PROPATHEIA: ORIGEN AND DIDYMUS ON THE ORIGIN OF THE PASSIONS

BY

RICHARD A. LAYTON

In his dialogue On the Soul and the Resurrection, Gregory of Nyssa intro- duced a discussion of the emotions by referring to the unique constraints

imposed upon Christian writers. While other philosophers might construct theories about the soul and its affections according to their own princi- ples, "we make," Gregory declared, "the Holy Scriptures the rule and the measure of every teaching."' This rule, however reasonable it might have seemed to Gregory's readers, raised an array of exegetical questions. What was meant by Jesus's equation of the emotion of "lust" with the crime of

adultery (Matt. 5:28)? How was a reader to reconcile Jesus's prohibition of anger (Matt. 5:22) with Paul's apparent lenience to the same emotion

(Eph. 4:26)? More generally, the endeavor to forge a biblical doctrine of the affections necessitated investigation into the causes and origins of emotions.

This essay seeks to chart the incorporation into Christian exegesis of a

preliminary affective event called a propatheia. Two exegetes, Origen and his follower, Didymus the Blind, found the propatheia a useful concept to

distinguish between spontaneous, involuntary affective movements and pas- sions (na6r)) over which agents exercised at least some measure of author-

ity.' This preliminary affective event demarcated a significant frontier in the human self between being involuntarily subject to external forces and

being an agent who initiated self-directed actions-and designated the point

' Gregory of Nyssa, de an. et res. (PG 46.49C, 52C). ' The Latin scholar, Jerome, appropriated the concept from Origen and Didymus,

and through him, the concept propassio endured throughout the early medieval period to become a fixture in discussions of sin in the school of Laon. For Jerome, see, e.g., Comm. Matt. 1.5.28 (CCL 77.30-31), ep. 79.9 (CSEL 55.98-99), Tract. in Ps. 15 (CCL 78.377), In Ezek. 18:2 (CCL 75.228). For the school of Laon, see the texts gathered by D. Odon I,ottin, "Les mouvements premiers de l'appetit sensitif de Pierre Lombard a Saint Thomas d'Aquin," in idem, Psycholqaie et Morale aux XIIP et Xill' Siicles, vol. 2 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1948), pp. 493-589.

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at which an agent became a moral being. This frontier in the self, however, was neither securely guarded, nor permanently fixed. Alterations in the

concept propatheia also created the possibility for a new cartography of the

human psyche. The concept and terminology of propatheia likely developed under the

auspices of Stoic moral psychology.3 The Stoics regarded the "passions" as,

by definition, negative states, in which, an impulse toward (or away from) a certain object exceeded the limits of reason, and consequently disturbed

inner tranquility.' Thc impulses in question, however, were not simple sen-

sations. These impulses resulted from, depcnded on, and expressed prac- tical decisions made about the value and significance of impressions received

from external stimuli. While the judgments in question violated the norms

of Reason, they nevertheless embodied rational processes.' 1 he Stoics based

this ethic upon a psychology that asserted that all psychic phenomena were

unified under a single, rational entity." A vulnerable point in this highly rationalistic theory was the seemingly irreducible non-rational nature of at

least some affective reactions.' The Stoics developed the doctrine of propatheia to account for affective reactions that were not susceptible to rational con-

trol, and consequently represented anomalies to their theory of the passions.

Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG 12.1141-1144A) provides the earliest example of the term's use as a psychological concept. While the precise origins of the concept of a propatheia remain disputed, there is general consensus that it owes its development to the Stoics. For various theories, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), pp. 175-181; J. Fillion-Lahille, Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des

passions (Paris, 1984), pp. 163-169; K. Abel, "Das Propatheia-Theorem. Ein Beitrag zur stoischen Affektenlehre," Hermes III 1 (1 983):78-97; B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism," in J. Brunschwig and M.C. Nussbaum, Passions l# Perceptions: Studies in the Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993), pp. 150-183.

' SVF 111.377, 378, 386. See B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Actions, pp. 127-132. ' I can refer here to only a few of the many valuable discussions of the oft-misun-

derstood Stoic theory of passions as rational judgments: M. Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul," in M. Schofield and G. Striker, eds., The Norms of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1986), pp. 93-110; M.C. Nussbaum, The Therapy ofDesire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, N J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 366-386; J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1992), pp. 103-120; J.M. Cooper, "Posidonius on Emotions," in idem, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton Univ., 1999), pp. 449-484.

A. Glibert-Thirry, "La theorie de la passion chez Chrysippe et chez Posidonius," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 75 (1977):393-435, esp. 402-418.

7 A point exploited by Plutarch, de virtute morali 8-9 (448D-449D).

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Only scattered references to this class of affects can be gleaned from the

fragmentary remains of Stoic texts.' The most complete description of the

function of the propatheia in the theory of the passions comes from a trea-

tise On Anger composed by Seneca.

At the beginning of the second book of the treatise, Seneca investigates the origin of anger. Does anger begin with an impulse or with a judg- ment ? Does it arise of its own accord or only in concert with knowledge?' Seneca concedes that a "direct impression (species) of an injury" stirs the

soul to anger (IL 1.3). But does anger follow immediately upon such an impres- sion, or is some mental activity required to process the "impression" into

a true passion? Seneca is certain that the latter is the case. Anger results

from a complex mental process, in which the mind assents both to the

impression of injury as well as to the desirability of vengeance for that

injury (11.1.4-5).10 This is an orthodox Stoic description of emotion, which

allows for a wide range of affective expressions outside of genuine "anger."" One might, for example, assent to the impression of injury, and feel a

good deal of resentment, but it would only constitute "anger" if the agent made a conscious choice to pursue vengeance.

Seneca recognizes that people exhibit a number of behaviors that oth-

erwise resemble "anger" except for the absence of rational judgment. An

"impression of injury" can stimulate physical reflexes, even as being doused

with cold water produces shivering, and peering down a cliff causes dizzi-

ness (11.2.1). Sympathetic responses also appear similar to emotions, such

as the stirring one feels at seeing historical atrocities re-enacted on stage.

8 Seneca, ep. 57.3-6; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae XIX.1.4-8 (cf. Augustine, civ. dei.

IX.4). 9 For discussion of this initial question, see Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, p. 411 n. 18.

B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism," p. 177 and n. 51, notes that as the

argument progresses Seneca avoids characterizing the initial presentation as an impetus. On the role of phantasia in the production of passions, see A. Glibert-Thirry, "La theorie stoicienne de la passion," pp. 416-417.

"' This definition of anger was common in antiquity, and presumed in most Christian

writing on the subject. See, e.g., SVF 111.395-398; Clement, Stromateis IV.23.152; Lactantius, de ira 17; Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (discussed below) and 36:8 (PG 12.1317A); Basil, Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur (PG 31.356C); Gregory of Nazianzus, adv. irana (PG 37.816); Nemesius, de nat. hom. 21 (PG 40.692AB); Gregory of Nyssa, de an. et res. (PG 46.56A). See also, R. Renehan, "Aristotle's Definition of Anger," PhilologuJ 107 (1963):61-76; J. Fillion-Lahille, Le De ira de Sénèque, pp. 173-176.

" B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism"; Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, pp. 410-413.

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Conditioned responses can wear the guise of emotions; a retired soldier, now in civilian dress, will "prick up his ears at the blast of a trumpet" and army horses are made restive at the clatter of arms (I.2.3-6). Although such responses exhibit symptoms characteristic of emotions, Seneca insists

that they are simply a "prelude to passions" ( principia proludentia adfectibus) and must be distinguished from genuine emotions (I.2.5).

Seneca's classification of these "preliminary motions" does not depend on a shared commonality among the events, but a shared dissimilariry with

genuine emotions. 12 He presumably identifies these various movements

as "preliminary" because they represent a "direct impression of injury" that

can, if confirmed by subsequent judgment, arouse anger. Seneca, how-

ever, does not conceive of such motions as the first stage in an unimpeded

psychological continuum. While "psychological inertia" may sustain the

preliminary movement in a weak individual-and perhaps encourage the

formation of a genuine passion-the well-trained mind can dismiss the im-

pulse when it recognizes the false nature of the impression. 13 The propatheia reflects a "preliminary" motion to the passions only insofar as certain in-

voluntary experiences have a proximate relationship to the judgments that

constitute genuine emotions.

Origen and the Introduction of Propatheia into Christian Exegesis

Seneca's theory of propatheia attempted to account for a species of affects

excluded from classification as genuine "passions." Origen was well-informed

about Stoic theories of action and emotional response, had read Chrysippus's foundational treatise On the Passions, and liberally employed Stoic technical

terminology in his biblical exegesis." His use of the concept of propatheia in biblical exegesis probably stems directly from familiarity with Stoic

12 Cf. B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism," pp. 178-179. 1:\ I am indebted to B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism" for the phrase

"psychological inertia" in Seneca's argument. Aulus Gellius, N.A. XIX.1.18-20 distin-

guishes the "fool" from the "sage" in terms of the management of these initial impulses. 14 See, e.g., Origen's discussion of different principles of motion in irrational and

rational beings, de prin. III. 1-.2-3 SVF 11.988) and de orat. 6.1 (= SVF IIL989). In Cels. 1.64, V.57, VIII.51, Origen mentions having read Chrysippus, and includes two extracts from his treatise on the passions. For the general contribution of the Stoics to

Origen's thought, see H. Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," JTS 48 (1947) :34- 49, who notes that both Origen and Clement show their closest affinities with the Stoics in adapting their ethical ideals.

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writing. While his employment of the concept demonstrates much affinity with Seneca, his primary aim in invoking the propatheia is to explain prob- lematic Scriptural texts rather than to integrate a category of human behav- iors into a theoretical framework. This shift, as I hope to detail in what

follows, had an enduring effect on both the nature and the function of

propatheia as an incipient emotional reaction. In Psalm 4:5, the Psalmist counscls: "Be angry (opyiÇEa8E) and do not

sin." Origen is perplexed by this advice. If "anger" is a passion, how can the Psalmist permit (let alone promote) it? To resolve this problem, Origen examines how Scripture describes the phenomenon of "anger.""' He detects an ambiguity in the verb form which can be either an imper- ative or an indicative form of "to be angry." As it seems implausible to him that the Psalmist would command anger, Origen decides that the verb must be treated as an indicative, which thus establishes the conditions in

which "ang-er" might be permitted. The question then concerns the nature

of the phenomenon permitted by the Psalmist. Origen judges that Scripture uses the term "anger" to cover a wider semantic range than would be cus-

tomary among philosophically trained writers. Scripture, he holds, refers

by the same term to both the involuntary sensation observed in individu- als who suffer provocation, as well as the judgment that seeks vengeance against a perceived wrongdoer. "The noun 'anger,'" he observes, "desig- nates something voluntary, which some customarily define as a 'desire to

take vengeance against those who seem to have committed an injustice.' But the term also refers to something involuntary, which some call an orig- inating propatheia, which attracts toward itself in circumstances of certain irritations what we previously defined as anger."" In other words, Scripture conflates under one category the two affective conditions that the Stoics

carefully distinguished. The Psalmist's advice, therefore, makes a limited concession to involuntary responses to provocation. Origen paraphrases the

meaning of the verse: "Inasmuch as you grow angry, and this occurs to

you without having thoughts with rcgard to anger, but do not add to what issues from these things. Let not something blameworthy follow upon what has occurred that is not blameworthy." 17

'' Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG l2.ll4lD-1144B). Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG 12.H41D): Ti6pYhnpo<7T)yopta... crllllaívfl Ti 7EpoatpcrIK6v,

ijv mptoavco -civeg OPfÇ1V åV'tl'tlllrop?cracr8at iov5 TjblKllKÉVat 8oxovviaS. Ankoi teat å1tpoaípnov, 6 KakO?)01' wvsS 1tpo1tá8nav Y1VOIlÉVllV, È1tí noi 6? ÈpE81crllolÇ ËÀKo1Jcrav

. fiv 1tporoplpcrállf8a " Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG 1 2. I 1 44A): "Oaov opyíÇf<J8£ K(Xi cr1Jll?aívEl WÛW bpiv 01?K

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In explaining the Psalmist's admonition, Origen employs the same dis-

tinction between involuntary events and voluntary dispositions used by

Seneca, and, like the Roman philosopher, limits genuine "anger" to the

movement that joins rational assent to the desirability of exacting punish- ment. Origen does not regard the propatheia as in itself sinful. In a sepa- rate discussion of the Psalmist's injunction, Origen acknowledges that

propatheiai occur even in the most advanced believers, the "perfect" in his

terminology. While Scripture forbids a believer from giving "assent" to

angcr, nevertheless, even the "perfect" will experience an involuntary occur-

rcnce of propatheia, "when they suffer such mishaps as call forth anger."" The mark of the sage--- or of the perfect Christian-is the ability to

withhold assent from the impressions that summon voluntary co-operation. Moral responsibility only enters into consideration at the point of yielding or withholding consent to the impulses that the presentations provoke.

Origen identifies a proximate, although not necessary, link between the

propatheia and the development of a passion in the aetiology of sin. While

not "sinful," the propatheia nevertheless "draws toward itself" the charac-

teristic qualities of Origen asserts that the passion of anger pre-

dictably results when thoughts on a propatheia are entertained-and that

such a passion is in fact "sin"-but he neither clarifies the mechanisms

that produce this transition nor defines the line that separates the propatheia and the pathos. Although he broaches the issue of the relationship between

passions and sin, Origen restricts his use of the propatheia to demonstrate

the compatibility of biblical language with Stoic ethics, and does not extend

his discussion to a full evaluation of moral psychology.

Origen's discussion of the Psalmist's concession to "anger" is wholly con-

sistent with Seneca's use of propatheia. A reader of the Bible, however, would

also frequently encounter emotions ascribed in the gospels to Jesus. The

exovat ?po5 iovio Xoyiapolg, MXXE TO a1J't(DV npoo6f)TE' iw ouupaivovtt ov

\?eKT(0 WCK-c6vci 6cKokol)OiIG&,c(o. '" Origen, Eph. Fr. XIX.68-75 ( JTS 3 [1902], p. 420) To à1tpoaipE'tov, 6nEp

Ttv?; ÈKáÀEGav 1tpo1táSnav, fíne; oup.(3i')OETai Kat ioi5 IEhE(Otg 6cnpootipEu6v it 1táoxo'UGl xaia Tit iotase £iS opyiw 1tpOKaÀo'0I1EVa cv pnT6lpaTa (reading 1tpo1táSnav with the man-

uscript against the unnecessary emendation of the editor to 7tpoond6Etav). Origen, In 4:5 (PG 12.1141D) (quoted above). Origen perhaps recalls Posidonius's

position that an "emotional pull" (Jta8r)TUcr) can influence a reason that has been distorted by false suppositions. See the discussions of I.G. Kidd, "Posidonius on Emotions," in A.A. Long, Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone Press, 1971 [repr. 1996]), pp. 200-

215, esp. pp. 206-207, Coopcr, "Posidonius on Emotions," pp. 470-472.

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attribution of potentially "sinful" affective states to Christ could pose a par- ticularly difficult problem for Origen's moral psychology. As reported in

Matthew, Jesus went to Gethsemane after his final meal with the disciples. '1'he narrative goes on to say that upon arriving at the place, Jesus went off with his inner circle of disciples to pray, and "began to be grieved and distressed" (Matt. 26 :37).z° Origen devotes to this statement a detailed exam- ination of the interior emotional life of Christ, and the passage, despite its

length, deserves citation in full.

And consider that Scripture did not say "he was grieved and distressed," but he began to be grieved and distressed. For there is a great difference between "to be grieved" and "to begin to be grieved." Therefore, if someone who defends human passions should bring it up to us that Jesus himself was grieved, let him hear that [hc was] "the one who was tested in every respect as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. 4:15). This man was not grieved by grief for his own suffering. This happened instead with respect to the human nature only to the extent of the very beginning of grief and trembling, so that by these very things he might show to his disciples who were present (especially Peter, who thought great things of himsclf)-what he also later said to them-that "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak" (Matt. 26:41), that at no time should confidence be placed in the flesh, but the flesh must always be feared. Unwary confidence leads to boasting, but fear of weakness encourages one to take refuge in the help of God, just as the Lord himself advanced a short way and fell to the ground and prayed (Matt. 26:38-40). Therefore, he indeed "began to be grieved and distressed" according to human nature, which is subject to such passions, not however, according to the divine power, which is quite distant from passion of this kind.'"

The two terms arc À,um:îo8m and a8iiuovetv. In the parallel text in Mark 14:33, the terms are £KØaJ..l?eîo8m xai åÕT1J..loveîv. The NRSV translates as "to be grieved and agitated."

" Origen, Comm. Matt. Ser. 92 (GCS 38.205f.): et considera, quia non dixit: trista- batur et taediabatur, sed: coepit tristari et taediari. multum cnim interest inter tristari et incipere tristari. si ergo aliquis defendens passiones humanas profert nobis etiam ipsum tristatum fuisse Iesum, audiat quoniam, qui "temptatus est per omnia secundum simi- litudinem praeter peccatum," hic non est tristatus tristitia passionis ipsius, sed factus est secundum humanam naturum tantum in ipso principio tristitiae et pavoris, ut ostendat discipulis suis praesentibus (maxime Petro magna de se existimanti) rebus ipsis, quod et postea eis dixit, qui "spiritus promptus est, caro autem infirma," et non est aliquando confidendum in ea sed semper timendum de ea; quoniam incauta confidentia ad iac- tantiam ducit, timor autcm infirmitatis ad auxilium dei confugere adhortatur, sicut et dominum ipsum paululum progredi et cadcrc in faciem et orare. ergo coepit quidem tristari <et taediari> secundum humanam naturam, quae talibus passionibus subdita est, non autem secundum divinam virtutem, quae ab huiusmodi passione longe remota est.

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The passage only exists in Latin translation; the absence of the term propatheia, may reflect Origen's original text, or may be due to the avoidance of tech- nical terminology by the translator. Nevertheless, the presence of the con-

cept is clear in the strong distinction Origen draws between a "beginning" and the full development of a passion.

The problem that the verse presents to Origen is that "gricf" was identified by the Stoics as one of the four cardinal passions, the presence of which in itself marked a flaw in the disposition of a sage.22 To remove

any implication of a loss of psychic control by Christ, Origen places inter-

pretive emphasis on the unusual addition of the verb "began" by the evan-

gelist : Jesus, the narrative reads, "began to be grieved and distressed." He insists that the verb "to begin" in this case does not signify the initiation of a continuing disposition, but rather defines the boundary beyond which an incipient movement did not pass. Origen elsewhere recognizes this

pleonastic usage as simply the distinctive idiom (oDvr)6eta) of Scripture." In this case, however, he capitalizes on the awkward expression to limit the susceptibility of Christ to the passions.

His comments balance several objectives. He first strives to demonstrate that the emotional disturbance attributed to Christ by the evangelist does not compromise the perfection of his human nature, which Origen under- stands in accordance with Stoic ideals. As noted above, the propatheiai are a universal experience of even perfect human beings, a result of their sus-

ceptibility to the vicissitudes of corporeal existence. Second, he insulates the divine nature from involvement in human affections by linking Christ's

psychic event to corporeal motions, the "passions"-and here Origen means

"sufferings"–of the "flesh." Although Origen does not speculate on the exact manifestations of the propathic event, one has in mind the physical symptoms-such as vertiginal dizziness or shivering with cold-that Seneca described as principia proludentia adfectibus. Finally, Origen brings an ethical interest to his reading of this text, promoting the agony in Gethsemane as a standard for the management of emotional impulses experienced by all believers. Origen turns Jesus's agony into both a didactic opportunity and an indication of Jesus's full participation in human nature.

Origen applies the concept of propatheia primarily in two exegetical

z2 See SVF 111.412-420. 23 Origen, Io. XXXII.4.51-52. Cf. Bauer, Arndt, Gingrich, Greek-English Lexicon of the

New Testament, apxw On Origen's appeal to <Juvf¡8na, see B. Neuschafer, Origenes als Philologe, SBA 18.1-2 (Basel: 1987), pp. 143-145, with examples p. 401, n. 36.

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situations: to clarify biblical language concerning emotional states, and to

analyze aflective responses of Christ. In both cases, Origen employs propatheia in close affinity with Stoic ethics, invoking the concept to control biblical

language about the emotions through Stoic vocabulary. There is, however, a subtle, but important distinction in the two paradigmatic cases. In his

comments to Ps. 4:5, Origen regards the propatheia as an affective reaction

to a discrete, external provocation, and preserves a well-defined boundary between passive receptivity to stimuli and active cultivation of emotional

states. This divide begins to erode when propatheia is applied to Christ's

agony. The representation that produces Christ's propatheia is not an external

"impression," but an image internal to the mind in anticipation of approach-

ing events. Thoughts and images may arise unbidden to one's conscious-

ness, but hardly arc "involuntary" in the same sense as being startled at

a loud noisc. The Stoics held that the passion of "pain" or "grief" occurred "whenever we fail to get what we were desiring or happen upon what we were fearing."24 In particular, grief was stimulated by thc "fresh

opinion" of the presence of objects that cause serious harm, that is, dur-

ing moments of clear and present danger The analogous location for a

propatheia in the passion narrative would be the confusion that erupted at

the moment of Christ's arrest, not during the preceding vigil in Gethsemane.

'I'he evangelists, however, depict Jesus as experiencing acute pain and dis-

tress before the arrest, but in complete self-control during the actual seizure.

The shift of the propatheia to this earlier moment in the narrativc blurs the

distinction between involuntary passivity and voluntary action in the for-

mation of the affective state. Moreover, the evangelists relate that in his

distress Christ prayed "if it is possible, let this cup pass from me" (Matt. 26:39 par.), an action that suggests deliberation concerning alternative

courses of action. The episode of Christ's agony enables a wider scope for

the operation of propatheia to refer to the forming of intentions, perhaps

pcrmitting the irrational propatheia to evolve into a genuine passion.

" Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.88.8-89.3 (= SVF 111.378), citing the summary of Arius Didymus. I have followed the translation of J. Annas, Helleni.stic Plailosophy of Mind, p. 104. See also the valuable collection of texts and translations provided by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1987), § 65.

"7' See, e.g., Ps.-Andronicus, On Passions, I (= SVF IJI.39 I ), Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 4.2.1 (= SVF 111.463), and 47.12-17 (= SVF 111.466), on the mit-

igation of All these texts are also compiled by Long and Sedley.

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Origen does not seem to have recognized the potential for expanding the scope of the propathic experience through its application to the gospel narratives. Nevertheless, the introduction of propatheia into an exegetical sit-

uation enables the concept to exercise independence from its role in Stoic

ethics, and to be colored by its function in the surrounding biblical nar-

rative. In his treatment of Christ's agony, Origen divorces the propatheia, from the direct, proximate stimulus to which Seneca links it. Although his

comments do not expand on the implications of this move, it pcrmits thc

propathic event to be recast as a movement initiated by the self. Origen did not speculate on this possibility, but his followers pondered the impli- cations of this new perspective.

Extending and Revising Propatheia: Didymus the Blind

Although Origen introduced the term propatheia into Christian biblical

exegesis, he limited its function to explain Scriptural texts that seemed dis-

cordant with his understanding of ideal emotional functioning. Didymus the Blind, the most-renowned follower of Origen in fourth-ccntury Alexandria,

attempted a more thorough integration of the doctrine of propatheia into

moral psychology." Didymus commented extensively on the Bible, and also

taught in Alexandria for several decades; we are fortunate to possess tran-

scripts to his classroom proceedings interpreting the books of the Psalms

and Ecclesiastes. 21 While Didymus occasionally referred to propatheia in his

written commentaries, these lectures provide the most extensive discussion of the function of firopatheia. The Tura commentaries do not offer strong evidence that Didymus possessed direct knowledge of Stoic psychology, and

he employed the propatheia in exegetical situations that derived primarily

26 Five previously lost commentaries of Didymus were discovered in the middle of the twentieth century in Tura, Egypt, and have now been published by French and German editors. I cite these editions by abbreviating the biblical book, in combination with the designation "T" and the page and line of the papyrus. In addition, I make use of the copious fragments to Didymus's Commentary on P.salms edited by E. Miihlenberg, Psalmen-kommentare aus der Yalenenu'berlie,ferung, 3 vols. (Patrist.ische Texte und Studie.n; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977), cited as "Muhlenberg" with the fragment number.

On the Tura commentaries to Psalms and Ecclesiastes as school products, see G. Binder and L. Liescnborghs, "Einleitung," Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). Teil l.l (PT A, 25; Bonn: Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1979), pp. x-xiii; A.B. Nelson, "The Classroom of Didymus the Blind," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Michigan, 1995).

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from Origen.28 Nevertheless, he expanded and increased the autonomy of

the propatheia, and in so doing, opened intriguing pathways to explore the

complexities of human behavior and motivation.

Didymus does not explicate the moral psychology that underlies his view

of the propatheia. Nevertheless, he treats propatheiai as features of regular and

predictable psychological processes, rather than sudden or unforeseeable

occurrences. While these surges of affect may be regular, they are not

value-neutral events. Every example that Didymus gives associates a propatheia with a negative affects. 29 Didymus does not regard all desires to be culpa- ble,30 but such affects that cause a "disturbance" or "agitation"'

in the rational soul are propatheiai.v' Although Didymus can speak of bodily pains as producing "disturbances," the state itself pertains to the

rational component of the soul, and characterizes a condition of confu-

sion, anxiety, and indecision." Didymus defines the opposite condition as

"peace," a harmony of the faculties of the soul, and a "stillness" of mind

(fiJvxla) that marks the spiritual perfection achieved by the saints."

211 The question of Didymus's knowledge of Stoic writings merits further considera- tion. A.B. Nelson, "The Classroom of Didymus the Blind," pp. 97-101, identifies pas- sages in the Tura commentaries where Didymus directly addresses Stoic positions. She does not discuss, however, how Didymus gained knowledge of these teachings. In a careful investigation of npoaipe6y in Origen and Didymus, BJ. Bennett, "Didymus the Blind's Contra Manichaeos and its Debt to Origen's Theology and Exegesis," (Ph.D. dis- sertation, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto, 1997), pp. 205-213, notes that

significant affinity exists between the function of the concept in Didymus with that of the Stoic teacher, Epictetus. Bennett further observes, however, that these points of agreement are also present in Origen (cf. pp. 195-205), and concludes that Didymus's treatment of 7tpOaípEcrtç "most nearly resembles that of Origen" (p. 213).

24 Didymus associates propatheia with each of the four cardinal passions: grief (Ps.T. 222.8-12, 293.3-12); fear (Ps.T. 43.20, 221.32-33, In Ps. 76-5 [Mühlenberg, fr. 793]); desire (Ps.T. 76.14-17, 252.33-35, 263.10-11); anger (Ps.T. 222.12-14, Eccl.T. 206.23).

"' Didymus, Ps.1 8.20-9.16, affirms that the soul has a "desiring component" (TO arnt6vprhixov) to pursue the good and strive for the useful. See also Ps.T. 101.9; In Ps. 102:5 (Muhlenberg, fr. 978), _7obT 60.2f: Èm8t>¡..t.ía àpE'tT1ç.

3' The condition of the soul in propatheia as Taptix0q: Ps.T. 33.28-29; 221.34; 222.12- 14; In Ps. 76:5 (Miihlenberg, fr. 33.33-36 (without the term propatheia); as K?.ovT)6Eioa: Ps.1 222.9; as T6CP(XXO; K(Xi KÀ.ÓVOÇ: _7obT 50.8-51.7 (without the term

propatheia). Origen, Set. Ps. 4:5 (PG 12 1144B) had previously identified the occurrence of propatheia as an "agitation and shaking (x7?ovov Kai oEiop5v) of the soul."

32 For corporeal distress causing Tapaxfi of the soul, _7obT 50.8-51.7. n Didymus, Ps.T. 274.4; JobT. 306.16-308.15. Even saints will suffer propatheias, Ps.T.

274.4-12.

273

Although not an exceptional event in the mental life of an individual, a propatheia is a symptom of the fundamentally disordered condition of

human existence."' It is a condition from which a saint, or Christ himself, desircs to be released.3? Didymus makes several cfforts to clarify the rela-

tionship between these psychological disturbances and sin, and on occa-

sion treats profiatheia as the initial stage in a predictable sequence of three

(or four) stages before sin is accomplished.% From an initial movement, a

sin passes through discrete stages of a "passion" and a "disposi- tion" before being expressed finally in the deed. A key prob- lem, which Didymus does not fully resolve, concerns the distinction between

a propatheia, relieved of culpability, and the pathos, to which he assigns at

least some measure of blame. One criterion is temporal; a propatheia can

extend only a "short while." Didymus places interpretive emphasis on the

statement assigned to Jesus, "JVb my soul is disturbed (,cF,c6cpaicc(xt)" (.John

12:27), to insist that the "now" marks the "boundary of time" rather than

defines the initial moment in a series of even tS.17 Didymus further suggests that a qualitative, and not simply temporal, distinction separates a propatheia from a true passion. Citing the same text that motivated Origen's discus-

sion of Christ's propatheia, Didymus cxplains: began to be astonished

and dismayed.' One should not understand a propatheia at the point of be-

ginning as a kind of cowardice. For the propatheia is a proof of nature, not

a quality which produces moral defect or virtue."" Unfortunately, Didymus does not amplify the qualitative distinction he perceives between these two

emotional states.

When discussing Christ's emotional experience, Didymus adamantly denies any culpability to the propathic experience.'9 On other occasions,

Didymus, Ps.T. 277.1-5: If humanity had retained its created image, there would be no disturbance: ei yap euevev ?v T71 a?,rletvp FiK6vt Tn 7tpónn xa6' ijv Ebrl?tovpyn8t?, oux È,apá't'tetO.

Didymus, Ps.T. 221.32-33. 16 see B. Krebber, Exkurs I zu 221,2-222,6: Die Lehre von der 7tpo7tá8na im Kampf

gegen Apollinarios, Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes, IV (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt

Verlag, 1972), pp. 157-158. :17 Didymus, 43.16-20, cf. Ps.T. 33.28-29, In Ps. 87:17b (Muhlcnberg, Fr. 878).

For discussion, A. Gesche, La C,hristologie du "Commentaire sur les pçaumes" découvert a Toura (Gembloux: Editions J. Duculot, S.A., 1962) pp. 152, 156.

Bs Didymus, Ps.T. 43.20-22. 8all?e'icr8at K(Xi à8r¡llove'iv." plxpi tOû 6p?(X(YOCCI pfi àv,t àvav8piaç 8úvatat ?,a(3eiv npona6erav <púcreffiç yap laTw 1l xpoxG0Eia, OD 7tOtÓ,r¡ç <paûÀ.ov 11 6nou8aiov 7towûcra.

39 Didymus, Ps.T. 43.23-25, concluding the above-cited discussion: "We have often

274

however, Didymus allows that some moral taint accompanies the experi- ence of a propatheia. Sins that consist in "thoughts" can pass unrecognized even by the one who has them. As even the slightest touch seems to blem-

ish a garment ncwly returned from a fuller's shop, so also the "completely clean man considers even the brief moment in thought to be a great sin

(cf. Ps. This is circumspect language-while the saint might "con-

sider" such a psychic disturbance to be a "great sin," Didymus does not

judge that the propatheia is in fact a sin. A favorite illustration of Didymus

captures this ambiguity. Whoever sees a woman "with lust" (cf. Matt. 5:28), but arrests the disturbance at the point of propatheia, "appears to fall," but

is not "cast down."" While it is clear that one should avoid even the

"appearance" of such a fall, the culpability of this psychic stumbling

remains-perhaps intentionally so-- undefined.

Another point of ambiguity in Didymus' treatment of propatheia concerns

the material content of the experience. In the examples just noted, he

applies thc concept to sudden events that have immediate somatic and psy-

chological effects-sexual arousal in an ascetic, a surge of fear in Christ.

More interestingly, Didymus also identifies "ideas" as the

source of propatheiai, suggesting that such events may combine impressions and judgments. This willingness to understand practical thoughts as giving rise to a propatheia allows Didymus to explore the possibility for detecting nascent intention even in the origins of emotional rcsponse. In his retelling of the betrayal of Jesus by Judas, Didymus fittingly offers an analysis of

propatheia that dwells on his motive. Didymus returns to this narrative on

numerous occasions, often conveying the story of Judas as an example of

the unsuccessful management of propatheia. +3 Warning against the ability of

a propatheia to swell into destructive acts, Didymus reminds his students:

difTerentiated four steps: the propatheia alone is free of blamc-does not suffer guilt; but the passion a moderate blame, the diathesis is already evil how much more tlte com-

pleted action!" Tllll 61eoTGXq iavia on TETTEpa eaTtv ? i? rrpo?&6cta p6vq à1toÀún evx?,tj?aio5, 01>K ú1to?áÀÀn evx7,,tj?raTr ? T6 K1i00§ 6? ÈVKÀ1Íllan . 6? õu:x8£O"tç Kaxia E6Tiv ÀOl1tÓV' 1tÀÉOV Kai h jrpo?T)(i(p6etoa.

40 76.10-13, cf. Ps. 71 293.4-6: the souls of saints "can be said" to sin when they come into a condition of propatheia, employing the same illustration.

" Didymus, Ps. T 252.33-35: E16Ev its yvvaixa npo5 Èm8UlltaV P6XPI Tfig 1tpo1ta8daç' £60§Ev 1tl1tt£lV, ov KaTEp p6yq . Cf. Ps. 1 76.15-17.

Didymus, Ps.1 41.26-42.6, 263.4-12, in Ps. 58:2-3 (Muhlenbcrg, fr. 608). 13 Didymus, Ps.T. 41.26-42.6, 252.33, 266.5, 267.1, 273.4; £ach.1 43.6-13; 7obT.

4.20, 245.8-12, Eccl.T 81.5, in Ps. 40:7-9 jmuhlenberg, fr. 418), in h 108:6-8 (Miihlenberg, fr. 1033), de spiritu sancto, ed. L. Doutreleau, Didyme L'Aveugle: Traiti du S'aint-Espril (SC

275

Indeed, for example, such a thing is said concerning Judas. First, the devil cast it into his heart to betray the Lord, then, Scripture says, "after the morsel Satan entered him" (John 13:27)-not that Satan entered first, but that he "cast into his heart" (John 13:2) [an initiation of the] propatheia. After he found that the propatheia pcrsisted, so that it was no longer a propatheia, but rather the worst kind of disposition, he took a position, a placc to enter into him."

Didymus recognizes two discrete stages in the formulation of the plan to

betray Christ. In the first movement, which Didymus equates with propatheia,, Satan exploits natural movements in Judas' mind to suggest the heinous

idea. Satan is able to "enter into" his victim only after the "disposition" of Judas demonstrated his receptivity to the plan.45 Didymus perceives in

the case of Judas a predictable maturation of an impulse from a propatheia to a "disposition," as the germination of an intention into a resolution to

act. The propatheia to which.Judas was subject was an inclination to betray his master, and even this incipient emotion contains some measure of cal-

culation and deliberation. In another discussion of this narrative, Didymus states that Satan cast an "idea" into Judas's mind; the inter-

changeability of the two terms shows how Didymus has integrated the con-

cept of propatheia into the rational operations of the human mind.'?' This

shift created a new potential for the theory of propatheia, and gave Didymus an instrument that might illumine the inchoate psychic movements that

germinated into complex emotional states-the concept propatheia could des-

ignate an "incipient passion," related to its mature form as a child is to

the maturc adult. How effectively did Didymus deploy this instrument he

had helped to forge?

386; Paris: Cerf" 1992), sects. 262-264. F'or discussion, see R.A. Layton, 'Judas Yields a Place to the Devil : The Use of Origen's Commentary on Ephesians by Didymus of Alexandria," in W. Bienert, ed., Origenes in den Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahrhunderts: Colloquium Origenianum Septimum (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), pp. 525-535.

1+ Didymus, 294.15-20: aviixa yovv xai nepi 2ou 'Iou8aToiaDTae('pr)Tai'jrp6TEpov e(3a?,ev "ei; K(xp8i(XV" aviov "ua 7tapaö0 T6V KÚptOV," EiTa Â.£yn' To yrwltiov EKTti?.6ev EiS Exeivov 6 6aiava5," où 7tpÓ'tfpOV EicreÂ.8wv, P(Xk6)V iV Tfi xap8ia (]lxpl

npo] 7ta8eíaç bta?evov6av E?P6)V iiw nporccz6etav 6(TTE prlxeit nporra6etav Eivai, Kat ötá8ecrtv xElp(GTQV, xwpav 'tÓ7tOV TOD ÈÂ.8e'iv EKE1VOV.

15 Didymus does not attempt to locate the stage of Ka9oq in the narrative. 4/i Didymus, In Ps. 58:2-3 (Miihlenbcrg, Fr. 608); cf' 267.22-28, In h 40:7-9

(Muhlenberg, Fr. 418): Satan cast "love of money" into Judas. In de spir- itu sancto, 263, Didymus declares that Satan prompted Judas with the insidit'? avaritiae. As

early as Plato, greed was recognized as a peculiarly human emotional state that depended on calculative faculties and was directed toward attaining a desired object (see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Ari.stotle on Emotion, [New York: Harper and Row, 1975], pp. 33, 38-39).

276

Adolphe Gesche has persuasively argued that the nature of Christ's

human soul is of central importance to the Psalms lectures, concluding that

the doctrine of propatheia contributed to one of the most successful responses to both Arian and Apollinarian arguments in antiquity.+7 In so doing,

Didymus significantly extended the range of application of the concept

propatheia beyond that contemplated by Origen. The Apollinarian Christology, which Didymus opposed, denied the contribution of a rational human soul

to the Incarnation, viewing the divine Logos as a full substitute to the pres- ence of a human mind." To use the concept of propatheia successfully against his opponents, Didymus needed to show that the psychic event gave sure

proof of human rational functions in the Incarnation. The pressure of

engagement with Apollinarian Christology forced Didymus to define more

precisely the relationship between a propathic event, the structure of the

human soul, and the nature of uniquely human emotional experience. As

the rational faculties become more involved in a propathic event, it became

more difficult for the exegete to hold the propatheia immune from sin. This

introduced a strain on the concept of propatheia; if a rational intention can

be discerned in the propathic event, is a subject morally responsible for

even these incipient emotional reactions?

Two cases taken from the lectures on the Psalms show the tensions that

Didymus created in stretching the application of propatheia in this fashion. In Ps. 40:5 (LXX), the Psalmist declares, "I said, '0 Lord, have mercy on

me, heal my soul, because I have sinned before you."' Didymus asserts

that the character of Christ is the first-person speaker in the Psalm. In his

comments to the verse in question, however, he does not explain how such

a statement can be placed in the mouth of the Savior."? The teacher instead

observes that the Psalmist's prayer for mercy could apply to almost any individual, since no one maintains an uninterrupted contemplation of divine

things. Student questions turn naturally to the possibility of sin in Christ, first addressing the occurrence of sin in Christ's human soul, and then

inquiring into the status of embodiment.

Question: But the body doesn't come into sin? Answer My soul comes into

propatheia. Indeed, "he began to be astonished and dismayed" (Mark 14:33). By this verse those who assign to Jesus [only] an appetitive capacity-the

A. Gesch6, La christologie du "Commentaire sur les Psaumes," pp. 118-221. A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), pp. 329-

341. Didymus, Ps.T 290.14-15; 292.15-16.

277

so-called irrational soul-are refuted. While the irrational creature is able to be "astonished," it is not able to be "dismayed." It is alien to an irrational creature to experience dismay. The gospels assign to him the beginning of both the experience of dismay and the experience of being astonished. It is not the beginning that comes after the propatheia. For a passion is not the kind of thing that is a beginning, which is instead a Que.stion: What does to "be dismayed" mean? Answer: It is a grief of the rational soul, together with the mental representation of the causes of the grief.50

The force of the question is uncertain, but may address antecedent Apolli- narian exegesis that finds in the reference to "soul" in Ps. 40:5 a distinc-

tion between the speaker of the Psalm, and the "soul" that is the subject of the speech." Even if the student does not mean to invoke Apollinarian theories of the Incarnation, Didymus preempts such use of the text by ref-

erence to Christ's agony in Gethsemane. Basing his comments on the

Marcan form of the narrative, Didymus holds that while the experience of "astonishment" can arise in both rational and irrational creatures, that

of "dismay" requires rational judgment. This unusual distinction of terms

elicits a follow-up question from a student on the definition of

The definition Didymus supplies is not elsewhere attested. His gloss, how-

ever, imbues the affect with a cognitive dimension, requiring that the

subject display both the symptoms of distress and reflective con-

sciousness of the source of that distress. The presence of such conscious-

ness Didymus takes as proof of a rational soul, enlisting the agony in

Gethsemane in his dispute with the Apollinarians. This gain comes at a

price, as the treatment of another text in the Psalms lectures demonstrates

the difficulty of maintaining a psychic disturbance in Christ apart from

any implication of sin.

The passage in question contains one of the most remarkable records

of a heated dispute between teacher and student preserved anywhere in

ancient literature. In Ps. 34:17 (LXX), the Psalmist prays, "Restore

Didymus', Ps.T. 293.6-12: TO awpa ou ytvEiat iv yrvxtj pov yivETat 1tpo1ta8d?' 7ObV "011]#EiG0lll xai a8rlpov£iv." £v't£û8£v E?E?"`?, OVTOCL 01 OpEKTLICI?V

8uvaptv Tfiv kEYog6vTlv &,7?oyov 1tpoO'á1t1:OV't£ç tco r6 äÀoyov 8?vcccal pev äpçaO'8at cob 8a??£îO'8at, 0'Ù pfiv a8?povEiv- 4?VOV yap laTw Šcpou T& &5??LOVFiV. à1to 1:OÛ

dC87l?IOVEiV Kat Tot) 6ap(3Eia6at TiV lipxiv amm 1tpoO'T1'1'av. 01)K eonv 6? àpXT) Ý] ?£'tà 1tpo1tá8Etav' oiov To 01)K e6itv dCpXfi, KpOK1i0Elll avitj. xai iV äÀÀro yovv

?,e7Eiat ? "àvnÀ1Í?1t'trop (iou- où pfi oa?.eD6m T6 d6qpovEiv ii

EOT1V; -hilKQ EOT1V hoylKoil 1:OÛ àva1toÀ£Îv TO alna

'' Didymus, Ps.T. 42.8-28; 282.2-7 rejects similar distinctions of speaker made by Apollinarian excgetes.

278

tá<J1:ll<Jov) my soul from their evildoing, my only-begotten from

Didymus interprets this Psalm as spoken by Christ, and the reference

to the "only-begotten" as the human soul he assumed in the Incarna-

tion. Only Christ's soul is called the "only-begotten," because "neither

thought nor idea nor disturbance separates the soul [from the divine Word]. Even if it is disturbed, the disturbance

stops at the point of propatheia."'v; While a propatheia does not "separate" the soul from union with the divine, the occurrence of such a disturbance

creates the potential for sin. The prayer of the Psalmist for a "restoration"

heightens the ambiguous nature of the psychic event. This plea seems

to Didymus to conceive a prior state to which the speaker yearns to

return: "for no one who comes to a place where he has never been says that he has 'returned,' but the one who comes from one country to an-

other country."'' Nevertheless, appealing to the cases of Susanna and Joseph as analogies, the exegete concludes that the prayer for a "restoration," is

simply another means of petitioning for "deliverance."

His students are not satisfied with this explanation and open the debate

by asking once again in what way Christ's soul might be "restored." Origcn's doctrine of the apokatastasÙ, the expectation of the ultimate restoration of

fallen rational souls to their original created state, surfaces in the query. The student asks whether Christ needs an apokata.sta.si.s, which would imply consciousness of a fall in Christ's soul. Didymus first reasserts his exege- sis ; the plea for "restoration" does not refer to the doctrine of the apokatas- tasi.s, but to the desire for protection from "the savagery of the opponents."

Didymus, however, acknowledges that the plea suggests "fear" in the spcaker. He strictly qualifies this concession; the Psalmist does not voice actual fear, but rather a propatheia: "for the experience of fear itself was only a propalheia. But he wishes also to be removed from propatheia-for he does not say, 'from my evil-doing."'-"-'

.ï2 A. Gesche, La christologie du "Commentaire sur les Psaumes," pp. 158-168, provides an excellent discussion of the Christotogica) aspects of this passage.

Didymus, Ps.T. 43.16-20, commenting on the use of the term "only-begotten" in Ps. 21:21 b. See also Didymus' remarks on the designation of Christ as "only-begotten" in Ps. 7l 86.16-87.16, 221.3f

Didymus', Ps. T. 220.25-26: oO6Elg Ox6ymv Eiç 'Ó1tOV, £v8a O'Ù8E1tO,E YEYOVEV, ÀEYELat a7roKa6!oTao6at, 6 ??,06V ?K nvo5 7taLpi8oç E7t' 7ta,pl8a 11 Ex Tonou Fi5 elepov ,r6nov.

'' Didymus, Ps. T, 221.28-33: E7tEp( ). múç à7tEKa,Ecr'll; -ov YEYOVEV iv á?ap,iatç, 060V E1tl Tfi wpoTrlTt Twv iKIKEIp?VWV E'ÙÀap?81l ph na6p -cobto ... "à7tOKa,ácrLllcrov" ODV

279

The teacher implies that a genuine passion of "fear" would in fact con- stitute a lapse in Christ's psychic control that would necessitate a "restora- tion."'6 The student seizes on this concession, and presses the distinction between propatheia and fear:

Question: Does he pray to bc rcstored] into the condition of fearlessness?" Answer: He does not speak as one now in a state of fear-"Into fearlessness restore me!," i.e., into no longer having even a propatheia. I have a percep- tion that I have been disturbed. "Restore," therefore, "my soul." Why do you grieve, 0 my soul, and why do you disturb me? Hope upon God, because I will confess to him" (Ps. 41:6). He has not spoken to anyone else, he has deliberated in his own mind-you are near to the one who stills distur- bance.... "Hope," therefore, "on God, because I will confess to him." When he persuaded himself to hope on God, he was restored from fear and con- fusion, which very fear and confusion occurred from the evildoing of the wicked powers and from the devil himself.'"

The student insists that the "restoration" sought by the Psalmist refers to an internal psychic experience rather than physical deliverance. The teacher

concedes the point, even as he refuses to yield to the notion that a state of imperturbable fearlessness is the only proper emotional condition for a

perfect human being. Didymus argues that Christ's emotional state is not

compromised by the perception that he has been "disturbed" by thoughts that generate fear. Because this disturbance remains as a deliberation within Christ's own mind, it is properly called a propatheia, and does not constitute

aura 6hW§ yap r6 6ElhW0fiVlll npojraQeta 0?hEl Kat itj5 Kpo?a6Eta<; ËÇffi yEVe6eat ? 0,) yap einev '(i7T6 xaxoupyia5.'

'`' Although not stated, the identification of the emotion of "fear" suggests that the episode of Christ's agony in Gethsemane is in view in this discussion.

The stenographer habitually records only a paraphrase of the questions to indi- cate the subject matter under discussion. See A. Kehl, Der Psalmenkommentar von Tura. Q,uaternio IX (Pap. Colon. Tlaeol. 1) (Koln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), pp. 25-28; Binder and Liesenborghs, Einleitung, Didymos der Blinde: YLOmmentar zum Ecclesiastes, pp. xxii-xxiii. The actual questions are not always preserved, and in the following translations are placed in brackets to indicate the reliance on editorial reconstruction.

;H Didymus, Ps. 1 221.34-222.6: ciq Tb -o-6 vuv 6e6wT6pevog F171F-v- To 6C5F?; p£ attoxaTaairl6ov,' dç To 1l1lK£'tt 1l1lÔ£ TCPOR&OFtaV 9XCIV. al'OOq(5tV exw, on. ieia P a yw at. "ac?oxaTaa2 rl aov" ow \)/D/f)v Ilou." "iva ii It£piÀuItoç Ilou, Kat iva n 6vvTapaa6?tS ËÀmcrov iK( Tov on ÈÇOIlOÀoY1Ícrollm 111, yap EITEEV - Tfi eocviov 8tavoia "iva ii 7EF-PiXIJ7tO; ei xai va ii avviapa66etS 11£;" exet5 iyybg rov ItŒÚov'ta 't1,v Tapaxtjv ... ovv lxl rov 0e5v, on 1§opoXoyfiaopai oic sinrt6ev Éam1,v ÈÀIticrm ÈItt Tov OF6v, a?cExaTe6ir? ano iov Kat Tf)q oTtep

xai ?7EEP 'taItax1, ano xaxovpyiaS Itovllpffiv 81)v6pp-(t)v xai aviov TOD Sta(3o?,ov yEy?VQTIXI.

280

the passion of "fear." Didymus neither clarifies what constitutes an appro-

priate human emotional condition, nor defines the line that separates admis-

sible propatheia from a prohibited pathos. He suggests that some measure

of rationality can be accommodated in the experience of propatheia; the

ability to label an experience with meaningful language necessitates a degree of conscious self reflection.'`'

After a brief effort to resume the line-by-line exegesis of the text, the

students quickly steer the discussion back to the problem of Christ's propatheia.

Question : [Why do you say Christ is restored from a propatheia?] Answer: Since "he was tested in all respects apart from sin," (Heb. 4:15) we attribute a

propatheia to thc soul. But the propatheia is not sin. For if we do not attribute this [kind of movement in the soul], we introduce another nature of the soul, and it would have no glory or dignity or praise or crowns if it were not agi- tated. You have, for example, in the gospel that "he began to be grieved and to fear" (Matt. 26:37). For the reference to "beginning" is nothing else than a propatheia. 'I'his "beginning" is and remains only a beginning-there is noth-

ing after it. Only this [soul] selected good before the choice of

Didymus argues that the testimony of Heb. 4:15 (the same prooftext adduced

by Origen) requires that Christ undergo a "testing" of the soul, which he

equates with the psychic experience of propatheia. The important addition

in this answer is that propatheia is identified as a necessary condition for

complete human experience. Didymus, unfortunately, does not explicate this brief' remark any further. He has introduced a possibility here to en-

sure that Christ's perfect human constitution-and by implication the souls

of the saints who imitate him-does not necessitate being impervious to

feeling. The ideal of complete release from psychic disturbance does not

Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism," pp. 166-176 argues that in ortho- dox Stoic thought, individuals are accountable for any effect that can be formulated in

elementary linguistic utterances For Didymus, it is sufficient that the ability to

express the reaction in meaningful language demonstrates, in his view, the rationality of Christ's human soul, and he does not pursue this problem any further.

"" Didymus, PL T 222.8-12. > -È7td "7tE7tEÍpacr'wt icac6c 7távm xu?pi5 á¡.tap1:iaç xa8' 8i8opsv a?,r? 7tpo7táOnav. OÜK ?6mv ùÈ 'Í1 7tpo7táOna á¡.tap1:ia' eav yap ¡.t11 8w5 iovio, ov6iav eioayett; Kat 01?8? Exev O1j6i àçia Ècr1:tV È7talvrov xai cr1:E<pávrov ¡.t11 ](?,OVIIOgi(Ya. exets youv 1:ip EùaYYEÀicr om 6a?j3elo6ai xai

(x8T))iovetV"' yap XTep5v Ti iaTw 1:fjç xpoxa0eiag 16 àpX11 aü1:Tl auTO 1:0Û1:O

àpX11 ?16vov e6iiv, ovx exEt n PET' aÙ1:1Ív. )i6vr) aÜ1:Tl7tpo 1:fjç aipeaEwS 1:Ô>V xaxwv To aya66v In the final sentence, Didymus alludes to Isa. 7:15, a verse he adduces else-

where to contest Apollinarian Christology. See, e.g. Eccl. T 221.18-21, appealing to the

propatheia theory, and Ps. 1 30.1-31.7.

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necessitate removal from emotional experience altogether. Finally, the stu-

dents pin Didymus down on the question of the propatheia itself

Questiora: [What causes a propatheia?] Answer: This has often been explained. The nature of the rational soul is susceptible to what it receives by nature. It is susceptible to wrath, desire, pain, disturbance, fear. Whenever something is presented that causes fear, the rational nature is completely disturbed. Some- times, however, [the rational soul] stills the disturbance immediately so that

nothing occurs after it. This they call propatheia.61

Didymus concludes his colloquy with this brusque response, but the per-

plexity of the students is understandable. The definition he provides fore-

closes further discussion of the tensions that Didymus himself had created

by his presentation of the propatheia,. Dogrnatic concerns of protecting Christ's

perfection, it appears, limit the opportunity to pursue a more sustained

investigation into the obscure roots of human emotions.

In Stoic psychology, and to a significant degree in Origen, a propatheia occurs when an external stimulus is presented to a subject. Didymus describes

an agent as productive of propatheiai; the preliminary movement occurs

internally to the psychic composition of the subject. The propatheia becomes

a foundational moral event in human psychology, both possessing the seeds

of intentional action and capable of articulation in linguistic symbols. The

students of Didymus, however, indicate a fuller awareness than does their

teacher that this formulation of the propatheia discloses a disturbing, and

yet unmapped, terrain in the human psyche.

Conclusion

In Stoic psychology, the term propatheia defined a set of mental phenom- ena that did not meet the essential criteria as "passions." The concept did

not describe a single psychic event, but designated a category of sponta- neous affects that produced behaviors symptomatic of the genuine passions, even though devoid of rational assent. Origen, followed by Didymus, detached the concept from the system of psychic relationships from which

propatheia derived its meaning in Stoic thought. Consequently, the propatheia underwent a gradual shift in semantic range as exegetical and apologetic

''' Didymus, Pr. T. 222.12-14: -1tOÀÀáKtÇ ÈÀfx81l 1:0Û1:0. Ý1 o?(yi(x Tfig Àoyucr\Ç 8exmx? e6mv wv 1tÉ<PUKfV 8?60601. 6EKTIKfi eonv 8u/lOû, ejtt6uj?!a<,,

ö1:av 1tapacr1:n n To KIVOBV 1táv'tú)ç mpá't'tf'tat Ý1 hoylKh ououx. Èvtó1:e 5? lcr1:llcrtV fù8froÇ 1:1]v Tap(xx?v w5 prl8ev /let a?)r?V yevE6eat. 1:am1]v nponaeetav k?701)GtV.

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concerns exercised a decisive influence over the function of the concept. Origen used the concept to protect certain spontaneous reactions from im-

putation as "sin," and incidentally ensured in this manner the integrity of

the frontier that separates involuntary reactions from voluntary dispositions. In his treatment of the concept, Didymus introduced greater permeability into this boundary. Didymus presented an agent capable not only of suffering intrusions into the psychic balance, but also one who produced these dis-

turbances. Consequently, the line between voluntary and involuntary became

less clearly marked, and Didymus entertained the view that a propatheia was

potentially, even if not actively, sinful.

Several factors contributed to this tentative redefinition of the interior

frontiers of the self, in ways that surpassed Didymus' own recognition of

the implications. Apologetic purposes, particularly the need to counter

Apollinarian Christology, encouraged the extension of propatheia to embrace

at least some rational functions, especially the ability to label emotional

states by linguistic symbols. The biblical narrative also influenced the direc-

tion of the revision of this preliminary affective movement. Didymus, and

to a lesser extent Origen, defined the propatheia in the mirror of Scripture, and found in the stories of Judas' betrayal and Christ's agony the defining marks of this psychic event. By situating the propatheia within canonical nar-

ratives, the concept began to absorb the shape dic.tated by these stories.

For Didymus, the propatheia was the audible echo of the faintest traces of

the inarticulate stirrings that prompt human thought and behavior, the

epicenter from which the shocks of emotion could eventually be detected

by the rational consciousness. Didymus fell far short of resolving the ten-

sions his expanded concept of propatheia created for a fully coherent moral

psychology. Such tensions, while untidy from a systematic perspective, nevertheless provide witness to the efforts of interpreters to use the biblical

narrative, as Gregory of Nyssa declared, as the "rule and measure" of their

moral and psychological theory.