rethinking the somali state - university of minnesota

Rethinking the Somali State

MPP Professional Paper

In Partial Fulfillment of the Master of Public Policy Degree Requirements The Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs

The University of Minnesota

Aman H.D. Obsiye

May 2017 Signature below of Paper Supervisor certifies successful completion of oral presentation and completion of final written version: _________________________________ ____________________ ___________________ Dr. Mary Curtin, Diplomat in Residence Date, oral presentation Date, paper completion Paper Supervisor ________________________________________ ___________________ Steven Andreasen, Lecturer Date Second Committee Member Signature of Second Committee Member, certifying successful completion of professional paper

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TableofContents

Introduction...........................................................................................................................3

Methodology..........................................................................................................................5

TheSomaliClanSystem..........................................................................................................6

TheColonialEra.....................................................................................................................9

BritishSomalilandProtectorate.................................................................................................9

SomaliaItalianaandtheUnitedNationsTrusteeship..............................................................14

ColonialEraSummation...........................................................................................................21

SomaliRepublic(1960-1969).................................................................................................21

SomaliDemocraticRepublic(1969-1991)...............................................................................30

SomaliaasaFailedState.......................................................................................................34

Somaliland................................................................................................................................35

PuntlandStateofSomalia........................................................................................................38

SouthcentralSomalia...............................................................................................................39

ReestablishingtheSomaliState(1991-2012).........................................................................41

InsightsandLessons..............................................................................................................43

RethinkingtheSomaliState:Vision2021...............................................................................47

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Introduction

Somaliahasbeenafailedstateforovertwodecadesandisbeginningtofullyrecoveras

anation.Beyondbroaderdevelopmentalissues,Somaliahaslaggedbecauseitlackedaproper

structureofgovernment.Somaliahasitsfairshareofhumanitarianissuesbutthisacademic

researchpaperispurelyfocusedondevelopingtheSomalistate.IacknowledgeSomaliahas

majorsecurityissues,butbeforeSomaliacaneffectualaddresshersecurityconcernsshemust

ironoutherpoliticalwrinkles.InRethinkingtheSomaliState,Ifocusontheprocessand

procedurestoachievepoliticalstabilitybyproposinganinnovativemodelforachievingfull

statehoodforSomalia:Vision2021.Inaddition,Iproposepolicysolutionstohelptacklethe

majorissuesservingasobstaclestothethreegoalsthatwereoutlaidinthenowdefunctVision

2016.

TheSomalination-state,Somalia,hashadtworepublics:(1)theSomaliRepublic,1960-

1969,and(2)theSomaliDemocraticRepublic,1969-1991.Bytheendof2016,theSomali

peopleandtheinternationalcommunitywerehopingtocreatetheSomalination-state’sthird

fullyfunctioningrepublicthroughanambitiousplancalledVision20161.Thisplan

encompassedthreemajorgoals:(a)federalizationofSomalia;(b)constitutionalrevisionanda

nationalreferendum;and(c)one-personone-votenationalelection.Thoughnoble,Vision

2016’sstrategywasnotpalatabletotherealitiesofSomalia’scurrentpoliticalclimateandthus

1 Vision 2016’s strategy is being executed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with guidance from United

Nations Assistant Mission to Somalia (UNSOM).

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wasafailure.Notonegoalwasfullycompleted.Thescheduledpresidentialelectionwasnot

evenheldbytheendof2016.

TheSomalistatewasinitiallyestablishedbyanamalgamationoftwoformercolonial

territories,BritishSomalilandProtectorateandSomaliaItaliana,whichunitedin1960tocreate

theSomaliRepublic.ThebirthoftheSomaliRepubliccanbetracedbackto1950whenthe

UnitedNationsadministeredSomaliaItalianafortenyears.Upongainingindependence

Somaliagoverneditselfunderamulti-partysystembutthisdemocraticexperimentabruptly

endedafternineshortyears.In1969,GeneralMohamedSiadBareexecutedacouptocreate

theSomaliDemocraticRepublicandgoverneditunderacommunistsystem.Aftertwenty-one

yearsofdictatorship,aconglomerateofclanmilitiasoverthrewSiadBarein1991leadingto

thecollapseofthestate.

ThereweremanyattemptstoresuscitatetheSomalistatebutallattemptswerefeeble.

SuccessfinalcameonSeptember16,2012,whenformerPresidentHassanSheikhMohamud

wasdemocraticallyelectedtoheadSomalia’sfirstpost-transitionalgovernment,theFederal

GovernmentofSomalia(FGS),albeit,theFGSisgovernedbyaprovisionalconstitution.On

February8,2017,PresidentMohamedAbdullahi"Farmaajo"waselectedasSomalia’snewhead

ofstateforafour-yearmandate.TheFGSisworkingonregainingfullstatehoodforSomalia

withtheUnitedNationsAssistantMissiontoSomalia(UNSOM)servingasitsinternational

guide.

InordertounderstandandappreciateSomalia’scurrentpoliticalclimate,andtodevise

achievablesolutions,wemustanalyzehermodernsociopoliticalhistory,beginningwithan

understandingoftheimportanceoftheSomaliclansystem,followedbyanhistoricalanalysisof

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hercolonialhistory.Additionally,wewillthoroughlydiscusstheSomaliRepublic’sdemocratic

experimentandbrieflydiscussthecommunisteraoftheSomaliDemocraticRepublic.

Thishistoricalanalysiswillprovidevaluableinsightsandlessonstowardsrebuildinga

democraticSomalistateandwillprovideaframeworkforachievingVision2021.Vision2021is

arevisedandenhancedversionofVision2016,andisaccompaniedbytimetablestocomplete

eachgoal.Itprovidesabottom-upapproachtoachievingfullstatehoodforSomaliabytheend

ofPresidentMohamedAbdullahiFarmaajo’stermin2021.TherearefivegoalsinVision2021

andeachgoalisabuildingblocktoachievingfullstatehoodinmoderation.

Vision2021willaccomplishthefollowinggoals:(a)regionalone-personone-vote

electionsforallrespectiveFederalMemberStates;(b)FederalConstitutionalConventionfor

purposesofconstitutionalrevision;(c)nationalreferendumforSomalia’snewconstitution;(d)

establishmentofafullyfunctioningSomaliNationalArmyandthewithdrawaloftheAfrican

UnionMissioninSomalia(AMISOM);and(e)one-personone-votenationalelection.

Methodology

Myresearchisbasedonreviewingandanalyzingmultitudesofacademicarticles,books,

documentsandreportsconcerningSomaliaffairs,combinedwithmyownacademicand

personalexperienceinSomalia.Myanalysisseekstoclarifyproceduresandtechniquesthat

weresuccessfullyimplementedtocreatetheSomalistate,whileidentifyingproblemsthat

accompanieditsinitialfounding.

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RethinkingtheSomaliStatecriticallyanalyzesthereasonsbehindVision2016’sfailure

andcritiquesitsapplication.Additionally,itprovideshistoricalanalysisonsuccessfulstrategies

duringSomalia’screation,whichcanbeappliedpresentlyduringitsrecreation.Myresearch

concludeswithpolicyrecommendationstoreestablishtheSomalistate.

I.M.Lewis’sresearchismostreferencedbecauseheisthepreeminentacademicscholar

onSomalistudies,“hehadbeenoneofthepioneeringsocialscientiststochronicletheprocess

ofstate-buildingamongSomalisfromthemid-1950sonwards.”2HefirstvisitedtheSomali

territoriesin1955foranthropologicalresearch,3andthroughouthislifecontinuedtoprovide

valuableandreliableinformationonSomalistudies.Ifrequentlysoughthisuniqueinsightby

evaluatinghistreasuretroveofresearchonSomaliaffairs.

TheSomaliClanSystem

AsanethnicSomali,whowasbornandraisedintheUnitedStates,Icanintimately

attesttotheimportanceoftheclan.ItistheSomalis’socialsecuritysystem,itisthe

preeminentunderlyingidentifyingfactorofourexistence,itisourwayoflife,anditmustbe

consideredinanypoliticalplan.IhavehadtheopportunitytotraveltoSomaliathreetimesin

2 Barnes, Cedrick. [review of the book Milk and peace, drought and war: Somali culture, society and politics:

essays in honour of I. M. Lewis, by Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Luling]. International Affairs (Royal Institute

of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 86, No.6, Post-American Iraq (November 2010), pp. 1453.

3 I.M. LEWIS 1930-2014: A GREAT TREE HAS FALLEN. Samater, S. Said. http://www.wardheernews.com/m-

lewis-1930-2014-great-tree-fallen/

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mylife,thefirsttripbeingdaqaancelis,or“returntoculture.”MyparentssentmetoSomalia

forasummertolearnmynativecultureintimately.TheothertwotimesIvisitedSomaliawas

foracademicpurposes;theUniversityofMinnesotaSchoolofLaw’sHumanRightsCenter

awardedmetheUpperMidwestHumanRightsFellowshipandtheRobinaHumanRights

Fellowship,whichallowedmetoconsiderissuesonamoreacademiclevel.

Throughtheseexperiences,andmyownupbringingasanethnicSomali,Ihavecometo

concludethat:tobeSomaliistobelongtoaclan.Inessence,tobeSomaliistobelongtoaclan

thatotherSomaliclansregardasbelongingtotheirsystem,regardlessofhowbigorsmallthat

clanis.IfonedoesnotbelongtoarecognizedSomaliclan,thenthatpersonisnottechnically

Somali.AsI.M.Lewisobserved,“[t]heentireSomalipopulationcanbecomprisedwithinone

vastgenealogyrecordingalltherelationshipsofthenumerouspatrilinealdescentgroupsinto

whichSomalisocietyisdivided...Somalisocietyisthusanagnaticlineagesociety....”4

TherearefourmajorSomaliclanconfederations,theBigFour,(1)Darood,(2)Dir,(3)

Hawiye,and(4)Rahaweyn,andamultitudeofsmaller/minorityclans.AllethnicSomalis,

regardlessofnationality,belongtooneoftheBigFourorsmallerclans.Generally,everyclan

confederationanditssubunitsliveindefinedterritories,therefore,clanloyaltyisintrinsically

tiedtoland.TheSomaliclansystemisgovernedbytheXeer,Somalicustomarylaw.5Xeeris

themaindisputeresolutionmechanismusedbetweenclansandencompasseslegaldoctrines

4 Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland I. Africa: Journal of the International African

Institute, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 245-46.

5 Van Notten, Michael. The Law of the Somalis. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 2005. Print. pp. 33.

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thatgovernlife,liberty,andproperty.6Clanshavefigureheadswhoserveastheirceremonial

leaderswithlifetimeappointments;theseappointmentsareusuallyhereditary.7

TheSomaliclansystemplacesgreatimportanceonelders,“[a]teverylevelof

segmentationitistheeldersofthenomadichamletswhocontrolpoliticalrelations.”8This

explainswhytheinternationalcommunityhaveutilizedclaneldersintheprocessofelecting

membersofSomalia’sparliament(HouseofthePeople),both,in2012and2016.Without

authenticdemocraticelections,claneldersarethemostlegitimateandrepresentativeof

Somalia’ssociety.Duetoitspaternalandagnaticnature,theSomaliclansystemdoesnot

traditionallyempoweritswomenfolk.

UnlikemostAfricannation-states,Somaliaisethnicallyhomogenousbutitsclansystem

servesasitsgreatdivider.“Africannationalistsinmostcolonialstates,becauseoftheirmulti-

ethniccharacter,didnothavetheluxuryofaready-made,country-widelocalfoundationfor

nationalism.”9Somalis,duetotheirethnic,linguistic,culturalandreligioushomogeneity,were

endowedwithamoreorganicformofnationalismwhencomparedtotheirAfrican

counterparts.10SomalinationalismdoeshaveanAchillesheel,theclansystem,thereforeits

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid. at 248

9 Lewis, I.M. (2004) Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. Africa (Edinburgh University Press),

Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.490.

10 Ibid.

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ethnicandculturalhomogeneityis“accompaniedbyapervasivesystemofinternaldivisions

basedontheideologyofkindship,andhenceinvisible....”11

TheSomaliclansystemhasitsprosandcons,butmostexpertsacknowledgethatithas

historicallyhamperedtheSomalipeople’ssocial,economic,andpoliticaldevelopment.

However,ifutilizedcorrectlyitcanbeatoolthathelpsrevamptheSomalistate.Theclan

systemisomnipresentwithinthefabricofSomalisocietyandthusmustbeavariablewhen

devisingapoliticalsolution.

TheColonialEra

TheBritishandItaliansencounteredthevariousSomaliclansduringtheircolonial

conquestofAfrica.Ironically,theSomaliclansystemassistedtheEuropeancolonialsintheir

conquestforSomaliterritories.“[D]espitetheirsenseofculturalidentity,theydidnot

constituteasinglepoliticalunit.Foreignaggressionthusencounterednotanation-state,buta

congeriesofdisunitedandoftenhostileclans....”12Inadditiontotheclanstructure,theway

inwhichtheBritishandItalians(andlatertheUNTrusteeship)governedthenorthernand

southernpartsofSomalia,respectively,hashadalastingimpactonthedevelopmentofthe

Somalistate.

BritishSomalilandProtectorate

11 Ibid.

12 Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 43.

10

TheBritishEmpirelaidclaimtonorthernSomalia,whatwouldbecometheBritish

SomalilandProtectorate,in1884.13TheBritishwereabletonegotiatewiththevariousclans

thatresidedintheareaduetotheirfearofAbyssinian(i.e.Ethiopian)expansion;theBritshad

signedtreatyagreementswiththeGadabuursi,Isaaq,IssaandWarsangeliclans.14Thequiddity

ofthetreatiesstipulatedthat“themembersofthetribalsectionsrepresentedbecame‘British

Protectedpersons’,andintheirlands(stilltobedefined)Britainwasrecognized,inreturn,as

theparamountpowerevenwhileultimatesovereigntyandownershipremainedvestedinthe

tribes...Legally,Somalilandwasneveracolony.”15

In1899,aSomalianti-colonialmovementknownastheDervisharosefromthe

ProtectorateledbySayyidMuhammadAbdilleHassan.16TheconflictbetweentheDervishes

andtheBritishwouldlastfortwodecades,endingwiththedefeatofAbdilleHassanin1920.17

AfterthedefeatoftheDervishes,theBritishbegantoenhancetheiradministrativecapacity

andinfrastructuraldevelopmentintheProtectorate.18“Itisonlysincethedestructionofthe

MadMullah[AbdilleHassan]in1920thatthecountry[Protectorate]hashadanyrealchanceof

13 Millman, Brock. British Somaliland: An Administrative History, 1920-1960. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print.

pp. 15

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid. at 16.

16 Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 68-69.

17 Ibid. at 80.

18Kittermaster, H.B. (Jul., 1928). British Somaliland. Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 27, No. 108, pp.

335-337

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progressing.”19SomeoftheprojectstheBritishinitiatedwereroadconstructionfromthe

coastalareatothehinterland,medicalservices,schooling,drillingwaterwellsandproviding

veterinarianservicestofacilitatethepastoraleconomyofthenomadicpopulation.20

WorldWarIIbroughtconflicttotheHornofAfrica,wheretheBritishandItalianempires

foughtforsupremacyoftheregion.MussolinicapturedtheBritishSomalilandProtectoratein

August1940andincorporateditintotheItalianEastAfricanEmpire,whichalsoincluded

Ethiopia,Eritrea,andSomaliaItaliana.21Aftersevenmonths,theBritishrecapturedthe

Protectorate,liberatedEthiopiafromMussolini’sgrips,andcapturedSomaliaItaliana.22The

BritishnowhadcontrolofbothBritishSomalilandProtectorateandSomaliaItaliana,and

governedtherespectiveterritoriesunderaBritishMilitaryAdministration.23TheBritish

governedSomaliaItalianauntil1949,whenithandeditovertotheUNTrusteeship,keeping

SomalilandasaProtectorate.24

ThesociopoliticaldevelopmentundertheBritishSomalilandProtectoratewasnotas

intensiveandsophisticatedasinSomaliaItalianaunderthenewUNTrusteeship.25TheBritish

19 Ibid. at 335.


21 Ibid. at 116.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid. at 116-17.

24 Ibid. at 128.

25 Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. Africa: Journal of the International African

Institute, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 352.

12

didnothaveapolicyofgrantingtheProtectorateindependenceuntilDecember1958.26Thisis

thereasonwhytheProtectorate’sSomalizationprogramswereinitiatedmuchlaterthan

SomaliaItaliana’s,whoseindependencewasdecidedin1949.“AccordingtoJ.H.A.Watson

(ForeignOffice),itwasimpossibletomaintainBritishruleoverSomalilandonceSomalia

becameindependent.Therewasanurgentneed,heargued,forarapiddevolutionofpowerto

theProtectorate...Somalilandwastobegranteditsindependencein1960,whichwould

coincidewiththedateofindependenceoftheTrusteeshipTerritory[SomaliaItaliana].”27

ThefirstdemocraticelectiontookplaceinFebruary1960,fourmonthspriorto

independence,fortheProtectorate’sLegislativeCouncil.28Thetwomainpoliticalpartiesofthe

ProtectorateweretheSomalilandNationalLeague(SNL)andtheUnitedSomaliParty(USP).29

TheinitialpoliticalplatformoftheSNLdidnotpromoteunitywithSomaliaItaliana,butrather

advocatedfortheProtectoratetobeitsowncountry,a“policyofindependencewithinthe

Commonwealth.”30Inaddition,itwasrepresentativeoftheIsaaqclancenteredaround

Hargeisa,Berbera,andBurco.31ThepoliticalplatformfortheUSPwasfortheProtectorateto

26 Mohamed, Jama (2002). Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The Decolonization of Somaliland. The English

Historical Review, Vol. 117, No. 474, pp. 1198.

27 Ibid. at 1998-99

28 Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. Bildhaan, Vol. 2, pp. 30.


Institute, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 347.

30 Ibid.

31 Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. Africa (Edinburgh University Press). 2004,

Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.499

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mergewithSomaliaItalianatoformtheSomaliRepublic.Itwasrepresentativeofthe

Gadabuursi,Dhulbahante,andWarsangeliclans,respectivelycenteredaroundBorama,Las

Anod,andLasQoray.32

Womenwerenotofferedsuffrageinthiselection,whichcausedconcernfortheBritish

intheProtectorate.33SirDouglasHall,lateGovernoroftheProtectorate,explained,“Oneof

ourmainworrieswashowthewomenwouldbehave.Theyhadnovote,buttheywere

surprisinglypolitically-conscious,andthereisnothingthatanadministratordislikesmorethana

riotofwomen.However,theSomalisthemselvesdecidedthattheelectionshouldbeorderly,

anditwas.TherewerenoincidentsworthyofthenameandforthewholeofFebruary17thnot

awomanwastobeseen.”34

Therewereone-hundredandfiftypollingstations,andanestimated82,000males

castedtheirvotes(80%-90%voterparticipationrate).35TheSNLwontwentyoftheLegislative

Council’sthirty-threeavailableseats,withtheUSPcominginsecondplacegainingtwelve

seats.36MuhammadHajiIbrahimIgal,wholedtheSNL,becamethe“LeaderofGovernment

Business”oftheLegislativeCouncil,inessenceitspresident.37Somalizationalsofollowedwith

allsixdistrictsoftheProtectorate“inthedirectchargeofSomaliofficials.”38

32 Ibid.

33 Hall, Douglas (1961). Somaliland’s Last Year as a Protectorate. African Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 238, pp. 7.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.


37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

14

TofacilitateitsnewfoundpolicyofgrantingtheProtectorateindependence,theBritish

hostedaconstitutionalconferenceinLondononMay2,1960,inwhichtheProtectorate’s

delegationwasledbyIgal.39TheconferenceconcludedonMay12,and“endedwiththe

signingofareportbytheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,whichformallyspecifiedthedate

ofindependenceofSomaliland(26June1960),anditsunionwithSomalia(1July1960).”40

SomaliaItalianaandtheUnitedNationsTrusteeship

TheBritishcolonizednorthernSomaliawhilethe

Italianscolonizedthesouthernpart.SomaliaItaliana,

Italy’scolony,wasfirstestablishedin1882“whenthe

SultanofZanzibarcededtheportsofBrava,Merca,[and]

Mogadishu....”41In1899,theItaliansextendedtheir

sphereofinfluencebysigningtreatieswiththeleaders

oftheMajarteenclan:SultanofHobyoandSultanofMajarteenia.42SomaliaItaliana’s

territorialconfineswouldfurtherbeexpandedwhentheBritishgavetheItaliansthefar-south

SomalicityofKismayo.43

39 Ibid. at 1200

40 Ibid.


42 Ibid.

43 Reece, Gerald (1954). The Horn of Africa. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),

Vol. 30, No.4, pp. 443

15

SomaliaItalianawaspeacefulandforthemostpartthelocalSomalisdidnotrebellike

theDervishinthenorth.“AlargesubsidycamefromRomeand...Somalisgotagooddealof

workwhichmadethemfairlywelldisposedtowardstheItalianadministration.Thedesertfolk

werenotinterferedwithverymuchand,asistheircustom,theykeptasfarawayfromofficials,

troops,andpoliceastheycould.TheItalianswereveryactivelyengagedonthemakingofroads

andtheerectionofbuildings.”44ItalywouldcontinuetogovernSomaliaItalianauntilItaly’s

defeatinWorldWarII.

AftertheAlliesemergedvictoriousinWorldWarII,oneofthemanyissuestheyhadto

solvewaswhattodowithItaly’scolonialpossessions.TheAlliesdecidedthatSomaliaItaliana’s

fatewouldbedecidedbythenewlyestablishedUnitedNations.45TheUNGeneralAssemblyin

1949agreedthatSomaliaItalianawouldbeplacedunderaUnitedNationsTrusteeship,which

cameunderaBritishprotectorateatthetimeofItaly’sdefeat,administeredbyItalyinwhich

“ItalianSomaliahastoberecognizedasanindependentstateintenyears....”46

TheTrusteeshipagreementofficiallycommencedonApril1,1950andsoughtto

graduallyprepareSomalisforself-governanceandeventualindependencein1960.47Inorder

toaccomplishthisgoalwithinadecade’stime“theagreementputspecialemphasisonthe

educationsystem,whichwasconsidered‘thebestinstrumentforpromotingthesocial,

44 Ibid. at 444


46 UN Resolution 289, 21 November 1949.

47 Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence. The

International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 360.

16

economic,politicalandmoralprogressofthepopulationoftheterritory.’”48Inadditionto

givingtheItaliansadministrativeduties,theUNhaditsownAdvisoryCouncilbasedin

MogadishutoobservethedevelopmentstowardsSomaliindependence.

AmongsttheaccomplishmentsoftheTrusteeship,themostnotablehighlightswerethe

fourdemocraticelectionsthattookplace.In1954,thefirstmunicipalelectionswere

conducted,followedbythefirstnationallegislativeelectionsin1956.49In1958and1959,the

secondmunicipalandnationallegislativeelectionsoccurred,respectively.50Priortocolonialism

andnationalindependence,Somalisociopoliticalstructuresweresolelybasedonpaternal

kinshipties(i.e.clans)managedandorganizedaroundtheXeer(customarylaw),therefore

makingSomalisociety“quintessentiallystateless.”51WiththeadventoftheTrusteeship,

Somalisbegantoorganizethemselvespoliticallythroughparties,althoughthesepolitical

partiesstillmaintainedstrongpaternalkingshipties.52Inactuality,clanrelationshipsplayedan

importantpartintheSomalipeople’sdemocraticexperimentthroughouttheTrusteeshipera.

“ClandivisionappearstobethemostevidentandmajorpartitionofSomalisociety...TheSYL

48Ibid.

49 Lewis, I.M. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. The World Today, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 290-91.

50 Ibid.



52 Ware, Gilbert (1965). From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960. Phylon, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1965), pp.

175-76.

17

[SomaliYouthLeague],thestrongestdeclaredpan-Somalimovementinthisperiod,had

politicalsupremacybutdidnotmanagetoeliminateclannismfrompoliticalcompetition.”53

SomalisfirsttastedelectoraldemocracywithmunicipalelectionsinMarch1954,

althoughonlymaleswereallowedtovote.SinceSomalisocietywasquintessentiallystateless,

the“inexperienceofthepoliticalpartieswithmodernelectoralsystemsandthepolitical

immaturityofthemassespersuadedtheUnitedNationsandtheAdministeringAuthorityto

extendgraduallythesuffrageinSomalia.”54Sixteenpoliticalpartiespartookinthe1954

elections,butonlytwopartiesemergedasauthenticpoliticalvanguards.Thetwopartieswere

theSomaliYouthLeague(SYL)andtheHizbiaDigil-Mirifleh(HDM);ofthetwo-hundredand

eighty-oneseatsavailable,theSYLwonone-hundredandforty-twoandtheHDMwonfifty-

seven.55TheresultseffectivelymadetheSYLthe“rulingparty”whiletheHDMservedasthe

“oppositionparty.”ItshouldbenotedthattheHDM’spoliticalandeconomicplatform

propagatedthatSomaliashouldbeafederalstate,ineffectmakingthemthefirstSomali

proponentsoffederalism.56Theseelectionsweredeemedsuccessfulandhighlyparticipatory


International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp. 361-65.

54 Ibid. at 177.





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withmorethan75%ofregisteredvoterspartaking.57Partofitssuccessisowedtothecensus

thatwasconductedpriortothe1954elections,inwhichthirty-fivetownsandvillages

participated.58

Followingtheelections,theAdministeringAuthoritypresenteda“seriesofSeven-Year

DevelopmentPlansfortheperiod1954-1960...”59anditspurposewas“evaluatingthe

country’seconomicimprovement.”60Anotherpost-electiondevelopmentwastheintroduction

oftheSomalinationalflag,whichwas“presentedtotheUNmissioninSomaliainSeptember

1954.”61ThelastmajortaskfortheAdministeringAuthoritywastolaythegroundworkforthe

1956generalelectionsfortheLegislativeAssembly.

Likethe1954elections,thefirstgenerallegislativeelectionswererestrictedtomale

voterswhoweretwenty-oneandolder.62SixtyseatswereavailabletoSomalis,whiletenseats

weredesignatedforminoritycommunities:Italians,Arabs,Indians,andPakistanis.63Ofthe





59 Lewis, I.M. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. The World Today, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 292.



61 Ibid. at 378.


63 Ibid.

19

sixtyavailableseats,theSYLwonforty-threewhiletheHDMwonthirteen.64TheSYL’sleader,

AdenA.Osman,becamethePresidentoftheLegislativeAssembly;65hewouldlaterbecome

thefirstpresidentofanindependentSomalia.ThatyearalsomarkedtheSomalizationofthe

Trusteeshipterritory,withtheLegislativeAssemblyinmajoritarianhandsofSomalisaswellas

allProvincialandDistrictCommissioners.66Amilestonehadbeenachievedwiththeadventof

electionsforthemunicipalitiesandLegislativeAssembly.“Throughoutthetrusteeshipyears,

theUnitedNationscallednotonlyforthetrainingofSomalisforgovernmentalpostsbutalso

forSomalization,thatis,widerparticipationbySomalisinthegovernmentalprocess.”67

The1958municipalelectionswerethefirsttrulydemocraticelectionsbecauseSomali

womenwerefinallyallowedtovote,whichresultedin85.5%ofregisteredvotersvoting.68

Somaliwomendidnotshyawayfromtheballotbox,“despiteallpredictionstothecontrary

anddespitethemalebiasoftraditionalMuslimsociety,[Somaliwomen]showedgreat

interest.”69Inadditiontowomansuffrage,thevotingagewasloweredtoeighteenyears,

whichresultedinanincreaseofthevoterregistrar,with156,636votersinthe1958elections




66Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II. Africa: Journal of the International African



180. (emphasis added).

68 Ibid. at 178.


20

comparedtothe50,740inthe1954elections.70ThelastelectionsoftheTrusteeshiptook

placein1959fortheLegislativeAssembly.71ThesefourelectionspreparedtheTrusteeship

territoryforindependence,andwouldsetthefoundationforSomalia’spoliticalstructure.

ElectoraldemocracywasnowfirmlyembeddedintheSomalisociopoliticalculture.

SincetheItaliansweretheAdministrativeAuthorityoftheTrusteeship,theyintroducedaform

ofgovernancewhichwas“copiedfromtheItalianpoliticalmodel,”butinreality,it“couldnot

managethedynamicsoftheclansystemeffectively.”72ThefoundationofSomalisocietyis

basedonclanrelations,andtheItaliandemocraticsystem,whichwasimportedtotheSomalis,

was“notrespectfuloftheSomalitraditionalstructure,Italypromotedtheadoptionofaformof

stateinappropriatetotheSomalipeople.”73ThisinappropriatepoliticalstructureofSomali

societywouldplayadetrimentalroleintheSomaliRepublic,andeventodayhindersthe

emergenceofapoliticallystableFederalGovernmentofSomalia(theFGScurrentlyusesthis

sameItalian-importedstructure).EventhefalloftheSomalistatecanbepartiallyblamedon

theun-Somalipoliticalfoundationofthecountry.AsBasilobserved:“Somalisocietyhastorn

itselfinpieces,notonlybecausetheinstitutionssetinplacein1960gaveplaytotherivalriesof


180.




73 Ibid.

21

clan-structuredsociety,but,worse,impelledtheserivalrieswithnewmethodsand

resources.”74

ColonialEraSummation

TheBritishandItaliansdifferedintheirprocessofcolonizingtheirrespectiveterritories

inSomalia.TheItaliansundertheUNTrusteeshippreparedtheirterritoryforindependence

startingin1950,whiletheBritishdidnotevenconsidernotionsofindependenceuntilthevery

endof1958.TheBritishrushedthroughtheirprocessofself-governanceandSomalization

withinfourmonths,whiletheItaliansgraduallyimplementedtheirprocessfrom1954until

eventualindependencein1960.

WhenSomaliaItaliana(southernSomalia)andtheBritishSomalilandProtectorate

(northernSomalia)mergedtoformtheSomaliRepublic,southernSomaliawasbetterprepared

andthusmoreinfluential.ThenationalcapitalbecameMogadishu,thecapitalofSomalia

Italiana,andtheSomaliRepublic’sformofgovernancewasmodeledafterItaly.Additionally,

thePresident,PrimeMinister,andSpeakeroftheHouseofthenewlyindependentSomali

Republicallhailedfromthesouth.

SomaliRepublic(1960-1969)

TheSomaliRepublicisuniqueamongstitsAfricannation-statepeersbecauseits

territorialconfineswerenotdrawnbyEuropeans,butratherbySomaliswhounitedtwo

74 Davidson, Basil, The Search for Africa (London, 1994), 284-85.

22

colonialterritoriestocreateanAfricannation-statewhosejurisdictionwasnotidenticaltothe

originalcoloniallines.InApril1960,thepoliticalleadersoftheProtectorateandTrusteeship

“agreedtothespeedyunificationofthetwoSomaliterritories.”75TheProtectoratereceived

independenceonJune26,1960whiletheTrusteeshipreceiveditonJuly1,1960.Somali

IndependenceDayisthereforeofficiallycelebratedonJune26th,whileitsRepublic’sDayis

celebratedonJuly1st.

PriortoindependenceofthetwoSomaliterritories,leadersfromtheTrusteeshipsent

thedraftconstitutionfortheSomaliRepublictotheleadersoftheProtectorate;exceptforthe

additionofonearticle,leadersoftheProtectorateacceptedthedraftconstitutionintotality.76

Uponindependence,“[t]hefirstactoftheunifiedNorthern[BritishSomalilandProtectorate]

andSouthern[SomaliaItaliana]parliamentswastheapprovaloftheUnionActby

acclamation.”77

Somalistudiesscholar,I.M.Lewis,observedthat“[t]oappreciatethefullimportofthis

immediateconsequenceofunionitisnecessarytorealizethat,despitethepatrioticfervor

whichacclaimedtheformationoftheRepublic,themostall-pervasiveelementinpolitics

remainedtheloyaltyoftheindividualtohiskinandclan.”78Hewouldfurtheraddthatclan

“remainedthemostpervasive,themostcommanding,andaboveallthemostinsidious.No

othersinglelineofcommunicationandcommoninterestconnectedsodirectlyand


76 Ibid. at 31.

77 Ibid.


23

incontrovertiblythepastoralnomadintheinteriorwithhiskinsmeninthecivilservice,inthe

NationalAssembly,orinthecabinetitself.Nootherbondofmutualinteresthadsomanyfar-

reachingramificationinallaspectsofprivateandpubliclife.”79

Inadditiontoclanties,dual-colonialidentityhamperedtheintegrationofthetwo

halves,north-southaxis,oftheSomaliRepublic.Thenorthernhalf’slegal,administrative,and

politicalsystemwasbasedonBritishtraditions,whilethesouthernhalf’sonItaliantraditions.

Also,politicalandeconomicpowerbecameconcentratedinthesouth,sinceMogadishuserved

asthecapitaloftheRepublicandseatoftheNationalAssembly.Duetosoutherndomination

oftheRepublic,northerners,especiallythosewithtiestotheSNL,feltunfairlycheatedinthe

dispensationofnationalpowerbecause“[t]henorthscarifiedmorethanthesouth”forthe

sakeofunity.80Aswewillobserveshortly,thisalmostledtothedemiseofthenascentSomali

Republic.

AftervotingontheUnionAct,all123membersoftheunitedSomalinationalassembly

(90seatsforthesouthand33forthenorth)votedforAdenAbdillahOsmantobethe

transitionalpresidentofthenewRepublicuntilthe1961constitutionalreferendum.81TheSYL

leader,AbdirashidAliSharmarke,wastappedbySomalia’sPresidenttobecometheRepublic’s

primeminister.82Thetransitionalgovernmenthadaoneyearmandate,inwhichitstwomajor

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid. at 172

81 Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 392-93

82 Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. Bildhaan, Vol. 2, pp. 32

24

goalswereintegratingthenorthernandsouthernhalvesofthecountryandhostinganational

referendumonitsprovisionalconstitution.83

Theconstitutionalreferendum,whichwasheldonJune20th,1961,wasconsidereda

testofconfidenceforthenewRepublicanditstransitionalleaders.84Inthenorth,theSNL

boycottedthereferendumandofthe100,000recordedvoteshalfvotedagainstit.85As

observed“themajoroppositionturnedouttobefromthecentralpartoftheNorthernregion

[Hargeisa-Berbera-Burcotriangle].”86Nonetheless,theconstitutiongarneredenoughnational

votesandthereferendumwasconsideredtobe“overwhelminglyfreeandfair.”87OnJuly6th,

1961,afterthreeballots,Somalia’snationalassemblyvotedforAdenAbdillahOsmanto

becomethecountry’spresident.Inreturn,PresidentOsmanreappointedSharmarketobethe

country’sprimeminister.88ThePrimeMinister’sgoverningcoalitioncontainedcabinet

membersfromtheSYL,SNL,andUSP89,butwithinmonths,thenewadministrationwouldface

anationalproblem.

Asaforementioned,northernSomaliswithtiestotheSNLwerenothappywiththe

politicalandeconomicdistributionofpowerinthenewSomaliRepublicandinDecember1961,

83 Ibid. at 33

84 Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 172

85 Ibid.


87 Ibid. at 35

88 Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 172-73

89 Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 393

25

rogueofficersfromthenorthtriedtostageacoup.90DuringtheProtectorateera,theSNL’s

originalpoliticalplatformwasforthenorthtobeitsownnation-stateundertheBritish

Commonwealth;itwouldlaterchangeitsplatformtoresembletheUSP’sandSYL’sunionist

stance.91ThegoalofthefailedcoupwastomakethenorthsecedefromSomaliaproper.I.M.

Lewisstatesthat“therealobjectoftherevolt,nodoubtstronglysympathizedwith,ifnot

directlyaidedandabetted,byelementswithintheSNL,wastobreakwiththesouthand

destroytheRepublic.”92Loyalsoldiersandpolicequicklyarrestedthering-leadersofthefailed

coup,quelledtheunrest,andayearlater,theSandhurst-trainedofficersweretriedinacourt

oflaw.93

ThenextfewyearsoftheRepublicwerefocusedonharmonizingthenorth-south

tensionofSomalia.TheSomaligovernmentunderstoodthatmoreattentionneededtobe

giventothenorthandtheAdministrationimplementednewdevelopmentandindustrial

projectsforit.94Inaddition,theAdministrationfocuseditsnationaleffortstowards

“reintegrationandreformofthecivilservice;findingamajorpowertotrainandarmtheSomali

military;anddevelopmentplanning.”95Itwasn’tuntiltheendof1963thatbothhalvesofthe

SomaliRepublicwouldbelegallyandadministrativelyintegrated.”96

90 Ibid.




93 Ibid.

94 Ibid. at 175


26

Thenextmajorgoalfortheadministrationwastohostthegeneralelectionsof1964,

buttheRepublicwouldfaceanationalcrisispriortoit.TensionsbetweenEthiopiaandSomalia

hadbeenbrewingsincepriortoindependencebecauseofaborderdispute,andinearly1964

all-outwareruptedbetweenthetwonationswhenEthiopiaunilaterallyattackedSomali

territory.97SomaliahelditsgeneralelectionsforitsnationalassemblyonMarch30th,1964.98

PrimeMinisterAbdirashidfamouslyaddressedthenationbystatingthat,“Wewillvotewith

onehandandfightwiththeother.”99ThefirstSomali-Ethiopianwarendedwithmediation

fromSudan.100

The1964electionswitnessedthedemiseoftheSNLandUSP,andtheentranceoftwo

newpoliticalalliances,theSomaliNationalCongress(SNC)andtheSomaliDemocraticUnion

(SDU).101Bynow,northerndisgruntlementhadbeenassuaged,andthesenewpolitical

alliances“signifiedthecollapseofthenorthern-southernregionalaxis,andindicatedthe

commoncommitmentofallthepoliticalleaderstotheRepublicasaunitarystate.”102TheSYL

triumphantlywonthatelectionbygainingsixty-nineofthe123seats,theSNCandSDUwould

garnertwenty-twoandfifteenseats,respectively,whiletheHDMSgarnerednineseats(the


97 Ibid. 201

98 Ibid.


100 Ibid.


102 Ibid. at 395

27

remainingeightseatswenttoothers).103Asnoted,“themannerinwhichtheelectionswere

conducted,andtheextenttowhichoppositionpartiesparticipatedinthem,reaffirmedthe

Republic’scontinuingcommitmenttotheprinciplesofparliamentarydemocracy.”104

PresidentOsmanwasreelectedandheappointedAbdirazakH.Husseinashisprime

minister.105PremierHusseinwasknownasareformistanda“politicianofconsiderable

personalcharismaandcourage.”106Hismainobjectiveswere“publicservicereform;

corruption;andpreparationforthenextpresidentialelection.”107Histenureaspremieris

knownforcurbingcorruption,whichhadbecomeamajorprobleminthenascentSomali

Republic.

OneelementofthePremier’sreformagendawastheestablishmentofthePublic

ServiceCommission,whichwas“giventhetaskofreviewingallpromotionsanddemotionsof

civilservants.”108Thiswouldeventuallyleadtothreeministersaswellasothercivilservants

beingdismissed;thereformagendatargetedthreetypesofemployees,“thecorrupt,the

incompetent,andindividualsengagedinleakingnationalsecurityinformation.”109Another

boldreformagendaofPremierHusseinwashavingallhiscabinetmembersdeclareandregister

103 Ibid.




107 Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. Bildhaan, Vol. 2, pp. 48-49

108 Ibid. at 53

109 Ibid. at 52-54

28

theirassets.110Thesereformswouldlaterhaunt,both,thePresidentandhisPrimeMinister,

whenthe1967generalelectionscamearound.MembersofParliamentwerenotfondof

PremierHussein’snewstyleofgoodgovernance.111

EventhoughincumbentPresidentOsmanhadtheofficialendorsementofhisSYL

party112,formerPremierSharmarke,whoalsoamemberoftheSYL,wasabletomobilizethe

nationalassemblytovotehiminasthenewpresidentoftheSomaliRepublic.113Thepresident-

electwouldinturnnominateHajiIbrahimEgalashisprimeminister;thiswasthefirsttimein

theRepublic’shistorythatanorthernerwasgiventhepremiership.114

Somali-AmericanscholarsAhmedandAbdiSamatarhavestatedthattheOsman-

Husseingovernmentshouldbeheldinhighregard,intermsofgovernance,duetotheir

“combinedcontributionsasexemplaryofwhatcourageousandnoblespiritmean.Their

clairvoyancetodiscernwhatwasimperativeforadifferentandmoreenablingfuture,coupled

witharesolutebeliefinthenecessityofconstitutionalpracticetothemakingofamature

politicalcommunity,areinspiringforSomaliandAfricantime,desperateforboth.”115More

importantly,PresidentOsmanandPremierHussein’sacceptanceofdefeat,andhandingover

110 Ibid. at 53

111 Ibid. at 54-55

112 Ibid. at 56


114 Ibid.


29

thekeysofthestatetotheirelectoralopponents,madethem“Africa’sfirstgenuinemodern

democrats....”116

The1967electionswouldserveasamajorturningpointfortheSomaliRepublic,andits

demisewouldsoonfollowaftertwoyears.WiththereformistsgoneandSharmarkeandEgal

backinpower,clantiesbecamemoreapparent.Theseproblemspeakedduringthe

subsequent1969elections,atotalof1002candidates,representingsixty-twopoliticalparties,

themajoritybeingclan-basedparties,contestedtheseelections.117Asusual,theSYLwonthe

overwhelmingmajorityoftheseats(seventy-three),andonceagainPresidentSharmarkeand

PremierEgalbecameheadofthestateandgovernment,respectively.TheSomalipopulace

believedthegovernmentriggedtheelectionsorthatmanyirregularitiestookplace.118As

observed,“officialcorruptionandnepotism[i.e.clannism]seemedtobeflourishingonascale

hithertounknownintheRepublic...TheNationalAssemblywasnolongerthesymboloffree

speechandfairplayforallcitizens.Onthecontrary,ithadbeenturnedintoasordidmarket-

placewheredeputiestradedtheirvotesforpersonalrewardswithscantregardfortheinterest

oftheirconstituents.”119BetweenJanuary1969andOctober1969,£500,000(758,000USD)

weregiventovariousmembersoftheNationalAssembly.120

116 Ibid. at 6-7


118 Ibid. at 399

119 Ibid.

120 Payton, Gary. The Somali Coup of 1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity. The Journal of Modern African

Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp. 501

30

Underthesescathingconditions,anationaltragedytranspiredthatderailedSomalia’s

democraticexperiment.OnOctober15,1969,PresidentSharmarkewasassassinatedbyoneof

hisguards,andonthemorningofOctober21,theSomalimilitaryexecutedacoupd’état.121

“TheNationalAssemblywasclosed,politicalpartiesweredeclaredillegal,anditwas

announcedthatthestatewouldbegovernedbyaSupremeRevolutionaryCouncil.”122

SomaliDemocraticRepublic(1969-1991)

TheCommanderoftheArmy,GeneralMohamedSiadBare,becamethePresidentofthe

country,andfollowingcommunistlexicon,renamedittheSomaliDemocraticRepublic.123

ScientificSocialismbecamethenewideologyoftheSomalistate,andthroughitthevestigesof

clannismandcorruptionwere,purportedly,buried.124Likeothercommunistcountries,

PresidentBaredevelopedapervasivesecurityapparatusknownastheNationalSecurity

Service,anditsfunctionwastobethe“longandstrongarmofthestate,withunlimitedpower

tosearch,detain,andeventortureandkillsuspecteddissidents.”125


122 Ibid. at 399

123 Ibid. at 401

124 Lewis, I.M. The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism. African Affairs, Vol. 88 No. 353

(Oct. 1989), pp. 573

125 Samatar, Ahmed I. Underdevelopment in Somalia: Dictatorship without Hegemony. Africa Today, Vol. 32, No.

3 Somalia: Crises of State and Society (3rd Qtr., 1985), pp. 28

31

Somalisinitiallywelcomedthemilitarytakeoverofthestateduetothecorruptand

nepotisticnatureofitsdemocraticexperiment.“Intheviewofthemostdisillusionedcritics,

democracyhadlapsedintocommercializedanarchy,andstrongruleofanewtypewas

desperatelyneededifthestatewastoberescuedfromitspresentmorassofpoverty,

insecurity,andinefficiency,andsetontheroadtoprogress.”126

PresidentBarefocusedondevelopingSomalia’sinfrastructure,economy,anditshuman

capacity.HisgreatestfeatofdevelopingSomalia’shumancapacityisarguablydeveloping

orthographyfortheSomalilanguage;priorto1972,thelanguagewaspurelyoral.Hechosethe

RomanscriptfortheSomalilanguage,andwouldlaunch“intensivenation-wideurbanandrural

literacycampaignsin1973and1974.”127

Sincetwo-thirdsofSomalia’seconomywasbasedon“theruralsector(pastoral,

agriculture,andfisheries),”anotherdevelopmentobjectiveofhiswas“thecontrolofanimal

disease;theextensionofagriculturalcrashprograms;andanimprovementoffoodgrain

productionandmarketing....”128Hisdevelopmentoftheindustrialsub-sectorwassomewhat

fruitful,“publicestablishmentsgrewfromfourteenin1970toforty-sixin1974.”129



(Oct. 1989), pp. 574

128 Samatar, Ahmed I. Underdevelopment in Somalia: Dictatorship without Hegemony. Africa Today, Vol. 32, No.

3 Somalia: Crises of State and Society (3rd Qtr., 1985), pp. 32.

129 Ibid. at 33.

32

EventhoughPresidentBareespousedtheideologyofsocialism,hestillreliedon

Somalia’straditionalsociopoliticalstructure,clanties,torule.Hisinnerpowercirclewas

dubbedthe“MODclique,”inwhichtheMrepresentedhisclan,theOrepresentedhismother’s

clan(i.e.hismaternalclanties),andtheDrepresentedtheclanofhisson-in-law,who

controlledsecurityaffairs.130UntilSomalia’sdefeatinthe1978OgadenWar,PresidentBare

wasabletogovernandruleSomaliathroughthedelicatebalanceofa“two-dimensional

politicalstructure,withclandestineclanpoliticsatthecoreandsurfacesocialistnationalismfor

everyoneelse....”131

SomaliaandEthiopiafoughtanintensivewarfrom1977-78overtheSomaliinhabited

regionineasternEthiopia:TheOgaden(alsoreferredtoasWesternSomalia).Ethiopiahad

gainedpossessionofthisSomaliterritoryviaatreatywithBritainin1954.132Overtime,a

SomaliliberationmovementwithintentionsoffreeingitsterritoryfromEthiopianrule

emerged,theWesternSomaliLiberationFront(WSLF).“Followingsuccessfulrisingsagainst

EthiopianruleinneighbouringprovincesbyalliesoftheSomalis,theforcesoftheWestern

SomaliLiberationFront(WSLF),aidedbytroopsfromSomalia,beganinthesummerof1977to

pushtheEthiopiansoutoftheOgaden.TheSomalivictorywas,however,short-lived.The

conflicttriggeredaseismicshiftinsuperpoweralignmentsintheHornofAfricawiththe



131 Ibid. at 502

132 Brown, Latham D.J. The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute. The International and Comparative Law

Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1956), pp. 259

33

RussiansturningtosupporttheEthiopiansandenablingthemtoregaincontrolofthe

Ogaden.”133

Bare’smilitaryjuntasufferedmajorlossesafterthiswarwhichresultedin“widespread

publicdemoralizationandtoanupsurgeof‘tribalism,’”andleadtodisgruntledmilitaryofficers

attemptingafailedcoupinApril1978.134Thosewhowereabletoescapewouldlaterformthe

SomaliSalvationDemocraticFront(SSDF),Somalia’sfirstarmed-oppositiongroupwith

intentionsofoverthrowingPresidentBare.135Yearslater,additionalarmed-oppositiongroups

wouldbeformedtohelpoustPresidentBare,mostnotablytheSomaliNationalMovement

(SNM)andUnitedSomaliCongress(USC).136Thesefactionsdidnotdifferinpoliticsperse,but

werejustarmedguerillarebelsoftheirrespectiveclans.

Thesearmedfactions,amongstothers,justifiedtheirrebellionagainstBare’sregime

duetohis“mismanagingtheOgadenwar;sendingmembersoftribesotherthanhisowntodie

intheOgadenwar;nepotism;tribalism;‘fascistrule’;running‘anabsoluteanddespotic

dictatorship’;[and]the‘underminingofthefaithandIslamicwayoflifeoftheSomalipeople..


(Oct. 1989), pp. 574-75.


(Oct. 1989), pp. 575



136 Ibid.

34

..”137Thesearmedfactionswouldeventuallysucceed,andPresidentBarevacatedVilla

Somalia(thePresidentialPalace)inJanuary1991.Hisfinaloverthrow“wasachievedthrough

theclan-basedmilitiasandguerillaorganizations.”138Subsequently,theSomalistatecollapsed

anditsfailedstatestatuswouldremainintakeforthenexttwodecades.

SiadBare’sdictatorshipwasseenbymanyinSomaliaastreatingtheDaroodclanas

first-classcitizens,whiletreatingtherestassecond.Thishelpedsowtheseedof

discontentmentamongstSomalis.“Theonlysubstantialdifference,now,wasthatthevolatile

relationsbetweentheseclanunitsacrossthewholecountryhadbeenraisedtoafeverpitchby

theexperienceofDarod(particularlyMarehan)hegemonyandoppression,andthebitter

fightingwhich,withmodernweapons,wroughtdeathanddestructiononanunprecedented

scale.”139

SomaliaasaFailedState

AfterthefalloftheSomaliDemocraticRepublicin1991,theSomalistatebrokedown

intoatriadicstructure(seemap140).TheSNMtookcontrolofnorthernSomalia,theSSDFtook

137 Ododa, Harry. Somalia’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations since the Ogaden War of 1977-78. Middle

Eastern Studies, Vol. 21. No. 3 (Jul.,1985), 295



139 Ibid.

140 The Economist.

35

controlofeasternSomalia,andtheUSCtookcontrolofsouthcentralSomalia.141TheSNM

unilaterallydeclaredindependencefromSomaliainMay181991,claimingjurisdictionofthe

formerBritishSomalilandProtectorate.142TheSNMnamedtheirsecessionistentitythe

RepublicofSomaliland,butitisunrecognizedbytheworldcommunity.143TheSSDFpursueda

pathofautonomy,callingtheirterritoryPuntlandonMay51998,andsayingitdesires“tobe

thecornerstoneofafuturefederalSomalia.”144SouthcentralSomalia,andmostimportantly

Mogadishu,becameaviolentandlawlessareaduetowarlordism.145Mogadishu,onceknown

asthe“PearloftheIndianOcean,”duringthe1990sbecamea“chaoticgraveyard.”146

Somaliland

NorthernSomaliaiscurrentlyadministeredbyanarmed

secessionistmovement,“Somaliland”,wantingtosecedefrom

Somalia,butitshouldbehighlightedthatsizablepopulationsinthe

northadheretothebeliefinaunitedSomalia.Itisnotfarfetched

tosaythatSomaliland,anditssecessionistideology,isanexistential

141 Duffiled, Andrew Scott. When Do Rebels Become State-Builders?: A Comparative Case Study of Somaliland,

Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. Bildhaan, Vol. 13, pp. 1

142 Ibid. at 6.

143 Ibid. at 4.

144 Ibid. at 9.

145 Ibid. at 15

146 Ibid. at 16

36

threattoSomalia.WhattheRepublicofBiafrawastoNigeriaiswhattheRepublicof

SomalilandistoSomalia.

ThesecessionistRepublicofSomalilandisthebrainchildoftherebelgroupSomali

NationalMovement(SNM),whichpoliticallyrepresentedtheIsaaqclan.147AfterSiadBare’sfall

inJanuary1991,theSNM’sfirstprovocativemovewastoattackanddisarmtheGadabuursi

clanthatresideintheAwdalprovince.TheSNMconducteda“full-scaleassaultonBorama

[largestcityinAwdal]onFebruary5,andarmedoperationsinZeila[coastalcityinAwdal]later

inthemonth.”148ThepeopleofAwdalhavebeenundersecessionistoccupationsincethat

attackin1991.Laterin2007,Somaliland’smilitaryattackedtheeasternterritories

incorporatingLasAnodintoitssecessionistentity.

ManyexpertsviewSomalilandthroughanarrowlens,oftencitingthatitisdemocratic,

“TheRepublicofSomaliland,thesecessionistnorthwesternsliceofSomaliathatdeclared

independencein1991,hasafarbetterdemocratictrackrecordthananyofitsneighbors..

..”149ThoughSomaliland’sprogressiscommendable,itspoliticalmotivesaremoresinister.

Historically,theIsaaqhaveasociopoliticalideologyofclansupremacy.Though

belongingtotheSomaliclanconfederationofDir,theIsaaqhavedismissedthis.“TheIshaaq

[Isaaq]areclassifiedbyotherSomaliasDir,butthemselvesdenythisgrouping,claimingthat

theyareaclan-familyofArabiandescentintheirownrightandwithouttheintermediacyof


148 Lidwien Kapteljns. Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Reinous Legacy of 1991. pp.158.

149 Kaplan, Seth (2008). The Remarkable Story of Somaliland. Journal of Democracy, Volume 19, Number 3, pp.

143.

37

otherSomaliancestors.”150DuringBritishcolonialism,“theIsaq[Isaaq]refusedtobecalled

Africans,orevenSomali...,”151andwhenBritishauthoritiestriedtoadministerapoll-taxon

themasSomalis“theIsaq[Isaaq]rejectedtheirpassesbecausetheyweredescribedasSomalis,

whereastheynowcalledthemselvesSharifIsaqArabs.”152WhentheSomalilandNational

League(SNL)wasfirstcreated,itspoliticalplatformdidnotinitiallyadvocateforunitywith

otherSomalis,butratherfortheProtectoratetobeitsownnation.153WhentheSomali

Republichelditsconstitutionalreferendumin1961,itwastheSNLthatboycottedit,anditwas

theirrespectivecities(Hargeisa,Berbera,andBurco)thatvotedagainstit.154Toaddinsultto

injury,itwasSNLsupporterswhoplannedthefailedcoupof1961.Again,“therealobjectof

therevolt,nodoubtstronglysympathizedwith,ifnotdirectlyaidedandabetted,byelements

withintheSNL,wastobreakwiththesouthanddestroytheRepublic.”Lastly,inMay1991,the

SomaliNationalMovementunilaterallydeclaredsecessionfromSomalia,completingthetask

theirSNLforefatherscouldnotin1961.Theirhistoricaloverlyingsociopoliticalthemecannot

bedenied,Somaliland’sraisond’etreforsecessionisbasedonclansupremacy.

150 Lewis, I.M. (1958). Modern Political Movements in Somaliland I. Africa: Journal of the International African

Institute, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 245. 151 Turton, E.R. (1974). The Isaq Somali Diaspora and Poll-Tax Agitation in Kenya, 1936-41. African Affairs, Vol.

73, No. 292, pp. 327.

152 Ibid. at 340


Institute, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 347.


38

NoteveryoneinnorthernSomalia

sharesthisview,however.Theclansthatwere

representedbythecolonialeraUnitedSomali

Party(USP)stilldesiretobepartofSomalia

proper,andhavestartedminorrebellionsinthe

north(seemap:lighterarearepresents

unionists).155

PuntlandStateofSomalia

ThePuntlandStateofSomalia,locatedinthenorth-easternpartofformerSomalia

Italiana,isthebrainchildoftheSomaliSalvationDemocraticFront(SSDF).156Puntlandisa

unionofclansundertheDarood,157mostnotablytheMajeerteensub-clan.158TheSSDFwere

Somaliunionistsand“therewasneverapparentlyanysuggestionofdecisivelybreakingfrom

Somalia,asSomalilandhaddone.”159

TheSSDFencounteredsomehurdlesbetween1991-98beforeofficiallycreating

Puntland.Bare’sfallresultedinapoliticalvacuumandgavewaytonumeroussecurity

155 United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Report on Somalia, S/2014/726 (13 October 2014),

available from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726

156 Ibid. at 10.

157 Ibid.


159 Ibid. at 287.

39

threats.160ThemostnotablethreatcamefromtheUnitedSomaliCongress(USC)basedin

southcentralSomalia,“theS.S.D.F.founditselfdefendingitstraditionalgrazingrightsinMudug

regionagainstthedeterminedeffortsof‘Aideed’sHabarGidirSa’admilitia,whowerebidding

fairtobecomeageneralscourgeofthewholecountry.”161Thisparticularconflictendedin

1993whenColonelAbdulahiYusuf,commanderoftheSSDF,andGeneralAideedoftheUSC,

signedtheMudugPeaceAgreement.162

By1998,theSSDF,alongwiththeirrespectiveclanelders,“establishedthenew

‘PuntlandstateofSomalia’asanautonomouslocalentity,with[AbdulahiYusuf]asitsfirst

electedPresident....”163Since1998,Puntlandhassuccessfullyconductedfivepresidential

elections,inwhichtheirparliamentariansareelectedviaaclanformulasimilartohow

Somalia’sHouseofthePeoplewaselectedin2012and2016.Puntland’sparliamentarianselect

theirpresident.

SouthcentralSomalia

SouthcentralSomalia’sclanmakeupishighlydiversesoithadmorerebelgroupsthan

SomalilandandPuntland,“[a]sopposedtoSomalilandandPuntland,whereviolencewas


Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. Bildhaan, Vol. 13, pp. 11.





40

concentratedmoreorlessintheSNMandSSDFrespectively,in[southcentral]Somaliaitwas

diffuse.Ineffect,themarket-placeforviolencewasmuchmorecompetitive,withnogroup

achievinganythingclosetoamonopolyposition.”164

Thoughnogroupachievedamonopolyposition,theUnitedSomaliCongress(USC)was

themostdominantplayer;theUSC“concentratedonprovidingsecurityandpursuingthe

interestsoftheHawiyekingroup.”165TheUnitedSomaliCongress(USC)didnotfocuson

buildingaregionaladministrationliketheSNMandSSDFdid,butrather,unsuccessfully,sought

tobetheSomalinationalgovernment,“theUSCfailedtoproduceablueprintforhowSomalia

wouldbegoverned...Thelackofpoliticalprogramforthesharingofpowerbetweengroups

producedanevengreatersecuritychallengethanBarre’stotalitariangovernmentbypavingthe

wayforwarlordism.”166

Conflictwasfurtherexacerbatedwhenahigh-rankingmemberoftheUSC,businessman

AliMahdi,declaredhimselfthePresidentofSomaliapriortoGeneralAideed’sarrivalto

Mogadishu.167Aideeddidnotacceptthisandwarbrokeoutbetweentheirtwofactions.168

TheUSC’slackofvisionarypoliticalleadershipforanationalgovernment,combined

withitsinternalfactionalwar,resultedinsouthcentralSomalia’scompletedisintegration.169In

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid.



167 Ibid. at 16.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid. at 17.

41

the1990s,warlordismterrorizedtheinhabitantsofsouthcentralSomalia,‘Mogadishuwasthus

thecentreofwavesofdestructionandterrorwhichradiatedoutsidethecityunpredictably.”170

ReestablishingtheSomaliState(1991-2012)

Sinceitsfallin1991,therehasbeen“fifteenattempt[s]bytheinternationalcommunity

atre-establishingtheSomalistate.”171Ofthesefifteenattempts,twostandout:(1)TheArta

peaceprocessand(2)theNairobipeaceprocess.172TheArtapeaceprocess,knownasthe

SomaliNationalPeaceConference,concludedinAugust2000withtheestablishmentofa

TransitionalNationalGovernment(TNG);bothSomalilandandPuntlandboycottedthe

process.173Throughoutitsexistence,theTNGwasunabletogaincontroloverSomalia,itdid

notevencontrolMogadishu.TheTNGeventuallyfailed,andinitsplaceemergedaTransitional

FederalGovernment(TFG).


171 Kasaija, Appuli Phillip (2010). The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008-2009: Results and

problems. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28:3, pp. 262

172 Ibid. at 266-69

173 Le Sage, Andre. Sovereign Disguise for a Mogadishu Mafia. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No.

91, Sovereignty, Democracy & Zimbabwe’s Tragedy (Mar., 2002), pp. 132

42

TheTFGwasestablishedinAugust/October2004aftertheoutcomeoftheNairobi

peaceprocess.174Thetwomostsignificantpoliticaloutcomesofthisconferencewerethe

acknowledgmentthatSomaliawouldbeafederalstate,andtheestablishmentofthe‘4.5

formula,’inwhich“powerwastobesharedbetweenthefourmainclan-familiesofSomalia...

togetherwiththeminorityclan-families,whichconstitutethe0.5.”175Puntlandparticipatedin

thisconference,butSomalilanddidnot.

TheSomalistateexperiencedtwelveyearsofvarioustransitionalgovernments,2000-

2012;thetransitionalphaseended“withtheannouncementofapost-transitionalfederal

governmentin2012[FederalGovernmentofSomalia]....”176

InAugust2012,basedonthe4.5formula,claneldersappointedmembersforSomalia’s

post-transitionalparliament,andsubsequentlythatparliamentelectedHassanSheikh

MohamedasSomalia’sfirstpost-transitionalpresident.177PresidentMohamed’svictorywas

widelyacceptedbySomalisduetothefactthathewas“viewedaspartofa‘constructiveelite’

thathadstayedinMogadishuthroughoutthe20-yearcrisisandbuiltschools,universities,

hospitals,andbusiness.”178TheFederalGovernmentofSomalia(FGS)isthefirstgovernment

togainofficialdiplomaticrecognitionfromthecommunityofnationssincethefallofthe

174 Kasaija, Appuli Phillip (2010). The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008-2009: Results and

problems. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28:3, pp. 265

175 Ibid.

176 Menkhaus, Ken. State Failure, State-Building, and Prospects for a “Functional Failed State” in Somalia. Annals

of the American Academy of Political & Social Science. Nov. 2014, Vol. 656 Issue 1, pp. 154

177 Ibid. at 168

178 Ibid.

43

Somalistatein1991.Currently,theFGS’s“capacityisweak,budgetsmodest,corruptionhigh,

andinstitutionalizationlow.”179

Asofthewritingofthispaper,themandatefortheFGS’sfirstadministrationisover;

SomaliasuccessfullyelectednewmembersofparliamentinDecember2016.Theseelections

differedslightlyfromthe2012elections.In2012,135claneldersselectedallmembersof

parliament(HouseofthePeople);in2016,thesame135claneldersselectedanapproximate

14,000electoralcollegemembers,whointurnelectedSomalia’snewmembersofparliament

(HouseofthePeople).Somalia’sparliamentarianselectedthenewPresidentofSomaliaon

February8,2017.TheFederalGovernmentofSomalia’ssecondadministrationhasafour-year

mandateendingin2021.

InsightsandLessons

IhavespentagoodportionofmyanalysisofSomalia’ssociopoliticalhistoryontwo

eras:theUNTrusteeship,1950-60,andtheSomaliRepublic,1960-69.Ifindthatthesetwoeras

arethemostanalogoustoSomalia’scurrentpoliticalsituation,andthereforeofferusthebest

insightsandlessons.Today,Somaliafindsitselftryingtoregainstatehoodwithinternational

guidancefromtheUnitedNationsAssistanceMissiontoSomalia(UNSOM).Thisresemblesthe

1950-60era,whenSomaliawaspreparingherselftogainstatehoodforthefirsttimewith

internationalguidanceviatheUnitedNationsTrusteeship.ThepoliticalplatformforSomalia’s

179 Ibid. at 164

44

thirdrepublicisamultipartyparliamentarydemocracy,justasitwasduringtheSomaliRepublic

era,1960-69,albeititwillbeafederalstateandnotaunitarystate.

TheTrusteeshiperagivesusinvaluableguidanceonhowtheinternationalcommunity

preparedSomalisforstatehood.WelearnthatthemajorfocalpointforpreparingSomalisfor

self-governancewasplacedoneducation.Institutionsofhigherlearningwereestablished,and

enrollmentsofprimaryandsecondaryeducationwereexpanded.180TheUnitedNations

enhancedSomalia’seducationalsystemtodevelopitshumancapacityforgoodgovernance.

Today,Somalia’seducationalsystemisinshamblesduetotwo-decadesplusofcivilstrife,and

Somalia’syouthhavesufferedthemost.TheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

estimatesthatseventypercentofSomalia’spopulationisundertheageofthirty,whichmeans

theoverwhelmingmajorityofSomalia’spopulationsufferedfromthelackoftraditional

educationsystems.181Strangely,theFGSandUNSOMsoughttointroducenationwideelections

bytheendof2016withoutproperlypreparingtheSomalipopulaceviaaneducationalsystem.

Thelessonhereisthatmuchemphasisshouldbeplacedonestablishinganeducationalsystem

whichpromotesprimaryandsecondaryschoolsacrossSomalia,withspecialemphasisonadult-

basedschoolingforthosewhocameofageduringthestatelessera.

AnothervaluablelessonfromtheTrusteeshiperaisthegradualdemocratizationof

Somalia.TheTrusteeshipintroduceddemocracytoSomaliainmoderation,withmunicipal



181 Somalia Human Development Report 2012: Empowering youth for peace and development. United Nations

Development Programme. 28 Sep 2012.

45

electionstakingplacetwoyearspriortonationalelections.TheFGSandUNSOMplannedto

haveanationalelectionbytheendof2016,yetnoFederalMemberState(orInterim

Administration)haseverhadone-personone-voteelectionswithintheirrespectiveterritories.

Thewiserapproachwouldbetohaveone-personone-voteregionalelectionsinallthe

respectiveFederalMemberStatesfirsttograduallyestablishdemocracyinSomaliapriorto

havinganationalelection.

WelearnedduringtheSomaliRepublic’serathattransposinganItalian-statemodel

ignorestheuniquenatureofSomalia’straditionalsociopoliticalfoundation,theclanstructure.

ToborrowfromtheChinese,whatisneededinSomaliais“democracywithSomali

characteristics.”Washington,D.C.’sdemocracyandLondon’sdemocracydifferincomposition,

yetbothareauthenticallydemocratic.ThereforeitisonlynaturalthatMogadishu’sdemocracy

willdifferaswell.Somaliscannolongerignoretheclanstructureintheirpoliticalcalculus,

somethingtheyacknowledgedintheNairobipeaceprocess.Whatisnowneededisthe

permanentinstitutionalizationoftheclanstructureinthenationalpoliticalfabricofthenew

Somalia.IfSomaliaistofullyregainstatehood,hermoderndemocraticfoundationmust

complementhertraditionalclanstructure.

AnadditionallessonwelearnedfromtheeraoftheSomaliRepublicisthatthelackof

goodgovernancehampersthepoliticaldevelopmentoftheSomalistate,andeventuallyleads

tounwantedoutcomes.CorruptionandnepotismweakenedthefabricoftheSomaliRepublic,

andifnotchecked,willalsoweakenthenewemergingSomalistate.Somalia’sformer

president,HassanSheikhMohamud,acknowledgedtheneedforgoodgovernanceinhis

forewordinForeignPolicyofSomalia.Hestates:“Itisnowacceptedthatpoorgovernancehas

46

beenoneofthemajorcausesofthecollapseofSomalia’ssocioeconomicdevelopment.”182

Whatisneededisatechnocraticcivilserviceandnational/regionaladministrationsfreeof

corruptvices.EnhancingSomalia’seducationalsystemwillhelpinthisendeavor.

WhenoneproperlyanalyzesSomalia’smodernsociopoliticalhistoryandthegoals

enshrinedinVision2016,onereachesapracticalconclusionthatthethreemajorgoals

(federationofSomalia,constitutionalrevisionandnationalreferendum,andone-personone-

votenationalelection)werenotgenuinelyattainableinsuchashorttime.TheSomalistate

collapsedin1991,becomingtheworld’squintessentialfailedstate,andhassufferedfromover

twodecadesofcivilstrife,whichincludecivilwar,warlordism/lawlessness,piracy,andviolent

extremism.Thoughnoble,thetimetableofVision2016wasnotfairtotheSomalinationand

people.Underthetheme“TransitioningTowardsDemocracy,”Vision2016wasformulatedin

MogadishuinSeptember2013withtheendorsementoftheUnitedNations.183Inretrospect,

wecanadmitthatitwasnaïvetobelievethattherecoveringSomalistatewascapableof

completingthosegoalsinthreeyears.Whatisnowneededisareassessmentofhowto

completethethreemajorgoalsoutlinedinVision2016bytheyear2021.

182 “FOREIGN POLICY OF SOMALIA.” http://www.mfa.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Somali-Federal-

Policy.pdf

183 “VISION 2016: TRANSITIONING TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.”

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CC8QFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2

Fwww.villasomalia.gov.so%2Fwp-

content%2Fuploads%2F2014%2F12%2FVision_2016_report_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf&ei=qnlKVZf2K8jisAXz04CID

A&usg=AFQjCNFN4XTHacKA6iRPCPN_G8Up6Vui8Q&bvm=bv.92291466,d.b2w

47

TheFederalGovernmentofSomaliaandtheinternationalcommunityneedtorethink

theSomalistate,ormoreprecisely,rethinkhowSomaliawillachievefullstatehood.Inthe

sectionbelow,Iprovidetimetablestoachievethethreemajorgoalsandprovidepolicy

solutionsonhowtoreachthemby2021.Specifically,Iamadvocatingforamoredetailed

approachtoachievingthethreeoutlinedgoalsbyprovidingadifferentformula,abottom-up

approach.Thismoredetailedversion,Vision2021,laysoutmorerealisticandlogical

parametersforSomaliatore-attainstatehood.

RethinkingtheSomaliState:Vision2021

Inordertoachievethegoalsofconstitutionalrevision,followedbyanational

referendum,andone-personone-votenationalelections,Somalia’sfederalizationprocessmust

firstbecompletelyfinalizedandinstitutionalized.ThefullfederalizationofSomalia’sregions

hasnotauthenticallytranspiredyet,andofficialdemarcationofSomalia’sregionalstateshas

notbeencompleted.

Thesouth,whatusetobeSomaliaItaliana,isinthe

finalprocessonfederalizingintosixpotentialstates(see

map184).Somalia’sProvisionalConstitutionstipulatesthat

“Basedonavoluntarydecision,twoormoreregionsmay

184 “SOMALIA’S FEDERAL FUTURE: LAYERED AGENDAS, RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES”

https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/somalias-federal-future-layered-agendas-risks-and-

opportunities#sthash.UKnpfEhx.dpuf

48

mergetoformaFederalMemberState.”185TheregionsarebasedontheSomaliDemocratic

Republic’sprovincialadministrativeboundariesatitsfallin1991.Therewere/areeighteen

regionsinSomaliaproper,withfiveprovincessituatedinthenorthandthirteeninthesouth.

Asoftoday,PuntlandStateistheonlyofficialFederalMemberState,buttheFGSand

UNSOMhavehelpedcreatefourInterimAdministrationsthatwillpresumablybecomeofficial

FederalMemberStates.Thesefourare:InterimJubalandAdministration(JubalandState),

InterimSouthwestAdministration(SouthwestState),InterimGalmudugAdministration

(GalmudugState),InterimHirshabelleAdministration(HirshabelleState).Thelastremaining

region/provinceinthesouthisBanaadir.WhatshallhappentoBanaadirisstillupintheair.

JubalandandSouthweststatesencompassthreeregions,andHirshabelleState

encompassestwo.SomeareproposingthatBanaadirbecomeaFederalMemberState,which

runscountertothe“tworegionsormore”requirementstipulatedintheProvisional

Constitution.ItshouldbenotedthatMogadishuis,literally,theonlycityintheBanaadir

region.Puntlandencompassestwowholeregions,andspecificdistrictsofthreeotherregions.

GalmudugState,intheory,isanamalgamationoftworegions,GalguduudandMudug,

butPuntlandclaimsjurisdictionovernorthernMudugprovince,specificallyitsdistrictsof

Galdogob,Galkayo,andJariban(see:ConstitutionoftheRegionalPuntlandStateofSomalia,

Article6.Section1.).ThisleavestheremainingtwodistrictsofMudugprovince,Harardhere

andHobyo,withinthejurisdictionalconfinesofMudugState.Therefore,GalmudugStatewill

notbeanamalgamationoftwoprovinces,butratheroneandone-halfofaprovince,whichalso

185 Provisional Fed. Const. June 12, 2012, art. 49, §6 (Som.).

49

runscountertothe“tworegionsormore”requirementstipulatedintheProvisional

Constitution.Inaddition,PuntlandclaimsjurisdictionovercertaindistrictsofeasternSooland

Sanaagregions,whicharealsoclaimedbySomaliland.

Sotherearethreemajorobstaclesconfrontingtheterritorialaspectsofthe

federalizationprocessofsouthernSomalia.Theseare:(1)Puntland’sandGalmudug’s

overlappingclaimtoMudugprovince,(2)Puntland’sandSomaliland’soverlappingclaimtoSool

andSanaag,and(3)BanaadirandGalmudugStates’disqualificationtobeFederalMember

StatesundertheConstitution,sincetheyonlyencompassoneregion,andoneandone-half

regions,respectively.TheFGSandUNSOMmustquicklysolvethesethreeobstacles.

Inordertocompletethefederalizationprocessthe“BoundariesandFederal

Commission”shouldbefullyinstitutionalizedimmediately,asstipulatedinchapter10ofthe

ProvisionalConstitution.Itcurrentlyexists,butisnottrulyfunctional,butoncethoroughly

establishedcanbethevenuefordisputeresolutionforFederalMemberStates’(FMS)to

resolvethevariousterritorialconflicts.Also,amendingtheProvisionalConstitution’scriteriaof

“twoormoreregions”asarequirementtobeaFMSto“oneormoreregions”willameliorate

thecurrentdilemmafacingtheemergingstateofGalmudug,andpotentiallyBanaadir.

Eventhoughitisevidentthatone-personone-votenationalelectionwasnotattainable

in2016,electoraldemocracyshouldstillbereintroducedtoSomaliainthenexttwoyears.

Insteadoffocusingonfirsthavinganationalelection,theFGSandUNSOMshouldwork

towardshavingaone-personone-voteregionalelectioninPuntlandState;thiselectionshould

happenassoonaspossible.PuntlandStateisthefirstofficialFederalMemberState(FMS)of

thenewSomalia,thereforehavingasuccessfulone-personone-voteelectionforitsregional

50

governmentwouldsignaltotheotherregionalstatesthatelectoraldemocracyisattainable.

ThiswouldmakePuntlandStatethefirstFMStohaveone-personone-voteelection,andwould

beasymbolicvictoryfordemocracy’sreintroductiontoSomalia.Thereisnobetterplaceto

reintroduceitthanPuntland.

OneofFGS’smajorgoalswasreachedbyDecember2016,i.e.,fullyinstitutionalizing

Somalia’sparliamentbyhavinganupperhouse.Somalia’sparliamentissupposedtobe

bicameral,butduring2012-16functionedasaunicameralparliament(theHouseofthePeople

onlyexisted).LikeAmerica’sSenate,Somalia’sUpperHouse,“HouseoftheFederation,"is

designedtobethechamberwhereFederalMemberStatesaregivenequalnumberofseats

regardlessofpopulationandterritorialsize.

Iwouldrecommendentirelyscrappingtheideaofa“HouseoftheFederation.”We

haveobservedthatignoringSomalia’straditionalsociopoliticalstructure,whilestrictly

importingwesternmodels,doesnotservetheSomalistateadequately.Whatisneededisfor

Somalia’sUpperHousetobethechamberwereclanrepresentativesareinstitutionalized(i.e.

“HouseofChiefs”).Thesame135clanchiefswhoappointedmemberstoSomalia’s

parliamentarianHouseofthePeoplein2012,andappointedthe14,000electoralcollegefor

the2016election,shouldserveinofficialcapacityinthe“HouseofChiefs.”TheHouseofChiefs

shouldhavetheresponsibilitiesofstabilizingclandisputes,normalizingclanrelations,and

reservingtraditions.

TheobservationsofI.M.Lewisshedsfurtherlight:“iffurtherprogressistobeachieved

instate-formation,Somalipoliticianswillsurelyhavetocomeoutof‘denial’andstartseriously

exploringhowclanandlineagetiescanbeutilizedpositively...HerealessEurocentricandless

51

evolutionaryviewoflineageinstitutionsbyWesterncommentators,socialscientists,and

bureaucratsmighthelptocreateamoreproductiveenvironmentforrethinkingclanship(i.e.

agnation)positively.”186Hefurtherstatesthat“[i]fthecontinuingforceofclanshiphadbeen

franklyrecognizedandacknowledgedandmeanssoughttoaccommodateitpolitically,rather

thanpretendingitdidnotexist,thingsmighthaveturnedoutdifferentlyforSomalia.”187Ifa

fullyfunctioningandviableSomalistateistopermanentlyreemerge,itisimperativetotake

Somalia’straditionalclanstructureintoaccount.TheHouseofChiefswillpurposefullyserve

thisendeavor.

Finally,Somaliamustchangeits4.5clanformulasinceitisnotbasedonascientific

censusbutratherclandiscrimination.FourclansaregivenequalrepresentationintheHouse

ofthePeople,sixty-oneseatseach,whileaconglomerationof“minorityclans”aregivenhalf

representation,thirty-oneseats.188Iwouldadvocatefora5.0formulatogivethe“minority

clans”equalseatsintheHouseofthePeoplebecausethe4.5formulaispolitically

discriminatory.

Onceapost-2016FederalGovernmentofSomaliaisinplace,itshouldfocuson

accomplishingthegoalssetoutinVision2021.Tocompletethesegoalsnecessarystepsmust

beinitiallytaken.


Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.508-09. (emphasis added)

187 Ibid. at 506

188 Hanson, Stephanie, and Kaplan, Eben. Somalia's Transitional Government. Foreign Affairs.

http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-transitional-government/p12475

52

TheFGS’snewadministration,inaccordancewiththevariousFMS,mustprepareall

FMSforregionalone-personone-voteelectionsby2019.FMSwillhavetheirregionalelections

atdifferenttimes,butmustallbeaccomplishedbythesecondquarterof2019.Thiswillallow

forelectoraldemocracytobegraduallyreintroducedtotheentireSomalinationviaabottom-

upapproach.Itwillalsoputinplacethenecessarymechanisms(census,voterregister,polling

stations,etc.)foraneventualconstitutionalreferendumandnationalone-personone-vote

election.Itshouldbenotedthatthesenecessarymechanismsarecurrentlynon-existent

throughoutSomalia,afurtherindicationoftheunrealistictimetableimposedbytheoriginal

Vision2016.

OnceallFederalMemberStateshavedirectly-electedrepresentativesfortheir

respectiveregionalgovernments,a“FederalConstitutionalConvention”shouldbehostedby

thefirstquarterof2020.IfSomaliaistocompleteherfederalsocialcontract,shemustironout

thewrinklesofherstyleoffederalism.Whatdifferentiatesfederalismfromotherformsof

governmentisthedual-sovereignnotionof“verticalseparationofpowers.”Thisnotion

disseminatesgoverningpowersbetweentwomainentities,thefederalgovernmentandthe

stategovernments(i.e.FederalMemberStates),andeachentitymaynotencroachuponthe

otherentity’sgoverningpowers.

IntheUnitedStates,thefederalgovernmentcontrolsforeignaffairs,nationaldefense,and

monetarypolicy,interalia,whilethestategovernmentscontrolpublichealth,safety(e.g.

policing),andeducationalaffairs,interalia.Thedual-sovereignconceptencompassestwo

parallelentities,federalandstate,governinginunison.TheFederalGovernmentofSomalia

(FGS)andthevariousFMSgovernmentshaveyettoproperlynegotiatewhatgoverningpowers

53

aredelegatedtothefederalgovernmentandwhatpowersarereservedforstate

governments.Somalia’ssocialfabricisslowlybeingsownbacktogetherthroughafederal

systemandthetenetsofherverticalseparationofpowersmustbecodified.Thiscanonlybe

viablydonethroughanationaldialoguebetweenSomalia’svariousFMSstakeholders.

In1787,America’sthirteenstatesmetinPhiladelphiafortheConstitutionalConvention

(alsoknownastheFederalConvention)todiscusshowtoformamoreperfectunion.The

UnitedStatesConstitutionwasthebrain-childoftheconvention.Theconventionaddressed

theissuesoffederaldelegatedpowersandreservedstatepowers,inadditiontothetripartite

systemofgovernment(Legislative,Executive,andJudicialbranches).Eachstatesentdelegates

totheconventiontoensureitsinterestwereproperlyrepresented,andthesedelegates

returnedtotheirrespectivestatestolobbytheircitizenstovoteinfavorofthenewUS

constitutioninanationalreferendum.

AsimilarconventionmustbeheldinSomaliatoensureSomalis,ofallclanandregional

affiliations,havetheirinterestsproperlyrepresented.Thiswillensureforanall-inclusive

constitutionalrevisionprocess.Subsequently,thenationalreferendumforSomalia’snew

permanentconstitutionshouldtakeplacebythethirdquarterof2020.

AnadditionalgoalofVision2021isforSomaliatoregaincontrolofhernationalsecurity

andpolicingpowers.Currently,theAfricanUnionMissiontoSomalia(AMISOM)isproviding

thebruntofSomalia’ssecurity,anditisobviousthatitcannotimmediatelyleave,butalso

cannotremaininthecountryindefinitely.Agradualapproachisneeded.Irecommendthat

from2017through2021allFederalMemberStatescontributeanequalnumberofrecruits(e.g.

54

5,000perregionalstate)fortheSomaliNationalArmy.Thiswillallowfortheestablishmentof

anall-inclusiveSomaliNationalArmyandwillallowAMISOMtodepartfromSomaliaby2021.

Oncethesegoalsareaccomplished,Somaliawillfinallybereadytohostitsone-personone-

votenationalelectionbyfirstquarterof2021.Toconclude,Vision2021willaccomplishthe

followinggoals:(a)regionalone-personone-voteelectionsforallrespectiveFederalMember

States;(b)FederalConstitutionalConventionforpurposesofconstitutionalrevision;(c)

nationalreferendumforSomalia’snewconstitution;(d)establishmentofafullyfunctioning

SomaliNationalArmyandthewithdrawalofAMISOM;and(e)one-personone-votenational

election.

“[I]ncontrasttotherestofAfricawherestatesarestrugglingtobecomenations,theSomali

peoplerepresentanationstrugglingtobecomeastate....”-FrankJ.Mahony

rethinking the somali state - university of minnesota

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