research article competition, innovation, risk-taking, and

Research ArticleCompetition, Innovation, Risk-Taking, andProfitability in the Chinese Banking Sector: An EmpiricalAnalysis Based on Structural Equation Modeling

Ti Hu1 and Chi Xie1,2

1College of Business Administration, Hunan University, Hunan, China2Center of Finance and Investment Management, Hunan University, Hunan, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Chi Xie; [email protected]

Received 23 August 2016; Accepted 3 October 2016

Academic Editor: Chris Goodrich

Copyright © 2016 T. Hu and C. Xie. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

We introduce a new perspective to systematically investigate the cause-and-effect relationships among competition, innovation,risk-taking, and profitability in the Chinese banking industry. Our hypotheses are tested by the structural equation modeling(SEM), and the empirical results show that (i) risk-taking is positively related to profitability; (ii) innovation positively affectsboth risk-taking and profitability, and the effect of innovation on profitability works both directly and indirectly; (iii) competitionnegatively affects risk-taking but positively affects both innovation and profitability, and the effects of competition on risk-takingand profitability work both directly and indirectly; (iv) there is a cascading relationship among market competition and bankinnovation, risk-taking, and profitability.

1. Introduction

Managing a bank is a complex process that involves interac-tions of numerous factors. Among all of these factors, risk-taking and profitability are themost two important indicatorsof bank performance.

Innovation is regarded as an important factor whichinfluences both risk-taking and profitability, because bank’sinnovation activities improve the efficiency of the screeningand monitoring of borrowers, which then reduces risk-taking and enhances profitability. Besides, financial innova-tion generates technology-based products which have severaladvantages, such as high returns and low risk.

Competition is widely accepted as an important factorthat influences all of innovation, risk-taking, and profitabil-ity. Specifically, it is generally acknowledged that marketcompetition changes a bank’s operating conduct, whichsubsequently influences bank risk-taking and profitability.For example, the market competition stimulates bank’s inno-vation activities and makes bank more efficient in screeningand monitoring borrowers, which in turn affects bank risk-taking and profitability.

Though there are lots of empirical works about the cause-and-effect relationships in banking, most of them focus onone-on-one relationships between the factors. We contributeto the literature by clearly presenting a technical framework ofstructural equation modeling (SEM) applied in the bankingindustry and systematically investigating the relationshipsamong competition, innovation, risk-taking, and profitabil-ity. Accordingly, our purpose is to reveal the interactionalmechanism of these four factors through the application ofSEM.

We select the Chinese banking industry as a sample,which is impacted by financial innovation in many aspects,such as organization, management, production, and busi-ness [1]. Furthermore, the Chinese banking industry hasundergone comprehensive reform since 1979, and, as a conse-quence, the market structure has also been transformed [2].

2. Literature Review

2.1. Competition and Profitability. The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis from traditional industrial

Hindawi Publishing CorporationDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and SocietyVolume 2016, Article ID 3695379, 10 pageshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/3695379

2 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

organization theory states that a firm’s performance is deter-mined by its business strategywhich is influenced by industrystructure [3]. Furthermore, the SCP hypothesis posits thatbecause of collusion and domination, firms earn higher prof-its in a concentrated market than in a competitive market. Inother words, there is a positive relationship between marketconcentration and firm profitability [4]. With respect to thebanking industry, existing literature provides lots of empiricalsupports for the SCP hypothesis. Bhatti and Hussain test theSCP hypothesis in the context of Pakistan’s banking industryand their result supports the SCP hypothesis [5]. Kamau andWere investigate the driving factors of bank performance inKenya during 1997–2011 and find that the source of superiorperformance is structure/collusive power [6]. Uddin andSuzuki empirically assess a negative relationship betweencompetition and profitability by using banking sector datafrom Bangladesh [7]. Tan and Floros investigate the rela-tionship among market concentration, profitability, and risk-taking in the Chinese banking industry during the periodfrom 2003 to 2009 and testify a negative relationship betweencompetition and profitability [8].

2.2. Competition and Risk-Taking. A standard view of bank-ing supervision is that competition is detrimental to bankstability. On the one hand, competition erodes a bank’s fran-chise value which is equivalent to the cost of bankruptcy andencourages bank to pursue risky policies, such as loweringcapital levels and softening the terms of loans, which increasenonperforming loans and result in credit risk [9]. On theother hand, a bank will select safe policies, which contributeto the stability of the entire banking system, to protect itsfranchise value when the market competition is restrained[10]. Another view argues that banks’ policies influence thebehavior of borrowers, which in turn change bank risk-taking[11]. Specifically, restrained competition results in a highborrowing cost (i.e., interest rates being charged on loans),which possibly raise the credit risk of borrowers due to moralhazard issues [12]. For example, because of the informationasymmetries in the credit business, borrowers can concealtheir credit condition and payback ability, while banks arealways at a disadvantage with respect to acquiring sufficientborrower information. Martinez-Miera and Repullo proposea model to illustrate the effect of competition on bankrisk-taking and find that two effects working in oppositedirections generate an unclear net effect on risk-taking andthat the intensities of these two effects vary with the level ofcompetition [13].

2.3. Competition and Innovation. The relationship betweenmarket competition and innovation is a primary focus ofindustrial organization theory. Schumpeter first states thatmarket competition discourages innovation by diminishingmonopoly rents and large firms are able to afford morecapital for innovation activities [14]. On the contrary, someresearchers assert that the Schumpeter hypothesis is not com-prehensive and that there aremore incentive factors in a com-petitive market than in a monopoly market [15]. Increasedcompetition encourages innovation activities because firms

in a competitive market attempt to escape competitionand obtain monopoly profits [16]. Aghion et al. propose atheoretical model and confirm that two effects vary withcompetition and produce opposing results; thus the net effectof competition on innovation is unclear [17].

2.4. Innovation and Profitability. The efficiency hypothesis(EH) posits that the bank profitability depends on the bank’sdegree of efficiency, whereas the bank’s degree of efficiencyis affected by its financial innovation activities [18]. That isto say, innovation improves bank technology, which thenincreases bank efficiency and enhances bank profitability.Moreover, Allen et al. find that improving a bank’s technologyenhances its quality of assets [19]. In addition, financial inno-vation generates new forms of bank products, such as Internetbanking, mobile banking, telephone banking, ATMs, andPOS networks, which provide relative high returns and lowcost advantages that enhance bank profitability [20–22].

2.5. Innovation and Risk-Taking. Chen states that a bank’sinnovation activities improve the efficiency of the screeningandmonitoring borrowers and eventually reduce the quantityof nonperforming loans and the bank’s credit risk [23].Schaeck and Cihak propose that great efficiency will trans-late into reduced likelihood of bank default and enhancedstability [24]. However, Norden et al. claim that whetherinnovation is beneficial or not depends on why and howit is used by banks [25]. If innovation is employed toimprove risk measurement and control, such as the screeningand monitoring borrowers, it contributes to bank stability.However, if the innovation supported by banks is mainly forthe purpose of achieving high profits, it encourages banks’risk-taking behaviors and leads to bank failure. Hou et al. finda positive relationship between technical efficiency and risk-taking behaviors of Chinese commercial banks [26].

2.6. Risk-Taking and Profitability. The capital asset pricingmodel (CAPM) provides the first coherent framework forinterpreting how the risk of an investment affects its expectedreturn and depicts that the expected return is calculatedby adding the risk free interest rate to the product of theinvestment’s beta and the expected market risk premium[27]. The investment’s beta is always positive; thus there isa positive relationship between market risk and expectedreturn. A commercial bank must manage its assets throughinvestments, and, in this sense, the bank can be perceived asan investor. Given that the risk appetites of bank managersdetermine the level of bank risk-taking, if most of a bank’smanagers are risk seekers, they will be willing to makerisky decisions to obtain high returns. In other words,there is a positive relationship between bank risk-taking andprofitability [28].

3. Model Description

SEM is a collection of procedures that tests hypothesizedrelationships among observed variables and is often related to

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 3

Competition

Innovation

Profitability

Risk-taking

Figure 1: A hypothetical path model.

causalmodeling [29]. It is regarded as a blending of confirma-tory and exploratory analyses that is capable of representingand detecting the complex interactions of several factors [30].

Thus, we use the structural equation modeling (SEM) tosystematically test the cause-and-effect relationships amongcompetition, innovation, risk-taking, and profitability.

3.1. Path Model. The path model involves hypothesizedcause-and-effect relationships among variables. These rela-tionships are usually based on theoretical and empiricalevidences from existing literature. Figure 1 illustrates thehypothesized cause-and-effect relationships among competi-tion, innovation, risk-taking, and profitability. Competitionis exogenous, because it is affected by administration poli-cies rather than bank operating strategies. Innovation, risk-taking, and profitability are endogenous.

Generally, an exogenous variable is always only a cause,but an endogenous variable can be a cause and/or an effect[31]. For example, innovation and risk-taking are both thecauses of profitability and the effects of competition. Thedirect effect of a causal variable on an affected variable isdenoted by the arrowed path, and the coefficient (directeffect) of each path is similar to a regression coefficient. Theindirect effect of a causal variable is estimated as the productof the chain of direct effects, and the net effect is the sum ofall direct and indirect effects.

In this scenario, competition is hypothesized to haveone direct effect and three indirect effects on profitability.The indirect effects are mediated by innovation and risk-taking, and the indirect paths are competition-innovation-profitability, competition-risk-taking-profitability, and com-petition-innovation-risk-taking-profitability, respectively. In-novation and risk-taking constitute the intermediate part ofthe indirect paths, indicating a cascading relationship amongcompetition, innovation, risk-taking, and profitability.

3.2. Measurement Model. The measurement model is em-ployed to quantify linkages between latent variables andobserved variables.

Latent variable is a conceptual variable that is not directlyobserved but inferred from other observed variables. In ourmodel, competition, innovation, risk-taking, and profitabilityare all regarded as latent variables.

Observed variables represent a specific latent variable inthe form of a linear combination. The selection of observedvariables must consider validity and reliability. Validity is theaccuracy of an observed variable for representing a latentvariable, and reliability is consistency and stability of anobserved variable for representing a latent variable.

The measurement model of the exogenous variable isdefined as follows:

𝑋 = Λ 𝑥Θ + Δ, (1)

where𝑋 is a vector of the observed exogenous variables 𝑥;Θis a vector of the exogenous latent variables 𝜃; Λ 𝑥 is a matrixof factor loadings 𝜆𝑥, relating 𝑥 to 𝜃; Δ is a vector of themeasurement errors 𝛿.

In our paper, competition is defined as 𝜃 and measuredby concentration ratio (𝑥1), HHI (𝑥2), and Boone index (𝑥3).Hence, (1) is expressed as follows:

[[[

𝑥1𝑥2𝑥3]]]= [[[

𝜆𝑥1𝜆𝑥2𝜆𝑥3]]]𝜃 + [[

[

𝛿1𝛿2𝛿3]]]. (2)

Similarly, the measurement model of the endogenousvariable is defined as follows:

𝑌 = Λ 𝑦𝐻 + 𝐸, (3)

where 𝑌 is a vector of observed endogenous variables 𝑦; 𝐻is a vector of endogenous latent variables 𝜂; Λ 𝑦 is a matrixof factor loadings 𝜆𝑦, relating 𝑦 to 𝜂; 𝐸 is a vector of themeasurement errors 𝜀.

We define (i) innovation as 𝜂1, which is represented bytechnology gap ratio (𝑦1) and cost efficiency (𝑦2); (ii) risk-taking as 𝜂2, which is represented by nonperforming loansratio (𝑦3), risk-weighted assets ratio (𝑦4), and 𝑍-score (𝑦5);and (iii) profitability as 𝜂3, which is represented by return onassets (𝑦6), return on equity (𝑦7), and net interestmargin (𝑦8).Hence, (3) is expressed as follows:

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[

𝑦1𝑦2𝑦3𝑦4𝑦5𝑦6𝑦7𝑦8

]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]

=

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[

𝜆𝑦1 0 0𝜆𝑦2 0 00 𝜆𝑦3 00 𝜆𝑦4 00 𝜆𝑦5 00 0 𝜆𝑦60 0 𝜆𝑦70 0 𝜆𝑦8

]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]

[[[

𝜂1𝜂2𝜂3]]]+

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[

𝜉1𝜉2𝜉3𝜉4𝜉5𝜉6𝜉7𝜉8

]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]

. (4)

3.3. Structural Regression Model. The structural regression(SR) model combines the path andmeasurement models andis the most general kind of core model widely applied inSEM to take measurement errors of observed variables intoaccount. The general form of SR model is

𝐻 = 𝑃𝐻 + ΓΘ + 𝑍, (5)


Measurement model Measurement model

SR model

𝛿1

𝛿2

𝛿3

x1

x2

x3

𝜃𝜆x

𝜂𝜆y

y1

y2

y3

𝜀1

𝜀2

𝜀3

𝛾

Figure 2: A simple form of SEMmodel.

Table 1: Market shares of sample banks.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Deposit 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.66Loan 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65This table reports the market share of sample banks in both deposit and loan markets.

where 𝑃 is a matrix of path coefficients 𝜌, which describesthe relationships among endogenous latent variables, Γ is amatrix of path coefficients 𝛾 that describes the linear effectsof exogenous variables on endogenous variables, and 𝑍 is avector of the measurement errors 𝜁.

Figure 2 illustrates a simple form of SEM.The central partis a structural regression model, and both left and right partsare measurement models.

In our paper, (5) is expressed as

[[[

𝜂1𝜂2𝜂3]]]= [[[

0 0 0𝜌21 0 0𝜌31 𝜌32 0

]]][[[

𝜂1𝜂2𝜂3]]]+ [[[

𝛾1𝛾2𝛾3]]]𝜃 + [[

[

𝜁1𝜁2𝜁3]]]. (6)

3.4. Model Assessment. We follow Lam and Maguire andchoose four basic indices to assess model fit [32]:

(i) The chi-square test, which is based on the test statistic𝜒2 and is only applicable in an overidentified model,that is, when df > 0

(ii) The root mean square error of approximation(RMSEA): a value range from 0.05 to 0.08 whichindicating a reasonable approximation and a value ≥0.1 suggesting a poor fit

(iii) The standardized root mean square residual (SRMR):the SRMR < 0.10 which is considered a goodmodel fit

(iv) Joreskog-Sorbom goodness of fit index (GFI): TheGFI which ranges from 0 to 1.0 with 1.0 indicating thebest fit

4. Data and Indicators

4.1. Data. We test the hypothesis with the financial statementdata from 14 listed commercial banks in China, namely,Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, Bankof Communications, China CITIC Bank, China MerchantsBank, China Minsheng Bank, Industrial Bank, China Ever-bright Bank, Hua Xia Bank, China Guangfa Bank, Ping AnBank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. All therelevant data is obtained from the China Statistical Yearbookand the annual reports of the banks from 2004 to 2014.These14 banks account for nearly 70% share in both the deposit andloan markets (see Table 1) [33].

4.2. Indicators of Profitability. We select return on assets(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and net interest margin(NIM) to measure bank profitability.

ROA is the ratio of net profit to average total asset, whichreflects the ability of a bank to generate profits by using itsasset.

ROE is the ratio of net profit to shareholder equity, whichreflects the ability of a bank to generate profits by usinginvestment.

NIM is the ratio of net interest income to the bank’sinterest-earning assets, which reflects the profitability of thebank’s credit business.

4.3. Indicators of Risk-Taking. Bank risk-taking is the riskresulting from banks’ policies. We uses nonperforming loan(NPL) ratio, risk-weighted asset ratio, and𝑍-score tomeasurebank risk-taking.


Nonperforming loan (NPL) is the loan that is in default orclose to being in default, and the nonperforming loan ratio isthe ratio of NPL to total loan.

Risk-weighted asset ratio is the ratio of risk-weightedasset to total asset, which measures bank risk-taking throughcapital constraint. The value of the risk-weighted assetscan be calculated by dividing the sum of core capital andsupplementary capital by capital adequacy ratio.

𝑍-score is a function of bank’s return on asset (ROA),capital adequacy ratio (CAR), and the standard deviation ofthe bank’s return on asset.

𝑍 = ROA + CAR𝜎 (ROA) . (7)

The greater the Z-score is, the lower the bank’s risk-takingis [34].

4.4. Indicators of Innovation. In order to measure bankinnovation, we employ the cost efficiency (CE) and the tech-nology gap ratio (TGR) and construct bank’s cost functionto examine bank’s ability to minimize costs via innovation.Because the cost function describes the relationship betweenoutputs and inputs, the set of estimated parameters reflectsthe state of technology and a parallel shift of the cost curverefers to the technical change triggered by innovation.

Figure 3 illustrates the technical change by using a simpleparadigm with two inputs (𝑋1, 𝑋2) and one output (𝑄) fortwo banks. Because the available technology of banks variesover time, there are two annual cost frontiers correspondingto 𝑡 = 1 and 𝑡 = 2. Given that the level of output is unchanged,the cost frontier represents the minimum cost curve basedon available technology.The dashed line which envelops costfrontiers is the minimum cost curve over the whole period ormetafrontier. The distance between the metafrontier and thecost frontier is defined as the technology gap, whichmeasuresthe difference between the current available technology leveland the optimal technology level. Battese et al. introducemetafrontier approach to measure technical change by con-structing a cost function [35]. Figure 3 demonstrates that ifBank I is located at point D, its cost inefficiency is OC/OD attime 𝑡 = 1 and OB/OD at time 𝑡 = 2; and technology gap isOA/OC at time 𝑡 = 1 and OA/OB at time 𝑡 = 2. Similarly, ifBank II is located at point H, its cost inefficiency is OG/OHat time 𝑡 = 1 and OF/OH at time 𝑡 = 2; and technology gap isOE/OG at time 𝑡 = 1 and OE/OF at time 𝑡 = 2.

The cost efficiency represents the ratio of the minimumcost on the annual cost frontier to the bank cost for a certain

level of output, and the technology gap ratio representsthe ratio of the minimum cost on the metafrontier to thaton the cost frontier for a certain level of output. The costefficiency equals 1 when bank operates on the annual costfrontier, which means there is no inefficiency. Because themetafrontier is invariably below the cost frontier, the valueof the technology gap ratio is bounded between 0 and 1,where the latter is reached when bank operates on themetafrontier. Innovation generates technical improvementand consequently increases the value of cost efficiency andtechnology gap ratio.

Following Bos and Schmiedel and Bos et al., we initiallyemploy the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate thecost frontiers in each year and then use a linear program toobtain the metafrontier [36, 37].

We express total cost as TC, output as 𝑄, price of outputas 𝑝, input as 𝑥, and price of input as 𝑤. Thus, total cost isdefined as follows:

TC = 𝑤𝑥. (8)

Because x is a function of 𝑤 and Q, (8) is expressed asfollows:

TC𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓 (𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑄𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡) 𝑒V𝑖𝑡+𝑢𝑖𝑡 , (9)

where the subscript 𝑖 refers to a bank, subscript 𝑡 refersto a sample year, 𝑧𝑖𝑡 denotes the control variable, and V𝑖𝑡denotes the random noise assumed to be i.i.d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎V2), 𝑢𝑖𝑡denotes the inefficiency term assumed to be i.i.d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢2)and is independent from vit. The cost efficiency is obtained asfollows:

CE𝑖𝑡 = [exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡)] . (10)

We model bank production by employing the intermedi-ation approach because of banks’ financial intermediary role.The intermediation approach regards banks’ fixed asset, labor,and funds as inputs (𝑥𝑖𝑡) and loans and investments as outputs(𝑄𝑖𝑡).The total cost consists of capital cost, operating cost, andlabor cost (see Table 2) [38].

We obtain the metafrontier by enveloping the cost fron-tiers and utilize the parameter estimates for the cost frontiers𝑓𝑖. The technology gap is calculated by fitting the minimumcost metafrontier 𝑓meta as follows:

min Distance =𝑁

∑𝑖=1

𝑇

∑𝑡=1

[𝑓𝑖 (𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡) 𝑒V𝑖𝑡+𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑓meta (𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡) 𝑒V𝑖𝑡+𝑢𝑖𝑡]2 ,

s.t. 𝑓𝑖 (𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡) 𝑒V𝑖𝑡+𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑓meta (𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡) 𝑒V𝑖𝑡+𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,(11)

where 𝑁 is the total number of banks and 𝑇 is the totalnumber of sample years.

The constraint condition in (11) means that the total coston the metafrontier is less than or equal to the total cost on


BA

CD

E F

G

H

O

Annual frontiers

Bank II

Bank I

Metafrontier

Frontier at t = 1

Frontier at t = 2

X1/Q

X2/Q

Figure 3: Cost efficiency and technology gap ratio.

Table 2: Definitions of variables.

Variable DefinitionTotal cost

Capital cost Interest expense

Operating cost Business and management cost, loss ofimpairment of asset

Labor cost Employee salary and welfareInput

Labor price The ratio of cash payments for salariesand staff expenses to amount of labor

Fixed assets price The ratio of depreciation to net fixedasset

Funds priceThe ratio of interest expense to thesum of customer deposit andborrowed fund

Output

Investment

Financial assets at fair value throughprofit or loss, available-for-salefinancial assets, held-to-maturityinvestment, receivables-bondinvestment

Loan Personal loan, corporate loan, otherloans

This table reports the definitions and measurements of the variables in (9).

the annual cost frontier. As a result, the TGR is calculated asfollows:

TGR𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓meta (𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡)𝑓𝑖 (𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡) , 0 < TGR𝑖𝑡 ≤ 1. (12)

4.5. Indicators of Competition. We employ concentrationratio (CR), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and Booneindex to measure competition.

Concentration ratio (CR) is a reverse indicator of com-petition and measures the total market share occupied by aspecified number of the largest banks in the industry. We

select CR4 to measure competition, because the four biggestbanks, namely, Bank of China, Industrial and CommercialBank of China, China Construction Bank, and AgriculturalBank of China, dominate the Chinese banking industry.

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonlyaccepted measure of market concentration. The value of theHHI is calculated by squaring the market share of all banksin the industry and then summing the result.

Boone index is an indicator of competition proposedby Boone and associates performance with the difference inefficiency [39]. Usually, banks achieve different performancedue to their different efficiencies. As market competitionincreases, the differences among bank performances becomemore obvious. That is to say, market competition has areallocation effect on banks which enhances the performanceof efficient banks and weakens the performance of inefficientbanks. Boone model is expressed as follows:

𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln (𝐶𝑖𝑡) , (13)

where the subscript 𝑖 refers to a bank, subscript 𝑡 refers toa sample year, 𝜋𝑖𝑡 denotes the profit, and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 denotes themarginal cost. Because the marginal cost cannot be directlyobserved, we use the average cost as a proxy [40].

With respect to the banking industry, the profit (𝜋𝑖𝑡)can be calculated by subtracting the operating expense fromthe operating income, and the average cost (𝐶𝑖𝑡) can becalculated by dividing the operating expense by the profits.The operating income is composed of net interest income,net fees, commission income, gains or losses from changesin fair values, and investment income; and the operatingexpense contains business taxes and surcharges, general andadministrative expenses, and impairment losses on assets.

𝛽 refers to Boone index which is always negative becauseit expresses the decline in profits caused by cost inefficiencies.The larger 𝛽 in absolute value is, the stronger competition is.

To allow for time variation and capture 𝛽 at every singleunit of time, we introduce 𝑑𝑘𝑡 as a time dummy variable,where 𝑑𝑘𝑡 = 1 if 𝑘 = 𝑡 and 𝑑𝑘𝑡 = 0 otherwise.

𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +𝑇

∑𝑘=1

𝛽𝑘1𝑑𝑘𝑡 ln (𝑐𝑖𝑡) +𝑇−1

∑𝑘=1

𝛽𝑘2𝑑𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, (14)

where 𝑇 is the total number of sample years and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is therandom error term.

5. Hypothesis and Results

5.1. Hypotheses. Although a comprehensive reform is placedto facilitate the liberalization, the monetary authority stillplays a leading role in Chinese banking industry. The marketstructure mainly resulted from the policies of the author-ity, rather than market discipline. Thus, we obtain severalhypotheses for the empirical work.

(i) The SCP hypothesis assumes that bank profitability isinfluenced by market structure or competition. A concen-trated market indicates collusion andmonopoly, which makea bank earn high profits. In other words, a bank in a concen-trated market has a high profitability. Thus, we hypothesizethat competition is detrimental to bank profitability.


Hypothesis 1. Competition has a negative relationship withbank profitability in the Chinese banking industry.

(ii) Competition has both positive and negative effectson bank risk-taking at the same time. The intensities ofthese two effects vary with competition; thus the relationshipbetween competition and bank risk-taking is unclear. Wehypothesize that competition is negatively related to risk-taking, considering that the Chinese banking industry ishighly concentrated and bank’s market interest rate primarilyresults from administration policies rather than marketdiscipline.

Hypothesis 2. Competition has a negative relationship withbank risk-taking in the Chinese banking industry.

(iii) Banks in a concentrated market can afford morecapital for innovation activities due to the monopoly rents,but a competitive market provides more incentive factorsfor bank innovation than in a concentrated market. InChinese banking industry, the domination of banks mainlyresulted from the policies of the authority, rather thanmarketdiscipline. Therefore, we hypothesize that competition ispositively related to banks’ innovation activities.

Hypothesis 3. Competition has a positive relationship withbank innovation in the Chinese banking industry.

(iv) The efficiency hypothesis (EH) states that bankprofitability depends on its efficiency, which is affected bybank’s innovation activities. In addition, new technology-based products generated by innovation also enhance prof-itability. Therefore, we hypothesize that innovation activitiesare beneficial to bank profitability.

Hypothesis 4. Innovation has a positive relationship withbank profitability in the Chinese banking industry.

(v)Though innovation can trigger technical progress andefficiency improvement, whether innovation is beneficial ornot depends on why and how it is used by banks. Basedon the empirical work about Chinese commercial banks,we hypothesize that innovation activities increase bank risk-taking behaviors.

Hypothesis 5. Innovation has a positive relationship withbank risk-taking in the Chinese banking industry.

(vi) Based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM),the expected return is positively related to the expectedmarket risk premium. Commercial banks can be perceivedas investor, because they must manage assets through invest-ments.Therefore, the CAPM can be applied to investigate therelationship between bank risk-taking and profitability. Wehypothesize that there is a positive relationship between bankrisk-taking and profitability.

Hypothesis 6. Risk-taking has a positive relationship withbank profitability in the Chinese banking industry.

Table 3: Indices of the model fit.

𝜒2/df RMSEA GFI SRMR7.57 0.053 0.92 0.09This table reports the value of indices of model fit.

(vii) We select competition, innovation, risk-taking, andprofitability as variables and investigate the cause-and-effectrelationships among them. The one-on-one relationshipbetween any two factors is supported by both empirical andtheoretical works. For example, market competition directlyimpacts bank innovation which has an effect on risk-taking;furthermore, the risk-taking is hypothesized to be relatedto profitability which is affected by competition. Thus, wededuce that innovation and risk-taking playmediating role inthe relationship between competition and profitability. Thatis to say, there is a cascading relationship among these fourfactors.

Hypothesis 7. There is a cascading relationship amongmarketcompetition and bank innovation, risk-taking, profitability.5.2. Results. We verify the hypotheses by applying the Analy-sis ofMoment Structure (AMOS) software, version 21. Owingto the difference of dimensions of the observed variables,the standardized processing of original data is required. Theestimated path coefficients depict the effects among variables(Figure 4).

The indices of model fit illustrated in Table 3 suggest thatthe SR model has an acceptable goodness of fit.

Figure 4 illustrates a complete path diagramof ourmodel.

(i) Risk-taking-profitability: this path represents a directeffect of risk-taking on profitability (0.890). Specif-ically, one percent increase in risk-taking directlyincreases profitability by 0.890 percent. This resultsupports Hypothesis 6, indicating a positive relation-ship between risk-taking and profitability.

(ii) Innovation-risk-taking-profitability: innovation has adirect effect on risk-taking (0.471), which supportsHypothesis 5 and indicates a positive relationshipbetween innovation and risk-taking. Moreover, inno-vation has both a direct and an indirect effect onprofitability.The direct effect is 0.206, and the indirecteffect, which depends on the innovation-risk-taking-profitability path, is 0.419 = (0.471 × 0.890). Thus,the net effect of innovation on profitability, whichincludes both the direct and the indirect effects, ispositive and equals 0.625 = (0.206 + 0.419). Thisresult supports Hypothesis 4, indicating a positiverelationship between innovation and profitability.

(iii) Competition-innovation-risk-taking-profitability:competition affects innovation directly (0.408), whichsupports Hypothesis 3 and indicates a positive relati-onship between competition and innovation. Andcompetition affects risk-taking both directly andindirectly. The direct effect of competition on profit-ability is −0.734, whereas the indirect effect, whichdepends on the competition-innovation-risk-taking


Competition Profitability

Risk-taking

Innovation

HHI

Boone

0.02

−0.01

0.26

0.99 0.61

ROA

ROE

NIM

0.54

0.03

0.64

CE TGR

0.90

Z RWANPL

0.89

0.639

0.4710.408

0.890

0.206

0.302 1.207

1.007

0.870

0.992

0.065 0.3240.622

0.983

0.675

0.593

−0.46

−0.734

CR4

Figure 4: The path coefficients of variables. The exogenous latent variable, competition, is measured by the observed variables (CR4, HHI,and Boone index). The endogenous latent variables are innovation (measured by CE and TGR), risk-taking (measured by𝑍-score, NPL, andRWA) and profitability (measured by ROA, ROE, and NIM).

path, contributes 0.192 = (0.408 × 0.471) to thenet effect. Thus, the net effect of competition onrisk-taking, which includes the direct effect andall possible indirect effects, is negative and equals−0.542 = (−0.734 + 0.192). This result supportsHypothesis 2, indicating a negative relationshipbetween competition and risk-taking. Similarly, com-petition affects profitability both directly and indi-rectly. The direct effect of competition on profit-ability is 0.639. The indirect effects of compe-tition on profitability in this scenario have three paths:competition-innovation-profitability, which contrib-utes 0.084 = (0.408 × 0.206) to the net effect; com-petition-innovation-risk-taking-profitability, whichcontributes 0.171 = (0.408 × 0.471 × 0.890) to thenet effect; and competition-innovation-profitability,which contributes −0.653 = (−0.734 × 0.890) tothe net effect. Thus, the net effect of competitionon profitability, which consists of direct effect andall possible indirect effects, is positive and equals0.241 = (0.639 + 0.084 + 0.171 − 0.653). This resultdoes not support Hypothesis 1 and indicates a positiverelationship between competition and profitability.The SCP hypothesis is not applicable for Chinesebanking, because themarket power of bank primarilyresults from an administration monopoly rather thana natural monopoly. Moreover, the social welfare loss

due to the monopoly is the other possible reason forthis result.

(iv) The competition-innovation-risk-taking-profitabilitypath of the indirect effect of competition on prof-itability shows that innovation and risk-taking con-stitute the intermediate part of this effect. This resultsupports Hypothesis 7 and indicates a cascadingrelationship among competition, innovation, risk-taking, and profitability.

6. Conclusion

We introduce a new perspective to systematically investigatethe cause-and-effect relationships among competition, inno-vation, risk-taking, and profitability in the Chinese bankingindustry. Several conclusions are obtained based on ourempirical work.

(i) A positive relationship between risk-taking and prof-itability has been demonstrated, which indicates thatthe risk appetite of bank managers has significantinfluence on bank profitability, and the rising appetitefor risk may increase the profitability of bank asset.Therefore, a balance between profitability and risk-taking is vital to banks.

(ii) The net effects of innovation on both risk-takingand profitability are positive. One percent increase in


innovation amplifies risk-taking by 0.471 percent andprofitability by 0.625 percent. Thus, it is concludedthat innovation more intensely affects profitabilitythan it does risk-taking, suggesting that financialinnovation should be actively supported and pro-moted.

(iii) Competition affects all of innovation, risk-taking,and profitability. One percent increase in competitionpromotes innovation by 0.408 percent and profitabil-ity by 0.241 percent, and it reduces risk-taking by0.542 percent. This outcome shows that competitioncan encourage innovation, enhance profitability, andreduce risk. This result indicates that competitionin the Chinese banking industry is not sufficientlyintense enough. Although comprehensive reformfacilitated liberalization, the monetary authority stillplays a leading role.

(iv) Innovation and risk-taking constitute the intermedi-ate part of the competition-innovation-risk-taking-profitability path, suggesting a cascading relation-ship among competition, innovation, risk-taking, andprofitability.

Disclosure

The authors confirm that they all have checked themanuscript and have agreed to the submission.

Competing Interests

There is no conflict of interests regarding the publication ofthis paper.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the National Natural Sci-ence Foundation of China under Grants nos. 71373072and 71501066; China Scholarship Council under Grantno. 201506135022; Specialized Research Fund for the Doc-toral Program of Higher Education under Grant no.20130161110031; and Foundation for Innovative ResearchGroups of the National Natural Science Foundation of Chinaunder Grant no. 71521061.

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