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  • 8/19/2019 Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    1/12

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"), which is part of Citigroup GlobalMarkets' sales and trading operations. 

    1

    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    Mikhail Teytel 

    212 816 8465 

    [email protected] 

    Sandra Vedadi 

    212 816 0949 

    [email protected] 

    David Cohen 

    212 816 0503 

    [email protected] 

      Ginnie  Mae  jumbo  or  “M  JM”  issuance  has  risen  at  the  end  of  

    2010, reaching $600M per month. 

     

    Prepayments 

    of  

    Ginnie 

    Mae  jumbo

     pools

     are

     much

     faster

     than

     

    prepayments  of   the  conforming  Ginnies,  and  over  the  past  two 

    years  frequently  stayed  in  the  50%‐70%  CPR  range.  Refinancings 

    are  the  greatest  cause  of   fast  speeds,  although  defaults  may 

    contribute as well. 

      Although  jumbo Ginnie borrowers are typically more affluent than 

    conforming  Ginnie  borrowers,  Ginnie  jumbo  default  experience  is 

    comparable  to  that  of   conforming  Ginnies.  Variations  in  credit 

    between  Ginnie  jumbo  pools  are  frequently  more  important  for 

    defaults than higher loan size. 

     A

     

    reduction 

    in 

    the 

    FHA 

    conforming 

    limit 

    may 

    lower 

    Ginnie 

     jumbo 

    speeds  by  20%‐30%.  This  together  with  the  recently  announced 

    increase  in  the  annual  MIP  may  significantly  improve  Ginnie  Mae 

     jumbo convexity. 

    After the burst of  the housing bubble in 2008, the supply of  credit to private label  jumbo loans dried up. 

    To address this problem, the government  increased FHA loan limits. In order to securitize high‐balance 

    FHA  loans, Ginnie Mae expanded the Ginnie Mae  II program to  introduce a new non‐TBA‐eligible pool 

    type  “M  JM”  ‐ the  focus  of   this  article.  Throughout  this  article,  we  will  refer  to  the  Ginnie  II  “M  JM” 

    collateral  as  Ginnie  Mae  jumbos,  and  will  review  legislation  governing  their  issuance  as  well  as  their 

    production volumes, collateral characteristics, and delinquency and prepayment patterns. We will also 

    compare Ginnie  jumbos to conventional agency  jumbos and traditional conforming Ginnie  II collateral. 

    Finally, 

    we 

    will 

    discuss 

    the 

    impact 

    of  

    the 

    recent 

    Ginnie 

    Mae 

    underwriting 

    changes 

    and 

    of  

    possible 

    reduction  in  the  FHA  loan  limit  on  Ginnie  jumbo  speeds.  For  our  analysis,  we  will  consider  30‐year 

    collateral, which constitutes the bulk of  the issuance. 

    Legislation Governing FHA Jumbo Production

    Composition  of   “M  JM”  Ginnie  pools  is  affected  by  the  loan  limits  of   FHA,  VA,  and other  government 

    loan  guaranty  programs,  as  well  as  Ginnie  Mae  TBA  eligibility  rules.  The  TBA  eligibility  rules  are 

    important  because  jumbo  collateral  generally  trades  at  a  discount  to  TBAs  and  originators  would, 

    whenever permitted, place cheaper  jumbo loans into higher priced TBA–eligible pools. Only  jumbo loans 

    that could not, for one reason or another, be placed into TBA‐eligible pools would end up in MJM pools. 

    Changes 

    in 

    FHA 

    loan 

    limit 

    Traditionally, the FHA loan limit has been set at about 87% of  the conforming limit. However, a series of  

    enactments changed this rule (see Figure 1). The starting point was the Economic Stimulus Act of  2008 

    (ESA)  which  temporarily  increased  the  FHA  loan  limit  depending  on  the  Metropolitan  Statistical  Area 

    (MSA).  Subsequently,  the  Housing  and  Economic  Recovery  Act  of   2008  (HERA)  established  permanent 

    MSA‐specific loan limits which were lower than the ESA limits. However, in the beginning of  2009, these 

    limits were restored  to their ESA 2008 levels by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). 

    February 24, 2011 Market  Quantitative  Analysis 

  • 8/19/2019 Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    2/12

    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral   February 24, 2011 

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"),

    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    2

    Figure 1. Impact of Enactments on FHA loan limits si nce 2008

    Economic Stimulus Act (ESA) of2008

    Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) o f 2008

     Amer ican Recovery andReinvestment Act (ARRA) of2009

    EnactmentDate

    February 13, 2008 July 30, 2008 February 17, 2009

    FHAmaximumloan size

    125% of the median house price inthe geographic area, but floored at$271,050 and capped at $729,7501 

    115% of the median house price inthat geographic area, but floored at$271,050 and capped at $625,500 

    ESA limits

    FHA LoanOriginationDate

    On or Before December 31, 2008 butloan endorsed after March 6,2008

    On or After January 1, 2009January 1, 2009 throughDecember 31, 2009 (laterextended to September 30, 2011)

    Source: HUD (Morgage Letter 08-06, 08-36, 09-07, 09-50, 10-40) and Citi. 

    Changes in VA guaranty 

    Unlike the FHA, the VA does not guarantee the entire principal of  the  loan. Instead, the VA guarantees 

    only  a  fraction  of   the  loan  up  to  a  maximum  amount  called  the  VA  entitlement.  Traditionally,  the 

    entitlement  was  county‐specific,  but  generally  limited  to  25%  of   the  conforming  limit,  which  allowed 

    lenders to originate conforming VA loans with no down payment. Theoretically, there was never a limit 

    to the size of  a VA loan. A non‐conforming loan would require a down payment that together with the 

    VA  entitlement  would  constitute  25%  of   the  home  value.  For  example,  in  the  first  half   of   2008,  the 

    maximum guaranty offered by VA was  limited to 25% of  the conforming  loan  limit of  $417K, or about 

    $104K. If  a veteran wanted to buy a $500,000 home, a lender would typically require about $21,000 in 

    down payment. 

    The  dollar  amount  of   VA  entitlements  has  increased  in  step  with  increases  in  the  conforming  limit. 

    Moreover in some high‐cost counties, the VA entitlement was raised above 25% of  the conforming limit. 

    Changes 

    in 

    Ginnie 

    Mae 

    TBA 

    pooling 

    Requirements 

    Traditionally, Ginnie Mae restricted the size of  loans allowed to be placed into a TBA‐eligible pool, with 

    the cutoff  at about 87% of  the conforming limit. However, in September 2007, the limit on the size of  VA 

    loans was  lifted, and VA  loans of  any size were allowed  into TBA‐eligible pools. After the  limit on FHA 

    loan size was raised  in 2009, Ginnie Mae allowed  loans exceeding a certain threshold, called the high‐

    balance loan limit, to be placed into TBA‐eligible pools, albeit subject to the 10% de minimus rule. At the 

    same time,  the VA exception was terminated, placing VA  loans under the same 10% de minimus rule. 

    Recent changes to the Ginnie Mae TBA pooling requirements are delineated in Figure 2. 

    1 Higher limits apply to 2‐4 unit properties or properties located in AK, GU, HI and VI. 

  • 8/19/2019 Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    3/12

    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral   February 24, 2011 

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"),

    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    3

    Figure 2. GNMA TBA Eligibility fo r 1-Unit Property

    September 1 2007 Apr il 1, 2008 January 1, 2009

    Loan Origination Date Before October 1,2008 On or After October 1, 2008

    High-Balance Loan Limitfor 1-Unit Properties2 

    $362,790 $417,000

    TBA Eligibility RuleHigh Balance Loans are not allowed (see VA exception

    below)

    High-Balance loans may be pooled intoTBA-eligible pools subject to the 10%

    de minimus rule

    Exception for VA loansVA loans are allowed in TBA-eligible pools without any

    loan size restriction.

    High-Balance VA loans may be pooledinto TBA-eligible pools subject to the

    10% de minimus ruleSource: Ginnie Mae (APM 08-05, 08-06, 08-25, 09-07) and Citi. 

    Issuance

    Issuance of  Ginnie Mae  jumbo collateral  is shown Figure 3. After the ESA Act of  2008,  jumbo  issuance 

    started 

    to 

    rise, 

    reaching 

    almost 

    $2 

    billion 

    per 

    month 

    by 

    the 

    summer 

    of  

    2008. 

    At 

    that 

    point, 

    the 

    share 

    of  

     jumbo  issuance  reached  18%  of   the  total  Ginnie  II  30  year  issuance.  However,  since  the  beginning  of  

    2009, the issuance of  “M JM” dropped for a variety of  reasons, including the reduction of  the FHA loan 

    limit  by  HERA,  ability,  albeit  limited,  to  securitize   jumbo  loans  into  TBA‐eligible  pools,  and  the 

    introduction  of   competing  conventional  products  (agency  jumbos).  As  seen  in  Figure  4,  issuance  of  

    Fannie Mae Jumbo pools (designated by the prefix CK) increased relative to issuance of  Ginnie  jumbos. 

    At the end of  2010, lower mortgage rates drove “M JM” monthly issuance to above $600 MM. The bulk 

    of  recent  jumbo issuance has been in 4s and 4.5s. 

    2 Higher limits apply to 2‐4 unit properties or properties located in AK, GU, HI and VI. 

  • 8/19/2019 Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    4/12

    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral   February 24, 2011 

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"),

    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    4

    Figure 3.GN II Jumbo Issuance and th e Ratio of GN II JumboIssuance to GN II Confor ming 30-Yr Issuance

    Source: CPRCDR and Citi. 

    Figure 4. Fannie Mae and Ginni e Mae Jumbos Iss uance

    Source: CPRCDR and Citi. 

    Collateral Characteristics

    Figure 5 and Figure 6 compare collateral characteristics of   jumbo and conforming Ginnie IIs. As expected 

     jumbo collateral pools have larger loan sizes (2.5 times bigger) than traditional Ginnie IIs (see Figure 5). 

    Jumbo 2008 collateral has a somewhat  lower  loan size than 2009 and 2010, which may be due to the 

    change in the loan size limit. 

    When  compared  to  GN  II  30  Yrs,  jumbos  have  somewhat  lower  original  LTVs  and  higher  FICO  scores, 

    suggesting somewhat better credit — perhaps the result of   jumbo borrowers being more affluent. The 

    data  shows  that  2008  jumbo  loans  have  somewhat  poorer  credit  scores  than  2009  and  2010  loans. 

    However, the FICO sample size is rather small for pools originated in 2008. 

    Figure 6 shows that  jumbo pools, especially those originated in 2009 and 2010, when interest rates were 

    low, have a significantly larger fraction of  refinance loans compared to GN II, which is a consequence of  

    their higher refinancing incentive. 

    On average,  jumbo pools have a higher share of  FHA  loans than VA  loans, which  is consistent with the 

    composition  of   conforming  Ginnies.  However,  for  lower  coupons,  the  FHA  share  is  lower  for  jumbos 

    than  for  conforming  Ginnies,  and  for  higher  coupons  —  it’s  higher.  Another  interesting  observation  is 

    that  jumbo collateral originated  in 2008 has very few VA  loans. Recall that  in 2008, VA  loans could be 

    placed 

    into 

    conforming 

    TBA 

    pools 

    without 

    loan 

    size 

    restrictions. 

  • 8/19/2019 Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    5/12

    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral   February 24, 2011 

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"),

    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    5

    Figure 5. Current Balance, Current L oan Size, Credit Scor e and OLTV of Ginnie Ju mbos and Ginnie II 30 year Collateral, January 2011

    CBal ($MM) Cloan size (K) FICO  OLTV

    Coupon  Year  Jumbos  GN II  Jumbos GN II  Jumbos GN II  Jumbos GN II 

    3.5  2010  24  1,260 503 195 757 720  92 9

    4.0  2009  103  2,406 494 190 689 665  90 9

    4.0  2010  1,727  35,161 541 198 740 719  92 9

    4.5  2009  424  48,338 483 185 664 681  94 9

    4.5  2010  1,680  77,829 528 185 731 710  93 9

    5.0  2008  206  3,661 428 167 673 661  93 9

    5.0  2009  614  64,976 493 166 714 647  93 9

    5.0  2010  774  57,186 516 162 723 690  93 9

    5.5  2008  745  17,449 431 152 632 651  93 9

    5.5  2009  271  7,107 480 137 694 629  91 9

    5.5  2010  21  2,245 459 118 698 644  92 9

    6.0  2008  332  8,258 434 130 603 635  92 9

    6.0  2009  35  846 407 111 608 602  93 9

    6.5  2008  191  4,475 424 114 615 612  92 9

    7.0  2008  34  385 429 94 635 589  89 9

    Source: Citi, CPRCDR

    Figure 6. Loan Purpos e and Loan Type, January 2011

    CBal ($ MM)  % REFI  % Purchase  % FHA  % VA 

    Coupon  Year  Jumbos  GN II  Jumbos GN II  Jumbos GN II  Jumbos  GN II  Jumbos GN II 

    3.5  2010  24  1,260  51.7 17.6 31.7 53.1 44.0  61.5 56.1 34

    4.0  2009  103  2,406  52.4 21.0 29.6 43.5 58.0  70.7 42.0 26

    4.0  2010  1,727  35,161  53.7 36.6 31.1 46.4 78.3  70.0 21.5 26

    4.5  2009  424  48,338  49.9 37.0 35.3 45.2 60.5  74.5 38.6 21

    4.5  2010  1,680  77,829  50.1 29.7 39.5 54.8 70.5  76.2 29.5 19

    5.0 

    2008 

    206 

    3,661 

    20.0 21.6 36.0 30.5 99.5 

    69.7 0.5 275.0  2009  614  64,976  42.7 31.4 46.4 51.6 81.7  81.5 17.3 13

    5.0  2010  774  57,186  37.7 28.8 53.3 58.1 74.6  83.6 25.2 12

    5.5  2008  745  17,449  27.4 30.1 50.8 40.2 99.2  80.7 0.6 15

    5.5  2009  271  7,107  45.5 28.6 43.8 56.8 91.1  85.8 8.0 11

    5.5  2010  21  2,245  53.1 36.5 42.3 49.5 88.0  88.4 12.0 10

    6.0  2008  332  8,258  31.7 30.5 53.3 44.6 99.9  84.6 0.2 9

    6.0  2009  35  846  38.7 22.4 48.5 55.0 90.8  88.9 9.2 7

    6.5  2008  191  4,475  43.9 33.6 48.2 48.1 100.0  87.6 0.0 6

    7.0  2008  34  385  53.5 36.1 39.9 50.1 100.0  95.2 0.0 3Source: Citi, CPRCDR

    Geographical Distribution

    Figure  7  shows  the  geographic  distribution  for  jumbo  collateral.  Since  FHA  and  VA  loan  limits  are  not 

    uniform  across  the  country,  the  geographic  distribution  of   Ginnie  jumbos  is  different  from  that  of  

    conforming  Ginnies.  Jumbo  collateral  has  a  larger  share  in  more  expensive  states,  with  California  and 

    New  York  accounting  for  more  than  50  %  of   the  jumbo  issuance.  While  differences  in  geographic 

    composition most  likely have an effect on  jumbo prepayments,  jumbo speeds are typically  faster than 

    those of  conforming Ginnies for all states, suggesting that geography is not the most important driver of  

    fast  jumbo speeds. 

  • 8/19/2019 Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    6/12

    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral   February 24, 2011 

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"),

    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    6

    Figure 7. Geographi cal Distribu tion o f Ginnie Mae Jumbo Coll ateral as of December 2010

    % Distribution CPR 1yr for 2008 6s

    State  Jumbo  GN II Jumbo  GN II

    CA  37.1%  10.2% 38.3  21.9

    VA  14.0%  4.6% 25.5  16

    NY  14.0%  3.4% 17.2  9.5

    MD 

    9.4% 

    3.0% 29.5 

    21.3NJ  6.3%  2.8% 32.3  17.1

    WA  3.7%  3.2% 39.6  19.5

    MA  2.4%  1.5% 39.4  26.1

    DC  1.6%  0.3% 18.1  19.8

    CT  1.4%  1.0% 29.7  14.8

    FL  1.4%  5.2% 17.6  9.6

    PR  1.2%  0.0% 4.6  0

    HI  1.2%  0.4% 36.8  19

    CO  1.0%  3.4% 46.4  18.6

    US  100.0%  100.0% 32.9  15.8Source: Citi, CPRCDR

    Servicers

    The servicer distribution for  jumbos changed somewhat between 2008 and 2009 (see Figure 8). In 2008 

    there was a  large concentration  in two servicers: Chase and Wells Fargo (about 45%), but  in 2009 and 

    2010  the  share  of   these  two  servicers  declined  as  they  shifted  some  of   their  jumbo  production  to 

    conventionals and TBA‐eligible Ginnies. 

    Figure 8. Servicer Dist ribut ion of Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae Jumbo Collateral (Fannie as of January 2011, Ginnie as of December2010)

    % per Servicer in 2008  % per Servicer in 2009 % per Servicer in 2010

     

    GN 

    Jumbo 

    GN II 

    30 

    FN 

    Jumbo 

    GN 

    Jumbo 

    GN II 

    30 

    FN 

    Jumbo 

    GN 

    Jumbo 

    GN II 

    30 

    FN 

    Jumb

    CHASE 

    24.2 

    15.6 

    12.5 

    BOA‐CW 16.9 31.3 17.0 UNRPT

     20.9 13.5 5.1

    BOA‐CW  21.3  24.6  17.1  CITI 13.1 2.5 4.9 BOA‐CW  19.8 23.7 19.6

    WFHM  20.7  19.0  21.9  NAVY 13.1 0.2   ‐   CHASE  10.9 7.8 10.7

    CITI  10.0  6.5  12.6  CHASE 6.6 9.0 11.5 WFHM  6.7 30.1 30.4

    GMAC  3.8  4.1  2.7  PHH 5.9 2.4 1.4 GMAC  6.5 3.9 6.0

    TBW  2.7  5.9  ‐ GMAC 5.7 5.9 4.3 NAVY  6.1 0.0 0.2

    FLAG  2.3  3.9  0.8  FLAG 5.4 2.0 0.5 METLIFE  5.7 1.2 2.0

    METLIFE  1.7  0.5  2.9  METLIFE 5.3 2.6 10.6 CITI  4.2 1.3 6.0

    SUN  1.6  2.6  3.3  WFHM 4.7 25.8 32.6 PHH  3.1 3.1 2.3

    PHH  1.3  2.0  0.8  FRDOM 3.2 0.6   ‐   FLAG  2.8 1.1 1.2

    BBT  1.2  1.6  ‐ BBT 2.5 0.9 2.4 FRDOM  1.9 0.6   ‐

    USB  1.1  1.7  ‐ MTB 2.2 0.1   ‐   SUN  1.6 1.1 1.4

    FT 

    1.0 

    0.4  ‐

    HSB 1.2  ‐ ‐

      MTB 

    0.7 0.0  ‐

    PNC  0.9  2.7  0.2  DORAL 1.0   ‐ ‐   QUICK  0.6 0.0 0.7

    MTB  0.7  0.0  ‐ HSBC 0.7 0.0 3.4 HSBC  0.6   ‐   1.1

    HSBC  0.5  0.2  0.9  PNC 0.7 1.5 0.0 BBT  0.5 0.9 0.0

    Source: Citi, CPRCDR 

  • 8/19/2019 Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral

    7/12

    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral   February 24, 2011 

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"),

    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    7

    Delinquencies

    Figure 9 compares  jumbo and conforming Ginnie 60‐day delinquencies for 6s of  2008 and 5s of  2009.3 6s 

    of   2008  had  lower  delinquencies  than  conforming  Ginnies  until  the  middle  of   2009,  after  which  the 

    trend  reversed.  For  5s  of   2009,  jumbo  and  conventional  delinquencies  were  similar,  perhaps  with 

    somewhat lower level for  jumbos. A similar pattern is observed for other cohorts: for 2008 production, 

     jumbo defaults

     are

     higher

     than

     conforming

     Ginnies,

     and

     for

     2009

     and

     2010

     collateral,

     default

     rates

     are

     

    similar, at least so far. 

    Figure 9. 60-Day Delinquency for 2008 6s (left) and 2009 5s (righ t)

    Source: Citi, CPRCDR 

    Ginnie Mae servicers have an option to repurchase 90‐day delinquent loans at par out of  GNMA pools, 

    and  buyouts  can  contribute  significantly  to  overall  speeds.  Figure  10  compares  buyouts,  measured  in 

    constant  buyout  rate  (CBR%),  for   jumbo  and  conforming  Ginnie  collateral.  For  6s  of   2008,   jumbo 

    buyouts are considerably  faster because of   higher delinquencies. Are  jumbo  Ginnies bought  out  more 

    efficiently  by  servicers  than  conforming  Ginnies?  Figure  11  shows  ratios  of   buyouts  to  90‐day 

    delinquencies. While

     buyout

     efficiency

     is

     similar

     for

     2008

     cohorts,

     it

     is

     lower

     for

     2009

     collateral.

     

    Figure 10. 1-Month CBR for 2008 6s (left) and 2009 5s (right )

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    35

    40

    45

    50

     Apr-08 Aug-08 Dec-08 Apr-09 Aug-09 Dec-09 Apr-10 Aug-10 Dec-10

       1  -

       M  o  n   t   h   C   B   R   (   %   )

    GN II 30 Yr 

    Jumbo

    0

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

    6

    7

    8

    9

    10

    Feb-09 Jun-09 Oct-09 Feb-10 Jun-10 Oct-10

       1  -   M  o  n   t   h   C   B   R   (   %   )

    GN II 30 Y r 

    Jumbo

    Source: Citi, CPRCDR 

    3 We have chosen the 60‐day delinquencies because they are indicative of  collateral performance, while 90‐day 

    delinquencies are affected by servicer buyouts. 

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    Review of Ginnie Mae Jumbo Collateral   February 24, 2011 

    This commentary has been prepared by Markets Quantitative Analysis ("MQA"),

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    8

    Figure 11. Ratio of 1-Month CBR to % 90D for 2008 6s (left) and 2009 5s(right )

    Source: Citi, CPRCDR 

    Overall 

    we 

    believe 

    that 

    Ginnie 

     jumbo 

    default 

    experience 

    is 

    generally 

    in 

    line 

    with 

    that 

    of  

    conforming 

    Ginnies. All else being equal, higher loan size most likely leads to higher defaults. However, all else is 

    rarely equal. The credit quality of   jumbo pools, including FICO and current LTV, vary from vintage to 

    vintage and frequently from pool to pool, and variations in credit quality are generally more important 

    determinants of  defaults than loan size.  Each pool should be analyzed on its own merits. 

    Prepayments

    Over the past two years, Ginnie  jumbo prepayments were very fast, frequently in the 50%‐70% CPR 

    range (see Figure 12). 

    Figure 12. 1-Month CPR for 2008 6s (left) and 2009 5s (right)

    Source: Citi, CPRCDR

    Fast in the money speeds for  jumbos are expected and are likely to continue in the future. Ginnie Maes 

    are no exception. Fast  jumbo speeds are caused by very large dollar incentives  – a direct consequence of  

    high loan size. For Ginnie loans, which have a popular streamlined refinancing program, refinancing an in 

    the  money  jumbo  loan  may  be  very  attractive.  Many  Ginnie  borrowers  choose  a  no‐point  no‐cost 

    refinancing, where all refinancing costs are converted into a higher mortgage rate. When a  jumbo Ginnie 

    borrower  is sufficiently  in the money to  lower their rate through a no‐point no‐cost refi, prepayments 

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    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    9

    should be  fast, and they were. Recent tightening of  the FHA’s streamlined refinancing rules may have 

    moderated speeds slightly (see the January 2010 drop in speeds of  6s of  2008 in Figure 12), but speeds 

    remained very fast. 

    Comparison to Conventional Jumbos

    In Figure

     13,

     we

     compare

     the

     prepayment

     S

    ‐curves

     of 

     conventional

     agency

      jumbos,

     Ginnie

     Mae

      jumbos

     

    and conforming Ginnie  IIs. The S‐curves  for conventional and Ginnie Mae  jumbos are steeper than  for 

    conforming  Ginnies  –  a  consequence  of   jumbo’s  higher  sensitivity  to  mortgage  rates.  Amongst  the 

     jumbos, the conventional S‐curve is steeper than the one for Ginnies  – most likely resulting from higher 

    loan sizes and better credit for conventional  jumbo borrowers. 

    Figure 13. Convention al Agency Jumb o, Ginnie Mae Jumbo and Con formin g Ginnie II Prepayment S-Curves for 2008 and 2009 Origination, Apr2008 to January 2011

    2008 Origination Year 

    0

    10

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    70

    -100 0 100 200 Incentive (bp)

       1  m  o  n   t   h   C   P   R   (   %

    GN Jumbo

    GN II

    FN Jumbo

    2009 Origination Year 

    0

    10

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    70

    -100 0 100 200 Incentive(bp)

       1  m  o  n   t   h   C   P   R   (   %

    GN Jumbo

    GN II

    FN Jumbo

    Source: CPRCDR 

    In Figure

     14,

     we

     take

     a

     look

     at

     the

     collateral

     characteristics

     of 

     Ginnie

     Mae

     and

     Fannie

     Mae

      jumbos

     as

     of 

     

    January 2011. The loan size is higher for conventional  jumbos by $50K‐$100K. Conventional  jumbos also 

    have  better  credit  than  Ginnie  jumbos:  current  LTVs  are  20%‐30%  lower  and  FICOs  are  often  50‐100 

    points higher. 

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    which is part of Citigroup Global Markets' sales and trading operations.

    10

    Figure 14 Current Balance, Current Loan Size, Credit Score* and OLTV of Ginnie Jumbos and Fannie Jumbo s Collateral 

    CBal ($ MM) Cloan size (k) CLTV FICO 1 Month CPR (%)

    Coupon YearGN

    JumboFN

    JumboGN

    JumboFN

    JumboGN

    JumboFN

    JumboGN

    JumboFN

    JumboGN

    JumboFN

    Jumbo

    3.5 2010 24  255  503  577  92  67  757  775  0  4.2 

    4 2009 103  384  494  527  91  60  689  772  0.1  13.5 

    4 2010 1,727 

    12,798 

    541 

    581 

    92 

    66 

    740 

    772 

    1.5 

    5.7 

    4.5 2009 424  6,384  483  551  94  64  664  767  14.7  30.4 

    4.5 2010 1,680  13,918  528  578  92  66  731  768  4.5  22.1 

    5 2008 206  449  428  578  101  73  673  761  36.8  61.7 

    5 2009 658  4,296  492  549  93  70  714  761  27.4  38.5 

    5 2010 774  4,311  516  571  91  70  723  759  24.2  35.7 

    5.5 2008 837  1,142  431  550  101  77  636  757  39.1  58.2 

    5.5 2009 271  241  480  545  93  73  694  747  32.4  34.8 

    5.5 2010 21  58  459  564  91  77  698  741  61.7  9 

    6 2008 1,011  935  424  549  98  81  611  750  47.5  54.4 

    6 2009 38  38  400  549  96  77  608  721  20.5  45.9 

    6.5 2008 305 

    190 

    422 

    553 

    97 

    82 

    619 

    737 

    46.6 

    47.1 6.5 2009 17  2  461  637  94  81  751  49.4  0 

    7 2008 34  16  429  555  93  83  635  712  26.2  61 Source: CPRCDR and Citi.

    Recent Underwriting Changes May Improve Ginnie Jumbo Convexity

    Recent changes to the Ginnie Mae underwriting guidelines will likely impact all Ginnie Mae collateral, 

    including Ginnie Mae  jumbos. In particular, a 25bp increase in the annual insurance premium, will 

    reduce refinancing incentive by 25bp, which according to Figure 13, may result in slower speeds by 

    about 5%‐10% CPR. 

    A possible reduction in the Ginnie Mae conforming limit may further damped  jumbo speeds. In a recent 

    white paper,4

     the

     Treasury

     alludes

     that

     the

     increase

     in

     the

     conforming

     limit

     due

     to

     ARRA

     may

     expire

     in

     

    September 2011. Ginnie Mae  jumbo borrowers, whose average LTV is above 90%, will typically not be 

    able to refinance into non‐agency loans, and therefore borrowers with a loan size above the new 

    conforming limit may not be able to refinance at all. 

    We estimate that if  conforming limits revert to the HERA’s level,  jumbo voluntary speeds may decline by 

    20%‐30%, although a larger drop is possible. The uncertainty in our estimate is due to the fact that the 

    FHA conforming limits are determined on the MSA level and the exact percentage of  loans that would 

    become non‐conforming is hard to estimate. Figure 15 shows that roughly 20% of  Ginnie Mae  jumbo 

    loans will exceed the maximum conforming limit under HERA ($625K). We estimate that perhaps 

    another 10% of   jumbo collateral, while under the maximum conforming limit, will exceed the 

    conforming limit for their MSA, and therefore will not qualify for another FHA loan. 

    This analysis suggests that the reduction in the conforming limit may reduce peak in‐the‐money  jumbo 

    speeds from about 60% CPR to about 45%. This would lead to a considerable improvement in the 

    convexity of   jumbo loans. However, since the details of  the transition have not been released, risks 

    remain. For example, it is possible that after ARRA expires, legacy  jumbo loans could still be considered 

    conforming. 

    4 “Reforming America’s Housing Finance Market. A Report to Congress”, February 2011 

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    11

    Figure 15  Average loan s ize quar ti les for Ginn ie Mae J umbo Pools , $ in Thousand. 

    Min Q2 Q3 Q4 Max

    181  457 517 608  874Source: CPRCDR and Citi.

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    12

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