SM

IWMI is a Future Harvest Centersupported by the CGIAR

Poverty Dimensions of

Irrigation Management

Transfer in Large-Scale Canal

Irrigation in Andra Pradesh

and Gujarat, India

RESEARCH

61

Water ManagementI n t e r n a t i o n a l

I n s t i t u t e

Barbara van Koppen, R. Parthasarathy and Constantina Safiliou

R E P O R T

SM

IWMI is a Future Harvest Centersupported by the CGIAR

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ISSN 1026-0862ISBN 92-9090-480-1

Water ManagementI n t e r n a t i o n a l

I n s t i t u t e

Research Reports

IWMI’s mission is to improve water and land resources management for food,livelihoods and nature. In serving this mission, IWMI concentrates on the integrationof policies, technologies and management systems to achieve workable solutions toreal problems—practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and water and landresources.

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ii

Poverty Dimensions ofIrrigation Management Transferin Large-Scale Canal Irrigation inAndra Pradesh and Gujarat, India

Research Report 61

Barbara van KoppenR. ParthasarathyandConstantina Safiliou

International Water Management InstituteP O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka

ii

IWMI receives its principal funding from 58 governments, private foundations, andinternational and regional organizations known as the Consultative Group onInternational Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Support is also given by theGovernments of Ghana, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

This collaborative study of the Poverty, Gender and Water Project conducted by theInternational Water Management Institute (IWMI) and the Gujarat Institute of DevelopmentResearch was sponsored by the Ford Foundation, New Delhi and the Swedish government(Swedish International Development Agency).

The authors: Barbara van Koppen is a Senior Scientist of IWMI, R. Parthasarathy isan Associate Professor at the Gujarat Institute of Development Research andConstantina Safiliou is a Freelance Consultant.

The contributions and encouragement throughout the process by Tushaar Shah—Research Leader, Policy, Institutions and Management of the International WaterManagement Institute—were vital and are gratefully acknowledged. The authors also wishto thank Prof. John R. Wood, University of British Columbia, for his inputs at variousstages of the work; Mr. Harish Joshi, Gujarat Institute of Development Research, whoshouldered the responsibility of fieldwork in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, and alsohelped in tabulation and analysis of data; Ms. Jharna Pathak, Mr. Bala Raju Nikku andMs. Minu Dodiya for assisting in the project; Mr. Jayanthi Solanki, Ms. Usha Rani, Mr.Lakshmi Narayanan and Ms. Nirupama for their committed support in fieldwork.

During the course of work, many organizations and individuals gave support. The authorsextend their sincere thanks to Mr. O. T. Gulati, Additional Secretary (PIM), Government ofGujarat and Mr. Raymond Peter, Secretary (Irrigation), Government of Andhra Pradesh.They also thank the Irrigation Department officials in both states and gratefullyacknowledge the cooperation and enthusiastic support of the Water Users Associations andthe farmers. A special thanks to Prof. Rathna Reddy and Prof. Gopinath Reddy of theCentre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad. The authors also thank Chris vanKoppen and Madhudusan Bhattarai for their stimulating comments on earlier drafts.

van Koppen, B.; R. Parthasarathy; and C. Safiliou. 2002. Poverty dimensions of irrigationmanagement transfer in large-scale canal irrigation in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat, India.Research Report 61. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute.

/ poverty / irrigation management transfer / privatization / large-scale canal systems /rural development / farmer participation / water users’ associations / equity /waterdistribution / water rights / farmer-managed irrigation systems / participatory management/ indicators / farm size / income distribution / India / Andra Pradesh / Gujarat /

ISBN 92-9090-480-1

ISSN 1026-0862

Copyright © 2002, by IWMI. All rights reserved.

Please send inquiries and comments to: iwmi-research-news@cgiar.org

iii

Contents

Summary v

Justification and research design 1

Poverty and farm size 4

Access to water 9

Impact of IMT on access to water 13

Participation in WUAs 18

Recommendations for pro-poor IMT 22

Annex 24

Literature cited 25

iv

v

Summary

The need for a pro-poor mode of irrigationmanagement transfer (IMT) has arisen due to theobserved tendency of IMT to aggravate ruralpoverty. This research, centered on large scalecanal irrigation schemes in India, seeks to: a)examine ways to measure relative income povertywithin large-scale irrigation schemes, b) examinethe validity of the common assumption that bothpoor and non-poor farmers of the same irrigationscheme have equal access to canal water, andc) assess the differential impacts of IMTprograms on poor and non-poor farmers in AndraPradesh and Gujarat, India. Two different IMTprograms—the state-wide program under theAndra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of IrrigationSystems Act of 1999 (APFMIS) and the pilotprogram under the Participatory IrrigationManagement Resolution in Gujarat of 1995(PIM)—were selected for this study. Sevenhundred land owning and tenant farmers from 7water users’ associations (WUAs) constituted thesample of “small farmers” and “larger farmers”with operational holdings of less than one hectareand one hectare or more, respectively.

Relative farm size was found to be a validindicator of relative income, as many featurescharacteristic of the farm size exert a determininginfluence on income. Moreover, the readyavailability of data on farm size makes it a

practical indicator. In Andra Pradesh a higherproportion of small farmers depend on canalwater but the concentration of their plots, mainlyin the tail ends, poses a disadvantage regardingcanal water accessibility. In contrast, nodifferences in water accessibility exist betweensmall farmers and larger farmers in Gujarat.Therefore, IMT that improves access to canalwater is pro-poor per se in Andra Pradesh andequally beneficial to both small and larger farmersin Gujarat.

Farmer participation in WUA activities israther low in both states and most small farmersare unaware of WUAs. While small farmers oftenparticipate in repair and rehabilitation work, thelarger farmers involve themselves in meetings,committees, etc. Such inequity in participationundermines the equitable distribution of benefitsfrom IMT and also the viability of WUAs thatdepend heavily on the labor contribution of smallfarmers. It is recommended that a one-farm one-vote right, irrespective of farm size, stipulated byAPFMIS, be concretized through awareness raising.

The impacts observed are from 5 years ofprogram implementation in Gujarat and 2 years inAndra Pradesh. The findings of this researchunderscore the necessity for monitoring farm-sizerelated differences as a prerequisite for ensuringpro-poor IMT.

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Poverty Dimensions of Irrigation ManagementTransfer in Large-Scale Canal Irrigation in AndraPradesh and Gujarat, India

Barbara van Koppen, R. Parthasarathy and Constantina Safiliou

especially poor people are reached and gainfrom irrigation investments are also on theagenda at the earliest stages of schemedevelopment. Targeting the poor by selectingtheir lands for improvement or land redistributionin the new command area and allocating newland primarily to the poor, are two possiblemeasures and they are essentially arrangedbefore construction (Chambers 1984; Jazairy etal. 1992). Prevention of poor people’s loss ofland and water rights without propercompensation is equally negotiated at the verybeginning. Another regulation that determinespoor people’s relative benefits, and is typicallydecided upon in the early phases, is theallocation of water rights. Allocation of suchrights in proportion to land size rather than, forexample, on the basis of an equal quantity ofwater to every farm household, reproduces theinequities of land distribution in the distributionof water and water-created wealth. Allocationproportional to land size is widespread incountries like India, which is the focus of thepresent research.1

Justification and Research Design

Justification

Poverty alleviation has always been animportant aim of the governments of developingcountries when investing in the constructionand operation of large-scale canal irrigationinfrastructure. Among the expected impacts arebenefits for poor net food producers from moreintensive cropping of higher-yielding varietiesduring a longer period of the year, including thelean period. Urban and rural poor net foodbuyers benefit from higher agricultural outputand lower food prices. New wage employment inirrigated agriculture, construction work and theincrease of local demand for goods andservices as spin-off of irrigation developmentwould further benefit the rural poor.

These plausible, and partly verified, positiveimpacts of irrigation on the income-poor arerealized when new schemes start functioningand effecting a shift from rain-fed agriculture toirrigated agriculture, one crop per year to morecrops, a low-value crop to a high-value crop,etc. Therefore, targeted measures to ensure that

1In India, the proportionality of water rights to land size (and crops) is strong in formal and local law, like warabandi (a system of rotational turnsthrough which each shareholder in a watercourse obtains his or her water supply). This reproduces the skewed distribution of land in water useand the distribution of wealth created with water. This proportionality is rarely questioned except for a few often-cited micro-scale experiments inwhich the rightful quantity of water was disconnected from land size, for example in the Pani Panchayats in Pune (Chambers 1994), and sometimeseven from landownership, as in Sukhomajri (Sarin 1996). In the present research, the quantity of water was disconnected from land size inGujarat WUA1 during a short period of severe water scarcity, with support from an NGO.

2

If the early phases of scheme developmentare most critical to realize poverty alleviationimpacts, the question is, whether there areirrigation policy-related poverty issues in theuse phase. Irrigation agencies concerned withpoverty may, during the use phase, simplyconcentrate on ensuring that the schemefunctions well and realizes its potential, whilewater is allocated equitably. It is true thatlocalized measures during the use phase, suchas rehabilitation or drainage and salinizationmanagement, may still be targeted at sites inthe scheme where a high proportion of poorpeople depend upon irrigation. However, ingeneral, the working hypothesis that once ascheme functions, the scheme operation andmaintenance equally affects poor and non-poorfarmers and that inequities related to farm size(and hence poverty) are a given which irrigationagencies cannot change anymore seemsjustified. An incidentally verified commonassumption that the poor are concentrated inthe tail ends as a consequence of povertycannot easily be changed either. It onlyunderlines the urgency to address the general,scheme-level head-tail inequities in water use inorder to reduce water scarcity which, in turn,tends to become an additional cause of povertyin the tail ends. Even if sociopolitical andeconomic power relations among farmers arefound to play a role in irrigation management atall levels (Mollinga 1998) including negotiationsfor water at farm level (Jairath 1999a; Raju2000), they seem less relevant than generalscheme problems, unless social inequities arehuge, as in feudal societies. The lack of toolsto monitor poverty dimensions in large-scalecanal irrigation schemes during the use phaseundoubtedly perpetuates the silence onpoverty—once schemes have startedfunctioning.

The working hypothesis that the interests ofthe poor sufficiently overlap the general schemeinterests may have been valid in the past.However, this could drastically change under

irrigation reform and IMT. Since the mid-1980s,hand-over of managerial and financialresponsibilities of the public schemes to newlyestablished water users associations (WUAs) inreturn for stronger rights for farmers over water,and in some cases also ownership ofinfrastructure, has been intensified worldwide(Vermillion, 1997). Evaluations of the earlyexperiences of IMT increasingly indicate thatthe current mode of IMT only works in respectof non-poor, market-oriented, large-scale andbusiness-like agriculture (Shah et al. 2002). Thisis the case in countries like the USA and NewZealand or on large farms in South Africa,Mexico and Turkey. In schemes in the middle-and low-income countries with a heterogeneouscomposition of farmers in the command areas,IMT succeeds only where farmers with thelargest holdings become the “champions,” forexample, in Colombia (Ramirez and Vargas1999) or Sudan (Narayanamurthy et al. 1997).For poorer farmers in Sudan, and indeed inmany smallholder irrigation schemes, especiallyin sub-Saharan Africa, withdrawal of statesupport led to partial or full collapse of thescheme, with negative consequences on bothproductivity and poverty. That pattern wassimilar in Kenya (Kabutha and Mutero 2001),Zimbabwe (Manzungu et al. 1999) and SouthAfrica (Shah et al. 2002). Many current modesof IMT aggravate rural poverty and jeopardizeoriginal government goals of irrigation investments.

Governments continue IMT in pursuit of theoriginally expected goals of removing theinefficiencies of costly state bureaucracies (orjust saving state funds) and intentions of bettertapping local farmer knowledge, entrepreneurialskills and their keen motivation to ensureadequate water services. This is also thepolicy and practice of the government of India(Brewer et al. 1999; Hooja and Joshi 2000).Hence, the question is how future irrigationmanagement transfer can be done in a “pro-poor” mode resulting in benefits to poor farmers,while benefiting non-poor farmers equally or

3

perhaps to a lesser degree. The presentresearch addresses this issue.

Research Questions

First, the research aims to contribute to thedevelopment of a poverty indicator appropriatenot only for use in the present research butalso for use by the government staff, WUAsand researchers for routine monitoring ofpoverty dimensions in large-scale canalirrigation schemes under IMT. An indicatorshould facilitate the comparison of differentialimpacts on poor and non-poor farmers within aparticular scheme at a certain moment andidentification of trends overtime. Existing dataand registers should be used optimally. Farmsize fits these criteria best. This researchfurther examines the relationship between farmsize and other intra-scheme variables that affectfarm incomes and income-poverty in order tovalidate and improve an indicator based on farmsize. These are the location of plots at heador tail ends, crop choice, cropping intensity andthe role of other income sources in farmhouseholds.

Second, the research empirically tests theabove-mentioned hypothesis that irrigationaffairs in functioning large-scale canal irrigationschemes, in particular access to water, affectpoor and non-poor farmers in the same schemealike, given land distribution, plot locations inhead or tail, and water allocation proportional tofarm size. Both canal water and water fromother irrigation sources, such as wells andmechanized pumps, are considered. Wheresystematic differences between poor and non-poor farmers in their access to water are foundto exist, plausible implications for IMT are traced.

Last, as the core of the research,differential impacts of irrigation managementtransfer programs in Andra Pradesh and Gujaraton poor and non-poor farmers are examined.Impacts of IMT with regard to access to water,

crop choice, newly irrigated area production andincomes are analyzed and equities andinequities of participation in the new WUAs areassessed.

Methodology

The research questions are addressed forschemes under two different IMT programs, theAndra Pradesh Farmers Management ofIrrigation Systems Act of 1997 (APFMIS) andthe Government of Gujarat Resolution onParticipatory Irrigation Management 1995(PIM).Worldwide, the innovative “big-bang” approachof APFMIS is seen as the most effective modeof IMT. The approach taken in Gujaratrepresents the more conventional, step-by-steppilot method, which has also been appliedelsewhere in India and other countries(Parthasarathy 2000; Brewer et al. 1999). Bothprograms are still young , only 2 years in AndraPradesh and 5 years in Gujarat. Hence, effectshave not crystallized as yet, especially in AndraPradesh and the findings at this stage serverather as a baseline for continued impactmonitoring. More importantly, the assessment ofearly impacts informs policy makers on timeabout poverty impacts so that recommendationsto render the mode of IMT more ‘pro-poor’, ifneeded, can still be implemented.

Seven newly established WUAs wereselected from the main agro-ecological regionsin Andra Pradesh and Gujarat. The three WUAsin Andra Pradesh (Andra Pradesh WUA1, AndraPradesh WUA2 and Andra Pradesh WUA3) arefrom the Telangana, Coastal and Rayalseemaregions respectively, and were chosen randomlyfrom the largest schemes in these regions. InGujarat, two WUAs were selected randomlyfrom the pilot PIM schemes in the dry northGujarat region (Gujarat WUA1 and GujaratWUA2) and two from the central south region(Gujarat WUA3 and Gujarat WUA4). NGOs arethe implementing agencies of the two Northern

4

WUAs while the governmental irrigationdepartment (ID) supports the southern WUAs.The main characteristics of these WUAs arelisted in the annex.

The total sample consists of 700 farmhouseholds operating holdings in the commandarea of these WUAs during the year 1998–1999.Further, in each WUA, committee memberstotaling 67 were interviewed. The selection ofthe 700 farm households was stratified andincluded landowners of four size classes ofoperational holdings: less than 0.5 ha, from0.5–1 ha, from 1–2.5 ha and above 2.5 ha.A fifth category consisted of owner-cum-tenantsor tenants who cultivated leased-in land in thecommand area and whose operationallandholding did not exceed one ha.2 Female-headed households were purposively included inthe study.3 This sample allows identifying farm-size-related patterns. As relevant, the findingsare either presented for all farm classes or fortwo main classes: the smallest three classes ofowners and tenants operating less than 1 haeach are regrouped as “small farmers” (totaling490) and the two categories with operationalholdings above 1 ha are regrouped into thecategory of “larger farmers” (totaling 210).

Farm-size-related differences in access toirrigation water were measured, first, byassessing access to canal water and othersources of irrigation by farm size. Second, thenumber of waterings received from canals orother irrigation sources for main crops in ascheme were compared. In Andra Pradesh,access to water was assessed for the kharif(summer season) 1998–1999. In this state, theirrigated area is generally the largest during thisseason. In one WUA in the sample, there is noirrigation at all in rabi (winter season). Themajor crops found in the study of WUAs werepaddy and maize as predominant food cropsand cotton, chili and groundnut as cash crops.In Gujarat, rabi (winter season) is the mostimportant season for irrigation; so the rabi of1998–1999 was analyzed. The major crops arewheat and the cash crops, mustard andtobacco. Access to water was studied for the910 plots in both states with these eight maincrops. For the assessment of effects of IMT onaccess to water, other aspects such as thequantities of water, timeliness and reliability ofwater services as well as perceived changes inproductivity and incomes, for any of the plots,were also included.

2These farm sizes fall within the relatively small farm sizes, for example, in Andra Pradesh where 97% of all irrigated farms are below 5 ha (FAO-INPIM 2000).3Results of the analysis of the gender aspects are reported elsewhere (van Koppen et al. 2000).

Poverty and Farm Size

rrigation schemes in India where land registersalready exist. Farm size is especially a validproxy for relative income and income povertywithin localized irrigation schemes whererelative farm size is a proxy for relativeincomes and relative poverty. Farmers in thesame scheme are more or less equally affected

The relationship between income poverty andlack of land is well established and continues tolead to poverty-focused land reforms (Sobhan1993; Dev et al. 1994; World Bank 2000).Hence, in an agriculture-based rural economy,farm size is a valid proxy for income. It is alsoa proxy for which data are available in many

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by other important variables that determineincomes, such as access to markets, off-farmemployment opportunities, climate, etc. So,farm size is the most appropriate and the onlycurrently available indicator for routinemonitoring of poverty dimensions in irrigationschemes. The question is whether and, ifpossible, how the indicator can be furtherimproved. Therefore, we examined importantfactors that influence the relationship betweenfarm size and income that may vary highlywithin WUAs, such as location of the plot in thehead or tail and related land value, croppingintensity, value of crops grown, and last but notleast, other household income sources thanirrigated agriculture. The assessment of whetherthere is a positive, negative or neutralrelationship between farm size and thesevariables led to the following conclusions.

Plot Location

Plots of small and larger farmers are notscattered randomly throughout the command

area. Larger farmers appear to besystematically more successful in occupying thehead and middle reaches and in avoiding tailends than small farmers. Tail ends are generallyassumed to be more disadvantageous. Figure 1shows that, out of all plots belonging to smallfarmers in Andra Pradesh, most (57%) are inthe tail ends, while the corresponding value forlarger farmers is 44 percent. A similar bias isobserved in Gujarat where the plots of smalland larger farmers in the tail end are 38 percentand 29 percent, respectively. This difference iseven more relevant because small farmers moreoften depend only on one or two plots. As figure 2indicates, in Andra Pradesh, the large majorityof the smallest farmers, with holdings of lessthan 0.5 ha (86%) have only one plot each. InGujarat, where plots are generally smaller, therisk of having only one plot in the tail end isless—half of even the smallest farmers withless than 0.5 ha, each have two plots or more.Thus, small farm size is related to location inthe tail. This makes the relationship betweenfarm size and income stronger and farm sizemore valid as a proxy. Head-tail inequities in

Figure 1.Proportion of plots by location and farm size.

Notes: Significance χ2

Andra Pradesh: Significant at 0.005 level. Gujarat: Significant at 0.005 level.

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water delivery are not just a general schemeproblem but they are a problem that affectspoorer farmers more than larger farmers. As aconsequence, in the WUAs of both states, IMTthat leads to better provision of canal water tothe tails would be “pro-poor” in itself as itdisproportionately benefits small farmers.

FIGURE 2.Proportion of households by number of plots and farm size and tenancy status.

Crop Choice4

Systematic farm-size related differences relatedto crop choice were found in Andra Pradesh. Asfigure 3 shows, a significantly higher proportionof plots operated by small farmers (54%) arecultivated with the low-value paddy crop, used

4Differential yields per unit of land and cropping intensities are not further considered here. The latter is of limited importance, because in sixWUAs the irrigated areas in the two irrigation seasons are comparable for both seasons. In one scheme there is only one kharif.

Notes: Significance χ2

Andra Pradesh: Paddy, among all crops: Significant at 0.005 level Chili, among cash crops: Significant at 0.01 level. Gujarat: Not significant.

FIGURE 3.Proportion of plots by major crop and farm size.

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for family consumption and for the market, thanthe plots cultivated by larger farmers (32%). Asfor high-value cash crops, larger farmerscultivate chili more often than small farmers(19% versus 8%, respectively). In Gujarat, nosystematic relationships were found betweenholding size and crop choice (wheat, mustard,tobacco). This means that farm size is evenmore strongly related to income in AndraPradesh but not in Gujarat.

Other Income Sources

Figure 4 highlights that the irrigated plots arerarely the only income source, especially amongthe smallest farmers. Even though the majorityof the farmers with holdings above 2.5 ha alsohave more income sources, this finding impliesthat caution is needed in equaling differences infarm size to differences in income. Additionalinformation on the relative and absolute contributionof these other income sources to total income andincome poverty would improve the indicator.

Insight into the source of other incomesclarifies whether additional income is from

irrigated agriculture and hence indirectly relatedto IMT, or not. Figure 5 shows that agricultureand allied activities such as agricultural wagelabor and livestock, are the primary incomesource for 91 percent of the sample householdsin Andra Pradesh. In Gujarat, the rural economyis less agriculture-based and off-farmemployment has become an important primaryincome source. Among the households operatingholdings of less than 0.5 ha, 46 percent findtheir major income outside agriculture, in regular(non-agricultural) wage labor and self-employment, and in trades such as diamond-cutting in areas like Visnagar, Surat.

The importance of agriculture in AndraPradesh is also reflected in the finding thatlaborer is the main activity status of asignificant proportion of all members ofthe poorest households in Andra Pradesh. Thus,49 percent of all working women and 33percent of the men in small tenants’households are reported to be active ascasual agricultural wage laborers. Wage laborprovides the primary source of householdincome in 33 per cent of all households and thesecondary source of income of another

FIGURE 4.Proportion of households with only one income source by farm size.

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24 percent of all households in Andra Pradesh.In contrast, in farms up to one hectare inGujarat, less than 14 percent of all malehousehold members and less than 6 percent ofall women are agricultural wage laborers.

In Andra Pradesh, landlessness iswidespread, which explains not only the highdependence on agricultural wage labor, but alsohigh tenancy rates. In Andra Pradesh WUA3, forexample, about 30 percent of the eligiblemembers of the WUA are reportedly tenants.5 InGujarat, on the other hand, leasing in of landby poor people is rarely reported. On thecontrary, the incidence of reverse tenancy ishigh, especially in the two WUAs where agricultureis least important as an income base for the smallfarmers. Farmers with very small smallholdingslease their lands to large landowners.

In Andra Pradesh literacy rates are low. Theaverage percentage of literate persons in thesample households is 49 percent for men and25 percent for women. In Gujarat, this is muchhigher—69 percent for men and43 percent for women.

Conclusion

In both states, small farms are more oftenlocated in the tail ends compared to largerfarms. In Andra Pradesh, small farm size isalso related to the cultivation of low-valuecrops. These relationships reinforce the validityof farm size as a proxy for income poverty.However, farm size and income diversificationare inversely related. Especially in very smallholdings, there is more often more than justone income source. Thus, in interpreting therelationships between farm size and othervariables that are presented below, one needsto realize that the smallest farms are notnecessarily the most income-poor in Gujarat.More research is needed on the importance ofother income sources, in respect of poverty(cattle, wage-employment, number of earningmale/female household members, casual/permanent employment, etc.).

Farm size is recommended for the routinemonitoring of income poverty dimensions inlarge-scale canal irrigation schemes. The proxy

5In some coastal areas, more than 75% of the land is sharecropped (Raju 2000). The average percentage of tenants in irrigation in AndraPradesh is 13 according to FAO-INPIM (2000).

FIGURE 5.Proportion of households with major income from agriculture.

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would improve if it was specified for variableslike location, crop choice, cropping intensity,and, as elaborated in the next sections, accessto water and the WUA. However, the indicator

Access to Water

FIGURE 6.Proportion of plots by WUA and source of irrigation.

would especially improve as a proxy for incomepoverty if additional information on other incomesources were included.

It is commonly assumed that importantfeatures of functioning canal irrigation schemessuch as access to water in the command areaare similar for poor and non-poor farmers, oncewater allocation proportional to farm size andskewed land distribution are accepted as agiven. The findings above already indicate thatin the sample WUAs there are systematicdifferences in variables that indirectly affectaccess to water, namely the concentration ofsmall farms in the tail ends and, in AndraPradesh, preference of small farmers for paddy,a water-consuming crop. Other systematicdifferences in access to water were found aswell, at least in Andra Pradesh.

Alternative Irrigation Sources

Before looking into farm-size related differencesin access to water, a general picture of theimportance of conjunctive use of water fromeither canals or other sources is given. Of allthe sample plots, 51 percent in Andra Pradeshand 62 percent in Gujarat are irrigated byalternative sources of water. However, thepattern strongly varies by WUA. Each state hasone WUA that still largely depends on canalwater only (figure 6). In Andra Pradesh,alternative sources are shallow large-diameterwells with mechanized pumps and tanks. InGujarat, they are primarily shallow wells with

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pumps. Deep tubewells are used only in GujaratWUA1, in the dry northern part of Gujarat,where as many as 66 percent of the plotssurveyed are irrigated by tubewells or acombination of tubewells and canal water.Another 11 percent of plots in this WUA areirrigated by shallow wells alone or incombination with canals. In Gujarat WUA2, theother WUA in the dry north, water provision in32 percent of the plots is done by both wellsand canals (but very few tubewells).Remarkably, less than 7 percent of plots in allfive other WUAs are irrigated by a combinationof alternative sources and canals. Thus, mostplots in the sample depend either on canalwater or, more often, on alternative sources ofwater, but rarely on both.

The location of alternative irrigation sourcesin the command area varies. In Andra Pradesh,alternative sources are significantly moreprevalent in the head and middle reaches,where 64 per cent of the plots depend uponalternative sources. In the tail ends, this is 36percent. In Gujarat, the alternative sources aremore towards the tail ends, where 69 percent ofthe plots depend upon alternative sources. Inthe upstream reaches this is less—59 percentof the plots.

For all crops, plots irrigated by alternativeirrigation sources received a higher number ofwaterings than plots irrigated from canals.Therefore, alternative irrigation sources performbetter (but tend to cost more). Expectedly, plotsthat depend only on canal irrigation face moreproblems in the tail. For seven out of the eightcrops (except wheat in Gujarat) canal-irrigatedplots in the tails received less waterings thanthose at the head. The picture is more mixed ifone compares the number of waterings from

alternative water sources either in the head,middle or tail. For five of the eight crops, tailenders get more waterings from alternativesources than head enders.

Differential Access to Water

The first aspect of possible systematicdifferences in access to water between smalland larger farmers concerns their access toalternative irrigation sources. In Andra Pradesha significant bias was found. In this state only46 percent of the plots of small farmers wereirrigated from alternative sources as against56 percent of plots of larger farmers. In Gujarat,there was no such difference. Among the plotsof small and larger farmers, 63 percent and62 percent respectively were irrigated fromalternative sources.6

The second aspect analyzed is the numberof waterings received by small and largerfarmers either from canals or from alternativesources. This highlighted important differencesin Andra Pradesh, as shown in figure 7. Thosesmall farmers with access to alternativesources received less waterings from them thanlarger farmers received for four of the fivecrops. Remarkably, not only a higher proportionof small farmers use canal water, but they alsotake more waterings than larger farmersespecially for paddy, their preferred crop, andalso for cotton. However, differences in thenumber of waterings for the other cash crops donot exist or point in the opposite direction.Thus, in Andra Pradesh canal irrigation, whichis the cheapest water source, is in a sense, a“small farmers’ affair.” Again, in Gujarat, thereare no systematic differences.

6No data are available on whether one has access to alternative sources as owner or as water buyer. Water buyers usually pay relatively highwater prices. The poor are typically buyers of water, because they cannot afford to buy mechanized irrigation equipment and become watersellers (Shah 1993; Parthasarathy 1999).

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FIGURE 7.Number of waterings received per plot by crop, source of irrigation, and farm size.

Tenants

In order to answer the question of whethertenancy status of plots has an effect on accessto water, the judgement of farmers on whetherthey received the number of waterings they hadthought was required for their plots wasexamined—comparing leased-in plots and ownedplots. As figure 8 shows, a higher proportion ofrespondents among small farms in both statesare satisfied with water delivery for plotsleased-in than for plots owned. This is thereverse for larger farmers. A lower proportion oflarger farmers are satisfied for plots leased-inthan for owned plots. This may indicate thatsmall tenants are able to choose plots with asatisfactory water supply. Larger farmers, onthe other hand, may have other reasons tochoose plots, i.e., bordering on their own land.

Whether IMT will negatively affect thecurrent satisfaction of small tenants needs to be

monitored. In the Gujarati law, tenants who lacktheir own land in the command area have nolegal status as members of the WUA. In AndraPradesh the law recognizes them (see below).Here the issue is that tenants may decline toget registered as WUA members as this makestheir legal claims under state tenancy laws sostrong that owners may stop giving their landson lease to them.

Conclusions

In Andra Pradesh, canal irrigation tends to bea “small farmers’ affair” in several respects. Aslightly higher proportion of small farmers thanlarger farmers take water from canals, andthey take a greater number of waterings thanlarger farmers, especially for paddy, apreferred crop. The access of small farmers tothe generally better-performing alternative

Note: “N” indicates the total number of small and larger farmers.

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irrigation sources is less frequent than that oflarger farmers. Moreover, those small farmerswho have access to alternative irrigationsources tend to get less waterings than thelarger farmers for most crops. Moreover,small farmers in Andra Pradesh who areconcentrated towards the tail ends, face theproblem of a lower number of waterings than atthe head reaches. Also, access to alternativesources of irrigation is less in the tail end,compared to that of the middle and headreaches. Small farmers probably rely on canalwater because it is cheap. They usually lackthe capital to invest in infrastructure or topurchase water, even though the net benefitswould be higher.

The important implication for IMT is thatsmall farmers would benefit more than largerfarmers from improved canal irrigationperformance. Their motivation to contribute tothis improvement is probably stronger as well,

which compounds their already strong stakes inagriculture as a primary source of income. InAndra Pradesh, therefore, any improvement inaccess to canal water in general would be “pro-poor” in itself and can count on the activesupport of small farmers. As a corollary,modes of IMT that negatively affect the provisionof canal water would particularly hit the poor.

In Gujarat, access to alternative sourcesand the number of waterings received fromalternative sources are generally equally spreadamong small and larger farmers. Only theirrigation costs from alternative sources may behigher for small farmers. Although small farmersare concentrated in the tail ends in Gujarat,they take equal advantages from alternativesources, which are widespread in the tails, evenmore than in the other reaches. Accordingly,for the Gujarati WUAs, the assumption thataccess to water in canal irrigation commands isfarm-size neutral, appears valid.

FIGURE 8.Proportion of plots without difficulties in access to water, by tenancy status and farm size.

Notes : Significance χ2

Andra Pradesh,owned plots: Significant at 0.05 level. Plots leased-in, total: Not significant. Gujarat, plots leased-in: Significant at 0.025 level. Owned plots, total: Not significant.

13

Impact of IMT on Access to Water

Characteristics of IMT in the TwoStates

The two IMT programs selected for this studyare the state-wide project under the AndraPradesh Farmers Management of IrrigationSystems Act of 1997 (APFMIS) and the scheme

under the Government of Gujarat Resolution onParticipatory Irrigation Management 1995 (PIM)(Parthasarathy 2000). In Gujarat, either theIrrigation Department (ID) or an NGO acts asthe implementing agency in the pilot projectsfunctioning under the schemes. As table 1summarizes, the populist reform of Andra

APFMIS PIM

Scale All systems 12,292 WUAs 13 pilot WUAs

Tiers WUA at lowest tier, Distributary Committees WUA at lowest tier only(DCs) at next level, and Project Committee (PC)at main system level

Implementer ID and District Administration ID or NGO

Membership in Stipulated in APFMIS Act—all land users and Voluntary—landowners as ‘shareholders’;command areas owners, if title is recorded or can be shown7 shares at nominal rates

Members’ rights Stipulated in APFMIS Act: one vote per farmer Cooperative law: if committeeto elect president and one vote to elect elections are held, usuallyterritorial committee member; right one vote per farmerof recall of president

Formation of WUAs Statewide by District Collectors in April 1997, Voluntary, upon registration as cooperativeeither by election or by consensus-basedappointment of presidents and territorial committee,WUA presidents elected DCs Committeesin November 1997, PCs not formed yet

R&R Statewide, all tiers 13 pilot WUAs

Subsidies R&R Fixed grants/ha, fivefold increase with IMT to Need-based grants up toRs 250/ha,8 financed by the World Bank Rs 500/ha financed by the state

Identification and WUA participates in joint survey, ID authorizes WUA participates in joint survey,implementation of R&R and disburses funds to WUA, WUA ID approves, WUA implements

implements (no contractor)

Setting of rates and Rates tripled, revenue department still collects WUA sets rates, collects fees,collection of fees fees as part of land tax, fee recovery and R&R and hands 50% of fees over to ID,

grants will be connected, land tax will be delinked if paid in timefrom water fees, so WUA will set, collect and partlymanage fees

Water distribution ID, as before IMT (rotation, below outlet locally), Higher tiers: ID and WUA to fill/collect formsin future stronger accountability of ID staff (sejhpali). Lowest tier—WUA.for water distribution to WUA, DC and PC

TABLE 1.Main characteristics of IMT programs in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat.

7As stipulated in the Amendment through Andhra Pradesh Legislative Bill no. 32 of November 1998: “any person who is in lawful possessionand enjoyment of the land under a water source, on proof of such possession and enjoyment in a crop year, may claim membership notwithstandingwhether he is a recorded landholder or not” (Rao et al. 1999).8In 1998, US$1.00=Indian Rs 40.

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Pradesh is unique in its massive scale. Itencompasses all irrigation systems in the stateand includes all tiers in the schemes. The legalframework has, in one stroke, accommodatedall relevant aspects of farmers’ empowerment,including quite strong rights for tenants. Theorganizational structure of the civil service,rather than NGOs or the ID, was and still isused for institution building.9 Immediately afterits adoption, district collectors arranged theelection or appointment of committee membersfor 5 years, statewide. This was accompaniedby large publicity campaigns and trainingprograms, with strong political support from thehighest levels. The World Bank co-funded amassive operation of repair and rehabilitation(R&R) that started 4 months after the elections(Raju 2000). Funds for construction weredirectly channeled to the new WUAs avoiding IDstaff costs and the costs on contractors. Thissmart channeling raised the amounts availableon the ground even more, and also fosteredeagerness of farmers to repair “their” schemes(Raju 2000). Water fees are still set by thegovernment (tripled just before adoption of theAct) and the revenue department continues feecollection, as part of the land tax. The IDcontinues to handle water distribution, which isby rotation in Andra Pradesh.

In contrast, in the conventional approach in13 pilot schemes in Gujarat, transfer of watermanagement and cost recovery are already inprogress. The new WUAs, formed under theguidance of either an NGO or the ID, are in theprocess of being empowered to set fees, forother purposes and to distribute water at thelowest tier of their WUA. The new obligationsinclude filling and collecting demand forms, asrequired in the sejhpali system in Gujarat, andcollection of fees and partial handover to the ID.The pilot schemes are scattered and federationwith adjacent blocks into higher tiers is neither

foreseen nor possible in the short term. In bothstates, the canals remain government propertyand major rehabilitation continues to be theresponsibility of the IDs in the long run.

Improved access to water was an importantobjective of the APFMIS Act and the GujaratPIM Resolution. Up till now repair andrehabilitation (R&R) work constituted the mostimportant means of reaching this objective inboth states. R&R included earth work, removalof shrubs and weeds, desilting and lining ofcanals, pitching, repair and construction ofvarious structures and placing of pipelines and,in some cases, closing of illegal outlets.Moreover, in Andra Pradesh, access to watercould also be improved by the new option, atleast in theory, for farmers to communicate withone another through the Distributary Committeesand also with the higher ID staff at distributarylevel. In Gujarat, on the other hand, onceirrigation management is handed over, WUAsthemselves are entitled only to distribute waterthat the ID delivers at the intake. Formalhandover had taken place in two WUAs of thisstudy, Gujarat WUA1 and Gujarat WUA4.

Access to Water

Figure 9 presents the proportion of householdsthat perceived improvements in access to canalwater after IMT. Improved access to watersince IMT was reported by both small andlarger farmers in tail, middle and head reachesof the command areas. However, the variationbetween WUAs was strong. The highestproportion of households with a positiveevaluation (46%) is in Gujarat WUA1, where thesupport by an NGO has been exceptionallyintensive (Parthasarathy and Iyengar 1998).Mainly it is this exceptional result that rendersthe average of Gujarat (25%) higher than that ofAndra Pradesh (15%). Apparently,

9Bruns (1999) highlights the global uniqueness of bypassing the vested interests of the ID by taking the route of regional and local administration.

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Extension of Irrigated Area

Among all respondents in the sample, 2 percentin Andra Pradesh and 3 percent in Gujarat,reported an increase in the area undercultivation due to R&R work. The average sizeof land gained was 0.66 ha per farmer in AndraPradesh and 1.1 ha per farmer in Gujarat. Thefew newly irrigated plots were both in the headand tail reaches and among both small andlarger farmers.

It was difficult to obtain scheme-levelaggregate data of extended area in AndraPradesh because, before APFMIS, the revenuedepartment tended to underreport irrigatedareas. When the grants for R&R becameproportional to reported irrigated areas, farmerswho have better knowledge, often suggestedadaptations. For example, the official figure inAndra Pradesh WUA2, which is an increase of2,000 ha, is probably so high because of theseeffects. According to the president of AndraPradesh WUA2, 806 ha out of which 766 ha

FIGURE 9.Proportion of households reporting better access to canal water due to WUA.

implementation by an NGO is not a sufficientreason in itself, because the same NGO wasthe implementing agency in Gujarat WUA2,where the reported rate of improvement is onebut the lowest.

The low improvement in Andra PradeshWUA1, by only 7 percent as reported, is partlybecause the main canal was still underconstruction. Andra Pradesh WUA3 is located inthe tail end of a system, where water does notreach, even after R&R. Andra Pradesh WUA2,with the highest improvement reported (28%)lies in the coastal area, where improvementsare generally considerable(Raju 2000).

Cropping Pattern, Yields, Incomes

When asked about changes since IMT, none ofthe respondents reported “higher yields” and“improved incomes,” nor reported changes incropping patterns due to better water availability.

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belonging to a state agricultural experimentfarm, have been added. In Andra PradeshWUA1, 42 ha were added.10

Aggregate data for the whole scheme in theGujarat WUAs showed small extensions. InGujarat WUA1, one group of farmers on about 9ha who had never received water earlier,benefited from the repair of the undergroundtubewell pipeline. The first R&R work wasundertaken in the lands of the high caste Patelcommunity and the next effort involved asignificant number of lower caste Thakorefarmers. In Gujarat WUA3, earthen canals werecemented but this work was completed only inthose parts of the canal where the WUApresident and committee members had land.This added 21 ha of irrigable land. Farmersfrom another distributary strongly complainedthat they had been left out in the joint surveyand that water still failed to reach their plotsand also that there was no response to theircomplaints. These examples highlight inequitiesintrinsic in the adopted mode of IMT in whichsetting of priority for R&R work can easily bedominated by the stronger sections of societywho secure leadership positions, apparentlywithout much accountability to members.

Higher-tier Negotiations in Andra Pradesh

A distinctive feature of APFMIS is that itfacilitates higher-tier organization andinformation on, for example, irrigation schedulesand, in the long run, on negotiations of waterdistribution between head enders and tailenders. However, it was only in one WUAdistributary committee that the president hadinformed the presidents of the WUAs under his

jurisdiction about water availability and rotationschedules.11

Cost Recovery and Water Distribution inGujarat

As process documentation showed(Parthasarathy 1999), the collection of watercharges from farmers has been difficult for thepresident of one of the two Gujarat WUAs towhich management has been transferred inGujarat WUA4. The command area of thisWUA covers 12 villages. With little support fromthe committee members, the president and oneemployee of the WUA had made a number ofvisits to some of the villages to recover watercharges. Since the WUA could not collect thewater charges in time, the president, on severaloccasions had paid the amount with his ownmoney to take advantage of the rebate (50% ofthe total water charges) given by the ID to theWUAs for timely payment. The new right ofwater distribution at the lowest tier requiresconsiderable organization as well. The secretaryof the Gujarat WUA4 is now authorized toremove the illegal “headings” by which farmersblock the canal to lead water into their fields.Once a week, the WUA president makeshimself available to the farmers for sorting outissues relating to water distribution and theWUA. This was appreciated and a highproportion of farmers (33%) reported improvedaccess to water in this WUA, as shown infigure 9.

The Gujarat WUA1, guided by the NGO,used its new water rights to introduce a newrotation during the first excessively dry year

10As Jairath (1999a) noticed, changes in the records of the revenue department and ID are difficult to interpret because they do not clarify the“quality of irrigation.” Once water touched the tail—after 15 years—the amount of water and the irrigated area were found to be entered in therecords but it is yet to be seen what this means for the user.11Raju (2000) reports effective communication in the case of a WUA in Andra Pradesh, which saved water during kharif and, for the first time,allocated water during rabi. Jairath (1999b) also observes better interaction between farmers and the ID to “get the message through.”

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when water scarcity was severe. Under thisschedule, each farmer got water for one acre,irrespective of the total farm size. Thisensured a minimum supply of water for all,before the remaining water was allocated to thelarger water consumers. This, besides the R&Rwork, contributed to the high proportion offarmers reporting “improved access to water”as shown in figure 9. This WUA1 also used itsnew freedom to raise water charges by fourtimes its original fee. However, protests amongthe committee members and farmers led to areduction again to 150 percent of the governmentwater rates (for details see Parthasarathy1999; 2000).

Conclusion

In sum, IMT in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat,respectively, led to:

• improved access to water for 15 percentand 25 percent of the respondents, and

• extension of irrigated area for 2 percent(average 0.66 ha) and 3 percent (1.1 ha) ofthe respondents.

These early gains reported by therespondents were independent of farm size.However, qualitative scheme-level informationhighlighted that WUA leaders imposed theirpersonal choice with regard to the priority ofsites for R&R.

In interpreting the above, it should be bornein mind that the reported impact in AndraPradesh, if extrapolated, would apply to morethan 10, 000 other WUAs. In this light, changesin Andra Pradesh become significant indeed.Moreover, these achievements are only the first

step and further transfer of financial and watermanagement from the ID to water users fromthe lowest to the highest level is still to come,as stipulated in APFMIS. On the other hand, thebenefits from the execution of long over-duerepairs and maintenance are “easy gains.” Thepace of improvements risks slowing down.Moreover, it is uncertain whether the heavysubsidies will remain available, and if not, whatfarmers’ own labor and cash contributions forR&R work will be (Jairath 1999a).

In Gujarat, slightly better average resultsare concentrated in one WUA where droughtand water scarcity problems were serious andwhere the NGO had made considerable efforts.The overall results took 4-5 years and can onlybe extrapolated for 13 pilot projects.Replication at a larger scale will requireconsiderable human and other resources.Moreover, the design of PIM in Gujarat does notforesee federation into higher levels. Thus, thetransfer of critical tasks, such as head-tailinequities, is not on the agenda. In the GujaratWUAs, farmers more or less welcome the newrights to manage water autonomously below theoutlet. However, the new obligations to collectdemand forms and fees represent a seriousextra burden for the irrigation committeemembers. Whether WUAs are willing, andequipped, to carry out the revenue functions isa question yet to be answered.

To conclude, in both states, IMT hasimproved access to water to a lesser or greaterextent and in a manner that was fairly neutral offarm size, despite incidental signs of self-interests of elite committee members. In bothstates it is still an open question whether andhow self-management at the lowest levels willbecome sustainable. Much will depend on theviability of the new institutional arrangements ofthe WUAs, an issue that will be examined in thenext section.

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Participation in WUAs

FIGURE 10.Proportion of households unaware of the WUA, by farm size.

Notes: Significance χ2

Andra Pradesh: WUA1, WUA2, total: Significant at 0.005 level. WUA3: Not significant, Gujarat: WUA2: Significant at 0.05 level, WUA3, WUA4: Not significant. Total: Significant at 0.025 level.

In Andra Pradesh, the creation of WUAsstarted with the statewide elections orappointments by consensus of committeemembers, who then took the process forward.In Gujarat, the local NGO or the ID staff got theinvolvement of some active farmers, toconvince fellow farmers in the command area tojoin as shareholders.

Awareness

The evident minimal condition for participation isawareness about the very existence of a WUA.It is evident from figure 10 that many respondentsare still completely unaware of the existence ofa WUA. Lack of awareness among respondentsis higher in Andra Pradesh (52%) than inGujarat (22%). As expected, awareness washighest in Gujarat WUA1 (93%), where the NGOhad strongly intervened. However, the shorter

time span in Andra Pradesh played a role here.Moreover, the average area covered by oneWUA in Andra Pradesh (1,342 ha) is muchlarger than that in Gujarat (180 ha) (see annex).However, extrapolated to the whole state ofAndra Pradesh, the creation of awarenessamong half of the irrigating farmers aboutcompletely new forms of management is anoteworthy achievement. The generally strongerstakes of farmers in agriculture in AndraPradesh than in Gujarat may also havecontributed to the spreading of the news.

Significantly, throughout the WUAs andstates, a high proportion of small farmers areunaware of the WUAs. Small farmers who havenever heard of the WUA are 58 percent inAndra Pradesh, about double the proportion oflarger farmers which is 31 percent. Theproportion of small farmers unaware of the WUAis lower in Gujarat, (26% ) , but this is alsoabout double the percentage of larger farmers

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still uninformed (14%). In some WUAs of eachstate the difference is small. For example,almost all the farmers are aware of the WUA inGujarat WUA1, but in Andra Pradesh WUA3,farmers (whether small or larger) are not awareof the WUA. The president of this WUA whichis situated at the tail of the large scheme, doesnot ask the farmers in the tail reaches furtherdownstream to contribute to R&R or other WUAactivities as water would still not reach them. Inother cases, there is a considerable gap inawareness between small and larger farmerswithin the same WUA. In the Andra PradeshWUAs, the gap is largest in WUA1, where 51percent of the small farmers have not heard ofthe WUA, while the corresponding figure forlarger farmers is only 6 percent. This WUA has

a female president.12 The gap in Gujarat iswidest in WUA4 which covers over 12villages—67 percent of the small farmersversus 17 percent of the larger farmers areunaware of the WUA. The gap in GujaratWUA2, the other WUAs with NGO support,shows that NGOs per se can neither createhigher awareness in general, nor necessarilyreach poor farmers better.

Member Participation in WUAActivities

Figure 11 summarizes the proportion ofrespondents actively involved in the variousactivities of the WUA. In spite of the higher

12There are female presidents in 98 WUAs in the whole state (Shyamala and Rao 1999).

FIGURE 11.Proportion of households participating in WUA activities, by farm size.

Notes: n.a. = not applicable. Significance χ2

Andra Pradesh: Meetings: Significant at 0.005 level. Labor input: Significant at 0.025 level. Gujarat: Meetings: Significant at 0.005 level. Joint survey, supervision of labor: Not significant.

Attendance at meetings by different categories of larger farmers. Gujarat : farm size 1–2.5 ha = 28% farm size > 2.5 ha = 40% Andra Pradesh: farm size 1–2.5 ha = 31% farm size > 2.5 ha = 18%

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rates of awareness in Gujarat, the overall ratesof active participation in institution building,R&R, water distribution and fee collection aregenerally similar in both states. The highest rateof participation in annual meetings is found inGujarat, which is 22 percent of the samplehouseholds. The findings are differentiated foractivities with high participation rates. In allWUAs, larger farmers dominate in meetings.However, in both states, small farmersparticipate relatively more often than largerfarmers in the R&R work, including the jointsurvey. Thus, most small farmers aware of theWUA also participate in the WUA work but notin decision-making.

A very active involvement of tenants inAndra Pradesh is noticeable. The proportion oftenants contributing labor to R&R work is thehighest of all (27%), whereas only 16 percent ofsmall landowning farmers and 9 percent oflarger farmers do so. Their attendance atmeetings is similar to that of the farmers withequally small holdings (9%). In contrast, tenantsin Gujarat are virtually inactive in the WUA.Even in Gujarat WUA1, only two tenantsparticipated in R&R work but they did not attendmeetings. So, although the formal position oftenants in the new Andra Pradesh WUAs maybe slightly weaker than that of landowners,their involvement in meetings and especially inR&R, is relatively strong. Tenant participation isweak in Gujarat where they have no formalstatus.

These findings underscore the essentialcontribution of small farmers and, in AndraPradesh, especially of small tenants to theupkeep of infrastructure. Their strong stakes inirrigated agriculture and higher dependency oncanals are probable reasons. This implies thattheir continued support is important for

sustainable self-management. In that light, themuch more limited participation of small farmersin meetings is likely to become a majorobstacle against their continued support. Theirlimited participation denies them many benefitslike information sharing, for example, on waterschedules upstream and within the scheme.Furthermore, their voices are not heard indecision making, which ultimately shapes thegains they receive.

Committees

Committee members are virtually always largerfarmers.13 It was learnt that in the first electionsin Andra Pradesh in 1997, for president andrepresentative positions of the differentterritories within the WUAs, candidatessometimes spent up to Rs 50,000, an amountonly affordable to better-off households. Thesepositions may be attractive because theyenhance conspicuousness and help in a politicalcareer, although many farmers claimed thatparty politics did not play any role. Finally,given that substantial amounts are available forR&R, these positions make it possible topropose oneself or one’s relatives and friends toreplace the contractors appointed by the ID. Anew generation of “president-contractors” mayhave been created (Raju 2000).14

Under the PIM program in Gujarat, theimplementing agencies largely controlled thecomposition of committees through theirmotivation efforts. After 4 to 5 years ofimplementation, these efforts were still found tobe confined to the wealthier sections of society.This pattern was sharply discernible in GujaratWUA1 and Gujarat WUA3 where the motivationprocess was limited to better-off Patel

13Jairath (1999b) found that out of 28 WUA presidents 14% have less than 1 ha each, 22% between 1 and 2.5 ha while 64% have more than2.5 ha. Given the average irrigated holding size of 0.88 ha in Andra Pradesh, the domination of large farmers is evident.14It is estimated that around 30-40% of the WUA presidents have been involved in construction works as contractors (Raju 2000).

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community members, ignoring other castes. Theformal rule is that command area farmers electcommittee members and that they, in turn, electamong themselves the office bearers consistingof a chairman, a secretary and a treasurer.Usually, constituent villages are alsorepresented. However, in reality, genuineelections are rarely held.An overview of the committee members’participation in the various WUA activities isgiven in figure 12. The degree of participation inAndra Pradesh is generally higher than inGujarat, especially in R&R. The involvement ofcommittee members in Andra Pradesh in waterdistribution is high (58%). This may reflect apartial overlap between the new WUA committeeand the existing local water distributionarrangements in Andra Pradesh where, belowthe outlet, a Neeruganti (a paid local person)

distributes water under the supervision of aCalava Pedda (an elected, unpaid authority). Infact in Andra Pradesh WUA3, some traditionallocal office bearers observing that funds wereflowing to the WUA, started demandingremuneration from the government for their work.15

Conclusions

What is called a “WUA” in reality is first andforemost a handful of local elite who facilitatethe beneficial implementation of state-initiatedand funded R&R work. In Gujarat, theseleaders are also in the process of undertakingwater allocation, distribution and feecollection, which are cumbersome tasks thegovernment would like to hand over. A half ofthe supposed constituencies of the WUAs in

15Raju (2000) observed the following reaction of some local water distributors vis-à-vis the flow of money for the establishment of the new WUA,“Then, let the WUA president and TC members do all.”

FIGURE 12.Proportion of committee members participating in WUA activities.

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Andra Pradesh and a quarter in Gujarat areunaware of the existence and the purpose ofWUAs. Being informed is definitely related tolarger farm size. In spite of the higher level ofunawareness in Andra Pradesh, actualparticipation rates are comparable and equallylow in both states. Relatively higher levels ofparticipation in R&R work and the joint survey

were found among small farmers—this is evenmore true for tenants than for landowning smallfarmers. However, in all WUAs small farmersparticipate considerably less in meetings thanlarger farmers, while they rarely becomecommittee members. This domination of the new‘WUAs’ by local elite is also reported elsewhere(Jairath 1999b; Raju 2000).

Recommendations for Pro-Poor IMT

of IMT that benefits small farmers is the key tothe viability and sustainability of the WUA, inaddition to being a measure for povertyalleviation.

The major weakness of APFMIS from bothviability and equity perspectives, is smallfarmers’ serious lack of information about theWUA and their relative absence fromcommittees and general meetings, where crucialbenefits are to be realized. Thus, small farmersare excluded from information, decision-makingand negotiation with leaders regarding spendingof government grants or site selection for R&Rand future self-management of water and cost-recovery. By law, APFMIS contains all elementsof a pro-poor mode of IMT. It vests well-definedrights in members for electing leaders and tohold them accountable. Small farmers havestrong formal voting rights because rights areirrespective of farm size. Moreover, APFMISstipulates potentially effective electionprocedures. Therefore, the most important andglobally unique chance to substantially improvesmall farmers’ inclusion in the WUAs, in orderto concretize these rights better than in thepast, will be the elections for new presidentsand territorial committee members. In theforthcoming publicity campaigns, state policymakers and the civil service should betterinform poor farmers about their rights than

The present research shows that there aresystematic poverty-related differences infunctioning large-scale canal irrigation schemesin the WUAs in Andra Pradesh. In this state,canal irrigation tends to be a “poor man’s affair.”Small farmers use more water because theycultivate paddy more often than larger farmers.They face more problems in accessing water,as their plots are concentrated in the tail ends,unlike those of larger farmers. Small farmershave less access to generally better-performingalternative irrigation sources, receive lesswaterings and, as buyers, tend to pay a higherprice for water from alternative sources. As aresult, they rely more often on cheap canalwater than larger farmers and take morewaterings per crop from canals than largerfarmers. Lastly, in the virtual absence of non-agricultural employment in Andra Pradesh, smallfarmers depend heavily on irrigated agriculturefor the production on their own plots, leasing-inland and agricultural wage employment.Therefore, APFMIS, which in its first two yearsof implementation led to general improvedaccess to water, is in itself pro-poor. The laborcontribution made by small farmers and tenantsto R&R to realize the benefits are considerablyhigher than those of better-off farmers. Thisimplies that if R&R is to continue, possiblywithout the current subsidies, a pro-poor mode

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during the hasty elections in 1997. Moreover,rather than rewarding for consensus,16 thepromotion of contest between severalcandidates and the election of the most favoredrenders the elections more transparent. Thisbenefits those who are still least aware ofWUAs—small farmers.

In contrast, in Gujarat, the hypothesis wasconfirmed that there are no systematicdifferences between small and larger farmers ina) the choice for cash and food crops, b)access to alternative irrigation sources, exceptwater costs and c) in the number of wateringsfrom either canals or other sources. Althoughsmall farmers were found to be concentrated inthe tail ends, their dependency on canal wateris mitigated because alternative sources aboundin Gujarat, especially in the tail reaches. Lastly,irrigated agriculture is less central for theincomes of almost half of the smallest farmerswho are engaged in off-farm employment. So,PIM would serve all farmers’ interests alike.However, while it was found that both small andlarger farmers benefited from the impacts ofR&R, PIM also introduced new inequities inawareness and decision-making in the WUAs. Asin Andra Pradesh, this may have long-termnegative impacts on equity, and perhaps also onthe viability of PIM. In the pilot WUAs the alreadycrystallized inequities are probably difficult toredress. If PIM is newly introduced elsewhere,information provision and inclusion of all farmersneed strong attention from the start onwards.

Another important issue in assessing theimpact of IMT on poverty alleviation concernsthe scale. To what extent can the findings ofthe sample WUAs be extrapolated in spaceand in time? APFMIS is clearly superior inboth respects. APFMIS is state-wide from thestart onwards. The past implementation of thefirst steps at the lowest tiers created massivemomentum, which forms a sound basis for theplanned next steps: the organization offarmers at higher tiers and complete hand-over. In contrast, a program focusing only onthe lowest tiers such as PIM in Gujarat(which, moreover, in its pilot-phase onlyselected few scattered schemes) is limited bydesign in its potential for vertical upscalingovertime.

In sum, irrigation management transfer, ormore precisely its R&R component has short-term benefits for all farmers in a scheme,including, if not especially, poor farmers.However, long-term benefits of irrigationmanagement transfer for poor farmers andthe viability of hand-over itself are at riskbecause of serious inequities in the newWUAs. Better inclusion of the poor ininformation and decision-making flows forsustainable poverty alleviation requires, inany case, systematic monitoring of keyscheme variables and IMT variables by farmsize, which is rather easy, or by income,which is more accurate but also more timeconsuming.

16In 1997, Rs 50,000 was awarded to presidents who were unanimously appointed, without elections, and only Rs 30,000 when there was acontest between several candidates.

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Annex

Characteristics of the study of WUAs.

States/details Gujarat Andra PradeshWUA WUA1 WUA2 WUA3 WUA4 WUA1 WUA2 WUA3village(s) Thalota Laxmipura Tranol Digas Ellabotharam Peddapala- Jantaluru

kaluru

Canal scheme Dharoi Dantiwada Mahi Kadana Ukai- Kakrapar Sriramsagar Nagarjunasagar Cuddapah -Karnool andTungabhadra

Region Mahesana Patan Anand Bharuch Telangana Coastal Rayalseema

Water supply Scarce Scarce Perennial Perennial Scarce Other ScarceMain irrigationseason Rabi Rabi Rabi Rabi Kharif Kharif KharifTwo main crops Wheat Mustard Tobacco Sugarcane Paddy Cotton Groundnut

Mustard Wheat Wheat Wheat Maize Chili PaddyCommand area (ha) 224 246 356 921 464 2,600 1,369Number of villages/territories 1 2 1 12 4 12 12Number of WUAmembers 210 174 168 169 500 2,325 1,200Implementing agency NGO NGO ID ID ID ID ID

• Andra Pradesh WUA1: Female President.No water supply in 1998–99 due to repairs.R&R work done under different programslike Jhanmabhoomi. Voluntary labor for R&Rwork reported.

• Andra Pradesh WUA2: Many villages andlarge command area. Mini-dams upstreamfor power generation affect water flow.WUA helped to improve water supply.

• Andra Pradesh WUA3: Many villages. Lackof water in tail ends. Jail authoritiesupstream illegally appropriate water.Traditional water distribution practicesobserved.

Particulars

• Gujarat WUA1: 5 tube well companiesoperate in the village. People contributed toR&R work.

• Gujarat WUA2: Only one watering in 1998–99 but none in 1999–2000. Peoplecontributed to R&R work.

• Gujarat WUA3: Seepage of earthenwatercourses. Waterlogging andinaccessibility of tail ends. Peoplecontributed to R&R work.

• Gujarat WUA4: Excess water andwaterlogging, lack of drainage.

25

Literature Cited

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Manzungu, E.; A. Bolding; and C. Zawe. 1999. Quarter and half measures and beyond: The case of irrigation managementreform in Zimbabwe. Paper prepared for the International Researchers’ Conference “The long road to commitment: asocio-political perspective on the process of irrigation reform.” Hyderabad, India, December 1999.

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Research Reports

48. Predicting Water Availability in Irrigation Tank Cascade Systems: The CASCADEWater Balance Model. C. J. Jayatilaka, R. Sakthivadivel, Y. Shinogi, I. W. Makin, andP. Witharana, 2000.

49. Basin-Level Use and Productivity of Water: Examples from South Asia. David Molden,R. Sakthivadivel, and Zaigham Habib, 2000.

50. Modeling Scenarios for Water Allocation in the Gediz Basin, Turkey. Geoff Kite, PeterDroogers, Hammond Murray-Rust, and Koos de Voogt, 2001.

51. Valuing Water in Irrigated Agriculture and Reservoir Fisheries: A Multiple Use IrrigationSystem in Sri Lanka. Mary E. Renwick, 2001.

52. Charging for Irrigation Water: The Issues and Options, with a Cast Study from Iran. C.J. Perry, 2001.

53. Estimating Productivity of Water at Different Spatial Scales Using Simulation Modeling.Peter Droogers, and Geoff Kite, 2001.

54. Wells and Welfare in the Ganga Basin: Public Policy and Private Initiative in EasternUttar Pradesh, India. Tushaar Shah, 2001.

55.Water Scarcity and Managing Seasonal Water Crisis: Lessons from the Kirindi OyaProject in Sri Lanka. R. Sakthivadivel, Ronald Loeve, Upali A. Amarasinghe,and Manju Hemakumara, 2001.

56. Hydronomic Zones for Developing Basin Water Conservation Strategies. David J.Molden, Jack Keller, and R. Sakthivadivel, 2001.

57. Small Irrigation Tanks as a Source of Malaria Mosquito Vectors: A Study in North-Central Sri Lanka. Felix P. Amerasinghe, Flemming Konradsen, Wim van der Hoek,Priyanie H. Amerasinghe, J. P. W. Gunawardena, K. T. Fonseka and G. Jayasinghe,2001.

58. Fundamentals of Smallholder Irrigation: The Structured System Concept. B. Albinsonand C. J. Perry. 2002.

59. A Gender Performance Indicator for Irrigation: Concepts, Tools and Applications.B. van Koppen. 2002.

60.Institutional Alternatives in African Smallholder Irrigation: Lessons from InternationalExperience with Irrigation Management Transfer. Tushaar Shah , Barbara van Koppen,Douglas Merrey, Marna de Lange and Madar Samad. 2002.

61. Poverty Dimensions of Irrigation Management Transfer in Large-scale CanalIrrigation in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat, India . Barbara van Koppen,R. Parthasarathy and Constantina Safiliou. 2002.

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Poverty Dimensions of

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Transfer in Large-Scale Canal

Irrigation in Andra Pradesh

and Gujarat, India

RESEARCH

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