Review Article 1905-1908: the 'Watershed' of the Empire-Commonwealth?

RONALD HYAM'S Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908 seeks to establish two m a i n points . O n e is the rehabi l i ta t ion of L o r d Elgin, C a m p b e l l - B a n n e r m a n ' s Co lon ia l Secre tary , whose u n g l a m o r o u s quali t ies have led h i s to r ians to ove r look his rea l con t r ibu t ion to imper ia l adminis t ra t ion . T h e second, expressed in t he sub-ti t le, a n d s u m m e d u p in a final chap te r , is t ha t the years 1905-1908 f o r m e d ' the wa te r shed of the E m p i r e - C o m m o n -weal th ' . i

N o t on ly is t he first po in t m o r e convinc ingly establ ished t han the second, bu t the re is s o m e con t rad ic t ion be tween them. If Elgin was in substant ia l con t ro l of events , he w a s an unl ike ly m a n to in t roduce str ikingly new pr inciples . H i s v iew of t he e m p i r e was f r a m e d by two inf luences. O n e was f a m i l y t rad i t ion , to w h i c h h e appea led bo th publ ic ly a n d privately. Elgin w a s the son of the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l w h o m a d e responsib le gove rnmen t a success in C a n a d a , a n d the g r a n d s o n of L o r d D u r h a m . T h e min is te r w h o is c red i ted wi th s teer ing the e m p i r e in to the C o m m o n w e a l t h fe l t himself to be app ly ing old, no t new, ideas. T h e second inf luence o n Elgin was tha t he, l ike his f a the r , h a d been v iceroy of Ind ia . L ike his colonia l secretary-ship, his v iceroyal ty w a s unspec tacu la r bu t solid in ach ievement . H y a m himself a rgues t ha t Elg in saw colonia l p r o b l e m s t h r o u g h Ind ian spectacles — scarcely t he m a n w h o was likely to conver t e m p i r e in to C o m m o n w e a l t h . 2

I t c a n n o t be denied tha t 1905-1908 was pa r t of an era of change f o r Bri ta in , bu t it is o p e n t o deba te h o w f a r these years were crucial . F o r ins tance, t he e lect ion of 1906 w a s a l a n d m a r k in the coun t ry ' s progress towards a m o r e d e m o c r a t i c sys tem, bu t it w a s mere ly p a r t of a process which h a d b e g u n wi th the R e f o r m A c t of 1884, a n d w a s to take one, if not two, w o r l d w a r s f o r its comple t ion . In te rna t iona l ly , chal lenges to Brit ish indus t r ia l a n d nava l s u p r e m a c y w e r e ne i the r new, n o r yet conclusive. T h u s a 'wa t e r shed ' t h e o r y f o r a n y shor t pe r iod m u s t p rove no t the existence of change , bu t its s ignif icance.

F o r this p u r p o s e , s o m e def ini t ion of t e r m s is requi red . I t is difficult to ascr ibe a p rec i se m e a n i n g to a f igurat ive t e rm, bu t 'wa te r shed ' p re sumab ly signifies a c h a n g e sufficiently extensive to m a k e its reversal highly unl ikely u n d e r n o r m a l c i rcumstances . Bu t even this m e t a p h o r is easier to def ine t han ' emp i r e ' o r ' c o m m o n w e a l t h ' . T h e s implest dis t inct ion is one based on p o w e r : if ' emp i r e ' h a s any m e a n i n g , it p r e s u m a b l y signifies s o m e measu re of central con t ro l , w h e r e a s ' c o m m o n w e a l t h ' involves equal i ty of status.

164

REVIEW ARTICLE 165

Hyam's theory consists of three main points. Of these the keystone is the claim that the period 1905-8 represents 'a watershed chiefly in that it ma rks the decisive rejection of the constructionist vision of imperial federat ion and consolidation". This once and for all rejection of imperial federa t ion occurred at the Colonial Conference of 1907, which 'proved the decisive turning-point in the demise of schemes fo r more fo rma l machinery of empire ' . 3

The second main point follows naturally f rom the first. The re was an ' increasing deference ' to the principle of colonial self-government , and the grants of self-government to the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies 'had their part to play in the evolution of the modern commonweal th ' . The British government recognized more clearly than in the past the l imitations on its f r eedom to interfere in the colonies, 'a clear stage on the road to the Statute of Westminster ' . 4

The third main point , relating to the dependent empire , is more difficult to relate to the general theory. T h e 'pacification' of Af r i ca was completed 'with a sharpened emphasis on the gentler methods ' . H y a m argues that native interests were kept to the fore, thus pointing to 'Commonwea l th ' . Native tribes were ruled indirectly through tradit ional chiefs, but commer -cial development 'was pressed with plenty of en thus iasm' . 5 H y a m also cites evidence for a watershed in the political development of two terri tories not under the Colonial Office, India and Zanzibar . 6 Significantly, there is no mention of Egypt, the most advanced non-European count ry unde r British rule.

H y a m opens his presentat ion in a highly tentative manner . ' I t could be argued", he writes, ' that the years 1905 to 1908 represent a dividing line in the history of several of the main European empires ' . The re is a brief discussion of changes in the G e r m a n , F rench and Belgian empires. How-ever, change in the empires of three European powers does not predicate change in a four th , especially as the three were mainly empires of dependent territories in Afr ica , whereas the watershed in the British empire is pre-sented largely in relation to self-governing colonies of white settlers. This tentative opening is followed by a sizeable disclaimer. 'The changes in the British empire were not so sweeping as in the G e r m a n , the F r e n c h and the Belgian empires. ' No t only were the changes less sweeping than those happening, probably coincidentally, abroad , but they were 'more of theory than of practice'.'? Thus the watershed is small and confined to theory. Indeed H y a m says there was no need for the changes to be any greater.

The idea of sweeping change is fu r the r discounted by a reference to the paradoxes which abounded in the Liberal adminis t rat ion of the empire . White settlement was being encouraged in Rhodesia , but f r owned on in Kenya. Churchil l wanted to develop Uganda as an exper iment in state socialism, while the Solomon Isles were virtually leased out to Lever Brothers. It appears that there were no established principles behind the administration of the empire , hence no established or thodoxy fo r a water-shed of theory to over turn. H y a m argues that there is no need to resolve these paradoxes, since at a watershed old and new att i tudes will be f o u n d to co-exist, and all that is necessary for the historian is to acknowledge the fact. This a rgument would be more convincing if it were established that

166 REVIEW ARTICLE

'old ' at t i tudes — such as white sett lement in Kenya — in fact disappeared beyond the 'watershed' . It is not clear that they did. N o r does it appear that ministers themselves were clear about the distinction since their ideas were of ten ' inconsistent and irreconcilable ' , a strange situation in a water-shed 'more of theory than of pract ice ' . 8

A related difficulty is Hyam's own statement that ' the continuity of policy between the Unionist and Liberal governments is striking'. Al though the Liberals won a command ing major i ty at an election in which colonial issues played a p rominent part , 'Elgin lent the weight of his support in the direc-tion of continuity of administrat ion wherever possible ' .9

T h e Liberals broke with their predecessors on two ma jo r matters, both South Afr ican . Self-government was granted to the Transvaal in 1906 and the Orange River Colony in 1907, without an intervening stage of repre-sentative government . Even now, it would be unfa i r to discount the real e lement of idealism which lay behind the decision, but equally weight should be given to practical considerations. The Unionists ' Lyttelton constitution offered Transvaal whites little more than a consultative voice in their affairs. Previous a t tempts to limit settler au tonomy suggest that such a scheme would not have worked for long, especially as not only the Boers but a large section of the Transvaal British demanded immediate responsible govern-ment . T h e Sandhurs t trained Under-Secretary argued that C rown Colony government was 'one practical and defensible position'. Was it possible to compromise between that and full au tonomy? 'When one crest line is aban-doned it is necessary to retire to the next. Halt ing at a "half-way house" midway in the valley is f a t a l ' . 1 9 H a d the Unionists remained in office, they would have faced the same problem.

The other mat ter on which the Liberals broke with their predecessors was the question of Chinese labour on the R a n d . 1 1 Even here Elgin only felt he could act because Lyttelton, his predecessor, had described the policy as an 'experiment ' . Elgin objected to an unqualified promise to end Chinese labour which Churchil l wished to make in his election address. T h e Liberals themselves encouraged the migrat ion of Chinese indentured labour to the N e w Hebrides , and turned a blind eye to the mist reatment of Indian in-dentured labourers in N a t a l . 1 - T h u s al though two great political issues, neither Transvaal self-government nor 'Chinese slavery' involved fundamen-tal theoretical changes which might be set against elements of continuity.

H o w does this relate to the theory of a 'watershed'? H y a m sees no diffi-culty. 'Such continuity does not conflict with the concept of a watershed, implying change. T h e significant point is that the Liberals were prepared to cont inue Unionis t policies in certain ways: this constitutes a watershed in the evolution of Liberal ism' . 1 3 T h e suggestion of this second 'watershed' — in which one may find seeds cf the later collapse of the Liberal party — is attractive, but the evidence adduced for it can only run counter to the theory of an empi re -Commonwea l th watershed.

T h e point in H y a m ' s watershed thesis is that 1905-8 'marks the decisive rejection of the constructionist vision of imperial federat ion and consolida-tion'. M o r e specifically, the 1907 Confe rence was ' the decisive turning-point in the demise of schemes for more fo rmal machinery of empire ' . T o argue that the period is so decisive requires proof of two points — first that there

REVIEW ARTICLE 167

had been a serious chance of the adoption of some fo rm of imperial federa-tion before 1907, and secondly that such schemes ceased a f te rwards . Ne i the r point can be established. In at tempting to define the 'constructionist vision' , the Imperial Federa t ion League had split into fact ions in 1893. Its one success was to persuade Salisbury's government to hold a Colonial Confe r -ence at the t ime of the Jubilee of 1887. Rosebery, president of the League, insisted that ' imperial federat ion was really inaugura ted ' by the meeting. 'If that was not imperial federat ion I do not know what is . ' i4 Some, then, saw the conference system as the success, not the fai lure of the movement . The question of whether a more definite move towards federa t ion could be made was largely one of whether the Colonial Confe rence would evolve into a more regular body. At the conference of 1897 the premiers flatly refused to consider submitt ing to an imperial council with taxat ion powers , and only two were interested in a regular advisory council -— one of them, Seddon, making it clear that no N e w Zealand delegate could have power to commit the colony. In 1902 the premiers gave even shorter shr i f t to Chamberla in 's invitation to discuss closer unity. They did, however , agree to meet at regular intervals, thus making the 1907 conference the first meeting independent of royal pageantry. In prepara t ion fo r this meeting, Lyttelton in 1905 produced a scheme to r ename the conference ' Imperia l Council ' and to provide it with a pe rmanen t secretariat . Elgin dissociated himself f rom the plan and, despite general support f r o m Deakin of Aus-tralia, it was rejected at the 1907 meeting. It is difficult to see that this marked a more decisive rejection of imperial federat ion than at previous conferences. It is true that in 1907, unlike 1897 and 1902, the impulse fo r closer unity did not stem f r o m the British. But this is simply to say that Chamberla in was no longer Colonial Secretary. T h e fa te of his Tariff R e f o r m campaign makes it open to doubt how far his ideas were shared even by his Unionist colleagues. Fo r Chamber la in , the imperialist, to lecture on the need for 'political federat ion of the E m p i r e ' t s was of no greater imperial significance than it would have been had Chamber la in , the Uni ta r ian , de-cided to preach to the colonial premiers on the doctr ine of the Holy Trini ty. N o r was Elgin so irrevocably opposed to fu tu r e evolution towards a more organic imperial union. H e merely thought ' the t ime has not yet come ' fo r Lyttelton's scheme, and he was prepared to consider the creation of a third, imperial, house of par l iament . it> N o r did schemes for imperial federat ion cease dramatically as H y a m implies. The fo rmat ion of the R o u n d Table in 1910 undoubtedly added to the strength of such ideas and at the r enamed Imperial Conference of 1911 Sir Joseph W a r d put fo rward a plan for an ' Imperial Par l iament of Defence ' which was more detailed than anything discussed at the three previous meetings. 17 Indeed, not merely was the idea as likely to appear af ter 1907 as before , but it is arguable that ' imperial federat ion ' itself came closest to realization a decade later, in the Imper ia l War Cabinet.

The second majo r theme of H y a m ' s 'watershed ' theory is his a rgument that there was ' increasing deference ' to the principle of colonial self-govern-rnent, 'a clear stage on the road to the Statute of Westminister ' . The re was, however, a marked lack of deference towards colonials — Deakin in par-ticular — who displayed minds of their own. Enthus iasm for self-govern-

168 REVIEW ARTICLE

ment was not unstinted. Hyam himself refers to "infuriation with self-government in Nata l and N e w f o u n d l a n d ' which the mild Elgin called 'our two spoilt children". is Liberal re luctance to intervene in the colonies s temmed f rom experience, not principle. On 28 March 1906 the Colonial Office learnt by telegram f rom Nata l that twelve Afr icans were about to be executed for murder . The Nata l whites had over-reacted to disturbances among the Zulu : two Afr icans had already been hanged for this particular crime, the trials had taken place under mart ia l law, and since British troops were involved in keeping order, the British government had a legitimate interest in the mat ter . At Churchil l ' s instigation, a reply was sent asking for a stay of execution pending fur ther informat ion, and raising the possi-bility of a re-trial in the civil courts. It scarcely amounted to a formal intervention. Churchi l l later told the C o m m o n s that 'no colonial secretary for fifty years conf ron ted by such a telegram under such circumstances could have acted otherwise' , thus placing the government ' s action firmly in the context of the past. But its effect was shattering. T h e Na ta l ministers resigned in protest, and no alternative government could be formed. H y a m would contest the con temporary South Afr ican verdict that ' the British Gove rnmen t has caved in' but Elgin's retreat was scarcely glorious. The Nata l ministers were reinstated, and the executions took place on 2 April . 10 It is difficult to see that 1905 brought any new measure of deference to the colonies. If anything the Liberals, being more susceptible to humani tar ian pressures, were more likely to intervene in such mat ters than their pre-decessors, a l though it may be conceded that they interfered in South Afr ican affairs little enough.

In one respect the Liberals stood very firmly on past traditions of govern-ment of the empire. Insofar as Britain's relations with the self-governing colonies could still strictly be called ' imperial ' it was because Britain retained overall control of foreign affairs. If 1905-8 really was a 'watershed ' then moves might have been expected towards greater sharing of foreign policy. Colonial contingents had fought in South Afr ica , and such co-operation had been encouraged by the fo rmat ion of the Commit tee of Imperial Defence in 1902. Some colonies had m a d e small naval contr ibut ions since 1887, and Austral ia and C a n a d a were beginning to plan navies of their own. If 1907 saw an increased deference to colonial self-government, it might well have displayed itself in f ront ier consultat ion over foreign affairs. This did not happen . F o u r years later Asqui th claimed that the dominions were m a d e privy to the secrets of British ( tha t is, ' imperial ' ) foreign policy 'without any kind of reservation or qualification' . This was simply not true. T h e dominions were not told of the existence, still less the extent, of British obligations to F r a n c e in t ime of continental war.20 i t is t rue that most British ministers were equally in the dark, but in August 1914 the cabinet at least had the option not to declare war. This was not the case with the dominions. The king's declaration of war , m a d e on the advice of his British ministers, legally involved Canada as automatical ly as Kenya or the Cayman Islands. In pract ice the dominions had little chance of declaring themselves neutral even had they wished to do so. N o n e of them had any independent diplomatic representat ion, while an agreement of 1911 had gone fa r towards integrating their rud imentary a rmed forces with those of Britain. In 1914

REVIEW ARTICLE 1 6 9

Britain declared war for the dominions. In 1939 they declared war fo r themselves except for Ireland which stayed out. Any search for an empire-Commonweal th watershed should presumably be carried on between these two dates.

The third main theme of H y a m ' s watershed theory deals with change in India and the dependent empire. In Afr ica the theory seems ha rd to apply. 'Commonwea l th ' Af r ica has been an amalgam of western and tradi-tional ideas. The Liberals hardly encouraged this ama lgam: commerc ia l development was strictly controlled, and administrat ion rested on the tradi-tional device of indirect rule. Campbel l -Bannerman praised Cromer ' s rule over the Egyptians for preserving 'what was vital and characterist ic in their habits, laws and customs . . . employing as f a r as possible native agents, he hoped to enable them to develop along their own lines' and not become westernised hybrids. Yet C romer himself called the Egyptians 'mere child-ren', a phrase which recurs elsewhere in Afr ica . -1 These are the att i tudes of paternalism, not partnership.

At first sight, India fits more comfor tab ly into the watershed theory. Certainly the open recognition of the elective principle m a d e the Morley-Minto re fo rms of 1909 highly significant fo r the fu ture . However , like Elgin's South Af r i can policy, Morley 's Indian consti tution was based on precedent : the Indian Councils Act of 1892 had in fac t brought Indians to government through a veiled fo rm of election called ' r ecommendat ion for nominat ion ' . N o r was Morley, undoubted Liberal as he was, sympathet ic to eventual Indian independence. H e denied that his r e fo rms were intended to be the instalment to self-government which H y a m claims they ' inevitably' proved to be . - - Inevitably? In 1909 what the R a j gave, the R a j still had the power to take away. Here is the significance of Egypt , where liberal r e fo rms in 1908 led to unrest , followed by a successful regime of oppression beginning in 1910. N o fo rmal promise of responsible government fo r India came f rom a British ministry until 1917, when fighting a m a j o r war was no longer compatible with holding down a recalci t rant sub-cont inent : the crucial factor was the factor of power. Both in India and in South Af r i ca , the Liberals were gambling on their fai th that concession would strengthen the status quo, not pave the way for its replacement . The Liberals certainly seemed more alive to the tradit ions of the past than the possibilities of the future . As Elgin's successor, Lord Crewe, pu t it in 1909:

What will be the fu tu re of India, fifty, sixty, or a hundred years hence, need not, I think, trouble us. It is on the knees of the gods, and all we have to do is to provide, as best as we can, fo r the condit ions of the moment , having, of course, an eye to the fu ture , but not t roubling ourselves about what may happen in days when, to use Sher idan 's words — 'all of us are dead and most of us are forgotten. '23

Men may perhaps preside over far- reaching practical changes wi thout fully realizing their significance, but this is surely a strange at t i tude to find in one of the architects of a watershed of theory. H y a m cites Tinker ' s judgement that for India ' the year 1909 marks the watershed between nineteenth-century paternalism, and the nat ional self-government of today' .

1 7 0 REVIEW ARTICLE

Spear , howeve r , appl ies the key t e rm d i f fe ren t ly : ' the F i r s t W o r l d W a r f o r m e d a wa te r shed in m o d e r n I n d i a n deve lopment ' .24 F o r it was in 1917, no t 1909, tha t a Brit ish cabine t first c o m m i t t e d itself to a g ran t of responsible g o v e r n m e n t f o r Ind ia — thus rep lac ing ' empi re ' by ' C o m m o n w e a l t h ' in its a ims. A n d w h e r e a s the M o r l e y - M i n t o r e f o r m s were a L ibera l pa r ty measure , cr i t icized by the oppos i t ion , the M o n t a g u dec la ra t ion of 1917 was no t only the p r o d u c t of a coal i t ion cabine t , but , a lmos t unbel ievably, d r a f t e d by C u r z o n .

Indeed , if it be real ly necessary to select a 'wa te r shed ' be tween emp i r e a n d C o m m o n w e a l t h , 1916-1918 wou ld seem m o r e plausible than 1905-1908. If the d i f fe rence be tween the two concep t s rests o n changes in Brit ish wor ld power , t hen the w a r p rov ides m o r e tangible ev idence of British decl ine. T h e M o n t a g u dec la ra t ion was m a d e w h e n the Bri t ish garr ison in India h a d been p a r e d to 15 ,000 m e n , and the Nat iona l i s t m o v e m e n t seemed likely f o r t he first t ime to gain the initiative. Similarly, whe rea s b e f o r e the war the d o m i n i o n s h a d needed Bri tain m o r e t han vice versa, the i r vast con t r ibu t ions to the n e w a rmies m a d e t h e m , f o r the first t ime valuable auxil iar ies . T h e i r very high casua l ty ra tes led d o m i n i o n poli t icians to insist o n some con t ro l over even t s : in 1914 they h a d hard ly ca red abou t fore ign affai rs , bu t in 1919 it wou ld have been un th inkab le to exc lude t hem f r o m the peace con fe r ence . T h e s e deve lopmen t s were a m e a s u r e of change in Bri t ish p o w e r . B e f o r e the w a r the e m p i r e h a d been u n d e r p i n n e d by the navy , and the navy was symbol ized by the bat t leship . But in 1914 the Bri t ish were d r a w n into a grea t l and war , a n d t rad i t iona l nava l sup remacy was t h r e a t e n e d by new f o r m s of w a r f a r e — submar ines and a i rc ra f t . Even wi thou t these innova t ions , Ju t l and showed tha t the bat t leship was less po ten t in c o m b a t t han it was as a symbol . In this la rger perspec t ive , it is i ronic tha t t he L ibera l g o v e r n m e n t ini t iated one of the biggest p r o g r a m m e s of bat t leship cons t ruc t ion in British his tory.

T h e first wor ld war , then , wou ld seem a m o r e plausible wa te r shed than 1905-1908. But is the search wor thwhi l e? F e w now bel ieve t ha t the Midd le Ages ended in 1485, whi le imper ia l h is tor ians in recen t years h a v e t h r o w n d o u b t on the idea of decisive b r e a k s at 1783 a n d 1870. T h e r e is surely r o o m f o r cau t ion b e f o r e accep t ing yet a n o t h e r ' 1485 ' , w h e t h e r in the f o r m of C a m p b e l l - B a n n e r m a n o r t he Kaiser . Th i s is no t to deny tha t there have been per iods of f a r - r each ing c h a n g e in imper ia l h is tory , bu t it is quest ion-able w h e t h e r d iscont inui ty was ever absolute . Whi le H y a m ' s theory has the mer i t of f o r c i n g cons ide ra t ion o n the s ignif icance of an i m p o r t a n t per iod , the search f o r a f u n d a m e n t a l b r eak is misconce ived . T h e emp i r e w a s never a single, wor ld -wide uni t , capab le of o rgan ic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n at a n o d f r o m W h i t e h a l l : C a n a d a w a s mov ing towards ' c o m m o n w e a l t h ' a cen tu ry b e f o r e the G o l d Coas t . Because the emp i r e w a s never u n i f o r m , it was possible f o r the m a j o r i t y of Eng l i shmen to be s t i r red b o t h by the mar t i a l a n d the l iberal va lues of the associa t ion. T h u s , examined closely, any short per iod is l ikely to reveal co-exist ing ' empi re ' a n d ' c o m m o n w e a l t h ' a t t i tudes, a n d give a mis lead ing impress ion of a t u rn ing point . In fac t , as H y a m himself recognized , con t inu i ty is a t least as i m p o r t a n t in imper ia l his tory as change .

GED MARTIN Australian National University

REVIEW ARTICLE 1 7 1

N O T E S

I Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 1905-1908: the watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth, London, 1968, esp. pp. 525-45.

- For Elgin's personality and Indian career, ibid., pp. 7-35. Elgin referred to the work of his father and grandfather in Canada in private correspondence with Selborne and Churchill, and publicly in Parliament, ibid., pp. 57-58; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (4th series) Lords, 26 February 1906, cols. 748-49.

Hyam, pp. 525, 544. i ibid., p. 544. •> ibid. There is some confusion here, since Hyam also shows that the Liberals

discouraged private commercial ventures, at least in Africa, and were not especi-ally generous with public funds, ibid., pp. 435-8, 468-74, 527-8.

II ibid., p. 528. " ibid., p. 525. * ibid., pp. 527-8. !l ibid., pp. 529-30.

10 ibid., pp. 98-136, quoting Churchill's memorandum of 20 January 1906 at p. 115.

' ' Cf. ibid., pp. 59-97. "The Natal coolies are not at present a factor in domestic polities', minuted

one official, ibid., pp. 7In, 74, 77n, 93n. >:! ibid., p. 530. >4 Quoted by J. E. Tyler, The Struggle for Imperial Unity 1868-1895, London,

1938, p. 184. This account of the conference system follows J. E. Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization, London, 1967.

15 Quoted by Kendle, p. 50. Hyam, pp. 333, 318-9.

>" Kendle, pp. 175-8. I s Hyam, pp. 318, 527, 301. 10 ibid., pp. 239-43. Cf. P. Lewsen, ed., Selections from the Correspondence

of John X. Merriman 1905-1924, Cape Town, 1969, p. 12 (diary entry for 31 March 1906).

2 0 N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, London, 1969, pp. 144-5, 149.

3 1 Hyam, pp. 541-2 and n. 2 2 Hyam, p. 528. But for Morley, see P. Spear, India: A Modern History, Ann

Arbor, 1961, p. 325. Spear also suggests that the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford con-stitution could be seen as 'an experiment which could be revoked as well as extended' and that even in 1935 there was 'no compelling force dictating con-cession or constitutional advance' and the British acted 'from strength', ibid., pp. 384, 386.

2;s Hyam, p. 543, quoting speech of 24 February 1909. 24 Hyam, p. 528, citing H. Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-government

in India, Pakistan and Burma, London, 1954, p. 88; P. Spear, A History of India, Harmondsworth, 1965, II, p. 181.