Resistance Movement Against SEZs

Case Studies of Kakinada SEZ & Brandix SEZ in Andhra Pradesh

Surendra Pratap

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Route to Setting Up the Zones

India was the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to establish a free trade zone (FTZ) in Kandla, Gujarat in 1965, which became operational in 1966-67. Thereafter, the Santacruz Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ) was established

Mumbai in 1973. These were central government controlled zones. The private units (producing for export) within the zones were offered financial incentives such as tax holidays, duty free imports and exports, dedicated infrastructure, cheap labour and strategic location. However, these two zones were not successful in attracting either significant amounts of foreign investment or in boosting exports.

Therefore, a committee (Tondon committee) was constituted in 1980 to review the zones and come up with recommendations. The major problems identified by Tondon committee included the absence of a policy, the absence of an implementation authority to centrally coordinate and control procedural constraints, infrastructural deficiencies, limited concessions and limited powers of the zone authorities. The Tondon Committee suggested concrete steps to resolve these problems and also recommended establishing four to five more zones. To address the problems identified by Tondon Committee a policy change was needed which could not be done in 1980s. However, four more zones were established in 1984 in Noida (Uttar Pradesh), Falta (West Bengal), Cochin (Kerala) and Chennai (Tamil Nadu). The Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh) EPZ was established in 1989.

After 1990, with an overall change in the mindset in favour of policies of liberalization and globalization, there was a major policy shift from a growth-model based on import substitution to one based on export-oriented growth. Then naturally the export processing zones attained major importance. Initially, steps were taken to address the problems and constraints as suggested by Tondon Committee, chiefly delegating more powers to zone authorities, providing additional fiscal incentives, simplifying policy provisions and providing more infrastructure facilities in the zones. Moreover, the scope and coverage of the EPZs and export operating units (EOUs) scheme was also enlarged in 1992 by permitting businesses involved in agriculture, horticulture and aqua culture sectors in the zones. In 1994, trading, re-engineering and re-conditioning units were also permitted in the EPZs. The EXIM Policy (1997-2002) finally introduced a new scheme from April 1, 2000 for establishment of the special economic zones (SEZs) in different parts of the country.

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The Exim Policy (1997-2002) provided for the conversion of all FTZs and EPZs into special economic zones (SEZs) and also for establishing of new SEZs. The seven zones at Santacruz, Kandla, Surat, Cochin, Visakhapatnam, Chennai, Noida and Falta all were converted into special economic zones by 2003. Moreover, different states including Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal issued orders andresolutions laying down their policy framework for establishing new SEZs. Soon after, 19 new SEZs were established in different parts of the country.

The SEZs were different from the EPZs and FTZs in that they were treated as foreign territories for all practical and legal purposes (‘deemed to be a territory outside the customs’ territory of India for the purpose of undertaking authorized operations’). They were also different from EPZs and FTZs in the sense that EPZs were only the industrial estates housing export oriented units (EOUs), while the SEZs were to host commercial complexes, educational institutions, hospitals, hotels and recreation facilities. EPZs and FTZs were permitted to offer a conducive operating environment, fiscal incentives and a developed infrastructure, but the SEZs were allowed to offer additional benefits, such as better linkages with the domestic economy, more attractive tax benefits, better control over foreign exchange for the purchase of imported inputs, lesser penalties for failure to achieve net foreign exchange earnings, greater access to the domestic market, imported inputs on self-certification basis, exemption from routine customs’ examinations of imported or exported cargo and 100 percent FDI through the automatic route. Provision was also made to establish free trade and warehousing zones (FTWZ) as a special category of SEZs in the vicinity of gateway ports and airports to provide world class warehousing, transportation, commercial office space, water, power supply and other infrastructure facilities such as banks and post offices.

The special treatment given SEZs as a foreign territory also necessitated enactment of special legislation. “The policy of treating SEZs as foreign territories necessitated corresponding modifications in various domestic laws. There were a plethora of central government and state laws and regulations that [were] required to be brought in line through suitable amendments. So many Central Ministries, state governments and local governments were involved. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry was insisting that all SEZs should be provided with a single window clearance, whereas the states were slow in giving response.

The Customs Act of 1962 influencing export-import trade and the Central Excise Act of 1944, affecting manufacturing business had to be amended in

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keeping with the SEZ provisions. All this was achieved through measures, like the introduction of a new chapter XA in the Customs Act, dealing exclusively with SEZ, and the amendment of the Drawback Rules, changing the definition of ‘export’ and thus granting immunity to SEZs and their units from the hitherto applicable provisions, rules, notifications etc. In short, the SEZs came to be treated as if they were physically outside the country. Subsequently, the government promulgated the Special Economic Zone Rules, 2003 and the Special Economic Zone (Customs Procedure) Regulations, 2003 in order to regulate the day-to-day operations concerning imports, exports, inter-unit transfers, procurements from Domestic Tariff Area (DTA), clearance of goods into DTA, valuation of goods, subcontracting of jobs, etc. of SEZs and their Units” (Modak 2007).

Finally came the Foreign Trade Policy Statement, 2004-2009 and soon after the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 was enacted and Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006 were notified. Now the policy 2004-09 and the Act of 2005 clearly stated that SEZs can be established not only under public sector auspices but also by a private sector entity, or by joint sector effort and at the initiative of state governments. The major underlying objective of the SEZ Act 2005 was to generate additional economic activity and to boost exports of goods and services by attracting investment from domestic and foreign sources. It was assumed that this would automatically generate huge employment opportunities. With the above perspective of economic development, the states aggressively moved towards implementation. There was no significant opposition from any parliamentary party and the SEZ Act 2005 was passed almost without any opposition. Only parliamentarians on the Left raised concerns about attempts to suspend the jurisdiction of labour laws in the SEZs.. At that time, the government led by the Congress Party was formed at the center with the support of the left; therefore, the left was successful in pressuring the government to address these concerns. However, later in the SEZ Rules 2006 similar provisions were again included, such as declaring the operations in the SEZs as ‘public utility services’ under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 which effectively superceded and nullified many labour law provisions in the SEZs

The real SEZ rush in India started after the SEZ Act 2005 was passed and the SEZ Rules 2006 were notified. However, even before the SEZ Act 2005 was passed, 19 new SEZs had been created. In three years, from January 2006 to December 2008, the number of approved SEZs reached 693 (552 formally approved and 141 approved in-principle), out of which 274 were notified. As of now, there are a total of 726 (575 formally approved and 151 in-principle approved) SEZs have

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got approvals and out of it 348 SEZs are already notified.1 Provinces with the most SEZs are Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Of the total above, 131 SEZs have already become operational in different parts of India, with the largest number of operational SEZs in Andhra Pradesh with 21 SEZs in operation, Tamil Nadu with 19 and Maharashtra with 15.

Data on the geographical location and principal industries located in these zones has been collected for the ‘formally approved’ (FA) and ‘in-principle approved’ (IA) zones. This data shows that the majority of the SEZs are located in coastal regions, and in and around the capital region (NCR) of New Delhi. Of the 571 formally approved (FA) and 147 in-principle approved (IA), SEZs (state wise and sector wise breakup is available for these numbers only) 438 FA and 95 IA SEZs are concentrated in coastal regions with highest number of SEZs in Maharashtra (109FA+36IA), Andhra Pradesh (102FA+4IA), Tamil Nadu (68FA+19IA), Karnataka (52FA+9IA) and Gujarat (48FA+11IA). On the other hand regions in and around NCR Delhi including Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Chandigarh and Punjab collectively host 92 formally approved and 29 in-principle approved SEZs. Most of the SEZs If we look at the sector wise distribution of SEZs, IT and ITES sector accounts for the highest number of SEZs. 351 out of total 571 formally approved and 10 out of 147 in-principle approved SEZs are for IT&ITES sector. 22 formally approved and 55 in-principle approved SEZs are for Multiproduct sector. Other major winning sectors are Textiles and Apparel, Pharmaceuticals, Biotech, Engineering, Multi-services, Gems and jewelry etc.2

In addition to geographical advantages, the attitude of the state governments played a major role in the concentration of SEZs in few states. The state governments of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Maharashtra, for example, made extraordinary efforts and moved in a very decisive manner to promote SEZs and attract FDI to their states, even when there was strong opposition from the people. All these states secured a major share of SEZs. Budhdev Bhattacharya, chief minister of West Bengal, failed in this regard, but it was not because of any lack of effort from his side. The credit goes to the people’s movements of Singur and Nandigram. It is worth mentioning that the Singur and Nandigram movements in West Bengal and anti-SEZ movements in other states, particularly Maharastra and Orrissa, were not only successful in halting some projects (e.g., the Nano project of Tata), they were also successful in compelling the central government to halt, at least temporarily, SEZ approvals under the ‘In-Principle’ category. The widespread protests resulted in the federal government announcing, in February 2007, the suspension of all land acquisition for establishing new SEZs until a new

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rehabilitation scheme for displaced people was put in place. (Bhaduri 2007; Bidwai 2007)

The people’s resistance against forcible land acquisition also compelled the government to redefine the policy of land acquisition. Most state governments were acquiring land for the SEZs by invoking the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (amended in 1984) of the colonial era. Under the act, land acquisition is defined as forcibly acquiring private land for public purpose by the government without the consent of the landowner. ‘Public purpose’ is defined to include village-sites, town or rural planning; land for residential purposes for the poor or displaced persons due to natural calamities; land for planned development (including education, housing, health and slum clearance), or land needed by a state corporation.

The major demand of the people’s resistance movements against such land acquisition is that if the landowner is not ready to sell his/her land, the government can not forcibly acquire it. They argued that the government should not forcibly acquire the peasants’ land for the corporate; rather the corporate should bargain with the people and purchase the land directly, if anyone is willing to sell. The Federal Government of India came out with the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 2007, promulgated in October 2007. The government also came out with two bills: Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill 2007; and Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill 2007. These bills were hotly debated. There was a strong opposition from within the government and from people’s movements. Both of these bills could not be passed and have lapsed. They may be introduced afresh in the new Lok Sabha, Lower House of Parliament. However, opposition to the bills remains strong, from within the government from Railway Minister Mamta Banergi who has enjoyed the image of being a leader of the Nandigram movement. With this image, she has been confident of making a history by defeating the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) in coming assembly elections in West Bengal. She opposed the bill and clearly said that she had fought and won the poll battle on land acquisition issues and could not return to Singur or Nandigram if the Bills were passed in the present shape.3

The Land Acquisition Bill superficially looks nice and in favour of the public, but in essence it actually widens the scope for land acquisition. The new definition of ‘public purpose’ in the bill includes (i) strategic naval, military, or air force purposes; (ii) public infrastructure projects; and (iii) for any purpose useful to the general public where 70 percent of the land has already been purchased from willing sellers through the free market. The term ‘infrastructure’ includes projects

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relating to electricity, construction of roads, highways, bridges, airports, rail, mining activities, water supply, sanitation and sewerage, and any other notified public facility. The new definition of ‘public purpose’ clearly widened the scope for land acquisition by adding new categories; and the addition of the phrase “for any purpose useful to general public”, greatly expands the scope of the billto include almost everything by justifying it as “useful to general public.” It represented a major pro-business, pro-private sector move by governments across India.

In addition, the broad sweep of the new bill has largely been upheld in the courts. In September 2008, the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving a complaint against the acquisition of land for the Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Investment Corp (APIIC) by the Andhra Pradesh government. Justices C.K. Thakker and D.K. Jain of the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against the Andhra Pradesh government. The court ruled that any project which brings in foreign

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exchange and creates employment was for the “public purpose”. This decision cleared the way for more forceful land acquisitions.4 One can imagine from this that if ‘public purpose’ is not clearly defined, virtually everything can be included in it.

All disputes related to land acquisition have previously been dealt with in civil courts. However, this new bill established the Land Acquisition Compensation Disputes Settlement Authority at both the state and national levels to adjudicate all land acquisition disputes within six months. The bill invested in these authorities the powers of a civil court. As far as the people’s interests are concerned, how can one think that these authorities will be better that the civil courts?

The Rehabilitation Bill of 2007 also looked good on the surface. It provided for the Social Impact Assessment clearance, suggested minimum displacement and options for non-displacing alternatives, etc. But the social impact assessment dealt mainly with the physical assets such as buildings, temples, institutions, or public facilities, while aspects of the broader social environment are not included. As far as the matters of ‘minimum displacement’ and ‘non-displacing alternatives’ were concerned, decisions would be taken by the administrator for resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) and not by an independent body. The most important point raised against this bill concerned its approach to rehabilitation. “In the case of the Sardar Sarovar Project, the basic principle in force (though it may not always be complied with) is: rehabilitation must precede submergence. The present Bill retreats from that position and requires only “adequate progress in rehabilitation” prior to displacement.” (Ramaswamy 2009)There is strong opposition from people’s movement against these bills and they cannot be accepted in their present shape.

In addition, the rules and regulations regarding the SEZs have raised serious concerns on labour issues. SEZ Rules 2006 declared the whole SEZ enclave as ‘public utility services’ under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act), which have made a legal strike almost impossible. Fourteen days notice is compulsory before employees undertake a strike or the employers a lockout in any public utility service. Moreover, the act and rules direct the state governments to delegate all relevant powers of their governments to the SEZ Development Commissioner. The powers of the labour commissioner have also been delegated to the development commissioners of the SEZs. Not only this, the state governments by way of framing their own SEZ policies and enacting State SEZ acts, have started a larger move to amend the labour laws for SEZs or exempt them from crucial provisions like Chapter V-A&B and 9-A of the ID Act, the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, various provisions of Factories Act, section 18 of the Minimum Wages Act, and the

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Apprentices Act to name just a few. The people’s movement has also challenged these moves to make the SEZs virtually immune to labour laws. The workers in the operational zones have been facing conditions of virtual slavery. In generally, no unions have been allowed to operate in the zones and conditions in the zones have made unionization almost impossible. However, workers in the zones have started revolting here and there. Particularly, in the zones with labour intensive manufacturing, a new trend of short (duration) sudden strikes has emerged.

The Zones

This study focuses on two SEZs in Andhra Pradesh, the Kakinada SEZ of East Godavari District and the Brandix India Apparel City SEZ of Vishakhpattanam District. Kakinada SEZ is situated in the East Godavari District on the north-east coast of Andhra Pradesh, bordered on the north by Visakhapatnam District and the State of Orissa, on the east and south by the Bay of Bengal and on the west by Khammam and West Godavari Districts. East Godavari District is situated in the Krishna-Godavari Agro Climatic Zone. It is one of the most productive agricultural districts of Andhra Pradesh, contributing about 10 percent of the total food production of the state. Kakinada Sea Ports Ltd SEZ (assisted by APIIC) is to be a multi-product SEZ (mainly Refinery, Petro-chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Ceramic units etc and a port) and will cover an area of 9,896 acres. This SEZ is one of the biggest in Andhra Pradesh, affecting 16 villages in the U.Kottapalli and Thondandi mandals of East Godavari district. An additional area of 2,666 acres is also to be acquired for a new port in Thondangi Mandal. As of 2009, Kakinada SEZ was not yet operational. There has been strong anti-SEZ movement against the zone, due chiefly to the land acquisition.

Brandix India Apparell City SEZ is located in Atchuthapuram. Vishakhapattanam. Brandix Apparel and MAS Holdings are Sri Lankan companies which service brands such as Victoria’s Secrets. Brandix India Apparel City (BIAC) SEZ started operations in 2008-09. It produces garments for export. In all, about 4,000 workers are employed in this zone. The issues related to land acquisition for this SEZ have been settled. On the other hand, labour relations issues in the zone have emerged as a serious issue. Therefore, the study has focused mainly on labour issues at Brandix.

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Social Impact of the Zones upon the Community

Land Acquisition, Displacements and Social Tensions

The SEZs are leading to mass destruction of livelihoods, including agriculture, horticulture, fisheries and other traditional means of livelihood. The report of the Committee on State Agrarian Relations and Unfinished Task of Land Reforms (2009) says: “Total area under SEZ across India is expected to be over 200,000 hectares, an area the size of the National Capital Region. This land – predominantly agricultural and typically multi-cropped – is capable of producing close to one million tons of food grains. Estimates show that close to 114,000 farming households (each household on an average comprising five members) and an additional 82,000 farm worker families who are dependent upon these farms for their livelihoods, will be displaced. In other words, at least 10 lakh (1,000,000) people who primarily depend upon agriculture for their survival will face eviction. Experts calculate that the total loss of income to the farming and the farm worker families is at least Rs 212 Crore (Rs2.12 billion) a year. This does not include other income lost (for instance of artisans) due to the demise of local rural economies.” (Committee on State Agrarian Relations and Unfinished Task of Land Reforms 2009)

In Andhra Pradesh, more than 15,000 hectares of land is to be acquired exclusively for SEZs. So far 18,000 acres (about 8,000 hectares) of land has been acquired. Controversially, out of 18,000 acres, 11,274 acres were patta lands and 4,000 acres were government land, which were also regarded as a land bank for distribution among the landless poor. It is said that a significant share of land to be acquired for SEZs was wasteland or fallow land. However, acquiring this so called wastelands was also not a simple issue, since 55.2 million ha of wasteland in India is actually very much valuable and used as grazing land, pastures or shifting cultivation. The survival of the poorest and the most marginalized in the society were dependent on this land. In addition, this area has been a source of firewood, fodder for animals and minor forest produce. (Swapna Banerjee-Guha 2008)

Andhra Pradesh, mainly the fertile area between the Godavari and Krishna rivers in coastal Andhra, has historically been called the “Rice Bowl of India”. More than 77 percent of the agricultural output of this region is rice. Andhra Pradesh produced 17.796 million tonnes of rice in 2006. The approved SEZs will acquire about 15,000 hectares of state land, leading to the mass destruction of livelihoods, not only in agriculture and horticulture but also in fisheries. . The PCPIR project extending to an area of about 700 kms will eat into a major part of this rice belt.

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Actually, the area of coastal Andhra, extending from Kakinada to Nellore, is considered to be the most fertile belt and large numbers of big SEZs are coming into this area. One conservative estimate has calculated that the total number of people that could be displaced in Andhra Pradesh will exceed 100,000, of which about more than one-third people have already been forced out..

The agony of the poor people of Andhra is doubled in the sense that a significant proportion of people were displaced without compensation, since they did not possess land titles (patta and assigned lands). A significant portion of the acquired land, shown in the data as government land, actually falls in this category. A significant portion of land is being recovered on the pretext that it was left unused, therefore, the government had all the rights to recover it, redistribute it or use it for some other ‘public purpose’.

Kakinada SEZ

Kakinada SEZ is one of the biggest in Andhra Pradesh. According to Mr Rajendra Kumar, a leader of the anti-SEZ movement in the area, the area affected by the KSEZ is spread over three mandals: Uppada Kothapalli Mandal, Thondangi Mandal and Kakinada Rural Mandal. The populations of 15 of the 16 villages affected face total displacement. There are on an average 500 families in a village and therefore total displacement may affect 7,500 families or 37,500 people. Kumar further stated that the Kakinada SEZ would also affect those in the fishing industry in 13 villages which lie between the SEZ area and the sea.According to Kumar, as of March 2010, 4,850 acres of land had already been acquired by the developer for the Kakinada SEZ, and farmers had received their compensation money.

However, the land was still in the hands of farmers and they were still cultivating it. The acquisition of another 2,000 acres of land by the government for the SEZ was being challenged by the people, and the case was pending in the High Court. The acquisition of yet another 6,000 acres has also been challenged by the people, and the case is pending in the civil court. A resettlement colony has been built at Molapeta village in Uppada Kothapalli Mandal with 1,500 houses. However, as of March 2010, only 200 landless dalit families have taken possession of the houses and received the R&R package accordingly. In order to take possession of houses in the resettlement colony, one has to knock down the walls of one’s village house and take a photograph of the broken walls with whole family standing in

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front of it. The photograph is then submitted to the authorities. Thereafter, KSEZ officials paste a declaration on the walls of wrecked house which says “This house henceforth belongs to the KSEZ.”

Dalit leader Abraham-Malamahanadu said that the people settled in the rehabilitation colony were mainly dalits of the Mala caste from villages of Matavarapalem, Katuruvaripalem, Kollavaripalem, Karrivaripalem, Butchireddypalem, Srirampuram, Dadalavaripalem, and Ravivaripadu. A few Setty Baliga families (Toddy tapers) were also resettled. According to Abraham Malamahanadu, the rest of dalit families would soon be moved to the colony, since life was better for them in the resettlement colony than in the village. He also claimed that the government provided most of the facilities as promised. There were only a few promises still outstanding, and the people were raising demands for those. In our interviews with people resettled at the Molapeta colony, it was very clear that they were by and large not against the SEZ, but they were also not happy with the resettlement. They put forward the following concerns:

1. The SEZ promoters and the government made a commitment that the “colony will be provided with facilities such as internal black top or cement (concrete) roads, electricity, water, proper sanitation & drainage systems, play grounds/tot-lots, community hall, shopping/commercial space, parks, schools, religious places, etc.”5 But in their colony there was only a school building but no school; therefore education of their children was affected. There also were no burial grounds or no temple or church.

2. Previously in the village, they used fire wood to cook, which was easily available in the village. But in resettlement colony this was a serious problem. The women spent a lot of time searching for fire wood. They were compelled to gradually shift to other options such as cooking gas, but this puts a heavy pressure on their monthly budget.

3. There were no regular employment opportunities, so mostly people were sitting idle and eating up the money they had received as compensation. Many of them had already spent the majority of the money they had received. Many people spent the money on the marriage of sons and daughters; and on purchasing necessary household utilities.

4. The promise of separate houses for married male children and unmarried female children was not yet fulfilled. A commitment was made to provide one job card to each family, but they had not yet received these. They were also told that the certain other compensation monies were not calculated and not paid, for example, loss of standing trees, etc.

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5. The compensation money (in addition to possession of a new house) was in all cases was less than Rs75,000; the majority of the respondents reported ‘house for house plus’ was Rs73,750). But in the new colony, monthly household expenditures increased substantially with greater travel expenses for going to work and school and the need to pay for many items that had often been available in the village free of cost.

6. Household incomes often fell sharply as a result of the move. In the village, many times both husband and wife went out to work, leaving the children at home, since they had a reliable neighbour and a reliable locality. But, after moving to the resettlement colony this was not possible, since they lost those neighbours and the reliable locality. There were also fewer opportunities for paid work in the new locale. If in the end there were opportunities, only one adult could take a job, since either husband or wife must be at home. National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) Job cards were not provided to the colony members and therefore they were unable to claim for ensured employment under the scheme.However, dalits in the colony were not against the SEZ. They were of the

opinion that they enjoyed a better social status in the colony: Since the whole colony was of dalits, there was no chance of caste oppression. Moreover, they hoped that there would be more and better employment opportunities for them once the SEZ develops. The majority of the respondents said that assurance had been given for employment for one person in each family in the colony. However, this was only an oral assurance. Few dalit youths had so far been employed in paid work, such as in the ongoing fencing of SEZ area, and few had been engaged as security guards. KSEZ provided training to a few youths in the colony in house nursing, which also including training in cleaning floors and domestic work.

On the other hand, the farmers,(including the dalit farmers, were not ready to vacate their land and house at any cost. In interviews with the farmers, their responses were qualitatively different from those of landless dalits resettled in Molapeta colony. In our sample the majority of farmers were from Kapu caste, but there were others from the Brahmins, Yadavas, Toditapers and dalits. Respondents from Kapu, Brahmin and Yadava communities had 4-12 acres of land, while those from SC and Todi taper communities owned less than two acres of land. There was little variation in the responses, since the conditions for all the villagers were same. But there was some variation in responses depending on whether the larger and smaller holdings were grouped together with the caste. It should also be noted that the anti-SEZ movement of farmers in Kakinada was successful in many regards. It was largely due to their resistance that the compensation payment for

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land was increased from Rs150,000 to Rs300.000. Moreover, they were not only successful in halting the acquisition process by inviting intervention by the Courts, they also retained the (acquired) land even after receiving the compensation. They were interviewed at a moment when it was still not final whether they will lose the land or retain it.

Largely, their concerns were as follows:

1. The land in these two Mandals was very fertile and well irrigated by the Godavari, Pampa and Aeleru canal fed by the river. Farmers here were able to get two harvests of rice a year. Moreover, this land also earned significant income for farmers from the planting Chiku, Mango, Cashew and Casurina. This land not only provided a livelihood to farmers but also to a large number of landless share croppers and wage-earning farm workers. The money offered was not sufficient to compensate the loss of all of these. Therefore, at any case the land acquisition was unjustified.

2. The farmers belonging to Yadavas and also Dalits and Todi taper communities in particular, said that livestock rearing also contributed significantly to their family income. If they shifted in the resettlement colony, this income would be significantly reduced. Due to the unavailability of grazing land, the cost of feed for the livestock would increase many fold

3. Smaller farmers, particularly from the dalit and Toditapers communities, put more emphasis on decent alternative livelihoods. However, cattle rearing farmers in these categories emphasised the issue of land for land

4. Larger farmers, mainly from the Kapu, Brahmin and Yadava communities, were not ready to sell their land at any cost. But if forced to move, they wanted land for land or better compensation

5. All the respondents raised the concern that no formal offer was made to provide permanent employment in the SEZ to one person from each family affected by the SEZ land acquisition

6. Larger farmers, mainly from Kapu, Brahmin and Yadava communities, said that they were not ready at any cost to shift to the resettlement colony. They said that the move to the colony was not worth it for them.

Brandix SEZ

APIIC acquired 9,200 acres of land in Atchuthapuram and Rambilli Mandals in the Visakhapatnam District for the SEZ in the first phase in 2005-06. One portion

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of this land was allotted to the Apparel Park Project to be developed by Brandix Company of Sri Lanka and a larger portion of land was allotted to Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to establish its second centre there. Thereafter in 2006, the administration identified 10,000 more acres of land in the second phase for developing infrastructure for the proposed SEZ. It should be noted that initially Brandix had set up a temporary facility in the Visakhapatnam Special Economic Zone (VSEZ) at Duvvada and was allotted 30,000 square feet of space in that zone in 2006 to start its operations. Later, it was allotted 1,000 acres of land at the proposed Andhra Pradesh Special Economic Zone (APSEZ) at Atchuthapuram for its Apparel Park within the zone. However, soon the project was granted SEZ status. Brandix India Apparel City (BIAC) SEZ at Atchuthapuram started its operations in 2008-09. The land was given to Brandix on a lease at Re.1 per acre per year. The terms of the lease were criticized by the Controller and Auditor General of India in its annual report. BIAC has 749 acres in the processing zone and 251 acres outside the processing zone.

A strong farmer’s movement emerged on the issue of land acquisition and compensation in the Atchuthapuram and Ramabilli Mandals as soon as the process of land acquisition started in 2003-04. Initially during the tenure of the Telagu Desam government, compensation of Rs200,000 per acre was offered to the farmers, but they demanded Rs400,000 per acre plus employment for one member of each family affected by the SEZ land acquisition. Farmers staged dharna (hunger strikes) and organized big demonstrations continuously during that period. Later, the government, led by the Congress Party, with pressure from the movement, increased the amount of compensation to Rs295,000 per acre. By 2005-06, the entire site of 9,200 acres had been acquired. After the first phase of land acquisition, the price of land started rising sharply. It was reported that in some areas the realtors were offering between Rs 2 million and Rs 4 million per acre depending on the location of the land. As a result, the farmers started demanding an additional increase in the rate of compensation. Farmers, whose land was acquired in the first phase, said that a large part of the compensation money that had been paid had gone to clear their loans and whatever left was insufficient to buy a piece of land even 50 km away from their old farm.

According to government records, the acquisition of 9,287 acres of land in the first phase of development of the SEZ displaced 5,029 families (in Rambilli-2,642 families from 15 villages; and in Atchuthapuram, 2,387 families from 14 villages)6

who were allotted house sites at Dibbapalem and Veduruwada. This figure included the families of the eldest sons as a separate unit. Members of displaced families said that they felt deceived, since all the promises were not fulfilled. Small farmers

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had already spent the compensation money on marriages, house constructions and other things. The company claimed that it would generate 60,000 jobs, but not even a couple hundred displaced residents have received jobs. According to them, the company defended itself by saying that most of the displaced people seeking jobs did not have the required qualifications. After persistent struggles by the displaced families, Brandix started one job training centre in each of the two colonies in September 2008. They selected 140 youths with a 10th class pass from the displaced families and trained them in different trades. Brandix management called a meeting of displaced families in January 2009 and declared that the training would continue and jobs would be provided to those who were trained. The deadline for providing jobs was fixed at March 2009.

It was also said that the trainees would be paid Rs1,500 per month and if the company fails to provide them with a job in March 2009, it would pay them Rs3,000 per month till the promise was fulfilled. However, by March 2009 both the training centers were stopped and no one knew whether and when the trained persons would get jobs? Kota Tarkesh, a resident of Dibbapalem colony was working as a casual labourer in the Vishakhapattanam steel plant in the maintenance department. After the Brandix training centre opened, he left his job and joined training in the hope of getting a permanent job in Brandix. Failing to get permanent employment, he then felt deceived.

In the interviews the workers said that almost the entire workforce in the production department was drawn people in surrounding areas, but there were only few workers from displaced families. The entire workforce at Brandix were women. A group of illiterate male workers from the Dibbapalem resettlement colony were employed to load-unload goods. However, they were not considered company workers and were paid on the basis of number of lorries loaded and unloaded. One of these workers said that his two acres of land had been acquired by the company and he was paid Rs600,000 for the land and Rs141,000 for the house in compensation. He had two children and the total expenditure on children’s education alone was Rs. 20,000 per annum. The money received as compensation had already been spent in paying back loans and on the construction of a new house. Therefore, they were now surviving as waged labours. His group of workers had been working for the company for past two years and the average monthly wage they received was only Rs 3,500.

1. Social and Cultural Impact

The SEZs are bringing about drastic social and cultural changes in the affected areas. In the area affected by the KSEZ there was still uncertainty about the future,

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but most of them realized that in the end they would be compelled to vacate their houses and sell their land. Therefore, the whole farming community was facing a complex psychological situation, feeling that they belonged to the village and also did not belong. These uncertainties were creating many social problems. The worst was that they were facing problems in getting brides for their sons. The farmers said that the whole social fabric was breaking down and if they were displaced all their entire cultural and social life would be lost.

“We may loose our social and cultural life forever”

“Places of worship (especially village goddesses) will be lost who are being worshipped by our elders for centuries. Burial grounds and all common spaces in villages called Grama kantham (Throat of the village) will be lost. Moreover the whole social and cultural life will be lost. These things can never be compensated.”

“We do not know what we and our family will do if the land is gone. We do not know anything other than cultivating the fields or rearing the cattle. There are only two options: move to some other village, purchase some land and start again cultivating the fields; or move to the city and start a small business. The compensation money offered is not sufficient to properly settle in a big city; therefore the only option left is a small township. On the other hand prices of agriculture land are rocketing like anything, therefore it is not possible with this compensation money to buy enough land and also build a house to live in there. Generally, farmers hate the business of traders, but it seems many of us will be poised to end as trader. If the land is gone, this seems to be our fate. It is not that we were very happy as farmers here. To be very frank, many of us, with only less than five acres of land are actually labourers in our own fields. Considering the rocketing prices of inputs, agriculture for small farmers like us is no longer a profitable business. But there is a dignity in our life; and also there is some sort of certainty in our life. Moreover, at least to some extent, our fate is in our hand. However, after losing the land, the life will be only full of uncertainties. Moreover, the social status and dignity associated with land will also be lost. Who will respect us without our land?” -

-Farmers of Ravivarapadu village-

The social and cultural impact was more visible where the land acquisition and displacement had already taken place, in entire area affected by the Brandix SEZ and the Molapeta resettlement colony affected by the KSEZ.. Consumerism was clearly on the rise and probably the main impetus for this came from the money they received as compensation. There were all sorts of consumer goods reaching the villages.

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Another aspect was a drastic increase in unemployment, since with their land gone, there was no alternative livelihood. Related problems, such as an increase in alcoholism and sex-related crimes, were also reported. Whole villages were also changed in terms of increased population of landless waged labours, which could be seen as a reserve army of waged labourers. A large numbers of peasants were converted to working as paid labour. Such incidents were reported as common phenomena, And with rising competition among these workers for paid work, incidents such as physical fights were a common occurrence. Many times there were fights between the groups of workers from different villages seeking a work contract and it took the shape of a conflict between the two villages. A Brandix Worker described one such incident, in which the elders of a village had to intervene and settle the dispute in favour of workers of their own village.

Unemployment was also affecting the social life of the displaced. Unemployed youth were not getting proposals for marriage. A Brandix worker narrated a sad story about a friend of his. Appalaswamy, a member of displaced family and resident of Dibbapalem resettlement colony, received training in the Brandix training center. He got married in the hope of getting a permanent job soon. However, he did not get a job. Later, his wife deserted him. According to him, this was due to the fact that he could not get a job. A local news paper Andhra Jyothi also reported similar stories.7

However, there were some positive aspects, also. In the region surrounding the Brandix SEZ, for the first time, large numbers of rural women entered factory employment. Employment was also changing the social status of these women workers. Ensured a monthly income, even if it was meager, they developed an independent personality. However, it was also reported that it created psychological problems for their unemployed husbands and many times it led to futile family disputes. Married women workers expressed this as a common problem. According to them, their husbands were creating lot of problems and not supporting them.

It is also interesting to note that how factory employment broke down the social structure and how the social structure was asserted there. There was a change, but there was also continuity. Upper caste and backward caste women doing the same paid work with scheduled caste women on an equal footing would have been unimaginable in the villages. Factory employment made it possible. All the women workers across the range of castes did the same waged work, standing shoulder to shoulder with each other. They were only workers, and there was no role of caste on the shop floor. But the social structure re-asserted itself when

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they were not at work. The upper and backward caste women sat at a distance from dalit women workers while taking lunch; they did not share seats with dalit women workers on the company bus when coming to and from the company. Dalit women workers reported, “The Gavara and other upper caste community girls prefer not to eat lunch with us. In the bus they also don’t sit with us.”

2. Migration

In the area affected by the KSEZ farmers are still holding onto their land and therefore there is no large scale migration as yet. However, they reported that if the land were acquired, a significant section of the population of small farmers would be compelled to migrate to the cities in search of paid work. On the other

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hand, the landless workers resettled in Molapeta colony reported high levels of short duration migration in nearby areas for paid work. In the area affected by the Brandix zone, it was reported that there was a surge in migration of male workers, particularly the youth. The majority of them migrated to nearby towns and cities, mostly to Vishakhapattanam city to work in factories. Members of these displaced families reported that many men and women traveled (many times for a day only) to Vishakhapattnam in search of paid work.

3. Environmental Impact

The environmental issues started emerging as soon as the Brandix India Apparel City SEZ started its operations. The major issue was related to waste disposal. The waste from the Brandix factory was thrown directly into the sea and the environmental pollution caused by this resulted in the killing of fish in that area. The fishermen of the coastal village of Pudimadaka were facing serious problems in this regard and they started a movement against Brandix alleging that pollution created by the factory was destroying their livelihood. The fishermen stalled the Brandix pipe line work many times. Thereafter, an agreement was reached between Brandix management and Pudimadaka villagers in the presence of the local member of legislative assembly (MLA). Brandix promised jobs to Pudimadaka villagers. They identified 353 members as deserving of jobs. Some of them were inducted as operators and others as manual labourers. However, the environmental problem remained unresolved.Rajendra Kumar, a leader of the anti-SEZ movement and the farmers said that the Kakinada SEZ would have a disastrous impact on the local environment, since most of the industries proposed for this SEZ are in the oil refining and petrochemical industries, and all the industrial waste could be released directly into the sea.

Resistance Movement Against SEZs in Andhra Pradesh—Case studies

The Andhra Pradesh is the home of the largest number of operational SEZs and another large number of big SEZs have been approved in the area. The land acquisition by SEZs is affecting hundreds of thousands of people and displacing thousands. The state of Andhra Pradesh is one of the states which formulated its SEZ policy as early as 2000. The governments of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu provided critical support to the central government in favour of SEZs when

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the policy was facing an all-round attack after the Nandigram incident. The Chief Minster of Andhra Pradesh also argued that the state was larger than West Bengal and Tamil Nadu and only 30 percent of its land was cultivable. Hence, SEZs were a good option for employment generation. Andhra Pradesh made special efforts to attract investment in certain sectors and its strategies for land acquisition were innovative

Andhra Pradesh’s textile policy yielded good results in being able to attract investors such as Brandix Apparel and MAS Holdings – Sri Lankan companies which service brands such as Victoria’s Secrets. Textiles have traditionally been the strength of the Tirupur area in Tamil Nadu. Andhra Pradesh realized that the cotton growing region within the state did not enjoy any value added from manufacturing. This was remedied by the government’s Textile and Apparel Promotion Policy 2005-2010. Andhra Pradesh competed with states like Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Punjab to make it an attractive investment destination. Water and power were made accessible at cheaper rates compared with neighboring Tamil Nadu. Power in Andhra Pradesh was available at Rs.2.75 per unit when the same was priced at Rs.6 per unit in neighboring Tamil Nadu.

Units were exempt from zoning regulations, which had involved the administrative costs of converting agricultural zones into industrial ones. There was 100 percent reimbursement for stamp duty on land procured for setting up textile units. Textile and Apparel Parks were treated as public utility services under the Essential Services Maintenance Act to ensure ‘labour discipline’ and productivity. There were special incentives for projects employing more than 2,500 people and with an investment exceeding Rs.1 billion. There were special exemptions from corporate tax and urban land ceiling regulations for textile SEZs. There was to be a one time grant of Rs.1000 per worker for spinning units, and garmenting and weaving units enjoyed an incentive of Rs.5000 per worker for costs incurred in training workers. Easy clearances on regulatory matters such as pollution, water, and electricity were made available via a single ‘window’ located within the state government. Provision was made for health care, fire stations, banks, and police stations, and other human and social infrastructure that could be made available via a special purpose vehicle. (Rahul Mukhergi 2007).

The government also took several steps to ease the land acquisition for SEZs and other industrial projects. The government amended the laws to acquire huge amount of assigned lands for which very low or no compensation was to be paid. Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfer) Act, 1977, was amended in 2006. This amendment actually made it easy to acquire these lands for SEZs.

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These assigned lands were being taken back by the government in the name of public purpose and handed over to projects like SEZs, industrial parks, coastal corridor or PCPIR. Therefore, the amendment to the act actually reversed the social justice that the original law was aimed at providing.

In July 2009, Andhra Pradesh government brought out an ordinance amending the Land Ceiling Act, facilitating assignment of surplus land (which is generally regarded as government land bank for allotting the pattas to the poor households) for industrial development. In the first step, about 200,000 acres of land, for which the status was pending before the courts, were to be freed and sold to industrial houses.8 Previously in 2006, Andhra Pradesh government had announced a new land acquisition policy aimed at, “ensuring greater transparency and sharing the developed area with the original landowners” in order to give them more profits. The policy offered the landowners a share of the developed land in addition to the sale price. This was a big offer since the price of the land would be many times higher after development.

With these efforts, the state of Andhra Pradesh successfully won a comparatively larger share of incoming investments and reached the top of the list of states with the greatest number of SEZs in operation. As for major investments in labour-intensive manufacturing, there were three success stories: Brandix Apparel City, in Vishakhapattanam employing about 4,000 workers; Apache SEZ (a company manufacturing shoes for Adidas) in Nellore employing about 4,500 workers, and Hyderabad Gems SEZ Limited employing about 1,200 people. It is expected that employment might rise further with the expansion of production in these facilities. These big SEZs also attracted companies in other sectors, including ports, power companies, petrochemicals businesses and the IT sector.

Hyderabad has already emerged as a major centre for IT and IT-enabled sevices, pharmaceuticals, call centers and entertainment industries. The city was called Cyberabad and already gifted by the presence of several big corporations. Vishakhapattanam is traditionally a well developed industrial area with well developed infrastructural facilities. One old export processing zone,VEPZ, is also located here and has been converted into a SEZ. Reliance, Brandix and HPCL are establishing their SEZs in the district. Knowledge City of Unitech Limited will occupy new facilities in an area of 1,750 acres. East Godawari district is adjacent to Vishakhapattanam where big SEZs are being built, including those hosting the the petrochemicals sector. The dream project of the Andhra Pradesh government is Visakhapatnam–Kakinada Petroleum, Chemical and Petrochemical Investment Region (PCPIR). The total investment is expected to be more than Rs300 billion

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over a period of seven to 10 years. The first of four clusters of the AP PCPIR between Vishakapatnam and Kakinada will cover an area of 603.58 sq kms.

The other major centre of SEZs is the region adjacent to Chennai in Tamil Nadu, where the Apache SEZ (Nellore), Sri City SEZ, Krishnapattanam Port SEZ, the Reliance Power SEZ, and others are located. These SEZs have acquired huge tracts of land resulting in large scale evictions of residents. As of 2010 a total of 106 SEZs have been approved (102 hve received formal approval and four have in-principle approvals) in Andhra Pradesh and out of those 72 have already been notified. A total of 21 SEZs have already become operational. About 55 percent of SEZs are in the IT&ITES sectors.Farmers and other community groups have staged protest movements around almost every SEZs. However, except in Kakinada, the movements have not been strong enough to pose any major challenge to the land acquisition programme. These movements largely revolved around the demands for the enhancement of compensation and guarantees for jobs in the SEZs for one member of each affected family.

As of 2010, there were anti-SEZ movements in three districts of the state against different SEZs. They were in Anantpur district, Mehboobnagar district and East Godavari district. The movement in Mehboobnagar against the Pharma SEZ is very interesting. In this case the land acquisition had been completed, but the farmers were protesting the level of compensation given by the SEZ and seeking improvement in the compensation. A total of 700 acres of land was acquired in Polepally and 300 acres in Mudureddypally village by the APIIC for the SEZ and the APIIC Green Industrial Park. Out of the 700 acres of Polepally, 300 acres were ceiling lands assigned to Dalits and Tribals. For these assigned lands, only Rs 18,000 an acre was paid, while to those with regular pattas Rs100,000 to Rs125,000. per acre was paid.

The farmers alleged that the same lands were now being offered to private companies for about Rs6 million an acre. It is also said that many families have not yet received the entire compensation amount, while some families have received only 50 percent. The construction work on the project was already in progress. These farmers have been fighting for justice for almost five years, organizing campaigns and demonstrations. According to activists of the anti SEZ movement, during this period, 42 farmers lost their lives, either due to hunger, heartbreak or suicides. Along with other forms of struggle, the anti- SEZ movement in the region also showed its strength in parliamentary elections. Fifteen contestants, all victims of Polepally Special Economic Zone and two supporters of their cause, filed nominations for the same parliamentary seat- Mahabubnagar, and focused

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their campaigns on their own villages. They collectively bagged as many as 77,568 votes.9 This shows the strength of the movement. The movement continues. In Anantpur district the land has also been acquired for the SEZs. The farmers have largely raised the issues of fraud, cheating and corruption in the process of land acquisition and in the issues of compensation. Recently, they started raising the demand for the return of their land.

The case of Kakinada is different from both of the above movements, because the Kakinada movement was successful in halting the land acquisition process. The farmers also successfully retained their lands even after it was acquired and compensation was paid. Farmers there were not ready to part with their land at any cost. At the same time, the workers’ struggles in operational SEZs have also emerged. In operational SEZs, there has been a trend in sudden strikes. It is also interesting to note that particularly those zones housing larger labour intensive manufacturing units with a comparatively larger number of workers, have become the initial flash point of the workers’ struggles. In the Apache SEZ in Nellore, there was a sudden two-day strike against an incidence of harassment of a women worker in 2007. It was reported that a Taiwanese official had hit one of the women workers in the company. The next day, workers came to the company and within hours declared a strike. They completely stopped the production in the company. There was no preparation for the strike and therefore management received no hint of it. There was a two-hour sudden strike in April 2008, demanding Ambedakar Jayanti be declared as a holiday. In March 10, 2010, the workers again suddenly went on a strike. In retaliation, the management declared an indefinite lock- out and threatened to close its operations. The lockout lasted for seven days. The Brandix India Apparell City SEZ also faced similar situations as soon as the factory became operational. There was a sudden strike in the company after the death of a worker due to lung disease, allegedly caused by the inhalation of cotton dust on the shop floor.

The Case of Kakinada Anti SEZ Movement

In case of Kakinada SEZ we have already discussed that it is going to affect about 100,000 people in 16 villages and force the displacement of about 30,000 to 40,000 people from 15 other villages. A strong farmers’ movement is continuously challenging the land acquisition process. The state and developer have used all manner of tactics to acquire the land, including police repression but the movement has continued.

The process of notification for land acquisition in Kakinada started in 2002 for

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M/S Kakinada Sea Ports Ltd and in-principle approval for the same was granted by the government on November 27, 2002. Initially, the state-owned Oil and National Gas Corp (ONGC) of India proposed setting up an oil refinery for which 10,000 acres of land was sought in Kakinada Rural Mandal and U Kothapalli Mandals. However, this proposal was later withdrawn. Thereafter, a private developer, KV Rao, came with a proposal to set up an SEZ catering to a range of industries, mainly oil refining, petro-chemicals, pharmaceuticals and ceramic units. at the same location with APIIC as co-developer. Thereafter, abandoning the initial notification, a fresh notification was issued on January 1, 2006 shifting the location from Kakinada Rural Mandal to Thondangi Mandal. Soon after that, the process of acquiring 10,000 acres of land in U Kothapalli and Thondangi Mandals was launched.

In the first step, in 2006-07, the government facilitated the acquisition of about 4,000 acres of land for the private developer of KSEZ, from the farmers of U Koyhapalli and Thondangi Mandals at a rate of Rs300,000 rupees per acre. During the same period, a strong anti-SEZ movement emerged in the area. According to the farmers, the government authorities forced them to sell their land and cheated the farmers in various ways to reduce the amount of compensation they received. According to Rajendra Kumar, a leader of the anti-SEZ movement, the farmers also said that land actually acquired was more than was recorded as acquired. It was also alleged that the farmers were forced to sign certain documents declaring reduced fertility of their land, thus devaluing their land and in this way the compensation paid them was reduced. There was great discontent among the farmers against the forceful acquisition of their land and stories of corrupt practices in the process of land acquisition were many.

In the meantime various farmers’ associations and NGOs, such as the Kadali (sea coast) network working in the area, came together to systematically raise this issue. Various political parties also supported the movement. There was already a network of organizations created during the tsunami disaster; therefore it was comparatively easy to build and unite a strong network of organizations to raise this issue. Finally a common platform was formed to lead the movement and KSEZ Vyathireka Zilla Sanghibhava Committee (Anti KSEZ Solidarity Committee) came into existence. Various interesting campaigns were started to awaken and organize the farmers, like “Stop the SEZ with One Rupee”. In this campaign launched in 2007, one rupee was collected from each farmer. Various demonstrations, sit-in protests were organized at district and state headquarters. National leaders of the people’s movement, such as Medha Patekar and Sandeep Pandey, also visited the area. Medha Pateker also facilitated the representations of the farmers before the

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Chief Minister of the state. The farmers declared that they were not ready to part with their land at any cost. They refused to vacate the land that had already been acquired. They also declared that they would oppose, using any and all means, any further moves to acquire their land.

But the state did not suspend the land acquisition process. Notification for acquisition of 2,000 acres of land was issued which was then challenged by the farmers. The case is pending in the High Court. Acquisition of yet another 6,000 acres was also challenged by the people and that case is also pending in the civil court. As the anti-SEZ movement grew stronger, the government, rather than rethinking the whole issue, resorted to repressive measures. Hundreds of policemen were sent to the villages with revenue officials to survey the land to be acquired. Ignoring the protests of the farmers, the government also tried to fence off the land already acquired.

According to Kumar of the Anti- SEZ movement, on September 6, 2007, about 1,200 police arrived in Sriramapuram, one of the affected villages with surveyors, revenue officials and senior functionaries of the district administration to acquire the land. However, the farmers strongly resisted the move. The police did everything they could to terrorize them and arrested four elders of the village and jailed them in Kakinada.. After this, the farmers surrounded the policemen and declared that they were under “people’s arrest”. They dug up the roads, so that it was almost impossible for the police to escape. The police used water cannons, to threaten them, but the angry mob of farmers compelled them to concede. Lastly, the police released the arrested elders and agreed to sign a written bond that they would not enter the village again. This incident was a reflection of radicalization of the farmers’ movement.

However, the national English daily newspapers did not carry any reports of the incidence. It was reported only in local papers. The farmers continued their protests and demonstrations.. Almost all the political parties,except the ruling ones,soon declared their support for the farmers’ movement. It is to be noted that no major parliamentary party opposed the SEZ policies at national level, but at regional level, wherever an anti-SEZ movement emerged, those in opposition supported the movement. In the case of Kakinada, the opposition parties were competing with each other to use the movement to their advantage. However, at the state level, they had not made it part of their major political agenda and limited their participation only to verbal support the movement.

In the meantime, Andhra Pradesh State Human Rights Commission (APSHRC) presented a petition to the high court exposing the fact that the government was

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coercing the farmers to sign over their land and using force involving the police and tax officials against villagers,. They also charged that undue influence was being exerted by government officials in the form of threats to withdraw all social welfare and benefit schemes from the villagers. According to Kumar, the district administration had started withdrawing development programs from the Kakinada villages to compel them to sell their land. The NREGA scheme was withdrawn from Sriramapuram village, and primary health centers were closed in some villages. However, despite all this, the farmers were not prepared to vacate their land.

On December 23, 2008, officials with the help of 1,000 armed policemen attempted to fence off the 2,000 acres of land said to have been acquired by the developer of the Kakinada SEZ. According to Kumar, the villagers protested against this move. The situation became tense, when police started repressive action and arrested two leaders of All India Kisan Mazdoor Sabha Sangh N. Ramanna and B. Narayana Swami. When policemen tried to erect fencing forcefully at Srirampuram, Moolapeta, Vakadaripeta, Thondangi, Perumallapuram and Chodipallipeta and other villages in the presence of Revenue officials, the angry crowd jumped on them. They police had to beat a hasty retreat as the villagers literally chased them off the lands.

The very next day an important judgment came from the High Court on the issue of land acquisition in Kakinada, directing the government not to take possession of the land forcibly. The New Indian Express reported: “In what is being considered a slap in the face of the government, a division bench of the AP High Court, comprising Chief Justice AR Dave and Justice R Subash Reddy, on Wednesday directed it [the government] not to take possession of lands forcibly except in accordance with law. The order was passed on a writ petition filed by Kakinada Special Economic Zone Vyathireka Porata Committee and five others, complaining that developer of the SEZ at Kakinada, KV Rao, had purchased 4,600 acres and that he was using police force to evict farmers who were still in possession of the lands. The villagers did not want their lands to be taken since the compensation that had been paid was not enough to buy the same extent of land elsewhere.”10 The farmers’ body in the area, the KSEZ Vyetireka Rytu Porata Samiti, also filed a case in the court, seeking that government be restrained from acquiring 1,200 acres.

Rajendra Kumar said that the case of the 2,000 acres of land acquired by the government was pending in the High Court and a case regarding another 6,000 acres was also pending in the civil court. The future course of the movement would be decided after the court decisions. Farmers said that they were not ready to part with their land and were waiting for the decisions of the court. It is also interesting to note that in Kakinada region, while the farmers, including dalits, were strongly

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opposed to the SEZ, landless dalit who were mainly agricultural labourers were not the part of anti-SEZ movement. Almost all the dalit workers interviewed in the resettlement colony at Moolapeta said that the new situation was better for them in two respects:

1. In the resettlement colony they were better off, since they were free from the social oppression that they faced in the village

2. SEZs will bring a better future for them in terms of generating better and diversified employment opportunities and ending their dependence on agriculture work

‘Anti-SEZ Movement offers nothing to landless dalits’

Abraham-Malamahanadu, leader of the dalit community in the resettlement colony, commented in an interview: “I am sorry to say that that the Anti- SEZ struggle is exclusive in nature. It has nothing to offer for poor agricultural labourers who are predominantly dalits. It is led by farmers of the Kapu community. They are the same elements who have opposed the dalit land struggles before the SEZ came in to picture. How can we trust them now? The Anti-SEZ movement has shown no interest in the welfare of the dalits. Let me assure you that we are not going to lose anything as we don’t have anything.”

Allegations were made against the dalit leader, saying that he was working as an agent of the SEZ developers. In the interview he commented on this saying: “I am a former communist party activist. I learned politics from them only. This kind of allegation is common to all leaders. We should not bother about them and keep doing our duty. If tomorrow the SEZ people ditch us and do not provide jobs, we will fight against them also.”

The Case of Brandix Workers’ Struggle

1. Working Conditions in the SEZ

Production in the Brandix Apparel City SEZ started in 2008-09. As of March 2010, Brandix employed a total of 4,000 production workers and 500 clerical and management staff. The majority of the workers had been with the company for 12 to 15 months, having joined just after the company started its operations in the SEZ. Almost all the workers joined in the Brandix without having any prior experience in the industry. However, they received training provided by the company before joining. Most of the production workers were engaged in stitching work and the

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rest mainly in the cutting and packing departments. The company has ran two eight-hour shifts (the A shift- from 6am to 2pm; and theB shift from 2pm to 10pm) each day. Almost 100 percent of the production workforce was women, drawn from surrounding areas, and the majority from the same district.

The male workers were mainly employed in storing and in loading and unloading work. The age of the workers ranged from 18 to 40 years old. However, more than 80 percent workers were between the ages of 18 and 25.. The majority of the workers were unmarried or newly married. However, we found one case of a mother (40) and daughter (18) both working in the company as production workers. The workers generally reported that their friends or relatives working in the company helped them in getting this job. However, some workers also reported that they got the job with the help of journalists or politicians. However, two supervisors who were interviewed were selected from campus interviews. The workers in Brandix represented all caste categories - upper castes, backward caste and scheduled castes11 (dalits). However, according to workers, there were more workers from the Gavara caste (linked to the pearl business) and Kapu caste (the dominant peasant caste in the region). According to the workers, the majority of workers were mainly from the families of medium, small and marginal farming families or urban, lower middle class.

All the production workers were on the rolls of the company and provided with Identity cards (I-cards) and salary slips with the employee code and provident fund (PF) account number. They were not provided with any appointment letter stating that they were permanent employees of the company. However, most of the workers believed that they were permanent workers. All the workers were provided with proof of employment in the form of I-cards and salary slips. PF and Employees’ State Insurance (ESI) contributions was also duly deducted and shown in the salary slips.

It is interesting to note that with all the proof of employment and illusion of being permanently employed, the workers said that their job was not secure. The threat of retrenchment seemed to hang over their heads at all times, like the sword of a executioner. They told that by virtue of the fact that there would be no interference from the labour department, management was able to throw them out at any moment without following any procedures. Their job security was at the mercy of the management. However, there were more cases of workers leaving the job themselves due to the heavy work pressure, mental torture and health problems, rather than due to summary dismissal by management. There were always threats of dismissal from the management made to any who regularly

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failed to meet production targets. Almost all the workers and two supervisors interviewed reported that the work targets were so heavy that even after using every second of every working day and even after squeezing the workers to the maximum, they were often unable to complete them. Supervisors and managers threatened them, abused them and made their life hell, when they were unable to achieve the targets.

The workers in the stitching department reported that generally work targets were 100 to 210 pieces per hour, depending on the style of the panty. Almost all the workers reported that many times they were unable to complete the targets and they faced threats and abuse from the supervisors and the Sri Lankan management staff. One worker reported that some of his friends received warning letters.

Both the supervisors interviewed by our fieldworkers said that they also faced problems when their lines failed to meet their work targets or there were quality related problems. In such situations generally they were ‘counseled’ in special classes with the ‘bosses’. However, sometimes they received the same treatment from the bosses as that they dished out to their line workers. One of the supervisors also expressed the concern that management did not here the complaints against Sri Lankan staff. She said, “Our bosses behave badly with us if our line operators are not meeting their targets. There is also discrimination between Indians and Sri Lankans. A few months back when a Sri Lankan hit a person working in store, the matter was reported to the HR [Human Resources] department. They just refused to hear the Indian’s side of story.”

The company runs two eight-hour shifts each day. Within those eight hours, only one break of 30 minutes for lunch is permitted. There are no tea breaks. However one tea is provided to the workers of the morning shift. The workers reported that it took not less than 10 minutes to go from the production department to the locker room and then the lunch room. Therefore in real terms the lunch period was only 10 minutes long. Moreover, the workers also reported that they had to get permission to use the toilets.

All the workers reported that they received Rs1,200 a month during the training period. When they became full-time operators, they were getting a gross salary of Rs2,588 a month (based on a salary slip of October 2008). There were no wage rises until April 2009. The gross salary in April 2009 remained Rs2,588 a month. In the salary of October 2008, the basic was only Rs1500 a month and in April 2009 basic became Rs2,141 a month. However, there was no increment in the gross salary. Actually in October 2008, an amount of Rs719/ was put as

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dearness allowance (DA) and Rs269/ as variable dearness allowance (VDA); while in the salary slip of April 2009, there was no DA but VDA was shown as Rs412. There was one additional entry of Rs 35 as a ‘skill allowance’ but again the gross salary remained same at Rs2588 a month. In October 2008, PF was deducted at the rate of 12 percent, while in April 2009, it was deducted at the rate of 13. 61 percent. In both the salary slips, there were columns for an ESI contribution at the rate of 4.75 percent, but no contribution was deducted and no amount was written against this. The workers also told that there was no facility of ESI in the company. However, they also told that a process was ongoing to provide some sort of medical insurance. There was also a deduction of Rs250 a month from the salary for the transport facility provided by the company. After all the deductions, workers received a net or take home pay of just Rs2,031 for April

‘Supervisors Treat us like Dogs’

The workers receive very bad treatment from the supervisors if they fail to meet their production targets.. This problem was so serious that during the interview two workers burst out: “The supervisors treat us like dogs. They shoutabuses at us all the time. Physically hitting the workers is not common, but it does happen sometimes. They hit one of our friends, when she failed to meet her target on two consecutive days due to illness. She was not given leave in the first place.”

Some workers tried to explain: “The supervisors are in fact good, but they behave rudely with workers to please the Sri Lankans.”

One worker narrated her own story, “I was given a target of 210 pieces a hour. I was experiencing backache due to periods, so I wasn’t able to make the target. The supervisor called out a lot of bad words and threatened to dismiss me. She shouted at me and said it shouldn’t happen again.”

The workers also narrated otherstories exposing the general behavior of local supervisors and the Sri Lankan management staff. One worker reported: “One of my friends was singled out for bad behavior and made to run around the building 10 times.”

One worker reported: “Some of our friends do have such experiences, of getting hit when they enter into arguments with the supervisors. ‘J’ is my friend who got into an argument with her supervisor on a quality control issue. She actually felt that she was targeted and therefore started arguing with the supervisor. Later, she was beaten up by the Sri Lankans.”

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The workers reported that in March 2010, most of them were receiving a net payment of about Rs 2,300 per month. Hence, there was an increment of only about Rs270 a month in their salary in about two years. Clearly, the salary workers received was far less than the minimum wage of Rs.4,600 a month for skilled workers and Rs3,800 a month for unskilled workers.There was a column in the salary slips for overtime payments, but on both the salary slips the column was blank. The workers said that the overtime was not a daily practice, but they needed to work overtime many days in a month. The overtime was not optional but compulsory. Formally, overtime work was paid at a premium rate, but there were also ‘unpaid’ overtime hours. As a result, the actual payments for total overtime hours became at the rate of single wages. It was reported that almost no worker was able to complete the work targets in eight hours and many times they had to complete the work after the working hours (generally two hours) without any extra payment. The workers said that they did not receive any annual bonus.

Moreover, the supervisors interviewed reported that they were getting a net monthly payment of only Rs5,000 a month. Their starting salary at the time they joined the company was only Rs 3500 a month,net of deductions. They said that they received an annual bonus.All the workers reported that they received days off each week, but that sometimes, in emergencies, they had to work on their days off and this was counted as overtime. They also received paid leave on major festivals. In one of the salary slips, the leave payment/balance was written as 25. Workers reported that it was not easy to get permission for leave and there would be a salary cut if one took leave without permission. Some workers and supervisors interviewed said that there was a paid maternity leave facility. However, other workers said that they were not informed about it.

In our interviews with workers, occupational safety and health (OSH) emerged as one of the major problems in the company. Two workers- Saana Durga,19 years old, and Kasi Lakshmi,21 years old, died of lung disease. This was the issue on which the workers spontaneously went on strike. Workers said that there was a serious dust problem, mainly in the stitching and cutting departments, and to some extent in the packing department also. The workers said that a central air conditioning unit had been installed in the production department to reduce the dust, but the problem remained. One said: “We have to clean the dust every 30 minutes.”

The workers also said that they were provided with masks but they did not wear them. Different workers cited different reasons for this. One said: “I wear them quite regularly but feel suffocated in them.” Another worker said: “They

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are of inferior quality, so when we wear them we feel very uncomfortable.” One worker gave an interesting explanation: “We look like monkeys in those masks, so we don’t wear them.” While one of the supervisors interviewed, said that actually there was no need for them. Still, the workers reported serious health problems due to the dust in the workrooms. According to them, many suffered from coughs and other breathing and lung-related problems. Moreover, some had to work constantly in a sitting position and others constantly in a standing position. For four hours they were not able to change their position. Only during the 30- minute lunch break were they able to take rest and change their position. The workers reported that it was creating lot of health problems from leg pains to back pain.

One worker said that bananas and jaggery12 helped the cough and breathing problems caused by inhaling the dust. Therefore during the strike it was also one of the demands that the company should provide bananas and jaggery to workers. However, this demand was not fulfilled.The workers also said that there was a clinic in the company with a full time nurse. A doctor also came from time to time. However, the workers were unable to take advantage of this facility, since they had no time to visit it or see the doctor.. All the workers gave similar responses: “We have a clinic and occasionally the doctor comes and goes without examining any body. We have a head nurse, but we never get time to see her. In fact we are not allowed.” A worker reported that the company provided hospital facility when the workers were facing serious health problems.” All the workers reported that there was no chance of accidents in any department.

All the workers said that there were good facilities for drinking water and toilets, which were safe and clean. The canteen was there but it was not subsidized. Actually the workers generally did not use the canteen. They brought their own food from home, and there was no time for tea. All the workers and supervisors reported that the company was in the process of establishing a crèche for the infant children of staff and it might become operational in a month or two. The company provided transport to and from the workplace, but it was not free. There was a deduction of Rs 250 a month from workers’ salary for it.

The workers did not say anything about sexual harassment. However, some local news paper reports have highlighted this issue.13 The Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), a national level trade union, launched a campaign against the cases of sexual harassment of Brandix women workers. Communist Party India (Marxist) CPM also organised a sit-in protest in front of the gate of Brandix, demanding an inquiry into the allegations of sexual harassment in Brandix be undertaken and also raised the issue of other labour law violations. Some CITU workers were victimized

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by the police because of this campaign. Responding to it, the management issued a press statement, refuting the alleged harassment of the women employees and other reports and described the allegations against the company as `totally baseless and unwarranted.’

2. Workers’ resistance

The Brandix workers and the CITU leader Ganisetty Satyanarayana said in the interviews that there was no union in Brandix India Apparel City SEZ, but there had been a major strike in the company in November, 2009. A women worker Sana Durga died on 9th November 2009 due to a lung infection caused by cotton dust pollution on the shop floor. She was from Kasimkota village, 10 kilometres from Anakapalle on the Howrah-Chennai highway. On the day following her death when workers arrived for work and heard the news, they were so angry that they suddenly declared a strike. All the workers came out of the factory, started shouting slogans. CITU also got involved in the movement and a massive protest demonstration was organized at the Atchuthapuram junction. Workers reported that the whole local population and even the policemen were sympathetic to the workers.

According to the workers, the strike continued for three days and completely stopped production. Along with asking for compensation and a job for a member of Sana Durga’s family, they also formulated and raised general demands. They demanded a wage hike and an improvement in working conditions. They also demanded improvements to reduce health problems. Workers said that one of the demands was to provide bananas and jaggery to protect against lung diseases caused by the dust.

On the third day of the strike, the morning of the 11th of November, some of the CITU activists involved in the movement were taken into police custody. At the same time, the police persuaded the workers to leave the crowded Atchtapuram junction and organize protest demonstrations at the factory gate. According to workers, when they came at the SEZ gate, the company executives appeared before them and the deputy general manager (GM) signed a memorandum from the workers saying “I will consider”. The memorandum listed the demands of the workers and was prepared by the workers themselves. Even though it was written in Telugu, the main language of the area which the Sri Lankan executives did not understand, the deputy GM did not bother to get it translated. He just signed it saying: “I will consider”. However, with this act, he was able to persuade the workers to end the strike.

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‘Like This, We May not Survive Longer’

Workers said that they were facing serious health problems and if the conditions did not improve, they might not survive longer. Two co-workers had already lost their lives. They described their health problems in the following words:

“Many co-workers report coughs and asthma due to the dust .While cutting and sewing, a lot of dust is generated. Two or three people died to my knowledge and many workers got ill. The workers standing can’t sit and vice versa. Lots of workers experience back pain, especially during their periods”

“I am suffering from regular fever and headaches.”

“I suffer from backache and headache especially during my period.”

“Backache is a common problem and so also are headaches due to the stress

“Suffering from back pain and coughing problems”

“I had severe lungs problem some time back”

“I suffering from bad cough due to the heavy dust”

“I get cramps due to constant sitting and headaches due to the constant pressure.”

“Constant sitting without a break is creates all kinds of body pains. The dust creates breathing problems.’

“I have experienced severe headaches and bad cough many a times.”

“I am suffering from leg pains.”

Once the strike was over, the workers’ collective power was gone and the management was able to cut three-day wages from the salary of all workers. None of the demands of the workers were fulfilled. There was no improvement in the working conditions. Moreover, according to workers, the burden of overtime work increased after the movement. The management did not appear to be the least interested in talking about the demands.Compensation of a few 100,000 rupees was paid to the family members of Sana Durga. However, no one knew exactly how much. Employment to another member of Sana Durga’s family was not provided.

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When researchers tried to contact family members of Sana Durga, they were not prepared to talk. They said, ‘whatever happened, the chapter is closed’.

Ganisetty Satyanarayana, president, CITU, in the Visakhapatnam district, said that there were two other movements of the Brandix workers. One movement occurred before this strike following a similar tragedy -- another worker, named Kasilakshmi, died due to the same reason, lung disease caused by inhaling cotton dust in the work room. A second protest was more recent and sprung from cases of sexual harassment. According to Satyanarayana, in early 2009, a women worker Kasilakshmi died due to lung infection arising from inhaling cotton dust. The workers were mobilized and a campaign was launched on the issue. CITU played a major role in this movement from outside. As a result of pressure from the movement, Brandix promised compensation of Rs300,000 and a job for one of her family members. But they also put up a condition that CITU not be involved in the case. The management said it would only deal with the members of Kasilakshmi’s family. Ultimately, the company paid only Rs200,000 in compensation, and no job was provided to any member of her family.

In the second other major incident at Brandix, a campaign movement was started by CITU in 2009-10, alleging gross violations of labour rights in the BIAC SEZ, and that women workers in the SEZ were facing sexual harassment. Union leaders also cited examples of specific cases. CITU launched a campaign around these issues and it was highlighted in local as well as regional and national English dailies. CITU also started a dharna [hunger strike] at the gate of the SEZ demanding enquiry into the alleged cases of sexual harassment. The Hindu reported:

“The Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) affiliated to Communist Party of India (Marxist) on Wednesday alleged violation of labour laws and sexual harassment of women workers at Brandix India Apparel City, Achyutapuram. CITU District Vice-President Dhanalaxmi and District Secretary P. Mani told reporters that they had also lodged a complaint at Achyutapuram police station listing out specific cases of sexual harassment. They said the management, which got 1,000 acres on lease at Re. 1 per year with a promise to provide 60,000 jobs in three years, had been exploiting the women workers by not giving them the minimum wage and fringe benefits.

Ms. Dhanalaxmi and Ms. Mani alleged that they employed only 3,500 instead of the promised 60,000 women and due to heavy work pressure, 700 workers were quitting every year. They said instead of one hour break for lunch, the workers were being forced to take just a 20- minute break and asked to work for an extra two hours if they failed to meet the hourly targets set for them without payment

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of overtime charges. The CITU leaders said the company, which was accorded Special Economic Zone status, was also not giving minimum wages of Rs.4,600 for skilled and Rs.3,800 per month for unskilled workers. Jobless women, who underwent training by Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation and other agencies on fashion technology were not being offered jobs. They were being asked to undergo fresh training at Pendurthy by the management on payment of a stipend of Rs.1200 a month and later taken on payrolls.”14

The management refuted the allegations. The Hindu reported: “Brandix management on Wednesday refuted the allegations of harassment of women employees and other reports and described the allegations against the company as `totally baseless and unwarranted.’ In a press release, the management assured the local community that it had conducted a thorough internal investigation

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and found no specific instance of any form of harassment to its associates. “As a responsible corporate citizen, Brandix is fully conscious of its responsibilities and its compliance standards are amongst the highest in the global apparel industry. .…” Without naming anyone, the management said as a consequence of `malicious and baseless’ allegations levelled against Brandix and continuous protests and dharnas carried out by groups with vested interests, the operation of the supply chain units functioning within BIAC were severely hampered, resulting in disruption of production, thereby incurring unwarranted additional costs at a time when the global economy was in crisis. The management said the worst outcome of these ‘malicious’ acts was the distraction to foreign investors.”15

It is worth mentioning here that even if there was no formal organization of workers in the Brandix, the workers were closely linked to each other and some sort of networking existed. There was no formal leadership, but there were workers with leadership qualities and spontaneously they took the initiative during the strike. The workers did not completely rely on CITU. Some workers who actively participated in the strike clearly conveyed this point.. However, CITU (particularly the women’s leadership) enjoyed a respect among the workers, since it was the only union continuously raising their issues and supporting them.

Conclusions

The rush to develop SEZs in India has had a multi-dimensional impact, affecting the economy, society and politics as a whole. The acquisition of huge tracts of agricultural land has led to the mass destruction of livelihoods and the mass displacement of the people. In all, this SEZ development rush could cause the eviction of about one million people. It is expected that there will be a reduction in grain output of one million tons per year due to the loss of agricultural land. Moreover, the SEZs have also created a water irrigation crisis by consuming huge amounts of water from canals and rivers, previously available only to farms.

This has also negatively affected agriculture production in surrounding regions. There has also been the destruction of livelihoods of fishermen and those engaged in other traditional occupations. The cumulative impact of SEZ rush might even aggravate the crisis of food security.

The overall SEZ-rush has also become part of the trend of jobless growth. The IT&ITES sectors which accounted for more than 50 percent of the development funds spent on SEZs, have in fact been low employment generators. The

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employment gains claimed by the SEZs have been far less than the livelihoods destroyed. And the emerging trends have shown that actual employment creation has been far less than the claimed. Moreover, if we look at the total picture of the development of SEZ, there has always been limited scope for employment for the local population affected by the SEZ land acquisition

The nature of growth promoted by SEZs is by no means sustainable growth. Recurring crises are inbuilt in the nature of SEZ based growth. There may a phase of very high growth but this is soon followed by a phase of severe crisis. At one point in time, it may attract huge investment, generating a large number of employment opportunities, but soon it may face disinvestment which creates mass unemployment.

The anti-SEZ movement in the country is mainly focusing on the land acquisition issue with the slogan-‘Scrap the SEZ Act’. The various divisions of the movement are still by and large scattered and unable to emerge as an united, all India movement. It is not the case that there were no efforts; the need was felt and expressed. An effort was made to form a national platform to bring all the movements under its leadership. In 2007, a national convention was held in Delhi, and representatives from almost all the anti- SEZ and anti- displacement movements participated in it and an All India Committee against SEZ and Forcible Acquisition of Land was formed. A process of the People’s Audit of SEZs was also started in 2009-10, in states with comparatively larger number of SEZs, to critically examine issues of land acquisition, displacement, corruption; environmental impact, compensation, employment generation, livelihood loss and labour rights. It involved visiting the affected areas and organizing public hearings. The process culminated in a two-day convention called the National People’s Audit of SEZs in Delhi on April 19-20, 2010. This process was organized as a joint effort of various organizations and forums engaged in anti SEZ movements in the country. At this convention, an effort was made again to form an all India alliance against the SEZs and land grab.

The strength of the movement is different in different states depending on the specific economic, social and political conditions in the area. In a few regions, such as West Bengal, Orissa, Maharashtra and Goa, the people’s movement is strongest, while in some regions, such as Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, the movement is weakest. In addition to the specific political and economic situations of different regions, social factors are playing a role in shaping the movement. In some regions, particularly in the south, some dalit leaders support the SEZ rush and believe that the dismantling of the rural economy and diversification of job opportunities for

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wage workers may be instrumental in ending caste oppression. There are also variations in impact of the SEZ developments in different states. In some states the disastrous impact of SEZs on the majority population is more homogenous and apparent than in other states.

In Andhra Pradesh socio-economic and political factors are playing a role in framing the nature of the anti-SEZ movements. Land distribution is such that the top 10 percent of the rural population holds 44 percent of the agricultural land and bottom 50 percent of the population holds only 15 percent of the land. The bottom 30 percent hold only five percent of agricultural area, with each landowner holding less than half a hectare.

A survey claims that about 55 percent of the rural population remains landless. out of which close to 40 percent are without house sites. The majority of the landless are drawn from scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) categories.16 Andhra Pradesh is also one of the states with high incidence of farmer suicides, which reflects the severity and precarity of agrarian life in the state. On the other hand, the mechanization of agricultural activity was actively encouraged by the state government through subsidies. As a result total agricultural employment in terms of Daily Status declined and there was no increase in non-agricultural employment to compensate for it. All these problems were aggravated further by recurring droughts since 2002-03.

This is the general condition of the state. However, while sharing this general condition, Coastal Andhra is somewhat different with better climate in terms of irrigation facilities and highly fertile land capable of producing two rice harvests each year. Indeed, this region is called the ‘Rice Bowl of India’. Therefore, the conditions of the farmers in this region are better. However, the conditions of landless workers are some of the worse in Coastal Andhra, since agriculture does not provide much in terms of wages due to the increasing mechanization of agricultural operations and the tendencies to grow crops that require the least amount of paid labour. On the other hand, share cropping is also a dominant practice in Coastal Andhra; but unlike in West Bengal where most of the sharecropping leases are recorded and sharecroppers have a vested interest in the land, here all tenancies are informal and it does not provide any sustainable livelihood for sharecroppers. Moreover, the rent on these leases is so high that the sharecroppers are left with an amount which does not even cover the cost of their time.. Farmers said that in East Godavari district (Kakinada) the maximum yield is 40 bags of rice per acre and the rent on the land is 16 to 25 bags of rice. Therefore, the sharecroppers have no

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interest in protecting the land of farmers. More than 36 percent of sharecroppers are drawn from SC categories, while 43 percent are from BCs. (Land Committee Report 2006)

In these situations, the different attitude of the different groups of agrarian population towards SEZ development is only natural. It also explains why the nature and intensity of the movement is different in different regions of the state. It is interesting to note that there have been anti-SEZ movements in three regions of the state, Mehboobnagar district, Anantpur district and East Godavari district (coastal Andhra). In the Mehboobnagar and Anantpur districts, the land has already been acquired for the SEZs. Actually, the farmers willingly sold their land. But they were cheated, and when they realized it, they started a movement to rectify the situation. Initially they demanded only proper compensation for the land, but later they demanded their land back. It is only in the ‘rice bowl’ region of Coastal Andhra, specifically in the East Godavari district (Kakinada), that a strong anti-SEZ movement has emerged with uncompromising attitude against land acquisition. Here also initially the government and developers were successful in purchasing hundreds of acres of land But once the movement started, the farmers refused to handover even that part of their land for which compensation had already been paid.

In Kakinada, the farmers simply do not want to loose their land, since they do not want to sacrifice a sustainable livelihood for an insufficient and unsustainable livelihood the SEZs are going to offer. However, there are heavy pressures on them, from the developers on one side and government departments on the other. The situation is such that many farmers do not know their fate, and many are gradually losing hope. Therefore we received mix responses from them. They were saying that at any cost they do not want to loose their land; but at the same time they were putting demands for better compensation of the land and guarantees of a paid alternative livelihood for at least one member of the family).

It is also interesting to note that due to the above dynamics of socio-economic conditions, different sections of agrarian populations are reacting differently on the issue of SEZs. Particularly in Kakinada region, while the farmers (including dalits) are strongly opposed to the SEZs, landless dalit agricultural labourers are not the part of anti-SEZ movement. According to their leaders, a continuation of the rural economic structure is the basis of caste oppression and the SEZs are breaking this system of bondage and free them from social oppression by the higher castes by creating diversified employment opportunities. Abraham-

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Malamahanadu, leader of the dalit community in the resettlement colony, clearly said that anti-SEZ struggle is not offering anything to poor agricultural labourers who are predominantly dalits. The movement is lead by the same community which opposed dalit land struggles before the SEZs came onto the scene.

The corporate and the state have also used these social dynamics to weaken the anti-SEZ movement. The Andhra Pradesh government adopted various innovative strategies to convince and compel the farmers to sell their land. Land acquisition in Sri City SEZ is often cited as a model worth following. Here, the developers of the SEZ were the sons of the soil with good knowledge of and good networks in the region. The person looking after the land acquisition was an ex-bureau chief of daily newspaper, Times of India in Hyderabad. He was not only prepared with an extensive knowledge of local social, economic and political conditions, he had done effective social networking in local political circles and government departments.

The people in the Sri City area were largely poor and uneducated. There were almost no English-medium schools. About 41 percent of the population was educated only up to fifth grade or primary 5, while 29 percent had passed 10th grade. About 68 percent of local residents were small, marginal farmers, tilling just1.4 acres, and 20 percent were small farmers with just 3.8 acres), 5 percent were medium-sized farmers with an average 6.5 acres, and the rest 7 percent are big farmers with 8.9 acres and big landlords with 18.1 acres. Only about 19 percent of the population was engaged in non-farm labour. Employment in farm work was available for only 90 to 120 days a year. Taking these conditions into consideration, a social package for the affected agrarian population was designed which offered dreams of a better life with better employment opportunities for youth. The programme was particularly targeting at poor farmers and the landless. Under this social package, A Sri City Human Resource Academy was set up to train people for the SEZ in plumbing, masonry, electrical work, driving, software, tailoring and embroidery. The trainees were promised. With the help of these trained youth from the academy, an effective campaign was launched to convince the agrarian population to accept the land acquisition programme. An attractive resettlement colony with social infrastructure such as power, water, sewage facilities, schools, temple, hospital, shopping area and theater also promised a decent urban life for the rural poor. The strategy was to win over the smaller farmers and landless who formed the majority in the area. This obviously had a caste dynamics also. Later on, these strategies were adopted everywhere in Andhra Pradesh.

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The developer of the Kakinada SEZ was also someone knowledgeable about the local situations and with a wide network of politicians and government officials. The chief promoter of the SEZ is Kakinada realtor K V Rao, who was previously the secretary of industrial promotion in the state government. Training programs were also organized for the youth in Kakinada. Dalit workers in the resettlement colony said that a number of youths were trained by the SEZ promoter in housekeeping, etc. Promises were also made to provide a job for one person in each family affected. The resettlement colony set up by the Kakinada SEZ developers was also attractive enough for the low income groups. In Kakinada, this strategy also became part of the political strategy for winning the wage workers and smaller peasants of oppressed castes to weaken the anti-SEZ movement. The major problem that SEZ developers faced in Kakinada was the rising expectation of the farmers. The prices of land were skyrocketing; therefore the farmers were now demanding very high prices for their land. Therefore, the developers were following the strategy to divide the population and weaken the resistance, by convincing a significant number of smaller farmers to sell their land and move to the resettlement colony. If they succeeded in this, the larger farmers would be left with no choice.

It is true that the anti-SEZ movement is strong in Kakinada, but if it is unable to effectively counter the above strategies of the state and developers, it is bound to lose strength. It seems that the movement is unable to understand the above dynamics and therefore there are no major efforts to systematically work on the strategies to bring together landless agricultural labourers and sharecroppers with the movement. The anti-SEZ movement all over India is continuing with some success. In some cases the state is compelled to halt the land acquisition process and in few cases also to de-notify the SEZs. However, day after day more SEZs are becoming operational. As of now, 131 SEZs have already become operational in different parts of India. Andhra Pradesh still tops this list with 20 operational SEZs. Therefore, the labour relations in SEZs have become an important issue.

It is to be noted that the special economic zones enjoy a qualitatively different industrial relations regime which ensures employers have almost unquestioned authority to hire and fire. At the same time, the power of the workers at the shop floor is reduced to the minimum. The authority of the labour commissioner under various labour laws is delegated to the development commissioner whose office has very broad powers over the SEZs. He is registration officer, conciliation officer as well as inspector under various labour laws, providing a single window service for the zone investors. Therefore, he is not only responsible for insuring the implementation of various labour laws, but is also the registrar for trade unions. There are provisions that the industrial units may also obtain inspection reports

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relating to workers’ health and safety from accredited agencies, i.e. agencies approved by the state government.

Moreover, all the operations in the SEZs are declared as ‘public utility services’ under the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act) 1947;,therefore legal strikes are next to impossible. Further, the amendments in to the labour laws, both those already approved and those proposed, by different states for their SEZs, have rendered the labour laws completely meaningless and toothless. The Andhra Pradesh government in its SEZ policy proposed that the SEZs be exempted from chapters V-B and 9-A of the ID Act. Chapter V-B makes it compulsory for employers to receive prior permission from the relevant government and give two months notice before retrenchments/layoffs are made; and Section 9-A makes it compulsory to give notice to the workmen or their representatives before any change in the service conditions of the workers is made. It is also proposed to exempt SEZs from sections 11, 13 and 18 of the Minimum Wages Act 1948, including Exemption from maintenance of registers and records; fixing hours of normal workdays, etc).

It is also proposed to amend Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, to provide suitable exemptions to make it possible for companies to operate 365 day a year for 24 hours in a day, provided suitable overtime allowance is paid. It is also proposed to exempt SEZs from publication of working time, wage rate and shift working as otherwise required under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. State government proposes to exempt SEZs from the Contract Labour Act without reference to Emergency. The proposed amendment in Trade Union Act 1926 would insert a provision excluding outsiders from becoming office bearers of a trade union; and the requirement of at least 30 percent of workforce be members in order for there to be recognition of the trade union. Under the Factories Act 1948, the labour officer working under SEZ development commissioner is delegated the powers of Inspector and Chief Inspector of Factories for units in SEZ. Moreover, it is proposed to introduce a provision in the Factories Act to exempting Units (companies) located in the SEZs or of a class of units from all or some provisions of the Act. Other states have also proposed or made similar amendments to the labour laws.

It is clear that the hundreds of thousands of workers in hundreds of SEZs in India will be compelled to work in conditions of virtual slavery. The working conditions in the zones that are already operational are some of the worse. The conditions are more like the informal sector than the formal sector; and we can say that this is actually transforming the formal sector to informal sector. The wages are very low. In Brandix India Apparel City SEZ workers are not getting the minimum

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wage. Overtime is compulsory for all workers. The workloads are so heavy that the workers can bear it only when they are young. In terms of occupational health, the situation is most serious. Two Brandix workers died due to lung disease caused by dust pollution at the shop floor. Most importantly, the workers have no voice. According to workers, unionization efforts are seen as a crime and anyone who is found involved in such efforts is thrown out. The most important factors making the unionization process difficult in SEZs can be listed as follows:

1. Legislation either banning trade union activities in the zones or erecting restrictions such that forming a union becomes next to impossible

2. A highly casualized workforce, generally hired and fired frequently 3. A workforce comprised chiefly of young unmarried women who usually

plan to leave the job after marriage, therefore do not take any interest in the unionization process

4. Special nature of the zones with restricted entry, minimum scope for interaction among workers and a near-ban on entry by outside trade union organizers

5. The inbuilt nature of the SEZ economy based on FDI and exports, which provides the foreign investors from different countries the opportunity to achieve an exorbitant level of profits, and with SEZ developers competing with each other to provide the cheapest labour

However, the problems and prospects of unionization and workers resistance in the SEZ-era cannot be equated with the EPZ-era. Even if the problems increased (in terms of relaxations and amendments to labour laws for SEZs and highly anti-labour politico-economic environment created in the phase of liberalization and globalization), the prospects for organizing the workers have also increased. There are mainly three factors behind this:

1. There were only seven EPZs and their importance to the economy as a whole was very small. There will be around 1,000 SEZs, and they are going to play a major, rather decisive role in the economy. Therefore, in 2011 almost all national trade unions are realizing the importance of organizing the zone workers.

2. EPZs largely hosted comparatively smaller units which employed a few hundred workers or even less. Therefore, unionization was difficult and the victimization of workers was easier. But now more and more large units are coming to the SEZs employing thousands of workers, which is increasing the power of workers and creating favorable situations for organizing them. It has also emerged as a new trend that majority of workers in the new zones

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possess proof of employment. Even if this does not provide them any job security, it legally empowers them to demand all the legal benefits they are due and creates better situations for unionization.

3. In the pre-liberalisation era, the unions had strong membership bases in sectors with secure employment. There was almost no emphasis on organizing workers in the informal sectors or in sectors with that were informal in nature if not in name. . Actually to organize such workers, a strategy qualitatively different from that of shop-floor unionism was needed, and most of the trade unions had no such experience of working on such strategies. However, in the phase of liberalization with the drastic informalisation of workforce even in the organized sector, trade unions realized the importance of organizing these sectors and also started learning to work on various strategies suited to these new situations

It is interesting to note that as soon as the SEZs became operational, the workers’ resistance also emerged, even when there were no trade unions. Apache SEZ in Nellore of Andhra Pradesh started its production operations in 2006-07, and there was a sudden two-day strike of workers in 2007 protesting an incidence of harassment of a women worker. There was another two-hour sudden strike in April 2008, demanding Ambedakar Jayanti be declared a holiday. In March 10, 2010, the workers again suddenly went on a strike. In retaliation, the management declared an indefinite lock out and threatened to close its operations. The lockout lasted for seven days. There was no trade union in Apache.

Brandix started its production operations in 2008-09 and in November 2009, there was a sudden strike of workers against OSH problems which led to death of a worker. In Brandix also there was no trade union. Nokia SEZ in Tamilnadu also encountered similar situations very soon. In 2008, there was a sudden strike by Nokia workers demanding wage hikes. However, in the meantime a trade union was formed at Nokia with the initiative of the trade union wing of the ruling Dravidian Progressive Federation, Dravida Munnetra Kazahgam (DMK) party17, the Labour Progressive Federation (LPF). But even after the union was formed, there was another sudden strike in 2009. From the above accounts, it is clear that workers’ resistance in the zones is emerging as sudden outbursts or wild cat strikes. This is largely due to the absence of trade union rights and restrictions on the right to strike. Particularly, in the SEZs with larger labour intensive manufacturing units, it is emerging as a trend. The discontent is growing among the workers and when it becomes unbearable, they suddenly stop working.

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Keeping in view the extreme anti-labour practices in the zones, the above situation suggest that the SEZs are going to emerge as the new war zones of the working class.

On the one hand, the zone investors and the state will never allow the workers to realize their union rights and improve working conditions; since the whole strategy for making the SEZ units internationally competitive is firstly and lastly based on ensuring a supply of cheap labour. On the other hand, workers with their increased strength will not tolerate these extreme exploitative conditions for long. The increasing strength of workers in particular zones and with support coming from national trade unions will certainly convert the zones into permanent conflict zones.

Generally, the export units cannot face long protests by workers, since there will be losses, not only in terms of production output and profits but also of export orders. Therefore, the impact will not be only short term but also long term. However, this situation also puts limits on the workers’ struggles. Since the capital has attained unrestricted mobility, there is always the fear of disinvestment. With labour struggles intensifying, the units may choose to close down their operations and move elsewhere. Hence there is always fear of losing jobs. In such situations, many times workers may be compelled to compromise; as it happened in case of workers’ struggle in Apache SEZ in 2010. A sustained and intense conflict between labour and capital is inbuilt in the nature of SEZs. This may many times lead to closures and disinvestment by companies, throwing out large numbers of workers on the road and leading to more intense and wider conflicts.

With the above situations, it is obvious that the traditional strategies of shop-floor unionism may not work in the case of SEZs. The general scenario as reflected in case of Brandix SEZ and also in case of Apache SEZ demands a qualitatively different strategy for organizing workers. The following points demand urgent attention in this regard:

1. There is little scope of interaction among the workers and absolutely no scope for trade union organizers for interacting with workers within the boundaries of the zones. This is due to obvious restrictions, and because workers have no time for it due to their long overtime work. Moreover, the workers can be fired very easily, and so hesitate to participate in any unionization efforts, gate meetings, etc. Hence, the initial organizational bases can be established at the places where they live, rather than at the workplace.

2. The nature of SEZ workers’ struggle is such that many times they face such situations when the companies threaten to close down the units, as seen in

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case of recent Apache workers’ struggle. In such situations they cannot win the battle without broader support from the community. Hence the scope of organizational work must be widened to include involvement in various community struggles with a labour perspective, to build a broader solidarity with the community.

3. Women constitute a significant proportion of the workforce in the SEZs, therefore the organization of workers must provide a larger space for their issues, both at the workplace and in the society; and also insure a larger space for them in the leadership.

4. The isolation of zone workers reduces their strength. Therefore, there is a need to build broader alliances to break this isolation and to extend effective outside support to zone level struggles. The struggle for labour rights in the SEZs requires state level and national level SEZ workers’ fronts to launch broader campaigns and struggles to realize policy changes.

5. There is always the chance of the closure of units in the zone and their reopening somewhere else, including another country, whenever the workers’ struggles intensify in the zones. Therefore, international solidarity is crucial to put effective restrictions on the movements of such capital and its hunt for cheaper labour.

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Endnotes

1. Factsheet on special economic zones March 2010; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, http://www.sezindia.nic.in; accessed on March, 12, 2010

2. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, http//www.sezindia.nic.in; accessed on March, 12, 2010

3. Mamata virtually nixes land acquisition bill; Times of India; Jul 25, 2009 4. Live Mint; Tue, Sep 9 2008; http://www.livemint.com/2008/09/09004252/A-judgement-and-

economics.html5. Retrieved from http://www.kakinadasez.com/ kakinada-sez-unit-details-government-support. htm6. See notification of AP SEZ Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Annexure-37. Andhra Jyothy, District edition, 17th October,20098. Amendment to Land Ceiling Act Proposed; The Hindu, Saturday, Aug08, 2009 9. Polepally SEZ contestants make their point; The Hindu, 19th May 200910. New Indian Exp Dec 25, 200811. Scheduled caste (dalit) and scheduled tribe (adivasi) refer to historically disadvantaged people12. Jaggery is or “Gur” or whole sugar is a pure, wholesome, traditional, unrefined, whole sugar. It

contains the natural goodness of minerals and vitamins inherently present in sugarcane juice & this crowns it as one of the most wholesome and healthy sugars in the world. In Mexico & South America, it is also known as panela. The information is retrieved from http://www.sugarindia.com/jag.htm

13. Protect women in Brandix ; Andhra Jyoti; Feb 4, 200914. CITU alleges violation of labour laws by Brandix; The Hindu, Feb 05, 200915. Brandix refutes allegations; The Hindu, Feb 05, 2009 16. 55 percent of rural population landless: survey; The Hindu, Wednesday, Sep 01, 2004. 17. Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (literally Dravidian Progress Federation) is a regional political party

in the state of Tamil Nadu in India, but also has presence in near by state of Pondicherry. Retrieved from http://www.antya.com/detail/DMK---Dravida-Munnetra-Kazhagam/54398