rfid/usn security issues
DESCRIPTION
RFID/USN Security Issues. 2009/7/14 신승목 Cryptography & Information Security Lab. Ubiquitous world. 1. RFID 개론 및 보안 이슈. 2. USN 개론 및 보안 이슈. 3. 3. Quiz. 4. 4. Contents. Advent of Ubiquitous society. Transition to Ubiquitous society. RFID/USN concept. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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RFID/USNSecurity Issues2009/7/14Cryptography & Information Security Lab
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KAIST-ICCContents* / 48
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KAIST-ICCAdvent of Ubiquitous society* / 48
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KAIST-ICCTransition to Ubiquitous society* / 48
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KAIST-ICCRFID/USN concept@ MIC/Korea 2007RFID/USN / IT .* / 48
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KAIST-ICCIntroduction to RFID*
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What it RFID?KAIST-ICCRadio Frequency IDentication (RFID) is a method of remotely identifying objects using transponders (tags) queried through a radio frequency channel.
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RFID - overviewKAIST-ICCDataBarcodeRFIDA typical RFID tagA multi-tier system: RFID tag, reader and backend serverAn infrastructure to build ubiquitous society* / 48
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RFID readers (1/2)KAIST-ICCFixed-Type Readers
Mobile Readers* / 48
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RFID readers (2/2)KAIST-ICCTypical Structure of RFID Reader
Power Supply* / 48
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RFID TagKAIST-ICCClassification by Power
Classification by FrequencyLow-frequency (LF: 125 ~ 134.2 KHz and 140 ~ 148.5 KHz)High-frequency (HF: 13.56 MHz)Ultra-high-frequency (UHF: 868 ~ 928 MHz)* / 48
PassiveSemi-passiveActivePower SourcePassiveBatteryBatteryTransmitterPassivePassiveBatteryMax Range(m)101001000
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Electronic Product Code (EPC)KAIST-ICC
296 = 79,228,162,514,264,337,593,543,950,33696 bits can uniquely label all products for the next 1,000 years.* / 48
VersionEPC Manager (Manufacturer)Object Class (Product)Serial Number8 bits28 bits24 bits36 bits
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EPC classification (1/2)KAIST-ICC
Class-1: Identity Tags (normative):Passive TagsAn electronic product code (EPC) identifierA Tag identifier (TID)A 'kill' function that permanently disables the TagOptional password-protected access controlOptional user memory* / 48
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EPC classification (2/2)KAIST-ICCHigher-class Tags (informative)Class-2: Higher-Functionality Passive TagsAn extended TID (Tag ID)Extended user memoryAuthenticated access controlClass-3: Semi-Passive TagsAn integral power sourceIntegrated sensing circuitryClass-4: Active Tags (i.e., sensor node)Tag-to-Tag communicationsActive communicationsad-hoc networking capabilities
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RFID system applications (1/3)KAIST-ICCLibraries
Supply chain management
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RFID system applications (2/3)KAIST-ICCAirline Baggage @ JFK Airport
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RFID system applications (3/3)KAIST-ICC
PassportsTransport paymentsAnti-counterfeitingWhitepapers in 2006 (by Auto-ID Labs.)Access controlAnimal tracking, etc.
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KAIST-ICCRFID security issues* / 48
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Security and Privacy in RFIDPrivacy invasion:Information leakage of users belongings without awareness of a userStatic ID is subject to tracking such as behavior tracking
Lack of authentication:Malicious reading (skimming): Captured information aids duplicating genuine tags.Denial-of-Service(DOS) due to deployment of cloned tags
RisksEavesdropping between T & RDB Desynchronization B & RImpersonation, spoofingReplay attack / Active QueryData loss (DoS, Message hijacking)Forgery (Decoy Tag, etc.)Physical (Hardware) attack* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Security Requirements in RFID SystemsConfidentialityIndistinguishabilityAnti-cloningAvailabilityForward security
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Weak Implementations (1/2)In January 2005, researchers at John Hopkins University and the RSA Lab announced a successful attack on the Texas Instruments DST RFID by guessing its 40-bit key using brute-force.The DST RFID was used in Ford immobilizers and ExxonMobil SpeedPass.
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Weak Implementations (2/2) - VideoCracking TI (Texas Instrument) DST (Digital Signature Transponder) chip
TI DSTCracking the key in a DST tagBuying gas using the DST simulatorSniffing a DST tag in a victim's pocket* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Security ChallengeThe narrow cost requirements of low-cost RFID systems make low-cost tags extremely resource-scarce environments, far below the requirements for any public-key and symmetric-key cryptographic systems.EPC tags: $0.05, 250 1000 gatesAES: 20,000 30,000 gates* / 48KAIST-ICC
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KAIST-ICCIntroduction to USN*
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Sensor & Sensor NetworkWhat is a Sensor?A device that produces a measurable response to a change in a physical or chemical condition, e.g. temperature, ground composition, etc.
Sensor NetworksA large number of low-cost, low-power, multifunctional, and small sensor nodesThey benefit from advances in 3 technologiesdigital circuitrywireless communicationsilicon micro-machining* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)New technologies have reduced the cost, size, and power of micro-sensors and wireless interfaces.Circulatory NetEnvironmental MonitoringStructural* / 48KAIST-ICC
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WSN - PropertiesCompose of a large number of sensor nodesDensely deployed inside(near) the phenomenonLow energy consumptionRelocation or recharge is impossibleSelf-organizing network (infrastructureless)Random deployment : manual configuration is unfeasible
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Applications: U-farm* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Applications: Weather sensing Fire Detection* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Applications: Fire Detection Cultural Property Asset Management using USN Bush Fire Detection* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Applications: Battle Field* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Applications: Disaster Detection2(2) : 15 : 7 : 2(7) : 4 : 2 : 2(6) : 11 : 6* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Communication ArchitectureSensor nodes can bedata originators anddata routers * / 48KAIST-ICC
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Node HardwaresensorsCPUradiobatteryAcoustic, seismic, magnetic, etc. interfaceElectro-magnetic interfaceLimited-battery supplyEventdetectionWireless communication with neighboring nodesIn-node processing* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Examples of Sensor Nodes* / 48KAIST-ICC
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KAIST-ICCUSN security issues* / 48
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Why should we consider the Security? (1/2)Providing confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the communications and computations
Sensor networks are vulnerable to security attacks due to the broadcast nature of transmission
Sensor nodes can be physically captured or destroyed* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Why should we consider the Security? (2/2)Since the system is able control house infrastructuree.g., gas, water control etcIf the adversary attacks house infra systemHouse infrastructure can be a serious harm to humane.g., Open gas valve, overheat the micro-wave
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Security Threats of Each Application* Yee Wei Lawand Havinga, P.J.M., How to Secure a Wireless Sensor Network, 2005* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Constraints of WSN* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Security Requirements for WSNData Confidentiality (Eavesdropping)Dont leak sensor readingsSolution: EncryptionData Authentication (inject / alter Attack)data was really from claimed senderSolution: MACData Integrity (inject / alter Attack)Received data is not altered in the mid-waySolution: data authentication* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Attacks on WSNTypical attacks on WSN are:Sybil attackWormholesHELLO flood attacks
Notations= adversary= base station* D. Wagner, Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond, SASN 2003* / 48KAIST-ICC
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HELLO flood attackInferring a node is a neighbor (i.e. within radio range) after receiving a broadcast packet from them may be ill-conceived. An adversary with a powerful transmitter could easily reach every node in the network.
* D. Wagner, Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond, SASN 2003* / 48KAIST-ICC
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Sybil attackAn adversary may present multiple identities to other nodes. The Sybil attack can disrupt geographic and multipath routing protocols by being in more than one place at once and reducing diversity.
* D. Wagner, Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond, SASN 2003* / 48KAIST-ICC
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WormholesTunnel packets from one part of the network and replay them in a different part.
* D. Wagner, Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond, SASN 2003* / 48KAIST-ICC
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ConclusionRFID/USNs are essential technology for up-coming Ubiquitous worldIf the system is not designed with security in mindThis technology would harm human life
Security should be considered from the design of entire Ubiquitous systemKAIST-ICC* / 48
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