is apt to have existence, whether

it have it or not. It is not distinctly actual Being,

nor distinctly potential Being, but Being left neutral

as to the assertion of actuality or potentiality. So

when we say that fire explodes gunpowder, we are

philosophically indifferent as to whether the occur

rence is actually going on at the time of our speak

ing. Thus we disarm the criticism of two anti-

scholastic writers, belonging to the renaissance

period, Valla and Nizolius, who contend that

Res

"

Thing," not Ens

"

Being," is the truly transcendental

11 term. With us Being and Thing are one:

Being means something, somewhat, A liquid,Em

Etwas, Ein bestimmtes Ding; it means an existible, that

11 The word is explained later.



82

which presents a ground for actualization, whether

as an individual object in itself, or as a part, or asa real aspect of some individual whole. Being so

understood is called Ens Essentice in contrast to

Ens Existenticz ; where essence is to be taken in its

wider sense 12for anything that has a whatness or

quiddity, even though this be but of the accidental

order as

opposed

to the substantial.

St. Thomas fully sanctions the use of the term

Being in the signification which we have just

attached to it;

but of course it is not anything

like his invariable interpretation. In some passages

he distinguishes Being from Thing, because he is

using the former professedly in its participial force,

and therefore is obliged to make it convey the notion

of actual existence. For example," There is nothing

affirmable of every Being (ens) except its essence

(essentia) : and the latter is signified by the word

tiling (res), which differs from Being (ens) in this,

that Being is a term derived from the fact of

existing (ab actu essendi), while thing expresses the

essence orquiddity;"

13 or again, "that is called

simply a Thing which has a definite, fixed nature

(habet esse ratum et fixum in natura) : but it is called

Being so far as it has existence."w He refers the

distinction to an Arabian philosopher:15 "

Accord-

Ing to Avicenna the word thing (res) differs fromBeing (ens) in that the former expresses the

quiddity or essence ofBeing." Again, on the

12 See next chapter.13

Quest. Disp. de Veritat. q. i. a i.

14Sentent. Lib. II. Dist. xxxvii. q. i. a. i.

15Quest. Disp. de Veritat. q. i. a. i.



ftiE NOTION OF BEING. 23~

same point he writes:16

"While in an object we

discover quiddity and Being, it is rather on the

Being than on the quiddity that its truth is to be

grounded." These passages suffice by way of

acknowledgment that many places in St. Thomas

are not to be read in the light of our present

interpretation of Being, which is made simply

with a view to settling the most convenient formfor the primary idea in the science of Ontology.

But now to prove that we have the Angelic Doctor

on our side in the usage which we adopt, let the

following words testify :

17 "

It is true that Being

(Ens) so far as it signifies that which is apt to exist

(secundum quod importat

rem cui

competitesse) means

the essence of thething."

Here is just what we

want. Against our determination to allow Being to

hold itself neutral as regards actual existence, it

might be urged that some scholastics, of whose

contention we shall say a little, but only a little,

later on, strongly uphold a real distinction between

essence and existence in created things. But that

this view is not brought forward by them against

our present position will appear from such a typical

writer on their side as Cardinal Zigliara, whose

words will serve as a brief recapitulation of all that

we have been trying to make plain :

18 "

Because

Being is described in relation to existence, that is

16 Lib. I. Dist. xix. q. v. a. i. Compare his reply ad iura where

he says that"judgment"

is about the esse of an object, while

"

apprehension"

merely gives it quiddity.17

Quodlibet, ii. a. iii.

18Ontologia, Lib. II. cap. i art. i.



BEING.

called real Being which either has, or at least can have,

an existence in nature. In this way we assert that

the world, man, God, are real Beings. Being is

divided into actual and possible : it is actual if it

de facto exist, possible if it is only in potentiaas

regard existence." It is an additional pleasure

to find even an Hegelian conceding to us, that our

use of the word Being is at least nearly in accordancewith what men commonly understand in every-day

speech."

In the ordinary application," says Mr.

Wallace,19 "

Being is especially employed to denote

the stage of definite and limited Being ;what we call

reality. Reality is determinateness as opposed to

merevagueness.

To be real it is

necessaryto be a

somewhat" Hence we are led to the most useful

remark that, according to our account of it, Being

is in one way a determinate idea;

it has a fixed

content, though this is the smallest possible. It

contains only one note in its"

comprehension," hut

it really does contain one. Therefore we say defi

nitively Being means Thing. As to the logical"

extension"

of the term that is illimitably large,

or, as we say, "transcendental," which means that

instead of being confined to the bounds of one

class, like mere universal terms, "man," "animal,"

"

substance," it passes over all bounds and reaches to

every member of every class and to every single

thing. Philosophers have assigned various significa

tions to "transcendental," but the above is our use

of it in the present connexion.

(6) It may allay the rising discontent of some

uLogic of Hegel, p. cxxxv.




if we declare at once that the sense which we have

just been assigning to the term Being is in part

conventional. The fact that there is such a con

vention and something about its nature must now

be made plain. No doubt there may be an

inclination to refuse acquiescence in the arrange

ment because of a certain unwillingness to let the

element of actual existence drop out of the explicit

signification of Being, which in its primary force,

as a participle of the substantive verb, asserts this

very character of existence.20

Still we have shown

that herein Being has only shared the common fate

of its kind. Just as a Protestant, in these days of

easy tolerance, might pass all his days without ever

actually protesting, and yet would have claim to his

title because his position is one that might naturally

lead to a protestation ;so a Being may never actually

be, and yet deserve its name, because it truly

presents an actualizable nature. It so presents

itself to thought, and thus the vulgarism somethink

for something is not altogether a useless reminder of

of what many suppose to be a correct piece of

etymology. They connect thing and think as ding

and denken, or as res and reri ; thing is thus a"

think

able content." But instead of further apologizing

for those who are parties to the convention about

Being, we must hasten to quote some documentsin which they openly declare that the case is one

for settlement by compact, not a matter that settles

itself. It becomes a very hopeless controversy when

20 In English there may sometimes be a dispute whether Being

: a participle or a gerund : but Ens is clear.



BEING.

rival disputants try to fix the signification of the

terms by the sheer necessities of the words. Yetthis is sometimes attempted. Suarez 21

puts the

matter thus :

"

Being in its double acceptation

does not stand for two divisions of a common

concept, but for a greater and a less degree of

abstraction in the formation of one idea. Being

as a noun (ensvi

nominis) signifies that which hasa real essence, prescinding from the question of

actual existence, not indeed so as to exclude or

deny it, but simply abstracting from it : while

Being as a participle (ens vi participii) signifies an

actual Being as existent, and thus it considers

Being in a more restricted sense. Accordingly

Being, as a noun, does not mean potential Being

(ens in potentia), inasmuch as the latter is privatively

or negatively opposed to actual Being; but it

means Being so far as it is a real22

essence, a real

something. Hence Being, as a noun, may be predi

cated of God, of whom we could never predicate

potential Being."After Suarez two or three con

temporary scholastics may be quoted to show how

his opinion is still in vogue. A Louvain professor23

speaks of the option that is given to us thus :

" The

act of Being may mean either what a thing is its

quiddity or that a thing is its existence." A like

account is given by Father Palmieri,24

where he

teaches that "the proper object of Ontology is

21Metaphys. d. ii. sect. iv.

22 Different senses of "real" will be given afterwards: here it

means an essence that at least is capable of receiving an existence

of its own, if it has not got it already.23

Ontologie, par A. D. Dupont, p. 35.M

Ontologia, cap. i. p. 271.




Being in the sense of essence, since Ontology

considers the essences of things, prescinding fromtheir actual existence." Essence is here employed

in the broad sense of any quiddity, whether strictly

an essence or only an accident, whether a concrete

essence or only an essence generalized by abstrac

tion;

about all which matters we shall have to

explainourselves

presently.Essentia as an abstract

term means simply that which gives the esse of a

thing, as sapientia gives the sapere of a wise man.

It is needless to add more witnesses about the

fact of a convention, when that fact is not disput

able : but a further remark made by the last-quoted

author raises a question. Is it, after all, between

two quite distinct significations of the word Being

that we have to choose ? Does em existentice, Being

the participle, really add a new note to em essenticz,

Being the noun ? Is existence wholly a different

idea from essence ? Father Palmieri25

thinks that

this cannot simply be affirmed;that at least to some

degree the assertion would be incorrect ; for, says

he,"

though the objective concept of Being is

made to express both essence and existence, never

theless it is not a compound notion, that is,

not a notion such as can be split up into two

elements, each conceivable apart. Essence and

existence cannot be so resolved, because theexistence signified by the Being is nothing more

than the essence itself as actualized,26 while on the

other hand the notion of essence always involves

25 L.c.

* This is a disputed point, on which a word will be said later.



BEING.

that of existence, a possible existence implying the

capability to exist."

27

It may be objected that the

implication of one term in others is so widespread,

that if we are to refuse to admit plurality of ideas

on this score, we shall bring down the number of

distinct ideas to a very small figure. This is true :

but at any rate a specially close implication of one

in theother

is

foundbetween the two transcendental

terms, essence and existence, existence being under

stood of both the mental and the actual order. In

this way it is taken by Father Tongiorgi :

" What

ever is conceived as having some reality (an essence)

is conceived as either actually existing, or at least

after the manner of something existing, for it is

such that there is no repugnance in its existence.

Nay, more, by the very fact of its being an object

of thought, it has a sort of existence in the ideal

order." So far from being a subtlety peculiar to

scholasticism the above view is frequently expressed

by authors of various schools, and even finds a place

in the writings of a man so little scholastic as David

Hume.28

27Ontologia, Lib. I. cap. i. art. i.

28 Hume says :

" There is no idea that is no^ conceived as

existent." (Treatise,Pt. I. Bk. II. s. vi.) Similarly Locke:

"Existence and unity are two ideas that are suggested to the

understanding by every object without and by every idea within.

When ideas are in our mind we consider them as being actually

there." (Bk. II. c. vii. s.7.)

The partially Hegelian author, Mr

F. Bradley, writes : "Whenever we predicate we predicate about

something which exists beyond the judgment, and which, of

whatever kind it may be, is real either inside of our heads or

outside of them. And thus it always stands for exists." Mr.

M Cosh says: "In all knowledge we know what we know as

having existence, which is Being."In the Hamiltonian school




Of course there is a school-boy desire, not

confined to school-boys, to have nothing introduced

into the teaching which at all complicates matters;

and to minds thus disposed the passages just quoted

will prove exasperating. But in study, as in manyother things, our wisdom is not to yield to exas

peration which is fatal to success, but patiently

to grapple with a difficulty, and make, if possible,some tolerable compromise where perfect arrange

ment is impossible. There is a good suggestion in

that title to a chapter in Gil Bias: De ce que fait

Gil Bias ne pouvant fairc mieux" What Gil Bias

did when he could do nothing better." Now to fix

upon a signification for

Being

as the subject-matter

of Ontology is clearly in part a question of conven

tion. And because of the extreme slipperiness of

the terms, no convention will be absolutely as neat

as we could desire;no convention will be even

maintainable unless we are aware of the ambiguities

which it has to provide for;and therefore in arrang

ing the terms of a settlement we must direct atten

tion to a difference, and yet a sort of identity

there is between essence and existence, especially

when both are taken as well in the possible as in

the actual order. Besides what has already been

Prof. Veitch says: "Whatsoever is thought is thought under

the attribute of existence." Finally a Louvain professor, Dr. Duponttells us: "Being signifies (a) what exists, (b) what has some reality.

The two meanings though distinct are inseparable. For nothing can

exist without having a determinate reality, and we cannot conceive

any essence which does not appertain to some existent Being,

whether in the order of facts or in the order of mental con

ceptions. In thinking of a possible essence we think of it as it

would be if it existed."(Ontologie, p. 35.)



BEING.

pointed out, Father Palmier! calls notice to a yet

further complication, by mentioning the fact that

existence itself can be regarded as a kind of an

object, a thing, an essence :

"

Ontology considers

the essences of things, abstracting from their

actual existence : so much so that when it comes

to treat of existence, it regards this not as bare

existence, but as being itself something either actual

orpotential"

In face of all these sources of

perplexity we must resolutely state our free

determination to make words have a certain force

and no more. However, the two terms may pass

over into one another, we can find a point of

distinction between that which does or may exist,

and the existence which does or may belong to

it, or to which it does or may belong ;for

perhaps, at a stretch, we can view this matter

of belonging either way.80 As a bargain, we under

take to mean by Being that which does or may

exist, whether it exist or not;we commit our

selves neither to its actuality nor to its potentiality.

When we want to say something about existence

considered as actual or potential, and about

its relation to that which does or may exist, we

shall be at liberty to do so;but meanwhile Being

for us is any existible whatever is capable of an

L.c.

30 Our way of settling the oft-disputed point whether existence

can be treated as a real attribute, is straightway to make it one.

"Of the Eiffel Tower, I predicate that it really exists." All the

same it is quite a peculiar attribute, and an attribute in the wider

sense of the term. For strictly attribute is used by the scholastics

to signify something over and above what is essential to the subject.




actual existence. One reason why some treatises

on Ontology are perplexing, is that no single account

of Being is made, as we are now making it, the basis

of the system, but varieties of meaning are allowed

to creep in, and what is said of one of these is apt to

be read on the supposition that it is another mean

ing which is intended. We shall see presently that

the principle of Excluded Middle has to be inter

preted differently when it is of ens existentice, and

when it is of ens essenticz that we say : Quodvis aut est

aut non est,

"

Everything either is or is not;

"

and

this example is only one among many in which it is

needful to know exactly how ens is being considered.

(c) But it may be asked, ifEns Essentia, or Beingwhen it is not positively understood to be actual,

forms the subject-matter of Ontology, is not the

Reality of the Science in jeopardy? No, for first

of all we have not made Being quite an emptynotion : we have not taken away from it, as some

have done, just the one bit of content, or as

logicianssay, of "comprehension," which is proper to it, and

without which it is left utterly vacuous, and there

fore most certainly unreal. Mansel 31is an offender

at this point."

In the act ofconception," he says,

"when we regard some attributes as constituting

an object, we conceive it as thereby limited, as

being itself and nothing else. The indefinite ideas,

therefore, Thing, Object, Being, are not concepts,

because they contain no distinctive attributes, and

the general object denoted by such a term is incon

ceivable.*

81Prolegom, Logica, c. vi. p. 181.



BEING.

As far as one requisite is concerned, we have

secured that Being shall be"

real :

"

for we have

provided that it shall contain one note in its" com

prehension." But that one note is"

Thing,"

whether possible or actual : and the question arises,

how can the"

real" fail to include positively within

its idea the actual ? How can it leave actuality

neutral? We reply, in one acceptation of the word,"real" is identical with actual, but in our present

use of it we regard reality as sufficiently provided

for, in that things possible are such that they may

hereafter exist and do now exist virtually in their

causes. They are not mere creatures of the mind,

nor arethey

creatures of the mind to the extent of

second intentions, a phrase which needs explana

tion. In the most rigorous use of the words, they

mean something, which, as it is regarded at a given

time, is so conceived that it could not, under the

present denomination, exist outside the mind. An

object literally and"

in first intention," is, or may be,

a man or an animal, useful or noxious : but to be a

subject or a predicate, to be one and the same in many

separate individuals, to be aspecies or a genus, to be

known, these are characters which cannot be attri

buted to anything, except in so far as it is affected

by the fact of becoming an object of thought : no

actually existent thing, as such, is subject or predicate,

or a universal, or aspecies. When, however, it is

said that "second intentions" can exist only as

objects of thought, it must be observed that thought

itself has an existence other than as an object of

thought ; it is a psychological activity of the mind,



THE NOTION OF BEING 33

the thought as distinguished from its object, and so

far it is of"

first intention." Now a possible Being,

though it can be looked upon from the point of view

of"

a second intention," must be admitted to be of

"first intention," inasmuch as it is an object producible

by creative or by physical causality.32

It has an extra-

mental existence in its causes or its materials : it is

possible as a fact in the concrete, and not merely

as an object of thought, though of course this fact

cannot be known without a mind knowing it. Its

reality lies in the fact that it is realizable by forces,

and sometimes also by materials, that are at present

actual, and have their power of production, whether

we think about it or not. Thus the unreal is reducedeither to what is intrinsically impossible, or else to

"second intentions,"83 which have indeed a founda

tion in things actual, but can never be simply actual

things, existing outside the mind. For example, there

can be no" human

species," physically existing as

aspecies,

but there are humanbeings

who can

mentally be represented under the form of a species

by abstraction from all but specific characters.34

We conclude, that in the sense assigned, the Being

that Ontology deals with, at least primarily, is real,

but it may be either actual or potential.

Even yet we have not quite finished with the

32 Not in Reid s sense of"

physical cause," but in the sense of

causality that has an actual influence in producing an effect.

3:{ The phrase "second intention" has various other uses, and

is often left in the vague. See Whately s Logic. Bk. III. 10;

Hansel s Aldrich, cap. i. 8; St. Thomas, in Lib. IV. Metaphys.

sect. i.;Silvester Maurus, Quasi. Philosoph. Log. q. xlvi

M First Principles, Pt. II. c. iii. nn. 5,6.

D



34 BEING.

description of the reality which is attributable to

Being. We have seen that it has one note, and

that this note points to a real object; but we have

yet to declare that the reality of Being is not some

thing actually distinct from the concrete natures

of which it is predicated, and that still less is the

Being of all things one and the same throughout.

We can suppose nothing to be real with a Beingother than itself; neither can we suppose that there

are any mere phenomena, or any phenomena which

are unreal. Every genuine manifestation is a real

manifestation, and is declarative of some real object

manifested. Being, then, stands apart by itself only

asa result of mental

abstraction,not as a fact in the

constitution of things. Again, as to the other point,

the singleness of Being throughout all existences,

that likewise is a doctrine quite abhorrent to our

principles, though only too congenial to some schools

of speculation. Its prevalence among the ancient

Hindus, who were so apt to regard all sensible,

perceptible nature as empty appearances, is ascribed

by Cousin to their want of history, which gives

dignity to passing events, to their very poor estimate

of human kind, and to their stern theocracy which

pushed to extremes the teaching that God is all-

in-all. We have not here to refute any of their

errors ; but the absence of such errors from any

system of ours is what we do well to insist upon.

At length we have completed the sketch of our

teaching on the subject of the Reality of Being ; and

the width of meaning which we have assigned to

the term"

real"

will be found highly convenient




on various occasions. For instance, it keeps away

from us the difficulty which some feel about universal

propositions of the categorical kind. They can allow

that where the "all" can be definitely enumerated,

as when we say,"

All the European sovereigns

desirepeace,"

the assertion is categorical:35

but

they feel driven to give a hypothetical character to

such cases as,"

All triangles have the sum of their

angles equal to two right angles ;

" "

All men are

naturally mortal." Here, because the"

all"

cannot

have its constituent members counted or found in

the order of existences, certain philosophers interpret

the enunciations thus :

"

If there is a triangle, the

sum of its angles will equal two right angles ;

" "

if

there is a man, he will be naturally mortal." We,on the contrary, who make reality neutral to actual

or possible existence, and to existence past, present,

or future, have no need to introduce any hypotheses.

Other conveniences will be felt in the course of

our treatise; to call

specialattention to them at the

time -will not be necessary, nor does it sound well

to be always advertising one s wares, and pointing

out how admirably they serve their purpose.

(3) Occasionally we find Being called the highest

genus, but according to the schoolmen it is not a

genus at all. It is true that Cajetan and Scotus

do not quite agree with the more ordinary account

of how it is that the generalized notion Being is re

duced, by the appendage to it of particular marks, to

the idea of determinate Being ;but the doctrine of

35 There is a mode of subtilizing which disputes even this ; but

we are not concerned with it.



36 BEING.

Aristotle36

is against calling this particularization

a descent from genus to species. Commenting on

the subject, St. Thomas says:87

"The philosopher

shows that Being cannot stand as a genus ;for a

genus has differences which are outside its own essence :

but no difference can be found outside Being, for

not-Being does not constitute a difference." The

argument is that a genus must be narrowed downto a species by some idea, such that neither of

the two ideas contains the other as its intrinsic and

formal constituent. Thus let us suppose, without

dispute as to facts, and simply by way of illustra

tion, that the generic term animal means a sensitive

organism, and that the specific term rational meansa spiritual intelligence acting, not on intuition alone,

but by ratiocination by"

discourse of reason." It

is clear that the generic notion here does not include

the specific in its"

comprehension," for there may be

animals that are not rational. And, on the other

hand,

"

rational"

does notexplicitly

contain within

its"

comprehension"

the meaning of"

animal."

For though it may perhaps be that rationality, as

above defined, can go only with animality, still,

"

using discourse of reason"

makes no open

mention of"

having a sensitive organism."

Unfortunately for the simplicity of our procedure,

the scholastics are not clear beyond confusion in

working out the idea of Aristotle. St. Thomas argues

from the point of view that "no difference can be

*Metaphysics, iii. 3.

17 Sum. Pt. I. q. iii. a. v. Cf. Quasi, de Veritat. i. a. i.

stance adds no difference pver and aboveBeing."




found outsidebeing;"

Carleton says that the diffe

rences of Being are outside Being; Father Lahousse 88

repeats the doctrine, making the obvious distinction

between"

comprehension"

and"

extension." His

view is, that while the differences of Being include

Being in their "comprehension," but not in their

"

extension," Being, on the contrary, includes its

differences in"

extension

"

but not in

"

comprehension." In other words, while you can say that

substance, spirit, matter, have Being as one note

within the compass of their meaning, you cannot

say that Being, as such, is substance, or spirit, or matter,

because Being, as such, need not be any particular

one of these;on the other

hand, Substance,or

Spirit,or Matter is Being, but Being does not contain

within its meaning Substance, or Spirit, or Matter.

Now this last part of the assertion, that Being does

not contain within its"

comprehension"

Substance,

or Spirit, or Matter, is obvious if we take the term in

its clear explicit meaning; but if we consider its

obscure, implicit meaning, then it almost seems as

though some authors supposed a sort of inclusion in

Being of any difference applicable to it in any parti

cular case. This fact will come out more luminously

when, as we shall immediately proceed to do, we

take up the subject of the analogousness of Being :

at present a single specimen of the style of treatment

to which we refer will suffice. It is found in the

words of Father Palmieri :

39 " The real modes of

Being are Being itself, so that in those objects which

are ranked under the head of Being, there is no note,

38Ontologia, pp. 290, seq.

39 Ibid. p. 273.



38 BEING.

other than that of Being, but only Being in some

particular mode of its existence." But, of course,

he may explain, that it is the differences which"

comprehend"

Being, and not vice versa.

The question may seem a subtle one, but it is not

really difficult. Some authors want to show cause

why they should not regard Being as they regard an

ordinary generic notion. They appeal to the fact,

that whatever other case be brought forward as

parallel to Being and its convertible terms, will be

found, on examination, to be not quite parallel. Thus

the disparity appears if we compare Being to that

which comes nearest to it, namely, one of the high

est

genera,Substance***

Comparingthe

phrases,"Animal

Being," "RationalBeing,"

with "Animal

Substance,""

Rational Substance," we observe that

Being, in its abstract form, can be predicated of the

abstract forms which are derivable from its differentia

ting adjectives, while substance, in its abstract form,

cannot so well be predicated of the abstract forms

which are derivable from its differentiating adjec

tives. We may say,"

Animality isEntity,"

"

Ration

ality isEntity,"

more conveniently than we can say,"

Animality isSubstantiality,"

"

Rationality is Sub

stantiality."The discrimination becomes more

obvious when we take something less universal than

a highest genus. Starting from"

Rational Being,"

and"

Rational Animal," we may write,"

Rationality

isBeing,"

but not"

Rationality is Animality." The

root of the doctrine lies in the more usual teaching

of the scholastics, against Cajetan and Scotus, to

*Fonseca, Comment, de Aristot. Mei.-.phys. Lib. III. C. iii.




the effect that the unlimited generality of Being

is contracted to successively narrower and narrower

spheres, not by the addition of ideas other than

that of Being not as"

animal"

is contracted by the

addition of"

rational"

but by a fuller expression

of the same idea.

We are at once launched on that difficult sea

of

controversywhich

ragesabout the

analogousnessof Being of Being, let us remember, taken as ens

essentitz. What analogy means is illustrated by the

remark of Sydney Smith, which puzzled a very

matter-of-fact Scotchman the remark, namely, that

a certain book was healthy. Clear, however, as this

illustration may be, it leaves us under need of further

explanation, which we enter upon with the observa

tion that an object, an idea, and a word, as a matter

of usage, may each be called by the epithet univocal.

Most appropriately objects would be denominated by

this epithet, for it is to objects that words (voces) are

primarily applied : but ideas and words have estab

lished for themselves a share in the title. A univocal

term, strictly so called, must apply to several objects

the same notion, without variation of meaning , a

condition of things which can be attained only by

mentally prescinding from all differences in the

objects. Thus if by"

animal"

we agree to mean

absolutely no more than

"

sensitively-organized

Being,"in complete disregard of variations in the

perfection of the organism or the sensitiveness, and

if by"

rational"

we agree to mean absolutely no

more than"

intelligence that works discursively,"

then these terms, because we have effectively willed



40 BEING.

to make them so, are each univocal when applied to

their respective objects. The only dispute that

could arise on the point, would be a biological or a

psychological one whether our definitions are valid.

But supposing their validity, then we have, at least

under an hypothesis, instances of what is meant

by univocal. We have one term applied to a plurality

ofobjects

withoutchange

ofsignification. Thus

it

appears that the power of making univocal terms

depends on the power of prescinding from all the

differences that exist between a multiplicity of similar

things, and of regarding them only so far as they

are alike. If, therefore, Being is of such a peculiar

character that we cannot perfectly prescind, or prefer

not fully to prescind, from its differences, then the

term becomes, instead of univocal, analogous, that is,

a term which in name is identical throughout its appli

cations, but in meaning is partly the same and partly

different. Thus a man, his food, and his book mayall be healthy, but with a variation in the applicability

of the term. Not to dwell at present on the several

sorts of analogy, we will ask at once, does Being

refuse to allow us fully to prescind it from its differ

ences ? Many authors, resting upon reasons already

given for denying that Being is generic, deny also that

it is univocal. Their argument often comes ultimately

to the plea that fully to prescind from differences is,

in the case of Being, impossible or unadvisable.

Carleton41

expressly relies upon the impossibility.

Suarez42

is unsatisfactory in his defence of the

analogousness of the term, because, though at times

41Philosophia Universa, Disp. xl.

42Metaphysics, Disp. xxviii. sect, iii




he seems to argue from the transcendentality of

Being, and from the impossibility of fully prescind

ing Being from its differences, nevertheless at

other times he implies that he has a better and

more radical argument. Authors on the same side

as Suarez also cause some perplexity by speaking

now as though any of the varieties of Being at

pleasure were, in some way, included under

"

the

comprehension"

of Being, now as though they

were rather under its"

extension"

only.

By way of specimen Suarez shall be cited,

"

Being,"he contends,

"

however abstractedly

taken, of its own nature implies this order, that

it belongs primarily and of itself (primo et per se), to

God." Thus, within the limits of the very notion of

Being, a hierarchical character is said to declare

itself. Being, as it were, asserts of itself that it

must be primarily independent, infinite and divine,

and can be only secondarily dependent, finite, and

mundane. The author sets forth these thoughts as

follows :

"

God, by the very fact that He is a Being,

perfectly simple in His essence and infinite, neces

sarily has in Himself the perfection of all Being in

the form of a single, incomprehensible perfection.

Hence the notion itself of Being, as found in God,

includes the notion of substance, of wisdom, of

justice, and therefore which is the main pointGod s Being is very Being itself, underived and

independent ;while on the other hand, in any

creature, Being is wholly derived, dependent, and

limited to some particular sort of perfection.

Therefore in God Being has its essential plenitude,



but in creatures it is only participated, or communi

cated in measure : God is one single perfection,

involving the fulness of Being; but other Beings

are only partial, dividing among themselves different

finite perfections." Hereupon Suarez puts to

himself a fair difficulty, which he does not answer

with as much clearness as might be desired. He

asks whether, instead of considering Being as Beingin the above argument, he has not been considering

Being as respectively firstprimitive and then derivative,

first finite and then infinite. Unless he again falls

back upon the transcendentality of Being, or the

impossibility of perfectly prescinding in its regard,

it is not so evident how hecompletely

satisfies the

Scotist question,"

Why do you not prescind from

every difference of Being?" Should he reply,

transcendentality forbids, his argument would be

easily understood. As a matter of fact he does

fall back upon transcendentality,43

but he does not

make it his chief support ;he intimates that he

can do without it, and even implies that he regards

another line of proof as more important. For after

having proved that the transcendental44

"notion of

Being is intimately included in all the specialized

notions ofBeing,"

he signifies that he has another

argument, more radical, in store."

Secondly, what

goes most to the root of the matter (dcinde quod ad rem

maxime special},the general notion of Being itself,

and as such, demands the idea of subordination

4! Kantists should be warned that there is no reference here to

Kant s distinction between "

transcendent" and "transcendental."

44 L.c. n. 31.



THE MOTION OF BEING. 43

between entities." His mind perhaps may be

expressed somewhat in this way : I will forego the

direct appeal to the transcendentality of Being, for

I have another resource. When I am inquiring

whether a term is univocal or analogous, I must

consider the special applications that are to be

made of it;for it is idle to ask me, without further

circumstances, if healthy and smiling are univocal

terms; they may be applied univocally to several

men, or analogously to men and countries in

common. So with regard to Being, I must

examine its applications before I pronounce it

univocal or analogous. As unapplied it is neither

univocal noranalogous,

but taken, as

logicianssay, in

"

absolute supposition." When I consider

the broadest division into Infinite Being and finite

beings, I observe an order of dependence consti

tuted within the very notion of Being itself. For

"Beingof itself essentially demands this order," that

the finite can be only by descent from the infinite;

thus the one differs in perfection from the other, and

the differences are constituted by the very Being of

each, not by something that is not formally Being.

I can apply the same argument to another broad

division of Being into substantial and accidental.45

I conclude, on the whole, that from the application

of the idea Being to its different objects, it is made

apparent that the term is predicated of them with

differences in the application, in other words, it is

analogous.

The position may, perhaps, be illustrated thus.

45Disp. xxxi. sect, ii



BEING.

On the hypothesis of creation, and on the not

extravagant assumption that the ascending scale

in animal life is not of metaphysical necessity, we

may say that the actual gradation is not involved in

the mere notion of"

animal." There might have

been an animal creation without our present grada

tions, or even without any gradations whatever.

Whereas in the case of Being, Suarez would maintain that its gradational order is involved in the

very notion; Being a se et per se, Being per se sed

non a se, Being nee a se nee per se ; that is, Un

created Substance, Created Substance, Accidental

Being this order is required by the very nature of

Being. Youmight

have had manproduced

alone with

out a single other specimen of the animal kingdom :

but you cannot have finite Being if you have not the

Infinite, nor accidental Being if you have not the

substantial, and that from the very nature of Being.

Suarez seems quite unconvincing to the Scotists

because he does not give a reason satisfactory to

them, for arguing about Being as Infinite and as

finite, when he professes to be arguing about Being

as such the famous Ens qua tale, Ens ut sic. If he

urges, as sometimes he does, that Being enters

into all differences and is affected by them, so that

this its universal sympathy, so to speak, is perpetually

modifying its mode of application, then he is

convicted of want of consistent loyalty to his own

principle, by allowing that Being can be predicated

univocally of things specifically the same.46 For if

Being is affected by all differences, it is affected by46

Disp. xxxi. sect. ii. nn. 21, 22.




the difference between any one individual and

another of the same species : therefore of no two

individuals can it be predicated univocally.

On the other side of the question, the Scotists

resolutely maintain that by disregarding all differ

ences they can, because they will it, view Being as

one unvarying notion throughout its applications.

For as the ordinary mathematician regards a line

simply under the aspect of direction in length, to

the utter ignoring of breadth, and as the ordinary

schoolman regards"

animal"

simply under the

aspect of"

sensitive organism," to the utter

ignoring of variations in structure and function :

so the Scotist claims to consider Being withoutregard to any of its variations.

In order that the reader may have some definite

teaching on a matter apparently so perplexing, we

venture to offer the following propositions as safe.

(a) Two grounds on which many philosophers

argue for the analogy of Being,namely,

the com

pleteness of the dependency of finite Being on

Infinite, and of accidental Being on substantial, are

very important : nor are they questioned by the

Scotists.

(6) The differences of conclusion which Scotists

and anti-Scotists respectively draw from these

grounds about the propriety of calling Being analo

gous, are nothing like so momentous as would be a

difference about the grounds themselves.

(c) Those who call Being analogous can give a

valid meaning to their words.

The stress of the conflict evidently falls on Being



46 BEING.

as applied to God and to creatures : and here the

analogists imperil their position if they do not cling

tenaciously to the proposition which Dr. Dupont47

has thus formulated :

" When we call God Being

per se, and creatures Beings by participation, we

do not wish to express what are properly styled

specific differences, which would have to be con

ceived as additions to the notion Being; but wemean different modes of

Being."The phrase

"

Beings by participation,"leads to a final remark

on this subject, and an important one too, as

directed against pantheism. Creatures are not one

Being with God, and in that sense Beings by parti

cipation. To emphasize this fact many writers call

the analogy of Being an analogy of "intrinsic

attribution." The gist of what they wish to

express is, that created Beings are intrinsically

Beings and are not called so simply by reference

extrinsically to the Divine Being, as food is called

healthy,not because

intrinsicallyit is

so,but because

it conduces to health in man. The latter analogy

is said to be of"

extrinsic attribution;

"

healthy is

attributed to food because of a health which

is outside the food itself, and within man who

eats the food.48

(4) After having laid down the terms of settle

ment as regards the meaning to be attached to the

word Being, there remains a little to be said on three

47Ontologie, p. 40.

48 We omit to consider the case of those who assert more than

one term Being, e.g.,an ens confusum, an ens dtstinctum, and an ens

medium. Cf. Fonseca, in Lib. IV. Metaphys. c. ii. q. ii. Suarez also

speaks of an ens confusissimum . Disp. xxviii. sect. iii. n. 16,




self-evident principles which spring straight from

the notion itself. We will not pause to engage in

the not very profitable controversies as to whether

the principle of contradiction is prior to that of

identity; whether we should distinguish priority of

apprehension from priority of judgment ;whether

the principle of identity is too tautological to be

called a principle at all,

49

and so forth. It is enoughto say that positive perception is more directly matter

of experience than perception of a negative, but

that at the same time, every positive perception

implies the perception of some negation. Hence

our plan will be to regard the principle of identity

as included in that of contradiction;we make one

complete principle of the two. In tabular form

wemay arrange the three thus, so as to show the

union of No. i and No. 2.

2.,

j.(What is,

"t is,

and cannotat the same time not be.

fBetween Being and not-Being

I there is no medium.

Thus No. 2 includes No. I, as part of itself.

In testing these principles it is requisite to

reduce examples to the simple form contemplated in

books of philosophy; for of course in a complex

40Against taking the principle of identity for tautological stands

the fact, that a most powerful discourse might be delivered to

enforce the text from Bishop Butler :

"

Things are what they are,

and the consequences of them will be what they will be." How

many lives are passed in ignoring this truth !



48 BEING.

case there is a mean between mere is and is not, yes

and no ; a distinction is often needed. With this

proviso we go on to remark that in Pure Logic

the principles are formulated for Affirmation and

Negation ;in Applied Logic these laws of affirma

tion and negation are shown, notwithstanding Mill s

scepticism, to be valid also for things themselves;

and in Ontology we must do what most people

neglect to do, we must accommodate the principles

to our own chosen sense of the word Being. Herein

many fail; they assign a fixed meaning to a term

and then, under pressure of convenience, or in a fit

of foigetfulness, they depart from their own arrange

ment. We agreed to consider Being as Ens

Essentia, as standing for a somewhat whether existent

or not : therefore if now we explain the principles

drawn from Being only in reference to Existence, we

are changing our plan illegitimately. Many a

person who could readily expound the principle of

Excluded Middle in relation to existence, would bepuzzled to know what it means in relation to essence.

The principles, or better, the Principle of Identity

and Contradiction, therefore, must now take this

shape :

" To be a thing is to be a thing, and not to

be a nothing: to be any definite thing is to be

that definite

thing

and not

somethingelse." The

principle of Excluded Middle is less obvious:"

Between being a thing and not being a thing,

between being any definite thing and not being that

definite thing, there is no medium." If we take the

form often given, Qu&vis res aut est aut non est

"

Every thing or essence either is or isnot," we must



THE NOTION OF BEING 49

be careful lest we make the second alternative

always an absurdity. For if we take the principle in

regard not to existence but to essence, where is the

sense in the alternative that an essence may not be,

that is, may not be an essence ? If we insist on

finding a meaning under these circumstances, we

can find one that will meet Mill s difficulty when he

indulgesin the

suppositionthat the word

maybe

unmeaning; "Abracadabra either is or is not." Weanswer that the hypothesis of Abracadabra without

a meaning is against the previous hypothesis, that

the principle is applied only to Being, for Being, as

we shall show presently, must be true;

but if we

want to take up Mill s supposition, then we interpret

his proposition thus :

"

Every suggested Essence

either really is one or not :

" "

Every proposal of a

Being either satisfies the requirement of a Being or

not :

" "

Whatever is brought forward as something

apt to exist, either really is so apt or not." As we

shall see later, certain conditions are necessary to

make a thing a thing, that is, an intrinsic possibility.

Lest we should be supposed to misrepresent

Mill by the assertion, that he does not regard the

three primary principles as applicable to things in

themselves, we will mention here the single excep

tion which he himself makes, and which does not

stand for much, when we take into account his

inconsistency in allowing that he can validly make

even a single proposition about Noumena. " The

only contradictory alternative," he says,50 "

of which

50 Examination of Sir W . Hamilton s Philosophy, chap. vi. in fine>

cf. chap. xxi. p. 417



50 BEING.

the negative side contains nothing positive, is that

between Entity and non-Entity, Existing and non-

Existing ;and so far as regards that distinction I

admit the law of Excluded Middle as applicable to

Noumena; they must either exist or not exist. But

this is all the applicability I can allow to it." Weshould be sorry to rob Mill .of as much credit as is

due to him, for

havingmore or less seen that

thingsin themselves either do exist or do not

;it is not

always that he is ready with such concessions to

common sense.

It has already been remarked that examples

must be properly simplified before they can be used

as illustrations of the three primary principles. As

the last of the three is most open to miscon

ception we will exemplify it in the proposition,"

All cows either are or are not red." What must

we do with the cows that are red and white, or

those the colour of which is not simple red but

a tint of red ? We must fix upon an exact descrip

tion of a red cow ; and say, for instance, that a red

cow is a cow presenting a colour that is at least

predominantly red, and having that colour without

patches of other colour interspersed. Then sup

posing the physical difficulties of verifying such a

definition to be overcome, we are left with the

safe metaphysical truth, that every cow eithersatisfies all our requirements or does not. To satisfy

them only partially is failure. Hegelians, of course,

object to these rigid distinctions between either and

or: we ourselves admit how difficult they are to

establish in the complicated cases of experience ;




butwe cannot therefore allow the Hegelian doctrine

that everything merges into its opposite, and that

Reason takes up and reconciles the contradictions

of the Understanding, by a process wherein "finite

categories or formulae of thought work their own

dissolution and pass over into the opposite cate

gories."

61 As a mystery guaranteed to us by revela

tion, we may believe that the God whom natural

intelligence discovers to be One God considered

absolutely in His Essence, is yet, when considered

relatively in His Personality, three Persons; but

revelation itself could not make us believe what

defies rational belief, namely, that one God was at

the same time, and under the same aspect, both one

God and three Gods.

At the conclusion of the chapter on Being, the

remark is worth making that to Being, as here

expounded, stands opposed what the scholastics call

nihil positivum, that which positively is a non-entity,

or presents intrinsic contradiction so as to defyactualization

;not nihil privativum, which means

an entity that has not indeed been brought into

existence but might be made to exist.52

81 Wallace s Logic of Hegel, p. 125.

52 Mr. Bradley seeks to lay needless difficulty in the way of our

arrival at conception of Nothing through the idea of Thing and its

negation." Take the idea of Reality, I could not admit that in

thought all our ideas are qualified by their negations ;I should

doubt if the highest term we arrive at can be said to have an

opposite even in thought, although by an error we are given to

think so." (Principles of Logic, p. 148.)



5a BEING.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

(i)The practice, so much in vogue now-a-days, of

appending notes and illustrations to philosophical dis

sertations has for its chief purpose to be suggestive, to

give some glimpses into varieties of thought, to show

some of the surroundings that really do lie about the

path which author and reader have been mainly intenton following, though it would have been a distraction

to have taken express notice of them before. The aim,

then, is not to describe whole systems, nor to give

complete historic sketches, nor to form a continuous

line of thought from one note to another;but to gather

a few appropriate fragments here and there, and put

them by the side of a continuous chapter, to illustrate

different parts of its contents.

In the case of Being, he is a poor sort of philosopher

who does not care to know anything about the vast

amount of human speculation which, in all ages, has

been devoted to that notion. It is hopeless to follow

many of the wild flights of imagination in pursuit of the

supposed transformations of Being; Oriental dreamsbefore the coming of Christ, and Gnostic fancies shortly

after His coming, are specimens of what we mean. The

Greeks,who were characteristically a clear-headed race,1

did not escape the fascination of Being and its dangers ;

for while the Eleatics held that immutable Being was

everything, and that Change or Becoming were unreali

ties, Heraclitus fell into the opposite extreme, teaching,or at least seeming to teach, that there was no fixed

Being, but only perpetual flux. His words are notorious

iravTa pel real ovSevjjuevet, ovSev fj.a\\ov TO ov TOV

fjbr)

1English readers may find some of the Greek doctrines re

specting Being illustrated in Professor Jowett s Plato, Vol. IV

p. 458.




ecrrt. Both these errors are perpetuated to the

present day, when we find men speaking of phenomena as idle shows without reality, which give no

indications of things in themselves;

and when we

find them so possessed with the idea of ceaseless evolu

tion, that they place Becoming before Being in the order

of important ideas. It has even been said that, as

Being was the leading idea of an age that believed in

fixity of species, so Becoming has grown to be the

leading idea of an age that believes in endless trans

formations. Such is the change of the Zeit-Geist, or

Spirit of the age, if indeed a certain class of people

are not too self-asserting in their claim to represent the

age.

(2) Hegel s identification of Being with Nothing is

so notorious, that some interest should naturally arise

to see how he describes this Being of his. Being, then,

is not a notion, but it is the beginning of thought." When we begin to think we have nothing but thought

in its merest indeterminateness and absence ofspecialization."

2

Such indeterminateness is not derived by abstracting

from previous determinations; it is "original and

underived indeterminateness, which is previous to all

definite character, and is the very first of all. It is not

something felt or perceived by the spiritual sense, or

pictured in imagination ;it is only and merely thought,

and as such it forms thebeginning." Impossible as

such a feat may seem, Chalybaus is said to have given

a popular exposition of Hegel s doctrines;so from the

popular account we will borrow the following description

of Being:3

"First of all let us ask, wherein consists

this Being, or what do we perceive in it ? We can only

say that as yet we do not distinguish anything in it

-

Logic of Hegel, p. 136.

3 The History of Speculative Philosophy, p. 365, English translation.



54 BEING.

nay more, that we are not even capable of distinguishing

it from empty and pure nought.. . .

Being is the purewant of determination, it is thinking which thinks

nothing, it is intuition which looks straight before it,

without perceiving anything; it is just as if we were

staring into the sky, of which we could not even say

that it was blue, or that it was not the earth, or that it

was not ourselves." One use of this description of

Being will be to bring out, by contrast, the fact that withus Being is a concept, that it has an objective meaning,

and that it is the very opposite of Nothing. Even

Hegel adds that along with the assertion that Being is

identical with Nothing, we must take the equally true

assertion that it is not identical with Nothing ;else we

shall be one-sided in our view.

The great means for reconciling this and all other

contradictions is the famous "

dialectic process"

which

is at work in the constitution at once of thought and of

things, for both meet in one identity. By the dialectic

process is meant 4"an indwelling tendency outward

and beyond, by which the one-sidedness and the

limitation of the formulae of the understanding are seen

in their true light and shown to be the negation of these

formulae. Things are infinite just because they involve

their own dissolution. Thus understood, Dialectic is

discovered to be the life and soul of scientific progress,

the dynamic which alone gives an immanent connexion

and necessity to the subject-matter of science;and in a

word is seen to constitute the real and true, as opposed

to the external exaltation above the finite. Whereverthere is movement, wherever there is life, wherever

anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there

Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all know-

4 Wallace s Logic of Hegel, pp. 141, 143, cf. 125, 129. See also

Professor Jowett s Introduction to Plato s Dialogue, The Sophist.



tHE NOTION OF BEING. 55

ledge which is truly scientific. . . .

The limitations ofthe finite do not come merely from without

;its own

nature is the cause of its abrogation, and by its own

means it passes into its counterpart. . . . Everything

that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of

Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead

of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable

and transient ; and this is exactly what we mean bythat Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite as

implicitly other than what it is, is forced to surrender

its own immediate or natural Being, and to turn

suddenly into its opposite. All things finite, it is said,

meet their doom;and in saying so we have a per

ception that Dialectic is the universal and irresistible

power before which nothing can stay, however secureand stable it may deem itself. . . . Take as an illustra

tion the motion of the heavenly bodies. At this

moment the planet stands at this spot, but implicitly

it is the possibility of being in another spot; and

that possibility of being otherwise the planet brings

into existence by moving. A Dialectic is recognized in

the common proverbs, Summum jus, summa injuria

Pride goes before a fall; Too much wit out-wits

itself."

The "Dialecticprocess"

if watered down to

mean some such truths as are often set forth in dis

coursing on texts like, "Extremes meet," "The know

ledge of opposites isone,"

" Too far East is West,"

might be acceptable ;but in the undiluted form it gets

into the heads of Hegelians and drives them to all sorts

of extravagant utterances.

(3) Should it be said that the identification of some

thing with nothing, or at least the assertion of the

nothingness of all created things is sanctioned by the

Fathers of the Church, unless indeed we put the still

worse interpretation on their words, that they make out



BEING.

God to be nothing ;we reply that they expressly

teach the opposite, and that the passages in which they

might seem inclining to the errors in question admit of

easy reconciliation with the truth. The fact is, that in

their desire to bring out the immense difference between

Uncreated and Created Being, they affirm on the one

side that the latter is a comparative nothing,5 and on the

other side that our predicates, derived from finite

experiences, may be denied in regard to the God whomthey so inadequately represent. But Scotus Erigena

clearly overstrains this style of phraseology. The follow

ing are a few specimen utterances of his : "No category

can properly include God in its signification ;

"

" God

is above all form, and is therefore rather no form than

form;

"" As the Divine Goodness is beyond compre

hension, it is called, per cxcellentiam, Nothing;" "God is

beyond Being, and is in General beyond the utterable

and the intelligible;""The Divine ignorance stands

for nothing else than the infinite and incomprehensible

Wisdom of God." Such modes of speech cannot be

recommended;

it being, for example, a very poor

reason why God s wisdom should b~ called ignor

ance because it is at the furthest possible remove from

ignorance and high above all that passes for wisdom

among men. Yet on the Scotist model Nicholas de

Cusa calls our highest wisdom docta ignorantia : in

God he finds all affirmations and negations recon

ciled.

(4)While treating of Being as not a generic and

not a univocal notion, we mentioned Carleton as one whoholds that Being does not include, within its "compre

hension," its own differences. His words may usefully

be given:6

"The very fact that we have Beingnarrowed down to some special form (ens contractum)

* Cf. Isaias xl. 17. Universa Philosophic, Disp. xl. sect. vii.




implies that there is some other concept oithide tke

concept of Being, though Being does not lie outside the

concept of it. Therefore Being is abstracted from

the differences of Being with only the incomplete

abstraction known as that of the Including and the

Included." While, however, some thus deny that

more determinate ideas come under the "

comprehension

"

of Being, others might suppose, that be

cause of the peculiar nature of the term, Being does,

after a manner, hold all other ideas even in its

"

comprehension," though not of course explicitly.

In this light, rightly or wrongly, they might read such

passages of St. Thomas as these: "There can be no

differentiating note which is outside the concept of

Being;"7 " To Being nothing can be added as of a

nature extrinsic to it, in the way in which a specific

difference is added to a genus, or an accident to a

subject. For every nature is, by its very essence,

Being ;and only in so far can anything be called

additional to Being as it expresses the manner of

Being, which is not expressed by the word itself."8

And once more," an addition may be made to Being

inasmuch as the term is brought down to its particular

conditions (contrahitur) by means of the ten highest

genera. But what these add to Being is not some acci

dent, nor some specific difference outside the essence of

Being, but a determinate mode of Being which is

founded in the very Essence of thething."

The concili

ation of opinions seems possible, since they are settle

ments of usage that are in dispute rather than truths

themselves. Carleton is quite right in the assertion,

"that the differences of Being cannot at all be conceived

apart from Being, while Being can be conceived apart

from its differences;

"

and that so far the differences lie

7 Sum. i. q. iii. a. v. 3Quasi. Disp. de Vet-Hat, q. i. a. i



BEING.

outside the concept of Being. On the other hand, all

these differences are themselves Being after a manner

in which no generic notion can be predicated of its

specific differences.

(5)This is not the treatise in which to discuss

innate ideas;

nor are these much in favour among

philosophers at present, unless they be reduced to the

category of the hereditary effects of habitual experience ;

but we may mention that Being is specially the idea

which is supposed to defy our means of acquiring

notions for ourselves. Hence Mr. Veitch says that we

have " the notion of existence a priori"

and that"

if we

are only conscious of an object as we apprehend it,

and only apprehend it as we affirm it to exist, then

existence must be attributed to the object by the mind;

and this could not be done unless existence, as a notion,

virtually pre-existed in the mind." The idea of Being,

such as we have described it, is quite within the reach

of man s ordinary means of acquiring knowledge.



CHAPTER HI.

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.

Synopsis.

(1) In what way the intellect is said to know all things under

the aspect of essences.

(2) The special way in which the intellect is said to know the

essences of some things, (a)Attack on the scholastic

doctrine about this point, (b) Defence of the doctrine

within proper limits; proof of the position.

(3) Essences are assigned sometimes according to physical,

sometimes according to metaphysical constituents.

(4) Distinction between essence and existence in an actually

existent creature.

Notes and Illustrations.

(i) Esszntia is not a word which we find in a

select Latin Dictionary that contains only the most

approved vocables of the classical period ;but it

certainly had its own period of high repute in

the flourishing days of scholasticism, and even now,

according to Martinus Scriblerus, it is faring better

than most of its kind."

For," he says,"

instead

of being, like them, quite abolished, it has survived

in the chemists shops, where it has even been

raised to the rank of a quintessence." Ridicule,

however, does not always kill;and we are going to

show that the term"

essence"

is still alive, and

must continue to live, if science is to have any

life in it. The word has a wider and a narrower

signification, each of which we have to examine.



60 BEING.

It is asserted to be the prerogative of intellect

proper, that it knows all its objects under the

aspect of essences;and this its power is made a

strongly distinguishing mark between the percep

tion which is characteristically human and mere

animal perception. A writer who was no school

man, Lewes, more than once falls back on this

distinction;

saying,for

instance,that

"

the animal

thinks, but only in sensations and images, not

in abstractions and symbols. The animal perceives

no object, no causal connexion," that is, nothing as

object, or as causal connexion; and this deficiency

comes from want of the faculty to apprehend the

whatness of things. Here is a virtual recognition of

the broadest meaning of the word essence, though

this is not the term which Lewes himself would have

used to express his opinion. Still his doctrine, which

is accepted in the recent work of Mr. Romanes,

so far as it is true, implies that no animal can

ask or answer the question, What ? Man, on the

contrary, even though uncultured, is ever employed

on the investigation of the what in things, and his

conceptions, however inadequate, take the form of

a quiddity or essence. Substantially, at all events, he

understands the force of the interrogative pronoun

quid. Hence the lines of Hudibras have some

truth :

He knew what s what, and that s as deep

As metaphysic wit can peep.

As a specimen of the scholastic teaching, the words

of Father Lahousse will suffice :

"

Essence is the



ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 61

formal object of the intellectual act;for the intellect

expresses all that it apprehends by terms in which

it conceives other objects of a like sort, such terms,

for example, as substance and accident, spirit and body,

infinite and finite, existent and non-existent, singular

and universal, present and absent. Now whoever

apprehends that whereby a thing is placed in a

certain definite order, apprehends an essence." Somuch for the meaning of essence in the widest sense,

according to which Being is the most generalized

essence : every object is a Being so far as in answer

to question, What is it ? the intellect must reply,

It is a something, an Ens essentia.1

(2)

Upto the

present pointour doctrine will

probably not provoke many dissentients, though

really it does involve the assertion of a thorough

going difference between sense and intellect, such

as the school of Hume flatly deny. Openly, the

tug of war begins over our next claim, which

involves higher pretensions to the knowledge of

essences. The schoolmen held firmly, that those

objects which they called natural, as distinguished

from artificial objects a distinction which they

must have felt they could not always draw with

precision were not mere aggregates of cohering ele

ments, but essences, each constituted strictly a unit

by an indivisible substantial form : for it was only

some writers who allowed the possibility of two or

more substantial forms superposed one on another.

How far the scholastic doctrine is demonstrable is

discussed in Cosmology. Here it suffices to prove1

Psychologies, thesis xxvi.



BEING.

that we can, more or less, reach the essential

constitution of a number of things find that which,as essentia, gives them their esse after the way in

which a man s sapientia gives him his sapere. Where

we cannot absolutely touch the goal, at least we can

make approximations.

(a) Attacks upon our present position may be

divided into three possible degrees, (i.) The factof

essence may be granted, but all further knowledge

of it denied; (ii.) the fact may be declared

doubtful; (iii.) the so-called fact may be pro

nounced a fiction of the mind. To borrow an

illustration from the hidden personality of an

Oriental monarch, who sometimes holds himself

aloof from his people as the great, mysterious

power in the background, we may find these three

corresponding stages of belief and disbelief. One

subject of the prince might say,"

There is such a

potentate, but that is all I know;

"

another,"

I

doubt whether there is such a potentate ;

"

a third,"

Such potentate certainly does not exist, and those

styled his Ministers are our real and only rulers."

The three modes of attack are actually made,

and we certainly shall not understand the important

question of essences if we are too idle to go through

the successive stages of the controversy. Adver

saries shall state their own case, and we will reply.

(i) Hobbes 2 had made the sarcastic remark that

"

quiddity51

was one of the words which God had

not taught Adam in Paradise;but to Locke espe

cially is traced the origin of the great revolution

2Leviathan, Pt. I. c. iv.




against the reign of essences. In praise of Locke,

Voltaire says,"

He alone has marked out the

development of the human mind, in a book where

there is nothing but truth, and, what makes the

work perfect, every truth is clearly set forth." To

this general commendation Mill has added his

special approval in regard to the doctrine of

essences:3 "

It was reserved for

Locketo convince

philosophers, that the supposed essences were

merely the significations of their names;nor among

the signal services which this writer rendered to

philosophy was there one more needful or more

valuable." Accordingly Mill teaches that definition

can only be of names, not of real essences. Evi

dently, then, it is our duty to acquaint ourselves

with Locke s doctrine, and to see whether we can

accept Mill s judgment on its value. If we like to

take the teaching first of all at second hand, we

have it in the commendatory words of Reid, who

makes the view his own: 4"The works of God are

all imperfectly known by us. We see their outside

or perhaps we discover some of their qualities and

relations, by observation and experiment, assisted

by reason; but we can give no definition of the

meanest of them, which comprehends its real essence.

It is justly observed by Locke, that nominal essences

only, which are the creatures of our own minds, are

perfectly apprehended by us;and even of these

there are many too simple in their nature to admit

3Logic, Bk. I. c. vi. 2.

4 Reid on Aristotle s Logic, c. ii. sect. iv. See Locke, Human

Understanding, Bk. III. c. iii.



64 BEING.

of definition." The reference which we give to the

author himself bears out the above compendium ofhis doctrine, which explicitly is that

"

the essences

of things are nothing else but our abstract ideas."

Thus Locke grants that things have essences "real

essences:" what he denies is, "that we can know

anything more than the"

nominal essences,"

which Hamilton5

says is only another phrase for

"logical essences," or "the abstract notions worked

out by general terms." In other words, Locke is

here a nominalist or a conceptualist in his denial

of reality to universal ideas;but he is most careful

to insist, especially in his polemic with the Anglican

Bishop of Worcester, that"

there is an internal

constitution of things, on which their properties

depend." So much by way of stating the first

antagonistic position, which is that our knowledge

is limited to the fact of the existence of real

essences, while for the rest we have to content

ourselves with nominal essences.

(ii.) and (iii.) The two other positions may bedealt with together, as the step from agnosticism

to positive denial is only one of audacity in making

assertions. As a representative writer, we will take

Mill, in weighing whose utterances we must bear in

mind that he allows a knowledge of no substance,

bodilyor

mental,and of no efficient

causality,and

of no metaphysically necessary truth; indeed, his

theory of knowledge is what determines his rejec

tion of essences. These are important items to

keep in view while considering his assertions with

8 Note on Reid, I.e.




respect to essences, the gist of which may be

conveyed in a few passages. 6"

An essential pro

position is one which is purely verbal;which asserts

of a thing, under a particular name, only what is

asserted of it in the fact of calling it by that name;

and which, therefore, either gives no information,

or gives it respecting the name, not the thing. Non-

essential or accidental propositions may be calledreal propositions in opposition to verbal." In other

words, no analytical proposition conveys any real

information;and that to which we are at liberty to

apply the word essential, is at most an explanation of

the meaning of a word. With the understanding that

the matter is a verbal one, we

mayclaim to know

the essence of classes :

" The distinction between the

essence of a class and the attributes, or properties

which are not essential, amounts to nothing more

than the difference between those attributes of a

class which are, and those which are not, involved

in the connotation (meaning) of a class-name." So

much for what is allowed; now for what is dis

allowed: "As applied to individuals, the word essence

has no meaning, except in connexion with the ex

ploded tenets of the realists ;and what the school

men chose to call the essence of an individual, was

the essence of the class to which the individual was

most familiarly referred." Here Mill falls into the

ordinary blunder of attributing to the schoolmen

generally, what was the extravagance of a compara

tive few;7 and accordingly he goes on to identify

Logic, Bk. I. cc. vi. vii. and viii.

lSee First Principles of Knowledge, Pt. II. c. iii. n. 6.

F



66 BEING.

the doctrine of essences with an error which most of

the defenders of that doctrine thoroughly repudiate.

"Aristotelians thought that ice was made ice, not

by the possession of certain properties to which

mankind have chosen to attach that name, but by

a participation in the nature of a certain general sub

stance"* Of course, Platonists rather than Aristo

telians would belikely

to commit such an extrava

gance ;but Mill says boldly and without limitation,

"

Aristotelians." Next we come to a statement

of Mill s own position :

" The inmost nature or

essence of a thing is apt to be regarded as

something unknown, which, if we knew it, would

account for all the phenomena which the thing

exhibits to us. But this unknown something is a

supposition without evidence. We have no ground

to suppose that there is anything, which, if known

to us, would afford to our intellect this satisfaction :

would sum up, as it were, the knowable attributes

of an object in a single sentence. Moreover, if there

were such a central property, it would not answer

to the idea of an inmost nature : for if knowable by

any intelligence, it must, like other properties, be

relative to the intelligence which knows it, that is, it

must consist in impressing that intelligence in some

special way; the only sense in which the verb to

know means anything."

According to Mill, therefore, an essential property

is one which is part of the very definition or meaning

of the word which stands as subject in a sentence;

8 This crooked version of a chapter in the history of philosophy

is repeated in the Examination, c. xvii. in initio.



ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 6j

and such essence is verbal, not real. As for any

real essential nature in physical things, we know of

none such, and in any case the relativity of all

knowledge would be a bar to the knowledge of

essences, such as the schoolmen assert. Here we

have a doctrine common in the school of Hume :

and we will illustrate it no further except by letting

Lewes repeat its chief tenets. He likens the Aristotelian essences to the pure space which is supposed

to be the background of all things ;essences are

empty as space, mere negations of all attributes or

phenomena : indeed there can be no absolute thing

in itself, for "nothing exists in and for itself," and

the universe known to us is a

systemof correlated

events.

Whether on the above principles, the attitude

taken with respect to essences is one of agnosticism

or of positive denial matters little for the refutation

which we have to give of the whole doctrine : but

at least the positive denial sounds not a little

arbitrary.

(b) In doing something to rehabilitate a much

discredited teaching of the schoolmen, we maystart from less disputed points. At least in the

abstract sciences, and notably in mathematics, it

is maintainable that we can devise essential defi

nitions which stand good arnid accidental variations,

and have a most unmistakeably real9

significance.

Reid confesses as much when he says, that from

the essence of a triangle we are able to deduce its

properties. We can determine exactly what con-

9 See our definition of real in chapter ii. p. 32.



68 BEING.

stitutes the precise nature of certain figures, dis

tinguishesthem

specificallyfrom other

figures,

and

enables us to infer their necessary attributes. In

regard to this deduction we must not let ourselves

be puzzled by the very narrow limits within which

some have chosen to confine our data : as, for

example, when it is declared that from the nature

of a straight line we cannot infer that it is the

shortest way between two points, because the

notion "straightline" does not contain the notion

"

shortest way ;

"

or again, when it is declared that

certain conclusions are not a priori because we

mentally construct a geometrical figure in order to

follow out our reasoning, and thus institute a sort

of experiment a posteriori. It is intolerable so to

take out all meaning from the process of deduction

as to deny that we are using it because, in arguing

from essential definitions, we picture objects to the

mind, or use terms not verbally identical with the

terms which are explicitly set down as the data.

On this rigorist interpretation no proposition in

Euclid would give deductive results. We could

not deduce from the nature of a triangle that its

angles are equal to two right angles, because

its definition does not say, for instance, what a

right angle is. Remove these unwarrantable restric

tions and it

maybe

fairly

affirmed that in mathe

matics we find examples of real essences,10 and of

their deduced properties. Moral science would

furnish us with similar results; but we must

J0According to the definition of real given in the previous

chapter.



ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 6g

hasten on to the main controversy, the essences of

natural objects in the concrete.

To start with, it may be observed, that to fight

out this battle to the end belongs, not to General,

but to Special Metaphysics to Cosmology, which

treats of such questions as the ultimate constitu

tion of bodies, and to Psychology, which lays

down what is meant by a spiritual substance. Asto the essence of matter we may note two divergent

tendencies. Those whose training, before they take

up philosophy, has lain largely in chemical analyses

and syntheses, and in reducing what they see in

physical nature to mathematical formulae, are apt

to assume without anyhesitation

that, given afew

elementary atoms which are unaccounted for, all

the other differences between bodies must be simply

matters of arrangement between parts ;all are

accidental, none substantial;

all are extra-essential,

none intrinsically essential. Contrariwise with the

man who takes up philosophy, without previous

training in physical science, having his mind

unfamiliar with the conceptions of chemistry and

mathematics, his tendency is to regard all striking

changes as replacements of one essence by another,

never as rearrangements of the same elemental

forces. Hence there is a difficulty to get the

opposite sides fairly to weigh each other s argu

ments. While it is an undoubted want in a man s

mind, if it has never taken up Descartes great idea

of applying algebraic symbols to material phe

nomena, on the other hand it is decidedly a mental

twist to have Descartes exaggerated notions about



yo BEING.

the sufficiency of algebraic symbols to explain

matter. To represent the scholastics of the present

time as men all ignorant of experimental science

would be as inaccurate as to represent them as all

clinging, without abatement, to the old multiplicity

of essential forms in all their abundance. One

point on which they are unanimous is, that the

soul is not indeed the body, but the essential formof the human body ;

few would deny a similar office

to a vital principle in the mere animals : very manyaffirm the like for vegetative life : and below this

point the dissidents begin to multiply.

It belongs to another treatise to attempt an

adjudication of this very difficult controversy : but

we at present must try a simpler method of justify

ing the assertion that we can know something about

essential natures. In the rough the form of expres

sion could hardly be rejected, that science seeks

to arrive at the very nature of things, and has

some measure of success in the enterprise. Even

Mill allows us this much ;for in one of the very

chapters where he has been scouting the doctrine

of definitions which profess to give the real essences

of things, he comes round,n

at the close of his

discussion, to these admissions :

"

Whenever the

inquiry into the definition of the name of any real

object consists of anything else than a mere comparison of authorities, we tacitly assume that a

meaning must be found for the name compatible

with its continuing to denote, if possible all, but at

any rate the greater or more important part, of the

11

Logic, Bk. I. c. viii. in fine.




things of which it is commonly predicated. The

inquiry, therefore, into the definition is an inquiryinto the resemblances and differences among those things ;

whether there be any resemblance running through

them all; if not, through what portion a general

resemblance can be traced;and finally what are

the common attributes the possession of which gives

to them all, or to that portion of them, the character

of resemblance which has led to their being classed

together ?"

So far Mill s words do something to

relieve definitions from his charge that they are

nominal, not real : and that "the simplest and most

correct notion of a definition is, a proposition

declaratory of the meaning of a word." What

follows in the same extract will do something to

relieve the definition from the further charge that

its claim to be essential is a false pretence."

In

giving a distinct connotation (meaning) to the

general name, the philosopher will endeavour to

fix upon such as are common to all the things

usually denoted by the name, as also of the greatest

importance in themselves; either directly, or from

the number, the conspicuousness, or the interest

ing character of the consequences to which they lead.

He will select as far as possible such differentia as

lead to the greatest number of interesting propria.

But topenetrate

to the more hiddenagreement

on which

these more obvious and superficial agreements depend,

is often one of the most difficult of scientific

problems. And as it is among the most difficult,

so it seldom fails to be among the mostimportant."

We express no surprise that Mill should have



72 BEING.

spoken so ;he would have had to be egregiously

ignorant of the nature of science if he had described

its inquiries as anything less radical. It was his

irrational denial of substance and efficient causality,

and his equivalent denial of any knowledge beyond

that of each one s own states of sensation, thought,

and volition, that made him refuse to admit that

the definitions of science werereal

and had somedegree of success in assigning essences. In spite of

his denials, a confession that definitions are more

than nominal and accidental is clearly implied in

such a sentence as this :

"

Since upon the result of

the inquiry respecting the causes of the properties of

a class of things, there incidentally depends the

question, what shall be the meaning of a word:

some of the most profound and invaluable investi

gations which philosophy presents to us, have

offered themselves under the guise of inquiries into

the definition of a name." So after all, nominal

essences are only"

incidental"

objects of scientific

inquiry, not the sole inquiries possible to men when

they search into essences.

As it is highly advantageous to our cause to

show our several adversaries in the act of con

ceding to us the foundations on which we build our

argument, alongside of Mill s utterances we will

place a sentence from one who is his closest

colleague. Mr. Bain, who, however, says else

where that he is not sure that there is anything

more in matter left for us to discover; that he is

not convinced that there is a picture beyond what

we call the veil, but that our veil may be the




picture ;nevertheless writes as follows :

12 "

If we

understood more thoroughly the ultimate arrange

ment of the atoms of bodies, we might not

improbably find that one fundamental property

was the foundation a real essence, of which the

other characters are but the propria* It is some

thing of this kind that we want to show.

The substantial gain to be got out of these

quotations from adversaries is, not that they fully

concede our doctrine, but that they supply correc

tions to errors in their own context : that they

furnish us with a part of our argument ;and

that they are admissions which only need inter

preting on better principles with regard to thenature of human knowledge, in order to lead to

our conclusions.

We cannot lay too much emphasis on the fact

that scepticism in the school of Hume about essences,

does not begin at this point ;it rests on utterly

false theories about man s

powerof

knowledge,which is logically reduced to a mere chemistry of

ideas, or of the phenomenal states of self-conscious

ness. Of course on these shifting and unsubstantial

grounds we can build up no knowledge of essences.

Hence the brunt of the battle falls to the share of

another manual in this series. Nevertheless, even

here, where we presuppose our own theory of

knowledge, we must put forth a defence of the

12 Deductive Logic, Bk. I. c. ii. ;Inductive Logic, Bk. III. c. ii.

Comte said that the natural tendency of man was to ask with

regard to anything," What is the one persistent type that reappears

in every member ?" The search for types is the search for

essences.



doctrine that we can attain to some insight into

essences.Our claim is moderate. We fully admit that

the human intellect has a very imperfect acquaint

ance with essences, and must often put up with

make-shifts; or, in the words of St. Thomas,13

"because the essential differences of things are

frequently unknown,we use accidental differences

to mark those which are essential." Thus on the

hypothesis which we need not discuss that there

is an essential difference between gold and silver,

certainly we do not penetrate to this fundamental

distinction, but have to discriminate it by such

accidental characters as specific gravity, solubility,

colour, and so forth. It is important to notice here,

how St. Thomas himself removes that stone of

stumbling which many fancy that they find over

and over again in the scholastic system. He

distinctly affirms that essences can often be indi

cated by us only in an indirect way, through non-

essential characteristics. Here, perhaps, is the best

place to enter a caution against a way of speaking,

which often leads to fatal misconceptions on the

part of hearers, and is not always without mistake

on the part of the speakers. It is often said that

"

simple apprehension"

seizes the essences of things,

and that universal ideas also are about essences.The assertion is clearly true of essence in the wider

sense, and often as clearly untrue of essence in the

narrower sense. Certainly it is not the way of

physical science to discover the inmost nature oi

18 In Lib. I. De Anima, Lect. i.




objects by easy intuition, but rather by laborious

methods of inference from phenomena ; and as to

universal ideas there are more of them that refer to

"

accidents" than to "essences."14 Further it is to be

noted, that if we take essences, not in the concrete,

but for the generalized essences which are reached

by mental abstraction, then frequently we do, at first

starting, apprehend objectsunder the universal and

essential ideas of Thing, Substance, Body, and even

under more determinate conceptions that are essen

tial inasmuch as they give the general nature of the

object, as man, boy, sailor; all which are immediate

perceptions only on the supposition of many previous

experiences as to what outside appearances imply.

Furthermore, the observation is to the point, that

we must not confuse"simple apprehension,"

when it

means mere apprehension as distinguished from judg

ment&

with"

simple apprehension,"when it means

apprehension of a simple, as distinguished from a

complex object. Of a nursery rhyme we could say

that it was "simple nonsense," meaning thereby a

simplicity that could not be meant when a bitter

opponent of Hegel affirmed that his system was"

simple nonsense." One would be nonsense of a

simple character, the other of a character anything

but simple. If, therefore, we take"

simple appre

hension

"

to be, as St. Thomas calls it, intelligentia

indivisibilium et incomplexorum,"

the perception of

what is indivisible and without complexity,"then

the notions so gathered are our most elementary

intuitions; they form the very fundamentals or

14 First Principles, 13k II. c. iii. n. 6.



BEING.

essentials of knowledge ; they give us our first

principles.15

After attending to these most necessary warnings

we proceed with our vindication for man of some

knowledge about essences in the stricter sense of

the term;or about that in things which, as far as

they are concerned, makes them what precisely

they are, which, as far as our investigations intothem are concerned, answers our question, What ?

and which, as far as their operations are concerned,

is more particularly called their nature.

As a scheme for making our general position

more readily understood, we will take the broad

division of

things

into matter and spirit, andbegin

by asking what we know of material essences. At

first we are struck by the apparent anomaly, that

here we seem to know complex much better than

simple essences. It appears that a chemist knows

what the nature of water is, but not what is the

nature of either of its component elements. The

fallacy here is kindred with the common delusion

that evident inference is satisfactory, while the

evident intuition of simple, irresolvable truth is not.

Undoubtedly, if the chemist assumes a certain

number of ultimate substances, he can trace all

other inorganic bodies, and in some sense all organic

bodies, to his primitive components. The main

point left for discussion in regard to the compound

is, whether it is rigorously a new substance, or only15 When in the first chapter we define Being as ens essentice,

essence is here taken in the highly abstract order indeed the

highest- -and it refers primarily to substantial essence, secondarily

to accidental;for analogously accidents have their essences.




a very intimate re-arrangement of old substances.

Given the elements, it is known what are the

elements that combine, and in what proportions, and

under what conditions, they combine to produce

what results;

all these are whats or quiddities, known

within certain limits. But if we fall back upon the

assumed elements, which hitherto have been taken

as meredata,

thenthey

are found all

alongto have

demanded explanation, and not to have had pro

perly assigned to them their essential definitions.

Probably many of them are really compounds,

resolvable into simpler constituents;

but if we

imagine ourselves at length to have arrived at our

ultimate element or elements of matter, what do we

know of essences there ? Those who are convinced

that the Aristotelian theory of matter and form 16is

correct, may call their doctrine a theory that goes

pretty near to the root or essence of the question ;

those who hold one or other of the remaining

theories which have gained credit in philosophy,

vary in what, af-er a new sense of the word, we

may call their radicalism; that is, their definitions

of matter go, some more, some less, near to the root.

Lastly, those who are unconvinced by any of the

prevalent theories about the essential constitution

of matter are in the case which we have heard

St. Thomas describe:

because to them

"

essentialdifferences are unknown," they "use accidental

differences to mark those which are substantial."

They describe matter by its most general properties,

weight, inertia, extension, and impenetrability.

*8 An outline of the theory is given in" Notes and Illustrations," a. i.



78 BEING.

If, therefore,, it be asked what, after all, do the

schoolmen know about the essence of matter, andif we frame our reply so as to keep clear of points

controverted among them;then from the position

of General Metaphysics we answer by telling the

inquirer to consult two sources of information :

first, books treating of cosmology, and arguing

their caselargely

onmetaphysical principles

and

in reference to matter in its most generic sense;

and next, books treating of the several special

sciences, and arguing their case on physical prin

ciples and in reference to matter in some specific

order. Our contention is that, when together, these

books do show some knowledge, more or less

adequate, about essences; that they do furnish

replies, more or less final, to the question, what is

this, that, and the other. For example the laws

of motion, of gravitation, and of combination by

definite proportions ;the reduction of light and

sound to vibratory movements calculable mathe

matically ; the doctrine of the transformation of

energy ;the assertion of comparatively few chemical

elements all these are approximations to a know

ledge of essences; they are the knowledge of what,

with a certain looseness of expression, may be

called secondary or derivative essences. Again, to

know matter as substance and efficient cause is to

know it under an essential aspect, though a highly

generalized one. Even the classificatory sciences,

such as botany and zoology, which in part at least

are concerned with matter, so far as they go on

"a natural system," point in the direction of




essences. In short, the very admission that there

is such a thing as physical science, and that science

is cognitio rerum per causas a knowledge of things

according to the rationale of them is tantamount

to saying, that some manner of acquaintance with

essences is possible ;that the world does present

its objects ranged according to at least a certain

number of different kinds, and that we can dosomething to mark off one kind from another.17

Whatever be the extent of"

the law ofcontinuity,"

at least it does not abolish every single specific

difference in the world;

and there are other

differences that have established a character which

is, if not in the fullest sensespecific,

at least

is secondarily and practically specific : for example

the difference between "chalk and cheese." To

this moderate extent the schoolmen are justified in

their pretensions to have knowledge of essences;

but if we must signalize the points most provocative

of debate within the modern scholastic camp, it is

the multiplication of essential forms to account for

what are called the substantial changes of. chemical

composition or decomposition, and the assumption

concerning the irresolvable elements, that they are

constituted by two real distinct principles, one

17 "

I have no sympathy with the oft-repeated attempts of

philosophers to show that the fundamental ideas of Physical Scienceare inadequate, disconnected, and frequently inconsistent. Without

attempting to determine how much of justice there is in this

indictment I readily admit that it is in the main true, but I am not

so much struck with these defects as filled with admiration at the

manifold variety of consistent and trustworthy results which, with

such imperfect means, science has established." (Lotze, Metaphysics,

Bk. II. c. viii. 21.)



BEING.

active and the other passive, one form and the

other matter.Such is a short statement of what we claim to

know about the essences of the material universe ;

and if the account is examined carefully, it will be

found not to differ so very widely from the one

which our more moderate adversaries give, when

theyare

delivering,not their

worse,but their better

sentiments on the subject. Let De Morgan stand

as an example :

" The most difficult inquiry which

one can propose to oneself is, to find out what

anything is : in all probability we do not know what

we are talking about when we ask such a question.

The philosophers of the middle ages were much

concerned with the is or essence of things ; they

argued to their own minds, with great justice,18

that

if they could only find out what a thing is, they

would find out all about it : they tried and failed.

Their successors, taking warning by their example,

have inverted the proposition and have satisfied

themselves that the only way to find out what a

thing is, lies in finding out what we can about it."

Precisely so taught Aristotle, and so teach we : it

is quite false to say with Mill, that our doctrine of

essences implies the ultra-realistic belief in universals

a parte rei, or to say that it supposes a priori con

ceptions of essences, not gathered from experience.We may read of a mystic like Boehme, that walking

one day near Gorlitz, he had suddenly revealed to

him the essences, the properties, and the uses of

18Unjustifiably, says Mill, in a passage already quoted. See De

Morgan s Logic, chap. ix. in initio.



ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.,

8l

herbs, so that he was able to write his book De

Signature* Rerurn : yet even so it was from the outer

appearances of plants that he argued what their

curative powers must be. Many also of the anti-

scholastic writers of the Renaissance, such as the

Cabbalists, Reuchlin, and Cornelius Agrippa, or the

physicists Cardanus and Paracelsus, are recorded to

have claimed a sort of intuition into essences, or a

discovery of them by other than scientific means.

But we are quite content with De Morgan s system

of inferring what a thing is, after observing what it

does.

In beginning our sketch of the position whicli

scholastic philosophy has been able to secure foi

itself, in regard to the actual knowledge of essences,

we chose Matter for our first subject of examination :

we have yet to consider the case in respect of Spirit,

Those who accept the doctrine of Matter and Form

as satisfactorily accounting for bodily substance,

wouldassert

that Spiritis

Formwithout

anyMatter

to act as a joint constituent with itself of the

spiritual substance as such : though the spiritual

part of man may take the place of form in regard to

his corporeal part. Those who doubt the doctrine

would yet have left, by way of approximations to

the ultimate essence, the known characteristics of

Spirit, which are that it is an inextended substance

acting by means of intelligence and will, especially

of intelligence, which shows itself to be perfectly

self-reflective, and of will, which shows itself to be

free. Then on De Morgan s principle that we can

infer what a thing is from what it does, they would

G



BEING.

assert that the phenomena of Spirit give some in

formation about its nature or essence : what manner

of substance it is appears from its manner of action.

After the above statements, the proof that we

can know something of essences may be put into a

short syllogism.

Thosepersons

can knowsomething

of essences

who, first, have the power of genuine intellectual

abstraction from the conditions of mere sense-cogni

tions, so that they can know things under the form

of quiddities, or in answer to the question, What are

they ? and who, secondly, have a genuine power of

inference, whereby from the modes of its activity

they can calculate the nature of an agent.

But we have these powers.

Therefore we can know something of essences,

Thus it is an approach to essential knowledge

when we know why the loudness of sound decreases

with the distance from its

source,and can trace

this diminution to the laws of vibratory propaga

tion in an elastic medium. Again, if planetary

motion is really accounted for by an initial impulse

and a central attraction, that again is at least an

approach to the knowledge of an essence.

It may be urged, that"

the plurality of causes,"

or the doctrine that like effects may spring from

agents differing in kind, is against any certain

conclision drawn from actions to essences. The

reply is, that this obstacle not unfrequently makes

itself felt, and not unfrequently it does not. The

principle, if pushed to its extremes, would forbid




the certain identification of any criminal, because

different individuals may present the same outside

appearances. Such similarity is occasionally a bar

t^ identification, but not always.

(3) For expressing the essences of things, there are

two ways open, advertence to which will be a security

against a not improbable source of confusion. We

may take the constituent parts of an essence either

according to physical, or according to metaphysical

considerations;

that is, so that the members are

different in themselves, apart from any act of dis

tinguishing thought, or so that the distinction made

by our thought is not, and could not, exactly be

realized outsidethought. Thus,

if

we give bodyand soul as the components of man, the division is

physical ;if we give animality and rationality, the

division is metaphysical, and the same is to be said

of the distinction between a man s nature and his

individuality. It is called metaphysical division

inasmuch as it passes the power of the physical

conditions of existence, and can be effected only by

mental abstraction.

To connect what has just been laid down with

what was previously said about"

second intentions,"

we must recall how the test of the latter is, that

they cannot be affirmed of objects as these exist, or

might exist in themselves, but only so far as they

receive a denomination proper to them as objects

contemplated by the mind. An abstract nature

regarded as common to several individuals is, on this

criterion, a"

second intention," for there is no

universal aparte

rei. When, however, we say that



BEING.

the metaphysical constituents of essences can be

distinguished only by the mind, and have not an

actual distinction in rerum natura, we do not thereby

debar them from being predicated in"

first inten

tion"

of the wholes to which they belong. Thus

we can affirm "in first intention" or of the man

himself, that he has"

animality"

and"rationality,"

"

nature"

and"

individuality." There are somewho include these abstract terms under

"

second

intentions," but we have chosen the narrower defini

tion.

(4) We have arrived at the place where a con

troversy is often introduced about the distinction

between essence and existencein

created objects.We shall not enter into the controversy, but we

cannot leave it unmentioned because it affects some

of our own doctrines up and down this treatise.

Essence we have already explained ;and existence,

though it is too elementary a notion to be rigidly

defined, can be described to mean "

the complement

ofpossibility,"

"that whereby a thing is placed

outside its causes, and has its own actual presence

in the universe," "the actuality of an essence."

About essence and existence these are the rough

outlines of the disputation to which we wish to call

attention :

(a) The controversy has no point for those who

do not believe in God as the sole self-existent Being,

and in finite things as receiving the whole of their

Being, possible and actual, from God.

(b) There is no controversy, but full accord

among the disputants, about the perfect identity



ESSENCE AtiD EXISTENCE. 85

of essence and existence in God;as also about a

certain sort of real distinction between any creature

in its merely possible state, and the same creature

in its actual state; a possible Adam is really other

than an actual Adam.

(c) What is controverted is, whether in an actually

existent creature, the actuated essence is really

distinct from its existence, the former being id quod

existit (that which exists), and the latter, id quo

existit (that whereby it exists).

(d) The affirmers of the real distinction appeal

to the fact, that only of God can it be said that

existence is of His essence, and that the essence

of any finite thing does not include amongits

constituent notes the note of existence. Opponents

reply that so long as creatures are maintained to be

totally created by God out of nothing, and not to

have existence implied in their essence, when that

essence is considered in the abstract, and meta

physically, for example, when man is considered as

"rational animality;" so long the difference between

the necessary existence of God and the contingent

existence of anything else, is abundantly emphasized.

The two sides of the question are argue J respectively

by Egidius, Tractatus de Esse et Essentia, q. ix., and

Suarez, Metaphys. disp. xxxi. sect. 4, 5, 6. A main

difficulty felt by impugners of the real distinction,

lies in their reluctance to allow, at least in this

particular case, a distinct reality which is a mere

quo and not a quod an existence which is not a

somewhat, but only a whereby the whereby through

which the somewhat exists.




(i)An outline 1 of the scholastic theory about material

substance is needful to explain what has been said

about our knowledge of essence, and is here presented

for inspection :

(a) As a result not of a priori speculation, but of

observed phenomena, it is contended that Matter

presents a double series of manifestations;

it is not

only active but passive; not only one in its nature, but

manifold in its extended parts ;not only special

in its

own nature, but generically common in all natures;further

more, it changes from one nature to another, and that

by way of transformation, not of simple substitution, for

there is something common to it before and after the

change.

(b)To produce these opposite results it is argued

that two opposite principles are required, one called

primordial matter (materia prima, r) Trpcorrj v\rf), the other

substantial form (forma, actus primus, eZ&o?, jjuopfyr),

eWeXe^eta, evepyeia). Matter is passive, indeterminate,

but determinable, the principle of multiplicity, the

constant under all changes ;form is active, determinate

and determining, the principle of unity, the variable

under all substantial changes. While forms come and

go, matter is the same throughout, not being liable to

"

corruption and generation.

(c) The opposition here is declared to be so real that

the two principles must be really distinct, not as two

distinct things, but as two constituents of one thing.

Some scholastics indeed say that materia prima has a

sort of incomplete entity of its own;

but Aristotle s

Aristotle, Phys. Lib. I. c. v. ; Mttaphys. Lib. VIII. c. i.



ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. $7

description of it is that it has 2"neither quiddity, nor

quantity,nor

quality,nor

anyof the determinants of

Being."Thus in completest contrast to God, who

is pure act, it is pure potentiality or determina-

bility, wholly actuated and determined by some form,

in conjunction with which alone it can exist, and

towards which its one function is to serve as subject

or support, and constitute with it a single Being.

Hence corporeal Beingresults

from the coalescenceof the two components, neither of which could con-

naturally exist apart : the form is the primus actus,

actuating the pura potentia, and so giving rise to the

primum esse ret. Each principle apart is rather id quo

aliquid est, than id quod est: only the compound is id

quod est.

The system of dynamism takes various shapes, butits tendency is to insist only upon the active or formal

element, as centred at indivisible points;3 whereas

atomism, which also takes many shapes, in its cruder

form tends to the assertion of mere passive matter-

elements, upon which a certain quantity of motion has

been impressed from outside, and is now handed about

without change of total quantity, by some mode oftransference which is left unexplained. These two are

the extremes to which, however, neither of the systems

need be pushed.

(2) It is impossible to disabuse the average British

philosopher of Mill s delusive idea, that the doctrine

*

/x^re rf, /u^jre irofftv, jw^re &\\o /urj5e> Xeyerai ols &pia"rai tb uv"

Neque est quod, neque quantum, neque quale, neque aliud quid-

piam eoram quibus ens determinatur." (Aristotle, Metaphys. vi. (al.

viii.)c. 7.)

3 A dynamist would put his own sense upon Rosmini s definition

of substance as an energy :

"

Quella energia in che si fonda 1 attuale

esistenza dell essere." (Nuovi Saggi, sez. x. Pt. II. c 2.)



88 BEING.

of real essences is one with the doctrine that each species

ofthing

has oneipsissima

essentia

physicallycommon to

all the individuals, which are specifically what they are

only by participation in this single form. But if any

honest inquirer wants to satisfy his conscience on this

point, let him look, if not directly at the treatment of

Essence in the scholastic books, then at any rate at theit

treatment of Universal ideas. The same reference, espe

ciallyif

supplemented byaglance

at

whatis said

aboutthe origin of ideas, will likewise satisfy him on another

subject ;for thus it will appear that essences are not

supposed to be known a priori and to lead deductively to

physical science, but they are inferred a posteriori. It

would be rather a Platonist with his theory of remi

niscence, than an Aristotelian, who would thoroughly

chime in with Browning s verses in

"

Paracelsus:"

There is an inmost centre in us all,

Where truth abides in fulness;and to know

Rather consists in opening out a way,

Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,

Than in effecting entrance for a light

Supposed to be without.

Yet thisis

vulgarly supposed to be the commonlyaccepted tenet of scholasticism. When, therefore,

essence is sometimes defined as " that which is con

ceived first in a thing, and from which all the properties

are conceived to flow," we must take "

first"

not in the

order of time, not in the order of the acquisition of

knowledge, but in the order of relationship between

the several constituents of the object known. Or wemust take first in the order truths, not in the order of

our knowledge of truths.

(3) Essence and nature with the scholastics are often

synonymous. Nature etymologically is that which a thing

is, as it were by birth or genesis : thus it is a term




apt to signify the kind to which a thing belongs. But

as its special signification nature means the thing on

its active side : and thus Aristotle gives the definition,4

" Nature is the substance or essence of things, which

have in themselves, as such, a principle of motion or

activity."As it is only by the activities of an object

upon us that we can know it, activities for us determine

its nature. Hence, subject to our own interpretation,

the words of Hume, the empiricist, will suit us : 5"

Forme it seems evident that the essence (or nature) of mind

being equally unknown to us with that of external

bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion

of its powers and qualities, otherwise than from careful

and exact experiments, and the observation of their

particular effects, which result from its different cir

cumstances and situations. And though we must

endeavour to render all our principles as universal as

possible, by tracing up our experiments to their utmost,

and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest

causes, tis still certain that we cannot go beyond

experience."

(4)Mill admits distinct

" natures"

in the universe,

so far as he admits differences between"

real kinds."

But instead of explaining these after anything like the

manner of definite essences, he has recourse to the note

of indefiniteness for his discriminating sign : so that

a definable essence, giving rise to a deducible series

of properties, from the very completeness of its self-

revelation, would not be a " real kind."

"

There is no impropriety," writes Mill,6"

in saying

that of these two classifications," into real and not-real

kinds," the one answers to a much more radical dis-

4Metaphys. iv. c. 4.

Treatise, Introduction, p. 308. (Green s Edition.)

Logic, Bk. I. c. vii. 4.



BEltiG.

tinction in things themselves than the other does. And

if any one ever chooses to say that the one classifica

tion is made by nature, the other by us for our con

venience, he will be right, provided he means no more

than this : Where a certain apparent difference between

things (though perhaps in itself of little moment) answers

to wt know not what number of differences, pervading not

only their known properties, but properties yet un

discovered, it is not optional but imperative to recognizethis difference as the foundation of a specific difference

;

while, on the contrary, differences that are merely finite

and determinate, like those designated by the words4

white, black, or red, may be disregarded if the

purpose for which the classification is made does not

require attention to these particular properties. The

differences, however, are made by nature in both cases ;

only in the one case the ends of language and classifi

cation would be subverted if no notice were taken of

the difference, while in the other case the necessity

of taking notice of it depends on the importance or

unimportance of the particular qualities in which the

difference happens to consist." Thus " the real kinds

are distinguished by unknown multitudes of properties,"

the not-real kinds"

by a few determinate ones."

Mr. Bain faithfully repeats the like ideas: 7"A

natural kind is distinguished by containing not one, two,

three, or four features of community, but a very large,

indefinite, and, perhaps, inexhaustible number. Oxygenhas a great many properties ;

the aggregate of all these

is properly the meaning of the word." Thus an object

is defined by all its ascertainable predicates, not byselect essential notes. For instance,

" the technically

correct form of predication would be as follows : There

exists in nature an aggregate of these properties7

Logic, Bk. I. c. ii. n. 7.



ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. gi

matter, transparency, the gaseous form, a certain

specific gravity, active combining power, and so on:to which aggregation is applied the name

Oxygen." It

may be noted that to illustrate a specific definition,

Oxygen is inconveniently chosen, because it is to us

an irresolvable element, and can be designated only bysuch rather superficial marks as we have been able to

discover.

(5) However much some may think such discussions

obsolete, yet in his Types ofEthical Theory, Dr. Martineau

gives us an instance of an Englishman, in the present

century, still discussing the relation of Essence and

Existence. His words show his disagreement with

Hume s assertion,8 " that the idea of existence is the

very same with the idea of what we conceive to be

existent, and makes no addition to it :

"

so that to

declare a thing existent signifies only a " certain live

liness in the idea." Dr. Martineau says," The relation

between existence and essence is perverted if the

former [in created things] is treated as one of the

characters that make up the latter, and may be elicited

thence. Every essence is the essence of something, and

needs an existence to hold and own it, and you cannot

depose existence from the place of substantive priority,

and send it down to do duty as a property among the

factors of the essence;

a property, moreover, not

generally found there, but only in the special case of

uncreated things. The essence of anything is that

which, being posited, gives the thing, and being with

held, excludes it. But this positing may be in either

of two fields. Do you say it in the field of thought ?

Then it may mean that your idea of essence includes

your idea of existence. Do you say it in the field of

fact ? Then it means that the essence cannot be real

8Treatise, Bk. I. Pt. II. sect, vi



92 BEING.

without the thing being real. But from the conceptual

essence to the real existence there in no passage, except

by the leap of a postulate. The logical constitution of

our conception is assumed to be adequate security for

the actual. . These remarks are a propos of St. Anselm s

argument for the existence of God as proved by the

very idea of a most perfect Being. The force of the

argument is discussed in Natural Theology, where most

authors agree with Dr. Martineau that it does not

suffice by itself alone, without calling in the aid of an

aposteriori element.



CHAPTER IV.

THREE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING, NAMELY, UNIT*.

TRUTH, AND GOODNESS.

Syitofsis.

(1) Every Being is one: in connexion with which property

various terms have to be explained, (a) Unity is tran

scendental, predicamental, mathematical,(b) Unity is

specific and individual, (c) Unity is real or mental.

(d) Unity is distinguished from uniqueness. (e) Allied

with

unity

is identity. (/) Tounity

is

opposed

dis

tinction.

(2) Every Being is true, (a) Establishment of the proposition.

(b)The truth of Being is not a reality superadded to it,

but is Being itself in its relation to the intellect,(c)

This

relation may be made either to the creative or to the

created intellect.(d) Objections do not upset the

doctrine.

(3) Every Being is good, (a) A disputed question of priority

between the good and Being, (b) How and why every

Being is good, (c) Not every Being is equally good, and,

what is more, evil is a reality which has to be explained

in harmony with the goodness of all Being as such.

(d) With the good is closely connected the idea of the

Beautiful.

(4) Hegelian opposition to our three attributes of Being.


OUR work is now to assign attributes to Being, in

which procedure we must be careful to assert no

properties but such as belong to Being qua Being,

and are co-extensive with the transcendental term

itself, which passes over all boundaries and quite



94 BEING.

disregards the distinction sometimes drawn between

Things and Persons. Persons are Things as we are

now viewing them, and Being is anything and

everything that is real. The attributes of Being,

then, must form no addition to its reality, they

must be identical with it, not only in the sense

that all the determinations of Being are them

selves, through and through, Being, butalso in

the sense that the attributes are given by the con

sideration of simple Being, apart from any of its

special determinations. The attributes of Being

must be only Being itself, taken in one or other of

its real aspects. They are Unity, Truth, and Good

ness, and shall now be declared in due order.

(i) Every Being is one, an assertion which

sounds like a tautology, when we consider that

"

every"

means each taken singly, and that we are

talking of Being in the singular, not of Beings in the

plural. Our English indefinite article to some

extent, and still more the French indefinite article

un, enforce the recognition of the oneness :

"

ABeing is one

"

Un etre est un.

One is a simple notion, irresolvable into two

ideas more elementary than itself; and hence it is

to be described, when not by its synonyms, then

by reference to its opposite. The opposite of the

oneness claimed for Being is division; thus oneness is said to mean indivision. Now some

Beings are undivided in such sort that they are

indivisible, which gives us the most perfect unity

of a simple Being. Other Beings are undivided,

yet divisible, as body and soul in man;and this is



UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS. 95

the less perfect unity, the unity of composition,

which has the higher form of unity when it is

substantial as compared with accidental. Howintimate is the union which the schoolmen assert

in a compound substance, will not be understood

by those who have before the mind only the notion

of elements specially aggregated, and combining

their intrinsically unchanged forces so as to producea resultant unlike any of the single components.

With the scholastics, every Being that forms a

distinct nature is determined to be what it is by a

substantial form which permeates the whole, and is,

so far as its own nature alone is concerned, in

divisible and without parts. Thus it constitutes a

unumper se as distinguished from a unum per accidens;

the unity of what is strictly a Being as distinguished

from a combination of Beings. Such at least is the

scholastic conception ;and though its merits have

not to be discussed in this place, mention of it is

necessary in order to convey the full idea of what

is meant by the majority of the schoolmen under

the proposition,"

Every Being is one." On any

system, however, such as is the bond which is

supposed to give unity to the compound, such also

will be the unity itself which is asserted of the whole

Being ;while as for simple Being its unity is clear.

St. Thomas furnishes, in few words, a statementand a proof of the unity of each Being.

1 " The One

is nothing but undivided Being, for it adds to Being

only the negation of division." Being, which is

thus undivided initself,

is also divided from all others

1

Quast. Disp. de Potentia, q. ix. a. j.



96 BEING.

"

indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio." The

latter part of the phrase St. Thomas thinks to bewell expressed by aliquid, which he takes to mean"

something other;

"

but the more correct meaning

seem? that of the indefinite pronoun,"

something

or other." His proof of the unity of Being runs

thus:2

"One is convertible with Being. For every

Beingis either

simple

or

compound;

but what is

simple is undivided both as to act and potentiality ;

and what is compound is not a Being as long as its

parts are divided, since it becomes such only when

they form the compound. Manifestly, therefore,

the Being of everything is undivided, and the thing

keeps its Being only as it keeps itsunity."

If this account of the oneness of Being should

seem a mere ringing of the changes on a few simple

ideas, it must be remembered that professedly we

are dealing with our most elementary conceptions,

in regard to which there is ample justification for

laying down explicitly in synonyms their meanings

and inter-relations, because experience abundantly

shows what great confusion may be introduced, even

among the very elements of thought. Besides, in

connexion with the notion of unity, its varieties and

its kindred terms call for explanation, which accord

ingly we proceed to give under a succession of

headings. The principles which will guide ourselection deserve mention. A priori it is always

difficult to settle what connected or collateral

questions are admissible into the discussion of a

central idea, and what not;for as everything has

8 Sum. i. q.xi. a. i.




some relation to everything else, it becomes possible

to drag in any topic as having a sort of bearing onthe main point. But experience steps in as a guide,

and knowing from it what terms related with unity

are of frequent recurrence in philosophical dis

cussion, we pick out these as practically recom

mended to our notice. Add to this a little"

sweet

reasonableness," and we have all we want for

guidance in making a selection.

(a) Transcendental Unity is nearly identical with

mathematical or with predicamental3

unity, but there

is some distinction. The former is proper to every

Being because of its indivision ; whereas the latter

is grounded strictly on extension or quantity, which,

because of its divisibility, gives rise to multiplicity.

Hence numerical unity is the foundation of number

which, when integral, consists of a progressive

addition of units in this shape:

3= 2+ 1

4 = 3+ 1

5= 4+1

6 = 5 + 1

Hence number is defined as"

multitude measured

by unity,"and such unity is called mathematical.

Secondarily,however, and analogously numerical

unity is applied to unextended objects, so that we

may number angels as well as men, and speak of

"the seven who stand before the throne," or of the

3 It is called predicamental because quantity is one of the

Aristotelian pradicamenta.

H



BEING

proportion of the faithless angels to those"

faithful

found." Indeed, number is said to be just one of

those ideas which can be most easily fitted on to

all things ;from which fact certain interpreters

would, in part, account for the Pythagorean attempt

to treat numbers as the constituents of all objects.

Mr. Bosanquet is much impressed with numerical

proportionas an element in the

recognition

of

things."

All intelligent recognition of individual

objects,"he says, "depends on proportion, or on

some principle which involves proportion. All things

have aspects and effects which find generalized ex

pression in number. Shorten a snipe s beak, take

one from the divisions of the horse-chestnut leaf,

or misplace the accent on an English word, and

recognition fails or falters. ... I very much doubt

if the element of proportion, both external as in

size compared with surroundings, and internal as

in shape, symmetry, or harmony of sound or colour,

is ever absent in a recognitive perception of an

individual thing."

To individuality we next turn our attention.

(b) Unity is eitherspecific or individual ; and in

asmuch as the species of a thing is settled by what

the scholastics call its form, for specific unity we

sometimes read formal. By his specific unity Peter

is a man, and not of any nature other than human:

he can belong to only one species, not to several

conjointly or mixedly. He is one nature undivided in

itself and divided off from every non-human nature.

On the other side, by his individual unity he is this

particular man, and not any other member of pfr



UNITY. TRUTH, AND GOODNESS. gg

own species, he is Peter, not James, or John : also

he is one man only, and not both one and several

together. To apply Bentham s principle,"

Every

man counts for one, and no man counts for more

than one." Some place in opposition to individual,

essential unity, whereby an essence cannot be divided

into several essences, all of one kind : they might

also call this thespecific unity ; but

inthe absence

of uniformity among authors, we have suited our

own convenience in the terms which we have

chosen to use. Mentally we may distinguish

individual from specific unity, as is proved by the

fact we have just done so;

but physically and in

the concrete man, according to what seems the

most reasonable view, nature and individuality are

not really distinct. Still the Scotists manage to

argue for a distinction here of a very diminutive yet

real order a distinction not as between thing and

thing, but as between what scoffers might call

thingwn and thingum. Thus at least they might

parody the asserted difference of realitates where

there is no difference of res. What those who

regard the matter seriously have to say for them

selves is, that one and the same thing (res) maycontain under its undivided unity as thing, really

distinct realitates or formalitates ; the test of such real

distinction being a plurality of objective concepts.

If, say they, to one thing we can truly apply two or

more concepts of different meanings, this is a sign

of some real distinction in the thing, though it maynot be a sign of two really distinct things. Thus,

in the case before us, an individual man is onetiling^



-oo BEING.

but the objective concept of his individuality is not

the objective concept of his humanity;

the twoideas have different contents or

"

comprehensions ;

"

therefore they point to some real, though subordinate,

distinction in the object itself.4

In reply it is argued,

first, that this theory, by making the individuality

really other than the nature, would make the

concrete nature, as far as itself alone was concerned,

a universal a parte rei an absurd position ;and

next, that a distinction less than real will meet all

the requirements of the case. For, intermediate

between the distinction which exists in the thing

itself and the distinction which is constituted by

mind alone with its power of abstraction, there is

the distinction which the mind indeed first com

pletes, but for which the thing itself furnishes the

foundation. This is called the virtual distinction, or

distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re, or the dis-

tinctio rationis ratiocinate?? the test of which is, that

while the thing itself has not the distinction, it does

give ground for it, because it offers to the mind an

object of consideration to which two ideas, not

mutually inclusive, can be applied. Thus, looking

at any individual man, we may conceive apart his

humanity specifically, and his thisness individually;

4According to the Scotist Mastrius,

"

Thing," res, is" whatever

is produced by truly efficient causality, whether the product be

capable of existing alone or not;

"

while "

reality"

is," what is

produced not by true physical influx, but by metaphysical resultancy,

per dimanationem metaphysicam. (Logic, Disp. i. q. v. a.ii.)

5 See more on the subject under the heading (/) ;its anticipa

tion, here, in a case where its aid is needed, will prepare the way

(or futureexplanation,.



UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS.

our two concepts are distinct, the imperfection of

our faculties forcing us to do, so to speak, at twice,

what a perfect intellect would do at once by an

intuition of the individuality itself, along with the

concrete nature with which it is identified. But

we do not, therefore, with the Scotists assert that

there are two realities in the thing, answering to

our duality of concepts. Besides this controversy

with the Scotists, there arises another with some

Thomists who, not on Scotist grounds, but on the

basis of their doctrine about materia signata, assert

a real distinction between an actually existent

nature among created things and its individuality.

We do not here enter into the discussion;

butwe are not afraid to say that we can see no

intelligible sense in which a really distinct principle

of individualization can be maintained. To us

individuality appears identical with the concrete

nature.

(c)A third division of unity is into physical and

mental or moral. A unity is physical so far as it has

or may have place in things, independently of the

mind conceiving it : it is mental so far as it is

not completed except by becoming the object of

the mind thinking, and sometimes also of the will

wishing. One form of mental unity is that which

belongs to several objects because of their inclusion

under one class-concept ;so the members of our

race are all contained under the term man. This

is the logical unity of the universal concept.

Another mental unity is often called moral, because

its bond is in the intelligence and the will of moral



toa BEING.

agents ; who, for example, voluntarily hold together

in a benevolent society, or even in civil society, so

far as the latter is not due to mere physical con

straint. A fighting chief sometimes keeps his

tribesmen together by something more than moral

ties.

(d) Unity is not quite uniqueness, though every

concrete unit will be unique to this extent, that its

individuality cannot be duplicated, or it would not

be what it is called. But generally a thing is unique

which has not got its like;

if it merely hns not its

like but might have it, the uniqueness is a contingent

fact;

if it could not have its like, the uniqueness is

essential, and only Godis

thus unique.(e) The mention of the word "

like"

brings us to

the discussion of similarity in its relation to identity

or sameness. Occasionally we have it disputed

whether we may speak of separate objects as the

same, or of the same event as recurring at successive

intervals. Here we deem it unnecessary, and not

in accordance with generally received usage, to pre

serve Aristotle s distinction of likeness in accidental

quality (o/jiota&v

rj TTOIOTTJ^ JJLLO}from sameness in

essential constituents (raura &>v fiia rj ovcrla).

Therefore, we take the liberty to assert sameness

between separate objects, on the understanding

that we mean sameness whether of kind or of

quality, not numerical sameness;and that whether

it is kind or whether it is quality that is meant,

must appear from the context in which the term

occurs. The same numerical act can never be re

peated, though some have fancied that this is possible




by Divine power ;the same numerical object cannot

be duplicated ; but specifically or qualitatively the

same act can be repeated, and the same object can

have its duplicate. Again, so far as a substance

continues identical withitself, physically the same

ornaments may appear at an annual celebration for

many generations. As a fact, the toughest materials

are sure to undergo some change from wear andtear

;but these minutiae may be disregarded, on the

principle parvum pro nihilo reputatur, "a trifle counts

fornothing."

If it be urged against the continued

identity of a single object, that identity is a relation,

and that a relation requires two terms, we reply that

on the side of the continuedidentity

of a

thing

with

itself, the two terms are sufficiently supplied by the

existence of the one thing at different times ; or even

at one and the same time we may make, at least, a

logical distinction between subject and predicate,

and say A is identical with A. If it be further

pressed upon us that identity, in the sense of like

ness, is often predicated where the likeness is far

from complete, the answer is that often we are satis

fied with a superficial or partial likeness, as when

we affirm of a certain event that it is history repeat

ing itself. All we mean is that there are strong

points of resemblance, and we are content to fasten

upon these, to the neglect of perhaps equally con

spicuous dissimilarities. We conclude, then, that

the philosophic rule for predicating identity and

sameness is not hard to discover;the real difficulties,

when they occur, will fall upon physical investi

gation. A moral identity is one where, according



i<HBEING.

to the

common estimate,the

thing, though really

changed, is reputed the same, as a river, an often-

mended garment, a restored cathedral.

(/) We may end the present section of our sub

ject with an idea implied in the opposite of the

notion from which we started : transcendental unity

has division for its opposite, and division implies

distinction. Distinction is denned "the absence of

unity between a plurality ofobjects."

In another

shape,"

those objects are distinct, of which one is

not the other." All physically separate objects are

evidently distinct;but there may be real distinction

of objects where there is not actual separation, as

between the soul and the body of a living man.

Real distinction is constituted by the existence of

some differentiating character, which is independent

of the mind s advertence to it, and is not the

creature of the mind s abstracting power. For

instance, in a perfectly desert spot, which no man

knows, the kernel of a nut on the tree would be

really distinct from the shell, because a parte rei,

"

one is not the other." Real distinction has been

subdivided into major and minor, whereupon unfor

tunately sharp controversies have arisen. Taking

the liberty to settle our own use of terms, we maycall that the

majordistinction which holds between

what can be regarded as two different entities,

whether these are each complete Beings in them

selves or otherwise. But since it may be disputed

whether every really distinct component will ipso

facto deserve to be called an entity on its own

account, we will give the alternative description,




that the major distinction holds between different

objects, each of which has more than a merely

modal existence of its own. Then the minor real

distinction will lie between an entity and its own

merely modal realities, which are described as rather

entities of that entity than simple entities, and which

not even by miracle could be sustained apart from

their subject. As an illustration, take the terrific

speed of a cannon-ball. The velocity is a modal

reality which may be present or absent from the

projectile, and therefore is not simply identified with

it;while it exists it is an ens entis : it has not Being

of its own, but is the mode of a Being, which can

exist without it. Yet this mode is not simply

nothing, or it would not make all the difference

between an easily supportable weight and a des

troying momentum, which hardly the strongest

armour-plate can withstand. Whether between the

substantial and the merely modal reality there can

be enumerated an intermediate one, such as theaccident of quantity, according to the scholastic

conception, depends on the doctrine held about the

constitution of bodies : and we shall speak of it

again in the chapter on Substance.

Next to real let us take mental distinction.

If it is

purely

of the mind s creation, it is called

distinctio rationis ratiocinantis. To find a quite

satisfactory example is not so easy ;but we may

instance the case of synonyms and definitions, or

cases where we employ different names for one

object without reference to the varying significa

tion of the words, but only to their one constant



io6 BEING.

"

supposition."

6 Thus the"

supposition,"or the

object for which the names stand is kept the same,

but the signification changes when we use the

terms" moon

"

(the measurer),"

luna"

(the shining

one),"

our satellite," "the queen ofnight,"

"Artemis/"

the silvery crescent." As etymologists

teach us, names first indicate clearly a definite

aspect of something : then this indication is blurred

and lost;in the end, the word stands for the thing,

as we say,"

without a meaning."

"

Heavens," a

person might say, is a term"

standing for thesky,"

but telling us nothing about it;Max Miiller would

interpose that the word means what is"

heaved up

on high."After different names have grown prac

tically synonymous, it is a distinctio rationis ratioci-

nantis, a merely mental distinction, that we place

between them :

"

heavens,""

sky,"

"

firmament,"

"

welkin"

they are all one in sense to the ordinary

understanding. Similarly, if we take names and

titles of persons, there is only a distinction rationis

ratiocinantis between Cicero and Tully ; Queen of

England and Empress of India;

six and half a

dozen;the subject and the predicate in the identical

proposition,"

business is business." More im

portance is attached to the distinctio rationis ratio

cinate orcum fundamento

in re. Itstest, at least in

all finite things, is that whereas the distinction is

not found ready made in the thing as such, yet this

single thing does offer to the mind the ground for

6 A technical term explained in Logic." Auld reekie

"

signifies

an old smoky place ;it stands for (supponitiir] Edinburgh, and so far

is the same with " The Athens of the North."



UNITY, TRUTH AND GOODNESS. 107

forming two concepts, of which one does not include

the other. To recur to an example already used.

This physical man is one individual nature : in him" man "

and"

individual"

are not two different

realities : yet the concept" man "

is not the concept"

individual :

"

the pair of ideas are objectively

diverse, so far as each has its different meaning,

though they are objectively identical so far as the

two are verified in one identical object. Hence

the distinction has to be established by abstraction

in thought : but the thing itself is really what each

of the separate predicates declares it to be.

The Infinity and the perfect simplicity of God

have led to special explanations of how the virtual

distinction, or the distinctio rationis ratiocinates, can

be applied to Him;

but these we must leave to

Natural Theology. To the Scotist distinction, how

ever, we must pay a little attention, because when

it previously came under our notice, we promised to

give

it further examination in due season. We saw

that the Scotists within what, as a thing, is un-

differenced, profess to find actually different"

re-

alitates," which they also call"

formalitates." The

meaning of formalities here needs to be accounted

for;

it will appear if we consider what it is to take

a term formally. We take it formally when we take

it as this or that thing in particular : individuality

when considered precisely as individuality, humanitywhen considered precisely as humanity, are taken

formally : they are taken exactly in the meaning of

the words according to comprehension;" they

are considered according to the exact form which



io8 BEING.

determines them to be what they are as signs. At

once it can be shown that, though the"

individual

man," Peter, is one undifferenced object, yet the indi

viduality, considered formally as the individuality, is

not the humanity considered formally as the humanity.

Hence the Scotists argue that there must be some

real difference between them aparterei, in the object

itself: it need not be a difference between thing

and thing, but at least it is a difference between a

real formality and another real formality in one

thing. Their opponents deny that the conclusion

follows from the premisses : they affirm that our

method of abstracting one aspect from another is

such, that two different aspects can be taken of an

object which in itself presents no real distinction of

its own, to correspond with that which mentally we

make. Of itself it offers to the mind a ground for

drawing the distinction, but it does not do more.

There is, then, a virtual7

distinction, but there is

not anactual one.

This explanationseems intelli

gibly to meet all the requirements of the case;

whereas the Scotist distinction between res and

realitas is an enigma, which its proposers have no

right to force upon our acceptance. Either they

mean no more than our explanation admits, or if

they do mean more the addition is unacceptable.

For it would drive us to suppose, that wherever the

weakness of our intelligence obliges us to conceive

an object by a succession of ideas, one of which does

not include the notes contained in another, there we

7 This is not the"

virtual intrinsic distinction"

of the Thomists

into the merits of which we do not inquire.




come across some actual distinction in the object

conceived. A doctrine which fits in better with asound system of philosophy is, that what in itself is

undistinguished is to us distinguishable by mental

abstraction. Indeed, it gives us an insight into the

nature of our minds to be made aware of the partial,

piecemeal way in which we have to gather our

knowledge, dividingobjects which in themselves

are not so divided. If it has been a fault of

scholasticism to attribute over-freely to things dis

tinctions that are but mental, the detection of this

error should render us cautious in taking up too

readily a doctrine like that of the Scotists. At the

same time, the extreme minuteness with which the

scholastics have tried to trace ascending degrees of

reality in the distinctions which the intellect draws,

and to mark off real from non-real distinctions, is a

refutation of the charge which is sometimes made

wholesale, that the scholastics rashly assumed any

and every mental distinction to be also real. The

fact is clearly seen to be that the scholastics weremost keenly alive to the difference between the two

orders, and that if they failed sometimes to apply

their own terms successfully, the failure at least was

not due to ignorance about the nature of abstraction.

(2) The second property of Being into which \\e

have toinquire

is its Truth.Every cognizable Being

cannot but be truly what it is : but we may still ask,

Does every Being present such a relation to intellect

as to be cognizable that is, to be a possible object

of knowledge ? or is there any genuine a\oyov, or

surd, or extra-intelligible JBeing ? Can we give such



no BEING.

an account of the truth in things as to meet the

Hegelian difficulty, that if we suppose material

things to exist in themselves, and to furnish the

data of sensation, then" we must take what is

given just as it is, and have no right to ask whether

and to what extent it is rational in its own nature"

?

Now we do hold that material things exist in them

selves, and that we first come across themthrough

the data of sense;

hence we have to meet the

objection, How can such objects be rational in their

own nature ? We shall not, however, complicate

the question by taking it up from the hands of

Hegel, and trying to answer his requirements. As

usual, he upsets all terminology,8

identifying the

thing with its notion, and saying that, while it maybe correct to say that a man is sick or is thievish,

this cannot be a truth, for truth is the conformity of

an object with its idea, or with itself, and man

ought not to be sick or thievish, for thereby he

departs from his proper type. Of the negative

side to the question which we are asking, Must all

things have in them the attribute of truth for the

intellect ? we find a more plain-spoken exponent

in Mr. J. Cotter Morison, who at the opening of his

book on The Service of Man, puts the inquiry :

" When the human race shall have ceased to exist,

would it be right to say that the truths recognized

by the human mind will survive it ?" And he

replies,"

This could only be maintained by an

idealist who should place their existence in some

extra-mundane eternal mind which may be an

8 Wallace s Logic of Hegel, p. 263.



UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS 111

article of faith, but not of reason." He refers to

a theory, like that of the late Mr. Green, that knowledge for men consists in an appropriation by them

of the contents of an eternal consciousness which

has all knowledge, and communicates it in measure

to individuals; that reality consists in relations,

and that intellect alone constitutes these relations.

Green chimes in with our principles little more

harmoniously than Hegel does;so we must leave

the followers of these two to shift for themselves,

while we take up Mr. Morison s question solely on

our own responsibilities.

(a) At the outset we have distinctly to repudiate

the agnostic position in regard to the origin of our

own minds and of the whole universe. Without a

positive doctrine on this head we are utterly helpless

before the inquiry, Must all things have about them

the attribute of truth ? Hence we start with the

assumptions, which are no mere assumptions, but

conclusions established in the treatise on Natural

Theology, that there is one, primal, infinite Being,the intelligent Creator of finite Beings, who works

with a perfect understanding of all He does. His

own Being is to Him perfectly intelligible, and,

according to exemplars which it suggests to His

mind, He sees all other realizable essences or Beings.

It follows at once thatnothing

can beliterally

chaotic and out of all relation to mind. Hence

every Being is true, which was the proposition to

be proved. It is the simplest deduction from our

premisses. St. Augustine, then, is right in his

remark that"

the true is that which,"

and the



in BEING.

delicate Orientalism which does duty for our rude

phrase,

"

to tell a lie," has a sound philosophicalbasis : the liar

"

says the thing which is not." For

whatever is, is true, and a lie asserts what is not,

even when its falsehood consists in denying a

fact. There is, however, an obvious difference

between a false assertion and a false negation ; yet

this is avanishing difference,

when we choose to

take advantage of our liberty to reduce all propo

sitions alike to the form of an assertion. Thus

he whose assertion is false, directly"

says the

thing which is not :

"

he whose negation is false

indirectly"

says the thing which is not." To

explain the latter point, those who dislike to

have recourse to the logical artifice, whereby a

negation is sometimes changed, as to shape, into

the affirmation of a negative predicate, may fall

back upon another doctrine on which logicians

dwell. They tell us how no negation stands simply

as a negative : it is prompted by positive reasons,

so that what we affirm is the ground of what we

deny. Hence a false negation would be prompted

by some implicit or explicit false affirmation. So

even in negations falsehood consists in"

saying the

thing which is not :

"

and it can never be logically

untrue to say the thing which is, for whatever is,

is true.

9

However, this is not part of our essential

argument, but a remark by the way.

9 "

A. thing is called true when it is referred to the intellect

according to that which it is : false when it is referred according to that

which it is not." (St. Thomas, Sum. i. q. xvii. a. i. adi.)

Because \ve

are pledged to keep primarily to ens essentia, with us the isness is

primarily essential, not evidential.



UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS. 1*3

A few words from St. Thomas will emphasize

our proof that every Being is true, though indeedthere is little left to prove, after we have started

with the supposition that the infinitely intelligent

God is the Author of all things, possible and actual,

"Because," writes the holy Doctor,10

"all things

are naturally referred to the standard of the Divine

intellect, as works of art are referred to the laws of

production in that art;

it follows that everything

is to be denominated true according as it has its

proper form, which is the copy of the idea in the

mind of the Great Artificer." Therefore, as God

fails in none of His own immediate works, all

things, inasmuch as they come from Him, are true;

and, as we shall be imperatively called upon to

explain later (under the heading c), even deformities

in nature are still true. A little higher up in the

same passage St. Thomas had remarked that all

things, so far as they themselves are concerned, are

at least potentially true in reference to our intellect

also ; not as to the master-mind which gives the

rule of its own productions, but as to the observer s

mind, upon which objects are apt to produce a true

impression of themselves.

By way of contrast with the command which

our Theistic position gives us in arguments like the

above, we maynote

howridiculous it would be for

Mill, on his system, to pronounce every Being true :

nor does he fall into the absurdity. There is for

him no known type of intellect which is universal :

10 In Lib. I. Peri Ilerm. L. iii. Cf. Quest. Disp. de Vet-Hat, q. L,

a. viii.



IT4 BEING.

there is no necessary, eternal truth : every part of

our knowledge is as relative as our mere sensations,

so that just as it would be preposterous to say, Every

object must be perceptible to one of our senses, in

like manner it is preposterous to say, Every object

must present an intelligible aspect. We, on the

contrary, deriving all the ultimate possibilities and

natures ofthings

from aneminently intelligent

and intelligible source, feel secure in our assertion

that every Being must have its truth as Being, or

its ontological truth. It cannot consist of con

tradictory constituents : it must truly be the sort

of thing which it is, and therefore it presents a

rational object of thought. This we can safeh

maintain on condition that we have got a correct

theory about the nature of thought itself; but those

who follow Hume s principles in relation to the

understanding of man, are hopelessly shut out

from all science of Ontology. Unwarrantably

enough, Hume himself equivalently teaches that

all Being is true ; for he regards it as a test of the

intrinsic possibility of a thing, that it should involve

no self-contradiction. But what is the absence of

self-contradiction in a positive object, except the

presence of some truly conceivable nature ?

Ontology, however, is content to stop short at

the declaration that every Being is true, without

attempting to describe how this truth makes itself

manifest to us;

for it belongs to Psychology to

discuss the origin of ideas. Our proposition,

therefore, does not commit us to various theories

which different people may fancy necessary to the




support of our view, because such would be their

way of interpreting our utterance, if they had to

defend its words. For example, we do not consider

ourselves bound to animate all objects for the

purpose of rendering them more apt to communi

cate a knowledge of themselves to us : nor do we

consider ourselves bound to endow all objects with

at least some sort of obscure intelligence, on

Schelling s principle, that"

what is destitute of

understanding cannot be an object of understand

ing,"that what has not got some share of logical

truth, cannot have ontological truth.11 We have

not, in this treatise, to prove that there are mere

materialthings,

without aspark

ofintelligence

in

them;

but we may be allowed to complete our

proposition that every Being is true, by a brief

statement of the principles from which we enter

upon the present inquiry.

Our view as to the identity and the difference

between thought and thing is this : (i.) In God, who

is the substantial thought, the two are identical,

when it is His own Being which is the object of

His knowledge : God is identically the infinite

Object and the infinite Knowledge, and it is false

to call Him the infinite Idea to the exclusion of His

substantiality. When, however, God knows any

11 See the systems of Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hegel,

Green, &c. The last named says,"

Every effort fails to trace a

genesis of knowledge out of anything which is not, in form and

principle, knowledge itself." (Prolegomena Ethica, p. 75.) Beneke

thinks that Schleiermacher discovered a fundamental truth in

Metaphysics, when he observed that living objects are the first to

beperceived by the senses.



ii6 BEING.

created object, such object is not identical with

His knowledge, (ii.) When man knows himself

thought and thing are not identical, because man s

knowledge is an act of the"

accidental"

order,

and is not simply identified with his substance,

least of all with his bodily substance : it is a real

mode that comes and goes, (iii.) In an angel the

case must be judged by doctrines, upon which wehave not to enter, (iv.) When man knows an

object as really distinct from himself, then such

object is neither substantially nor accidentally

identical with him, but is another thing. Here is

our position against the idealism which would say

thatthought

is theonly reality

:

nothingis

simplythought and no more, while some things are quite

devoid and even incapable of thought.

(6) When we teach that truth is a property

of all Being we do not insinuate that truth is a

reality over and above the reality of Being ;

rather it is Being itself in relation to intellect.12

Every Being really presents an intelligible re

lation;

so that while its truth is no superadded

reality, it is real with the reality of Being. It

is not a mere negation, though like other positive

properties it may be described negatively, and is so

described by Carleton, who places the truth of a

thing in that whereby it is opposed to mere seem

ing or false appearances."

I like the view of

Aureolus," he writes, "which is the opinion of

12 So important is this relation to intellect that St. Thomas says

truth has its denomination primarily from the intellect." Verum

dicitur per prius de intellectu et per posterius de re intelleQtui

adsequata." (Qucest. Disp. Veritat.q.

a. ii. ad I.)




many others, that transcendental truth consists in

the fact that Being gives us ground for denying the

bare semblance of Being. For as Being is opposed

to non-Being, so Being as true is opposed to Being

as simply apparent." He allows, nevertheless, the

tenability of the opinion upheld by Suarez and others,

that the truth of Being is its knowableness"

ut idem

sit verum ac ens cognoscibile :

"

and this seems themore radical account of the matter. To define

truth by its opposition to mere seeming, is better

indeed than the device of Heraclitus, who describes

truth as that which is not hidden, TO py \r)6ov ;but

truth, as a positive property of Being, is best

explained to consist in the fact, that every Being

must stand in the relation of a possible object for

intellectual perception. Thus truth is Being as related

to mind, a relation which no Being can be without.

(c) To the Creative Mind every truth of Being

must be actually and always known;

but to

the created mind the knowableness need not be

more than potential, and need be even that only

under an explanation. For if some objects, except

in their highest generalities as things or substances,

remained for ever beyond the power of knowledge

communicated, as a fact, to creatures, no objection

could be raised;but it would always remain possible

that such objects should become, in some measure,

intelligible to created faculties more highly endowed,

whether naturally or supernaturally. Thus the know

ledge would be beyond possibility to actual creatures,

but not simply beyond all possibility of creatable

creatures.



ii8 BEING.

The relation of ontological truth to finite mind

is such that the former gives the rule to which the

latter has to conform;the position is that of measure

to measure-taker; and all that a creative genius

among men can do is to dispose the given elements

in conformity to the requirement of their own laws.

Obediendo imperat : it is by submission that he rules.

And even God Himself does not simply make truth

by thinking it, and by thinking it as He likes : He

too conforms, but His conformity is not a real sub

jection. For it means only that His intellect, as we

mentally distinguish it from His essence, takes its

rule from His essence, with which it is"

really"

identified,though "formally"

it is not so: that is,

His intellect, "formally" qua intellect, is not His

essence,"

formally"

qua essence.

Another difference in the relationship of the

Divine and of the created intellect to the truth of

things is observable in the fact, that the human

artist may quite fail in executing what he has con

ceived, or may get puzzled over the very formation

of the conception ;whereas no such failure besets

the action of the Almighty. If some of His works

never attain their normal perfection, if in nature

there are abortions and monstrosities and frustrated

processes, all this follows from interference or want

of co-operation between the several secondary

agencies ;all this the Creator fully foresaw . and

permitted, as regards every consequence actual and

possible. So explained, nature s widest departure

from right order is not a falsification of the Divine

ideas. These ideas are, as they are called, prototypict




and that character none of the miscarriages in the

universe destroy. The very strife of things follows

according to law, and might absolutely be deduced

beforehand from the data. There is, however, some

thing specially exceptional in free transgression of

the moral law, whereby man departs from"

true"

conduct, in the sense in which Scripture calls all

virtue truth and all sin a lie. Suchdeparture

from the type is not calculable from the physical

data, it is no mathematical sequence ;it is the

nearest approach to an upsetting of our pro

position in its universality,"

All being istrue," yet

it does not succeed in the overthrow. The above

statements are sufficient to meet the difficulties;

but a refutation of these latter might be made by

taking them higher up in the principles of Meta

physics. We are dealing with Being as Being, as ens

essentice, with Being also as it is one. Now Being so

taken is always some one essence as such;and this

cannot but be true to its own nature, and therefore

to the Divine ideas. Whatever untruth comes in

will be due to relations!: ips between different Beings,

even though these latter be only the different parts,

constituting a compound Being. But any Being

considered as an essence is necessary,13

eternal, and

immutable. It cannot suffer change of itself without

ceasingto be that

Being;hence it is of its own

nature true, and we will add good also. For this is

the attribute which we have next to consider, and

the consideration of which will throw fuller light on

what we have just said. It is convenient before,we

** Under the limitations stated in the chapter on Possibilities.



120 BEING.

begin the explanation of goodness to have had

occasion to point out how, in assigning attributes

to Being, we are primarily concerned, not specifically

with the determinations of Being and their inter

relations, but with Being in general as ens essenticz.

Our inquiry has first taken this shape. Is Being,

regarded as such, One and True ? And having

settled thesci two points in the affirmative, we havenext to go on with the investigation, Is each one

and true Being also good ? can it, as Being, ever be

pronounced bad ? However, before plunging into

the deep question about goodness, we will put an

end to that about truth, by showing how to dispose

of what

maybe estimated as one of the

primedifficulties against our doctrine.

(d) It is a fact which is ever being dinned into

our ears, that the world in which we live is a

deceitful world, a world of false appearances, and

this even in the physical order.

The smoothest seas will oft-times prove

To the confiding bark untrue;

And if man trust the skies above,

They can be treacherous too.

Brt more than this and here is the point with

which we wish to deal in the world of commerce,

all is declared to be"

shoddy,"and

"

pinchbeck,"

and"

Brummagem." Hence a mercantile man,whose life-long experiences of the tricks of trade

have inclined him to regard the world as a large

market for the sale of spurious articles under the

guise of genuine, or at least for passing things off as

other than what they exactly are, may quote his own



UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS. jai

knowledge as dead against the proposition that

"

every Being is true." His mistake is simply about

the meaning of the words : taken as they are intended

by us, the words of our proposition merely assert

the plain fact that everything is just what it is, not

that everything is just what a vendor would have

it thought to be, or tries to make it appear to be.

The most adulterated or counterfeit article thus

preserves its ontological truth;and so does even a

lying utterance. For the liar thinks what he does

think, and says what he does say, though he

deliberately says other than he thinks. There is

moral untruth, but not ontological.

(3) (0) Goodness, as a

property

of

Being,

is

aptextremely to puzzle the young student, because of

the apparent trickishness of the notion. When he

handles it for a length of time together, it is per

petually slipping through his fingers ;and when he

picks it up again it often seerns to have changed its

shape. But most perplexing of all is it when he comes

across the doctrine that to regard goodness as a

property of Being is to reverse the right order of

concepts ;that goodness is the most fundamental of

all, and that upon it Being rests as a sort of attribute.

About this theory it will be useful to say a few

words, in the course of which it will be necessary

to bear in mind, how easily, since Being, its Unity,

its Truth, and its Goodness are all the bame thing

under different aspects, their relative positions can

be altered by changing the point of view;and the

chief question is whether some of these changes are

not too violent to meet with our approval.



i** BEING.

As a variation upon the procedure of the

Eleatics, who made fixed Being the only reality and

denied the changeable to be real, Euclid and the

Megaric schoolu

put the good in place of Eleatic

Being, and said that it was the one, constant, immu

table element. "The Megarics," writes Cicero,15

"

affirmed that alone to be good which is one, and

like, and always the same," olov, opoiov, ravrov. Noexact system can be gathered from their teachings,

and they are mentioned merely as instances of those

who regarded good as the most radical notion.

Plato16

often tends towards the same doctrine in

which he is followed by various Platonizers. St.

Thomas thinks it worth his while to state andanswer the difficulty which he finds in the fact, that

the Pseudo-Dionysius17 seems to place the Good, as

a Divine name, before Being. Scotus Erigena,

however, is one of the boldest assertors of the pre

eminence of good above essence : he says," Not only

thosethings

whichare,

aregood,

but even those

which are -not, are called good. Nay, the things

14 Zeller s Socrates and Socratic Schools, c. xii. p. 222.

18 A cad. iv. 42.16

Specimens occur in the Republic, Bks. VI. and VII. The

Socratic school gave such prominence to the moral element, that it

naturally fell into the doctrine that"

the good"

stands first in the

order of reality.

17 Sum. i. q. v. a. ii. The idea of extending the good beyond Being

is connected by Egidius with curious etymology." A thing is called

bonum from boare, which means to call;and this is the reason why

the good is a term of wider extent than Being."The explanation

may be seen, Dist. xxvii. qucest. ii. art. i. Resolutio. St. Thomas,

Erigena, and Egidius all refer to the fact that mere possibilities,

inasmuch as they are objects of desire, are good.




which are not, are called much better than the

things which are; for in so far as they transcend

essence they approach to the superessential good,"

that is God, whom Erigena styles, Nothing; "but

in so far as they participate of essence, they are

separated from the superessential Good."

If, however, we find the good in various ways

put at the root of Being, the like, to some extent,is observable of the One and the True. Plotinus

takes as his starting-point the One or the Good

indifferently, but not Being (TO ov) ;and those whose

tendency it is to regard thought as that which

constitutes the order of things, will incline to make

truth fundamental, and to reverse in some degree

Plato s maxim that Being is the measure of

thinking.18 Parmenides 19

identifies the thought and

the thing; and in Kantian or Hegelian language,

we are told20

that "to say that the real world is

the intelligible world, is to say that reality is some

thing at which we arrive by a constructiveprocess,"

that is, the mind in some way makes its own reality

or truth.

St. Thomas had dealt with the question whether

we should regard Being as more fundamental than

the good ;and his reply is that

21"in the order of

reason, Being is prior to the good. For Being is

the first object which the mind conceives, because

18

\6yos, t>s h.v ra uvra. Xtyy &s fffriv, a\r)6^s tt>s 5 kv as OVK eVr

i euSTjs. (Plat. Rep. v.)19 ruvrov 5 eVrl vot-tv re Kal OVVSKSV eVri v6t\p.a.. (Quoted b

Ueberweg, Logic, p. 25.)30

Bosanquet s Logic, p. 248.u Sum. i. q. v. a. ii.



i24 BEING.

it is precisely that according to which a thing is

cognizable : everything is cognizable inasmuch as it

is inact,"

inasmuch as it is not merely potential but

actual. It is only from the actual that the potential

can be known;never can it be known directly from

itself. It will be observed that St. Thomas is

speaking rather of ens existentice than of ens essentice ;

rather of Being the participle, than of Being thenoun : whereas we, for the sake of clear con

sistency throughout our exposition, must speak of

em essentia when we defend the truth of all Being.

Nevertheless, we may adopt his language and

make it our own. For, whether we speak of

existence, or whether wespeak

of essence in its

widest sense of a somewhat capable of receiving

existence, in either case we can apply the maxim,

which, referring to priority not of time but of nature,

says, Prius est esse quam esse tale" To be at all is a

more fundamental conception than to be this or

that." On which principle Being is more funda

mental than being good; or Being is the subject and

goodness is its attribute. Of course the two are

one identical reality ;but in the order of mental

distinction we have a valid reason for choosing to

regard the mental relation of one to the other in the

light under which we have considered the case.

At the same time we do not deny to others the

possibility of taking the two words, Being and

Goodness, as practically synonymous, and even of

-

using the expression that a certain amount of

goodness or perfection is what is necessary to con

stitute a Being, or is a condition of Being. At the




same time we claim for ourselves the right to rest

satisfied with the ordergiven by

St.Thomas. 22 " The

intellect first apprehends Being itself; next, it

apprehends its own knowledge of Being ;and

thirdly, its own appetition23

of Being ;therefore the

succession of ideas is, Being, Truth, Goodness."

It will be observed that oneness, which is estimated

on a different ground, is omitted in the enumeration.

After these few remarks on a frequently raised

question of priority, we must now inquire how and

why every Being is good.

(b) By a sort of cross-division we might take

the intellect as understanding the act of volition,

and the will as willing the act of intellect. Thus

truth would be referred not only to intellect, but

also to will, and goodness would be referred not

only to will, but also to intellect. But it is here

found convenient that we should keep to one refer

ence at a time;on which supposition Being, in

relation to intellect, has just been shown to be

true, and we have next to prove that Being in

relation to appetite or will is good. Plato, in the

Sixth Book of his Republic, says that"

the good

is the object which all pursue, and for the sake

of which always they act;

"

in correspondence

with which words, Aristotle, towards the beginning

of his Ethics, describes the good as the object of

11 appetite.24 No small confusion is introduced

&

2 Sum. i. q xvi. a. iv.

23 St. Thomas, I. q. xxx. a. i. ad. 3, defines appetite to be "the

jclination and ordination of a thing to what is suitable to it."

24KoAcos atre^vavro rayaBbv, ov iroij/ra e^icrat. (Ar.,

Eth.I.)



I2 BEING.

into the subject, because of the variety of aspects

under which we can regard the good as appe-

tible, and because of the great tendency to slide

inadvertently from one point of view to another.

It is well, therefore, that we should, at the outset,

explicitly direct our attention to four conceivable

aspects. Each Being taken in itself, according to

its own nature as an ens essentice, has a certain degreeof perfection which constitutes its intrinsic good

ness. Now (i) if this Being is intelligent, it can

appreciate its own goodness, and make it the term

of an act of approval by the will; if, however, the

Being is non-intelligent (2) we can regard its good

ness as becoming an object of disinterested approval

in the will of an intelligent contemplator, who

wishes the thing to have the perfection which it

possesses ;or (3) by endowing the thing with a sort

of metaphorical will, we can imagine it as pleased

with its own degree of perfection. Hitherto we

have been taking the thing always as bonum sibi,

good in its own regard ; we can further take it

(4) as bonum alteri, good in regard to something

really other than itself. These are four aspects

which are often usefully distinguished.

Occasionally, another principle of distinction

proves convenient. Every good is bonum alteri,

good to another : but this otherness may be merely

logical, and then it corresponds to the bonum sibi

of the first division;or it may be bonum alteri, in

the sense of real otherness. We might stop short

tere : but a few subdivisions of the second member

vhich are easily intelligible, will add clearness to




future details. The real otherness is greatest when

we have two distinct substances, one helpful tothe other : it is not so great when one substantial

part of the same body helps another, or helps the

whole body : it is least when it is only an accidental

quality or disposition which perfects the substance

to which it belongs. Bread is good for man;

his

own eyes are good for man;the movements gone

through in exercise are good for man : these

examples illustrate the successive degrees. With

the above distinctions to guide our thoughts, as to

the possible terms of reference towards which a

thing may be said to be good, we may proceed to

establish our proposition, which is, that every Being

is good.

So much Being as each thing has, so much

perfection cceteris paribus must it have;and this

perfection is good in itself.25 Here is a more

infallible rule than Falstaifs," The more flesh, the

morefrailty." Therefore, if presently we can make

ourselves secure about that cateris paribus, as weshall be able to do in the explanations which follow,

every Being is proved to be bonum sibi, or good as

taken absolutely in itself: and it may be viewed in

any of the three aspects mentioned in the first of

our two tables of division.

Furthermore,there is no

Beingthat cannot

discharge some good office in regard to something

28 " Good is the perfection which exists in anything, with the

connotation of some capacity, inclination, or natural tendency of the

thing for thatgood." (Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. x. sect. i. n. 18.) He

is speaking precisely of the bonum sibi,



128 BEING.

else : which shows that every Being is likewise

bonumalteri, good

astaken relatively

toanother to

something which is really, and not only logically

another. As Hooker puts it, "All things, God

alone excepted, besides the nature which they have

in themselves, receive some perfection from other

things."It is not affirmed that everything is good

in regard to everything else, or good in every respect

even to anything else;

it is maintained only that

every Being has some use in regard to something

else, as when rubbish serves our purpose of filling

up a hole, or pain warns a man off from what

would prove utter destruction to his life. A new

manufacture occasionally gives a market-value to

what before was unsaleable. If, therefore, we illus

trate our proposition from the region of matter

alone, we can put the case compendiously, by refer

ence to what is given in last chemical analysis.

There we find matter ultimately made up of certain

elements which we cannot alter;each of these has a

definite nature of its own, that is, a certain perfection

or goodness in itself; each, moreover, is capable ol

entering into relation with some others for an end

which is good. What combinations are good and

what not, must be judged by the purposes which

are helped or hindered in the several instances;

and what is bad under oneaspect,

will

generally befound good under another. Yet this does not put

even relative good and bad on a par, and making it

as philosophical to say,"

Every Being isbad," as to

say,"

Every Being isgood."

No doubt any finite

Being may enter into relations which are bad for



UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS, 129

itself or for another: nevertheless, badness is never

Being as such, nor the mere natural tendency of

Being as such.

We have been using perfection as synonymouswith Being, and the right so to do needs a word

of explanation. The perfect is, etymologically, that

which is fully made, or is a thorough piece of work;

in this sense it cannot apply to God. But whenthe perfect is described as, "that which wants

nothing of all that is proper to its nature," then

God also may be called perfect. Being is perfection

because it is either a complete nature, or something

which contributes towards the completion or the

adornmentof

somenature.

The doctrine that every Being is good sounds

very odd to some, who fancy that there must be

jugglery in the words, and that, perhaps,"

good

fornothing,"

or"good for doing mischief," is in

cluded under good ;therefore we will rehearse the

whole teaching in the authoritative language of

St. Thomas. He lays it down that as truth is what

intellect tends to, so goodness is what the will or

appetite tends to; yet with this difference, that

whereas the true is so denominated primarily from

the intellect, the good is so denominated primarily

from the thing.26 Each of the two properties,

however, is adequately denominated only by refer

ence to both faculty and object. As regards the

faculty of appetition, he distinguishes the appetite

roused and guided by knowledge (appetitus elicitus)

from the appetite in a lower serse(appeiitw>

26 Sum. i. q. xvi. a. i.

J



130 BEING,

natumlis),namely,

the

tendency

27of

everythingtowards that which is suitable to its nature. Under

this wide sense of"

appetite"

he defines the Good,

in most general terms, as that which gives per

fection, either complete or partial, to a thing, and

so is appetible."

Good has for its meaning perfection,

and the perfect is the object ofappetite."

28Rather,

however, than say with some modern evolutionists,

that a thing is good because it is appetible, St.

Thomas would say that a thing is appetible because

it is good a principle which would allow for acquired

appetites, and the effects of custom. For each Being

has a perfection suitable to its own nature, towards

which perfection certain other things are of themselves conducive ; this perfection and this condu-

civeness form their goodness, and on their goodness

follows their appetibility.29 Thus of the two defini

tions, Bonum est quod alicui convenit" Good is what

is suitable to someBeing,"

and Bonum est quod alicui

appetibile est "Good is what is appetible by someBeing,"

the latter is best regarded as consequent on

the former, and not the other way about. When,

however, it is said alicui bonunt, alicui appetibile, the

"

otherness"

which is required between that which

is good and that to which it is good, need not

alwaysamount to a real distinction

;a mental or

logical distinction will suffice. Because there always

is some otherness real or logical, goodness is to that

extent always relative : but as the logical otherness

27 Sum. i. q. Ixxviii. a. i. ad 3, et alibi passim.38 Sum. i. q. v. a i. ad i

; Quast. Disp. Veritat. q. xxxi. a. i.

29Quast. Disp. Veritat. q. xxi. a. ij.




is not real, the goodness with which it is concerned

may be called absolute (bonum sibi), by comparison

with the other kind of goodness (bonum alteri),

which is therefore termed especially relative. Of

course in its fullest sense absolute goodness means

goodness without alloy or limit infinite goodness,

just as absolute perfection means infinite perfection ;

still finite natures have each their absolute goodnessand perfection, so far as they have all that properly

belongs to them. The only difficulty is that often

we cannot precisely fix what a"

nature"

is;but that

difficulty belongs to some special science, not to

General Metaphysics. In the case of absolute good

ness, then, accordingto our

presentuse of the

phrase, a thing has, or may be imagined to have,

a sort of complacency in that which it is; for, says

St. Thomas,"

everything already in possession of

Being, naturally likes that Being, and preserves it

to the best of itspower."

30 Contrasted with this

good of rest in an end attained (in fine quiescere), is

the other good which is tended to as an end yet to be

attained (tendere infinem).31 Or good may be divided

into the good which a thing has, the good which it

wants to acquire for itself, and the good which it

seeks to diffuse to others. If in the case of material

things this wanting, or seeking, or appetite is only

figurative, St. Thomas justifies the metaphor by

usage, quoting Boethius, who says :

"

Providence

has given to created things this chief principle of

permanence, that, as far as they can, they have a

natural desire to persist in Being ;wherefore you can

30Quast. Disp. Veritat. q. xxi. a. ii.

31Ibid,



BEING.

in no way doubt thai all things whatsoever have a

natural tendency to seek their own continuance and

to avoid destruction."32 We may add the words

of a yet higher authority, St. Paul: 33"The ex

pectation of the creature waiteth for the revelation

of the sons of God;

for the creature was made

subject to vanity, not wittingly, but by reason of

Him that made it subject in hope. But the creature

also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of

corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children

of God. For we know that every creature groaneth

and travaileth in pain till now." In the broad sense,

then, of the words desire and appetite, every Being,

according to St. Thomas, seeks after good:

every

Being is good, and actively tends to good, for every

Being in itself, and every activity in itself, con

stitute or effect some perfection some nature or

some energy which as such cannot but be good.

Thus Manichasism as a theory is quite excluded.

The security of the whole doctrine, as expounded

on our own chosen plan, consists in resting it

upon Being as Ens Essentice ; no Ens Essenticz,

whether substantial or accidental, can be otherwise

than good as an Ens Essentice. St. Thomas puts the

point thus,34 "

Every essence is natural to some

thing or other. Because, if it is in the order of

substances, then it is the very nature itself;

if it

is in the order of accidents, it must follow from

some substantial principle, and so be natural to its

own substance, even though to another substance it

32 De Consolat. Lib. III. prosa xi. vers. fin.

w Rom. viii. 19 23.34 Contra GenUs, iii. 7.




may not be naturally adapted. Whereas something

evil in itself could be natural to nothing ; for it is

the character of evil to be the privation of something

native to an object, or due to it;but the privation

of what is natural to an object, cannot be natural

to anything. Hence what is natural to a thing is

its good if it is present, its evil if it is absent. Thus

no essence is in itself bad."

(c) The doctrine that every Being is good is not

the same as the false doctrine, sometimes conveyed

by writers like Walt Whitman, that every Being is

equally good ;nor with the other false doctrine that

there is no real evil in the world. It is only a

pseudo-philosophy which can pretend to be so

reverential for facts as to consider every fact

equally sacred", and to pronounce a life primarily

devoted to discovering facts about the structure

of one tiny insect well spent, indeed better

spent, than a life primarily devoted to the study of

theology, where facts are less manifest to the

senses. On this theory, a man who was so busy

with his microscope that he had no time even to

inquire about religion, would be put down as

deserving a happy futurity, if unexpectedly he

should find himself existing after death and

confronted with God as his Judge. Our doctrine,

while it pronounces every Being good with a

perfection of its own, recognizes different degrees

of perfection according to the rank of the several

Beings which make up a gradational or hier

archical universe. Next and more important still

is our assertion, that not only are some Beings less



134 BEING.

perfect than others, but that there is real evil to be

met with in the world. The equal mind with which

some artists, who call themselves"

realists," profess

to view all things, is bad enough in art;

it is worse

as an explicit philosophy. Of art we are told,

With equal feet she treads an equal path,

Nor recks the goings of the sons of men;

She hath for sin no scorn, for wrong no wrath,No praise for virtue and no tears for pain.

Asserting that good and evil are two contraries and

that both are to be found side by side, what we

have yet to explain is that which the schoolmen call

the precise formality of evil namely, the character

wherein exactly its badness consists. The saidschoolmen have entered minutely into the question,

investigating not merely bad things, but the precise

reason why things are bad.

We may begin by taking it as clear that there

cannot be a thing wholly evil, but that there is

always" some soul of goodness in things evil

;

"

the

more correct expression for which would be,"

some

badness in things good."For as the axiom has it,

malum est in bono subjecto, every instance of evil must

be found in a subject which of its own nature is good.

Bacon s saying that"

Being without well-being is a

curse," cannot be taken to mean that well-Being

is a real addition to Being, without which it would

have no desirableness. As we have already shown,

Being as Being must be good : so that it is not the

good that is the character to be accounted for with

difficulty, but the evil. How into good Being can

evil be introduced ? and what is it when intro-




duced? The scholastics reply not that the whole

evil thing, but that just precisely its badness the

malitia which is in the malum and constitutes it

malum is never a positive entity, but always some

privation of positive entity in subjecto bono, that is, in

an entity which, as such, is good. Our task then

is to show, that badness can in every instance be

regarded as a"privation,"

which is defined to be

"the absence of a perfection which is by nature

due to somesubject."

Not to see is in man a

privation, and is called blindness;not to see in a

stone is a mere negation, and is not properly called

blindness.

As we divided good into absolute and relative, so

we will apply the same division, as far as the natureof the case will allow, to bad. Thus we get the

following heads: (i) A simple substance admits of no

absolute evil in itself as a substance;

for it is a

definite nature, good in itself, which simply either

exists or does not exist;and the only evil it can

allow of would be in its accidents, as, for example,

when an angel puts forth a perverse act of will,

sins, and is afflicted with punishment. (2) A com

pound substance, because it is made up of parts, is

more liable to evil. For if we take these parts

according to the rough division of distinguishable

members, it is clear that a limb may be missing, or

out of its proper position, or distorted in shape.

But if we go deeper into the question, then on the

scholastic theory of matter and form even in

compound substances, no evil can be rigorously

substantial; for the schoolmen regard every com-



336 BEING

pound substance as due to a single indivisible form,

which gives determination to matter otherwise quite

indeterminate. According to this supposition the evil

would not be in the essential substance : it could

only affect the accidental parts. If, however, we maytake a rougher estimate of compound substances,

we can say that in it relative-absolute badness is

possible. We call it relative-absolute not for anyrecondite reason, but simply because it is relative

inasmuch as it is due to the bad relationships of

parts, which are ill-arranged, or misshapen, or have

some of their number wanting, while it is absolute

inasmuch as it affects the thing regarded in itself, and

not

merelyin reference to other

things.

In the last

place (3) there is evidently relative badness between

thing and thing, inasmuch as one destroys the

perfection of another. Thus on a complete survey

it will appear the evil always arises from some

relation, either between the accidents of a sub

stance and their subject, or between substantial

parts within the same subject, or between different

subjects. Therefore the question now takes the

shape, how can evil arise out of the relations of

Beings ? If each Being, as such, is good, if all the

accidents and activities of Being in themselves are

good, how from these elements can evil originate ?

How can we have in the consequent what is not

given in the several antecedents ?

We must fall back upon first principles. God is

the very Being, ipsissimum ens, which implies the

exclusion of all imperfection. Therefore Being in

itself, and in its plenitude, is nothing but perfection.



UNITY, TRUTH. AND GOODNESS. 137

Creatures, however, as the Fathers of the Church

sometimes put it, are made up of Being and not-

Being an expression which may be much misap

prehended. It would be a gross blunder to regard

this not-Being as a positive component ;it stands

for the limitations of Being. If we may borrow an

illustration from another treatise, it is there shown

that error never comes ofintelligence

as such : there

is no intelligence which is strictly erroneous, and

the intelligence of error can mean only the detection

of error, which is a knowledge of truth. Error,

however, though not springing from intellect, is

rendered radically possible by the limitations of

intellect. What is impossible to infinite knowledge

is possible to finite understanding. Similarly, evil

has its root, not in Being, but in the limitations of

Being. Error and evil are not mere limitations,

but they supervene upon limitations. What super

venes in the case of evil is a relative unsuitableness

between two or more objects that are brought into

some sort of connexion, which they are incapable of

forming without detriment to one or all of the

members.

An example will best show how evil so brought

about can be reduced to the idea of a privation,

however positive it may at first sight seem in itself.

To be fair, wewill

not choose an instance of themore negative order, but distinctly of the positive

kind, so far as that can be. Some disease germs

appear to take no hold on the human body, unless

there is what physicians call the appropriate morbid

diathesis, or the appropriate nidus; in which case



i 3 BEING.

we should already have evil existing before the

precise point of time at which we want to suppose

it being produced ;for there would be a bad pre

disposition. But there are poisons that will destroy

the healthiest frames, and we might take their

action for an illustration;

it will, however, be more

convenient if we imagine some fungoid growth,

which could be started at pleasure on the surface of

any human body. Upon the healthy flesh, then,

the foreign growth is supposed to be introduced,

and begins to feed on its substance. It is common

to call such fungoid matter itself the disease or the

evil;but strictly this is not so, for it is rather the

cause of the evil

whichis in the

man, notin it

;

it

thrives and is well, the man wastes away and is ill;

it, so to speak, triumphs, and man is defeated. The

evil, then, is in man, and is reducible to a privation

in that he has not the flesh which he ought to have,

or the nutriment for it which he ought to have, or

the composition and disposition of its parts which

he ought to have;for an alien organism has robbed

him of his natural due. Similarly, cancer eats awaythe human flesh

;it is itself healthy, prosperous and

figuratively happy, while man is diseased, unpros-

perous, and literally unhappy, because of an evil

which consists in a privation of proper structure in

the part affected. But, it is urged, suppose we

introduce into the human system not a germ that

thrives on man s substance, but some mineral

matter that simply obstructs the way. If a child

swallows a plaything that sticks in the throat, stops

the breathing, and produces death, how is there



UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS. 13$

privation in this case ? Again, the evil is not in the

plaything: .at least, we may suppose that to beneither better nor worse in itself, for its novel

situation;

but the evil is that the lungs suffer

privation of fresh air, the blood, deprived of its

proper constituents, fails to do its proper work, and

so privation upon privation succeeds, till the child

is

deprivedof the vital conditions and dies. The

mere positive presence of the obstruction would not

kill; the mere positive presence of carbon in the

blood would not kill, unless something positive were

taken away which was necessary for life. Some

foreign substances are lodged in man s body, but

because they stop no vital function which ought

to go on, they do not produce evil. No man dies of

a simple addition to his body, which effects no sub

traction. Whence it appears that the agent from

which evil proceeds may be, and even must be, posi

tive;

its effect may be, and even must be, positive,

so far as no positive activity can result in simple

nothingness or annihilation ; nevertheless, the bad

ness, ipsa malitia, is never the positive Being as such,

but some privation of Being. The evil in the bullet-

wound is neither the mass of lead, nor the blood

that soaks the earth, nor the flesh which is torn, nor

the veins which are opened ;all these, so far as they

are positive entities, are good; the

evilin them

is

reducible to privations of several kinds -privations

of all those conditions which ought to be there

and are not. If this doctrine should still be

doubtful to the reader because he has difficulty

in distinctly tracing evil to its form of a priva*



140 BEING.

tion, he may satisfy himself indirectly in this

way. He can convince himself of the propositions,

that all Being as such is good ;that spilt blood,

lacerated flesh, flesh putrified and dissolved into less

complex compounds, have, as entities, their own

perfection ; next, he can convince himself that evil

is not a mere negation ;and lastly, he can draw the

conclusion that badness initself,

since it is neither

entity as such, nor non-entity as such, must be

something intermediate, namely, a privation. Here

is a doctrine which might seem a useless refine

ment;

but in the days of the Manichean con

troversy, it proved very serviceable in the hands of

the Fathers, who had to show that no original

Principle of Evil need be postulated as coeval with

the Principle of Good, in order to account for what

is bad in the world.

Suarez developes the argument in the eleventh

disputation of his Metaphysics. He fully admits

that35 "

a positive form can be in disagreement with

a subject, and to be in disagreement with another is

the same thing as to be evil. As, therefore, the

good, in the sense of what agrees with another,

means no more than the perfection of one thing,

along with the implied signification of something

else, such that the said perfection is suitable or due

to it ; so the bad which is the opposite of the good,

has for its precise meaning nothing else than the

perfection of one thing, along with the implied

signification of something else, such that the said

perfection is in disagreement with it, or is repugnant35 Sect. i. n. 8.




to it." In these words the author makes ample

provision for all that is positive in evil;

evil is in a

positive and good subject ;it comes from an agent

positive and good ; yet its precise badness, ipsa

malitia qua talis, is a privation." The unsuitable-

ness itself belongs to the category of privation ;it

lies in the unfitness for suitable union or composi

tion"

36

between the form which is positive and goodin itself, and the subject which is positive and good

in itself. These expressions must not be pushed

too far. The evil of a parasitic disease is not

simply that a morbid growth is under privation of

the power to maintain itself without injuring man,

while man is underprivation

of thepower

to feed

it without loss to his own integrity. These two

inabilities are not privations, if the two growths are

considered as possible apart ;for it is then not due to

either that it should be able to accommodate the other.

What now lives as a parasite, perhaps, can also

maintain a non-parasitic life : in which case the two

lives are compatible. Their mutual unstiitableness

does not become an evil till a combination takes

place which is detrimental to at least one side.

Here begins the badness;

for however good man

may be to his destroying parasite, it is bad to him.

The evil is neither a positive Being nor a positive

activity of Being as such ;it is the privation of

some perfection, the absence of a good that is need

ful. What the parasite takes from man leaves him

in the evil plight. "Theevil," says St. Thomas,

87

"

which attaches to some good, is the privation of

36 L.c. & Sum. i. q. xix. a. ix.



14* BEING.

some further good;

" "

evil is the deficiency of somegood which ought to be

present."

38

It is likely to have struck the reader, that when

evil is said to arise as a result from the unsuitable-

ness there is between two finite beings as regards

the union of their several perfections, for example,

from such anincompatibility

as there is between

the successful propagation of a disease germ and

the successful functioning of the system at whose

expense it feeds, the difficulty is to fix on a

standard of good. Clearly if the disease germ kills

the man we call that evil;

if the human system

proves too strong for the germ and kills it, we call

that good : because we can give a decided pre

ference here to the human organism. But in the

struggle for existence between life and life in the

mere animal or vegetable order, or between com

pound and compound in the mineral order, fre

quently we have no absolute standard. In these

cases we either give no preference, or else we give

it on the understanding that it is relative to present

purposes, and may be reversed under other require

ments. In general we make our standard the

adaptability to ordinary human uses. On this

criterion water in the liquid state is often pro

nounced good; in the frozen condition, evil. Like

wise we may at times have regard to the universe

as a whole, or to our planet in particular, or to the

interests of our nation above other nations. In

living beings there is a healthy standard which is

scarcely to be found in chemical combinations,

38 Sum. i.

q.

xlix. a. i,




among which the chemist comes to have a wonder

ful impartiality, being as interested in a process of

decomposition as of composition or of preservation.

Thus it appears that we must allow for the relativity

of good, without allowing that good is a purely

relative term;for we can fix some points of absolute

worth.

The conclusion is that we are neither pessimists

nor optimists ;that we admit evil, but not any

essentially evil principle : that we maintain every

Being as such, and every activity of Being as such,

to be good, yet so that out of the interrelations of ,

finite perfections evil may ensue for want of the

power of mutual accommodation. When evil doesthus result the badness itself is neither a positive

Being, nor a positive activity of Being; it is the

privation of some perfection, the absence of a good

that is needful. Moral evil because of the peculiar

nature of free-will, which does not act simply with

the mathematicalnecessity

of its nature,presents

special difficulties in the way of the reduction of

evil to a privation ;but to these we have paid no

special attention because they belong to another

treatise.39 We are content to point out that there is

a distinction between the physical evil which results

39 For the Patristic authority that evil is nothing positive but

a privation, see St. Augustine, De Natura Boni; St. John Damascene,

De Fide Orthodoxa, Lib. IV. c. ii. The schools are divided on the

point, as to whether it is needful or possible to reduce moral evil

to the category of a privation. Alexander of Hales, St Bonavem

ture, Scotus, Bellarmine, Suarez, are on the affirmative side, while

on the negative stand many Thomists, with Cajetan at their head.

(In la 23s,<j

xviii. a. v.)



144 toRING.

from intrinsically and separately good agencies,

working according to the rigorous necessities oi

their nature, and that evil which is not chargeable

upon nature, but upon the responsibility of the

individual who may use or abuse his powers at

will.

There is, however, one evil which is found both

in the sensible and in the rational order, and which

seems to present peculiar obstacles when we try to

show that it is privation ; which, moreover, we

cannot fairly transmit for consideration to another

treatise. Pain seems to be a positive evil;for it is

not reducible to the absence of pleasure, nor, on

the theory that some painful positions bring pleasure

along with them, because of the sympathy received

or because of an exalted state of feeling, can we

argue that pain is only pleasure in disguise. Wecan, however, urge as a preliminary point that pain

has its decided uses, so decided that a cautious

man would think twice before he voted, supposing

the case was put to the plebiscite, that pain should

be utterly abolished from the universe. Pain is a

most useful monitor against the approach of disease

and death to the body ;it is the only check which

we have on the deeds of some of the criminal

classes ; it offers occasion for the highest humanvirtues. Still it is a sign, that however wonderful

be the perfection displayed in that most wonderful

of things, consciousness, the created consciousness

is what theologians called a mixed perfection that

is, a kind of perfection which involves an element of

imperfection. Finite objects have always this draw-




back, that the consequence of the limitations in

their nature is at least a liability to evil. Created

consciousness, while it is the very condition for being

able to enjoy pleasure, has the defect that it is also

the very condition for possible pain.

Pain is, first of all, in the sensitive faculties.

Here we should have no difficulty in showing that

so far as concerns the material conditions, the evil

in the nervous system is a privation of some con

natural state. There remains still the feeling of

pain in sensation, which feeling is bad;and this

we will recur to when we have brought down

pain in the intellectual order to a similar residuum.

Pain in this latter order is difficult to analyze.We cannot, to begin with, assign a deranged

condition of parts to the soul, answering to what

we said about the derangement of the nervous

organism. On the other hand, what we know of

the punishment of lost angels, and of lost souls

of men in the disembodied condition, suggests

the idea of a pain in the very substance of the

soul. Again it might be asked whether, when the

body is in pain, a sympathetic condition of pain

is not taken up in the substance of the soul. What

ever other answer may be given to these difficulties,

at any rate pain, as pain, must always be a conscious

state, and consciousness in creatures, the only beings

capable of pain, is not a substance, but the accident of

a faculty, whatever may be the precise distinction of

that faculty from its substance, whether real or only

mental. Now pain as found in consciousness will be,

under one aspect, the perception of some evil either

K



146 BEING

moral or simply physical. Moral evil we havealready passed over

;and physical evil, as perceived

by the intelligence to exist between objects, could

be reduced to privation. There stands over, never

theless, the pain of feeling. Painful feeling, then,

whether in the sensitive or in the intellectual sphere,

is the evil that has yet to be reconciled with our pro

position,"

Every Being isgood."

We will not ground the reconciliation on the

doctrine that Being and consciousness are the two

great opposites ;and that therefore positive evil in

consciousness is no proof of positive evil in Being.

At the same time it is fair to appeal to a parallel

case. Against the thesis,"

Every Being is true," it

is no exception that there are such things as

positively erroneous judgments ;for the error in

such judgments is logical, not ontological, while

our thesis is concerned with truth as ontological.

Moreover, the positive error is not a positive

perception, for it results from an act of the

intellect, which passes beyond strictly intellectual

procedure. To return, however, to pain as in

consciousness;this is in some way an entity. But

what kind of an entity ? Psychologists have great

difficulty in determining what that feeling is, that

sense of pleasure and pain, that emotion, whichis

found in the exercise of thought and will. It

seems extravagant to teach that such feeling has

as much right to be distinguished from thought

arid will, as these two have to be distinguished

from each other; the more moderate doctrine

seems to be, that precisely because thought and




will are conscious acts, they will carry with them

the character of pain or pleasure, though some

times these characters may be reduced, if not

absolutely, at least equivalently to nothing. Feel

ing is thus a character of conscious action. Painful

feeling in a certain sense, has a positive opposition

to pleasant, for it is its contrary, and not its rn^re

contradictory. Are we, then, to be distressed that

we cannot, in pain, discover the privation of some

element, such that in this privation the very formality

of its evil consists ? We think not. We found that

in assigning privations we always reduced evil to a

defective composition of elements either of sub

stantial or accidental elements, or of both together.Now pain considered simply as a feeling does not

allow of analysis into parts. We may analyze the

objects or motives which cause pain : we may in

them discover the privations that are evil. We maylikewise distinguish one pain as different in quantity

or

quality

from another. But within a single painful

feeling, regarded as a feeling, we cannot distinguish an

element which is present, and another element, the

absence of which is a privation. The conclusion is

that the evil of pain offers no valid objection to our

general doctrine, for we see clear reason why our

ordinary analysis in the case proposed cannot be

fully completed.

(d) Being in its reference to the intellect has

been shown to be true;

in its reference to the

will it has been shown to be good, and if we had

what some assert, a distinct faculty for the per

ception of the beautiful, Being in reference to that



148 BEING.

wouldgive

us the beautiful. But we have no such

special faculty, so we must manage to find the

beauty of Being in its reference either to intellect,

or to will, or to both. Thus we shall identify the

beautiful with the good, or the true, or both.

Identifying it with the good, St. Thomas refers the

latter in this case, not as before, to an appetite for

the possession of it, but to the intelligence of it;

he makes the beautiful to be the good as affording

contemplative delight, apart from the desire to

possess.40 " The beautiful," he says,

"

is the same

thing as the good, from which it is only mentally

distinguished. For as the good is the object of all

appetite (quod omnia appetunt], its nature is to give

rest to the appetite. But the special nature of the

beautiful is, that by its mere contemplation the appetite

is set at rest;hence those senses which belong

most to the cognitive order are most apt to perceive

the beautiful, namely, the eyes and the ears which

especially minister to the reason; for we speak of

beautiful sights and sounds, but not of beautiful

tastes and odours. Whence it appears that the

beautiful adds to the notion of the good a peculiar

relation to the cognitive powers ;and while the

good is that object which simply gratifies the

appetite,the

beautiful

is that whichgratifies by

its mere apprehension." In another place41

he

repeats nearly the same words, except that instead

of referring both properties to a"

quieting of the

appetite,"he distinguishes appetite and intelligence,

and says that while the good and the beautiful are

40 Sum. la 2x, q. xxvii. a. i. ad 3.41 Sum. i. q. v. a. iv. ad i.




the same really, yet as mentally distinguished"

the

good properly has reference to the appetite (that being

good which is the object of all appetite, for which

reason good has the character of an end, and

appetite the character of a movement to this end) :

on the other hand the beautiful has reference to the

cognitive power, for those things are beautiful which

please in their very contemplation." We may borrowan illustration from Cousin,

42 who contrasts the

artistic delight of gazing upon a beautifully arranged

banquet, with a fear perhaps to spoil it by beginning

to eat, and the gastronomic delight at the prospect

of so many good things to eat. As the reason for

thedelight

of the intellect in thepure contemplation

of the beautiful, St. Thomas assigns the pleasure

which the mind experiences at beholding therein

its own likeness43

something which presents a

rational order." When an object is such that it

offers several elements at least virtually distinct,

and these elements conspire to give to the whole

a unity, each part bearing a proportion to the total

nature of the thing ;then there is offered to the

mind an object which delights the gaze, and is called

beautiful."Hence the beautiful lies in proportion,

in unity amid variety, or in the combination of the

three elements, completeness of the whole (integritas,

perfectio], harmonious relation of parts (debita pro-

portio, consonantia) , and, shed over all, a certain

definiteness, clearness, lustre or splendour (claritas} ,

44

What will strike the ordinary student of art

42 Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien, Legon vi.

43 Sum. i. q. v. a. iv. ad i.44 Sum. i. q. xxxix. a. viii.



150 BEING.

when he reads the theory of St. Thomas, will be

its extreme generality, and the utter absence from

it of all practical detail. This is only what was to

be expected. For just as the metaphysical account

of the good, that it is Being in its relation to appetite

or will, leaves a whole treatise to be written upon

what actions are morally good, and what bad : so

the metaphysical account of the beautiful leaves theseveral aesthetic treatises, in different departments,

to be yet excogitated. No painter or sculptor is

invited to attend the school of General Metaphysics,

on the promise, that what he there learns will act as

substitute for a long technical training in his special

art,or will enable him to

judge definitivelybetween

rival styles. Ontology simply professes to take the

highest generality, Being, and to point out how con

nected, and even identified with its two properties,

truth and goodness, is another property, beauty ; which

arises when the mere contemplation of the good,

apart from its possession, gives pleasure to the

mind, because of a perceived order in elements

really or virtually distinct from another. If, there

fore, in General Metaphysics the treatment of the

beautiful is very general and very metaphysical, that

is only what ought to be.

It may be objected that, on St. Thomas s theory,

every object ought to be beautiful. As a fact there

are some who do not shrink from the proposition,45

45 Not merely the schoolmen so speak. De Quincey says so, and

Mr. Ruskin writes :

" There is not a single object in nature which is

not capable of conveying ideas of beauty, and which to the rightly

perceiving mind, does not present an incalculably greater number

of beautiiulparts."




"

Every Being is beautiful;

"

and if you remind

them that some Beings are ugly, they reply that asthe thesis,

"

Every Being isgood,"

leaves room for a

sense in which it can be said" Some Beings are

bad," so "Every Being is beautiful" may allow a

sense in which some Beings are ugly. In that case

ugliness, like evil, would be explained by unsuitable

interrelations between parts in themselves unexcep

tionable. Each distinct Being, each ens essenticz,

would have its degree of beauty, which might be

a low one and scarcely perceptible to us : while

ugliness would arise from the defects due to unsuit

able combinations. In a gas-light to which is

gradually admitted a larger and larger supply of

gas, the flame is there from the beginning ; but it

is not called bright till it has reached the pitch of

intensity not accurately determinable at which

we start to call it bright. So every Being, as such,

has a beauty proper to its nature;but before we

recognize it as beauty it must have reached a

certain degree. Hence with Plato and others the

beautiful is not merely the true or the good, but

the splendour of the true or the good, or the

splendour*6of order. There must be an element of

distinction, as Mr. Matthew Arnold would have said,

of lustre, as Father Faber puts it;and this splendour,

ordistinction,

orlustre,

is oftensupplied by

some

pleasing instance of"

unity invariety,"

which

48Liberatore, Ontologia, c. i. art. viii. n. 62, quotes a definition

by St. Thomas: "The universal character of the beautiful is the

splendour of form as shown either in different parts of matter, or

in different powers and activities."



BEING.

many make to be the very definition of the

beautiful.

It may be urged, in remonstrance, that a barn

may be built in good proportions without beauty;

and that it and many other unbeautiful objects

present"

unity invariety,"

without"

splendour"

or

"distinction," or"lustre,"

which are just the

question-begging words, to explain which would be

to explain precisely wherein the beautiful lies;these

are what want defining. Perhaps this mention of

defining is itself a piece of question-begging, il

definition be understood in its strict sense. For in

that case it requires the use, not of mere synonyms,

but of distinctly simpler terms ;

and there are thosewho maintain that the true, the good, and the

beautiful are not really reducible to simpler terms

when they are considered in their most generalized

form; though of course in their more particulai

determinations the elements can be analyzed. Al

any rate some form of the doctrine that the

beautiful is based on unity amid variety has found

extensive acceptance, and a few samples of how

authors work this theory will be instructive. Onthis point Sir J. Barry says that the disputes about

definition do not represent corresponding diver

gencies in the idea itself of the beautiful; and he

allows the theory of unity in variety on condition

that this combination be such as to show "

fitness

and conformity to the design of eachspecies."

Cousin, dispensing with this limitation, says :

47

" The most probable theory of the beautiful is still

47 Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien, Legon vii.




that which makes it consist of two elements mutually

opposed and equally necessary ; these are unity and

variety. Take a beautiful flower: undoubtedly it

has got unity, order, proportion, symmetry, for

without these it would lack that intelligible signi

ficance, which is so marvellously present in all

things. But at the same time what diversity there

is!

What delicate shades in the colour, whatrichness in the smallest details ! In mathematics

themselves what is beautiful is not the abstract

principle, but the principle bearing with it all its

long train of consequences. Unity and variety are

the notions applicable to all orders ofbeauty."

In

support of Cousin stands his compatriot Lacordaire :

"

Isolation is the denial of order, of harmony, of

beauty, since none of these things can be conceived

without the double idea of plurality and unity.

Plurality without unity is positive disorder : unity

without plurality is negative disorder. In the former

case the bond is wanting to the things, in the second

case the things are wanting to the bond." Whenwe have paralleled the words of these two French

authors with words from two English writers,

Cardinal Newman and Mr. Ruskin, we may draw a

conclusion which is highly practical, even though

our theoretical analysis of the idea of beauty be

judged still incomplete. The Cardinal writes withhis usual power of descriptiveness on the subject of

the Divine Beauty :

"

Order and harmony are God s

very essence. To be many and distinct in His

attributes, yet after all to be but One to be

sanctity, justice, truth, love, power, wisdom to be



154 BEING.

all at once each of these as fully as if He were

nothing else but it, and as if the rest were not;this

implies in the Divine Nature an infinitely sovereign

and utterly incomprehensible order, which is an

attribute as wonderful as any, and the result of all

the others. Such is the unity and consequent

harmony and beauty of the Divine Nature." The

passage from Mr. Ruskin is on a less sacred subject,

but its teaching is corroborative :

"

Composition

means literally and simply putting together several

things, so as to make one thing out of them, the

nature and goodness of which they will all have a

share in producing. Thus a musician composes an

air

by putting notes together in certain relations ;

and a painter a picture by putting forms and colours

in pleasant order. In all these cases observe an

intended unity must be the result of the composition.

Everything should have a determined place, perform

an intended part, act in that part advantageously

for everything that is connected with it." The

practical lesson is that we should improve many of

our unpleasing productions by more attention to the

variety which saves from wearisome monotony, and

to unity which saves from distraction and pointless-

ness;and these results are often desirable for higher

ends than mere artistic effects. So we have gained

at least one clear advantage from our imperfect

study of an aesthetic theory, if we have thoroughly

grasped what Mr. Tyrwhitt declares to be the

compendious principle of all artistic composition,

namely, "that it has several ideas made into one

new idea, with skilful use either of contrast which




produces excitement, or of harmony which produces

repose, or of both together which produces reflective

repose."

It would not be well to omit all mention of the

fact, that there is a great difficulty in the way of

defining the beautiful because the use of the term is

made very elastic. Often it means almost any

pleasure-producing character,in

whichcase the

Alisonian theory of association becomes very appli

cable. For we must allow to the accidental result

of associations much of the charm of many objects

that are said to be beautiful. Round a name, a

phrase, a form, or a piece of imagery there may

gather a wealth of pleasant feeling which is not to

be accounted for by the things themselves, but by

connected circumstances. Again, the vagueness of

the term"

beautiful"

is seen in its alternate inclusion

and exclusion of what gratifies the sense. Mere

sense-gratification is not strictly beautiful;and yet

the senses feed the intellect, and for a composite

being like man, much real artistic effect depends on

a judicious admixture of the elements of sense and

intellect. Hence art has been called spiritualisatio

materialium, et materialisatio spiritualium. Excess

maybe committed on both sides, as in M.Taine s

overdone rendering of intellectual thoughts into

sensuous imagery, and in the fondness of a recent

English poet for abstruse metaphysical expressions

to represent physical nature. The sense-element,

then, has its place, but it is absurd to reduce the

beautiful to formulas like"

the maximum of nerve-

stimulation with the minimum offatigue."

In this



156 BEING.

place, however,it is

enoughto have

pointedout

that there are broader and narrower acceptations

of the term, and that these render a commonly

acceptable definition very hard to frame.

(4) We have given now the properties of Being.

Under this heading it is not so much the beautiful

that the schoolmen are wont to discuss as the

one, the true, and the good, in which attributes

beauty is included, though not explicitly declared.

Hegelians dislike this triple attribution, and think

that they have got hold of a more philosophical

doctrine, when they speak of Quality, Quantity, and

Measure. One statement of their view is given in

brief by Mr. Wallace,48 and we append it for the

cursory inspection of the reader, not believing that

it merits or will bear deep investigation." The first

part of Logic, the theory of Being, may be called

the theory of unsupported and freely-floating Being.

We do not mean something which is, but mere IS,

the bare fact of Being, without any substratum.The degree of condensation or development, when

substantive and attribute co-exist, has not yet come.

The terms and forms of Being float as it were freely

in the air, or to put it more correctly, one passes

into the other. . . . This Being is immediate, i.e.,

it contains no referencebinding

it withanything

beyond itself, but stands forward baldly and nakedly,

as if alone;and if hard pressed, it turns over into

something else. It includes the three stages of

Quality, Quantity, and Measure. The ether of is

presumes no substratum, or further connexion with

48Logic of Hegel, Prolegomena, p. cxix.




anything; and we only meet a series of points as

we travel along the surface of thought. To name, to

number, to measure, are the three grades of our

ordinary and natural thought ;so simple that one

is scarcely disposed to look upon them as grades of

thought at all. And yet if thought is self-specifica

tion, what more obvious forms of specifying it are

there than to name (so pointing it out, or qualifying

it), to number, (so quantifying it, or stating its

dimensions), and to measure it. These are the three

primary specificates by which we think the three

primary dimensions of thought." We give this

merely as a specimen of a rival theory which has

got acceptance in some of our few philosophic

strongholds ;but by what intrinsic merits of its own

we are at a loss to discover. The reader is not

asked to work at the above extract till he fully

grasps its meaning ;that would be a cruel task to

impose upon him;but he may take an intelligent

interest in catching some glimpse of Hegelian

method,



X5S BEING.


(i)It is one thing to give the definitions in a science

like General Metaphysics, and another to know the

exact mode of their application to special cases. It

would be preposterous to demand of the logician, who.

describes what " moral certainty"

is, to pronounce

decisively on the degree of credence to be attached to

any historical statement whatever, which a questioner

might bring forward. Similarly when the metaphysician

has defined an individual to be " some one thing which

cannot be divided into a plurality of things like to

itself," he is not thereby obliged to know all about

what happens in fissiparous generation. If the bio

logist will tell him exactly what it is that happens in

this mode of propagation, and what precisely is the

truth about one or more vital principles, then the

metaphysical definition of individuality can be easily

applied ;but till the case is understood, the application

must wait.

As suggestive cases to show the difficulties which

beset the study of individuality in detail, we maymention the conception of the physical universe, such as

it is furnished by Sir William Thomson s vortex theory,

or by dynamism ;the aggregate life in a polypdom ;

the power of some segmented animals, after having been

cut in two, to go on living as different individuals;the

condition of some growths, which appear like inde

pendent lives, set up within a larger organism. Then

there are other theories, strange to physical science,

but common enough to speculative philosophers, which

give a curious view of individuality. Such is Plato s

world-soul or Cudworth s"plastic

nature. On the

latter hypothesis,1

"though it is not reasonable to

1Intellectual System, Bk. I. c. iii. art. xxxvii. n. 25.




think that every plant, herb, or pile of grass hath a

plastic life of its own, distinct from the mechanism of the

body ;nor that the whole earth is an animal endowed

with a conscious soul; yet there may be one plastic

nature orlife belonging to the whole terrestrial globe, by which

all plants and vegetables continuous with it may be

differently formed, as also minerals and other bodies

framed, and whatever else is above the power of

fortuitous mechanism effected."

(2)A scholastic dispute about individuality turns OP

the distinction of matter and form. If we go back as

far as the Arabian philosopher, Avicenna,2 we find him

teaching that " to assert souls separate from matter is

to propound an opinion which no philosopher accepts,

and what is very doubtful. The reason is, that matter

is the principle of number and plurality." This doctrine as

a whole is, of course, repudiated even by those amongthe Christian schoolmen who place the principle of

individualism in the material component of bodies, not in

the form. It is a remarkable consequence of this last

theory, that its upholders find themselves driven on to

regard each angel as specifically distinct, and to affirm

that two angels, because they have no material com

ponent to give them their individuality, can never be

regarded as merely individuals of one species ;on the

other hand, it must be recorded that there are school

men to whom such a view appears highly incomprehensible

;and they place individuality in the whole

concrete nature of a thing, whether matter and form in

combination, or form alone.

(3) Concerning individuality we must not mix upthe different questions :

(a)what is the efficient cause

of the individual ?(b)

what intrinsically constitutes the

individual ? and(c)

what are the outward signs by2Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophic ,

Band II. ss. 5867.



i6o . BEING.

which we practically tell this individual from another?

Locke blunders here: for just as he confuses a signof personality, namely, continuous self-consciousness

with personality itself, and a sign of free-will, namely,

the power of outward execution with free-will itself, so

he puts a sign of individuality for its constituent, saying:" The principle of individuation, it is plain, is existence

itself, which determines a Being of any sort to a parti

cular time and place, incommunicable to two Beings of

the same kind;

" 3whereupon he proceeds to insist, not

on the "existence itself," but on the "

particular time

andplace."

With Locke s view may be compared,

but not made interchangeable, Leibnitz s principle of

" the identity of indiscernibles"

a principle valid

enough for an omniscient intellect, but not in itself

sufficient for a finite intellect, unless supplemented by

something more positive than mere indiscernibility ;

for we cannot seriously argue that wherever we perceive

no diversity, there we have identity.

(4)As a specimen of how interpreters endeavour to

extract Plato s theory about the true and the gcod,

and the priority of the good, we may take Mr. R. L.

Nettleship s words: 4

"

The sense in which the good is

used by Plato is, perhaps, most simply and clearly

illustrated in the familiar expressions :

* What is the

good of a thing ? What is a thing good for ? . . .

To conceive a thing as good for something is, in the

truest sense of the words, nothing more than to conceive

it as having a meaning, or being intelligible; for strictly

speaking, a thing of which the elements exist side byside in no order or connexion whatever, or a thing

which itself exists by the side of other things without

standing in any expressible relation to them, is to oui

*Hellenica, Essays edited by Evelyn Abbott, pp. 172 177.

4 Human Understanding, Bk. II. c. xxvii.




intelligencean inconceivable

non-entity. Andthe

moment we mentally interpret a thing, or in other

words understand it, we give it a reason for existing,

whether that reason be a form which it assumes, a

purpose which it serves, a function which it performs,

or a substance which it is. ... The world is not an

unmeaning chaos, but a something of which, however

slowly, weare

discovering,and not

merely inventing,the significance. . . . Like the sun in the allegory of

the cave, the good is the crowning vision in the upward

progress of the soul from darkness to light, or to speak

without metaphor, if the soul* in the strength of the

dialectical impulse, penetrates right through the imageryof sense, and traverses the whole chain of intelligible

relations, the

*

end ofthe

intelligibleat

whichit

arrives, the *

unhypothetical first principle upon

which it sees the whole structure of knowledge to

depend, is again the good. In Plato s mind, then, the

conception of knowledge and truth, the conception of

objective reality or essence, and the conception of

systematic order or cosmos, alike implied the con

ception of a good, which cannot be identified with anyof them, but is the condition or the logical prins of

them all." It is upon these last words especially that

the critic would fix, for the good must be identified with

the Being, the Truth, the Order of which it is the good :

so that whatever priority may, under some aspects, be

given to the good, it cannot be a priority excluding

identification.

(5)Aristotle s theory of the beautiful is often referred

to; his two constituents are " crder and size" (TO yap

KaXov ev /jLeyeOei KOL ra^et eVri). By size he means

what is not insignificantly small, nor yet so large as

to be more than the apprehension can well take in at

once. This brings us near to his doctrine that virtue

L



BEING.

consists in the mean;

which doctrine again has an

affinity with certain views taken by Goethe, Words

worth, G. Eliot, and others. They teach that it is

mostly in common things that art must find its

materials, especially in middle-class life, which escapes

the sordidness of poverty at one extreme and the

affectations of luxury on the other. A kindred notion

again is that of SirJ. Reynolds, with regard to the

ideal average type." Most people err," he says in

his Lectures," not so much from want of capacity

to find their object, as from not knowing what object

to pursue. This great *ideal perfection and beauty are

not to be sought in the heavens but upon the earth.

They are about us, and upon every side of us. But

the power of discovering what is deformed in nature, or

in other words, what is particular and uncommon, can be

acquired only by experience : and the whole beauty

and grandeur of art consists in being able to get above all

singular forms, local customs, particularities, and details of every

kind." The theory is supplemented by what Reynolds

writes in his letters to the Idler: "I suppose it will

easily be granted, that no man can judge whether anyanimal be beautiful of its kind or deformed, who has

seen only one of thatspecies.

. . . The works of nature,

if we compare one species with another, are all equally

beautiful, and preference is given from custom or some

association of ideas. In creatures of the same species,

beauty is the medium or centre of its variousforms."

Mr. Ruskin s variation

upon

this doctrine is, that what

nature does rarely will be either very beautiful or

very ugly ;thus he allows that a very wide departure

from average type may be very beautiful, on which

supposition beauty cannot be defined as average

type.

(6)The pleasure felt at the display of great imitative




skill is often confounded with the beautiful, but is not in

itself the same thing.

II, n est pas de serpent ni de monstre hideux

Qui par 1 art imite ne puisse plaire aux yeux.

On the other hand, it is not impossible that what is

from one aspect repulsive may from another have beautyin it : and the selective power of the artist will exert its

influence in stripping off or hiding away what is repellent.*

Everything," says Kant," short of what is nauseous,

may be made beautiful by artistic rendering. The

genius of art frees the object from the hampering and

distracting circumstances, which hang around it in what

is called real life, that is to say, frees it from association

with opinions, wishes, laws, and other conventionalities,

and lets us see it as an object wrought by nature, expres

sing, by the unsuborned conciliance of its parts and

features, a truth typical and universal. It does, in short,

perfectly and over a wide range what ordinary per

ception does in a few instances."5 Still it is only a

lower stage of art which delights simply in imitation,

and is ready, as Plato says, to imitate anything and

everything.

(7)With regard to the symbolism of various artistic

forms, we must remember what is true of most con

ventional signs, that they have a suggestion of their

use in the nature of things, but that it is left to the

choice of man to turn this suggestion one way or

another. Hence the possibility of many interpretations

for one symbol. Music, not determined by words, is

notoriously indefinite;

the words of a well-adapted

song give a fixed meaning to the tune, but not in such

a way that a different song may not be, perhaps equally

well, adapted to the same tune. Critics, therefore^

Kant, by W. Wallace, p. 197,



164 BEING

should be careful in not forcing a symbolic meaning on

another man s work, and in not refusing to accept the

artist s own symbolic purpose as a justification of what

he has done. A wide and wise tolerance is needed in

these matters, to save the non-artistic world from utter

distrust in artists, who are ever pronouncing upon each

other the verdicts of"utterly wrong," "quite

out of

taste,"

" devoid of all idea,"

" a confused medley of

dements." In art especially we may have what in

philosophy we try to abolish, namely, an effective use

of the element of the vague. As a contrast with the

.lear, definite, correct, but somewhat narrow genius of

the Greeks, which constantly aimed at getting quit of

-oaTreipov,

we have the grandeur of a partially intelli

gible vagueness, such as we often find in Holy Scripture

when it treats of mysteries that are but darkly revealed.

As regards finite things, however, when these come

"mder human treatment, what is sometimes called the

obscure element of the finite may easily be overstated,

till we fall into a sort of pantheism. We may say with Mr.

Ruskin, that "

art is man s delight in God s work," but

we feel the need of some qualifying phrases before we

adopt without reserve Mr. Tyrwhitt s comment in his

Pictorial Handbook :" As to the beauty of nature, it

seems to defy all analysis, and this, and its universal

presence, and the intensely powerful feeling it evokes,

seem to point to its being a direct manifestation of Divine

power. Again, the fact that man can produce it in a

high perfection, but cannot analyze it, or clearly see

how he produces it, seems to throw light on the expres

sion that man is made in the image of God." All

created Being is indeed a sort of reflexion from the

Divine;but what may be called Platonic modes of

expressing the fact easily grow exaggerated. But a

moderate form of Plato s doctrine is what Cardinal




Zigliara is aiming at when he says :" The essence of

beauty does not consist properly in proportion and neat

adaptation, nor in harmony and unity of parts ;but it

consists in that harmony whereby the beautiful object

corresponds to its archetype, namely, to the light of

intellect as showing forth the rule and measure of

beauty. The original archetype is in the Divine mind,

the secondary is in the created mind. For we experi

ence in our intelligence the vision of I know not what

primitive and excellent form;and gazing upon this as

a pattern the mind judges what each object ought to

belike."6

(8) Of all the attempts to get at the physical basis

of certain beautiful forms, the science of acoustics has

made about the most successful in its theory of music.

Though it cannot explain everything, it can give a fair

account why single notes are not mere noises, and whythe laws of succession and concurrence among several

notes are what they are. Thus it affords us some

means of judging between the two extreme theories,

that all beauty comes from the arrangement of indifferent

elements, and that all beauty is resolvable into elements,

which we must accept as given, but not hope to explain.

*Qntologia, Lib. II. c. ii. art. vii.



CHAPTER V.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF BEING.

Sywpsis.

(1) The pure empiricist must, on principle, give up the inquiry

into the ultimate source of possibilities.

(2) Of those who have a theory, some wrongly make potentiality

prior to actuality.

(3) The true theory of ultimate possibilities.

(4) Opposed by the error of Descartes.

(5) Necessary and contingent Being.

(6)The above account of necessary and of possible Beinp

explains how finite essences are sometimes said to be

eternal, immutable, beyond contingency.


(i) BEING, says St. Thomas,1

is adequately divided

by a dichotomy, per potentiam et actum ; it is either

possible or actual. The former must be the next

subject of our investigation : we must try to throw

some light on that dark region of which Cicero

speaks at the opening of his treatise De Fato :

" There is an obscure question about the possible

and the impossible, which the Greek philosophers

call 7re/H $vvaT&v." For want of a

good theologythe Greeks could make little or nothing out of their

inquiry; and the same want still shows itself dis

tressingly in some of our modern speculators. Con

sistent disciples in the school of Hume can go no

1 In Metaphys. Lib. III. sect. i.



THE POSSIBILITIES OF BEIttG. 16?

further than man s experience, such as it de facto is;

the actual for them is the measure of all known

possibility, and they profess to hold no proposition,

which is more than verbal, with the assent due to

a universal and necessary truth. They teach that

all which at present we call true might, for anything

we can tell, have been just the opposite ;and why

anything is as it is, rather than the other way

about, lies wholly beyond our power of penetration.

We must renounce the investigation of origins or

ultimate reasons;we must take phenomena as we

find them, and leave alone all theory as to their

commencement or endless continuation.

Vainly does each, as he glides,

Fable and dream

Of the lands which the river of Time

Had left, ere he woke on its breast,

Or shall reach when his eyes have been closed.

Only the tract where he sails

He wots of; only the thoughts,

Raised by the objects he passes, are his.

For what was before us we know not,

And we know not what shall succeed.2

Moreover, Hume is worse than merely negative ;

by his denial of free-will, he leads directly to

fatalism. For from his principles it is inferred, not

only that man is without freedom, but that the

very idea involves a self-contradiction;whence it

straightway follows that nothing could ever be other

than it is, and the actual, as it developes itself

throughout the course of the ages, is the exact

2 Matthew Arnold s Poems," The Future."



168 BEING.

measure of the possible. The utmost that Pure

Metaphysicscan

mean whenit teaches

bythe

mouth of Mill or Huxley, that a square might have

been elliptical, and that two and two might have

made five, is that if our universe had been other

than it is though other it could not have been for

want of a power to bring about the diversity or

if again our organism had responded differently to

its outer environment, then on either hypothesis

our associated ideas might have fallen into this

order :

"

a square iselliptical,"

"

two and two

make five."8

Regarding the universe as"

a closed

system,"which has nothing outside to influence it,

the followers of Hume state, by way of purely un

realizable hypothesis, that if the parts of the system

had been otherwise arranged, there is no knowing

the limits to which the changes in its working

might have been carried; any present order might

have been reversed. Therefore, a priori we can call

nothing possible rather than impossible ;and for

us to ask, why it is that some things are intrinsically

possible and others not, is a most idle inquiry,

because we never can do more than take these

matters as we find them, without pretending to fix

any ultimate basis.

(2) Next to the pure empiricists who are without

atheory

as to the foundation ofpossibility, we take

those who hold the false theory that potentiality,

and not actuality, is the origin of all existence.

This doctrine appears in some of the old cos-

3 Hume allows only a pair of absolutely contradictory ideas,

existence and non-existence.



THE POSSIBILITIES OF BEING. 169

mogonies which start the course of Being from a

pure possibility, or at any rate, in their uncertain

gropings after a philosophy of origins, occasionally

lay hold of some such explanation. Nor is modern

speculation wholly above theories of this kind;for

we find Hartmann 4

laying it down in all seriousness,

that"

before the world stood forth in determinate

form there was not anything actual anything

beyond the great motionless, inactive, self-contain

ing Wesen without Dasein which was Nothing."

Now it lies at the root of all right conception about

Being clearly to perceive, how while in regard to

secondary existences the possibility precedes the

actuality, yet the primary existence itself mustalways have been actual. A potency is not an utter

non-entity if there is some actuality by which it can

be reduced to act;

but the idea of an original

potency, before any actuality whatever, is no real

idea at all, but a contradiction. To Mill s"possi

bilities of sensation," and"

possibilites of conscious

state," apart from all substance and efficient

causality, it is a strong objection that they are

possibilities stripped of the conditions of possibility.

Against them is valid the argument which is not

valid against Aristotle s understanding of eV&vvd/j,e(,.

In criticism of the latter conception Lewes contends

that nothing really exists till it exists, and nothing

exists possibly, for possibility is only the uncer

tainty of our ignorance." This would have some

truth in it if there were nothing already actual and

4 See his system in the last volume of Stockl s Geschichte der

Philosophic.



170

possessed of the power of efficient causality ;but it

is quite untrue as directed against the system of

Aristotle. We must, then, hold by the doctrine that

the source of all possibility is to be finally traced to

the actual;the opposite conception is irrational.

(3) General Metaphysics borrows from Natural

Theology the principles which explain the real

nature of possibilities: all it has to do on its own

part is to make a few deductions from these

principles. We assume, therefore, that the first

Being is God, who is one and infinitely perfect ;

who eternally and immutably exists by His own

very essence;besides whom nothing exists or can

exist, exceptin

dependenceon Him as its Creator

out of nothing creating not blindly and perforce,

but with intelligence and free choice. Himself a

pure actuality without any potentiality actus

purissimus He has yet the active power to produce

objects other than Himself. How this is to be

explained is what we have now to declare.

We make a mental but not a real distinction

between God s essence, His intellect, and His will.

Under the terms of this three-fold distinction we say

that the essence furnishes the primary object to the

intellect, and the intellect guides the will. Thus

God does not will without intelligence, nor is His

intelligence the arbitrary creator of its own truths.

The intellect, however, first gives determination to

the several possibilities in their distinctness;for it

would be wildly extravagant to regard the Divine

essence itself as a sort of tesselated or mosaic work,

made up of as many independent parts or patterns



THE POSSIBILITIES OF &EING. i? l

as there are independent natures possible in creation.

Such a monstrous conception would have less sanity

in it, than Vacherot s saying, Dieu est Videe du

monde, et le monde est la realite de Dieu. The fact

is that God, contemplating His own essence, sees

it not only as it is in itself, but also -as it dictates

the law to all possibility outside itself. Conse

quently, what is possible will always be a rational

object to thought;5 what is impossible will always

be irrational or self-contradictory. The self-contra

dictory is a non-entity, and hence the impossible

is no limit on the Divine power. To declare simply

that a square circle cannot be, because it is beyond

the

powerof

omnipotence,leaves

unexplained howthis is not a denial of omnipotence ;

but to say

that a square circle is nothing, shows how there

is no such denial.6

Thus, then, we have settled what is the ultimate

determinant of possibility : we must throw further

light on the doctrine by distinguishing between

intrinsic and extrinsic possibility. It is the in

trinsically possible that our explanation has so far

been concerned with;and we have seen it to be

any positive object the conception of which includes

no contradiction, no inner repugnance of character,

such as is found in "a learned carriage-wheel."7

6 This adds light to the previous proposition,"

Every Being is

true."

6St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, Lib. II. c. xxv.

7 Hume is correct in the assertion, but he has no right to make

it, that"

tis an established maxim in Metaphysics that nothing that

we can clearly conceive is absolutely impossible." (Treatise, Bk I

Pt. 11. sect- ii.)



BEING.

Extrinsic possibility is the power possessed by

something else to actualize that which is intrinsically

possible. In reference to created forces, many

things intrinsically possible are extrinsically im

possible ;but in reference to God s omnipotence,

just because It is omnipotence, the extrinsically

possible is co-extensive with the intrinsically

possible. Because, however, what singlyinvolves

no repugnance may in conjunction with certain

circumstances present contradictions, therefore we

have the class of incompossibilia, or things possible

separately but not conjointly. God cannot arrange

the order of His Providence so as to put before man

good and evil, between which to choose, and at the

same time take the choice of evil quite out of human

power. God cannot retreat from His promise once

unconditionally given ;neither can He literally undo

the past, though often He may repair it :

p.6vov yap avrov Kal

ayev-^ra iroisiv affff a.v ??

God, again, cannot Himself, and in His own

Divine Nature, elicit those acts which are essentially

immanent in a finite and imperfect nature : He

cannot vegetate, or have sensations, or make new

discoveries, or show courage in the arduous pursuit

of virtue, or nobly apologize for a mistake.A propos of mistakes, we are liable to them in

the case of ambiguous words;and therefore it will

not be without its utility, as a caution, to point out

how the above description of"possible,"

whether as

intrinsic or as extrinsic, differs from another use of




the"

possible,"

whereby

it signifies the"

probable."

A person may say to his friend, who ought to have

sailed for America a month ago, but perhaps did

not,"

Possibly he is yet in England." Now if the

man really has landed in the New World, and has

remained there, it is not"

possible"

that he should

still be in England except in the sense of"

probable,"

to one who is left to mere conjecture. Probability

is a calculation made partly according to our know

ledge, but partly also according to our ignorance ;

hence the probable need not be true, or even

possible in the strict sense.

Our doctrine may now be summarized in

scholastic phraseology. The possibilities of things

ire all derived from God, the first Actuality : they

are in His essence fundamentalitcr, and eminenter :

they are in His intellect formatter, they are in His

will, so far as He wills them, executive, though the

complete accuracy of the last adverb depends on

whether we make a distinction between God s will

and His omnipotence or Almighty power, as efficient

cause.8

Pure empiricists and some others will object to

such doctrine that it labours under the inborn vice

of all Metaphysics, the presumption of settling, by

a priori method, which can be settled either by

experience only, or not at all.9 We fully allow that

in the concrete and in particular instances we can

determine the possibilities of things in no other waythan by observing their activities. But our problem

8Lessius, De Perfectionibus Divinis, Lib. V. c. ii.

*Lotze, Metaphysics, Bk. I. Q. vii. 85. (English Translation.)



174 BEING.

has not been to settle a single determinate thing as

either possible or impossible: all we have sought to

discover is the great root of every finite possibility,

and we are quite indifferent whether it be this or

that. Not one statement of physical science have

we pretended to settle a priori, our inquiry has been

wholly metaphysical; it has been the inquiry into

Whence is

possibility?

notinto What

thingsare

possible?For our investigation we required to know, but did

not assume as known a priori, God s relation to finite

objects : we borrowed that knowledge from a treatise

which makes it matter of laborious proof. That

relation once understood, our task became one of

simple deduction from the given principles ;in the

course of which work we have not violated, but

merely have not come across the vaunted principle

of the 11ovum organon :"

Man, as nature s minister

and interpreter, can do and understand only so

much as he has observed in nature ; beyond this he

can do and understand nothing."

Lest our teaching should be thought to be ex

clusively scholastic, we will give a specimen of the

same doctrine as delivered by the mouth of a pro

fessor who thought scholasticism a fetter upon the

freedom of intellect :

" From Plato to Leibnitz,"

says Cousin,10 "

the greatest metaphysicians have

held that Absolute Truth is the attribute of the

Absolute Being. Investigate nature, ascend to the

laws which govern it, and which make it, so to speak,

a living truth;the deeper you dive into these laws,

the nearer you approach to God." And from

ia D* Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien, L^on iv,



THE POSSIBILITIES OF BEING. i7j

Leibnitz he takes the words :

"

It is asked, Where

would these ideas be, if there existed no spirit to

give to them a solid and sure foundation as eternal

truths ? Thus you are led to the ultimate ground

of all truth, to the Sovereign Spirit that cannot but

exist, in whose intelligence the eternal truths have

their abode, after the manner which St. \ugustine

has vividly described. Lest; however, it should

be fancied that there is no need to have recourse

to such an origin, be it observed that these necessary

truths contain the determining plan and the regu

lative principle of existent things themselves;

in

a word, they give the laws of the universe. It

follows that, since they are prior to the existence

of contingent natures, they must have had their

foundation in some necessarily existing substance."

The importance to philosophy of this doctrine

about the origin of possibilities is very great ;and

a reference to the above principles will often clear

upa

perplexity, shedding lightwhere else

hopelessobscurity would prevail. To have fully established

even that possibilities do not account for themselves,

but need some real foundation, is a great step ;

it lands on firm ground for future progress. Hence

forth we adhere closely to the truths that possibilities

differ from nothing, in the blankest sense of the

word;

and that they already possess a virtual

existence in the power of the agents that can bring

them into actuality, and in the intrinsic actuability

of their own nature.

(4) There is an author who admits the ordinary

scholastic view about God s primacy in the order



i76 BEING.

of existences, and yet so innovates upon the usual

deductions therefrom, that his error will serve to

emphasize the true conclusions in a matter of the

greatest moment. Perhaps not without some con

nexion with his confusion between assent of the

judgment and consent of the will, whereby he re

garded affirmation and negation as acts of the latter

faculty, Descartes asserted that ultimate possibilities

depended on the free choice of God, to such an

extent that another determination on His part might

have made the opposites of all our present necessary

truths to be true. In his Reponses aux Objections, n. 8,

Descartes argues that God, who cannot but choose

the best, would not have been free to create, if the

possibilities of creation had presented degrees of

perfection, antecedently to the settlement, by God s

arbitrary decision, of what is good and what is less

good or bad. "For if any element of good had

shown itself prior to God s determination of what

was to be, it would undoubtedly have moved Him

to do what was best.11 But the fact is the other

way about;because God has decreed to make the

things which are in the world, therefore it is said

in Genesis,*

They are very good ;in other words,

the reason of their goodness rests on the Divine

will to have made them what they are. It is useless

for us to vex ourselves with the question whether

God from eternity could have settled that twice

four should not be eight ;for I allow, this passes

11Compare Leibnitz s argument that no two things can be

perfectly similar, because God would have no reason to choose one

rather than another.




our comprehension ;but as on the other side I

understand very well that nothing of any sort canexist which does not depend upon God, and that

He could easily have arranged things so that man

could conceive no other arrangement possible ;it is

quite contrary to reason to doubt about what we

fully understand, because of something else which

we donot

understand, and which, though we mayfail to see the fact, it was not likely that we should

understand. Thus, then, the eternal truths depend

only on God s will; they are as the Supreme Law

giver has from eternity determined that they should

be." So teaches Descartes on a most vital question.

The ruinous consequence of his system is that he

has left himself without any fixed point on which

truth or goodness may rest. If the true and the

good are simply what God settles they are to be,

and His settlement is quite arbitrary, with no ground

for choice on one side rather than on another, what

becomes of God s own essential truth and goodness ?

Why cannot He have decreed that lying is good,

and have made His own revelation accordingly ?

Why may He not make us the sport of perpetual

delusion ? What if He had ordained that religion

should consist in blaspheming Himself, and that to

reverence Him should be the very depth of wicked

ness ? What becomes of that indispensable elementin every philosophy which is at all tenable a basis

of absolutely fixed principles? Descartes simply

subverts all reason by pretending to ground truth

ultimately on an indifferent choice between what is

to be truth and what is to be falsehood, without

M



178 BEING.

any prior claim of one side over the other. An

appreciation of the ruinous result will inspire a

greater esteem for the common doctrine of the

schoolmen in regard to the necessary, immutable

character of all ultimate possibilities. These are

necessary and immutable with God s own necessity

and immutability. Of previous writers, Descartes

might have singled out Ockam,12

to lend some coun

tenance to his views a service which that author

would have rendered by neglecting to find a foun

dation for intrinsic, as distinguished from extrinsic

possibility, and by simply referring possibility to

Divine Omnipotence. But Ockam is an author

who could not be appealed to with much effect,

because of his notorious defects ; and his failure to

pay proper attention to the intrinsic possibility was

just the omission of a point which is of capital

importance in the whole question. Intrinsic possi

bility is a reality that needs accounting for after a

manner quite as rational as is the manner of

account which we render for extrinsic: it

cannot betaken for a mere nothing, nor yet, as Wolf takes it,

for a sort of self-settled law, which still would hold

though God ceased to exist. If it had this in

dependent validity, then God in creation would

have been obliged to work by a strictly limiting rule,

which had no origin in Himself, and to which He

would therefore be in literal subjection. But, it

may be asked, is not God somehow so subject ? for

by what are the possibilities of His own nature

12 In Lib. I. Distinct, xliii. q. ii. Silvester Maurus is of like

mi ad. (Quasi. Phliosoph. q. xvii.)




determined, if not by some necessity, at least logically

prior to His own existence ? There is no such

priority, for in God there is no potentiality ;and if

ever we speak of the possibility of the Divine nature,

as legitimately we may,13

it cannot be in the full

sense that is applicable to all things else, which come

under the rule prius est posse esse quam esse "to be

possible comes before to be." God gives the law to all

things possible, and thereby makes them subordinate :

but He cannot fall under the same law so as to be

subordinate to Himself. Should any one try here to

puzzle us by bringing in the principle of excluded

middle," God either is possible or He is not pos

sible," we choose the second horn of the dilemma,provided we are allowed to explain, that

"possible,"

according to the use of it supposed by the objector,

is taken to include the idea of past or present poten

tiality, and that its contradictory,"

notpossible,"

is different from"

impossible." God therefore is

"

notpossible

"

in the sense that He is above the

conditions of potentiality. The only way in which

we should be likely to need the phrase," God is

possible,"would be as the conclusion of an argument

to prove, that an infinite, self-existent Being, One,

intelligent, and Supreme over all things, is not a

self-repugnant notion. But even this inference has

to be drawn from the proved fact of God s existence,

not from an a priori consideration of the several

u In Pure Logic we come across the four" modalities

"

necessity,

contingency, impossibility, possibility : in which enumeration possibility

is so taken as to include the case of the Divine nature. This fact

appears by the distinction of possibility from contingency.



*o BEING.

ideas involved in the description of the Divine

nature ; and when we thus declare God to be pos

sible, no potentiality is involved. The term has

reference only to the clearing away of the human

error, that a God, such as Theism asserts, cannot

be ; we refute the cannot be by establishing the possi

bility.

In explanation of a mistake like that of Ockam,we may consider the kindred mistake of Storchenau,

14

who says," Even on the hypothesis that God did

not exist, propositions of the following kind would

remain valid, There is no contradiction between

the essential notes of such and such an object;

Things would still have their internal possibility."

A common but very misleading fallacy is here

detectable. It is right to affirm that one who had

not yet admitted God s existence might recognize

certain necessary truths as self-evidently necessary :

he might be sure about some intrinsic possibilities

or impossibilities. But observe the vast difference

between the two propositions :

"

Without a previous

recognition of God, the mind can recognize a certain

truth :

"

and," On the hypothesis that no God

existed, a certain truth would still remain true."

Surely it is one thing to say," A building may be

proved to be stable, though its foundations have not

been explored," and another to say,"

That building

would remain stable though its foundations were

removed."

(6) In Pure Logic some authors recognize only

four"

modals," possibility and impossibility, neces-

14Ontologia, sect. ii. c. i.




sity and contingency: wherein we have a sufficient

reminder, after treating of possible Being, to add a

few words about Being regarded as necessary and

contingent. Already in First Principles15 we had

much to say about necessity ;now in Ontology we

must return to the idea. We take it as established

that God is the primal, absolutely necessary Being ;

all other beings, as they depend for their creation

on His free choice, are contingent, existing as

matters of fact, whereas they need not have existed.

Besides absolute necessity there is a lower grade of

necessity, following on a hypothesis. It is at least

running a great risk of false doctrine when hypo

thetical necessityis

made the onlykind to which

the term necessity should be given. Yet we find

Mr. F. Bradley16

writing thus: "It is easy to give

the general sense in which we use the term necessity.

A thing is necessary if it be taken not simply in and

by itself, but by virtue of something else and

because of something else. Necessity carries with

it the idea of mediation, of dependency, of inade

quacy to maintain an isolated position and to stand

and act alone and self-supported. A thing is not

necessary when it simply is : it is necessary when it

is, or is said to be, because of something else." Thus

the absolute Being of God would be the one nega

tion of necessity, for He alone of all Beings is

not"

because of something else." Afterwards Mr.

Bradley excludes the term necessity from the region

of reality.17 "

Reality in itself is neither necessary,

nor possible, nor again impossible. These predicates

16 P. 68. 16Principles of Logic, p. 183.

17 P. 197.



i8a BEING.

(we must suppose in Logic) are not found as such

outside our reflexion. And to a knowledge andreflexion that had command of the facts nothing

would ever appear possible. The real would seem

necessary, the unreal would seemimpossible."

However, leaving the real, and keeping strictly to

the logical,18 "

in logic we find that a necessary

truth is

reallyan

inference, andan inference is

nothing but a necessary truth." Lotze again is one

who has set the example of limiting the term neces

sary to mental processes:19

"Necessity, if not

confined to a necessity of thought on our part, but

extended to that which is expressly held to be the

unconditioned condition of all that is conditioned,

would have simply no assignable meaning, and

would have to be replaced by the notion of a de facto

universalvalidity."

The tremendous issues that turn

on the idea"necessity,"

must be our justification

for yet further illustrations showing how different

is the sense in which it is admitted by some non-

scholastic authors from the meaning given to it by

scholastics. Mr. Bosanquet20

affirms that"

absolute

18 P. 221.

19Metaphysics, Bk. I. c. vii. 89. Hume, as is well known,

makes necessity a mental creation, Mr. Huxley s "shadow of the

mind s throwing." The former understood by necessity only con

stancyof

sequence,or of association between "

ideas in theimagina

tion :

"

he abolished all efficient causality. In the same spirit Comte

denied out competence to inquire into genuine causes, beyond mere

sequences of phenomena.20

Logic, Vol. II. p. 213. He also says," So far as a context

is necessary it is not self-sufficing, but it is a consequence of

something else." Hegel does not allow this view. (Logic of Hegel,

pp. 230, 235.)



THE POSSIBILITIES OF BEING 187

wise than he does. The Megarics again were philo

sophers who got themselves entangled in some very

awkward mazes;a specimen of which we have in the

obscure argument called /cvpievcov, and invented by

Diodorus. It rests on the assertion that the three

following propositions cannot be held consistently

together :(i.)

" From the possible there never follows

the impossible :

"

(ii.)

" What has happened in the

past cannot be other than it has been :

"

(iii.)

" Some

thing is possible which neither has been nor will be

actualized." While Chrysippus denied the first of the

three, Diodorus deduced the falsehood of the third

from the other two, which he admitted. His argument

was: 2"From anything possible nothing impossible

can result;but it is impossible that the past can be

different from what it is;for had it been possible at

a past moment, something impossible would have

resulted from something possible. It was, therefore,

never possible ;and generally speaking it is impossible

that anything should happen different to what has hap

pened."The reader need not rack his brain over this

sophism ;but there may be some to whom this little

historic fragment has an interest of some kind or other.

(2)The bearings of our theory of possibility on the

proposition that "

every Being is true," as also on the

idealistic theory, that the truth of all the reality in

the universe is constituted by conscious mind, are very

close;for we make the possible and the intelligible

essentially coincident. This view is largely insisted

upon by philosophers of different schools, as for ex

ample, by Cudworth :" The entity of all theoretical

truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, and what

ever is clearly conceived is an entity and a truth : but

that which is false Divine power itself cannot make to

2Zeller. I.e.



188 BEING.

be clearly and distinctly understood."3 Reid indeed

quotes and criticizes unfavourably the doctrine:

butafter adducing other authors who speak in the like

sense, he remarks,4 that he had " never found one that

called it inquestion."

Of course it is easy enough to

make pretence at conceiving the impossible, but the

terms of the conception will never be united in thought.

All that we are concerned to defend is, that every pos

sible object is, of its own nature, conceivable, and that

no really conceivable object is impossible, though we

may by abstraction conceive only a portion of it, which

by itself alone, without other portion or portions, could

not exist.

(3)In the case of free agents we come across a

special sort of impossibility, called " moral impossi

bility ;

"

on which, though the action might absolutely

be done, the difficulty of doing it is so great that we

cannot expect it to be done. For example, there is a

degree of attention to one s occupation which could not

be justly exacted, not because it could not be reached

by an extraordinary effort, but because it is beyond

what is possible by ordinary effort;and ordinary effort,

as we will suppose, is all that the gravity of the case

demands. Of moral impossibilities some approach

nearer, some less near, to absolute impossibility : if

they reach absolute impossibility, then they become

likewise physical impossibilities. For example, that an

ordinary Christian should say frequent prayers, and

never for a whole year have a distraction, is an impos

sibility at once moral and physical. In these matters,

however, the use of words is not uniform : and we

should not be too ready to condemn another man s

expressions till we have made sure of their meaning, or

of their want of clear meaning.3 Eternal and Immutable Morality, p. 172.

Intellectual Powers, Essay iv. c. iii. p. 377.



CHAPTER VI.

THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING.

Synopsis.

(1) The true notion of the Finite and the Infinite.

(2)False doctrines about the Infinite,

(a)That there is no

such thing, or at least no such notion,(b)

That the

notion is made up empirically by the addition of finite

quantities, (c)

That the notion canonly

be innate.

(3) Admittedly real difficulties connected with the notion of

the Infinite; especially in regard to the so-called

" sum of

allpossibilities."

THERE is one more division of Being which we

must discuss, before we pass on to the second book

of this treatise : it is the partition of Being into

Infinite and Finite. Straightway some readers will

be inclined to limit our inquiry to the one aspect of

space, as though infinity in extension were the

only meaning of the term; and, therefore, we

wish distinctly to forestall such misconception,

because otherwise it may do a great deal to prevent

our words from being rightly understood. We havealready used

"

perfection"

as in some way synony

mous with Being ;and if we say that our present

investigation concerns the difference between infinite

and finite perfection in things, we shall be conveying

a much truer notion than if we spoke as though



igo BEING.

endless space and limited space were the two special

objects of our interest.

(i) The amount of discussion that has gone on

in the world about the finite and the infinite has

been appalling, not simply on account of its vastness,

but more still because of the bewildering nature of

many of the speculations into which philosophers

have wandered.It

will, therefore, be well to openthe discussion by as concise an account of the two

ideas as possible, in order that the reader, having

distinctly before his mind what he ought to mean by

the finite and the infinite, may be enabled afterwards

to take a few peeps into the wilderness of confusion,

with a steady confidence that it need not frighten

him.

We began this treatise by making quite clear to

ourselves the signification and the reality of Being ;

also we have, in various ways, been brought across

the idea of negation or limit ; we need only put these

two elements together, and we obtain the notion of

finite Being. That we ourselves are such Beings is

brought home most certainly to our consciousness

by means of reflexion, no matter how earnestly

pantheists or monists may labour to persuade us of

our identification with the infinite.

The notion of Infinite Being is what we have

next to make clear. The success of the effort will

not depend on the number of pages over which we

extend our account;

if a few sentences amply suffice

for our purpose, all the better, except for the danger

there is lest what is contained within the compass

of a single page should fail to secure the attention



THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING. 191

which it deserves, because it covers only one page. It

would beinsulting

to the reader toprint

inlarge

capitals, or have fingers drawn, pointing to the short

passages that are important beyond the measure

of their length ;but we may respectfully invite

careful advertence to the following paragraph which

contains, substantially, all the positive doctrine that

General Metaphysics has to deliver about the Infinite.

In Natural Theology the subject has to be further

developed with painful elaboration.

Before, by denying more than a certain degree

of perfection to Being we got finite Being ;and now

if we deny our previous denial, and assert unlimited-

ness of Being, we have got the idea of the Infinite,

provided we can satisfy one peremptory condition.

We must give guarantee that our new phrase is not

self-contradictory ;and this we cannot do by a

simple inspection and comparison of the two terms,

"unlimited" and"Being."

Therefore we borrow

from the treatise to which we have so frequently to

make recourse:

we take from Natural Theology the

proposition that there actually exists an Infinite

God, according to inferences that are convincingly

drawn. Thereupon, what otherwise would have

been no better than the suggestion of an idea,

becomes a real idea, and we are assured that our

conceptionof

"

unlimited

Being

"

is valid. It is not

a mere subterfuge like the pretence to pile finite

upon finite till the Infinite is reached : it commits

us to no assertion that the finite is made up of parts ;

it gives us simply Being which, as such, is not

confined within any bounds. While the idea so



193 BEING.

formed really does attain to its object, we are free

to confess that it does so after a very imperfect

mode, because it has to proceed by way of negation,

instead of positive intuition;and though the nega

tion, inasmuch as it is the negation of a negation,

that is, of a limit, is so far turned into something

positive, yet for all that it does not give us a direct

positive conception of the infinite. Later on we

shall allow for all shortcomings, but here we are in

sisting upon the success of our enterprise, so far as

we have achieved a success. We may now turn to

the failures of others, which will take us more time

to consider, for error is often more roundabout than

truth.

(2) (a) Some of the old pagan systems, even

though they do not explicitly deny the existence of

the Infinite, implicitly deny it by allowing only a

finite quantity of material elements and certain

presiding spirits whose attributes declare them to

be certainly finite. Others argue that existence

meansdeterminate existence

;

that all determina

tion is limitation;and that, therefore, there can be

nothing actual which is not bounded.

It is, however, to the denial of our power to

conceive the Infinite that we may more profitably

turn, because the arguments on this side have

about them a greater show of reason. Hobbes

in his rough leviathan-like way, quite ignoring the

distinction between sensitive and intellectual powers,

thinks to crush, as with a sledge-hammer, man s

pretence to know the Infinite.1

"Whatsoever we

1Leviathan, Ek. I. c. iii. p. 17.




imagine is finite. Therefore, there is no idea or

conception of anything we call infinite. No man can

have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor

conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite

force."The identification here of imagination, of the

sensitive picturing of infinite magnitude or velocity,

with the intellectual conception of the infinite is very

characteristic. We all allow that we cannot picture

the Infinite;nor are we concerned to defend the

conceivableness of an infinite magnitude, nor yet

of infinity in any material order. Hence we quite

disagree with the principles of a man who, as

Hobbes does, acknowledges no other actuality but

what he calls"body."

Hecontinues,

"When we

say anything is infinite, we signify only that we are

not able to conceive the ends or bounds of the

things named; having no conception of the thing,

but of our inability. And, therefore, the name of

God is used, not to make us conceive Him, for He

is incomprehensible ;but that we may honour Him.

Also because whatsoever we conceive has been

perceived first by sense, a man can have no

thought representing anything not subject to sense.

No man, therefore, can conceive anything, but he

must conceive it in some place and endowed with

some determinate magnitude." All contrary declara

tions "are absurd speeches, taken upon credit,

without any signification at all, from deceived

philosophers and deceived or deceiving schoolmen."

While differing widely from Hobbes as to the

power of intellect above sense, Hamilton agrees

with him that we cannot conceive the Iniinite,

N



194 BEING.

For, he contends,"

to conceive is to condition;

"

hence to think the Infinite would be to condition the

unconditioned, or to destroy it. Nevertheless, we

are bound to believe the Infinite,"

believing what we

cannot prove,"

for" we have but faith, we cannot

know."2 Our attempt to conceive the Infinite reveals

"a mere impotence," "the negation of aconcept,"

"

a fasciculus of negations." With these assertionsHamilton would have to reconcile what he says in

his Logic :

" The manifestation of belief necessarily

involves knowledge ;for we cannot believe without

some consciousness or knowledge of the belief, and

consequently some consciousness or knowledge of the

object of belief"*

This is rational, but it warns us off

the statement that simply we cannot know the

Infinite. Hamilton, however, is here pledged to a

principle, which occupies a great place in his system,

and which he could not forego without a notable

retreat from a position long stoutly maintained."4

" The sum of what I havestated," he says, ." is that

the conditioned is that which alone is conceivable

or cogitable ;the unconditioned is that which is

inconceivable or incogitable. The conditioned or the

thinkable lies between two extremes or poles, and

these extremes or poles are each of them uncon

ditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them

exclusive or contradictory of the other. Of these

two repugnant opposites the one is that of uncon

ditional or absolute limitation, the other that of

unconditional or infinite illimitation." For example,

2 In Memoriam, Introductory Stanzas.

* Vol. IV. Lect. xxvii. p. 73.4Metaphys. Lect. xxxviii. p. 373.




neither can we conceive a finite object which is an

absolute whole or an absolute part, nor can we

conceive an infinite object,"

for this could only be

done by an infinite synthesis in thought of finite

wholes, which would itself require an infinite time

for its accomplishment."5 Here precisely we catch

Hamilton tripping ;for addition of finites is not the

only mode that man has of attempting the idea of

the Infinite, since we have already given another

and a valid mode. And this is the sufficient refu

tation of Hamilton, whose appeal to Aristotle s6

" The Infinite is unknowable as Infinite;

" " The

Infinite is the object neither of the reasoning nor of

8Discussions, p. 13.

" In our opinion the mind can conceive

and consequently can know, only the conditionally limited. The

unconditionally unlimited or the Infinite, and the unconditionally limited,

or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the mind : they

can be conceived only by thinking away from, or abstraction of,

those very conditions under which thought itself is realized : con

sequently the notion of the unconditioned is only negative the

negative of the conceivable itself. For example, we can positively

conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great that

we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole;

nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small that we cannot conceive

it as a relative whole divisible into smallerparts."

In further

making the Absolute to be the contradictory of the Infinite,

Hamilton only adds to the evidence that he is misconceiving the

two: "

Absolutum means finished, perfected, completed : it thus corre

sponds to the rb 6\ov and rb Tf\ctov of Aristotle. In this accepta

tion and it is that in which I myself exclusively use it theAbsolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the

Infinite." Our doctrine is, that if we take the Absolute to be that

which is complete in its own nature, then the Absolute may be

either infinite, as in the case of the Divine nature, or finite, as in

the case of any created nature.

6 rb &TTfipov tiyvoMrrov 77 oTreipo?/ rb tinreipov ottrt



iq6 BEING.

the perceptive faculty,"will not avail him against the

fact that mankind have actually hit upon a means of

conceiving the Infinite, which manifestly does attain

to the Infinite itself to the whole Infinite, though

not to a comprehensive, exhaustive knowledge of its

nature. No parts of it are left out, for it has no

parts ;still the conception is partial in the sense

that while it seizes the wholeobject

it does not

wholly comprehend its nature.

In behalf of Hamilton, the defence which his

pupil Mansel has to make ought fairly to be heard,

but it cannot be admitted to satisfy all requirements.

He contends 7 that Mill s attack is beside the mark,

for his great objection is, that Hamilton, instead

of addressing himself to the consideration of the

concrete thing which is supposed to be Absolute or

Infinite, tries to prove "the unmeaning abstrac

tions to be unknowable;

"

whereas the truth is

that"

Hamilton maintains the terms Absolute

and Infinite to be perfectly intelligible as abstractions,

as much so as Relative and Finite, but denies that

a concrete thing can possibly be conceived as absolute

or infinite." The abstractions are knowable,"

in

the only sense in which abstractions can be known,

by understanding the meaning of their names;"

but this meaning cannot be intelligently applied by

man to a concrete example, because

"

in order toconceive the unconditioned existing as a thing, we

must conceive it as existing out of relation to every

thing else, as one, simple, and universal." The

apology cannot be accepted, for the word Absolute

rfhe Philosophy of the Conditioned,, pp. no, 102, 103.




certainly can be applied to an object without ex

cluding from it all relation;

the thing

may

be

absolute under one aspect, relative under another.

This is clear enough in regard to finite natures : and

with respect to God, if we pass over the Trinity as

belonging to Revelation, all should admit that the

Creator enters into what are conceived as relations

to His creatures;and if many theologians refuse

to call these relations real, it is only to save the

appearance of asserting any intrinsic change within

the immutable God, or any real dependency.

Others, with the proviso, that the Divine attributes

are to be kept inviolate, say that the relation maybe called real, in order to signify that creation on

the part of God is most really His work, though Hedoes not work after our way of passing from potency

to act and of depending on materials.

As a further instance of the view, that man can

form no intelligible notion of the Infinite, we may

appeal to sermon literature, where we shall find

Kingsley addressingthese words to a Christian

public:8

"It is said God is infinite and absolute,

and how can the finite comprehend the Infinite ?

These are fine words, but I do not care to under

stand them. I do not deny that God is infinite

or absolute, though what that means I do not know.

But I find nothing about His being infinite and

absolute in the Bible. I find there that He is

righteous, just, loving, merciful, and forgiving : and

that He is angry, too, and that His wrath is a con-

8 The Gospel of the Pentateuch, Sermon II. Compare Dr. Mar

tineau s Study of Religion, Vol. I. pp. 400 416; Vol. II. p. 148.



BEING.

suming fire;and I know well enough what these

words mean." It is not the way of Scripture to

use philosophic terms to express a doctrine;but

there are plenty of texts setting forth the illimitable-

ness of the Divine Being, and these are taken by

the early Christian Fathers to mean that God is

infinite, so that literally"

of His greatness there is

no end."9

From Hamilton s doctrine that we must believe

God infinite, though we can form no conception of

the Infinite God, onwards to Kingsley s opinion,

that a word which for us is empty of meaning need

not be held to declare a Divine attribute, the step

is very easy. Dr. Martineau 10

goes further still : his

view is that inst( ad of creation out of nothing wemust assume a sort of chaotic matter, coeval with

God;and his answer to Spencer s argument about

the unknowableness of the Absolute is, that it is

enough to know God in His relation to His creatures.

"True, God, so regarded, will not in the rigorous,

metaphysical sense,be

absolutelyinfinite. But we

know no reason why He should be : and must leave

it to the schoolmen who worship such abstractions,

to go into mourning at thediscovery."

For Catholics,

however, the Vatican Council has inserted amongits decrees a passage to the effect, that God is a God

of infinite perfection, the grounds for which doctrine

may be found in theological treatises, De Deo,11

9 Psalm cxliv. 3.

10 See the places lately referred to;also the Essays. Yet in his

own way, Dr. Martineau does teach that God is Infinite.

uKleutgen gives the arguments in brief, De Deo, p. 186.



THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING. igg

while the meaning of the term"

infinite"

must

be gathered, not from Hamilton, or Kingsley, or

Dr. Martineau, but from the philosophy which the

Church uses.

The Hamiltonian teaching about the inconceiva

bility of the Infinite, which has become widely

diffused in this country, and which Professor Huxley

has lately described as having exercised a great

influence philosophically on his youthful mind, is

akin to, but not identical with, the Kantian dis

tinction between the understanding, which judges

only according to the finite categories, and the

reason which has regulative ideas about the infinite,

such, however, that we can speculatively assert no

real object corresponding to these subjective ideas.

Hegel, who kept the distinction between under

standing and reason, represented the true Infinite

as not other than the finite, but as that into which

all finite objects are absorbed by the identifying

reason. He blames Kant for separating the infinite

from thefinite,

andmaking

it a"

transcendent,"

or an object beyond the reach of human intelligence.

Nevertheless, Kant s antinomies or contradictions

have largely prevailed : and they give Mr. Spencer,

at the beginning of his First Principles, his chief

grounds for asserting the basis of things to be the

Unknowable.

(b) Next to the explicit rejection of a true notion,

is its implicit rejection by describing it in a way

fatal to its essence : and such is a description of

the Infinite to which we have already referred, and

which makes it out to be the result of an indefinite



BEING.

addition of finite quantities. This intellectual piling

of Pelion upon Ossa to some may seem a verysublime effort : but there is much truth in Hegel s

sarcasm against Locke on this point ;that we must

abandon the occupation not because it is too sublime,

but because it is too tedious. Locke s teaching is12

that"

finite and infinite are looked on as modifica

tions ofexpansion,"

and that"

as

bythe

powerwe

find in ourselves of repeating as often as we will

any idea of space, we get the idea of immensity,

so by being able to repeat the idea of any length

of duration, we come by the idea ofeternity."

Really this process never brings us up to the notion

of infinity : it leaves us at some finite point, whence

we look forward to a possible advance indefinitely

extending : but this is the indefinite, not the infinite.

At most it might be regarded as implying or pre

supposing the Infinite: for, to take the example of

space, if we assert that no matter how we add space

to space in our imagination, we can always go

further in our additions, we do in some sort in

sinuate that there is an unlimited expanse to draw

upon. If the idea does not involve self-contra

diction, about which there are grave doubts, then

our way of conceiving infinite space would be pre

cisely by denying all limit to it. Locke, however,

omits this most necessary element in the process,and contents himself with the indefinitely numerous

parts. We are not, therefore, surprised to find the

patrons of this system equivalently admitting that

they have not got an idea of the Infinite, but only

18 Human Understanding, Bk. II. c. xvii.




a substitute for it;a fact which appears in Mr.

Calderwood s polemic against Hamilton."

It does

not follow," he writes, "that since we have not a

clear and definite knowledge of the Infinite, we

can have no knowledge at all;we can have an

indefinite knowledge of it;our notion of the Infi

nite is a notion of that to which there is always

something beyond." To call the notion indefinite

is to spoil it; only when a previously determinate

notion of the Infinite has been formed, can we

describe it as something such that, no matter what

finite greatness we assign to it, "there is always

something beyond."This latter description is a

secondaryaccount of the Infinite, and is insufficient

in itself, though, as we shall see presently, it has

some authority in Aristotle. Again, if we carry out

the Lockian theory in Mr. Sheddon s fashion,13 and

compare the acquisition of the idea of the Infinite

to climbing a mountain, which ever presents new

peaks to our ascending energies, then, with the same

author, we must admit that "the Infinite is for ever

beyond ourgrasp."

He "

believes in its existence,"

but he destroys the notion by which the object of

the belief is expressed.

(c) To assert that the idea of the Infinite is

innate in man, is about the only resort left for those

who, on the one hand, firmly hold that he has the

conception, and on the other, that his single wayof endeavouring to acquire it for himself by ex

perience must be through the addition of finite to

finite. Descartes is a representative of the a priori

w Three Philosophical Essays, Essay i. in initio.



2oa

theory of thinking: he maintains that only the

Infinite Being could have infused into our finite

minds the knowledge of Infinity. From such an

inference we dissent;but otherwise what Descartes

has to remark upon the subject is not without some

valuable hints. "As God alone," he says,14

"is the

only true cause of all that is and can be, it is clear

that we shall befollowing

the best course in our

philosophy, if from the knowledge of God Himself

we try to deduce the account of the things which

He has created. Now that we may do so in

security from all danger, we must use the caution

always to bear most carefully in mind, that God is

infinite and we altogether finite. Hence, if it should

happen that God reveal anything to us about His

own nature, for examples, the mysteries of the

Blessed Trinity and of the Incarnation, we shall

not refuse to believe these truths which are beyond

the reach of our natural apprehension ;nor shall we

be in the slightest degree surprised, that both in the

immensity of His own nature, and in the objects

which He has created, there are many things which

pass our understanding. Never shall we weary out

our minds in disputations about the Infinite;

for

seeing that we ourselves are finite, it is absurd to

suppose that we can come to conclusions about it,

and it would be absurd in us to try to bound it

within our comprehension. Therefore we shall not

be at pains to frame answers to those who ask

whether, if a line were infinite, the half of it would

also be infinite;or whether an infinite number be

14 De Princip. Philosoph. Pt. I. n. 14.




odd or even;because it seems that no one ought

to presume to have ideas on these questions, unless

he thinks his own mind to be infinite. We for our

part, in regard to all those objects to which, from

some aspect, we can discover no limit, shall not

indeed call them infinite, but shall look upon them

as indefinite. For example, since we cannot imagine

an extension so great that it cannot be greater, weshall say that things possible are indefinitely many."

Upon this very point we must presently enlarge a

little, and the conclusion we shall try to enforce is,

that it seems safest to take refuge in the limitations

of our powers, and to confess our inability even to

askproperly

thequestions

that are

supposedto be

so effective on one side of a controversy or on

another. We have to acknowledge not only insoluble

problems, but also problems that we cannot even state

adequately. However, before we take up this point,

we have a few words to add. The school of philo

sophers known as ontologists agree with the Car

tesians in teaching that we begin with the knowledge

of the Infinite, and thence descend to the knowledge

of the finite;that our idea of the Infinite is wholly

a positive idea, and that the use of the negation

comes in when we conceive the finite as the negation

of the Infinite. The intuition of God and the infu

sion of ideas, which are the postulates upon whichthe doctrines respectively rest, are both contrary

to sound psychological principle, or to speak more

simply, to the results of the most ordinary examina

tion of experience. We must not assume means

vhich are beyond our powers, but must account for



BEING.

each notion that we have, by assigning to it suc i

an origin as we discover in the workingsof our own

mind;and this we do when we trace our idea of

the Infinite to a conception of Being without limit.

When, however, we affirm that the notion of the

finite comes before that of the Infinite, lest we

should seem to deny that correlatives can be known

apart,

we must allow that a perfect perception of

finite requires us to observe that it is the opposite

of the Infinite. Still there is a less perfect know

ledge of the finite to be had by observing the differ

ence in magnitude between two finite objects.To

perceive that one thing is smaller than another

gives the idea of limitation; and even though the

idea of illimitation as applicable to Being, do not

then and there spring up, a sufficient contrast is

at hand to produce the notion of the finite. It

may be only later that a deliberate effort is made

to give precision to the full contrary opposition of

infinite to finite; then an implicit idea becomes

explicit.

(3) Without postulating any innate idea, we have

shown how the Infinite can really become an object

of our knowledge ;but at the same time, because it

was not an intuition, nor any fully comprehensive

notion of the object, that we proved to be ours, but

only a sort of made-up idea, needingthe device of

negativing all limit, it cannot surprise us, as we have

just heard Descartes remark, that our conception of

the Infinite leaves many puzzles to perplex the mind.

We meet with no downright contradiction of our

doctrine : but we do meet with difficulties apparently




beyond our powers of perfect solution. Unsolved

difficulties, however, cannot upset the partially ac

quired truths out of which they spring ; they show

only the incompleteness of the knowledge, not that

the knowledge is not correct as far as it goes.

The serious difficulties about the Infinite do not

so much begin with the One Infinite Being : for He

is declared to be without beginning or end, without

parts or composition, without change or any poten

tiality. But when we come to the assertion of an

infinite that has not this simple unity, but is sup

posed to be constituted by finite parts, straightway

strong arguments appear against the validity of such

a conception. St. Thomas

15

indeed regards it asnot demonstrable that creation could not have been

from eternity ;but he distinctly says that there can

not be an actually infinite number or multitude, and

when he puts to himself the explicit question," Can

the human intellect know an infinity of objects ?"

he answers that"

it cannot actually know an infinity

of objects, without numbering all the parts, and this

is an impossibility ;

"

and that we can know Infinity

in potentia only, which is defined by Aristotle 16to be

"

something such that those who take any quantity

of it have always more yet to take." This definition

is adopted by others, being rendered by Silvester

Maurus 17 as follows: "The infinite is that which

always leaves something over and above, so that he

who subtracts from its quantity can always take

more and more, without ever exhausting the whole."

18 Sum. i. q. vii. a. iv.;

i. q. Ixxxvi. a. ii.

WPhys, iii. .

* 7

Quast. Philosoph. Lib. II.q. xxxiii



to6 BEING.

This quantitative infinite is quite a different thing

from the infinite perfection of simple Being simplenot in the sense that it is mere Being without deter

minate attributes that are mentally distinguishable

by us, while not really so, but simple in the sense of

uncompounded. Hence the Aristotelian definition

really explains to us no more than the indefinite;

it

tells us that no finite

magnitude,which we choose

to name, will exhaust the possible extension of

quantity; but it does not tell us that there is an

infinite extension, nor even that infinite extension

has a valid meaning. It informs us only that, how

ever far we stretch quantity, we can always stretch

it further. It gives us no more guarantee that we

can predicate of it infinite greatness, than that we

can predicate of it, by reason of its indefinite sub-

divisibility, infinite smallness, or parts infinitely

minute.

The inquiry has its direct bearing on the question

of possibilities which we treated in the last chapter.

We are asked, Is their sum-total infinite, or finite,

or indefinite ? If we reply finite, we seem to limit

the Divine power; if we reply indefinite, we seem

to be using a term that has reference only to human

ignorance, and has no application to the Divine

knowledge ;and therefore the remaining word,

infinite, is strongly urged upon our acceptance as

the only one eligible. On the threshold we mayremark upon a frequent assumption which requires

more caution on the part of its friends than it gene

rally receives. It is taken for granted that there

must be possible an infinite production as the only



THE FINHE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING. 20?

adequate term of omnipotence. But if this principle

be urged unqualifiedly, then omnipotence ought to

be able to create another God; and inasmuch as

what is thus implied is the height of extravagance,

we have a right to affirm that God s power of

creation has not an absolutely illimitable term for its

object. Here is a fact which at least should be

borne in mind while we are discussing the so-called

sum of all possibilities. Next we may premise, that

from the point of view of our limited capacities,"

indefinitely many"

forms a fair reply when it is

asked of us, How many things God can make ?

Never will so many be assigned in numbers that

He cannot produce more. We have the like exampleof an indefinitely large multitude when we consider

the limitless subdivisibility, not perhaps of matter

itself, but of abstract, mathematical extension. In

it there is no bound assignable by us to the possi

bility of halving, and halving again, without ever

coming to a necessary stoppage. Once more, if it

be asked, how many thoughts will go through the

mind of a person who is eternally to live and to be

mentally active, our powers of framing an answer

at least carry us as far as"

indefinitely many."

But next, when we no longer consider our limited

knowledge, which easily allows of the indefinite, but

God s knowledge which seems to exclude indefinity,

we feel driven to say that God could give a definite

reply to the query," What is the sum of the pos

sibles ?"

One great advantage which He has over

us certainly will enable Him to know an infinite

number or multitude, if that expression has an



BEING.

intelligible meaning. For He does not number

things successively :

He would not have to pass

over successive steps in order to reach an infinite

number, if such a number have a real signification.

To God, then, perhaps, the sum of all the possi

bilities is infinite, or rather infinitely infinite, in the

sense that He contemplates an infinite number of

individuals in each of an infinite number ofdifferent

kinds.18

If by these considerations we could be driven

into a plain contradiction, it would be fatal to our

philosophy : but if from them it be proved only that

about the infinite there are some questions which

we cannot satisfactorily, we will not say answer, but

propose, then that proves our knowledge to be

restricted, but it does not discredit the little that we

do understand. If objectors cannot give a suffi

ciently clear meaning to the inquiries which they

are trying to put to us, and by which they seek to

reduce us to mental confusion, then the limitation

of their and our faculties may be betrayed ; but our

theory about possibilities may still claim to be un

shaken, so far as ever we professed to have estab

lished a theory. It is enough, therefore, if we

succeed in showing that the almost flippantly made

interrogation," What is the sum of all the possi-

18 " The right and duty to admit that something is and happens

does not depend on our ability, by combining acts of thought, to

make it in that fashion in which we should have to present it to

ourselves as being or happening. It is enough that the admission

is not rendered impossible by inner contradiction, and is rendered

necessary by the bidding of experience." /I.otze, Metaphys. Bk. II

c iii 143-)




bilities on the supposition that their origin is in an

infinite God?"

is dark, not with "excess of light,"

but with defect of light. Perhaps it is absurd. At

any rate, we shall content ourselves with maintain

ing that its want of demonstrable intelligibility in

any form which we can give to it, is enough to bar

its force as a decisive objection to any doctrine.

Others may meet the objection directly, but weshall not attempt more than an indirect defence

of our position against the attack.

Recalling, as a thing to be kept in mind, our

remark that omnipotence cannot produce another

God, we fasten upon the phrase, "sum of all the

possibilities,"

and demandproof

that it is not in

coherent in its terms. We do not positively affirm

that it is incoherent : but we ask to have grave sus

picions allayed which are against its coherency.19

At least it is an obscure combination of words, and

we want more clearness. It seems to ask what is

the summation of a series which can never end, and

which cannot be submitted to any mathematical

formula, and which very likely would not gain much

if it could be so submitted, because mathematicians

proceed by a convention in regard to the infinite,

leaving it to philosophers to explain the convention

if they can. The mathematician, as such, is quite

19 " There is no enumeration of infinite numbers, and yet they

are not beyond the comprehension of God, whose intelligence is

without number." (St. Aug. De Civ. Dei, xii.18.)

" No species of

number is infinite, for in every case number is multitude measured

by unity." (St. Thomas, Sum. i. q. vii. a. iv.) The Conimbricenses

take the view that a quantitative infinity can be proved neither

possible nor impossible. (In Lib. VI. Phys. c. viii. q. ii.)

O



210 BEING.

content to write 77=00, and sometimes 001 = 00,

and despises ultimate explanation, because from hij

hypothetical point of view there is no need of con

siderations that are in the present case absolute. The

theory of infinitesimals, or of absolute ultimates in

smallness, and the theory of limits either of these

two can be worked by the mathematician, who can

work also with what he recognizes to be, and calls,

surds. He can allow the symbols for impossible

operations to enter into his workings and he ordi

narily considers it no necessary part of his business to

venture any philosophy about the deeper meaning of

2

>v/

I. For him the important point about the in

finite is that no finite quantity shall ever be allowed

to satisfy its requirements ; and, as every one must

see, this stipulation is quite consistent with the

impossibility of an infinite number, for it exacts no

more than the exclusion of a definite limit being set

to number in a particular case. Number in this

instance is not an infinite source actually existing,

which, because it is infinite, enables us to draw

upon it indefinitely ;it is only a magnitude capable

of indefinite expansion, but it is the expansion which

gives the magnitude and defines its limits at each

stage : we are at liberty to push these stages further

and further, but it is a convention when the mathe

matician supposes them infinitely advanced. Weshould need a more philosophic explanation of

that convention than the bulk of mathematicians

care even to attempt, before we could accept their

use of the terms as proof that a number literally

infinite involves no contradiction, or is not like a



THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING, ail

surd. Mathematicians, then, at least leave us un

satisfied; professedly many of them ignore the

philosophic difficulties underlying their convention.

Suppose, therefore, we try for ourselves to discover

what is the meaning of all the possibles. We find

that it is often treated as the exhaustive term of in

exhaustible power ;the summation of an unsummable

series, or better perhaps, the last number in an

arithmetic progression, which ascends always by an

increment of one, and has no last term;the gather

ing up of all into one collection in spite of the

agreement that outside any assignable collection of

the individuals, there should always be more left to

gather. Word our account of

"

all the possibles

"

as we like, when we suppose them gathered into

one sum, the cautious mind will be slow to set

aside its suspicions about the validity of the ex

pression. However, its defenders rest the case on

another consideration. They allow their inability to

explain

infinite number;

they appealto the

parallelinstance of infinite Being, which, nevertheless, we

admit to be actually existent, though we cannot com

prehend it. Against such a subterfuge we have two

things to say. First, there are proofs producible for

the infinite perfection of God;but as God cannot

create another God, there is a want of directness

about the argument from His own infinity to show

that He can create, or must regard as possible, an

infinity of different kinds, or of individuals under any

one kind. Second, an infinity of finite objects has

difficulties which are avoided in the case of God

who is one, indivisible, uncompounded, and perfectly



si2 BEING.

simple in His essence. Hence with Him there is

no constituting the infinite out of parts : whereas

the supposed infinity of possibles is the result of an

aggregation, which gives rise to endless and hopeless

perplexities, when inquiries are made about the

results of adding or subtracting units. The infinite

number would have to be made up of units, and

these are elements which have furnished such diffi

culties against the number itself that it seems safe

to say, they have been satisfactorily answered by

no one;

all attempt at reply rests on an assumption

which cannot rationally be justified. De Morganis right in his explanation of the numerals : they

start, as he affirms, from one, and thenproceed by

the addition of a unit at each successive advance.

Thus,2 is the conventional sign for i+ 1

3 2+1

4 if 3+1

Hence we can never get rid of the difficulties arising

from the fact that any number whatsoever is made

up of separate units;

and these difficulties are

serious.

The first Roman numerals are undisguisedly

I, II, III.

Here it may be worth while to point out a defect

in the expression, that the numerals "tend to in

finity."If we say that the asymptote tends to touch

its curve, or that a polygon of ever-multiplying sides

tends to a circle, the contact with the hyperbola and

the contact with the circle are in themselves terms

which are most clearly intelligible whatever may be



THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING. an

said of their being reached by the asymptote and the

polygon. But if any one says that ever-increasingnumber "tends to

infinity,"the ultimate term itsell

Here lacks the clear intelligibility which we admitted

in the former cases. It seems rather that the very

law of number,20

or if some people prefer the word,

of multitude, should be that there shall be no term

to which it can tend as to its

completion;

just

as it

seems the law of the production of parallel lines,

that they should always as rigorously preserve their

distance, as if an inflexible bar held them apart.

They have no law of nearer and nearer approach,

such as is apparent in the case of the asymptote.

The force of the above arguments will be missed

if the reader forgets that they are purely sceptical,

not dogmatic proofs against the possibility of infinite

multitude. They insist only on the two facts that

there are unsolved difficulties against such infinity,

and that we cannot be compelled to sink these diffi

culties, because of some proof aliunde, that there

must be an infinite number or multitude. If certain

mathematical results seem to be against the latter

assertion, we plead in explanation, that these results

depend on a priori conventions which, at the time

they were made, were not philosophically analysed.

The results follow deductively on the convention, but

we wait for the fuller

analysisof that convention

itself. As we have more than once said, and must

20 Number is defined "multitude measured by unity."To

escape this definition some speak only of infinite multitude : but

we have no belief in trying to get over a real difficulty by a verbal

distinction : it would still remain to justify the assertion of an

infinite "multitude."



2T4 BEING.

repeat again because of the undue air of triumph

with which the consideration is

pressed uponus,

the difficulty of the infinite multitude is not on the

part of the Divine knowledge of it;

if it be a rational

object of thought, God would know it all at once,

collectively, without successive summing up of

parts. Still the parts would be there and they are

the obstacle;and we are quite unsatisfied in mind

when we are told to ignore the parts and regard only

the whole, as God would do. We are pertinacious

in our assertions;the parts are there, they make up

the whole, and if their very nature appears to throw

grave doubt on the rationality of such a whole, to

such doubts we will cling until, we will not say our

opponents, but our instructors, make their instruc

tions more intelligible to our powers of understand

ing. For we cannot accept a proposition without

some sort of motive, intrinsic or extrinsic to the

subject, and such as we can understand.

Our position of non probatur, or not proven, against

those who hold an infinity of possibles may befurther illustrated by the failure of the attempt to

translate eternity into clear terms of time. If any

one likes to say that eternity equals an infinity of

years, months, weeks, days, hours, or seconds, he

has the power to utter these words, but what do

they signify

? and what is their warrant ? and what

is the excess of the infinity of years over the infinity

of seconds, sixty of which go to each minute ? Weshould prefer to confess that we do not know how

to effect the translation of eternity into time.

Similarly we do not know which is the way to




express how God now looks comprehensively upon

the thoughts of a creature who is going to elicit

thoughts throughout an eternity, that is, who is

going to posit a series which will never reach a final

limit, though it had a definite starting-point. Efforts

to express eternity in measures of time seem to lead

us into fallacies comparable, in part, to those where

byZeno

disprovedthe

possibilityof motion. Motion

continuous, successive, and without actually divided

parts was treated more or less like a fixed line, of

co-existent parts, along which it might be supposed

to take place and have its resting-places. But the

fact is we cannot divide continuous motion itself

into fixed intervals of rest. Neither have we any

right to speak of the duration of an indivisible

instant, nor to regard a finite duration as made up

of instants without duration, nor to make sundry

other suppositions which occasionally are made in

dealing with those very unique ideas, motion and

duration, which are without first part or last part,

without co-existent parts, nay, without any actual part

at all. For motion of its own nature is best con

ceived under the figure of an evenly-travelling point,

which leaves no record behind it, but simply goes ever

uniformly forward. On this subject we shall have

to speak afterwards; at present we are only caTing

attention to the fallacy of translating continuouslysuccessive motion into co-existence and rest, and

we are paralleling it with the fallacy of translating

the infinite into the finite.

Balmez has tried to illustrate the difficulties of

an infinity of finite parts. He says, in regard to



ai6 BEING.

the assumed divisibility of finite space into infinite

parts:

21"Absurdities if we

suppose

infinite divisibi

lity,absurdities if we suppose the opposite ;

obscuri

ties if we admit unextended points, obscurities if we

deny them. Victorious in attack, reason is helpless

in defence, and unable to maintain an opinion.

Nevertheless, reason cannot be in conflict with

itself: the proof of two contradictories would be

the absolute negation of reason. Therefore, the

contradiction is but apparent ;but who shall untie

for us the knot !

"

We maintain that the foundation of the possi

bilities in an Infinite God leads to no proved contra

diction, but only to a question which is suggested,

yet seems incapable of clear formulation by the

human mind. And when we remember the mere

artifice to which we must have recourse, in order

that we may have an idea of the infinite, which,

while it really attains its object, yet fails to

comprehend its inmost nature, we cannot be sur

prised that about this notion we have intimationsof questions to be put, but cannot clearly put them.

If we may borrow a rather distant analogy, we mayuse the illustration of a man who knows sound only

as it is heard, but who knows nothing about its

mode of propagation in a vibratory medium. He

would ask some most unscientific questions about

the wonder that there should be a sound apiece for

each listener, about the disappearance of the sound

as soon as it has been heard, and about other

matters equally vexatious to the educated man.

11 Fundamental Philosophy, Bk. III. c. xxiv.



THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE IN BEING 217

What seems a hopeless inquiry when sound is

discussed with no approach to an understanding of

its physical conditions, becomes an intelligible

question only when an adequate hypothesis has

been framed. So we may be hopelessly muddling

our brains over the infinite, because our conception

of its nature is so very indirect and inadequate. It

doesnot, then,

seemextravagant

toconclude,

that

perplexities concerning the infinite and its relations

to the finite, are no real contradictions, but only

attempts to think out problems that are beyondour data. We are trying to stretch our terms till

they reach to heights and depths for which they

are much too short. So when we are asked the

question with which we started this discussion," What is the sum-total of all the possibles ?

"

we

venture to maintain that the questioner has no

right to press that inquiry upon us, till he has

satisfied us that he has a determinate meaning to

his words. Of course we must abide by the law

of excluded middle : and if the subject of the

sentence has a real meaning, and if in the case

under discussion non-finite is the same as infinite,

then to the assertion, "The entire number of pos

sibles is either finite or infinite," we must yield our

assent. But we claim at present to take refuge in

the conditionality of the conditional particles, thetwo ifs

: and we wait till these can be replaced by

the purely categorical statement," The entire num

ber of possibles is either finite or infinite." Wetake refuge in Mill s difficulty against the law of

excluded middle, with this difference : he supposes



ti8 BEING.

his difficulty to be valid against the law itself, while

we hold it to be valid

only againstan uncertain

application of the law. His proposition is, that

when a predicate is declared either to belong or

not to belong, to a certain subject, the assertion

is open to the exception, that possibly the term

standing as subject is devoid of real significance.

This may be the defect of the phrase, "All the

possibilities."

It is the more needful to insist on the precise

position which we take up, for it borders so near on

the Hegelian territory, that it may easily be mistaken

for one of its belongings. Hegel,22

for example,

teaches us that"

in the narrower sense dogmatism

consists in the tenacity which draws a hard and

fast line between certain terms supposed to be.

absolute, and others contrary to these. We may see

this clearly in the strict either or, for instance,

the world is either finite or infinite; but one of

these two it must be. The contrary of this rigidity

is the characteristic of all speculative truth. Thereno such inadequate formulae are allowed, nor can

they possibly exhaust it. These formulae speculative

truth holds in union as a totality, whereas dogmatism

invests them in their isolation with a title to truth

andfixity."

Our way of dealing with the limita

tions of ourunderstanding

is

quite

different from

the Hegelian. Instead of postulating a power

32 Mr. Wallace s Logic of Hegel, p. 56. Hegel pities Kant s

scrupulosity in limiting contradiction to reason and not referring

them to objects; he says the antinomies are real and are found in

all things.




higher than understanding, we simply do our best

to

make allowances forits

limitations, so that thepartial truths we reach are considered by us, not

only as true, but also as partial, or as true only

under the recognition that they are partial. Where

we recognize a distinct contradiction between pro

positions, no matter how narrow, we refuse to believe

that this real contradiction can be overcome by a

so-called reason. Hence we cannot accept what

follows on the passage just cited :

" The soul is

neither finite only, nor infinite only : it is really

the one just as much as the other, and in that wayneither one nor the other." If finite and infinite

are here referred to the same aspect, and if the

subject of the proposition,"

soul," can be taken,

as"

the sum-total of possibilities"

cannot be taken,

with a perfectly clear and valid meaning ;then on

the principle of excluded middle, the soul certainly

is either infinite or not infinite, "infinite" here mean

ing inferentially finite, for it cannot be indefinite.

The only reason why we cannot apply the like

dichotomy to "the sum of thepossibles," is be

cause we cannot make sure about the meaning of

the phrase. Given that "the sum of thepossibles"

has a clear signification and validity, then as we

have said before, and now repeat for the sake of

emphasis,

we should have to meet thedifficulty

from the law of the excluded middle. Some, there

fore, would allow the infinity : others would say that

non-infinite is not obviously the same as finite, but

may be the indefinite. We ourselves have not

allowed the question to go as far as this stage : we



220 BEING.

have stopped the inquiry at its very birth by a

demand for a perfectly intelligible interpretation of

the words,"

the sum of the possibles." On the

ground above marked out we find a battlefield

large enough for the quarrels which probably philo

sophers will not settle till the end of time, after

which something higher than philosophy will

enlighten those who, during life, have been consis

tently something higher than philosophers. Mean

time we wait in humble acknowledgment of our

limitations.



GENERAL METAPHYSICS.

BOOK II.

EXPLANATION OF SOME NOTIONS NEXT IN POINT

OF GENERALITY TO TRANSCENDENTAL BEING,

CHAPTER I.

SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.

Synopsis,

(A) Introductory remarks.

(B) Substance and Accident explained.

(1)Definitions of Substance which lead to Pantheism.

(2)Destruction of the right notion of substance among

English Empiricists.

(3) The reality of substance defended. (a) A contrast

between substance and accident is matter of clear

experience, (b)Substance is defined as what exists

Per se, and is not inherent in a subject, (c)This is the

fundamental idea of substance; substance need not be

a hidden substratum really distinct from accidents that

manifest themselves,(d)

It follows that substance is

a reality known beyond all doubt.

(4) Accident.Notes and Illustrations.

(A) THE second part of this work has an aim

like that of the first, so far as it takes up some

of those perpetually recurrent notions upon which

certain writers have managed to throw very dark



222 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

shadows. Bringing these forward to the open

daylight, it tries to show plain men that they

can understand them and be sure of their real

validity. The opponents whom we shall seek to

encounter will be mainly our English Empiricists,

because they represent the most natural aberra

tions of British intellect;whereas other aberrations

are of an imported character, being borrowed

especially from Hegel. Lest, however, we be

accused of hiding away that luminary from the

sight of our readers, we will give a summarystatement of his doctrine about the ideas with

which we are going mainly to deal;

and should

this

summaryseem

invitingto

readers, theywill

be set on the task of investigating for themselves,

with what results we will leave them to find out

for themselves. Mr. Wallace shall furnish the

synopsis :

1"If the first branch of Logic was the

sphere of simple Being in a point or series of points,

the second is that of difference and discordant

Being, broken up in itself. The progress in this

second sphere of Essentia or Relative Being con

sists in gradually overcoming the antithesis and dis

crepancy between the two sides of it the Permanent

and the Phenomenal" Here precisely are the notions

with which we, in our own way, are going to deal,

while Hegel follows his way thus : "At first the

stress rests upon the Permanent and true . Being,

which lies behind the seeming, upon the Essence or

Substratum in the background, which lies behind the

seeming, on which the show of immediate Being

1Logic of Hegel, p. cxxi.



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. *2j

has been proved, by the process in the first sphere,

really to rest. Then, secondly, Existence comes to

the front and Appearances or Phenomena are regarded

as the only realities with which science can deal.

And yet even in this case we cannot but distinguish

between the phenomena and their laws, between force

and its exercise; and thus repeat the relativity,

though both terms of it are now transferred into

the range of the Phenomenal world. The third range

of essential Being is known as Actuality, where the

two elements in relation rise to the level of inde

pendent existences, essences in phenomenal guise,

bound together, and deriving their very charac

teristics from that close union.Relativity

is now

apparent in actual form, and comprises the three

heads of Substantial Relation, Causal Relation, and

Reciprocal Relation." Substance, Cause, Relation, and

others are the notions we now want to investigate ;

but we shall not use the Hegelian method, though

the fact of its existence we cannot now be accused

of having failed duly to advertise. We can

claim no more than to have advertised it, for to

make its meaning plain is more than we profess

to be able to accomplish. At least the reader

will recognize the notions which Hegel wants to

interpret to him to be those which we also discuss

in the following chapters ; and furthermore, he will

have a specimen page, to show him what very tougli

material Hegel offers for the philosopher s mastica

tion. In detail we shall seldom recur to Hegel;

for our best way of refuting him is to make the

clearest and most convincing exposition we can of




our own positive doctrine;to which work without

further preface we proceed.The course we have yet to travel over is not

quite settled either by the nature of things or by

common agreement ;but under the guidance of

"

sweet reasonableness," after having brought Onto

logy in its stricter sense, as the doctrine of Being,

to its close, we mustsurvey

those other grounds

which General Metaphysics may fairly claim to

occupy. Next to Being the scholastics generally

place in the treatise a selection from the highest

genera, such as they are declared to be by the

Aristotelian categories ;for these come nearest in

their generality to the"

transcendental"

term which

is confined within no one genus however high. The

categories are Substance, Quantity, Quality, Rela

tion, Where ? When ? Posture, Action, Passion,

Habit. Of these Substance and Action will claim

the lion s share of our attention; Cosmology deals

with nearly all the others as well as with the two

just mentioned ; but we shall merely add to the

latter a few notions as to Time and Space. At once

it will be perceived that the second part is divided

from the first by no very hard and fast line;for in

the former, after we had considered Being in its

rigorously transcendental characters, we went on

further to consider it in its determinations as actualand possible, necessary and contingent, infinite and

finite. The chief difference now is, that we are

going to borrow the determinations from some of

the Aristotelian categories, and consider Being as

substantial and accidental, as active in opposition



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 225

to passive, as relative in opposition to absolute, as

spacial and as temporal. So that if any one wants

a more accurate partition of our work, he may have

it under three headings Being as quite undeter

mined or transcendental, Being as determined by

highly general characters not contained in the

Aristotelian categories, and Being as determined

by highly general characters contained within those

categories.

If we may make here one remark as to a matter

of precise terminology, the schoolmen do not usually

rank God under the categories; yet they apply

analogously to Him the terms Substance, Relation,

Action. With this understandingwe shall make

some provision for the application of Substance and

Action to God.

(B) (i) The whole of Being is divisible into

Substance and Accident;

but how these differ it

will take us some time to settle, for we shall have

much to do in the way of refutation before we

come to our own positive doctrine. To begin with,

we may make short work of certain definitions

which tend to limit, or do actually limit, substance

to a single instance, and so favour pantheism. Thus

Descartes lays it down 2that

"

substance is a thing

which exists of itself, in such sort that it needs for

its existence no other thing; and, indeed, the sub

stance needing absolutely nothing else can be but

one, namely, God." Though the author does not

himself teach that God is the only substance, but

2

Princip. Philosoph. Pt. I. n. 51. Compare Reids definition,

Works, Vol. I. p. 232.

P



TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

rather that God is the only perfect substance, yet

he leads the way to the pure pantheism of Spinoza,1

who writes,"

By substance I understand that which

is in itself and is conceived by itself; in other words,

that the concept of which does not need the concept

of anything else to aid its formation." That there

may be no mistake about his meaning, he plainly

declares that no substance canproduce another,

and that only one substance can exist, of which all

other things are either attributes or modes. Weshould allow to these definitions the element of

truth that the completely independent substance is

only one;that God is a substance with a perfection

wherewith no created thing is a substance;

still as

we cannot tolerate that finite objects should be

regarded as real parts of God, either His attributes

or His modes, we dislike the definition of Descartes,

while that of Spinoza we wholly repudiate.

(2) The next error about substance will cost us

much more labour in its discussion, for we shall

have to enter somewhat minutely into the history

of opinions. Some may shrink from such minutiae,

but perhaps they will have the courage to overcome

their repugnance if they are reminded of ths

importance of the issue. There is a traditional

English philosophy which has much vogue in our

country to-day ; its boast is that it has brought the

scholastic notion of substance into utter contempt

in fact has put it out of all rear enable consideration.

3Ethic, Pt. I. definit. 3. Cousin also allows only one real

substance, or one Being, which he defines as that" which in order

to its existence supposes nothing outside itself."




This verdict is widely accepted by numbers who

have no notion of the real meaning of the con

troversy. Hence it is worth while to trace at some

length the course of this revolution in thought ;and

no apology for repeated quotations will be wanted

by those who understand that if they are to judge

a weighty and intricate case, they must have the

patience to hearthe witnesses. After

the evidenceshall come a clear verdict

;but it is unwise to pre

cipitate the decision. Moreover, the accused shall

speak for themselves, and not through reporters,

who often report inaccurately. Locke leads the

way in the departure from sound doctrine, but as in

the case of essence,4so too in the present case, he

builds up again with one hand what he had pulled

down with the other : he is only a half-hearted

destroyer. There are indeed sentences in the 23rd

chapter of his second book which seem to prove

him a thorough-going iconoclast;for instance this :

"

Not imagining how simple ideas can subsist by

themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose

some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from

which they do result; which therefore we call

substance. So that if any one will examine

himself, concerning his pure notion of substance in

general,5 he will find that he has no other idea of it

at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what

support of such qualities as are capable of producing

simple ideas in us, which qualities are commonl

4 See Pt. I. c. ii.

8It is over the nature of the reality to be found in unive

ideas that Locke is perpetually tripping. It was so over essence.



ts8 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

called accidents. The idea of substance being

nothing but the supposed, but unknown supportof

those qualities we find existing, which we imagine

cannot subsist sine re substante, without something

to support them, we call that support substantial

There are two radical errors here : first, the usual

blunder of Locke, that becaur-e all actual things are

singular, general names do not stand for reali

ties, but are "fictions of the mind;" and, second,

the error of fancying that the primary notion

of substance is some hidden-away support, really

distinct from the accidents which it holds together.

As we shall see later, the radical notion of substance

is preserved, even though it should prove true that

it is substance itself which immediately acts on our

senses, manifesting its own qualities as modes of its

own activity. Locke himself, whose errors are

often rather those of confusion than of complete

misrepresentation, gives, in his reply to Stillingfleet,

the most ample assurances that in spite of ap

pearances he still believes in the reality of sub

stance.6 "

It is laid to my charge that I took the

being of substance to be doubtful, or rendered it so

by the imperfect or ill-grounded idea I have of it.

To which I beg leave to say that I ground not the

being, but the idea of substance on our accustoming

ourselves tosuppose some

substratum : for it is of

the idea alone that I speak there, and not of the

6 See note to Bk. II. c. xxiii. In c. i. he says, "We know

certainly by experience that we sometimes think, and thence draw

the infallible consequence that there is something in us which has

|he power to think," i.e.," a substance."




being of substance. And having everywhere affirmed

and built upon it, that a man is a substance, I

cannot be supposed to question or doubt of the

being of substance. Further, I say, Sensation

convinces us that there are solid, extended sub

stances, and reflexion that there are thinking ones.

So that I think the being of substance is not shaken

by what I have said ;

andif

the idea

7

ofit

should beyet (the being of things not depending on our ideas)

the being of substance would not be shaken by my

saying we had but an obscure, imperfect idea of it,

and that that idea came from our accustoming

ourselves to suppose some substratum ; or, indeed, if

I should say that we had no idea of substance at

all. For a great many things may be, and are

granted to have a being, of which we have no ideas.

The being then of substance being safe, let us see

whether the idea of it be not so too. I have said

that it is grounded upon this, That we cannot

conceive how simple ideas of sensible qualities

subsist alone, and therefore we suppose them to

exist in, and be supported by, some common

subject, which subject we denote by the name

substance. Which I think is a true reason,

because it is the same your lordship grounds the

supposition of a substratum on in this very page ;

even on the repugnancy to our conceptions that

modes and accidents should subsist by themselves."

7 Locke should have observed that unless his idea of substance

was of substance as a reality, i.e., a real idea of substance, he could

have no right to affirm that the being of substance was real. Hi?

idea must tell him that, or else he must remain in ignorance



23o TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

Thus Locke takes up the not very clear position,

that whether or not he has any real idea of it, there

is such a thing as substance; and, moreover, that

he has a real idea of it, because of his"

custom to

suppose a substratum, not imagining how simple

ideas can subsist by themselves :

"

indeed on no

account will he be thought"

almost to discard

substance out of the reasonable part of the world."

What he really wants to teach us is, that we under

stand no more of the admitted reality, substance,

than that it is a something we know not what

which is always needful to account for the groups

of phenomena brought under our experience ;that

beyondthis

generic conceptionof substance we

cannot advance; that being known as a substratum,

but otherwise unknown, it may be called "the

unknown substratum," which is "fiction of the

mind"

simply because it is"

a general idea."

A last quotation we will give as strongly

illustrative of Locke s position, not only as to

substance, but as to essence also two subjects

which authors generally treat in a kindred spirit.8

" Had we such ideas of substances as to know what

real constitutions produce those sensible qualities

we find in them, and how those qualities flow

from thence, we could, by the specific ideas of the

real essences in our minds, more certainly find out

their properties, and discover what qualities they

had or had not, than we can now by our senses;

and to know the properties of gold it would be no

more necessary that gold should exist and that

Bk. IV. c. vi. ii.



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 23*

we should make experiments upon it, than it

is necessary for the knowing the properties of a

triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter.

But we are so far from being admitted into the

secrets of nature, that we can scarce so much as

ever approach the first entrance towards them. For

we are wont to consider the substances we meet

with, each of them as an entire thing by itself,

having all its qualities in itself, and independent ol

other things; overlooking for the most part the

operations of those invisible fluids they are accom

panied with, and upon whose motions and operations

depend the greatest part of these qualities which

are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the

inherent marks of distinction whereby we know and

determine them. Put a piece of gold anywhere by

itself, separate from the influence and reach of all

other bodies, it will immediately lose all its colour

and weight, and perhaps malleableness too; which,

for aught I know, would be changed into a perfect

friability. Water, in which to us fluidity is the

essential quality, left to itself would cease to be

fluid. But if inanimate bodies owe so much of

their present state to other bodies without them,

that they would not be what they appear to us,

were these bodies that environ them removed, it is

yetmore so in

vegetables. . . and animals, . . ,

We are then quite out of the way when we think

that things contain within themselves the qualities

that appear to us in them;and we in vain search

for that constitution within the body of a fly or an



S3* TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

elephant, upon which depend those qualities and

powers we observe in them."

Enough now has been done to give a view of

Locke s position ;and our next labour must be to

find out how Hume took up some of Locke s

sceptical hints, and carried them further than his

predecessor ever dreamt of going with them. Hume

reduces man

9to a series of

"

perceptions,"

which

are divisible into"

impressions"

and"

ideas," the

impressions being further subdivisible into"

sensa

tions"

and"

emotions"

or"

passions."The emo

tions are termed "reflexions."10 The test of an

"

impression"

is its liveliness as compared with an

"idea,"which is its "faint

copy,"and the test of

the reality of an"

idea"

is the possibility of tracing

it back to some"

impression"

as its source. All

that can be said of this source itself is, that"

sensa

tions arise originally in the soul from some unknown

causes :

"

they are in our regard ultimates. More

over, impressions and ideas cannot be said to have

any substance to hold them together : we are in a

position to assert only the bond of phenomenal

association.11 " Were ideas entirely loose and

unconnected, chance alone would join them ;and

tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall

regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do)

9Treatise, Bk. I. Pt. I. sect. i.

" Those perceptions which enter

with most force and violence we name impressions; by ideas we

mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning."

10Ibid. sect. ii. Compare Inquiry, sects, ii. and iii. Hence Mr.

Spencer borrows his" vivid

"

and "

faint aggregate" as to the two

ultimate divisions in Philosophy.11

Ibid. sect. iv.




without some bond ofunion among them, some associating

quality by which one idea naturally introduces another.

This uniting principle among ideas is not to be

considered as an inseparable connexion;

for that

has been already excluded from the imagination ;

nor yet are we to conclude that without it the mind

cannot join two ideas;

for nothing is more free

than thatfaculty

;but we are

onlyto

regardit as

a gentle force which commonly prevails. The

qualities from which this association arises, and

by which the mind is conveyed from one idea to

another, are three, namely, Resemblance, Con

tiguity in time and place, and Cause and Effect."

Thus the perceptions themselves are made all in

all : they are the acts of no substantial soul; they

come and go by their own mutual affinities. Not

to real outer substances, but to association of

impressions and ideas, is attributed what we know

of the arrangements called the order of physical

nature : inasmuch as"

the senses, in changing their

object, are necessitated to change them regularly,

and take them as they lie contiguous to each other."

Yet Hume does riot wholly fail to distinguish"

a

natural world"

from"

a mental world"

: for he

says, whatever may be the consistent meaning of

his words,12 that

"

there is a kind of attraction

which in the mental world willbe found to have as

extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show

itself in as many and in as various forms." One

would think that he had pretty nearly identified

the two worlds for all purposes of human know-

12Treatise, Bk. I. Pt. IV. sect. ii.




ledge. Yet, as though he had been a common

realist, he is at pains to assure us of the corres

pondence between the two, as between two different

orders.

We are brought next explicitly to Hume s doctrine

on the notion of substance. He tells13

us to renounce

the quest of causes, and to be content with analyzing

effects,

dividingour

"

complexideas

"

into"

Rela

tions, Modes, and Substances." An examination

of the last will show us"

that we have no idea of

substance distinct from the collection of particular

qualities. The idea of Substance as well as that

of Mode is nothing but a collection of simple ideas

that are united by the imagination, and have a

particular name assigned to them, by which we are

able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that

collection." Commonly indeed, but by a"

fiction,"

"

the particular qualities are referred to an unknown

something in which they are supposed to inhere."

Thus, whereas Locke had maintained that we

could not in reason deny substance, though weknew no more about it than that it was a something

in which attributes inhered as in their subject,

Hume goes beyond his predecessor and declares

that reason demands no such bond. He is content

with"perceptions,"

and their laws of association.

He is so little concerned with Locke s great questionabout perceptions, namely, the question of innate

ideas, that he dismisses the whole business with

a short reference to his own psychology ;it is a

mere matter of the difference between vivid and

18Treatise, Bk. I. Pt. IV. sects, iv. and vi.




faint states of consciousness.14 "

Understanding

by innate what is original or copied from no pre

cedent perception, we may assert that all our

impressions are innate, and all our ideas not innate."

Even admirers of Hume can hardly withhold their

confession that this treatment is too off-hand for so

serious a controversy. It is shallow, as is much

else in thesame

author. Histhoroughly perverted

notion of substance is only part of a perverse

system. The reason why Hume cares very little

for the word "innate "is obvious: for besides his

denial of efficient causality, he leaves no mind

wherein ideas may be innate : he has only ideas

themselves, and of course it is useless to inquire

whether these are innate in themselves. On this

point Mr. Huxley, who seems to take his author

so much more seriously than that author took

himself, gives us most apposite quotations:15 " What

we call the mind is nothing but a heap or collection

of different perceptions united together by certain

relations.""

The true idea of the human mind is

to consider it as a system of different perceptions,

or different existences which are linked together

by the relation of cause and effect,16 which mutually

produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other.

In this respect I cannot compare the soul more

properly to anything than to a republic or common-14

Inquiry, sect. ii. note at the end of the section; Treatise, Bk. I.

Pt. I. sect. i. in fine.

15Huxley s Hume, Pt. ii. c. ii. pp. 63, seq.

16 Of course on Hume s theory of causation, which excludes all

efficiency or genuine causality, yet uses the erms "

produce, destroy,

influence, modify."




wealth, in which the several members are united

by the reciprocal ties of government and subordina

tion, and give rise to other persons who propagate

the same republic in the incessant changes of its

parts."The members of a state are separate

substances, living on a substantial part of the globe,

and so they can manage to keep up their connexion :

but howHume

s unsubstantialperceptions

are to

hold together in orderly existence without a .sub

stantial mind, baffles all conception. The supposi

tion that they do so cohere, offers, as a basis for

psychology, a hypothesis on which no solid system

can possibly be built.

Hume s very words, and many of them, have

purposely been given because of the conviction that,

if seriously weighed, they will utterly discredit their

author. It is a fact that numbers of people go on

swallowing, as a child will swallow poison which is

sweetened over with sugar, the reiterated assertion

that Hume thoroughly unmasked the fiction of sub

stance, and proved it to be the idlest of scholastic

dreams, for which he substituted a thoroughly scien

tific conception. Whereas the fact is, that his theory

stands a very portent of unscientific construction for

any one who will examine the case by pulling to pieces

the ill-compacted monstrosity. Hume did not believe

in his own extravagances. Though he speaks of

sensations "as innate," and"rising originally in

the soul from unknown causes," yet when forced

to retreat from this position, he takes shelter under

the ordinary derivation of them, and declares that

"

an impression first strikes on the senses;

of it



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. tyj

there is a copy taken by the mind." What gives

the impression is"body," and in the reality of

"

body"

we have got to acquiesce, whatever specu-

latively may be our doubts. For 17"a man must

assent to the principle concerning the existence of

body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments

of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has

not left this to his choice, and has doubtlessesteemed it an affair of too great importance to be

trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations.

We may well ask what causes induce us to believe

in the existence of body : but tis vain to ask whether

there be body or not;

that is a point which we

must take for

granted

in all our reasonings." This

Body, if analyzed, will turn out to be material

Substance, and with regard to it Hume s instruction

to us is : If you believe what I have been pleased

to call my philosophy, you won t believe in body :

but the fact is you can t help believing in body, and

making it the very basis of your reasoning on cor

poreal things. Therefore, in practice, yield to the

superior force of nature over my philosophy : but

all the same respect my philosophy from grounds

of high speculation where practical impossibilities

may be disregarded.

We have now got a fairly adequate sketch of

Hume s vagaries on the question of substance ;

with the exception that we have not yet quoted

his admission that even on the principles of specula

tive philosophy there are substances, if calling sub

stance no longer a substratum, we define it as 18

17Treatise, k. I. Ft. IV. sect, i, Ibid. sect. v.




"something that can exist by itself." Because,

when the time comes, we shall make this our ownprimary idea of substance id quod per se stat

the declaration of Hume is important, and to some

extent we shall agree with our adversary; though

we shall have to disagree with his application of

the definition which leads to the result that"

every

perception is a substance, and every distinct part

of a perception is a distinct substance."

To the point raised here we shall recur later;

at present we will only recapitulate the whole of

Hume s most objectionable doctrine in a very few

words from Ueberweg :

19 " We have no clear ideas

of anything but impressions : a substance is some

thing quite different from an impression : hence we

have no knowledge of substance. Inherence (in

hesion) in something is regarded as necessary for

the existence of our perceptions; but in reality

they need no substrate. The questions whether

perceptions inhere in a material or in an immaterial

substance cannot be answered ; neither has it any

intelligible meaning."It is the acceptance of this

doctrine by so many of the philosophers in England

that is a disgrace to the sound sense of the nation.

The theory would not be received if its real nature

were better understood;

and therefore so many

pages have been expendedin its

statement.Having traced an error from Locke to Hume, we

will add a few words about its recent champions. As

on 3 of the chief propagators of Hume s bad philo

sophy in our own generation stands Mill. Not quite

*History of Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 524. (English translation.)




unwaveringly, but characteristically, he is an idealist

with regard to matter, and assigns to it no knownreality outside the senses.

20 "

Matter may be denned

as a permanent possibility of sensation. If I am

asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether

the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he

does, I believe in matter, and so do all Berkeleians;

in any other sense I do not." So much for his

profession of belief as to matter;mind he reduces

similarly to actual and possible states of conscious

ness, with the important addition, that between

these there must be some real, though undescribable

bond, a bond not required for the connexion of

material objects.21 " The theory which resolves

mind into a series of feelings, with a background

of possibilities of feeling, can effectually withstand

the most invidious of the arguments directed against

it. The remembrance of a sensation, even if it be

not referred to any particular state, involves the

suggestion and belief that a sensation, of which it

is a copy, actually existed in the past ; and an

expectation involves the belief, more or less positive,

that a sensation, or other feeling to which it directly

refers, will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena involved in these two states of consciousness

be adequately expressed, without saying that the

belief

theyinclude

is,

that I

myself formerly had,or that I myself shall hereafter have, the sensations

remembered or expected. If, therefore, we speak

of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged

to complete the statement by calling it a series of

? Examination, c. xi. p. 198. (2nd Edit.)21 Ibid. c. xii. pp. 211, 313



24o TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

feelings aware of itself as past and present, and we

are reduced to the alternative of believing that the

mind, or Ego, is something different from the series

of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting

the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi, is

but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a

series." So deep-seated is Mill s horror of substance

that he prefers to take up the paradox, which he

calls,"

an ultimate inexplicability," such as in last

analyses, he says, we must come across because we

can explain no further. The same is Mr. Spencer s

plea for calling all ultimate scientific ideas"

incon

ceivable," or"

unknowable"

: to" know

"

is"

to

comprehend," that is, to rank under some more

ultimate idea ; but ultimate notions themselves

cannot be ranked under more ultimate; they must

be accepted with a vague consciousness, but they

cannot be known. Mill, therefore, summons up

his resolution to make an act of faith"

that some

thing which has ceased, or is not yet in existence,

canstill

be in a manner present ; that a series of

feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past

or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single

present conception accompanied by a belief of

reality." Truly this is"

a paradox"

on Mill s

principles, and may well require the qualifications"

in a manner," and "

as it were," or some other

saving clause to help it out.

In a later edition22

Mill was driven to make

more explicit acknowledgment of the real bond

that is requisite to unite together the several states

22Appendix, p. 256



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT 241

of consciousness." The inexplicable tie or law, the

organic union which connects the present conscious

ness with the past one, of which it reminds me,

is as near, I think, as we can get to a positive con

ception of self. That there is something real in this

tie, real as the sensations themselves, and not a mere

product of the laws of thought, without any fact corres

ponding to it, I hold to be indubitable. Whetherwe are directly conscious of it in the act of remem

brance, as we are of succession in the fact of having

successive sensations, or whether, according to the

opinion of Kant, we are not conscious of self at all,

but are compelled to assume it as a necessary

condition of

memory,I do not undertake to decide.

But this original element which has no community

of nature with any of the things answering to our

names, and to which we cannot give any name but

its own peculiar one without implying some false

or ungrounded theory, is the Ego, or self. As such

I ascribe a reality to the Ego to my own mind

different from that real existence as a permanent

possibility, which is the only reality I acknowledge

in matter."

It would not be easy to declare exactly what

was the view either of Hume or of Mill; for they

both labour under a certain degree of inevitable

obscurity ; but at any rate the tendency of their

teaching has been sufficiently indicated, and we

shall possess a fairly clear idea what it is that we

have to refer when we seek to establish contro

versially our knowledge of substance. Mill might

suffice as the exponent of Humism in the nineteenth

Q



42 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING

century ;but his great ally, Mr. Bain, may usefully

be quoted, because some of his utterances will

discover to us still more fully the enemy s position,

before we make our onset.23 "

Substance is not

the antithesis of all the attributes, but the antithesis

of the fundamental, essential, or defining attributes,

and such as are variable or inconstant.24 From the

relative character of the word attribute, the fancy

grew up that there must be a substratum, or some

thing different from attributes, for all attributes to

inhere in. Now as anything that can impress the

human mind Extension, Resistance, &c. may be

and is termed an attribute, we seem driven entirely

out of reality if we find a something that could not

be called an attribute, and might stand as a substance. Substance is not the absence of all attri

butes, but the most fundamental, persisting, in

erasable or essential attribute or attributes in each

case. The substance of gold is its high density,

colour, lustre everything that we consider necessary

to its

being gold.Withdraw

these,and

golditself

would no longer exist;

substance and everything

else would disappear." Mr. Bain is not wholly

wrong in some of these assertions;

for it is true

that, in the wide sense of attribute, we can put

almost anything into the shape of an attribute,25

saying even that it is the attribute of a certain

83Logic, Vol. I. Appendix C. n. vii. p. 262.

84 Mill says the same thing, Examination, c. xiii. p. 219.25

Spinoza s definition is calculated to identify attribute with

substance." Per attribvitura intelligo id quod intellectus de sub-

stantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens." (Ethic

definit 4.) He thus distinguishes an attribute from a mode.



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT 243

object to be a substance;

for we can predicate of

it that it is a substance. But while we can go with

him a certain way, he makes it clear to us that we

cannot go with him the whole length of his doctrine.

For after telling us that the substance of matter is

inertia or resistance, he declares that the substance

of mind is feeling, will, and thought ;and that

"

the

supposition of an Ego, or self, for the powers toinhere in, is a pure fiction, coined from non-entity

by the illusion of supposing, that because attribute

applies to something, there must be something

which cannot be described as an attribute." Finally,

in Mind Mr. Bain has declared that to him"

the

word substance has no meaning." He cannot

therefore allow that behind phenomena"

there is

anything to scrutinize;

"

and he is confident that

"certainlyin respect to matter we seem to know

all that is to be known, as far as regards ultimate

properties," and that "if there be anything beneath

all this which a grudging power hides from us, we

need say nothing about it : to us the curtain is the

picture."So we are to give up hankering after

a revelation of"

an unknown and unknowable sub

stratum," because this is "an idea we cannot possibly

obtain by experience."26

Our English philosophers in their denial of sub

stance have a following in France, where M. Taine 27

declares his opinion that"

there is neither spirit nor

matter, but only groups of movements actual and

possible, and groups of thoughts actual and possible ;

86Logic, Vol. I. Introduction, n 10

27l*e Positivisme A

tight is,p. ii^.




there are no substances, but only systems of facts, . . .

substance and force being relics of scholastic en

tities : there exist only facts and their laws, events

and their relations." The only legitimate sense

which he allows to substance is that"

substance is

the whole of which the qualities are the constituent

parts,"or "the different points of view," taken

singly and by abstraction from the rest.

The empirical school, in their denial of sub

stance, were opposed by Hamilton and his school;

but he rests his cause on his very awkward law of

the Conditioned, which is so often dragged in to

decide a controversy. By this law we are supposed

to be forced to pass beyond the phenomenal to the

noumenal.28 "

Take substance. I am aware of a

phenomenon a phenomenon be it of mind or of

matter; that is, I am aware of a certain relative,

consequently conditioned, existence. This existence

is only known, and only knowable, as in relation.

Mind and matter exist for us only as they are known

for us:

and they are known only as they have certain

qualities relative to certain faculties of knowledge in

us, and we certain faculties of knowledge relative to

certain qualities in them. All our knowledge of

mind and matter is thus relative, that is, con

ditioned." But we cannot think mind or matter

as only thus conditioned, but "are compelled by a

necessity of nature to think that out of this rela

tivity it has an absolute or irrelative existence

i.e., an existence as absolute or irrelative, unknown

and incomprehensible ;that it is the known phe-

28Reid s Works, p. 935.




nomenon of an unknown substance." It is very

troublesome to have to believe an object which wedeclare unknown : and therefore we will try to give

an account of substance which shall make it the

known object of our conceptions as well as of our

belief. We will endeavour to show that it is a

notion quite intelligible in itself, to which reality

answers on the side of theobject,

and which is

derived from the most ordinary use of our under

standing.

(3) The work now before us, which is not a

slight one, is gradually to disengage the essential

idea of substance, and to show that this idea repre

sents something real.

(a) Roughly it is said that substance is what

exists by itself, and does not inhere in another : but

this declaration is open to misconstruction until it is

more precisely limited. For a spoon inserted into

some preserves is a substance, though it inheres in

something else. Upon this earth of ours, where

nothing seems to stand by itself, but everything is

supported by some other objects, we need a more

accurate determination of substance than simply to

say, it is that which exists of itself without being

sustained by another. Not only may substance rest

on substance, but the schoolmen speak of substantial

forms, which are obviously not accidents, yet whichinhere in matter, as, for instance, man s soul in his

body ;and they speak also of substantial forms still

more dependent on matter, so that they could not

exist alone, as does man s soul after death.

To put before ourselves a clear notion of the




mode of inherence which distinguishes an accident,

we had better select a class of real accidents about

which there can be no dispute. A man may dispute

whether his faculties are really distinct from his

soul : but that the acts of these faculties, his thoughts

and volitions, are in some real sense distinct from

his soul is a truth which St. Thomas says no sane

person can dispute.29

Ideas and wishes come and

go : they so depart as to leave habits formed,

and memories of themselves afterwards recallable :

they are joined to a continuous consciousness in

the unity of the Ego, or I;the successive states

are real, and the mind to which they belong is

real, and the contrast between the two gives, on

reflexion, the two different notions of substance

and accident. It is irrational, after the teaching

of Hume, to regard each perception" or mental

phenomenon as a distinct substance, and it is

equally irrational to regard it as an activity or

state belonging to no substance. Wandering thoughts

we may have in one meaning of the phrase, butit is nonsense to talk of thoughts existing apart

from a thinking substance, or, as Mill puts it,

"

a

series of states aware of itself as a series." This

will appear more clearly when we declare what we

mean by substance. The like contrast between

substance and accidents is shown indisputably be

tween an organism and its sensations, a projectile

and its velocity, a carriage and its motion. No one

can intelligibly maintain that sensation, velocity,

and motion are realities of no sort, or that they are

29Quasi. Disp. de Spirit, a. xi. ad i.




realities not inherent in substance, or that they are

realitiesquite

identified with thereality

of their

substance as such. The examples chosen have all

been of the more incontrovertible order : for whether

there exist those more than mere modal accidents,

as they are sometimes called, that is, quantity and

qualities which most theologians suppose to be

proved capable of a separate existence by the

mystery of the sacramental species in the Holy

Eucharist, this is a question which we n.ay leave

to Theology, for it is chiefly thence that the philo

sophic theory has been derived. But in the case

of thoughts, volitions, and motions we have manifest

instances of what we mean by real accidents : for

these even by Divine power could not exist at all

unless they had a subject of inhesion. On the other

hand, no substance rests upon another as in a subject

of inhesion : the substance exists per se, and the best

way to fix in the mind the distinction between the

two modes of existence is steadily to contemplate

the case of mind with its thoughts and volitions, orof body with its movements at different velocities.

"

Substance is Being inasmuch as this Being is by

itself; accident is that whose Being is to be in

something else (tanquam cujus esse est inesse)." Such

is the definition of St. Thomas formed in accord

ance with the method of discrimination above

explained.30

As repetition in these matters is useful, the

account already given shall be given again in the

30 " Substantia est ens tanquam per se habens esse: accidens

vero tanquam cujus esse est inesse (De Potentia, a. vii.)




words of a scholastic writer who is not at all

inclined to exceed in his scholasticism.

"

As soonas we

begin," says Tongiorgi,31 "

to reflect upon our

experience, whether inner or outer, we obtain the

notion of substance and accident, even though the

philosophic names be unknown to us. For in truth

so many changes, and such constant succession in

things, straightway

show us that there must be

something which is recipient of these which gains

and loses them which is their subject. For ex

ample, the wax which I handle is now warm, now

cold;

first hard, then soft, and finally liquid ; by

the pressure of the fingers it acquires first one shape,

and afterwards another : yet throughout it is the

same piece of wax. There is, therefore, a subject

permanent under the successive changes : it is one

while they are many; it can be without any par

ticular set of them, they cannot be without it, for

they are precisely its modifications. Similarly as

regards the experience of our inner consciousness :

amid the multitude, variety, and succession of the

ways in which we are consciously affected, we per

ceive something which is one, the same, and con

stant, namely, that which is the subject of the

different states, and which experiences them as its

own. Thus experience, outer as well as inner,

furnishes us the idea of something which is per se

and of something which is in altero ; the former is

substance, the latter accident. And between these

two conditions of Being there is no medium : there

is no Being which does not belong to the one or the

Ontologia, Lib. II. c. i. art. i.




othercategory."

Hence substance is said to be

id

quod est,while acciJent is said to be id

quoest:

substance is that which is : accident is that whereby

substance is modified. Of the two orders of ex

perience, internal and external, the former is the

most telling : the merest rustic is convinced that he

has some permanent self, which undergoes the real

vicissitudes of joy and sadness, of love and hatred,

of heat and cold, of hunger and satisfied appetite.

The unity is necessary for the comparison, and the

variety of conscious affections is necessary to furnish

the materials of comparison.

When, therefore, it is said that analysis or re

flexion is necessary to draw out from experience the

distinction between substance and accident, it need

not be strictly a philosophic process : common sense

is adequate to the task, though philosophy may do

it more perfectly. Reid 3Z introduces an unnecessary

mystery into the grounds for the judgment that

qualities imply a subject ;whereas it is an obvious

interpretation of facts, when we assert substancesand accidents, and declare the latter to depend for

their existence upon the former, or to be inherent in

their respective subjects. We maintain the dis

tinction to be given by a most rational analysis of

experience, within the competence of any fairly

educated man : whereas Reid attributes it to un

accountable"

suggestion,"or to

"

an inference"

which we cannot logically defend."

If any man

should demand proof that sensation cannot be with-

32Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. c. xix. See too his complaint about

the relativity of our knowledge of body. (Active Powers, Essay i. c. i.)




out a mind or sentient Being, I confess that I can

give none;

and that to pretend to prove it seems to

me almost as absurd as to deny it."

33 Then he

falls back as usual on the mysterious process of

nature which no man can account for :

34 "

Leaving

Hume s philosophy to those who have occasion for

it, and can use it discreetly as a chamber exercise,

wemay

still

inquire

how the rest of mankind, and

even the adepts themselves, except in some solitary

moments, have got so strong and irresistible a belief,

that thought must have a subject, and be the act of

some thinking Being : how every man believes him

self to be something distinct from his ideas and

impressions something which continues the same

identical self when all his ideas and impressions are

changed. It is impossible to trace the origin of this

opinion in history, for all languages have it inter

woven in their original construction. All nations

have always believed it. The constitution of all

laws and governments, as well as all common trans

actions of life, suppose it. It is no less impossible

for any man to recollect when he himself came by

this notion; for, as far back as we can remember,

we were already in possession of it, and as fully

persuaded of our own existence, and the existence

of other things, as that one and one make two. It

seems, therefore, that this opinion precededall

reason, and experience, and instruction : and this is

the more probable because we could not get it by

any of these means. ... By what rules of logic we

33 Reid s Works, p. 108.

84 Idem. p. no. See too what is said of"

suggestion," pp. in, 122.



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. tfi

make the inference it is impossible to show; nay, it

is

impossibleto show how our sensations and

thoughts can give us the very notion either of a

mind or of afaculty."

Reid s mystery is merely

the mystery, how there can be such a thing as

reason at all;

but if we take the fact on the

abundantly sufficient evidence which comes before

the consciously active reason that is within us, all will

go well. We must reach an end of explanations

somewhere, and if that before which we are brought

to a standstill is self-evident truth, there is no room

for decent complaint; it is not as though we stopped

short at Mr. Spencer s"

inconceivable ultimates."

The analysis by the reflecting mind of its own expe

rience into acts or phenomena which are transient,

and into subjects of such acts or phenomena, giving

to them their connexion, rests ultimately on intui

tively evident data. Therefore it is a rational

process with which we ought to rest content. Wehave already in part described the process : but

more remains to be done before we have adequatelyestablished the idea of substance.

(b) It is necessary to explain more fully what is

meant by existing per se, and what by existing in olio.

There is a sense in which God alone exists per se,

that is, independently of all else;and there is a

sense in which every created substance exists in alio,

for in God "we live, move, and have ourbeing."

Not only did God create all finite things, but He is

omnipresent to them, and ever conserves them in

existence, or else they would be annihilated."

For

how could anything endure if Thou wouldst not ? or




be preserved if not called by Thee?"85

By agree

ment, then, the schoolmen have settled that they

will not mean by per se the self-existence which is

proper to God alone. To mark the distinction,

St. Thomas even rejects, with an explanation, the

definition of substance, which under another ex

planation might be accepted." The definition of

substance," he writes,

80 "

is

not Being perse

withouta subject" (ens per se sinesubjecto). At first sight the

words appear to deny what we want to prove,

namely, that to be per se is just what we ought to

mean by substance. But the- divergence simply

turns on a double use of Being, either for existence

or for the thing or quiddity which may exist : St.

Thomas is speaking of the former, we are keeping

our original engagement to abide by the latter. He

says that absolutely to exist per se is peculiar to the

Divine substance ;but that hypothetically, if a created

substance exist, it will exist per se (quidditati seu

essenticz substantive competit habere esse non in subjecto).

On a like supposition St. Thomas, in another place,37

defines substance as"

a thing to the nature of which

it is due that it should not exist in a subject"

(res

cujus natures debetur non esse in alio). The schoolmen,

in order to leave per se applicable to both uncreated

and created substance, have chosen a se to signify

the special character of the former. When they

affirm that some created things must exist per se,

they do not deny that these things are from God,

but they assert that the created world is not a mere

* Wisdom xi. 26.3(J Sum. iii. q. Ixxvii. a. i. ad 2.

37Quodlibet, ix. a. v. ad 2.




series of accidents, one inherent within another,

and the whole either left withoutany subject

or assignable to God as a subject. Such a series,

whether it is regarded as finite or infinite, and

such an inherence of all creatures in God as their

substance, both involve impossibilities. Therefore

our conclusion is that there are created substances,

which in their own order are ultimate subjects, and

do not inhere in other subjects : so far they exist

per se. They are the entia, while their accidents

stand in regard to them as entia entium. The

doctrine is as old as Aristotle, who teaches that

substance is"

primarily and simply Being"

(TO

?r/)&)Tft)9 ov, /cal aTrXw? ov),38 while accidents are

"not simply Being" (ovS* ovra, &>? a-TrXak etVe^).39

St. Thomas repeats the same doctrine. Even Hume,

in a passage already quoted, says that he admits

the reality of substances in the sense, of things that

exist by themselves : his error is to declare"

per

ceptions"

to be substances of this kind. Accord

ingly we are safe in our definition and in our

understanding of it : substance is that which exists

per se, or which has its own proper Being (id cui

ratione sui convenit esse, cui competit esse non in alio) ;

and thus it is opposed to accident, which exists

in alio, or which at least naturally, whatever may

happen preternaturally,

has its

Being only byinherence in a subject.

(c) It will give us the key to a host of difficulties

if we hold firmly to this as the most radical defi

nition of substance. According to it we see that

38Metaphys. Lib. VII. c. i.

3SIbid. Lib. XII. c. i.




God is a substance, though He has no accidents,

and does not present within Himself the double fact

of a permanent essence, modified by perpetual

changes of state. Etymologically indeed substance

suggests substare accidentibus,"

to underlie acci

dents :

"

but many a word, when applied to God,

has to give up its etymological meaning, which even

as applied to creatures often presents a superficial

aspect rather than an essential nature. Now the

chief attack on substance is made precisely on this

misconception, that the inmost essence of the notion

is a substratum, hidden away under qualities really

distinct from itself, a fixed, unchangeable thing

clothed in attributes, some variable, some constant,but all, as was just said, really distinct. Such is

the interpretation of the scholastic theory by most

opponents : while the schoolmen themselves have

held up existence per se as the fundamental notion

of substance. For, first, it is clear that they could

apply

no other definition to God, whomthey

never

regarded as a compound Being, with attributes

that were"

accidental." Moreover, even with re

gard to created substance, they were aware of

the enormous philosophic difficulty in the proof of

what are sometimes called"

absolute accidents

that are more than merely modal," for the demon

stration of which they relied not on mere arguments

from reason, but upon consequences which they

thought to be involved in the Church s doctrine

about the Holy Eucharist. Notwithstanding which

dogma, they had among their numbers those who

taught that the substance of the soul was the




immediate agent in thought and volition, and did not

act through the medium of really distinct faculties.

In support of this historic assertion about the

schoolmen, take the words of an author writing in

the thirteenth century, Henry of Ghent: 40"The

substance of the soul, which is really one thing,

nevertheless according to its different determinations

is said to have different faculties of intellect and

sense : but radically its faculties are nothing but its

simple substance, the diversity of powers adding

nothing over and above its essence, except a reference

to the diversity of its activities according as their

objects vary."Duns Scotus was another who

taught that the substance of the soul was the im

mediate agent in its activities, without the inter

position of really distinct faculties;and he, being

the head of a school, had many followers. These

words are his :

41 " The substance of the soul is

really identical with its faculties;so that while in

relation to body the soul is its substantial form, it

takes the name of different faculties according to its

different operations. Thus the soul is the eliciting

principle and the recipient of its own acts, as appears

in the act of intelligence : by its own substance it is

at once the efficient cause and the subject, not by

any faculty which is really distinct." What is here

taughtin

regardto the soul was

taughtalso in

regard to material agencies : and Suarez, if not an

40 See the account of Henry of Ghent in Stockl s Geschichte tier

Philosophic, Band II. 204.41

Ib. 225. Sec also a list of authors quoted by Hamilton,

Lect. xx. pp. 5, 6.




advocate of the opinion, is at least a witness as to its

probability on mere philosophic grounds.42

He says :

"

St. Thomas, with a sufficient amount of proof

(satis probabiliter) establishes, that in every created

nature the immediate principle of action is distinct

from the substance, and is, therefore, an accident.

To assign a reason for this a priori is difficult,

thoughSt. Thomas

givesseveral

probable arguments, which Scotus and others impugn, while

Capreolus and Cajetan offer a vigorous and wide-

ranging defence. But I think the efforts of these

two latter writers unavailing, because in truth

their reasons are not conclusive, nor ought a wise

philosopher, in a question so recondite, to look

for demonstration.43 For unless it can be shown

to be above the degree of perfection possible to a

created substance to be the immediate and single

principle of an act which is in the order of

accidents, we can assign no a priori reason whyour present created agencies should always stand

in need of an accidental principle whereby to act.

That a creature should act proximately and solely

by its own substance does not seem to require an

infinite perfection in the order of substances;and

only infinite perfection seems to be incommunicable

to creatures."44

42Metaphys. Disp. xviii. sect. iii.

43Lepidi says :

" In this question it seems that nothing can be

said for certain." (Ontologia, Lib. III. c. vi. n. vii.)

44 Of the various views on this point St. Bonaventure says :

11

Quaelibet opinio suos habet defensores: nee est facile rationibus

cogentibus earum aliquara improbare." (In Lib. II. Distinc. xxiv.

p.i. a. ii. q. i.)




The purport of these quotations must not be mis

conceived:

we have not got to settle the question ofthe real difference between substance and the most

absolute of the"

absolute"

accidents, but we have

got to refute a common error. That error is that the

scholastic notion of substance stands or falls with

the truth of the supposed substratum, upon which

are engrafted qualities or activities really distinct

from it, and manifesting themselves to us as the

only objects of our immediate experience. Against

this theory we are showing that the essential notion

of substance is, not that it is such a substratum, but

that it is a Being existing per se : and that so far as

substance is a substratum, the one class of accidents

which are philosophically demonstrable beyond all

controversy are modal accidents, such as thought,

volition, and motion. Let us see what is meant in

the words of a non-scholastic author : Mr. M Cosh s

opinion suffices for substance and for the substratum

so far as the authors above quoted undertake fully

to prove it apart from theological considerations:

"I do not standup,"

he says, "for an unknown

substratum, beneath the known thing; whatever

is known as existing, as acting, as having per

manence, I regard as substance." So much reason

can establish, putting it beyond a doubt that

eachdistinct

agentis a substance

;but for the

downright proof that there are accidents of quan

tity and quality which by Divine power might

be made to go on existing and acting when their

substance was no more, the schoolmen rested

on their interpretation of the real species in

R




the Blessed Sacrament. This assertion, perhaps,

will sound suspicious without witnesses, but wit

nesses we have in abundance. Among recent

authors Dr. Dupont testifies that not philosophy,

but theology, gave rise to the question of accidents

which are more than merely modal.45 Father

Mendive 46puts down the proposition not as indis

putably true, but as more probable, and his chief

arguments are from the Holy Eucharist and from

the condition of grace as an accident in the soul;

and Lepidi47

declares that we owe our knowledge on

the matter, not simply to the light of reason, but to

an inference from revealed doctrine. Nor are these

declarations

unsupported bywhat we

actuallyfind

in the writings of the old schoolmen, as will appear

if we return to the passage in Suarez, which we

were lately considering. Having said that the

arguments of St. Thomas to prove a priori the

real distinction of the active powers of a created

object from its substance are not demonstrative, he

adds that the a posteriori or inductive arguments are

better and lead probabiliter satis to a conclusion; but

that the convincing proof is borrowed from the

mystery of the Holy Eucharist. We are, then,

amply warranted in our assertion that among the

schoolmen, the essential idea of substance is inde

pendent of the controversy about a really distinct

substratum; and that, therefore, the brunt of the

enemy s attack on the notion is directed against a

mere outwork, the capture of which would leave

**Qntologic, These 48, p. 174.

MOntologia, pp. 145 151,

47Ontologia, pp. 184, 183.




the citadel safe as ever. He who is vaunted as the

great victor over the old idea substance, Hume, is

its champion in so far as he says that he believes in

the existence of substance as in that which exists by

itself.

Whether what exists by itself will be permanent

or not is a distinct question : it is possible for a

created substance to be annihilated, though we are

not aware of a complete instance in point : but at

any rate, permanence is not of the essence of sub

stance, any more than the non-permanence or

succession of accidents is of their essence : Kant,

therefore, and Green, are wrong in the leading

position which they assign to permanence.48 A

substance would have been a substance, though

its duration had been but for a moment.

(d) After having laboriously extracted from con

flicting views the essential signification of the word,

we can, if we hold by the true principles of human

knowledge, assert that substance is a reality known

to us beyond the shadow of a doubt. We mayresolutely refuse the fetters offered to us by Mr.

Huxley, when he propounds the doctrine that,"

whether mind or matter has a substance or not,

we are incompetent to discuss." We certainly

know, besides God, a real world which cannot all

be madeup

ofmutually

inherent accidents : there

is in creation real Being, and the reality of Being

implies substance, as Aristotle in the name of sound

sense proclaimed :

"

It is clear that of the various

48Critique of Pure Reason. Vol. II.

pp. 130, 160. (Max Miiller i

Translation.)




kinds of Being the fundamental is that which

answers to the question, What is it ? and this

signifies its essence or substance" He adds that

always to inquire what a thing is, means to inquire

what its substance is. Substance he properly looks

upon as a real thing, not as a grammatical term

meaning the same as subject in regard to predicate,

or substantive in

regardto

adjective.He does indeed

remark, of course without reference to mysteries like

the Trinity and the Incarnation, that what he calls

the"

first substance"

as distinguished from the

"

second substance," or a substance in the concrete

and singular as distinguished from substance in the

abstract and universal, cannot be the predicate of

anything else."

Socrates," for example, cannot be

a predicate except to a synonym ;but this observa

tion is not all one with saying that substance means

only grammatical subject in a sentence. Moreover,

the reality of substance becomes certain to us, not

only as regards the conscious self of each one of us,

but also as regards other objects, whether personal

or impersonal. We reject, therefore, as quite unphilo-

sophical the limitation put by Mansel,50that

"

beyond

the range of conscious being we can have only a

negative idea of substance," and that"

in denying

consciousness we deny"

the only form in which

49tyavepbv #TI TOVTWV irpwrliv fiv, rb ri fffTiv, onep ffrjfJLaivfi TT\V

ovffiav. (Metaphys. Lib. VII. c.i.)

Aristotle says that " second sub

stances," that is, genera and species," are not in a subject, but are

affirmed of a subject," whereas "first substances," that is, indi

vidual substances in the concrete, neither are in, nor are aGrmed

of, asubject." (Categor. c.

vi.)

*Prolegom. Log.

c. v. pp. 131, 133,



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. a6i

unity and substance have been presented to us,"

while between unconsciousthings

" some kind of

unity may exist, or it may not,"but at any rate,

we cannot come to the knowledge of it.

In the end, then, we are in this position. The

adversary thought to stop our assertion of substance

by arguing that it is idle to affirm the existence of

a mere mysterious, unknown something, which is

distinct from all that manifests itself in experience.

We elude the attempt so to baffle us partly by

making substance independent of the question about

a distinct substratum, and partly by showing that

at least there are real accidents of the merely modal

order which are distinct from their subject. With

the exception that he says more of Locke than is

unqualifiedly true, Rosmini gives a fair compendium

of our doctrine :

61 "

In my opinion, substance was

denied by Locke through a pure misconception, he

imagining that more is required than is really the

case. In fact, to have the idea of substance it is

enough to know that there can be no modificationwithout a subject modified. Now the idea of this

subject is the idea of substance. But you may tell

me, you do not know what the subject is : nay,

further, that you cannot know it, for to you it is

essentially an x. Still you know that it is the subject

of such and such modifications, the cause of such

and such effects, and what do you want more ? It

is true that if you strip this subject of its modifica

tions, of its properties, of its effects, you have only

81 The Origin of Ideas, Vol. I. sect. iii. c. ii. a. i. p. 37, in a foot

note. (English Translation.)




the x remaining ;but even then you will still have

the idea of it,

youknow the relation which this x

has with its perceived modifications. Such is the

knowledge we have of substance considered in

the abstract;nor have we a right to require more,

since there is enough in that knowledge to give us

the idea inquestion."

The mention in this extract of"

stripping the

subject of its modifications"

introduces a point

yet to be explained as regards the reality of sub

stance : for it is precisely the taunt which the school

of Hume makes against us, that we know nothing

but the modifications, and that if we take them

away there is a blank left : if we remove all the

attributes of a thing, then nothing is left. Wemust distinguish between attributes and attributes,

and between removal and removal. Attributes

strictly so called are the accidental modes of a sub

stance, attributes in the wider sense include the

substantial characters themselves, as when we say

it is man s attribute to have a rational soul, or anature compounded of body and soul, and when

we say that it is God s attribute to be an infinite,

self-existent Being. Now it would surely be a mere

sophism to play upon the uncertain use of a word,

and because attribute in its larger meaning includes

subtance,to

pretendthat there is no difference

between substance and attribute in its narrower

meaning. So much as to the two sorts of attributes :

next as to the removal from substance of attributes

strictly so called;for only with respect to them has

the question any meaning. The removal may be




physical and it may be metaphysical or logical.

Logically, or by mere mental abstraction, it is

clear that we can remove the attributes and still

have the concept of substance remaining. What

must be confessed, however, is that this concept

may be only very generic, such as substance,

without further determination, material substance,

living substance, &c. For as we declared in the

chapter on Essences, our knowledge of them is

often very imperfect and generic : so that we

specify them, not by genuine specific differences,

but by accidental differences, which suffice to mark

off one kind of thing from another, without pre

cisely indicating wherein the difference of kind

consists. If, however, we take up the consideration of a physical removal, we find that some

accidents can be removed and leave the substance

intact, as when a ball loses its velocity, or a coal its

heat, or a mind its thought. Created means suffice

to bring about these removals;

but how much

further Divine

powercould

goon

stripping

off

accidents while the substance endured, we must

not pretend to determine. Those who are fond of

conjectures might conjecture, though they could

not prove the parity of the two cases, that as in

the Blessed Sacrament God leaves the accidents of

bread without their substance, so He might leave

the substance without any of its accidents. Some

accidents at any rate He does remove in a way

impossible to nature : for example, the quantity of

Christ s Body is left without its connatural extension

in space : the Sacred Body is just where the small,




round Host is, but it does not become correspond

ingly round and small.

If, however, on matters like these we are power

less to answer the difficulties of objectors, they are

equally powerless to make their difficulties effective

against anything that we positively hold. They are

ignorant, and so are we, in many things; but

neither their nor ourignorance

is a reason for

renouncing the little knowledge that we can attain.

We must not be thought to have conceded more

than in fact we have. When we allowed that created

faculties of action may, perhaps, be not really

distinct from the substance under its dynamic

aspect, we were not allowing that substance may,

perhaps, be reduced to a continuous series of

activities : that would be more like Plume s view,

or Lotze s, who says,52 "

Every soul is what it shows

itself to be, a unity whose life is in definite ideas,

feelings, and efforts." The faculties may be not

really distinct from the substance : they may be the

substance itself under the aspects of its various

activities; but at any rate a substance there is, and

in it the faculties are united, and we have not got

mere unsubstantial activities by themselves. If by

activities some authors mean substance having these

activities, then they are on our side.

After all that has been argued it is needlessto enter into a special polemic against Kant s

theory that substance is not a real object of

knowledge, but a category of the understanding

according to which we are obliged to think the

52Metaphys. Bk. III. c. i. 245.




objects of our experience, without being sure that

things in themselves are substances. It is the

perversion of all right reason thus to turn our

most evident objective conceptions into mere con

ditions of conceiving, and Kant himself is not

always faithful to his extravagant resolution, to

call insight into objective truth a mere form in

which mind must act by reason of its subjective

nature. Here is our great divergence from him :

We hold that when we have before the mind the

idea "substance," derived in the manner already ex

plained, then to call such an idea a rule of our think

ing, and an a priori form which, so far as we can

ascertain, is without any counterpart in the region

of objects, means simply to abdicate the empire of

reason. For of nothing are we more convincingly

assured than that such ideas are ideas, and therefore

must represent to us some object; so that to degrade

them to mere subjective rules would be equivalently

to renounce all objectivity. The further urging of

this

pointwould

requirethe

repetition

of

nearly

all

that is laid down in First Principles ; so we forbear

to say more.

As we conclude this account of Substance we

can hardly fail to remark how vague is the attack

of the adversaries on the point, how little they have

of definite in their theory of substance except that

it is an unknown substratum, something other than

anything we come across in our experience of things,

something which is the antithesis of all that we can

predicate of known phenomena, and which therefore

it is a contradiction in terms to pretend to know.




Whereas we have seen that the primal notion of

substance is Being, which exists per se, in contradistinction to such realities as the figure or the

velocity of a body, which clearly cannot exist per se.

Hume, the great leader of revolt against substance,

himself admits that we must affirm existences, per

se, and as such he defines his"perceptions." So

that while we teach that there is one substance of

mind in each man, with many accidental modes,

Hume teaches that there are as many distinct

substances as there are"

perceptions," the several

perceptions being bound together by some in

describable law of association which is not a sub

stance, and not an efficient causality, and not

anything to which we can give a name except that

of association. The unity of consciousness is

impossible on these terms;the creations and the

annihilations of substances, which must take place

while the perceptions come into being and cease

to be, are appalling; and the whole theory is

manifestly absurd. Still it is accepted as part of

modern wisdom, and like much more of modern

wisdom, it is accepted with no very precise in

telligence of what it means, or of what is the

doctrine for which it is the substitute. In the

name of right reason we adhere to the old idea of

substance, ens per se stans.

The idea thus vindicated will help to solve the

difficulty of those who allow that our means of

knowledge put us into some phenomenal relation

with things outside us, so that we can adapt our

selves to external conditions, but who doubt whether



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT 26?

we have herein any real insight into the things

themselves. If substance stands to its

phenomenalmanifestations in the way which we have partially

indicated, then since we cannot know the phenomena

without knowing something about outer reality,

there are no unreal phenomena, either on the

objective side or on the subjective side. Even

mental illusions, so far as they are acts of mind,

represent some objects, actual or. possible. The

one reality is not the mysterious substratum which

nobody comes across : whatever impresses us must

be real, as will appear more fully when in the next

chapter we explain the doctrine of efficient causality,

and as for the substratum, it is not the unapproach

able thing which some strangely imagine.

(4) The bulk of what we have to say about

accidents has already been said while we were

speaking of them in contrast to substance;but a

few details have to be added in order to give further

insight into the question. The schoolmen divide

accidents into differentorders,

andsome

keen con

troversy arises out of the undertaking. They

distinguish accidents into absolute and relative, as

will be seen by an inspection of the nine Aristotelian

categories which belong to accident. In the last

chapter we will give the main outlines of the

doctrine of relation. The great difficulty, however,

springs up when absolute accidents are divided, as

by Suarez,53

into those which are merely modal, so

that not even by miracle could they be preserved

apart from their substance, and those which by6>

Metaphys. Disp. vii. sect. i.




miracle can be so preserved. The latter are hard

not merely to imagine, but even intellectually to

conceive, nor would their existence be so con

fidently affirmed if it were not for the mystery of

the Holy Eucharist, which according to the more

commonly received doctrine, presents an instance

of quantity and qualities continuing to exist as

accidents when their substance is gone. The

question is, how to regard these so as not to make

of them at least imperfect substances ? For

accident is described not as an entity, but as the

entity of an entity; not as that which is, but as that

whereby a substance is in some way modified. St.

Thomas 54 makes a distinction, saying that while

"

accident neither has the character of an essence,

nor is a part of the essence as such," yet "justas

it is a Being secundum quid, or after a manner, so it

has an essence secundum quid, or after a manner."

This is easily illustrated as regards the merely

modal accidents;

for example, the velocity of a

bullet is certainly not identical with the substance

of bullet, and yet its reality is to this extent

identified with the bullet that it cannot be passed

on, as numerically, physically the same velocity, to

another bullet. The motion in the bullet may be

destroyed, to give rise to other motions in other

bodies,but there is

notransfer of one identical

motion. Now, if the merely modal accident has a

reality, though this cannot otherwise be described

than after the example just given, how do we know

that even a higher reality may not be possible to

64 De Ente et Essentia, c. vii.



SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. a6g

some accidents without taking away their character

of accidents ?

Certainlywe cannot demonstrate

the opposite ;and if the fact is proved by the

Blessed Sacrament on which point theologians are

not all agreed at least reason has nothing positive

to object.

Suarez is thought by many to have confused the

subject by denying to mere modal accidents even

such distinct reality as they have, and by giving to

the more than modal accidents a distinction from

their substance greater than they have. It is com

plained that he does not allow to the compound

being, which is made up of substance and more than

modal accident, its full unity of being; that he

asserts too much of an actual distinction betweensubstance and accident, while they are actually

united;and that hence he is obliged to bring in

his" modes of union

"

as third realities to unite

the other two. These are very subtle questions,

which it is suggestive to see stated, for they add to

the range of our ideas about substance and accident;

but we need not prolong the discussion of them

here. Even if they should leave in the mind a

sense of inability to come to a clear decision, they

would not therefore upset so much of well-

ascertained doctrine as we have previously estab

lished. That mind is very poorly educated which

cannot put up with unexplained residua at the end

of an inquiry which at least has explained part of

what was being investigated ;nor would a mystery,

like that of the Holy Eucharist, be a mystery, if it

were intelligible throughout. There is, then, no




need for going over to agnosticism, because we

cannot hunt some notions down to their deepest

recesses; just as there is no need to throw away

the microscope because it, too, has its limits. A real

distinction has been established between substance

and accident, and that is a very useful piece of

philosophic knowledge; perhaps, an unsolved diffi

culty has been encountered, and that alsois

a veryuseful piece of philosophic experience.


(i)Our English philosophers have so fixed on

Substance as a matter of discussion, and so perverted

the notion, that a little more about their doctrines maybe acceptable to readers who have an inquisitiveness

concerning the disputes which have gathered round

this important topic.

(a) James Mill regards substance as a mental fiction,

which we might go on multiplying for ever, asserting

subject after subject, inherence after inherence;and he

puts the whole down to his favourite process of asso

ciation, whereby he accounts for nearly everything. Byassociation every event calls up the idea of an ante

cedent or cause, whether this be conceived definitely or

only indefinitely, and in the most general terms. 1 " Of

this most remarkable case of association, that which we

call ourbelief

in external objects is one of the most remark

able instances. Of the sensations of sight, of handling,

of smell, of taste, which I have from a rose, each is an

event : with each of these events I associate the idea of

a constant antecedent, a cause." Thus the quality of

red is regarded as the cause of the sensation of red;the

1Analysis, c. xj.




qualities of coexistence and extension as the causes of

the sensations of touch;

thequalities

of odour and taste

as the causes of corresponding sensations. Here quality

always stands for an unknown cause or antecedent.

" Such is one part of the process. Another is that by

which the ideas of those sensations are so intimately

united as to appear, not several ideas, but one idea, the

idea of a rose. We have now two steps of association :

that of the several sensationsinto

one idea,and that of

the several sensations each with a separate cause. But

we do not stop here :

"

for theoretically we go on ever

supposing antecedents beyond antecedents, because w(

never can regard any antecedent as ultimate. Practically^

however, we do stop at the notion of a substratum.

" The ideas of a number of sensations, concomitant in

a certain way, are combined into a single idea, asthat

of a rose or an apple. The unity which is thus given

to the effect is, of course, transferred to the supposed

cause, called qualities : they are referred to a common

cause. To this supposed cause of supposed causes we

give a name substratum. It is obvious that there is no

reason for stopping at this substratum; for, as the sensation

suggested the quality, and the quality the substratum, sothe substratum as properly leads to another antecedent,

another substratum, and so on from substratum to substratum

without end. These inseparable associations, however,

rarely go on beyond a single step, hardly ever beyond

two."

This is known as " the regressive process," and is

a sore puzzle to puzzle-headed philosophers, but oneentirely of their own invention. On the rational expla

nation that there is one primal Substance, the creator

of secondary substances, and that substance in each

case is what exists per se, the difficulty quite vanishes.

It may look very terrible at first to hear that thc icrht




is within faculty, and faculty within mind, and mind

within the soul, and the soul within man, and humanitywithin substance; but some of these distinctions are

logical, not real, and even the logical distinctions must

come to an end when any further repetition of them

serves no rational purpose. Hence we listen unsympa

thetically to complaints like that of Green: 2"From

mind, as receptive of and operative about ideas, is

distinguished mind as the substance within us, of

which consciousness is an *

operation that it sometimes

exercises and sometimes does not : and from this think

ing substance again is distinguished the man who finds

it in himself,1

and carries it about with him in a coach

or on horseback, the person consisting of a soul and

body, who is prone to sleep, and in sound sleep is

unconscious."

(6)In his Logic, when he tries to keep clear of

metaphysical controversies, John S. Mill over and

above phenomena allows the knowable existence of the

noumenon, about which we can make a few predications.3

"

Sequences and coexistences are not only asserted

respecting phenomena; we may make propositions also

respecting those hidden causes of phenomena which are namedsubstances and attributes. A substance, however, being to

us nothing but either that which causes, or that which

is conscious of, phenomena ;and the same being true,

mutatis mutandis, of attributes;no assertion can be made,

at least with a meaning, concerning those unknown and

unknowable entities, except in virtue of the phenomena

by which alone they manifest themselves to our facul

ties. When we say Socrates was contemporary with

the Peloponnesian War, the foundation of this asser

tion, as of all assertions concerning substance, is an

assertion concerning the phenomena which they exhibit.

* Introduction to Hume, 131.* Bk. I. c. v. 5.




Still the propositiondoes not assert that alone : it asserts that

the thing initself,

the noumenon Socrates was existing, and

doing, or experiencingvarious facts during the same time.

Coexistence and sequence, therefore, may be affirmed and denied,

not only between phenomena, but between noumena, or between

a noumenon and phenomena. And both of noumena and

phenomena we may affirm simple existence. But what is a

noumenon ? An unknown cause. In affirming, there

fore, the existence of a noumenon, we affirm causation."

This knowledge of the unknown is a curious piece of

philosophy, which is not made less curious by the

assertion that whereas " of noumena we may affirm

simple existence," as also " coexistence and sequence,"

yet" existence has to us no meaning but one which has

relation to phenomena,"4 for "as we conceive it, it

is merely the power of producing phenomena." To

noumena he professes to be unable to apply the funda

mental principles of identity, contradiction, and ex

cluded middle: the reason being, that "we are entirely

ignorant"whether these "laws of thought are laws of

existence too." No wonder Mr. Mill is anxious to escape

from this perplexed state of things ;so that in his Logic

he claims a position of neutrality:5 " With the opinion

which denies noumena I have, as a metaphysician, no

quarrel : but whether it be true or false is irrelevant to

Logic :

"

in which sentence, it is fair to add, that he

is speaking of the "outer world" only, and does not

undertake to say that it has any existence outside our

sensations." We know nothing, and can know abso

lutely nothing, except the sensations which we experi-

4Examination, c. xxi. p. 418. (and Edit.) Similarly Spencer

holds that our ultimate scientific ideas are symbolical of the Ultimate

Reality, and may be taken as practically representing it, bift not as

making known to us its true nature.

Logic, Bk. I. c. iii. 8, in the note

S




ence from it : the distinctions which we verbally make

between the properties of things and the sensations we

receive from them, must originate in the convenience

of discourse, rather than in the nature of what is

signified by the terms."6

(c) Lewes, in his Problems of Life and Mind, suffers

from the ordinary scare about an unknown substratum.

" All we positively know of matter is what its qualities

are : and if we group them into a general synthesis,

naming the group matter, we are not entitled to infer

anything more than is given in the particulars thus

grouped. Metaphysicians are, for the most part, all

actively engaged in trying to solve the problem of

matter by disregarding the known functions, and theo

rizing on the unknown quantity, disdaining the obser

vable phenomena." However, Lewes cannot agree

with Hume s reduction of the mind to an unsubstantial

series of states; though, as we have seen before, Hume

calls each state a substance so far as it is something

which exists by itself." In denying a mental substra

tum," says the critic,7 " Hume was left in a condition

of absolute scepticism : he gave a logical unity to

consciousness, andsupposed

that this logicalunity

was

all that was meant when men spoke of realunity."

(d)A short sentence from Mr. Spencer will give an

insight into his theory of substance: 8 " Existence means

nothing more than persistence ;and hence in mind that

which persists in spite of all changes, and maintains

the unity of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to

Logic, Bk, I. c. iii. 9. Compare Ferrier s Remains, Vol. II. p. 296.

7History of Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 315. (3rd Edit.)

8Psychology, Part II. c. i. 59. We notice that in the Index to

the Epitome of Mr. Spencer s philosophy by Mr. F. H. Collins, the

word substance is not found worthy of a place in the Index a

copious Index of twenty-seven pages, double columns.




divide it, is that of which existence in the full sense

of the word must be predicated that which we must

postulate as the substance of mind in contradistinction

to the varying forms it assumes. But, if so, the impos

sibility of knowing the substance of mind is manifest."

This " substance of mind"

is an "

indefinite conscious

ness," "the raw material ofthought," which becomes

thought as soon as it receives any definite determination

by concrete experience. The Unknown Power is ulti

mately the substance ot all things : a doctrine which we

have to bear in mind lest we take as too satisfactory

sentences which seem to meet our own views as exactly

as does the following:9

"It is rigorously impossible to

conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of appear

ances only, without at the same time conceiving a

reality of which they are the appearances ;for appear

ances without reality are unthinkable."

(e)In his Prolegomena Ethica, Green says:

10 " Sub

stance is that which is persistent throughout certain

appearances. It represents the identical element through

out appearances, that permanent element throughout

the times of their appearances, in virtue of which they

are not so many different appearances, but connected

changes. A material substance is that which remains

the same with itself in respect of some of the qualities

which we include in our definition of matter qualities

all consisting in some kind of relation while in other

respects it changes. Its character as a substance

depends on that relation of appearances to each other

in a single order which renders them changes. It is

not that first there is a substance, and then certain

changes of it ensue. The substance is the implication

of the changes, and has no existence otherwise. Apart

from the substance no changes, any more than apart

First Principles, p. 88.10

Pp. 55, 56.




from the effects any cause. If we choose to say that

matter exists as a substance, we merely substitute for

the designation of it as consisting in relations, a desig

nation of it as a certain correlation of a certain kind of

relation. Its existence as a substance depends on the

action of the same self-consciousness upon which the

connexion of phenomena by means of that relation

depends." We have shown that permanence under

change is not the essential idea of substance, andGreen s reduction of material substance to relations

constituted by the intellect is too idealistic to meet our

approval.

(/) Mr. M Cosh, in getting rid of the unknown

substratum as a mere bugbear to Philosophy, gives

three requisites for substance. " In saying that the

mind is substance we mean nothing more but that in usand in others there is

(i)an existing thing, (2) operating,

(3)with a permanence. It is high time that those meta

physicians, who defend radical truth, should abandon

this unknown and unknowable substratum or noumenon,

which has ever been a foundation of ice to those who

built upon it. Sir W. Hamilton having handed over

this unknown thing to faith, Mr. Spencer has confined

religion to it as to its grave. We never know quality

without knowing substance, just as we cannot know

substance without knowing quality. Both are known

in one concrete act;we may, however, separate them

in thought. Taking this view, we cannot, without

protest, allow persons to speak of substance as being

something unknown, mysterious, lying far down in a

depth below human inspection. The substance is known

quite as much as the quality. We never see an appear

ance (phenomenon) apart from a thing appearing (nou

menon). I understand what is meant by the thing : it is

the object existing. But what is meant by the-thing-in-




itself? If Ding-an-sich means that there is a thing in

addition to the thing as it manifests itself, and as it

exercises property, I allow that for aught I know there maybe such a thing; but believing that no other man on mere

philosophic grounds knows any more about it than I

do, I protest against it being represented as a support

of the thing known, or in any way essential to it."

We have here an admirable lesson as to the attitude

which Philosophy should take to Theology. Philo

sophically Mr. M Cosh sees no proof for the distinct

substratum;neither does he see disproof: therefore his

attitude ought to be one of ready acceptance of any

thing which may appear demonstrable from theologic

sources in regard to the distinction between substance

and accidents.

(2) Lotze,11 however

badly

he

maydefine the term,

claims substance as distinctly a matter of experience."

It has been required of any theory which starts from

the basis of experience, that in the beginning it should

speak only of sensations and ideas, without mentioning

the soul to which, it is said, we hasten without justifi

cation to ascribe them. I should maintain, on the

contrary,

that such a mode of

setting

out involves a

wilful departure from that which is actually given in

experience. A mere sensation without a subject is

nowhere to be met with as a fact. It is impossible to

meet with a bare movement without thinking of the

mass whose movement it is;and it is just as impossible

to conceive a sensation existing without the accom

panyingidea of that which has it or rather, of that

which feels it, for this also is included in the given fact

of experience, that the relation of the feeling subject to

its feeling, whatever its other characteristics may be, is

in any case something different from the relation of the

Metaphys. Bk. III. c. i. 241.




moved element to its movement. It is thus, and thus

only, that sensation is a given fact ; and we have no

right to abstract from its relation to its subject because

this relation is puzzling, and because we wish to obtain

a starting-point which looks more convenient, but is

utterly unwarranted by experience. In saying this, I

do not wish to repeat the frequent but exaggerated

assertion, that in every single act of feeling or thinking

there is an express consciousness which regards the

sensation or idea simply as states of a self: on the

contrary, every one is familiar with that absorption in

the context of a sensuous perception which makes us

forget ourpersonality."

(3)Great stress is laid by adversaries on the asser

tion that if any substance were made known to us, it

would be our own; but that about our own selves

consciousness testifies only that there are successive

states. We answer that these states are reported to us,

not in the abstract, but in the concrete, and that the

most simple analysis, by reflexion, of what is involved

in them, gives us the two elements permanent sub

stance and its variable modifications at successive

times. It is enough if we settle that there is somesubstance of self: for the purposes of General Meta

physics are satisfied if we prove only that the most

generic concept of substance is real;as to our knowledge

of specific substances, that, after the establishment of

substance in general, may be judged by what has before

been said in the chapter on Essences. Locke, there

fore, allowed what we are contending for when he

allowed that we are certain of a substratum and of its

reality.



CHAPTER II.

SUBSTANCE AS HYPOSTASIS AND PERSONALITY.

Synopsis.

(1) The way of meeting the bewilderment likely to come on an

ordinary mind in presence of the question, What is per

sonality ?

(2) Explanation of personality.

(3) The wrong and dangerous doctrine of Locke in regard to

personality.(4) Hume goes still further astray.


(i) A SPECIAL aspect of substance is Personality,

and this is too important an idea to be left without

explanation. It is just one of those ideas before

which an ordinary mind might feel helpless and

despondent, having yet to learn a great lesson

taught . by exercise in philosophic studies, which

is, calmly to take a notion and determine how

much, so far as we can grasp its object, it

includes. Thus only are we able to fix for our

selves the signification of a word, and secure

that, in our meaning at all events, the term

has no element of vagueness. Unless we acquire

this power of precision, we may leave the subject of

a discussion so indeterminate that no result can be

reached. It was thus in reference to the ship sent

annually by the Athenians to Delos ; they disputed




whether it was the same vessel as that in which

Theseus sailed a thousand years before. The sup

posed facts of the case may be assumed to have

been tolerably clear to all : what had been changed

and what not, probably furnished no serious matter

in the dispute ;but having no fixed definition as

to what they intended to mean by sameness in a

ship, they wrangledwithout conclusion : whereas

a succinct statement of the case, ought itself to

have solved their difficulty about identity.

(2) All things which can naturally have a sepa

rate existence are substances, and every existing

substance in nature must be individual. When an

individual substance is complete in itself, forming

an entire nature, and remaining intrinsically inde

pendent, incommunicable, or sui juris, it is called a

supposition or hypostasis, because to it are attributed

all the activities and passivities of the thing. The

maxim is, Actionessuntsuppositorum"

Actions belong

to their respective supposita."Thus man is a sup-

positum, and to his suppositum are attributed the

slightest movement of a finger, and the slightest

pain of a tooth. The man moves and the man

suffers. Hypostasis, therefore, though it has other

senses in other connexions, is defined in the present

connexion, as any single substance which is of itself

something complete, is not part of another thing, and cannot be regarded as a part. This of course is said in

reference to a physical, intrinsic whole;

for ex-

trinsically different supposita may be united to form

a whole by way of aggregation. That precisely

which makes a substance to be a hypostasis is



SUBSTANCE AS HYPOSTASIS AND PERSONALITY. 281

frequently called its subsistentia. Furthermore, the

hypostasis or supposition^ if intelligent, is called a

person a word which meant the" mask "

(irpocrwirov)

that marked out in the stage-player the character he

was sustaining. The mask told who the wearer

was, sacrificing facial expression to ruder and more

easily perceptible ends, and to the necessities of an

enormoustheatre,

and of ahighly

idealized form of

drama. Boethius defines a person as the individual

substance of rational nature. It is a notable fact that

all the words here are positive, with the disputable

exception of"

individual," which, however, may

easily be regarded in a positive light.

After we have explained in previous chapters

substance, essence, and individuality, so little more

remains to be said in order to give the meaning of

the term"personality,"

that readers are apt to over

look the account unless it is spread over more pages

than are really necessary or even helpful to clearness.

We have the entire teaching in a nutshell, if, starting

with the doctrine that a suppositum is a substance,

complete as a substance, and complete also as

some definite nature, which forms a whole in and

by and for itself, we then add that a person is an

intelligent suppositum. The highest organisms, vege

table or animal, are supposita; but in the mineral

world, as also in lower forms of life, it is often

impossible to assign the different supposita. A cup

of water is a mere aggregate : perhaps the mole

cules are supposita : but any dispute that arises

on this point belongs to the department which

has to provide a theory of the constitution of



TRANSCENDENTAL BEINC.

material substances. We have here again another

instance like what we have had before, in which

General Metaphysics furnishes the general de

finition, but does not undertake to settle all its

applications within the sphere of each special

science.

Every person in the created order will be finite,

but if we look back at the definition of personality,

we shall find that finiteness is no part of its con

tents. A person must have indeed one substance

distinct from any other substance, but it is nowhere

proved that finiteness is essential to this distinct

unity. Those who allow the unity and the infinity

of

God,and also allow that He is other than

anyof

His creatures, should not pretend to a special diffi

culty on the score of his infinite Personality ; any

objection of theirs would probably have at its root

the error of Spinoza omnis determinatio est nega-

tiOy"

all determination is negation"

the kindred

error of the Scotists that personality is rather nega

tive than positive, and the views of Hamilton and

Mansel about limitation. From the mere analysis

of the term we should not know whether personality

did or did not exclude infinity : but reason can

demonstrate that God is both infinite and personal,

and this settles the question. Of course, as far as

the bare words are concerned, we might have re

stricted the term"

person"

to finite natures, and

have found another term to be applied to God alone :

that would have been a convention permissible in

itself, but not without its inconveniences. When we

pass on beyond what reason can tell us of the Divine



SUBSTANCE AS HYPOSTASlS AND PERSONALITY. 283

personality, we come across the revealed doctrine of

three Persons in one God. Our definition still meets

the requirements, but how it discharges its extended

functions cannot be explained in this place.

Besides the Blessed Trinity, another revealed

dogma has extended, without contradicting, our

natural knowledge of personality; for in the In

carnate Word we are made aware of two distinct

natures in the unity of Person. Whence some have

concluded that personality is really distinct from

the created nature of which it is the determinant;

but other theologians see no necessity for such an

extraordinary hypothesis. They believe that the

Humanityof Christ is not of itself a

person,not

because of anything that it has lost, but because of

something that it has gained. By virtue of its

hypostatic union with the Son, it has been elevated

to a higher rank without parting with any of its

reality. The philosophic bearing of these opinions

deserves notice because it shows that, while we

labour to make our terms definite and sure as far

as our knowledge carries us, we have to remember

that for the most part it does not carry us to the

comprehensive intelligence of objects in all their

length, breadth, and depth. We have a natural

knowledge of personality, true as far as it goes, but

not exhaustive.

(3) In the last chapter, in the present, and in

the next, as well as in other places, we have to

single out Locke as one who leads the way in false

doctrine ;on the subject of personality his view is

fatal to the Catholic dogma concerning the Incar-




nation, and would render moral retribution highly

unsatisfactory in its arrangements.Because Locke left scholastic subtleties alone,

and took to questions more on the surface of things,

he is sometimes praised as a very clear writer. The

praise is not warranted on an estimate of his whole

work, and in many passages he might stand as a

warning example of an obscure involved style. Histreatment of personality as that which is constituted

by continuous consciousness, is an instance in

point, about which subject a man with his mind

clear could hardly have penned a complicated

sentence like the following :

l "

That which seems to

make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness

being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there

being no moment of our lives wherein we have the

whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in

one view;but even the best memories losing the

sight of one part, whilst they are viewing another,

and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our

lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent

on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having

no thoughts at all, or at least none with that con

sciousness which marks our waking thoughts : I say,

in all these cases, our consciousness being inter

rupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves,

doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking

thing i.e., the same substance or no, which, how

ever reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not per

sonal identity at all;the question being, what makes

1 Human Understanding, Bk. II. c. xxvii. Cf. Descartes. Med. iii.

P-74-




the same person ? and not whether it be the same

identical substance which always thinks in the same

person, which in this case matters not at all : dif

ferent substances by the same consciousness (where

they do partake in it) being united into one person,

as well as different bodies by the same life are united

into one animal, whose identity is preserved in that

change of substances by the unity of one continued

life." This remarkable utterance may be taken as

somewhat typical of the state of Locke s mind on

the subject which he is undertaking to discuss. Wemust try to follow some of the meanderings of his

famous twenty-seventh chapter.

He seems to have been moved by the reflexions

that the parts of the human body are ever changing ;

that there might be rational animals, and therefore

persons, with bodies quite unlike ours;and that

absolutely souls might transmigrate from body to

body. In view of these unfixities, he wants some

stable test of identity in persons. He distinguishes

three identities, those ofsubstance,

of

man,and of

person. The first he places in the extrinsic and un

satisfactory elements of time and place :

" We can

not but conceive that each kind of substance must

necessarily exclude any of the same kind out of the

same place ;else the notions of identity and diversity

would be in vain, and there could be no such dis

tinction of substance or anything else one from

another. Could two bodies be in the same place

at the same time, then these two parcels of matter

must be one and the same; nay, all bodies must be

one and the same, for all bodies may be in one




place."After this inconclusive argument, he goes

on to speak of his second kind of identity, that of

man, which he places "in nothing but a participation

of the same continued life by constantly fleeting

particles of matter, in succession united to the same

organized body."It is curious that

" man "

should

thus be limited to matter as organized or vivified,

when we remember that Locke was a philosopher

who believed in a soul. But let us hasten on to his

third kind of identity, with which we are specially

concerned. Personal identity is continued con

sciousness :

"

for nothing but consciousness can

unite remote existences into the same person ;the

identity of substance will not do it. So that self is

not determined by identity or diversity of substance,which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity

of consciousness. . . . Some consciousness always

accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes

every one to be what he calls himself: in this alone

consists personal identity, that is the sameness of

the rationalbeing."

With the courage to follow

out his principles, he does not shrink from asserting

that could the same consciousness be transferred

from one thinking substance to another, these two

would form one person ;and that contrariwise one

and the same spirit, losing old conditions of con

sciousness and gaining new, would form a plurality

of persons. Locke carries his consistency into the

region of rewards and punishments."

If the same

Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the

same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping

is not the same person ;and to punish Socrates




waking for what sleeping Socrates thought and

waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be

no more right than to punish one twin for what the

other twin did." Of course it is right not to punish

Socrates waking for what Socrates sleeping did : but

the reason is not the one assigned by Locke. Our

philosopher ventures even to propound and meet a

difficulty on the subject. Human law, he objects,

rightly punishes a sober man for what he did in

his drunkenness, though, on the principle just ex

pounded, there may be two persons here. Yes,

answers the objector to himself, because human

law, not being able to discriminate when there are

two persons here and when not, punishes for the

criminal act which can be proved and disregards

the unconsciousness of it, which cannot be proved.

There are many ethical principles violated at this

juncture. The author places the injurious acts done

by the sleep-walker, whose state is not his own

fault, in the same order with those done by the

drunken man, whose state with its foreseen con

sequences is generally his own fault, proximately or

remotely. Again, he uses probability against, in

stead of in favour of, the accused : saying that

because unconsciousness of guilt cannot be proved,

consciousness can be presumed. But if we make

our presumption from known facts, we may come

to a fair conclusion as to whether a man was drunkor not, and then we may add our further piece of

knowledge that a really drunken man has not, at

the time of his action, a genuine consciousness

of wrong-doing. Again, on Locke s principles a




criminal who afterwards lost all memory of his

deeds could not be condemned for a whole life of

previous crime. An atrocious murderer, who in the

interval between his capture and his trial had under

gone a sickness which wiped out the recollection of

the act from his own mind, would have to be released

if he could prove his complete obliviscence. Or,

perhaps, there is this subterfuge for Locke, and he

is welcome to it. The criminal ought to believe his

guilt on the testimony of others : thus once more it

enters into his consciousness, and belongs to the

culprit s personality. When Locke adds piously,"

In the great day, wherein the secrets of hearts

shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think

that no one will be made to answer for what heknows nothing of,"

our philosopher is quite safe

in his conjecture, so far as it is expressed ;but if it

implies that the Judge will ignore all things which

men have no memory of when they die, simply

because they have no memory of them, then the notion

is

verymuch

astray. Onthe side of the offended

man,"

forgive and forget"

is often a good maxim

to follow;but on the side of the offender forgiveness

obtained by means of his own forgetfulness is a

doctrine that has not recommended itself even as a

heresy.

Locke s teaching about personality may in

the end be acknowledged to have these results:

(a) it furnishes a definition which would suffice for

Hume s theory of man as a series of conscious

states without substance : (b) it steers clear of the

awkward facts that if there were rational animals




other than man, we should have either to extend

the termman,

or add to its definition as"

rational

animal :

"

and that if human souls did transmigrate,

our definition of man s personality would have to

accommodate this change. If it be asked whether

we cannot further accord to Locke s definition that

it gives what personality, as a term, might mean, we

reply that the word has got its accepted signification

too well fixed to allow an individual to change it

at will. The most we can grant to Locke is that

continued consciousness is one test of personality ;

we cannot grant that it is personality. If because

of the intimate connexion of thought with perso

nality we permitted Locke to turn thought into

personality, how should we resist Cousin, whobecause personality is asserted specially in the will,

says, La volonte c est la personne ; and again, Qu est-ce

que le moi ? L activite volontaire et libre. A long waythe best plan is to keep to the theory that the person

of man is the composite nature, body and soul, left

in its completenes and sui juris ; the soul being substantially unchangeable, though variable in its acci

dental states, the body being constantly changed as

to its constituent particles, yet preserving a certain

identity, describable only by reciting what are the

facts of waste and repair in an organism. It is a

great secret in the explanation of many puzzling

terms to know, that the only way is concisely to

declare the known facts which the word is meant to

express. Thus we describe in what man s bodily

identity consists so far as we can. A limb may be

lost, and that mutilation may be followed by thq




loss of another limb;we hardly know the extent to

which a body may be deprived of its parts; still so

long as the man lives, we know that he is the same

person, constituted by the union of the same soul

and body. His integrity is gone, but not his perso

nality.

From Locke s insistance on the connexion

betweenunity

of consciousness andunity

of

personality, though he carries it to an extreme which

would logically require the assertion of two persons

in Jesus Christ, we may borrow a warning against

the impersonal intelligence, of which so much is made

by many philosophers, of which they can give so

little account, and of which their proof, if they

attempt one, is so utterly unconvincing. The

doctrine is quite to be rejected that a primeval

intelligence, impersonal in itself, becomes personal

only in finite intelligences such as our own. Pro

bably in the natural condition of things, every finite

intelligence is a sign of a single personality ;but in

the supernatural union of Christ s Humanity with

the Person of the Word, the human intelligence

foregoes the personality which would otherwise be

proper to it, and is taken up by a higher person

ality in some way quite mysterious to us, and

known at all to us, only because we have been told

so by absolutely credible authority. Even so wedo not come across that most unphilosophical in

vention of philosophers,"

the impersonal intelli

gence :

"

for the human intelligence of Christ is

personal with the personality of the Second Person

of the Blessed Trinity. If it had not been tfcis



SUBSTANCE AS HYPOSTA SIS AND PERSONALITY. 291

assumed to a higher hypostasis, it would have had

its own natural personality ;in all cases it must

be personal.

(4) Hume, as usual, carries Locke s expressions to

greater extremes; denying the knowableness of any

such substantial nature as that which his predecessor

undoubtedly considered to underlie the phenomena

of consciousness, and which he calls "the identity

of man." The most outspoken utterances of Humeare to be found in the Appendix to his Treatise on

Hitman Nature. There he plainly confesses the defec-

tiveness of his theory ;he owns that

"

all hopes

vanish"

when he tries to explain, on his principles,

the bonds which unite the successive states of

consciousness. Nevertheless he abides by his ownphilosophy, because

"

all our distinct perceptions

are distinct existences, and the mind never perceives

any real connexion among distinct existences."

Hence, pleading"

the privilege? of asceptic,"

there

is nothing for him but to acknowledge himself at

presentbeaten

by

"

adifficulty

too hard"

for his

understanding. Still he is a sceptic only in the

etymological sense; he does not finally renounce

the knowledge of the truth, he merely avows that

for him truth is yet to seek. Perhaps even still,

"

upon mature reflexion," he may be so lucky as to

"discover some hypothesis that will reconcile the

contradictions." Meantime he can give this account

of his own personality :

" For my part when I enter

into what I call myself, I always tumble upon some

particular perception or other; I can never catch

myself at any time without a perception,and can



2Q2 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

never observe anything but the perception. When

my perceptionsare removed for

any time,as

bysound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself,

and may be truly said not to exist. . . . Setting

aside some metaphysicians, I may venture to affirm

of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but

a bundle or collection of different perceptions,

which succeed each other with an inconceivable

rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement.

. . . There is properly no simplicity in the mind at

one time, nor identity in different." Thus person

ality is"

a fiction of the imagination ;

"

it is"

the

smooth passage of our thoughts along our resembling

perceptions, that makes us ascribe to them an iden

tity."2

2 Treatise I. iv. 2. Mr. Spencer s views are given in his Psycho

logy, Part VII. cc. xvi. and xvii. He is mostly concerned with dis

tinguishing between the objective"

vivid states"

of consciousness,

and subjective"

faint states," and showing the intermediate position

of a man s own body in relation to the two classes." In some way

or other there is attached to the faint aggregate a particular portion

of the vivid aggregate, and this is unlike all the rest as being a

portion always present, as having a special coherence among its

components, as having known limits, as having comparatively

restricted and well-known combinations, and especially as having

in the faint aggregate the antecedents of its most conspicuous

changes, which prove to be the means of setting up special changes

in the rest of the vivid aggregate. This special part of the vivid

aggregate, which I call my body, proves to be a part through which

the rest of the vivid aggregate works changes in the faint, and

through which the faint works certain changes in the vivid. Andin consequence of its intermediate position, I find myself now

regarding this body as belonging to the vivid aggregate, and now

as belonging to the same whole as the faint aggregate, to which it is

intimately related." These are fair specimens of the best things

Mr. Spencer has left to say ; after he has renounced all right to

speak of a substance of body or of mind, and has left himself nothing




It is not necessary to examine later developments

of Hume;

but there is one recent investigation

which should be mentioned in connexion with the

reduction of personality to conscious states.

Because of the duality or even higher plurality,

which can be produced apparently in consciousness

by certain morbid conditions, some speak of a

multiplicity of persons in one man : we must reject

the phrase in its literal sense, because of the reasons

already given. It is no wonder if with our complex

conditions there are abnormal states, in which

consciousness is said to testify to strange things.

This alleged testimony, however, especially when

the report is given on the mere memory of a past

condition ofdisturbance, cannot

beaccepted

with

implicit trust, for the memory of a period of

abnormal action may easily be distorted.

to describe but two ultimately distinguished groups of faint and of

vivid feelings, which have, as the mediator between them, the

philosopher s own aggregate of feelings which he calls his body.

It .is only Hume continued. To account for the common opinion

Mr. Spencer adds, "There is an illusion that at each moment the

Ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas,

actual or nascent, which then exists." (c.ix. 220.)





(i) It was undoubtedly Christianity which set men

inquiring more carefully into the nature of personality,

for the two prime mysteries of the Trinity and the

Incarnation turned on this idea. The maxim, actiones sunt

mppositomm, obtained for the latter of the two dogmasa great significance, which brought out the unity and

the dignifying influence of personality. Reid insists

that a person must be taken as a monad, as a whole,

and never as a part ;and this is eminently true in

estimating the worth of Christ s human actions." All

men," he says,1

"placetheir personality in something

that cannot be divided. . . . When a man loses his

estate, his health, his

strength,

he is still the same

person and has lost nothing of his personality. If he

has a leg or an arm cut off, he is still the same person

as before. . . . My personal identity, therefore, implies

the continued existence of that indivisible thing which

I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is some

thing which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and

acts, and suffers. I am not

thought,

I am not action,

I am not feeling ;I am something that thinks, and acts,

and suffers. My thoughts and actions and feelings

change every moment they have no continued, but a

successive existence;but the self or I to which they

belong is permanent, and has the same relation to all

the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings, which I

call mine."

From these words some might gather that only the

thinking principle in man is his person ; indeed, we

hear it said," Man is a soul." But if we keep to our

definition, and if we remember that the body is an

1Intellectual Powers, Essay iii. c. iv. p. 345.




essential constituent of human nature, we must include

it also in the personality.

(2) The dignity of personality is explained by

Schelling as consisting in"lordship."

As Chalybaus2

interprets him, "To be lord over one s existence

constitutes the idea of personality to be lord over all

existence constitutes the idea of absolute personality.

The Deity is such from the beginning." So much

truth as underlies these words has beengiven by

us,

when we described a person as sui juris: to the conscious

personal Being its own existence is for itself,and what

soever other existences serve its known ends, so far

they also are for it, even though a Higher Lord mayclaim to be the absolutely ultimate centre of reference.

(3) Self-consciousness is no doubt closely connected

withpersonality,

and has aspecial power

in

makinga

thing exist for itself. Lotze, speaking of the very common

theory that all things have souls, says that his own

reasoning on the point" does not demand anything

more than that there should belong to things, in some

form or other, that existence as an object for itselfwhich

distinguishes all spiritual life from what is only an object

for somethingelse.

8 "

Hence,"

hesays,

" we must believe

that there are other persons like ourselves, but not that

there are any merethings." Holding the monistic

doctrine that there is only one Being, within this Being

he allows only such objects to claim an existence of

their own as can refer their states to a self. "It is so

far as something is an object to itself, relates itself to

itself,

distinguishesitself from

somethingelse, that

bythis act of its own it detaches itself from the Infinite.

. . . Whatever is in a condition to feel and assert itself

as a self is entitled to be described as outside the all-

2

History of Speculative Philosophy, p. 327.*Metaphysics, Bk. I. c. vii. 97, seq.



2Q6 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

comprehensive Being." Dr. Martineau is not a follower

ofLotze, but,

in

denyingto mere

things,and indeed to

all objects that have not free-will, a real causality, he

comes near to the German philosopher.4 " All cosmic

power is Will;and all cosmic Will is God s. The

natural forces are numerically distinguished, only

because they are assembled in different families of phe

nomena, but dynamically, they pass to and fro; they

aresubject

to the same measure;

theyare

substantiallyindifferenced

;and the unity to which they converge is

nothing else than His. He is the one cause in nature,

acting in various modes, and to all else among physical

things that has borrowed the name, we may give a

free discharge. We cannot have these * second causes

idle on our hands." The only "second cause" is

personal, andcreated

personalityis

thus contrastedwith the physical universe.5 " In the ultra-physical

sphere, the whole tendency is precisely the reverse,

viz., away from the original unity of power into

differentiation and multiplicity, the end pursued bythe will of the Creator is here to set up what is other

than himself and yet akin, to mark off new centres

of self-consciousness and causality, that have their

separate history and build up a free personality like his

own. We have seen how conceivable it is that, without

prejudice to the Providential order of the world, he

should realize this end, by simply parting with a portion

of his power to a deputed agent, and abstaining so far from

necessary law. Now this Divine move, this starting

of minds and characters, making the universe alivewith multiplied causality, is quite different from the

transitory waves of physical change that skim their

deep and lapse : it brings upon the stage, not an event,

4 A Study of Religion, Vol. II. p. 147.6 Id. pp. 364, 365.




but an existence : not an existence merely, but an orderingand

electing and creative Existence, a thinking power which

is. not a mere phenomenon of the Supreme Mind, for

that would not constitute a mind at all : how can a

state of one conscious subject be another conscious

subject ? . . . Personality is not the largest, but it is

the highest fact in the known cosmos." Our next

chapter will discuss"

second causes," and we shall seewhether that title is to be denied to all impersonal

objects.

(4) Some wonder that Catholic theologians insist

so much on the personal character of the offence which

is committed in sin against God, and they would lay

more stress on the intrinsic inordinateness of acts.

But if we take as the complement of actiones sttnt

suppositorum, the maxim, passiones sunt suppositorum,

then we shall see the propriety of measuring sin

especially by personal considerations. It is true

that there must be intrinsic inordinateness in the

sinful acts themselves;

but given this, we gaugeits full deformity only by looking at it on the

personal side. We have not the complete idea ofsin till we have grasped it as a crime committed bya personal agent against a personal superior. It has

been by tracing the work of the actions of the ManChrist to His Divine Personality, that Catholic

theologians have, by contrast, become so keenly alive

to the personal element in sin. Moral worth is

essentially something personal, even though in finite

agents at least, the personal worth of the doer of a

deed is not straightway the worth of the deed, which

has to be judged by its object and circumstances, but

still the personal element has all that importance which

we have declared it to have.



CHAPTER III.

CAUSALITY.

Synopsis.

(1) Various sorts of causality ; selection of efficient causality

for special treatment.

(2)The opposition made to efficient causality, (a)

on the part

of"

Occasionalists," who allow its reality ;but attribute

it directly to God, and(b)

on the part of pure Empiricists

who deny it to be a known reality.

(3) Proof(a)

that there is efficient causality in the world, and

(b)that this causality is not divine but mundane.

(4) Explanationof some statements about efficient causality,

which need clearing up :(a)

" The effect is like its cause."

(b)"The cause is prior to its effect." (c) "The same

cause under the same circumstances has always the same

effect." (d) "On the cessation of the cause the effect

sometimes ceases, sometimes not." (e)" A cause is more

than a condition."


(i) A WIDER term than cause is principium, or prin

ciple,which is defined to be,

1"that from which

anything in any way proceeds,"whether the bond

between the two be intrinsic, or only extrinsic;

whether it be real, or only logical. In Logic the

premisses are the principles whence the conclusion

follows ; in the order of knowledge they are theo

retically supposed to stand first, and it comes after;

but in the order of real sequence it may very well

be the other way about, as when from observed

effects we infer the producing causes. Here, how-

1 Sum. i. q. xxxiii. a. i.



CA USALit Y. 299

ever, we have not to treat oflogical

"principiation,"

but of real.

The order of priority is three-fold : it may be

that of mere time, as when January the ist, according

to our calculation, is called the principle whence the

year starts : it may be that of nature, in which

priority of time may or may not be included, as

when the essence of a creature is said to be the

principle of its"

propria,"that is, of its peculiarly

inseparable attributes, or the soul is said to be the

principle of life in the body : and lastly it may be

that of origin, a name devised to express that the

Father is principle of the Son, and the Father and

the Son form the joint principle of the Holy Ghost,

without any priority or superiority either of time or

of nature.

Principle, as expressing priority of nature, leads

us to the general idea of cause, which is defined,

A principle which by its influence determines the

existence of something else:

or a principle which insome way furnishes the ground for the existence of

an object; a principle which of itself gives birth to

something else? In some cases the otherness of

the effect from the cause is obvious: but there are

also cases in which it is not so unmistakeable,

because the cause enters in as a constituent of

the total result, which is called the effect. Yet in

all cases, without exception, St.Thomas3insists that

there is an otherness in the shape of some perfec

tion produced : hence a thing that is simply self-

*Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. xii. sect. ii. n. 4.

* Sum. i. q. xxxiii. a. i. ad i.



300 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING

taused, according to our definition of causality, is an

impossibility.

If ever God is

styledthe cause of

Himself, the phrase is an inaccuracy; we should

say God is self-existent, or is His own sufficient

reason. Moreover, His immanent action is quite

identical with His substance, and has therefore no

strict causality ;His thoughts and volitions, for

example, viewed apart from any external effect that

they produce outside God, are thus identified with

the Divine Essence : whereas in the immanent

action of creatures the agent as agent is distinguish

able from the agent as patient. We distinguish the

soul as productive of thought from the result, the

soul as informed by its own thought : but what

precisely the distinction is Psychology must say.

Though Lewes has declared the four Aristotelic

causes to be"

not verifiable, inadequate, and un

scientific," we must take leave to set aside the

verdict as not sound. Reid 4 had previously objected

against them that they could not be called causes

for want of a common generic concept, to whichdifficulty Hamilton had replied that

"theyhave this

much in common, that each is an antecedent, which

not being given, the consequent called the effect

would not be." Our sufficient reply is, that each

comes under the definition which we have assigned

to cause in

general,

as that which is aprinciple of

Being to another, or that upon which the Being of

another depends.

Material and formal causes are such, that each

contributes itself as a constituent of the whole

4 Active Powers, Essay i. c. vi.



CAUSALITY. 301

which results from the union of the two. Not by

mere mutual interaction, but by mutual self-com

munication, they combine to produce the total

effect;so that if the subject is said to support the

form, this support, though grammatically it is repre

sented as an action, is not physically an action in

the ordinary sense of the word, as when a pedestal

supports byits action a statue. Accidental unions

of the kind are such as those between marble and

its form in a piece of sculpture, and between the

mind and its thought : while the connexion of soul

and body is an instance of substantial union between

matter and form. No mere presence in space or

dynamic interaction will suffice for such union : the

two causes are constituent, not efficient. Never

theless, not all constituents are straightway to be

ranked as matter or form in relation to one another:

but only such as stand to one another as recipient,

determinable subject, and determination received.

That relations of this kind are entered upon so as

to produce definite effects cannot be denied, and

practically is not denied, even by those who theo

retically ridicule the whole conception of matter and

form;the only controvertible question is whether

the schoolmen have pushed the idea too far, and

such controversy is out of place here.

It is impossible to explain at any length materialand formal causality without entering upon Special

Metaphysics : and therefore we must rest content

with indicating two of the questions which will be

found to have received due attention in other

treatises; in Cosmology the discussion about the ulti-




mate constitution of matter, and in Psychology the

discussion about the substantial union between man s

soul and body, bring out pretty nearly all that the

schoolmen have to say on matter and form.

The final cause is another subject which receives

its fullest degree of attention in the treatise on

Natural Theology. There, under the heading of the

Argumentfrom

Design,authors

inquirewhat evi

dences of a planning mind are to be discovered even

in the physical universe;whether all the laws and

the harmonious working together of the material

elements to constitute a cosmos, can be ultimately

attributable to blind forces acting uniformly through

out indefinitely long ages. Again, philosophers

frequently discuss whether vegetable and animal 5

organisms have risen up spontaneously and without

foresight, or whether they point irresistibly to an

intelligent Creator. Lastly, the finite intelligence

itself is taken into account, and the inquiry is

made whether it originated out of blind elements

without design on the part of some Supreme In

telligence. This sketch is enough to show how

completely the subject of teleology is discussed in

the scholastic system. If we start from the most

certain testimony of consciousness, it is thereby

put beyond reasonable doubt, that we are induced,

by ends which we propose to ourselves as desirable,

to carry out even long series of works in order to

achieve such ends. They clearly are causes in out

8 In the living organism the tendency to an organic end so clear

that Clifford has called organization "the good"

is much insisted

on, as Zweckstrebigkeit, Zweckmassigkeit.



CAUSALITY. 303

regard, not because they compel our efforts, but

because at any rate they solicit them, and call forth

our energies, which would remain inactive if there

were no solicitation brought to bear upon them.

When a man, who perhaps otherwise would have

been a sluggard, makes it the struggle of a lifetime

to carry out his fixed purpose of becoming Prime

Minister of England before he dies ;

when one whohas spent half his days in idle luxury is suddenly

roused to intense activity in order to repair the

fortunes of his house which he has ruined, it would

be a lamentable sacrifice of truth to some pet

theory if certain philosophers persisted in main

taining that final causes had no real influence. So

real is their influence that we may call them even

efficient causes, if only we remember that their

efficiency is of a peculiar character one which is

adapted to the manner of acting proper to a moral

agent, who is moved not physically, but through his

intelligence and will. It is no part of the doctrine

of free-will, as adversaries sometimes suppose,6 that

it maintains motiveless action;on the contrary, it

holds that motives are quite necessary, and that

freedom consists in following the call of one motive

in preference to another. The error is rather with

some of the opponents of free-will, who while they

scout the notion of motiveless action, yet deny that

motives, when regarded precisely as intellectual

motives, have any causality. Mr. Huxley considers

it probable that the conscious phenomenon in man

6 Even Reid thinks that there may be capricious acts "

without

all motive," and even"against all motive." (Works, p. 51.)




is a mere concomitant of the choice, in no degree a

determinant. We take up the position thatfinal

causality is absolutely demonstrable from an analysis

of our own conduct, about which we cannot be

deceived.

Final causes include the main object at which

we aim, or the end to be reached (finis qui) ;the

actual possession, or the actual production of this

object, accordingly as it is a finis possidendus or a

finis efficiendus, a goal to be reached, like the summit

of a mountain, or a work to be accomplished, like

the carving of a statue (finis quo) ;and lastly, the

person for whose sake the object is sought, whether

this be self or not-self (finis ctti, or cujus gratia).*

The exemplary cause is such as guides the artist

in the execution of his work, whether it be the

copying of a masterpiece, or the realization of an

original conception. God who created all things,

not unintelligently, but according to His own proto-

typic ideas, used these as exemplary causes. These

may also be regarded as formal causes, if we re

member that they are extrinsic, not intrinsic, to

their matter.

But our chief concern in this chapter is with

efficient causality in the strict sense, as defined by

Aristotle,"

a principle of change in another." The

definitionis

variously reproducedthus :

" That

which by the activity of its powers makes some

thing to be which before was not;" 7

"That which

7 The before is generally understood of time : but if any one

believes that creation ab aterno is possible, then he would have to

accommodate the meaning of before, and of any other such term, tq

his own theory.



CAUSALITY. 305

transfers from non-existence to existence what was

incapable of self-existence ;

"

"That from the real

physical activity of which the production of some

thing follows." To defend this definition will be

our tpsk : but we will premise a few points of detail,

not indeed necessary to our main object, but still

useful. One observation especially deserves atten

tion, namely, the relation of efficient causality to

the chapter on Possibility. In that chapter what

we called intrinsic possibility mainly engaged our

attention, and of extrinsic possibility we said very

little. The treatment here of efficient causation

supplies the previous omission.

Answering to every action is a corresponding

passion, at least if we leave out of account simple

creation from nothing, where in reference to the

whole object the passion is metaphorical rather

than literal. Again, action is transient or immanent

according as it passes out of the agent or abides

in it as in a subject : the action of one billiard

ball on another is transient, the action of the

thinking faculty is immanent. In both cases, though

in less degree for one than for the other, the

schoolmen assert some distinction between agent

and patient ;because even in immanent agency, the

agent as active and productive must be somehow

differentfrom

itself aspassive and receptive.

It is

an opinion, which St. Thomas at least in certain

places approves,8that the action and the passion,

are the same thing under different relations;the

action is the effect as dependent on the cause, the

8 In Lib. III. De Amma, c. ii;Sum. i. q. xlv. a. ii.

U



3o6 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

passion is the same effect as received by the subject.

At this point Suarez 9has a subtle argument whereby

he wants to establish a modal distinction between

the action and its term : but this is a delicate

question which we may leave for defter hands to

manipulate, as our broad inquiry turns on much

more tangible pivots. If however it is remarked

upon as strange, that by the above theory we have

as a result that the action is in the patient, the

schoolmen reply that under one aspect it is, in

another it is not : as that which is produced and

received into a subject, the action is in the patient ;

but so far as the agency producing and communi

cating the action belongs to the efficient cause, the

action was in the latter potentially. Suarez furtherteaches that by acting the agent qua agent, if we

regard the matter in ultimate analysis, makes no

change in itself, but only in the patient. To do

justice to this assertion we must observe that it does

not exclude the facts so obvious, at least in material

changes,

that

every

action is

repaid byreaction, so

as to make every agent also a patient ;and also that

in a complex agent one part acts upon another, so

as notably to change the agent as a whole.10 For

example, in severe bodily labour man in his entirety

undergoes many changes. But to understand the

9

Metaphys. Disp. xlviii. sect. ii. "Actio non est nisi quidammodus ipsius termini ilium constituens dependentem a sua causa :

est habitude viae ad terminum."

10 Hence the otherness between cause and effect must be taken

for neither more nor less than is required by the definition of active

power, pnncipium mutationis in alio quatenus est aliud, and of passive

power, pnncipium recipient mutationem ab alio, quatchus est aliud.



CAUSALITY. 307

aspect from which action works no change in the

agentas an

agent,we should have to take a

simplercase than ever our rude experience brings us

across.11

From these subtleties let us pass to the more

tangible matter of dispute. We have to settle

whether that on which all science ultimately rests,

namely, efficient causality, is real: and the subject

is so vital that Hobbes was near the truth when, as

he tells us, it dawned upon him quite in a startling

light, that the most important philosophic question

a man can put to himself is, Why does anything

pass from rest to motion, whether it be in physics,

or ethics, or politics ?

(2) If we wish for anything like thoroughness in

our appreciation of the controversy about efficient

causality, we must not shrink from the inquiry into

what has been actually maintained on the point by

the champions of each side;and if we have any

thing like a philosophic temper, we shall deem such

inquiry interesting rather than wearisome. Ouropponents may be divided into two great classes :

(a) those who fully allow the fact of causality, but

think that certainly in regard to matter, and perhaps

in regard to mind, God must be the sole cause of the

activities;and (b) those who, equivalently abolishing

causality,

reduce it to mereconstancy

of

sequence.We will take each of the pair separately.

11 This important point, the source of so much confusion, is

fully explained later, where it will be seen how very vague is man s

ordinary conception of the cause and the effect, where there are many

causes and many effects. It is vague as with many logicians is the

induction.




(a) Occasionalism, which we find St. Thomas

already in his time opposing,12

is the name under

which the first doctrine that we have to attack is

known. It teaches that created things are the mere

occasions on which the Divinity takes the oppor

tunity to act conformably to the requirements of the

objects present. This theory is specially charac

teristic of the school of Descartes, and is in intimate

connexion with the reduction of matter by that

philosopher to extension, with inertia for its chief

property. Matter, according to him, can itself do

nothing: it is a mere receptivity and channel of

communication or transference for the motion im

parted by the Creator : it can hand about movement

from particle to particle, but it cannot originate or

destroy any ;and thus it is opposed to mind, the

very essence of which is thought or activity. Matter

is inert extension, thought is ever-operative inex-

tension. One short paragraph in the Principia13

is

a complete exposition of the theory :

" We must

consider motion in its twocauses,

theprimary

and

universal cause, to which is due all the motion that

is in the world, and the particular cause to which it

is due that various portions of matter acquire the

movements which before they had not. As to the

former, it is evident to me that it must be attributed

to God Himself, who in the beginning created

matter along with motion and rest, and ever since

has preserved these in the same quantity. For,

though motion is nothing but a mode in the thing

which is moved, yet it is of a definite amount that

Contra Gent. Lib. III. c. Ixix. Pt. II. 36. Cf. 42.



CAUSALITY. 309

remains constant for the whole universe, though it

varies in regard to the several parts.*

This con

stancy the author connects with God s attribute of

Immutability. He continues :

" Whence it follows

that it is most consonant to reason for us to suppose

that God always preserves in the world just so much

motion as He impressed on it at its first creation."

To the soul Descartes allows an activity of its own,but subject to certain qualifications which he fails

definitely to express ;for he wavers in his view as

to the innateness of ideas, and as to the power of

intellect to form its own notions on the occurrence

of sensible experiences ;while he clearly commits

himself to the argument that a God must exist,

because only as a gift from Him could finite

intellect possess its idea of the infinite.

A disciple of the master namely, Geulinx,

carries his principles to the extreme of rendering

both body and soul passive subjects under the

Divine hand, denying as well the influence of soul

upon body which Descartes allowed as that of

body upon soul. His doctrine in brief is,"

Secondary

causes have no activity of their own" Causa secunda

non agunt.

Another Cartesian, somewhat more moderate, is

Malebranche,14 who quite denies all activity proper

to matter, and goes near to making the soul inac

tive, but saves himself in a sort of mistiness of

expression. He fully agrees with his master thai

all the movement which is to be found in things

material is from God, but does not appear to care

" Recherche de la Vente, Liv. I. c. i. ; Liv. VI. Pt. II. c. iii.



3io TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

much for the addition that the sum-total of motion

was communicated at the first Creation; while as to

the soul he allows it only one mode of immediate in

tuition namely, self-consciousness, all other objects

being known to it "through the medium of ideas,"

which are derived from the intimate presence of

God to the mind. It is by his express repudiations

that Malebranche saves himself from the charge ofsome awkward inferences which might be drawn out

of his principles in favour of pantheism, and of a

direct vision of God in Himself. No doubt he was

a pious, well-meaning man, but often not a wise

one;and his system cannot be maintained in any

thing

like its substance.

Among our English philosophers many in past,

and even in present days, must be ranked with the

occasionalists as regards material bodies. Cud-

worth s remark is good as far as it goes,15

"that it

seems not so agreeable to Nature, that Nature, as a

distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite super

seded, or made to signify nothing, God Himself

doing all the things immediately."Clarke was

openly an occasionalist in respect to matter;Locke

sets the question aside as not properly coming in

his way, yet describes material impulse as the mere

transfer of impressed motion.16 Reid and Stewart

decidedly tend to occasionalism. The former says: 17

"

Whether the Creator acts immediately in the pro-

15Intellectual System, Bk. I. c. iii. sect, xxxvii.

16 Human Intellect, Bk. II. c. xxi. and c. xxvi. Cf. pp. 58, 59,

66, 67.

17 Active Powers, Essay i. c. v.



CAUSALITY.

duction of events in the natural world, or by sub

ordinate intelligent agents, or by instruments that

are unintelligent these I suppose to be mysteries

placed beyond the limits of human knowledge. The

active power of which alone we can have any dis

tinct conception can be only in beings that have

understanding and will. Power to produce any

effect implies power not to produce [a confusionbetween power in general and power of choice] ;

we

can conceive no way in which power may be deter

mined to one of these rather than to another in a

Being that has no will."

" We are unable to con

ceive any active power to be exerted without will.

Theonly

distinct

conceptionI can form of an active

power is that which is an attribute in a Being, by

which he can do certain things if he wills. This is,

after all, only a relative conception. It is relative

to the effect and to the will producing it. Take

away these and the conception vanishes. They are

the handles by which the mind takes hold of it.

When they are removed our hold is gone. If any

man, therefore, affirms that a Being may be the

efficient cause of an action which that Being can

neither conceive nor will, he speaks a language

which I do not understand. It seems to me, then,

most probable that such things only as have some

degree of understanding and will can possess active

power; and that inanimate Beings must be wholly

passive. Nothing we perceive without us affords us

any good ground for ascribing active power to any

inanimate Being : and everything we can discover

in our own constitution leads us to think that active




power cannot be exerted without will and intelli

gence." The consequence of this opinion, whichwe often find re-affirmed by English writers, is that

though science were to reduce all sensible pheno

mena to their laws, it would, as Reid himself

remarks, only assign the rules according to" which

some cause works, but it would not prove that cause

to be matter itself.

18

Stewart atfirst

sight seemsto go further than Reid, and positively to assert

occasionalism in regard to matter;for he affirms,

19

that"power, force, energy, and causation are all attri

butes of mind, and can exist in mind only:"

but a

closer inspection of the context will show that his

meaningmay

be to say, as Reid does, that we know

no force but that of will, and that the phrase,"

material force," is addressed only to our ignor

ance, on the strength of an obscure analogy between

will and bodily movement. Distinguishing" meta

physical or efficient causes"

from"

physical,"the

latter of which means only constancy of antecedent

to consequent, he maintains that physical science

has to do only with"

physical causes," and that

"we know nothing of physical events but the laws

which regulate their succession." Soon afterwards,

if his words are to be taken literally, he dis

tinctly contemplates the possibility of matter being

an efficient cause ; for speaking of the popular

rejection of actio in distans, he says :

" That one

body may be the efficient cause of the motion of

another body placed at a distance from it, I do by

18 Ibid. c. vi.

uPhilosophy of the Human Mind, Pt. I. c. i. n.



CA USALITY. 313

no means assert;but only that we have as good

reason to believe that this may be possible as to

believe that any one natural event is the efficient

cause of another." With the examples now given

we may suppose the doctrine of occasionalism to

have been sufficiently illustrated, so that its meaning

and the reasons for it are clearly before the rrlind.

(b) The next theory to be considered, while

retaining the name, virtually abolishes the notion

of causality altogether ;and Hume is the prime

representative of this doctrine. The truth about

his theory may be conveyed in three statements :

(i.) First, he sometimes argues as though he were

goingon the

suppositionof real efficient

causality,and labours to prove merely that causality is known

to us by its effects alone, while its inmost nature

cannot be penetrated by our methods of inquiry.

We get no insight into the mode of causality, how

it is that agents work, and why their effects are

what they are. With this assertion we very largely

agree, (ii.) Secondly, he argues that from single

experiencesof any kind we have no

"

impression of

power,"and hence can have no valid

"

idea"

of it

from this source;but after frequent experiences of

similar sequences, custom produces in us"

a feel

ing"

or an"

impression ofpower." (iii.) Thirdly,

he teaches that this idea of power does not carry us

beyond the knowledge of invariable sequence ;it

does not give us efficient causality ;we have no

notion of one thing literally acting by its influence

upon another. Mill tries to improve on this doctrine,

but not with much success;

both authors deny



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distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The

separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause fromthat of a beginning is plainly possible for the

imagination, and consequently the actual separa

tion of these objects is so far possible, that it

implies no contradiction or absurdity."

22 For it is

a principle which Hume adopts, that what is con

ceivable is

possible.To those who instead of a mechanical associa

tion of units, called ideas, believe in man s power

of rational insight into objective truth, it is clear

that the only sufficient account of real change is

what we designate by the term"

efficientcausality."

Whatever before was not, and now begins to be,

owes its being to something other than itself. The

otherness may not be complete, but at least it is

partial, for even an immanent agent under the aspect

of its power to produce an effect is distinguished

from the same agent under the aspect of its recep

tivity of that effect in itself as subject, and from the

effect received. No real act is without real effect,

though the effect be identical with the act. All

science depends on holding these principles, and not

only all science in the grander meaning of the word,

but likewise in the meaning of all genuine know

ledge.

The dynamic aspect of the world is, therefore, asreal as the static

;the universe presents problems of

kinetics as well as kinematics. We must admit

something which is as truly an agent as it is a Being,

22 Remember that Hume allowed only two absolute contra

dictories, existence and non-existence : his name for them is, contraries.



CAUSALITY. 317

which acts as truly as it is. Where this agency is

we leave an open question for the present ; but a

leal agency we prove to exist.

In support of the universal recognition of

efficient causes Reid appeals to the unmistakeable

tokens of conviction among mankind.23"The

arguments which I have adduced," he says,"

are

taken from these five topics : That there are many

things which we can affirm and deny concerning

power with understanding : That there are in all

languages words signifying not only power, but

signifying among other things that empty power,

such as action and passion, cause and effect, energy,

operation, and others : That in the structure of all

tongues thereis

an active and a passive formin

verbs, and a different construction adapted to these

forms, of which diversity no account can be given

but that it has been intended to distinguish action

from passion : That there are many operations of

the human mind familiar to every man come to the

use of reason, and necessary in the ordinary conduct

of life, which imply some degree of power in our

selves and in others : That the desire of power is

one of the strongest passions of human nature."

One always regrets that Reid, who says so much

which is good about the real power of created will,

should also have said so much against any real

power proper to material things, and should have

lamented that24

"even the great Bacon seems to

have thought that there is a latens processus, as he

23 Active Powers, Essay i. c. iii.;Intellectual Powers, Essay vi. c. vi. 6

-

24Works, p. 76.



3i 8 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

calls it, by which natural causes really produce their

effects."

The argument for the bare fact of efficient causality

must be completed by the settlement of a question

which arises as to the immediacy of the perception

in regard to the abstract principle. The inquiry

is, whether the general principle, that every new

reality must have a cause, is immediately evident,

or whether it is, as Mill contends, an induction from

experience. To save himself from the vicious circle

of grounding Induction on the principle of Causality

and the principle of Causality on Induction, Mill25

distinguishes a natural knowledge of the principle

which precedes the inductive proof, from the scientific

knowledge whichis the

outcomeof that

proof.In

behalf of the need of an induction, Mill argues from

the fact of the very tardy acquiescence of mankind

in the reign of law, or in the belief that things do

not happen at hazard, but all according to definite

causation. We reply that rude peoples are not so

much astray about the abstract principle, that

whatever happens must have a cause, as about its

application. They see so much happen for which

they cannot account, and they are so accustomed to

the freaks of their own free-will, that they overlook

the need of an account to be rendered for every

event, or they find that account in a cause called

Fate, which is the impersonation of the freakish

Will. But whatever may be the explanation of the

blunders of the incompetent, when we rationally

consider the principle of causality, we have a right

85Logic, Bk. III. c. xxi. 2 and 4.



CAUSALITY. 319

to pronounce it immediately evident, or if we like

to resolve it into elements, we may.26

It contains

the propositions : Every thing must have a sufficient

reason why it is rather than is not, and why it is thus

rather than otherwise : The only sufficient reason

for a real change is efficient causality : Therefore

every real change has an efficient cause. So worded

the principle escapes the charge of tautology, to

which it is liable as long as it stands in this shape,"

Every effect must have a cause."

(b) So far we may claim to have established that

we do find efficient causality at work in the world;

the next point we have to prove is, that this causality

is not simply Divine, but that creatures act. We

will begin the inquiry by another question about

immediacy, Have we any immediate perception of

created causality itself, or is it all at best a matter

of inference ? The answer depends largely on our

way of talking, and is akin to the difficulty found by

logicians in discriminating what they call immediate

inferences from inferences in strictsyllogistic

form.

At least it may be affirmed that man has immediate

consciousness of his own activity, as that of which

he is the cause, in some of the acts of the will. If it

is objected that consciousness testifies to facts, but

not to what philosophers often call the how of facts,

we deny the assertion to be universally true, other

wise we should not know some acts to be pleasant,

others unpleasant, some to be according to our will,

others against it. When it is said that such truths

28 " Le principe de causalite n est qu une application du prin-

cipe de raison suffisante." (Ontologie, par A. H. Dupont, p. 366.)




as the spirituality, the immortality, the substantiality

of the soul are matters not of direct consciousness,

but of inference therefrom, there can be no intention

to place every piece of information about the think

ing principle in the position of an inference : at least

some characters are immediately revealed. Notably

our own causal activity is a fact of which we are

directly aware;and if we single out the act of free

choice especially,it is

not that we wish to excludeall other acts from the list of these which give

immediate testimony to our causality; but we fix

upon the most prominent of our own free acts

as pre-eminently establishing the point in question.

Nor do we think it any objection to the immediacy

of the testimony, that it needs some reflective

thought explicitly to recognize what causality is,

how it differs from mere sequence, what it is to be

the principle whence causality flows;and so forth.

Even the three primary principles about Being and

Not-Being need reflexion explicitly to formulate

them, and, as we were made painfully to perceive in

the chapter on Being, the primitive notions can be

described only by the employment of great care.

Under fair allowances for immediacy we have some

immediate knowledge of causal activity as a fact in

the concrete.

(c) Having found at least one case of efficient

causality in created agents, we have now to prove it

for other cases. Anticipating results, we may divide

man s experienced proof of efficient causality into

a succession of certainties, all deserving their name,

but varying in rank, (i.) His highest certainty is



CAUSALITY. 321

about the activity of his own intellect and will.

Coleridgians insist mainly on the latter, and say

that only by the consciousness of an originative

will within us can we be secure against Hume, (ii.)

Man s certainty next in degree, is that he exercises

some causality in movements of his own body in

some if not in others;and this truth holds in spite

of Reid s assertion,27 "

For anything I know to the

contrary, some other Being may move my hand as

often as I will to move it." (iii.) Man is sure that

other bodies act on his, and also (iv.) that they act

inter se, one on another, though knowledge of the

fact depends on their action upon his own body.

All our task will beaccomplished

if we cangive

valid reason for holding that material substances are

real agents. We may begin with a difficulty that

applies equally to acts of our own will, though we did

not mention it when speaking on that subject : for

its plausibility is greater with regard to the agency

of external bodies, about which we are now to

treat. Suarez, in defence of his peculiar theory

that action is modally distinct from its own in

trinsic term, or that the product of the action

has the action itself for its really distinct mode,

allows that God might absolutely bring about these

acts without the concurrence of the faculties in

which they inhere.28 "

God might Himself alone

produce these acts, so far as they are certain quali

ties, without the active concurrence of the faculties,

whether He produced them as forms inherent in

the faculties, or not;

for this latter point is quite

*7Works, p. 8.

3

Metafhys. Disp. xlviii. Lect. ii. ra,

V




another inquiry. Hence it is not of their essence

that these qualities should depend on thefaculties."

Having allowed that this opinion has the support of

so respectable an authority as Suarez, we deny its

force against the doctrine we here maintain. For

to pass over what we have already shown, that

whatever might have been, yet de facto consciousness

testifies the origin of our thoughts and volitions to

be from our own causal agency, and testifies against

the mere infusion of them into our passive soul;we

single out especially the effects that take place in

material bodies, and observe that at best the theory

of Suarez would go to show that by miracle God

might work the results which we call natural. Now

we do not dispute that God might, by His sole power

supply much of the causal influence which brings

about physical changes in matter;

but that He

commonly does so is a supposition derogatory to the

Divine attributes. We are at least half-way on to

pantheism if we make all material action Divine;

furthermore, as we know things only by their

activities, there is no reason why we should assert

those inert masses if we suppose them to be nothing

but idle occasions of the Divine operations. As

Berkeley says,"

Nobody will miss them," so let

them go. Leibnitz and many others declare that

thevery notion of a Being with no activity native to

it is a contradiction, and that there can be no actus

primus without an actus secundus. At any rate God s

works have a perfection of their own which marks

them as worthy of their Maker;hence the maxims i

29

* St. Thomas, Contra Gent. Lib. III. c. Ixix,



CAUSALITY. 323

Natura non deficit in necessariis"

Nature fails in no

requisite ;

"

and ovSev jjLarijv

"

Nothing is without a

purpose," as matter would be, if it were so absolutely

inert as to be in a condition of simple do-nothing

ness. It may be said that these maxims are theo

logical. This is not exclusively true, for they have a

foundation on the generalizations of experience ;but

they are also theological, and under this aspect they

just meet present exigences. For the occasionalists

against whom we are contending appealed precisely

to God in their theory that the efficiency, which we

want to prove to be in nature, was not from nature,

but from its Author : and it is on considerations

which concern the

requirements

of Divine wisdom

that we frame our reply.

We give the argument from St. Thomas :

"

If

effects are not produced by the activity of creatures,

then they cannot manifest to us the powers of

creatures;

for it is only by means of the activity

which, coming forth from the cause, finds lodgment

in the effect, that the effect can show us what the

power of the cause is. Now the nature of an agent

is known from its effects, only so far as its power

is thereby known; the power being in accordance

with the nature. If, therefore, creatures exert no

activities that produce effects, it follows that never

could the nature of a creature be known by its

effects: thus we lose all natural science, which

proceeds chiefly by the method of demonstrating

causes from their effects."80

The proof admits of a further development on

* Contra Gent. Lib. III. c. Ixijc,



324 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING,

these lines : it is a matter of our inmost conscious

experience that our own bodies act : therefore

matter has certain inherent activities;therefore it

is reasonable to assert the activity also of lifeless

matter. If in the living body matter is not the

mere passive recipient of the soul s causality, but

has a causality due to itself, then the theory that

matter is essentially inert, in the sense of wholly

inactive, falls to the ground.

Here then we end our argument for the broad

fact of natural causality : but we must repeat that

it is only the broad fact for which we have been

contending, not for the mode of operation. Mr. S.

Hodgson must be trusting most deceptive guides

when he affirms, in the teeth of plain facts, that

"the schoolmen assumed the general conception

of causal energy as equivalent to a knowledge of

what causal energy consists in;

"

and that Hume

made a strong point against them when he showed

we have no knowledge of what is the nature of

force.

Theschoolmen were well aware of

thedistinction between the that and the how, and did

not stake the fate of the first inquiry on the success

of the second. Rather it was those who were bent

on penetrating the how who fell away from the

common-sense view. To account for his defection,

Malebranche says:81

"The chief reason is the in

conceivability of the thing : try as I may, I cannot

find a representation in my mind of what this power

is which is commonly attributed to creatures."

Hume also insists much on the same inconceiva-

?* Rtchmht de la Verite. Explications au Liy. VI. Pt. II. c. iii.



CAUSALITY. 325

bility to justify his scepticism. The difficulty is

admitted,but

fortunatelyit need not be encoun

tered, else we should be in a hopeless state,

for it has puzzled the most penetrating genius.

Laplace declared that"

the nature of force is and

ever will be amystery." But he did not on that

account deny force, or renounce all knowledge of its

nature: he held that we can determine "its actions

and its effects." The mystery of essence and the

mystery of the substratum, were the stalking-horses

behind which adversaries attacked essence and

substance;and under the same shelter of mystery

they attack causality. We allow a mystery, but

likewise contend for something plain to the ordinary

intelligence. We are not to be driven from this

plain truth by the cry of mystery. Hence we are

struck more by the incompetence than by the argu

mentative skill of a man who will tell us, like Mill,32

"that the notion of causation is deemed by the

school of Metaphysics most in vogue at the present

moment, to imply a mysterious and most powerfultie, such as cannot, or at least, does not exist,

between any physical fact and that other physical fact

on which it is invariably consequent, and which is

properly termed its cause; and that thence is deduced

the supposed necessity of ascending higher into the

essences and inherent constitution of things, to find

the true cause, the cause which is not only followed

by, but actually produces the effect." Unmistakeably

in our intellectual ascent we can go as high as"

the

cause which certainly produces the effect :

"

but we

32Logic, Bk. III. c. v. 2.




do not pretend to have risen to that upper region

of the mysterious; we content ourselves with what

we can claim to be securely sure of, namely, real

efficiency. Kant is another opponent of the reality

of our notion about causality ;but as this is not the

place to open out the whole question of his a priori

categories, we must content ourselves with the

assertion that what he regards as a mental form, we

have proved to be the idea of a reality. We haveshown that there are real causes effecting real

changes among things in themselves. Even Kant

has confessed as much. For, greatly to the discon

certment of his friends, he argued that we know the

existence of noumena, or of things in themselves,

becausethey

are theefficient

causesof impressions upon

our organs. No special pleading has been able to

conceal this inconsistency in Kant s theory. Whereas

he ought to have regarded the category of causality

as not valid beyond subjective phenomena, he has

unguardedly applied it to things in themselves, as

though they were knowable as real causes. He was

right in so arguing, but the argument implies the

renunciation of his theory about the categories.

And as we are on the subject of differences of

meaning in the use of terms, it may prevent useless

cavils if we add, that in defending the reality of

created force, spiritual and material, we take the

word on our own interpretation of it, not in any or

all of the interpretations which various authors have

given. Hence many an adversary will be saved a

deal of misdirected efforts, if he puts aside his own

notion of what force ought to mean, and investi-



CA USALITY. 32?

gates whether our sense is not vindicated by our

arguments.

(4) While we do not pretend to clear up manyof

.the obscurities which beset the question of

causality, at least we may give explanations of some

current phrases, and so dispel certain mists that

unnecessarily are allowed to confuse the view.

(a)" The effect is like its cause." How, then,

have the same philosophers who adopt this principle,

divided causes into univocal and equivocal, the

univocal being those in which like produces like,

as when living things produce their offspring, and

the equivocal being the opposite to univocal ? The

whole account seems preposterous, and has proved

a scandal tomore than one weak brother

inthe

philosophic fraternity. If an artist carves the figure

of some animal whose name is a reproach when

applied to man, are we justified in quoting to him

the maxim," The effect must be like its cause

"

?

All the difficulty arises from taking cause and effect

in the rough, instead of in their proper analysis.

What we ought to look to is the precise causality

that and nothing more which the artist has

exercised. We find that he did not produce his

own materials, nor did he expend upon them every

variety of his causal powers, still less his whole

self; yet he did exert upon them a certain causality,

or rather a countless succession of causalities, which

are identified with his total effect upon the mate

rials, and therefore it would be strange indeed if this

causality were not like the effect. Though the

causality may not always be such as to indicate




the full nature of the agent, it must always be in

conformity to that nature : no agent can effect

anything quite out of character with himself or

itself. This is the substantial meaning of the

principle we are explaining, and the meaning

evidently conveys a truth in flat contradiction to

Hume s error. He said that for aught we can

determine a priori, anything may produce anything,

and events may succeed quite at random.

33 "

Asall objects which are not contrary are susceptible

of a contrary conjunction, and as no real objects

are contrary [the only contraries with Hume being

existence and non-existence} ,I have inferred from

these principles, that to consider the matter apriori,

anythingmay

produce anything, and that we shall

never discover the reason why any object may or

may not be the cause of any other, however great

or however little the resemblance may be betwixt

them. This evidently destroys the reasoning con

cerning the cause of thought or perception. For

though there appears no manner of connexion

betwixt motion and thought, the case is the same

with all other causes and effects." A man to whom

causality is mere succession of ideas without reason

able objectivity and without any efficiency, may

easily acquiesce in the conclusion that anything

may be the cause of, that is, be constantly followed

by, anything. Still, if Hume can show that there

are" no real

opposites,"he will have gained a

decided point in his favour : and, moreover, he may&eem to be able to claim some support from us,

33Treatise, Bk. I. Ft. IV. sect. v.



CAUSALITY. 329

who have laid down such doctrines as that evil is

not a thing, that impossibility is nonentity, and

that all Being is true. Now, if these teachings

are correct, and especially if Being is essentially

true, the proposition that truth cannot contradict

truth may be turned into Being cannot contradict

Being. The inference is that there are no real

opposites, and that the only opposition is, as Hume

says, between existence and non-existence: henceno real opposition between any cause and any effect,

and so far at least"

anything may produce any

thing."In reply, let us recall what our doctrine has

been. We have taught not that nothing evil is real,

but that the evil qua evil, might be reduced to the

idea ofa

privation. Anillustration

used was that acancer is a real evil to man s body, but that yet the

cancerous growth in itself, as an existence, is not

evil;

its progress is all very well for the cancer.

The evil springs from the relationship ;man and

cancer have not got sufficient powers to enter upon

terms of mutual accommodation, and the good

fortune of the cancer results in deprivation to man.

Two finite perfections may be such as to be essen

tially opposed, and mutually exclusive;but the oppo

sition comes of the finiteness of one or other, or both,

not of their perfection as such. Similarly, our ex

planation of impossible combinations between finite

Beings, each of which was true in itself, left ample

room for contradiction, and positive contradiction,

in falsely asserted conjunctions. When then we,

against Hume, maintain that between certain causes

and certain effects, the opposition may be such as



330 TRANSCENDENTAL &ETNG.

to warrant the argument a priori that certain causes

cannot have certain effects, we speak of an opposi

tion between realities. Such opposition we maycall real, however true it may be that opposition

implies contradiction, and a contradiction is a non

entity, or the intrinsic impossibility of actualization.

So far as no cause can give what it has not got, by

producing something wholly opposed to its nature,

which furnishes the law of its activity, we are right

in the statement that effects must resemble their

causes to the extent in which these causes are pro

ductive of the effects; but we must be careful to

note, if we can, what precisely is this extent.

To sum up results: nothing gives what it has

notgot

:

nothingcan act in a

way quiteunlike its

own nature : therefore every activity must have

a certain likeness to the agent. Now the effect, so

far as it is the effect of this particular agent, is only

that agent s activity as received into some subject :

in this sense, and not in some mysterious sense

which no one can exactly make out, every effect

is like its cause. The likeness must be recognized

simply in the way we have pointed out, not by

trying to make a drawing of it, in any other

manner that is unavailing. The case is analogous

to the likeness of knowledge to its object ;con

sider what true knowledge must mean, and then

observe that likeness expresses the relation ; do not

try to paint the likeness.

(6)" The cause is prior to its effect

"

Prius est

esse quam agere. To the bucolic intelligence the

statement would seem obvious, and the agricultural



CA USAL1TY. 331

labourer would quote in proof of it his spades, hoes,

scythes, and ploughs, which have to be made before

they can be used. The whole substantial thing

exists at least before many of its acts;

still it has

other acts not usually taken into account, which in

point of time are as early as the substance. As far

as we can see, a newly created piece of matter would

be created gravitating; and, indeed,if

we look at

action, not as the production of new "

forms," but

as attraction and repulsion, it seems questionable

whether the elements ever do anything else than act

with one equal intensity from beginning to end, all

difference in effects being due to differences in the

balance of opposing forces, and in their respective

distances. We are told that a weight on a table,

though it does no work, gravitates all the time, and

must have its downward tendency checked by an

antagonist pressure upwards. We are almost quite

in the dark as to the mode of action;but it is a

wholesome reminder to be told not to be too free in

speaking of causes issuing from potency into act, or

of an effect being in fieri and in facto esse, in process

of production and a product. What is taken as

the first issuing forth of activity may be only the

first release of that activity into open mani

festation, and what is taken as the process of one

effect is often the succession of many different

effects. Here once more the case is presented

in which we must be on our guard against taking

a series of causations for one simple causation.

If the fire is considered as the cause, and the

condition of being cooked as the effect, then it




looks as though the effect on a round of beef was &

long time in coming quite an illustration of the

difference between in fieri and in facto esse. But if

ive examine the process more accurately, each factor

of the causation is found to be synchronous with

each factor of the effect. Hence the maxim, Causa

in actu ei effectusin actu sunt simul. It is not, then,

in the order of time, but in the order of nature that

the cause, acting qua cause, must be prior to its

effect. Not that with Lewes we may make the

effect the mere sum-total of the causal agents : for

besides the agents there must be their agencies, real

issuings forth of activity, and it is the sum-total of

these that may be identified with the effect. The

cook who makes a pie efficienter, as efficient cause,

does not make it constitutive, as constituent cause,

or we should often be cannibals at dinner. The

cook is not identified with the cooked materials

or with any part of them, but the cook s agency

which is only a portion of the whole agency

requiredis identified with her effect

uponthe

materials. She really does produce an effect, and

"in the order of nature" the producer is always

prior to the producing, though in time producer

and its production may occasionally have a

simultaneous origin. Herein our doctrine differs

from that of Lewes, who says,34 "

Cause means

unconditional antecedence. The metaphysical con

ception of a cause, the producer of an effect, needs

limitation. We can know nothing of the final

nexus. When we say heat produces expansion, we

34Aristotle, c. iv. pp. 90, 91.



CAUSALITY. 333

simply express the observed facts that one heated body

brought near a colder body begins to contract, and

the other simultaneously begins to expand ; nothing

new has been produced, a mutual change in the

condition of the two bodies has resulted in the

transference of so much motion (heat, expansion)

from one body to another." To effect even a

transference is some sort of real production ; but

what we should give special attention to is, that

on Lewes s showing,"

invariable antecedence"

is

declared not to be antecedence;

or causality is

reduced to antecedence, on the understanding that

the antecedence need not be antecedent. For if

causeand

effect aresimultaneous,

one is not before

the other; there is no precedence where the con

ditioned is simply the sum of the conditions. Hence

Lewes himself adds,"

Rigorously speaking, we must

limit even the expression of necessary sequence, which

is held to express all that is known of causation.

There is no following of effects from causes; but, as

Sir John Herschel more truly says, the causes and

the effects are simultaneous. . . . We say that the

earth s attraction causes the weight of the apple ;but

the weight is. the attraction, they are two aspects of

one unknownreality."

This is awkward in the mouth

of Lewes;but we can easily accommodate ourselves

to circumstances. We say that inasmuch as action

is productively exercised by a substance which is

the causal agent, the cause is prior, at least"

in the

order of nature," to the effect;but the causality is

contemporaneous with its effect not necessarily

with the whole result which is roughly denominated!




effect for the two are the same thing under different

aspects.Thus we at

anyrate are free from certain

grave difficulties which beset the empiricist, for

whom causality ought always to mean antecedence

in time.

(c) "The same cause, under the same circum

stances, always has the same effect." An ambiguity

here lies in the word "

circumstances." As before,

we found"

attribute"

taking the place of its

opposite, "essence" or "substance," so that we got

"essential" or "substantial attributes," and as we

found"

accidents"

having their own inferior kind

of "essences," so that we could speak of the

essence of some accidental property being so and

so ; similarly now,"

circumstance"

comes to usurp

the whole field to itself. At last we ask in bewilder

ment," Where is that round which something else

stands?" Now, if we take man s free choice as this

central point, then it forms an exception to the rule,

"The same cause, under the same circumstances,

always has the same effect," provided we further

understand cause as"

agent,"and not as

"

agency,"

as that which acts, and not as one definite mode

of its activity. But apart from liberty of choice

in all other causes the rule holds both of agent

and of agency. It is true that exposure to what

wemay suppose

the same climate is said togive

different men different diseases, and other men

no disease at all; but even if we allowed the

exposure to be exactly the same for all, yet the men

exposed differ vastly one from another. Hence if

genetically" man

"

an4"

climate"

are the constants,



CAUSALITY. 335

in the concrete we have not the same "

circum

stances." In what is called the "plurality of

causes" or the doctrine that one effect may be

due to a variety of causes, we must distinguish two

things its bearing on practical science and its

bearing on philosophic analysis of what precisely

causality is. On practical science the result may

often be very prohibitive, because, at least so far as

we can detect, a given effect may be due to any one

of a multitude of causes. The obstacle is real,

though its reality may be exaggerated.35

Next, in

abstract philosophy, the case is still a difficulty.

An angel, a human arm, or an explosive mixture

mayeach

givethe same rate of

velocityto a missile :

if we identify the causality with the effect, so far it

looks as though in each cause the causality was the

same, though certainly the three causes were very

different. The more we go into the details, into

the several modes of producing motion, into the

difference between agent as acting, action, and

effect, the more we find opportunity for raising

questions. And yet, after all, we may defend our

original statement as true. For whatever maybe the correct doctrine about the

"

plurality of

causes,"M

that is a matter which affects only the

35

Mr. Balfour s Defence of Philosophic Doubt, c. iv. pp. 56, 57.

Newton made it his second "rule ofphilosophizing," effectuum

naturalium ejusdem generis eeedem sunt causa.

36 Mr. Bain says,"

It seems to me, if I may venture an opinion,

that for the present the vicariousness of causes must be practically

recognized, at least in the more complex sciences; but that the

particularity of causes, if I may use the expression, is really true,"

(Logic,Vol. II. pp. 16, seq., pp. 76, sec}.)




tracing back of special results to special causes;

it is

an empirical process, an investigation a posteriori.

Whereas our proposition is general, its procedure is

in the reverse direction, from causes to effects;

its

truth is a priori. We affirm that given a necessary

cause which has fixed laws of action, then if that

cause exerts itself under conditions that are just

alike, its ownprecise

effect will bejust

alike.

Otherwise we should have indeterminism in Physics,

and contradiction in Metaphysics. It is raising

quite an irrelevant issue to remark, that never, in

the whole history of the cosmos, are exactly the

like circumstances repeated ; they approximate near

enough to identity for all practical purposes.

(d)"

On the cessation of the cause the effect

sometimes ceases, sometimes not." When Keats

desired to have as his epitaph," Here lies one whose

name is writ in water," he evidently distinguished

the effect which perishes at once from that which

endures. What is it that makes the difference ?

In the world of mind, according to some, there are

no passing effects, but all are permanently stored

up in memory; such at least is a theory which

Hamilton adopts.37 But if we take the world of

matter, then probably our best guides are the laws

of motion, according to which no effect ceases,

except when it meets with some counteracting cause

whereby it suffers transmutation. By the force

87Metaphysics, Lect. xxxiii. p. 211 Lotze suggests a somewhat

opposite theory, which gives the soul an internal power to repress

the various motions stored up within it. (Metaphysics, Bk. III.

C. ii- 26.)



CAUSALITY. 337

of gravitation waters just divided close up again ;

the wind obliterates traces on the sand ; the Londonatmosphere eats away carvings on stone

;and the

whole question of endurance appears as one of the

absence of opposing forces. We are not justified

in saying positively that local movement is the

only effect producible by matter; even in those

scienceswhich

aremathematically

reducible to

modes of motion, these modes need not be the

whole effect;

still the laws of motion seem to give

us the best criterion we can find for judging about

the nature of permanency in material effects. A

German philosopher, Herbart, has largely used the

analogy of impact between material particles to

illustrate the process by which ideas are checked

by ideas;

but it is only an analogy and is over

worked.

On the whole we must admit that the saying," On the cessation of the cause, the effect ceases,"

is only as a piece of popular philosophy, and that

it needs to be explained, and even explained away.

The axioms about causality so far discussed are

typical instances;and what we have laid down in

their regard will serve for the elucidation of others,

such as that the"

effect cannot excel its cause."

Throughout, the principles on which we must fall

back are especially two given by St. Thomas, thatbetween the agent and the patient there must be

some sort of difference, and that yet action and

passion are one thing under different relations.

" The thing under the same aspect cannot be both

in act and in potency :

" " When something effects

w




an alteration in itself, it is not agent and patient,

mover and moved under the same aspect ;

" w

"Action and passion are the same entity, and differ

only according to their different relations."39 So

teaches St. Thomas, though because of other

passages,40

his meaning is not undisputed. In the

utterance last quoted, which contains a principle to

which we have often recurred, he is but repeating

doctrine to be found in Aristotle, who said 41 that

"action and passion and motion are the samething"

TTpWTOV fJ,V &>? TOV dVTOV OZ>TO9 TOUTCCLGytlV Kal

rov KiveicrOai Kal TOV evepyeiv Xeycopev. Mr.Wallace 42

thus translates the whole passage :

"

Let us in the

first place agree to regard in our discussion the

words passive impression, movement, and activity asidentical: for movement is a species of realized

activity, though it is imperfect. Now in every

instance things are impressed and set in movement

by something which is capable of producing an

impression, and which exists in fullactivity. And

thus animpression

is in one sense madeby

the

like, in another sense by the unlike;

for it is as

unlike that anything suffers an impression ; after

the impression has been made, it is converted into

like." In this sense it is said that while the effect

must be like its cause, the agent, as such, must be

unlike the patient, as such;

and yet the agent

must have a nature conformable or like to its own

activities.

88 In Metaphysics, Lib. IX. c. i. Lect. i.39 Sum. i. q. xlix. a. ii. ad 2.

40 Contra Gent. Lib. II. c. ix. ;De Potentia, q. vii. a. ix. ad 7.

41 De Anima, Lib. V- c. iii.42 Aristotle s Psychology, p. 87.



CAUSALITY. 339

(e) "A cause is more than a condition." This

saying is of a different type from those previously

explained, and leads some people to a hazy and

erroneous idea, that a condition may positively do

something, without being a cause. We must try to

distinguish different senses.

The most pure instance of a condition is one

which does nothing, but consists in the mere

absence of an obstacle. Thus a window is a con

dition of seeing, because it does not impede the

course of light ;it may be a simple hole, as in more

primitive buildings, or it may be glass, inasmuch

as it has the negative quality of not appreciably

obstructing the luminiferous waves. But the best

glass gives no light of its own, as we may verify

for ourselves at night, when the candles are out.

The second case of a"

condition," is one where

the reality does something positive, but, as a

cause, it is so comparatively inferior in rank, or

so far removed from the final result as not to

be reckoned among the causes. This is instanced

by the oft-quoted relation of the bellows-blower to

the organist. The former has positively to cause

something, but his work is unskilled labour, and he

is not the immediate producer of the musical sound.

If we were so inclined we might also call the

organista condition

;

for heonly opens

the vents

and lets the imprisoned air act on the tubes;

but

because it requires much skill to press the keys

in the ways required, the actions are dignified with

the title of principal causes. The remoteness of the

organ-builders, or of the musical composer from




the actual playing at the time, would lower them

to"

conditions," though in point of dignity they

might claim to be causes.

A third meaning of"

condition"

refers to a

moral agent, who is not simply made to act upon

the fulfilment of certain"

conditions," but chooses

to act where these motives are presented. Thus,

the grace of God is sometimes"

conditioned"

by

certain acts on the part of man, though there is

no obligation, not even one consequent on a promise

given. If not the free acts only, at least the free

acts especially, of a moral agent deserve to be

styled acts dependent on conditions.

We conclude that in reference to a moral agent,

so far as his action is distinctively moral, a condition furnishes a requirement without which he

will not act : while in reference to physical agency

as such, a condition is either a remote or a com

paratively insignificant cause, or else it is the

absence of a possible obstacle.

Anoccasion is a

conjunctionof

causes,efficient

and material. Those who speak of the evolution

of our solar systems from a primitive nebula, have

noticed that not only the primitive elements of

matter in such a nebula need to be accounted for,

but that likewise their collocation, their arrange

ment, their distribution, is a distinct fact about

them, of which some account should be rendered.

Now an occasion answers to this collocation : it

always must have a distinct cause, but in itself

we regard it as an incident of causation, not as

SL cause. If on the occasion when a flower is ready



CAUSALITY. 341

to scatter its seeds a high wind arises, they are

dispersedall

the further;

if

onthe

occasion whena tile falls from a roof a man is passing just

under the spot where it falls, he is injured. Our

ordinary practice is, to take the conjunction of

two or more causes which we regard as practically

independent, to ignore the cause or causes which

have brought them into conjunction, and then, to

speak of their combination as occasional. In the

example of a free agent, he may choose his occasions

because of their special fitness to his purpose, and

they may become conditions of his action.

We forbear further illustration of the maxims

of causality. We fail indeed to explain some of

the points which they suggest because our know

ledge of the mode of causality is very limited;

nevertheless, we are able to sustain our main pro

position, which is, that we can make sure of real

causes in the created universe.


(i) The promised account of the three doctrine*

about causality which are to be found in Hume, must

now be given.

(i.)In proof of the first of the three assertions, that

often Hume only argues that our knowledge of causes

is aposteriori, not a

priori,

it is

enoughto refer to the

Essays, sect. vii. Part I. Here it will be seen that he

is working out his principle, that " when we know a

power we know the very circumstance in the cause bywhich it is enabled to produce the effect

;so that from

3uch knowledge we should be able to predict, apart




from experience, all that the power is able to effect."

His arguments tend not to disprove real causality, but

merely to show that while we are made aware of muchreal activity, yet we never penetrate into the secrets

of its nature. For lack of the perfect knowledge of

power in its inmost character, he renounces his claim

even to the imperfect knowledge, which, nevertheless,

he perpetually supposes. He says, for example, of our

inner experiences, that "if by consciousness we per

ceived any power or energy, we must know this power ;

we must know the secret union of soul and body, and

the nature of both these substances." The assumption

is more than a trifle extravagant, that unless a man

knows all about power he knows no power at all. It

is the old story of the "hidden essence" and the

" hidden substratum," which we considered when

treating of essence and substance; nothing is known

because something is hidden.

(ii.)Our second statement about Hume, that the

"impression"of force or power is given by no single

experience, but only by repeated experiences, is proved

by citation from Part II. of the same Essay, which

may be copied out with little comment;

it contains the

pith of his whole theory, and should be carefully read :

" We have sought in vain for any idea of power,

or necessary connexion, in all the sources from which

we could suppose it to be derived. It appears that in

single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can,

bv our utmost scrutiny, discover anything but one

event following another; without being able to com

prehend any force or power, by which the cause

operates ;or any connexion between it and its supposed

effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating

[singly] the operations of mind on body, where we

observe the motion of the latter to follow on the



CAUSALITY. 343

volition of the former, but are not able to observe nor

conceive the tie which binds together the motion and

the volition. The authority of the will over- its ownfaculties and ideas is not one whit more comprehensible."

After examining the operations of outer body uponouter body, of will upon our own body, and of will upon

the mind s own actions, he pronounces that," on the

whole, there appears not any one instance of connexion

which is conceivable by us." So he repeats the old

blunder of confounding together the knowledge of a

fact, and the knowledge of its inmost nature;because

he cannot conceive the how (St,6n) of the connexion,

he cannot affirm the that (on) that there is a con

nexion. Hence he continues, "All events seem entirely

loose and separate ;one event follows upon another,

but we never can observe any tie between them."

Then he draws his conclusion, that from single experiences

there is no "

impression ofpower,"

and consequently

no "idea." What he fails to find in single instances,

he next proceeds to seek and find in the repetition of

many similar instances. From neglect of this part of the

theory, some report Hume as wholly denying that we

have the impression of power from any source. Whereas

his words are clear :"

There is nothing in a number of

instances different from every single instance, which is

supposed to be exactly similar, except only that after

the repetition of similar instances the mind is carried by

habit, upon appearance of one event, to expect its usual

attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This con

nexion, therefore, which we feelin the mind, or customary

transition of the imagination from one object to its usual

attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we

form the idea of power or necessary connexion."

(iii.)The third point that remains to be shown

is the manner in which Hume arrives at no objective




knowledge of causality, strictly so called, but only at

invariable sequence, and that in the subjective order

of feelings. The passages in support of this inter

pretation are embarrassingly numerous. Let us begin

with the following:1 " Reason can never show us the

connexion of one object with another, though aided

by experience and observations of their constant con

junction in all past instances." Therefore, whatever

be the way in which Hume arrives at causal con

nexion, it is not by the way of reason; and that is

an important declaration, though afterwards what it

says is unsaid. " When the mind passes from the

idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief

of another, it is not determined by reason, but by certain

principles which associate together the ideas of these objects,

and unite them in the imagination. Had ideas no more

union in the fancy than objects have in the understanding,

we could never draw any inferences from causes to

effects, nor repose belief in any matter of fact. The

inference, therefore, depends solely on the union of ideas." In

strict logic, he assures us, each new revision of our

judgments should go on diminishing their probability,

which was all they had to start with, till at last every

vestige of

probability

is lost.

Logically

this shouldbe;but nature is too strong for Logic, and the only good we

get out of considering what Logic has to object against

our way of procedure is, that it" makes the reader

more sensible that all our reasonings concerning causes

and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and

that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than

of the cogitative part of our nature." For the result of

reflexion being such that it gradually" reduces the

original evidence tonothing,"

the inference is that 8

"if belief were only a simple act of thought, without

1Trtatise, Bk. I. Pt. II. sect. vi. Ibid Pt. IV. sect. i.



CA USALITY. 345

any peculiar manner of conception or addition of force

and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself." Never

theless, since each one,"

though he can find no error

in the foregoing arguments, yet continues to believe as

usual, he may safely conclude that reasoning5 and belief

is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception, which tis

impossible for mere ideas and reflexions todestroy."

Thus the reason which Hume sets over against mere

modes of sensation or feeling, in the end is reduced to a

mode of feeling ; and the principle of causality, which

reason cannot prove, is declared to be reasonable,

because reason after all is not reason, but a kind of

sentiment which is natural to us, and which it is

useless logically to dispute, though logical disputation,

if employed, is fatal to its claims. We know causality

by a process which both is not reasonable and is

reasonable: it is not reasonable, because reason is

logical, and Logic pronounces against causality ;it

is reasonable, because reason is a kind of feeling, and

we have a"feeling

"

of causality. If these exhibitions

of fatuity should do anything towards making apparentthe chaos of confusion into which Hume precipitates

himself, the effect on the appreciation of much modern

philosophy will be highly useful; for this last is not

radically better than that of Hume which it aims at

slightly improving.

It is well that we should thus be brought across

Hume s wavering tendency between making knowledgea matter of " natural

propensity,"and distinguishing

"naturalpropensity" from knowledge. He says,

4

" After the most accurate of all my reasonings, I can

give no reason why I should assent to it;and feel

nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects

strongly under that view under which they appear to

9 Note this word. 4Treatise, Pt. IV. sect. vii.



346 TtiANSCENbENtAL

me." And his final decision, given almost at the end

of the First Book, takes this

shape:

"Where reason

is lively and mixes itself up with some propensity it ought

to be assented to;where it does not, it can never have

any title to operate upon us." If some should think

that this is only a clumsy expression of the truth, that

ultimately we must believe because of felt conviction,

they have only to consider the application to our

present subject

of

causality,

andthey

will see how

Hume makes it the very triumph of his system, that it

holds equally for the animals below man and for man

himself. Once more our vouchers shall be Hume s

own words. He has to explain the necessity of con

nexion, which forms part of our notion of causation ;

and here is his explanation:5

"The idea of necessity

must be derived from some internal

impression.

There

is no internal impression which has relation to the

present business, but that propensity which custom produces

to pass from one object to the idea of its usual attendant.

This, therefore, is the essence of necessity. Upon the

whole, necessity is something which exists in the mind, not in

objects ;6 nor is it possible for us ever to form the most

distant idea of it, considered as aquality

in bodies.

Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is the

determination of the thought to pass from causes to

effects, and from effects to causes, according to their

experienced union." Then he adds 7 as " an invincible

proof"

of his system of explanation, that it applies to

the knowledge both of man and beast. He is aware

that this

theoryis of all his

paradoxes

8 " the most

violent," and very much against "the inveterate pre-

5Treatise, Bk. I. Pt. III. sect. xiv.

6 Hence Mr. Huxley says,"

Necessity is a shadow of the mind s

own throwing."

7Treatise, Bk I. Pt. III. sect. xvi.

8Ibid. sect. xiv.



CAUSALITY. 347

judices of mankind;" yet he makes bold to maintain

it notwithstanding. In regard to causality, he asks us

to believe, on the one side, that as far as reason can see,

"

anything may produce anything ; creation, annihila

tion, motion, reason, volition" all these may arise from

one another, or from any other object we can imagine,

on the other side " we infer a cause immediately from

its effect, and this inference is not only a truespecies of

reasoning, but more convincing than when we interpose

another term to connect the two."9

Evidently Humehas two sorts of reason, and the marvel about them is,

that one of them is irrational yet valid, while the other

is rational yet invalid.

Of Hume s recent followers we will take only one,

Mill, who felt that his leader s definition of cause was

inadequate. The definition stood: "The cause is an

object followed by another, and where all the objects

similar to the first are followed by objects similar to

the second;" or " a cause is an object followed by

another, and whose appearance always conveys the

thought of that other." Mill saw that this clumsy

formula, so far as it provided for anything, pro

vided only for invariable sequence, and invariable

sequence need not be causality; hence he added the

word "unconditional," and said that causality was" invariable and unconditional sequence."

10Day may

have invariably followed upon night, without thereby

proving itself the effect of the latter, for it is conditioned

"on the existence of the sun or some such luminous

body, and on there being no opaque medium between

that body and the part of the earth where we are

situated;these are the sole conditions, and the union

of these, without any superfluous (?)n

circumstance,

9Treatise, Bk. I. Pt. III. sect. xv.

10Logic, Bk. III. c. v. 5.

u Does "

superfluous" mean "additional

"

?




constitutes the cause." All the advance which Mill

here makesupon

Hume, is that he secures attention to

a completer enumeration of the several parts of the

antecedent;

but having provided for this completer

enumeration, he leaves causality in the category of

mere invariable sequence, without any productive

power. He has pointed12 out with a great deal of good

sense, that what we generally call" the cause," is only

a

part

of it, and he adds that,adequately

taken," the

cause is the sum-total of the conditions, positive and

negative, taken together; the whole of the contingencies

of every description, which being realized, the con

sequent invariably follows." The practical difficulty is

to know where to stop in the attempt at such an

exhaustive method of enumeration;for it would carry

us back to thebeginning

of theworld;

and the fact

that we must break off a long way short of this initial

point has formed one link in the argument of some

who assert that our propositions about nature, because

we can never perfectly isolate one truth from its con

nexions, must be hypothetical, not categorical. In his

own writings, and in the very place we are discussing,

Millexemplifies

theincompleteness

which he is con

demning. For he is satisfied with the presence of a

luminous body and the absence of an opaque medium,

as constituting the conditions of day ;whereas there is

further need of a transmissive medium, such as the

luminiferous ether. Again, so long as he assigns no

exact meaning to the word "

day,"it is impossible to

decide whether, even apart from the omissionof the

ether, he is right in calling a luminous body, and the

absence of an opaque medium between it and the earth,

rather " the cause ofday,"

than day itself. Some

people call it"

day,"even though a solar eclipse should

" L.c. 3.



CAUSALITY. 349

be going on between sunrise and sunset;and in that

case one of Mill s "invariable antecedents" to the

undefined consequent"

day," has taken the liberty to

vary. In a later chapter of the same book (c.xix.

i),

Mill gives his account of day in other words :

"

Day is

not the cause of night : both are successive effects of

a common cause, the periodical passage of the spectator

into and out of the earth s shadow consequent on the

earth s rotation and on the illuminating property of the

sun."

But our main objection to Mill is that he denies our

knowledge of efficient causality, without which his

"

invariable and unconditional sequence"can never be

rationally deduced from any amount of experience.

His improvement on the position of Hume is only one

of very superficial appearances.

(2) Brown, in his Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and

Effect, clearly ranges himself on the side of those who

reduce causality to a matter of invariable sequence.

In Part I. sect. i. we read,"

It is the mere relation of

uniform antecedence, so important and so universally

believed, which appears to me to constitute all that

can be philosophically meant in the words power and

causation, to whatever objects, material or spiritual, the

words may be applied. ... A cause, therefore, in the

fullest definition that it philosophically admits, may be

said to be that which precedes any change, and which,

existing at any time in similar circumstances, has always

been, and will always be, immediately followed by a

similar change. Priority in the sequence observed, and

invariableness of antecedence in the past and future

sequences supposed, are the elements, and the only

elements, combined in the notion of a cause." In re

ing what he conceives to be a definition, which

power something more than invariable antecede




describes such power as "something mysterious, at once

a part of the antecedence and yet not a part of it, an

intermediate link in a chain of physical sequences, that

is yet itself no part of the chain, of which it is said,

notwithstanding, to be a link." Finally, in Part III.

sect. v. he sets forth his view of the origin of our belief

in uniform sequence or causation, which he attributes

neither to perception nor to reasoning, nor to Hume s

"customary

association of ideas," but to aspecial

intuition or instinct implanted by the Creator." That

with a providential view to the circumstances in which

we are placed, our Divine Author has endowed us with

certain instinctive tendencies, is as true as that He has

endowed us with reason itself. We feel no astonish

ment in considering these when we discover the

manifest

advantagethat arises from them

;and of all

the instincts with which we could be endowed there is

not that which seems I will not say so advantageous,

merely but so indispensable for the very continuance

of our being, as that which points out to us the

future, if I may so speak, before it has already begun

to exist. It is wonderful indeed for what is not

wonderful? that the internal revelation which this

belief involves, should be given us like a voice of cease

less and unerring prophecy. But when we consider who

it was that formed man, then difficulty vanishes." This

completes the positive statement of Brown s own view;

but in the Fourth Part, where he proceeds to explain

and reject Hume s theory, he ought to have been more

struckby

words sovery

like his

own,as are these from

the Inquiry, Part II. sect, vii.: "What stronger instance

can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weak

ness of the understanding than the present ? For

surely if there be any relation among objects, which it

imports us to know perfectly, tis that of cause and



CAUSALITY. 351

effect." Yet observation and reasoning are declared

incompetent to produce this belief: we owe it to the

instinctive force of custom, in which "those who delight

in the discovery and contemplation of final causes have

ample subject to employ their admiration." (sect, v

in fine.)



CHAPTER IV.

RELATION, SPACE, AND TIME.

Synopsis.

(1)A mean to be sought between English empiricism and the

a priori forms of Kant.

(2)The Relative and the Absolute.

(3) Space.

(4)Time.


(i) WE are now about to enter upon questions on

which once more differences of theory about the

origin of knowledge make themselves very con

spicuously felt. To the pure empiricist, Relation,

Space, and Time are ideas that result from complex

conditions of sensation ; to the Kantian they are

a priori forms;

to us they are general ideas which

have a foundation in experience, but are generalized

only by the abstracting intellect.

We will begin with our English empirics. To

the mind that loves concrete images, and does not

see the need of any subtler inquiries, the Aristoteliantreatment of Relation, Space, and Time seems

singularly obscure in contrast to the plain handling

of the subject by Brown, who gives us a vivid

picture of an infant brandishing its little arms and

kicking about its little legs in Space and Time. It



RELATION, SPACE, AND TIME. 353

thus acquires feelings of relation;and the feeling of

the relations of co-existence give the notion of Space,

while the feelings of the relations of succession give

the notion of Time. 1

And yet we have but to read on a little, and we

shall find the plain terms of the empirical school

giving place to obscurities on each of the three

ideas which we want to investigate. Each becomes

matter of controversy, and this fact it is well to

bring out, for the benefit of those who fancy that the

experience philosophy has made quite plain what

centuries of scholasticism only involved in deeper and

deeper obscurity. As to the first, Brown himself2

draws a distinction between"

feelings which arise

in simple succession, without involving any notion

of the relation of preceding feelings,"and therefore

are called"

phenomena of simple suggestion ;

"

and,

on the other hand,"

feelings which consist in the

mere perception of relation," and therefore are called

"

phenomena of relative suggestion."Mr. Spencer

concursin

making muchof these

"

feelingsof rela

tion," as distinct from the mere feelings which are

related. John S. Mill, however, declares,8 " The

simplest of all cases of relation are those expressed

by the word antecedent and consequent, and by

the word simultaneous. If we say, for instance,

that the dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in which

the two things, dawn and sunrise, were jointly con

cerned, consisted only of the two things themselves ;

no third thing entered into the fact or phenomena at all.

1

Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lect. xxiii.

8 Ibid. c. xlv. in initio. Logic, Bk. I. c. iii. 10,

X




Unless indeed we choose to call the succession of the two

objectsa third

thing: but their succession is not

somethingadded to the things themselves, it is something involved in

them. Our consciousness of the succession of these sensa

tions is not a third sensation or feeling added to them : we

have not first the two feelings, and then a feeling of their

succession. To have two feelings at all implies having

them successively or else simultaneously. Sensa

tions, or other feelings being given, succession and

simultaneousness are the two conditions, to the

alternative of which they are subjected by the

nature of our faculties;and no one has been able,

or needs expect, to analyze the matter any further."

The writer s doctrine of relativity would seem to

compel him to use this language. His colleague,

Mr. Grote, takes an intermediate or a conciliatory

view.4 He objects to the elder Mill for calling Space

and Time abstract terms. In regard to Time, for

instance, he thinks those wrong who call it"

an

abstract name for the pastness, the presentness, and

the futureness of our successive feelings," instead of"

a collective name for our feeling of their suc

cession"

that is, for what James Mill himself calls

the part of the process"

which consists in being

sensible to their successiveness," to express which,

he declares," we have not a name." Grote, then,

continues his commentprecisely

on thepoint uponwhich we are examining the divergent doctrines of

the empirical school namely, upon their views as

to that which it pleases them to style the feeling of

relation."

This taking notice of the successiveness

4 Note to James Mill s Analysis, Vol. II. p. 134.




of our feelings, whether we prefer to call it a part oj

the

feelings themselves,or another

feeling superaddedto

them, is yet something which, in the entire mass of

feeling which the successive impressions give us, we

are able to discriminate and to name apart from the

rest. A perception of succession between two feel

ings is a state of consciousness per se, which, though

we cannot think of it separately from the feelings,

we can yet think of it as a completed thing in itself,

and not as an attribute of either or both of the two

feelings. Its name, if it had one, would be a con

crete name. But the entire series of these per

ceptions of succession has a name Time, which I,

therefore, hold to be a concrete name." For those

who take an intelligent interest in these discussions,

and who are not indulging simply the delusion that

they can freely pronounce upoin. them, without any

real work in the way of study, it cannot but be strik

ing to observe how empiricism is not such plain

sailing as to the superficial reader it appears. Even

on one of the ideas which is so all-important in its

system as is Relation, obscurities begin to make

themselves felt, and some of the minutiae, which are

popularly supposed to be mere scholastic subtleties,

are equivalently acknowledged to call for an exami

nation into their nature.

Again, the assertion that Space may be analyzed

into relations of co-existent feelings, and Time into

relations of successive feelings, does not satisfy

some of the empirics themselves. To start with,

co-existent feeling obviously need not give spacial

co-existence;and if it fails to give Space, it fails tq




give just what was required of it. To say that one

feeling is outside another simply in the sense of other

or different from it, does not furnish the outsideness of

Space. The idea of co-existence is by Mr. Spencer5

analyzed into the idea of succession under special

circumstances. His tendency to regard conscious

ness as made up rather of successive than of co

existent states, naturally leads him to pronounce the

feeling of succession to be more primitive than the

feeling of co -existence, and to derive the latter from

the former. Of things exciting successive sensations

we are able, on his theory, to predicate co-existence

on condition that we are able to reverse the order of

succession. Thus a cow and a horse co-exist, if at

will we can pass without strain and with vividness

from horse to cow and from cow to horse;and the

same holds of the several objects that make up an

outspread landscape. The objects are represented

by successive sensations, but the power to vary the

order of succession proves their co-existence.

Lastly, not to be diffuse in these illustrations of

the differences between empiric doctrines, we maymention that while he does not give up the above

analysis of Space and Time as wrong, Mr. Bain

does admit that there is a certain inadequacy in it,

so that he is not so peremptory in his condemnation

of innate ideas as some might expect. He contentshimself with affirming that there is no proved necessity

to have recourse to so unwelcome a theory, and that

future labours may complete an analysis which at

present is incomplete.6

*Pyschology, pp. 222224.

6 Mental Science, Bk II. c. vi. 4




So much by way of specimen from the empiri

cists. On the other side, Kant boldly ranks Rela

tion, Space, and Time among the a priori categories

of the mind which no experience could give, and

which no valid ground in reason warrants us in

applying to things-in-themselves, as they exist out

side the mind. Hegelians abolish the things-in-

themselves, but do not on that account succeed in

giving a real basis to these fundamental conceptions.

To teach equivalently that there is no reality but

thought, will not satisfy those who are bent on

seeking a more genuine reality for their thoughts

than the undoubted fact that thought itself is real.

Our course will be a mean. We shall rely

neither upon mere accumulated, related sensations,

nor upon innate forms;but we shall take such ideas

as they arise out of experience, in a mind that has

the consciously possessed power of seeing into what

is objectively evident, and recognizing it as the

real.

(2)There is almost a

superstitionconnected

with the term Relation : indeed superstition consists

in asserting a relation between two objects which is

out of all proportion, so that the effect assigned to a

cause is quite beyond its natural powers. It is,

therefore, superstitious to think that a man s destiny

is settled by the star under which he is born. Mill

has much right on his side when he affirms his

inability"

to see in what respect Relation is some

thing more recondite than any other attribute ;

indeed it seems to be so in a somewhat less

degree."




A relation is defined to be the way one thing

holds itself in regard to another habitudo unius adalterum. It therefore requires three elements, that

which is related, that to which it is related, and

that whereby the relation is constituted; The first

is the subject, the second the term, and the third the

foundation of the relation. All agree in making the

subject and the foundation intrinsic to the relation :

but the term to which the subject is related, is by

some deemed extrinsic, inasmuch as it is that to

which the relation is directed, not the relation

itself. At least in all created things a relationship

can be reversed, the term becoming subject and the

subject becoming term; in which process we must

observe whether the same denomination applies to

both members, as when A is brother to B, and B

is brother to A, or whether the denomination is

different, as when A is father to B, and B is son to

A : as also whether both members are existent, or

one existent and the other merely ideal.

The conditions of a real relation are easily

assignable ;there must be a real distinction between

the subject and the term at least such distinction

as holds between a whole and its part and the

foundation must be real. There is, however, an

ambiguity about the foundation;sometimes it is

considered inadequately asit affects

the subject only,at other times it is considered adequately as it affects

the term also. In the real relation of teacher to

taught the adequate foundation is all that passes

mutually between master and pupil in their re

spective characters as such. Thus we are thrown



RELATION, SPACE, AND TIME. 35$

back on a remark like that which we had to make

in reference to causation ; what we roughly speak

of as simply"

the cause"

often includes a multi

plicity of causes, and what we roughly speak of

as simply"

the relation"

often includes a multi

plicity of relations. A sculptor s relation to the

statue which he produces entails every single stroke

of his chisel, and more besides. Indeed, whenever

we have a difficulty about a relationship, the obstacle

is not from the special nature of relation as such, but

from obscurity as to the facts involved in a particular

case.

Real as a relation may be, it is often true that,

as the formation of it is a past event, it is only by

its preservation in the memory that it can be known.We cannot read in a man s outward frame that

another has been in past time a benefactor to him.

Still the relation is real, not merely mental. A

mental relation is one which is not constituted

except by an act of the mind distinguishing in

objectswhat is not

reallydistinct.

Thus,accord

ing to our view, the relation between the indi

viduality in a living man and his specific nature,

as that nature exists in the concrete, is mental, for

there is no real distinction between the two. Also,

it is said that the relation between object known

and person knowing, though real on the side of

the latter, is not so on the side of the former,

because this is in no way altered by the fact. Aman is neither fatter or leaner simply for being

known. Nevertheless, inasmuch as a material object

acts on the senses to produce a knowledge of itself,




it establishes a real causal relation on its own part.

Also the relation of similitude between any idea andits object, though it comes under the definition of

mental relation so far as it is"

constituted by the

mind," yet is not described by these words in their

intended signification ;it is rather a real relation,

for the idea is real : its object is real and really

other than the idea, and the foundation is real.

Besides real and mental relations, philosophers

also enumerate on another principle of division

transcendental and predicamental. The former are

so called because they are found in all things

without exception ; everything by its own nature,

without additional modification, bears some rela

tionship. This is true even of God, as we see in

the revealed doctrine of the Blessed Trinity. It

is true that the schoolmen are not uniform in their

account of the "transcendental"

relation;but the

simplest way is to take it as we have said, for a

relation which is essential to a thing because it is

what it is. Thereby the contrast is brought out, for

the opposite to transcendental is the predicamental

relation, an accident which may come and go, and

which derives its name from the fact that it is the

vrpo?TI of the Aristotelian predicamenta. Such a

relation is one that may or may not be present,

thatis not

simplyessential to its

subject,but

superinduced upon it, not necessary to it, but con

tingent, as to be President of the United States,

whatever be a man s inborn ability for that office.

Next we may inquire whether anything can be

purely a relation and not also something absolute.



RELATION, SPACE, AND 7IME. 361

Some of the schoolmen go near to affirming a purely

relative thing when they assert that a real relation

is a sort of diminutive entity, intermediate between

the terms related, and really distinct from each and

from the foundation of the relationship. It seems

better to submit this doctrine to the edge of

Ockam s razor, Entities are not to be multiplied

unnecessarily. But we may go further, and say that

all relation is founded on the absolute, and no

purely relative Being can exist. Absolute, how

ever, has a variety of meanings which need some

discrimination. It may mean the independent, that

which in reference to any other is absolved or free

from all tie or obligation both physical and moral :

and so it wouldapply pre-eminently

to God. It

maymean also that which is complete in its own nature,

which is finished and perfect : God again is thus ab

solute inasmuch as He is infinite perfection. But as

opposed simply to the relative, the absolute is that

which is taken in itself and on its own account. Every

thing in the order of logical if not of chronological

priority, first of all is, and then is in reference to some

thing else : it has thus its absolute and its relative

aspect, and the one cannot be without the other.

Of course before a real relationship is complete there

must be some real other to complete it;and this is

all the truth that is to be found in Locke s words,7

"

Relation is not contained in the real existence of

things, but is something extraneous and super

induced." Every absolute thing has its foundation

on account of which it is apt to enter into a trans

7 Bk. II. c. xv. n. 8.




cendental relation, without any change in itself, as

soon as the other term is posited ; also by means of

of various activities and passivities a variety of ether

relationships can be contracted. But in every case

there is no reality beyond the absolute agents and

the absolute activities and passivities, though these

at the same time that they are absolute are also

relative.

Thereis

nocontradiction

here,for it is

under different aspects that they are at once abso

lute and relative. They exist each of them in their

own nature, but they exist each in connexion with

other natures. So much is admitted even by so

stout a defender of the relativity of all knowledge

as Mr. Spencer, with the exception that he allows

us only an "obscure consciousness," not strictly

a"

knowledge"

of the absolute element." The

existence of the non-relative," he says,"

is un

avoidably asserted in every chain of reasoning by

which relativity isproved."

8

Here is an appropriate place to declare our

objection to the Hegelian doctrine that the mind

is the only relating faculty, while all objects of sense

are isolated and without order. We object also to

the excess of relativity in writers like Mr. Bain,

who, much probably to his own dissatisfaction,

has been claimed on this score as a Hegelian."

I

end with the remark," says Mr. F. H. Bradley,9

"

that it wouH be entertaining and an irony of fate

if the school of experience fell into the cardinal

mistake of Hegel. Professor Bain s Law of Rela

tivity, apprc^d by J. S. Mill, has at least shown

8Psychology, P 1. c. Hi. 88. 9

Principles of Logic, pp. 148, 149.




a tendency to drift in that direction. Our cog

nition,as it

stands,is

explainedas a mutual

negationof the two properties. Each has a positive existence

because of the presence of the other as its negative.

I do not suggest that Professor Bain in this ominous

utterance really means what he says, but he means

quite enough to be on the edge of a precipice. If

the school of experience had any knowledge of facts,

they would know that the sin of Hegel consists, not

at all in defect, but in excess of Relativity. Once

say with Professor Bain that* we know only rela

tions : once mean (what he says) that those relations

hold between positives and negatives, and you have

accepted the main principle of orthodox Hegel-

ianism."

The safe course is to give each side its due:

individual objects are absolutely in themselves, but

they are not only absolute; they also enter into

real relations of causality and dependence, of

likeness and unlikeness. The same things are

both absolute and relative ;

and in a closely inter

connected world like ours, where actions and

re-actions are so multiplex, where the transforma

tions of energy are so perpetual, attention has of

late been so much called to the relative aspects of

things, that the absolute have been either over

looked or denied, in spite of the pretty obvious

truth, that the relative implies the absolute.

(3) In turning next to the predicament or cate

gory Ubi Where, we come across the idea of Space,

about which so much mystery has been made, and

so much also really must exist. For we ourselves




fully allow the very imperfect knowledge we havts

on this subject, as is

proved bycertain

puzzlingquestions that can be proposed, and also by certain

mysteries of our faith which bring us to be

acquainted with possibilities in Space, at least

under preternatural conditions, which we should not

have suspected, and which, even when revealed,

leave us unable to understand their possibility.

What we have to do is to take the natural con

ditions of body in Space, not the preternatural, and

to make such assertions as the evidence of the case

justifies. We shall find, as usual, that something

is left to agreement about the use of terms, and that

not all significations are precisely settled on the

ground that there is only one way of looking at

things ;often there are more ways than one.

Great noise is sometimes raised about the mode

in which we come to know extension. Strained

efforts are made to evolve the conception out of

simpler elements of sensation, or else to show 10 such

evolution impossible and so to discredit the notion

altogether as unreal. But in truth, if, as the facts

stand, we have an extended, sensitive body and live

in the midst of other extended bodies, and have a

mind capable of intelligent reflexion, it does not

seem so very extraordinary that we should be con

vinced of extension as an actual reality. What is

the use of raising imaginary difficulties against a

clear verdict of experience ? especially when the

10 See the note to James Mill s Analysis, Vol. II. pp. 146, seq.,

where the opinions of Messrs. Bain, Spencer, and John S. Mill are

collected together.




difficulties are urged on the strength of convictions,

to say the least of it, not a whit better established

than the conviction they are intended to upset.

When we are solemnly assured, in opposition to the

derivation from experience, that the idea of space

is not given in the sensation of body, we answer

that no idea is ever given in any sensation, if thereby

is meant that the sensation already contains the idea

as such. But if we take the right doctrine about the

validity of intellectual perception of objects that have

passed through the medium of sensitive cognition,

we shall find no reason to distrust our knowledge

of space by ordinary experience, and shall be very

little disturbed by the assurances of Hamilton and

Reid,

11

that extension cannot be analyzed intosensation. We shall listen unmoved to the latter s

usual cry of"

mystery :

" " How the notion of

extension comes into the mind is utterly inex

plicable. It is true that we have feelings of touch

which every moment present extension to the mind;

but how they come to do so is the question, for

these faculties do no more resemble extension than

they resemble justice or courage nor can the

existence of extended things be inferred from those

feelings by any rules of reasoning; so that the

feelings we have by touch can neither explain how

we get the notion nor how we come by the belief

of extended things." Of course a feeling by touch

contains neither an intellectual conception nor an

intellectual belief; but if man has been created a

rational Being that acts by sense and intellect, when

w Wcrks, p. 124.




the sensitive part is touched by an extended body

and sensitively perceives it,it is

no wonderif the

mind is prompted to elicit the idea of extension.

This is a more satisfactory account than Reid s

favourite device of"

naturalsuggestion," though

that phrase might be meant to convey all we mean.

Usually, however,"

suggestion"

is not the word

we use for the origination of fresh ideas, but rather

we employ it to signify the calling up or the putting

together of old ideas by associated conceptions.

Extension has been defined, Partium extra paries

positio" The position of parts outside

parts,"which

is not strictly a definition, because it cannot be said

to consist of terms simpler than the one to be

defined. Even if we leave the word"

part"

un-

discussed, at least"

outside"

means spacial outside-

ness, that is, it implies the idea of extension, and

is not a simpler element out of which extension

is compounded. We may be excused then, if for

the sake of clearness, we go straight on with our

explanation, and do not stop to consider those

perversely ingenious theories, which have for their

practical result, either to throw doubt on Space or

very much to mystify a notion which, as far as it

goes, is simple enough.

Assuming, therefore, that we know extended

bodies, we might consider, in the abstract, all thereal

12extension in the material universe; then if we

named this Space, we should be assigning to the word

ja Real is here used in its sense of actually existing, not in the

wider sense in which it is opposed to a strictly logical entity, which

aii exist only as a terrn of the mind,"

a second intention."




a possible meaning, and not only a possible but an

actually received meaning. For Locke says that

real Space is the really extended universe, and

Cartesians make a similar use of the word.

Descartes himself we leave out, because of his

unfortunate identification of body with extension;

an error from which many of his followers have

shaken themselves free. To them we allow the

possibility of understanding under the name of real

Space the actual extension presented by created

matter, and under the name of ideal Space, the

extension that might be presented if more matter

were created. On this theory, however, any vacuum

between parts of the universe would have to be

regarded as ideal Space;

an exception whichDescartes provided against by the assertion of

necessary plenum, and by saying that two bodies

between which no other body intervenes must co ipso

be in contact. Against the above view of Space

stands the fact that it does not square well with

the

ordinary usages

of

speech, according

to which

things are in Space as the contained within the

containing. This idea of Space as a container is

better preserved by the old Peripatetic school of

philosophers, whose view Cartesians ought to regard

as at least permissible. What it is will appear if we

begin from Aristotle s definition, not of Space, but

of place :13 TO rov Trepte^oz ro? irepas CLKLVT^TOV Trpcorov

a celebrated phrase which is rendered into Latin,

Corporis ambientis terminus immobilis primus, or into

English, "The superficies of the containing body13

Physics, Bk. IV. c. vi.



3(58 TRANSCENDENTAL BEING.

considered as immoveable and immediately con

tiguous to the body located." In other words, the

place of a, body immersed in water is the immediate

watery surface which touches it all round, and

which is considered, for convenience, as unchange

able. A fossil immoveably imbedded in a rock, if

it were suddenly annihilated would leave a perfect

definition of its

place;while a

bodyon the

veryconfines of creation for want of a containing super

ficies, would have no real place on that side by which

it was turned towards vacant space. A single body

existing alone, if we may make such a supposition,

would have no real place at all in the Aristotelian

sense. Later writers have added, that it would

have no extrinsic place, no place marked by an

extrinsic superficies, but would have an intrinsic

place, marked by its own superficies. To avoid

the inconveniences which come from the perpetual

changes of place that are ever going on, all over

the known universe, we are obliged to take certain

relatively fixed boundaries as equivalently immoveable. Absolute fixity of place is impossible for us

;

but no serious inconvenience to our calculations

happens on that score. If, then, Aristotle s defini

tion cannot be applied with physical nicety, it has

a moral applicability which makes it sufficient. Our

big ship, the world, sailing on the ocean of ether,

does not rock so that we cannot be as if at rest on

its surface. We may repeat the doctrine about

place in the words of Cardinal Zigliara.14 "

Place

is conceived as a bounding object, the outer surface

14Ontologia, Lib. III. c. iv. 2.




of which shuts in, as it were, the room which the

thinglocated has

occupied;and

thoughthis outer

surface really changes, yet equivalently and in so

far as the circumscribed limits are the same, it

remains identical. Hence we say that a man

standing in a stream abides in the same place, in

spite of the constant flow of the water which

surrounds him."

Having determined upon a meaning of place, we

shall easily settle one for Space. They are not so

much two different notions, as two notions each

with the same total content, yet reversing the order

in the part of it which is to be emphasized, and the

part which is insinuated. Place is emphatically the

bounding surface, with a reference to the interval,

or voluminal distance, included within it;

while

Space is emphatically this interval, or voluminal

distance, with a reference to the bounding surface.

The place of a man immersed in mid-ocean, and

supposed stationary, is the bounding surface of the

water with a reference to the room whichit

enclosesand the man fills

;his Space is the same room in

reference to the surface of water that defines its

limits. Space is real, no matter whether it be filled

or not with substance, if only the bounding super

ficies is real : it is imaginary if the bounds are not

real but imaginary. Here the schoolmen mean by

"real" not all tnat the word signifies in its wider

sense, but what it means in its narrower sense, when

it stands for the actually existent. We can give no

sense to our words if we take as our absolute Space

a purely imaginary extension, without any reference

Y




to the actual;but if we start from the given, actual

Space,

we canassign

a definite sense to

imaginarySpace. Thus if a man goes in fancy to the confines

of creation, he can there imagine an extension

reaching out a thousand miles in this or that

direction. If, however, he neglects all considera

tion of given objects in Space, and merely asks

himself, where a single atom would be if created

alone, he can only say that it is where it is. Hehas no co-ordinates to which he can refer it

;hence

he can describe it only on its own account.

The Ubi of a body or its ubication, is what con

stitutes it in its place. We must distinguish what

constitutes the ubi from what is its efficient cause.

Thus the force of a bow may send an arrow into a

target and so be the efficient cause of the change

from the old place to the new;but it is not the

constituent of the new ubication, namely, the

presence of the thing located to its place, or con

taining superficies. Space as thus explained is

shown to be an idea derivable by abstraction fromordinary experience,

15 and to have the reality which

belong to other ideas generalized from concrete

individual things. Space, then, is not, as Cousin

supposed, itself a universal a parte rei; nor is it, as

Kant imagined, an a priori subjective form of the

senses, without any objective validity that we can

make certain of; nor is it, as Newton and Clarke

contended, one of God s attributes, namely, the

15 Mr. M Cosh does not use his ordinary skill in giving a natural

derivation to the idea of space. Hence he exaggerates the need we

are under of regarding space as infinite.




Divine immensity; nor finally is it, as Gassendi

taught, a distinct creation, serving as the recipient

of other extended creatures. All these views are

sufficiently refuted by a clear statement of the

correct view, which carries with it its own evidence.

Space thus shows itself to be neither a distinct

entity nor a non-entity ;neither a purely real nor

a purely ideal object ;it has the reality proper

to a term generalized by abstraction from actual

existences. But the generalization must be effected

by a genuine power of intelligence ;it cannot be

done, as our English empirics suppose, by repeated

sensations.

Just as an illustration how a slight change of

aspect does not affect the truth of doctrine, we maymention that some would not be satisfied with real

boundaries as constituting real Space, even when

the interval between them is a vacuum. We have

taken that view for its convenience. Cardinal

Zigliara requires the interval to be occupied with

body.

"

Real Space,"he

says,

16 "

is realextension,

and hence body really extended between two other

bodies, or between two parts of the samebody."

Without attacking the possibility of this definition,

we have preferred another, which insists on the

reality of the bounding surface only, while it allows

the contained volume to be either a plenum or a

vacuum, as long as its size remains the same in

both cases.

(4) It is usual to introduce the subject of Time

with a quotation from St. Augustine :

" What is

16Ontologia, Lib. III. c. iv. art iii.




Time ? If no one asks me I know, but if some one

asks me, and I try to explain, then I don t know."

Nevertheless, we must try to frame an answer to

the question, after the same manner in which we

proceeded in regard to Space. But at once we

must notice a difference. Space is made up of

co-existent parts, Time is continuous succession, and

as it is

always

on the move, it has no actual parts

in extension. Some have devised the word pro-

tension for it;but this does not help much, except

as a reminder to beware of differences.

In order to show the reality of Time, and to

confute such opinions as we find in Kant, that Time

is an a priori form of internal sensibility, the best

way is to take the elements whence we derive the

notion. If occasionally instead of rigorously de

fining terms by terms still more simple, we are able

only to substitute synonyms one for another, the

elementary character of the notions with which we

are dealing is the satisfactory account of the pro

ceeding. To begin with, we are evidently on real

ground when we say that things have duration,

which is described as"

the perseverance of an

object in existence." On the strength of another

treatise, we are justified in asserting an external

world;we are equally justified in asserting that its

objects actually and in themselves endure. Duration, however, may be of two kinds : an object mayendure without any intrinsic change whatever, and

such is the eternity of God : it is existence all

together and perfect ;or an object may endure with

intrinsic change, with a movement of succession




within itself. There is manifestly such a succes

sion in some of the accidents ofa substance

;

also in

those changes which the schoolmen call substantial,

and attribute to"

the generation and corruption

of substantial forms." There is succession here,

though the transformation itself is supposed to be

instantaneous, not a continuous movement. Next

it is asked whether this duration has a reality.

Some reality it undoubtedly has because it is

embodied in concrete facts. But is it a reality

distinct from the thing which endures ? In God

certainly not. But what about creatures ? They

might absolutely have existed not when they do,

but at far distant times; they might have a longer

or a shorter duration. Furthermore, their dura

tion depends on the continuance of God s con

serving power, for no finite object, by its sole

creation, is endowed with the attribute of inde

pendent duration. Thus, though the duration of

creatures be not a distinct entity apart, added on

to things, it is not completely identified with their

substance.

Some straightway affirm that Time is successive

duration in creatures : it is the movement of objects

in the course of the world; or, as Locke says, it is

especially the movement of human thoughts one

after another.17

As, however,we had to

pointout,

that whatever be the possibility of understanding

by Space the actually extended universe of matter,

it does not answer to ordinary modes of speech

about Space, so we have again to call attention to

17 Bk. II. c. xiv.




the fact, that whatever be the possibility of calling

Time the successions in the course of createdexistences, this is not exactly the common accepta

tion of the word. For commonly Time is considered

as a continuous flow without interruption : Time

stops for no man;Time is neither quick nor slow,

but always uniform. Whereas movements take

place in Time, they do not simply constitute Time,

they are interrupted, and of variable velocity.

These are familiar expressions, and they do not fit

in with the view just mentioned, which is often

called the Cartesian, though Descartes himself

inclines to call time a modus cogitandi, a way of

thinking about things as having duration, which

way of thinking is unchanged, whether the duration

be successive or not.18

It is much disputed what

sort of succession, or whether any succession, is

presented by angelic substance in its continued

existence :

19 but apart from such disputable matters

many objects certainly present us no evenly con

tinuous motion such as would suffice for Time.Hence we take the movements of the heavenly

bodies as affording us the most even and uninter

rupted movement we can find, and from them we

get our measure of Time. If according to this

explanation there is no real entity which is simply

and formally Time, yet Timeis

clearly foundedin

reality ;it has a reality in the real motion of things,

and is not a mere Kantian form of inner experience.

18 De Princip. Philosoph. Pt. I. 1518.18 See the pamphlet, Die Philosophische Lelire von Zeit und

Raum. Von Dr. Schneid.




We will repeat our explanation for the sake of

clearness. Time, like Space, is neither a simple

reality nor a simple fiction of the mind;

it is an

idea founded in reality, but not exactly answering

to it. Space, we said, does not exist as such;but

there do exist extended bodies marking out definite

volumes;

the volume marked out by the bounds

of the actual universe is called real Space, and

imaginary Space may be extended beyond this

unlimitedly. If the whole universe is moving off in

some direction, then even real Space is not a fixture,

but we have no other real term against which to

measure its direction. Time is very much the same

kind of notion, but with peculiarities of its own.

For Time especially we must assume the validity of

memory, which being granted, we become certain

that real changes go on in the world. Not every

change involves Time, for in place of one body

God might instantaneously substitute another;but

change in the stricter sense takes place within the

same substance, so that the two successive states

are the contradictory one of another. Here it is

that the opinion of Balmez is of some use. He

traces the notion of Time to the principle of con

tradiction :

" A thing cannot both be and not be

simultaneously." If he merely fastens on the adverb"

simultaneously," that of course contains the idea

of time;but if he fastens on the contrast of being

and not being, then undoubtedly there is in succes

sive change such a contrast. That a thing should

be in its altered state at the same time that it

is unaltered is a contradiction. Nevertheless, we




cannot in this way pretend to have simplified Time,

We must trust to the

powerof

memoryfor

givingus a before and an after as marked by some change.

Thus we come to know that things really endure

amid changes. Next we can find out a real process

of change, such that, being itself sufficiently regular,

it will serve to measure those other changes which

are irregular. So far we are dealing with realities.

The things are real, the changes are real, the regu

larities and irregularities of change are real;but we

have not exactly come across Time as the abstract,

which is"

successive duration," apart from all

concrete objects, and from all reference to rate of

succession or to possible interruption. We can, how

ever, so prescind from all such circumstances as to

put before ourselves the idea of a point regarded

as moving not simply in Space, but in successive

Duration; an indivisible now ever leaving the past

behind it and invading the future, yet never itself

actually either past or future. There is no actual

thing which is this point ; the actualities are all

objects liable to changes in more or less irregular

succession. Ideally we fix upon an even flow of

duration, and we call this Time. Time is not a

thing, but it marks a real fact in the successions of

things.20 In reference to things it is idealized, as

is geometry. The definition which Aristotle21

gives

of Time may now be brought forward with some

good prospect of being easily understood." Time

20 See Dr. Schneid s pamphlet, Die Philosophised Lehre ton Zeit

\nd Raum.21

Physic, Lib. IV. c. xi.




is the number of movement, estimated according to

its

beforeand its

after" apiO^os KivrivzwsKara TO

vrporepov KOIv<rrepov.

Some refer the before and the

after to Space and not to Duration, lest they should

seem to be guilty of the fallacy of idem per idem ; but

we cannot thus derive temporal from local succes

sion. There may be temporal without local succes

sion, as in the flow of thought, and mere place will

never give Time. Aristotle says that then we reach

the notion of Time, when we reduce to number a

succession which is marked by the characters of

prior and of subsequent in point of duration. St.

Thomas gives a paraphrase of Aristotle s words :

2S

"It is clear that we affirm Time to be when in a

movement we can fix upon a this term and a that

term, with an interval between the two. For when

we consider both extremes of an interval, and when

the mind perceives two nows, one antecedent, the

other subsequent, and counts the before and the

after in the movement, then we have Time. . . .

Time is nothing else but the number of movement,estimated as before and after t

for we perceive time

when we number before and after in movement. It

is evident, then, that Time is not movement, but is

consequent upon movement, when this is expressed

by number." It is no fault of the Aristotelian defi

nition that it cannot define termsalready simple

by still simpler ;so that if

"

before"

and "

after,"

which enter into the account of Time, already

suppose the notion which they are meant to ex

plain, this cannot be helped.

22 In Lib. IV. Physic, Lect. xvii.



378 TRANSCENDENTAL

Whether Time is said to have real parts or not,

is a matter that depends largely on how we look at

the question. As the past is past and the future

is yet future, neither of them is actual;but in so

far as the past actually has been traversed whereas

the future has yet to be traversed, the former has

a sort of advantage. It is common, however, to

saythat

onlythe

presentis actual

;but because

the present is a point with no duration, we seem to

be thrown across the awkward result that the only

actuality in time is very like nothing. But we need

not be distressed, for we are already acquainted

with the degree of reality that is needful for

an idea abstracted from individual conditions.

We have a choice between supposing as manydifferent nows as we mark different instants in a

long duration, or with St. Thomas,23 we may regard

now"

as substantially the same throughout the

duration," and still say with the same authority24

that" Time has no entity except according to the

indivisible now." We may compare the course of

time to the tracing out of a line by a point travelling

in Space. The line indeed so traced has all its

parts actually co-existent at the end of the opera

tion, whereas Time has no such co-existence. The

comparison, however, consists in this : to each point

of Space in the line there corresponds a point in the

duration of Time;and if we do not say that each

point of Space was traversed during its corresponding

23 In Lib. I. Sent. D. xix. q. ii. a. ii.

24 In Lib. IV. Phys. Lect. xxiii.



DELATION, SPACE, ANt) TIME.

point of Time, the obstacle lies in the word during.25

Nevertheless the

points

in both orders arereally

assignable limits; they are not distinct entities,

constituting a part of the extension, yet they answer

to real truths in the order of Space and Time.

The conclusion is, that the indivisibility of a point of

Time no more tells against the reality of Time than

the indivisibility of the point of Space tells against

the reality of Space; and if Time has not co-existent

parts as Space has, yet it has parts in the only

way possible to a continuous succession. Its parts

are not finite periods of rest, but finite measures

of the ever-moving duration, such as the minutes

and hours marked by the ceaseless rotation of the

earth. Thus no measurable part is ever strictly

an actuality ;but this does not detract from such

reality as we attribute to Time, for our doctrine has

been that there is no distinct entity called Time, as

there is no distinct entity called Space ;and that

nevertheless both have real foundations, one in the

succession ofevents, and

the other inthe extension

of bodies. It must have been clear that half the

perplexities which beset the question of Time, come

from a want of a proper conception of continuous

motion; which, being a continuum and a movement,

cannot be treated as though it were made up of

discrete parts at rest. Aristotle allows that move

ment is strictly undefinable anao/H<7roz/.

26 He has,

25 A scholiast calls the instant, ov xpfoos o.\\a O.TO/J.OV rov -^povov.

Kant argues that"points

and moments are only limits."

26Physic. Lib. III. c. ii. Laplace says that movement is the

strangest and most inexplicable phenomenon.




however, attempted such a quasi definition as the

case admits of, and thereby, until it is discoveredon what principle he was proceeding, he may seem

to have justified the oft-made charge, that he has

wrapped up a very clear idea in very dark language.

He was unwilling to speak of motion as a transfer,

or to call it by any other name which was simply

synonymouswith

itself;

but hethought

that if he

could express it in terms of act and potency, he would

be using ideas that run through all the categories,

divide all Being, and are most fundamental as con

ceptions. So he defined motion in terms of potency

and act, and described it as uniting these two in a

very peculiar manner. Motion is in act so far as

it is actually started, and no longer exists simply

as potential in the cause that was to produce it;

but it is in potency inasmuch as it has not yet

reached its term and effected its final purpose, that

is, its relatively final purpose, for the transmutation

effected may rapidly give place to another. Full of

these ideas, Aristotle wrote what sounds so strange

to some ears, which we need not straightway call

"long ears," but at least we may ask that they be

willing to open themselves patiently to words that

are far from being wholly foolish :

"

Motion is

the act of that which is potential, inasmuch as it

is potential

"

rj rov Svvdjjiei, OVTOS eWeXe^eta, y

Aristotle was wrong on one point because he did

not know the truth of creation;he asserted the

27Physic. Lib. III. c. i. See Die Aristotelische Lehre uber Begyifl

und U"sache tev KINH2I2. Von Matheas Kappes, pp. 914.




eternity of motion as an evident truth $rj\ov w?

ea-riv atSios fclvrja-is. The possibility of such a thing

is disputed ;but leaving this discussion alone, we

may turn our attention to the confusion that fre

quently arises from trying to translate eternity into

terms of time. God s motionless eternity is the only

actual eternity ;we can assert it to be equivalent,

and more, to indefinitely prolonged time, but we

cannot even approach to a measurement of it bythis means. When we say that God knows the

future because it is present to Him, as all the

circumference is present to the centre of a circle,

we must beware lest we pass beyond the warrant

which we have for such an expression. There is

some truth init,

but it is

nottrue if it is

understoodto mean that God does not recognize the reality of

the succession in events. If it is correct to affirm

that the future is present to God, it is also correct

to affirm that the future is future to God that He

knows it to be future, and will not at this moment

justify a sinner who is going to repent forty years

hence. It would be a marvellous novelty of doctrine

in the Catholic Church to allow a man to go to

Communion at Christmas on the strength of a good

Confession he was to make at the Easter following,

the theory being that all time is present to God.

Futurity is a fact which God recognizes.

Our labours to explain Time and Space have

once more enforced the lessons so often put before

us in the course of this treatise; that we can fix

upon a definite meaning for our most generalized

and ultimate ideas, and need not call them, with




Mr. Spencer, confused states of consciousness, unfit

for the name of knowledge ;that we can make

sure of their real validity in the region of things ;

that nevertheless our knowledge is very far from

exhaustive, and can be asserted only under its

limitations. What mysteries gather round Time

and Space, especially in their preternatural mani

festations ! What greater mysteries round God s

Eternity and Immensity ! and again, What mysteries in the relations of the first order, which is

created, to the second which is uncreated ! Yet

of each we know something certain, and of their

interrelations we also know something certain.

General Metaphysics thus proves to be a human

science, and has been treated as such throughout

these pages neither as more nor as less. We have

not claimed further insight into truths than that

human insight which is manifestly our prerogative

as intelligent creatures. But this we have claimed,

and boldly claimed, against many whose philosophy

consists in little except a plea for denying what wehave been affirming. Positive in name, these writers

are negative in fact;while we forego the name of

positivists, but do in fact hold Metaphysics to be

positive a positive science.



RELATION, PACE, AND TIME. 383


(i) Systems of Psychology characteristically dis

tinguish themselves by the way in which they deal with

the knowledge of relations;and the system to which

the late Professor Green was attached, is shown by the

following remarks in his Introduction to Humes Works,

40:" In making the general idea of substance precede

the particular ideas of sorts of substances, Locke

stumbled upon a truth which he was not aware of, andwhich will not fit into his ordinary doctrine of general

ideas : the truth that knowledge is a process from the

more abstract to the more concrete, not the reverse.

Throughout Locke s prolix discussion of * substance

and essence we find two opposite notions perpetually

cross each other;one that knowledge begins with the

simple idea, the other that it begins with the real thingas particularized by manifold relations. According to

the former notion, simple ideas being given, void of

relation, as the real, the mind of its own act proceeds

to bring them into relation and compound them;

according to the latter, a thing of various properties

(i.e.) relations) being given as the real, the mind

proceeds to separate these from each other. Accordingto the one notion, the intellectual process, as one of

complication, ends just where, according to the other

notion, as one of abstraction, itbegan." Many of the

schoolmen have propounded a doctrine that the simpler

and therefore the more generalized ideas are formed first,

and that particularizations follow gradually afterwards;

but as they would wholly repudiate the mere subjectiveforms of Kant, and all innate ideas, so they would reject

Green s ideas borrowed from "a universal conscious

ness," and giving relationship and order to the data of

the several experiences, which are themselves a mere




unordered multitude. A further result of Green s 1

system, opposed to all the results of our last chapter,

is briefly given in a later passage of the same

work, but a fuller explanation must be sought in the

Prolegomena Ethica. Noting that Locke supposes" the

co-existence of real elements over a certain duration,"

and attributing this to imperfect analysis, the author

says :

" To a more thorough analysis there is no alter

native between finding reality in relations of thought,

which, because relations of thought, are not in time,

and therefore immutable, and submitting it to such

subdivision of time as excludes all real co-existence, because

what is real or present at one moment, is unreal or

present at the next."

The point in this system to which we call special

attention, is the reduction of all reality to "

relations,"

which relations are not things in themselves, but are

" constituted by the self-distinguishing consciousness.

We attach no meaning to reality as applied to the world

of phenomena, but that of existence under definite and

unalterable relations, which can subsist only for a

thinking consciousness." Thus is opened out a whole

field of curious speculation which must have puzzled

the Oxford students of a recent period, and which still

holds sway in our seats of learning.

(2)The same University had previously been

puzzled by Hansel s doctrine about the relative and the

absolute ;and the pith of his theory may be gathered

from the following paragraph :2 "

Hamilton, like Kant,

maintained that all our cognitions are compounded

of two elements, one contributed by the object known,

the other by the mind knowing. But the very con

ception of a relation implies the existence of things

to be related;and the knowledge of an object, as in

Ibid. 98.a Mansel s Philosophy of the Conditioned, pp. 69, 70.



RELATION, SPACE, AND TIME 385

relation to our mind, necessarily implies its existence

out of that relation. How far it resembles, and how

far it does not resemble, the object apprehended by us,

we cannot say, for we have no means of comparing the

two together. Instead, therefore, of saying with Kant,

that the reason is subject to inevitable delusion, by

which it mistakes the regulative principles of its own

thoughts for the representations of real things, Hamilton

would say that the reason, while compelled to believe in

the existence of these real things, is not legitimately

entitled to make any positive representation of them

as of such and such a nature;and that the contradic

tions into which it falls when attempting to do so, are

due to an illegitimate attempt to transcend the proper

boundaries of positive thought." Hegelians regard this

as cowardly on the part of Kant and of Hamilton;

they prefer to maintain that the contradictions of

thought are also the contradictions of things, and that

the whole life of the universe rests on a movement of

contradiction and reconciliation.

(3)M. Charles, in his Elements de Pkilosophie, Vol. I.

p. 239, suggests that though the "

primary qualities"

of body, or those founded on extension, are necessary to

body as conceived by us, they may not be absolutely neces

sary. As regards bodies existing in some preternatural

condition, we know that the character of extension in

space may be dispensed with;but the fact does not at

all invalidate the reality of extension in nature. A

thing does not cease to be real, because it may be made

to give place to some other condition of existence;even

annihilation hanging over the material universe as its

destiny, would not negative its present reality. Still less

do preternatural conditions of extended objects in the

concrete, take off from the absolute truth of mathe

matics, concerning extension in the abstract.



INDEX.

ABSOLUTE, finite and infinite

195 .;

meaning of 361.

ACCIDENTS in relation to

essences 74 ;

inheringin matter

245 ;

definition of St. Thomas

247;

existing in alio 253 ;

absolute 254 ;

existing without substance

257;in the Blessed Sacrament

263;absolute and relative 267 ;

modal 267.

ACTION and passion 305 ;

Suarez1

distinction 306.

ACTIVITIES and possibilities

173;and substance 264.

ACTIVITY, certainties of 320 ;

additional proof of 323 ;

likeness of to agent 330 ;

and passivity 338.

ACTUALITY of Being 32 ;

its notes 34 ;

Hume s error concerning

167;the source of Possibility 170 ;

God the first 170, 173 ;

in past and future 378.

ANALOGOUSNESS of Being 38 ,

safe propositions concerning

45-

ANALOGY, explanation of 39 ;

intrinsic and extrinsic attri

bution46.

APPETITE, definition of 125 n.;

elicitus and naturalis 129.

APPREHENSION, simple, error

regarding 74, 75 5

St. Thomas definition 75.

ART, how related to sense and

intellect 155 ;

imitation and symbolism in

162.

ATTRIBUTION intrinsic and

extrinsic 46.

BEAUTIFUL, how identical with

the good and true 148 ;

nature of 148 ;

theory of St. Thomas 149 ;

universal character of 1 50 ;

definition discussed 152 ;

vagueness of the word 155 ;

not average type 162.

BEING, false ideas concerning

6;M Cosh on 1 1

;

errors concerning 12;

confusion respecting 15 et

seq. ;



383 INDEX.

etymologically discussed 18;

the object of a cult 19 ;

what it is 20;

actual and possible 24 ;

scholastic definitions of 26;

a convention regarding 30 ;

reality of 32 ;

possible 33 ;

actual 33 ;

singleness of 34 ;

the highest genus 35 ;

relation to Substance or

Spirit or Matter 37 ;

analogousness of 39, 43 ;

Suarez on gradations in

44;

per se and by participation

46;

principles flowingfrom notion

of 46;

opposed to non-entity 51 ;

ancient teaching concerning

52;doctrine of the Fathers 55 ;

generalized essence 61;

attributes of 93 et seq. ;

unity of 94 ;

truth of 109 ;

in relation to intellect 116;

and untruth 1 19 ;

goodness of 121;

how more fundamental than

good 124 ;

intelligent and non-intelligent

126;

not every one equally good

133;and consciousness 146 ;

degrees of beauty in 151 ;

Hegelian properties of 156 ;

possibilities of 166;

necessary and contingent

184, 185 ;

finite and infinite 190 ;

in Substance and Accident

225;

a^ entia entium 253.

BLESSED SACRAMENT, Sub

stance and accident 247,

254, 257, 263, 268.

BODY in the person 289 ;

integrity not personality 290.

CAUSE vid efficient causality ;

Hegelian ideas on 222;

definition of 299 ;

Aristotelic 300;material and formal 300 ;

constituent and efficient 301 ;

final 302, 304 ;

exemplary 304.

CERTAINTIES proving efficient

causality 320.

CHANGE denied and accounted

for 315, 316;sufficient reason for 319 ;

a measure of change 376.

CHRIST, personality of 283,

290, 294, 297.

CIRCUMSTANCE and Causality

334-

COMPREHENSIONS, distinct

100.

CONDITION and Cause 339.

CONDITIONED, Hamilton s

principle of 194 ;

law of applied to Substance244.

CONSCIOUSNESS and pain 144 ;

and Being 146 ;

Hume s vivid and faint states

232, 235.

CONTINGENCY opposed to

necessity 185.

CONTRADICTION, principle of

46.COSMOLOGY, its scope 69.

COUNTERFEITS, ontological

truth of 121.

DIALECTIC, its office 54.

DISTINCTION, virtual 100;

defined 104 ;

real 104 ;



INDEX

mental 105 ;

in the beautiful 151.

DIVISION the opposite of unity

94;a note of predicamental

unity 97.

.DURATION defined 372 ;

ideally considered 376.

EFFECT vid Efficient Caus

ality.

EFFICIENT CAUSALITY defined

304;and possibility 305 ;

opponents of 307 ;

occasionalism 308 ;

denial of 313 ;

defended 315 ;

proved 319 ;

in created agents 319 ;

current phrases explained

327, 330, 334, 336, 339-

EGO, Mill s idea of 241.

ENS essentia et ezistentice 21;

vid Being.ERROR supervening upon limi

tations of the intellect

137.

ESSENCE, definition of 27 ;

Father Palmieri s opinion

3o;

and principle of ExcludedMiddle 48 ;

what it is 59 ;

what gives it 61;

objections to scholastic

doctrine 62;

nominal 63 ;

and mathematics 67 ;

and natural objects 69 ;

foundation of scepticism

regarding 73;

imperfect knowledge of 74 ;

concrete and generalized 75 ;

material 76 ;

knowledge of possible 78 ;

how inferred 80 :

knowledge of proved 82;

divisions of 83 ;

and existence in created

objects 84;

outlines of the controversy

84;and nature 88

;

never in itself bad 132 ;

how eternal, necessary, andimmutable 185 ;

Locke s ideas on 230.

ETERNITY in terms of time

214.EVIL in Being 128;

formality of 134 ;

a privation 135 ;

in simple and compoundsubstances 135 ;

relative-absolute 136 ;

how brought about 137 ;

examples of 137 ;

moral 143.

EXCLUDED MIDDLE, principleof 48.

EXISTENCE, Mill s vagueness

concerning 14 ;

Kant s opinion 16 #., 17 ;

its real relation to Being 21;

its relation to Essence 27 ;

Father Palmieri s opinion 30 ;

principles flowing from 48 ;

and Essence 84 ;

outlines of the controversy

84;

Perse 25 1, 254;a se 252.

EXTENSION how known 364 ;

Reid s mystery of 365 ;

defined 366.

FAILURES in execution, causeof 118.

FALSEHOOD, distinctions in

112.

FEELING, pain of 145 ;

a character of conscious

action 147.



390 INDEX.

FINITE, what it is 190 ;

Hamilton s addition of 195 ;

notion of, prior to that of

infinite 204.

FORCE, mystery of 324.

FORM, scholastic doctrine on

78;and spirit 8 1

;

substantial determining

Being 95 ;

the note of species 98.

FORMALITIES, explanation of

107.

FREEDOM, errors concerningidea of 1 83 ;

what it consists in 303.

GENUS of Being 35, 38.

GOD, perfection of Being 41 ;

analogy applied to 45 ;

teaching of revelation con

cerning 51 ;

identity of Essence and Existence in 84 ;

St. Anselm s argument of

Existence of 92 ;

the Truth 113;and identity of thought and

thing 115;in relation to Truth 1 18

;

ideasof not

falsified

bynature 118;

and the existence of evil

136;a pure actuality 1 70 ;

power of 170;Descartes error respecting

essential truth of 176 ;

"notpossible" 179 ;

necessary Being 184;infinite 191 ;

His relation to creatures 197 ;

cannot create another God

207,211 ;

not ranked under the cate

gories 225 ;

existingper se 251 ;

a substance with no accidents

254;

personality of 282;

not self-caused 300 ;

the cause of activities 307,

321 ;

and time 381.

GOODNESS of Being 121;

opinions on 122;

etymologically considered

122 n.;

how synonymous with Being

124;how appetible 125 ;

distinctions of 126;

perfecting the appetible 130 ;

absolute and relative 131 ;

every being not equally

good 133 ;

difficulty of finding standard

of 142 ;

how identical with beautiful148;

priority of 160.

GRADATION in Being 44.

HARMONY and beauty 154.

HYPOSTASIS, defined 280.

a substance 281.

IDEALISM, case against, stated

116.

IDEAS, prototypic 118.

IDENTITY, principle of 46 ;

relation of to similarity 102;

moral 103 ;

of thought and thing 115;Locke s

theory 285;

of man, Hume s theory 291.

IMPOSSIBLE, errors concerning

167;irrational 171 ;

morally 188.

INCONCEIVABILITY of the In

finite 193, 199.



INDEX.

INDEFINITE signs of essences

89;and infinite 200.

INDIVIDUALITY,what it is

98;

errors concerning 99 ;

identical with concrete nature

101;

theories respecting 1 58.

INFINITE in Being 44 ;

what it is 191 ;

pagan ideas of 192 ;

Hamilton s idea 193 ;

Catholic teaching 198 ;

not indefinite 200;

innate ideas theory 201;

difficulty respecting 204 ;

number not possible 205 ;

in possibilities 206;

mathematically considered

2IO.

INFINITY, misconception of

term 189.

INTELLECT capable of knowingessences 60

;

of God 118;

in art 155.

INTELLIGENCE, impersonal and

personal 290.

INTENTIONS, first and second

32;

(first and second) in meta

physical constituents of essences 83.

KINDS, real and unreal 89.

KNOWLEDGE, Mill s opinion on

66;

human, accidental 116.

LOGIC, in relation to Meta

physics 4 ;

Hegel s idea 9 ;

principles of contradiction,

&c. 48.

LUSTRE, in the beautiful 151.

MATHEMATICAL UNITY de

fined 97.

MATHEMATICS and Metaphysics

4;

and essential definitions 67.

MANIFESTATION not unreal 34.

MATTER AND FORM, bearing

on essences 77 ;

scholastic theory of 86.

MATTER described by non-

scholastics 77 ; by scholas

tics 78 ;

scholastic theory of 86;

Mill s theory of 87;materia signata 101

;

nature of its perfection 128;

Descartes theory 308.

MEASURE, Hegelian view of

156.

METAPHYSICS, subject-matter

ofi;

reality of 3, 5 ;

general as distinct from special 3 ;

principal terms of 7.

MIND, Hume s idea 235 ;

Mill s idea 239 ;

MODALS in Logic 179 ,180

;

MORALS in relation to Meta

physics 4 ;

MOTION, Hobbes query 307 ;

Descartes theory 308 ;

potency of 380 ;

NATURAL distinguished from

artificial 61;

NATURE of things 76 ;

how synonymous with es

sence 88;

Mill s theory 89:

NECESSITY, absolute and hypothetical 181

;

necessary and consequent

184;

NOTHING, Hartmann s theory

169;



392 INDEX.

NUMBER, definition of 97 ;

infinite not possible 205.

NUMBERS, explanation of 212;

NUMERALS in relation to Meta

physics 2.

OCCASION, definition of 340.

OCCASIONALISM, doctrine of

308;illustrations of 308 313.

ONTOLOGISTS doctrine on the

Infinite203.

ONTOLOGY, definition of 4 ;

the subject-matter of 21;

limits of doctrine on truth

114;

generality of 1 50.

ORDER of principles and con

clusions 298.

ORGANISM and Being 19.

OTHERNESS ofeffect from cause

299.

PAIN, how an evil 144 ;

a conscious state 145 ;

of feeling 146 ;

cannot be analyzed 147.

PERCEPTIONS, Hume s theory

232, 253, 291.

"PERFECT, etymologically considered 129.

PERFECTION of Being 126;

degrees of to be recognized

133-

PERMANENCE the essence of

substance - theories 259,

274, 275 ;

of effects 337.

PERSONALITYofsubstance 279;

defined 281;

of God 282;

of Christ 283 ;

Locke s error 283 et seq. ;

Hume 291 ;

other opinions 294 ;

:

.n character of sin 297.

PHYSICS in relation to Meta

physics 2, 4, 5.

PLACE, Aristotle s definition

367 et seq.

PLURALITY of causes 334.

POSSIBLE, Hume s error con

cerning 167 ;

precedes the actual 169 ;

always rational 171 ;

and probable 1 73.

POSSIBILITIES of Being 166;

of sensation 169 ;

nature of explained 170 ;

determined by the Divine in

tellect 170 ;

intrinsic and extrinsic 171 ;

incompossibilia 172 ;

the "whence" and "what"

of 174;

Descartes error on 176 ;

Ockam s error on 178 ;

ancient theories respecting

186;

their number 206;

in God s sight 208;

incoherency of sum of 209 .

sum of 211 et seq. ;

and efficient causality 305.

PRINCIPLE, definition of, 298 ;

priority of nature 299.

PRINCIPLES, the Three 46;

accommodated to notion of

Being 48.

PRIVATION, the essence of evil

137.

PROBABILITY and possibility

173-

PROPORTION, numerical 98.

PROPOSITIONS, universal cate

gorical 35.PSYCHOLOGY, its scope 69.

QUALITY, Hegelian view of 1 56.

QUANTITY, Hegelian view of

156.

QUIDDITY, vid essence.



INDEX. 393

REALITY, realitates v. res. 99 ;

substantial and modal 105 ;

Mr. Green s opinion on in;

Hegelian idea of 123 ;

of intrinsic possibility 178 ;

of states of consciousness

246 ;

of Being affirmed 259.

RELATION, Hegelian ideas on

222;

what it is 352 ;

empirical ideas on 353 ;

Kant and Hegel 357 ;

superstition connected with

3575real 358 ;

mental 359 ;

predicamental and transcen

dental 360.

SCHOLASTICISM, errors regard

ing 88.

SCIENCE, Mill s admissions res

pecting 70 ;

not obtained by intuition 74.

SCOTISTS against Suarez on

Being 42, 44.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS and per

sonality 295.

SENSATION, Mill s permanent

possibility of 239.SENSES in art 155.

SIMILARITY, relation of, to

identity 102.

SIN, personal character of 297.

SOUL, on the substance of 255 ;

unchangeable in substance

289;

activity of, Descartes theory

309-SPACE, what it is 352 ;



discussed 364 ;

real and ideal 367, 369 ;

errors concerning 370.

SPIRIT, what it is 81.

SPLENDOUR necessary to

beauty 151.

SUBSTANCE compared with

Being 38 ;

Hegelian ideas on 222;

Descartes idea of 225 ;

errors concerning 225 et seq.;

Locke on 225 ;

Hume on 232 ;

Mill 238;Bain 242 ;

true theory regarding 245 ;

definition of St. Thomas 247 ;

Tongiorgi 248 ;

etymologically considered

254;of the soul 255 ;

not a substratum 257 ;

permanence of 259 ;

removal of attributes of 262,

dynamic aspect of 264 ;

Kant s idea of 264 ;

further opinions on 270 et

seq.;

personality of 279.

SUMMATION of possibles 211,

217.

SUPPOSITION, object of names1 06.

SUPPOSITUM, vid Hypostasis.

SYMBOLISM in art 163. ^

THING as distinct from

being 17 ;

in relation to being 21;

etymologically considered 25;

a note of Being 32 ;

and person 93 ;

and reality 99 ;

and thought 115.THOUGHTas distinguished from

its object 32.

TIME, what it is 352 ;



St. Augustine s definition 37 1;

continuous succession 372 ;



394 INDEX.

and space 375 ;

part of 379.

TRANSCENDENTAL, definition

of 24 ;

unity 97.

TRUTH of Being 109 ;

Hegelian difficulty 1 10;

proof of 1 1 1;

benefits of scholastic doctrine

113;A. reality 116;definition of Heraclitus 117;

departures from 119 ;

how referred to intellect and

will 125 ;

of Being elucidated 171.

UBICATION, vid space and

place.

UGLINESS, how explained 151.

UNIQUENESS, not unity 102.

UNITY of Being 94 ;

perfect 94 ;

of composition 95 ;

transcendental 97 ;

specific and individual 98 ;

essential v. individual 99 ;

physical, mental, moral 101;

and the beautiful 149.

UNIVERSAL IDEAS, referring

mostly to accidents 75.

UNIVOCAL, explanation of 39.

UNKNOWABLE, derivation of

Spencer s idea of 199.

UNREAL, the 33.

UNTRUTH, due to relationshipsof Beings 1 19.

VARIETY and unity discussed

SI-

OF AUTHORS REFERRED TO.

AQUINAS (St.Thomas) on Beingand Thing 22

;

how to be interpreted 23 ;

on Being as a genus 36 ;

comprehension of Being 57 ;

doctrine on essences74

;

on simple apprehension 75 ;

on unity of Being 95 ;

on Truth 112 n., 113;on goodness 122, 123 ;

on the succession of Being,

Truth, Goodness 125 ;

definition of appetite 125 n.;

teaching concerning perfection of

Being 129;

evil is privation of further

good 141 ;

on the beautiful 148 ;

theory of the beautiful 149 ;

on infinite number 205 ;

on substance and accident

245;

accident and essence 268;

on causality 323 ;

on Time 377.

ARISTOTLE on Being 36 ;

definition of nature 89 ;

theoryof

the beautiful discussed 161

;

on the Infinite 195 ;

on substance 260;

on action and passion 338 ;

on Time 376, 380.

ARNOLD (Matthew) on Being1 8.

AUGUSTINE (St.) on Truth 112;

on Time371.AviCENNA on Being and Thing

22;

on individuality 159.

BACON (Lord) on goodness

Being 134;on possibilities 174.



INDEX. 395

BAIN on existence 15 j

on essence 72 ;

onkinds

90 ;

on Substance 243 ;

on the Ego 243 ;

on plurality of causes 335.^

BALMEZ on infinity of finite

parts 215 ;

on Time 375.

BENTHAM (Jeremy) principle

of unity 99.

BOETHIUSpersistence

in Being

I3I-

BOSANQUET (Mr.) on numerical

proportion 98.

on absolute necessity 182.

BRADLEY (Mr. F.) on essence

and existence 28 n.;

on reality 5 1 n.;

on necessity 181;

on Hegelian excess of rela

tivity $(:\

BROWN on causality 349 ;

on space and time 352.

BUTLER (Bp.) on principle of

identity 47.

CAJETAN on Being 35.

CALDERWOOD (Mr.) on know

ledge of the Infinite 201.

CARLETON on Being 36, 40 ;

comprehension of Being 56,

575on transcendental truth 116.

CHARLES (M.)on extension 385.

COMTE on essence 73 n.

COUSIN on Being 18;

on Hindu belief 34 ;

illustration of good and beautiful 149 ;

theory of the beautiful 152 ;

on the origin of possibilities

1745

only one real substance 226 n.

CUDWORTH, theory of indi

viduality 158;

on the entity of truth 187 ;

on occasionalism 310.

DE CUSA (Nicholas) on God 56.

DE MORGAN, inference on

essences 80;

explanation of numerals 212.

DESCARTES on ultimate possi

bilities 176;innate idea of the Infinite

202;

on substance 225 ;

on occasionalism 308.

DUPONT (Prof.) on Being 26,

29 n.

EGIDIUS on goodness 122.

ERIGENA (Scotus) on good and

essence 122.

GEULINX on secondary causes

309-

GREEN, on genesis of know

ledge 1 1 5 n.;

on freedom 183 ;

on substance 275 ;

on relation 383.

GROTE on Time 354.

HAMILTON on the conception

of the Infinite 193 et seq. ;

on substance 244.

HARRISON (Frederick) on the

cult of Being 19.

HARTMANN on Nothing 169.

HEGEL on number 3 ;

his modern influence 9 ;

his division of Logic 9 ;

reasons for opposition to 9 ;

doctrine as to the ExcludedMiddle 50 ;

on Being and Nothing 53 ;

on dogmatism and specula-

tive truth 218;

on the soul 219.

HENRY OF GHENT on the sub

stance of the soul 255.



396 INDEX.

HERACLITUS, definition of

Truth 117.

HERSCHEL (Sir John) on cause

and effect 333.HOBBES on quiddity 62

;

on the infinite 192.

HODGSON (Mr. S.) on scho

lastic doctrine of causality

324-

HOOKER on perfection of things

128.

HUME on Being 13 ;

on essence and existence28 n.

;

on nature of mind 89 ;

error concerning the actual

167;

on substance 232 et seq. ;

on innate ideas 235 ;

on perceptions 253 ;

on personality 291 ;

oncausality 313, 315, 328,

341 et seq.

KANT on General Metaphysics

35distinction between Thingand Being 1 7 ;

on imitation in the beautiful

163;

on substance264

;

on causality 326.

KiNGSLEY on the Infinite 197.

LACORDAIRE(FR.) definition of

the beautiful 153.

LAHOUSSE (FR.) on differences

of Being 37 ;

scholastic definition of es

sence 60.

LEWES on essence 60, 67 ;

on possibility 169 ;

the unknown substratum 274 ;

on causality 332.

LOCKE on essences 62;

on individuality 160;

on finite and infinite 200;

on substance in general 227

et seq. ;

error on personality 283 ;

discussed 285 et seq. ;

summary of doctrine on per

sonality 288;

on Time 373.

LOTZE on physical science 79 ;

on necessity 182;

on freedom 185 n. ;

on the soul 264 \

substance and sensation 277 ;

on self-consciousness 295.

MALEBRANCHE on activity of

matter 309, 324.

MANSEL, error regarding Being

31 ;

on Hamilton s theory of the

Infinite 196 ;

error on substance 260;

on the relative and absolute

384-

MARTINEAU (DR.) on Des

cartes idea of existence 16;

on essence and existence 91 ;

on Infinity 198 ;

on self-consciousness and

personality 296.

MARTINUS SCRiBLERUSon es

sence 59.

MAURUS (SILVESTER) on the

Infinite 205.

MASTRIUS, Thing and reality

100 n.

M COSH (MR.) on Being n ;

on existence 29 n.;

on substance 257, 276.

MILL QAMES) on substance

270.

MILL (J. S.) on Being 13 ;

difficulty about essence 49 ;

on Locke s opinion of es

sences 63 ;

on verbal and real propositions 65 ;

on knowledge 66;



INDEX. 397

admissionsrespecting science

70;n natures 89 ;

difficulties of his theory on

truth 113 ;

possibilities of sensation 169;

on matter and mind 239 ;

on the Ego 241 ;

the knowledge of the un

known 272 ;

on Causality 318, 347 ;

on the mystery of force 325 ;

on relation 353.

MORISON (MR. J. C.) on the

truth of things no.

NETTLESHIP (R. S.) on priority

of the good 161.

NEWMAN (CARD.) on Divine

Beauty 153.

NIZOLIUS on Being 21.

OCKAM, error on intrinsic

possibility 178.

PALMIERI (FR.) on Being 26 ;

on Essence and Existence

30;on analogousness of Being

38 -

PAUL (ST.) desires of creatures

132.

PLATO on the good 125.

REID on Locke s opinion of

essences 63 ;

his

own admission 67;

"mystery" respecting- Substance 249 ;

on personality 294 ;

on occasionalism 310 ;

on efficient causality 317 ;

"mystery"of extension 365.

REYNOLDS (Sm J.) on the ideal

average type 162.

ROSMINI on Substance 261.

RUSKIN on the beautiful 150 .,

1545on the average type 162

;

on rt 164.

SCHELLING on object of un

derstanding 1 15.

SCOTUS on Being 35 ;

on the substance of the soul

255-

SHEDDON (MR.) on the Infinite

201.

SPENCER (H.)on existence 16;

foundation of the" Unknow

able" 199;

theory of substance 274 ;

on personality 292 n.;

on feelings of relation 353 ;

co-existence 356 ;

on relativity 362.

SPINOZA on substance 226,

242 n.

STEWART on Occasionalism

312.

STORCHENAU on possibility

1 80.

SUAREZ on Being 26;

on analogousness of Being40;

on Infinite and Finite Being

445

goodness of Beings 127 n.;


256;on modal accidents 269 ;

on action and its term 306,

321.

TAINE (M.) on Substance 243.

TONGIORGI (FR.) on essence

and existence 28;


248.

TYLOR (MR.) on numerals3.



398 INDEX,

TYRWHITT (MR.) on artistic

composition 1 54 ;

on the

beautyof nature 1

64.

UEBERWEG on Hume s ideas

of substance 238.

VALLA on Being 21.

VEITCH (PROF.) on existence

29 .;

innate idea of Being 58.

VOLTAIRE in praise of Locke

WALLACE on the excluded

middle 51 ;

on theproperties

of

Being156;

Hegel s ideas on substance,

cause, and relation 222;

on action and passion 338.

ZIGLIARA (CARD.) on Being 23 ;

on the essence of beauty 165 ;

on place 368 ;

on space 371.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. III. : Abraham and Lot Wilfulness of Israel in Rejecting SamuelSaul

EarlyYears of David

JeroboamFaith

and Obedience Christian Repentance-Contracted Views in Religion A Particular Providence as revealed in the Gospel Tearsof Christ at the Grave of Lazarus Bodily Suffering The Humiliation of the Eternal Son

Jewish Zeal a Pattern to Christians Submission to Church Authority Contest betweenTruth and Falsehood in the Church The Church Visible and Invisible The Visible

Church an Encouragement to Faith The Gift of the Spirit Regenerating Baptism Infant

Baptism The Daily Service The Good Part of Mary Religious Worship a Remedy for

Excitements Intercession The Intermediate State.

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Grace The Visible Church for the Sake of the Elect TheCommunion

of Saints TheChurch a Home for the Lonely The Invisible World The Greatness and Littleness of

Human Life Moral Effects of Communion with God Christ Hidden from the World-Christ Manifested in Remembrance The Gainsaying of Korah The Mysteriousness ofour Present Being The Ventures of Faith Faith and Love Watching Keeping Fastand Festival.

CONTENTS OF VOL. V. : Worship, a Preparation for Christ s Coming Reverence, a

Belief in God s Presence Unreal Words Shrinking from Christ s Coming Equanimity-Remembrance of Past Mercies The Mystery of Godliness The State of Innocence-Christian Sympathy Righteousness not of us, but in us The Law of the Spirit The NewWorks of the Gospel The State of Salvation Transgressions and Infirmities Sins of

Infirmity Sincerity and Hypocrisy The Testimony of Conscience Many called, Fewchosen Present Blessings Endurance, the Christian s Portion Affliction, a School of

Comfort The Thought of God, the Stay of the Soul Love, the One Thing Needful ThePower cf the Will.

CONTENTS 9F VOL. VI. : Fasting, a Source of Trial Life, the Season of Repentance-Apostolic Abstinence, a Pattern for Christians Christ s Privations, a Meditation for Chris

tiansChrist the Son of God made Man The Incarnate Son, a Sufferer and Sacrifice

The Cross of Christ the Measure of the World Difficulty of realising Sacred PrivilegesThe Gospel Sign Addressed to Faith The Spiritual Presence of Christ in the ChurchThe Eucharistic Presence Faith the Title for Justification Judaism of the Present DayThe Fellowship of the Apostles Rising with Christ Warfare the Condition of Victory

Waiting for Christ Subjection of the Reason and Feelings to the Revealed WordThe Gospel Palaces The Visible Temple Offerings for the Sanctuary The Weaponsof Saints Faith Without Demonstration The Mystery of the Holy Trinity Peace in

Believing.

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Man The World our Enemy The Praise of Men Temporal Advantages The Season of

Epiphany The Duty of Self-Denial The Yoke of Christ Moses the Type of Christ TheCrucifixion Attendance on Holy Communion The Gospel Feast Love of Religion, a newiN ature Religion Pleasant to the Religious Mental Prayer Infant Baptism The Unityof the Church Steadfastness in the Old Paths.

CONTENTS OF VOL. VIII. : Reverence in Worship Divine Calls The Trial of Saul

The Call of David Curiosity, a Temptation to Sin Miracles no Remedy for Unbelief

Josiah, a Pattern for the Ignorant Inward Witness to the Truth of the Gospel Jeremiah,a Lesson for the Disappointed Endurance of the World s Censure Doing Glory to God

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ENGLISH MANUALS OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY.

Outlines of Dogmatic Theology. By SYLVESTER JOSEPH HUNTER,of the Society of Jesus. Crown 8vo. 3 vols., 6s. 6d. each.

LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

5,000/6/1901.



To*



Rickaby, Jom.

General metaphysics

BD

131-

.R5

cop. 2

rickaby, j. - general metaphysics

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