republic of trinidad and tobago in the high...

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REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Claim No CV2013-01803

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER THE REAL PROPERTY ACT

CHAPTER 56:02

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER THE WILLS AND PROBATE

ACT CHAPTER 9:03

BETWEEN

RAMONA ANNE STOBBART- OWENS Applicant/Claimant

(BY HER ATTORNEY GARY GEORGE STOBBART WHICH POWER OF

ATTORNEY WAS REGISTERED AS DE201102469782)

AND

TASMA CHARMAINE SILK Respondent/Defendant

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE ELEANOR DONALDSON-

HONEYWELL

APPEARANCES:

Mr. Gregory Armorer instructed by Ms. Everlene Khan, Attorneys-at-Law for the Claimant

Ms. Sushma Gopeesingh, Attorney-at-Law (amicus) for the Defendant. Defendant in person

Delivered on: 13th

January, 2016

JUDGMENT

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1. The Claimant and the Defendant are sisters and at the time of the filing of this claim they

were joint executors of their mother’s Will. They have been embroiled for many years in

a dispute over the property bequeathed to them and their three siblings [“the

beneficiaries”] by their mother Indra Lall-Clayton who died in 1999. The property is

situated in the Ward of Diego Martin at Savory Bay on Gaspar Grande Island [“the

Property”].

2. There can be no disagreement that of the five beneficiaries, it is the Defendant who has

spent the most time and effort managing the property. She says she took charge of this

responsibility prior to her mother’s death and the Claimant admits that since at least 2001

the Defendant has looked after the property. She has also resided there since 2006 whilst

the Claimant at all material times resides in Canada. The Claimant, by way of the Fixed

Date Claim filed herein on April 26, 2013 initially sought more extensive relief; however,

in the course of case management there was resolution of some of the matters in

contention. Among the matters agreed to was an opportunity for the Claimant to visit the

property and the joint engagement of a valuator who has valued the property at Seven

Million Dollars ($7,000,000.00) as at May 14, 2014 inclusive of the buildings and site

improvements thereon which are valued at Five Hundred Thousand Dollars

($500,000.00).

Relief Claimed:

3. The relief sought by the Claimant evolved over the course of the proceedings and the

final position was articulated by her Attorney in closing submissions. A number of the

ten sub-heads of relief initially claimed were abandoned by the Claimant as having either

been rendered unnecessary during the case management stage or due to lack of evidence.

A significant area of relief that was dropped in closing submissions was the claim for

damages for physical damage to the property. The remaining relief that the Claimant

seeks is as follows:

a. An order that the property be sold by public auction with the beneficiaries

having the first option to bid and that the Defendant produce the Certificate of

Title Volume 4737 Folio 63 for purposes of the conveyance of the property.

b. A declaration that the lease agreement made between the Defendant and Peter

Grongvist on May 1st, 2011 is illegal.

c. An injunction that the Defendant forthwith cease and desist from excluding the

Claimant and the other beneficiaries from the property and that the Claimant be

allowed access to the property.

d. Damages for loss of rental income from the property.

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e. Costs of the claim calculated based on the quantum of damages awarded, if any,

and costs of the Counter-Claim at Fourteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.00) based

on prescribed costs applicable to a claim treated as one for Fifty Thousand Dollars

($50,000.00) in accordance with Part 67.5(2)(b)(iii) of the Civil Procedure

Rules, 1998 [CPR].

4. The Defendant also seeks relief from the Court as set out in her Amended Defence and

Counterclaim filed herein on September 23, 2013. She seeks:

a. An order that the property be partitioned into five parts or as is just and equitable

in lieu of sale.

b. A declaration that the Defendant is entitled to an equitable interest in the

dwelling-house situated on the property and/or the sum of One Million, Three

Hundred and One Thousand, Six Hundred and Eighty-Four Dollars and Forty-

Eight Cents ($1,301,684.48) based on alleged expenditure reasonably incurred in

what she refers to as her lawful duty as Executrix towards maintenance and

upkeep of the property. As it relates to the quantum claimed as compensation for

her alleged equitable interest the Defendant initially also claimed in the

alternative that the value of the parcel of land on which the dwelling house stands

and which is occupied by her be set-off against such sums spent by the Defendant

as the Court may find.

c. In the alternative to receipt of compensation for the equitable interest claimed the

Defendant seeks to have that specific part of the property namely, the parcel of

land on which the dwelling house stands and which she presently occupies

conveyed to her in fee simple and that she also be given credit for the value of her

share in the entire property.

d. The Defendant seeks an order that she be paid the costs of her counter-claim and

of the Claimant’s claim.

Factual background and evidence:

5. Indra Laetitia Lall-Clayton otherwise Indra Lall-Clayton otherwise Indra Laelita

Stobbart, [“Indra” or “the parties’ mother”] died on October 17, 1999. She resided in

Canada at the time and had executed a Will a few months before her death bequeathing

the property to her five children who had also moved at various times to Canada [“the

Beneficiaries”]. These Beneficiaries included the Claimant and the Defendant.

6. The Executor/Trustee named in the Will was a Mr. Bruce Robinson and there was

provision that if he died before Indra, the Claimant and Defendant would be joint

Executors. Bruce Robinson survived Indra but he too resided in Canada. The Defendant

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had by then returned to Trinidad to live, so Bruce Robinson gave her authority by way of

a Power of Attorney to administer Indra’s estate on his behalf. The Defendant duly

applied for a grant of letters of administration with the Will annexed and obtained the

grant on August 11, 2001. The Will provided for recovery of the expenditure incurred on

administering the estate at clause 4(c) which states:

“IN ORDER TO carry out the provisions of my Will, I give to my Trustee

the following powers to be used in his sole discretion at any time:

(c) To Make advances or payments out of my estate generally or to do any

other act for the insurance, protection, improvement, development,

realization, repair or rebuilding of any assets thereof, and to set up

depreciation reserves; it being my intention to provide the same powers in

these respects as I would have had if I were alive for the administration of

these assets but not to alter the benefits otherwise provided by this

will.”………………………………………..

7. At the time of Indra’s death the property at Gaspar Grande was occupied by a Randal

Harford who was hired as a caretaker. He continued in that capacity after her death and

was responsible for maintaining the property, collecting rental income and keeping it

accessible to all the beneficiaries. After obtaining the grant to administer the estate, the

Defendant removed Randal Harford from the property and he was replaced by Kenneth

Peterkin as caretaker.

8. Bruce Robinson died on April 5, 2003 and by law this meant that the Defendant no

longer had authority to serve as administrator of Indra’s estate. Instead both she and the

Claimant were jointly entitled to be executors of the estate. There was however a lengthy

delay in applying for a grant and in practical effect the Defendant remained in charge of

the estate in the belief that she still had residual authority. The Claimant did not reside in

Trinidad and there is no evidence of her having taken steps to take charge of the property

in or around 2003.

9. The Claimant alleges that up to 2004 the property was earning rental income but that in

that year the Defendant intervened and income earning ceased. At around this time as

well, the Claimant alleges that the new caretaker was allowing the property to fall into

disrepair. She says Peterkin allowed visitors to stay at the premises without collecting

rental from them. She complains further that the Defendant never brought legal action

against Peterkin within the statutory limitation period. In 2006 the Defendant removed

Peterkin as caretaker and moved into the property herself.

10. It was also in 2006 that on the evidence, the Defendant commenced repairs to the

property. This is admitted at paragraph 11 of the Claimant’s Defence to her

Counterclaim. There was an unusually strong storm in early 2006 that damaged the

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property and Government assistance was sought by the Defendant for repairs. All that

was provided however was a tarpaulin to cover the roof. The Defendant undertook some

storm damage repairs herself, as well as other maintenance work.

11. The Claimant says however that the repair work done by the Defendant was done without

permission of the other beneficiaries. There was written proof, by way of a letter from

the beneficiaries then Attorney to the Defendant that they did not agree to be financially

accountable for repairs undertaken by the Defendant without their agreement. The letter

dated August 18, 2006 stipulated that all repairs “reasonably necessary” for the

Defendant’s occupation of the premises could be done but only at her sole expense.

Furthermore, the letter warned that if the Defendant wished to do extensive repairs or

renovation works she would be required to send “detailed drawings and cost estimates” to

the Claimant and her brother and seek their consent.

12. The Defendant supported her claim for an equitable interest by receipts or invoices

showing repair expenses and other costs she had incurred. However, the majority of the

receipts post-dated the letter from the Claimant’s Attorney warning her that all repairs

had to be agreed. Under cross-examination the Defendant admitted that she had not

obtained approval from the Claimant for any repairs. The Defendant however included in

her amended Defence and Counterclaim a compilation of receipts for repairs and other

work done in relation to the property. Included among the receipts were:

a. Proof of payment of land and building taxes for 2001 to 2006 totalling

approximately One Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty Dollars ($1,320.00).

b. An invoice dated August 22, 2000 from her Attorneys setting out the fees for

various services mainly connected with the Estate totalling One Hundred and

Thirty-Three Thousand, Two Hundred and Nine Dollars and Forty-Eight Cents

($133,209.48).

c. An invoice from Two Star Construction Company dated September 30, 2006 for

the period May 2006 to September 2007 which included costs for “post tornado

strike repairs” totalling Two Hundred and Sixty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred

Dollars ($268,500.00).

d. Invoices and receipts for repair work done prior to the August, 2006, letter from

the Attorneys including an invoice from Robert Auerbach dated August 1, 2000

for repairs and renovations at Three Hundred and Sixty-One Thousand, Five

Hundred Dollars ($361,500.00) and miscellaneous receipts for household

appliances, hardware supplies, estate house repairs, transport of materials by

dinghy and boat repairs dated February to August, 2006 totalling approximately

Two Hundred and Twenty-Two Thousand, Six Dollars and Sixty-Nine Cents

($222,006.69).

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The majority of the expenses itemised above were incurred before August, 2006 and the

approximate total is Eight Hundred and Fifty-Three Thousand, Three Hundred and

Twenty-Six Dollars and Sixty-Nine Cents ($ 853,326.69). The original schedule and a

modified version to reflect only pre-August, 2006 expenditure on repairs are attached as

Appendices I and II to this Judgment. The Defendant also paid caretakers salaries from

2006 to 2008 totalling Nine-Two Thousand Dollars ($92,000.00) bringing to Nine

Hundred and Forty-Five Thousand, Three Hundred and Twenty-Six Dollars and Sixty-

Nine Cents ($945,326.69) the amount spent by the Defendant that was not affected by

the Claimant’s warning not to spend on un-agreed repairs.

13. The Defendant listed all these and other items of expenditure in a schedule to the

amended Defence and Counterclaim. It was on this basis that she sought to support her

claim for an equitable interest valued at One Million, Three Hundred and One Dollars,

Six Hundred and Eighty-Four Dollars and Forty-Eight Cents ($1,301,684.48). The

Defendant was self-represented at the Trial as a result of a breakdown of her relationship

with her Attorney-at-Law during settlement negotiations immediately preceding the Trial.

Though she was represented prior to the Trial her witness statement was bereft of any

documentary evidence of her expenditure. It appears that by inadvertence the documents

attached to the amended Defence and Counterclaim were omitted from the Defendants

sworn witness statement. This omission was a point underscored by the Claimant’s

Attorney in cross-examination of the Defendant and in his closing submissions to impress

upon the Court that there was no evidence to support the quantum claimed by the

Defendant as compensation for her alleged equitable interest.

14. Part 29.6 of the CPR provides that “A witness statement must …. (e) sufficiently identify

any document to which the statement refers without repeating its contents unless this is

necessary in order to identify the document.” There is no express requirement that all

documents referred to must be attached to the witness statement. The critical question

therefore is whether, although the Defendant did not attach any documents to her witness

statement the documents relied on to support her claim to an equitable interest were

sufficiently identified therein. It is clear from paragraph 4 of the Defendant’s witness

statement that she has sufficiently identified these documents by reference to her Defence

and Counterclaim and by pointing out that they are exhibited to her Defence and

counterclaim. The defence contains a certificate of truth and may therefore be considered

as evidence. Accordingly, there is no merit in the contention that the Defendant did not

provide evidence of her expenditure.

15. The Claimant in her sworn witness statement sought to shed further doubt on the validity

of the Defendant’s claim to an equitable interest by pointing out that the receipts she

relied upon were not addressed to her by name. Accordingly, the Claimant says she does

not believe that the Defendant paid for the items or services in question. The Claimant

also indicated that much of the expenditure, if she did actually pay, was for the

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Defendant’s personal use as occupant of the property. More specifically she said that

“any repairs done before the storm were for general upkeep and maintenance as the

Defendant had decided on her own to reside on the property. The Defendant was also

repairing and replacing things that went missing or were damaged during the time she

allowed Mr. Peterkin (Chinee) to stay on the Property.”

16. As it relates to the post storm repairs started in or around May, 2006 the Claimant

contends that it was not necessary for the Defendant to have incurred expenditure

because two of their brothers offered to do the repairs at no charge. The Claimant also

contended that if any amount was spent by the Defendant on maintenance of the property

it should have come from the rental income that ought to have been earned from the

property. There was however no evidence of any actual rental income from the property

prior to 2009.

17. In 2009 the property was rented to Cassius Williams and Affie Duncan. The Defendant

says the period of rental was for three months at One Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars

($1,500.00) per month. After that the tenants maintained the grounds as caretakers in lieu

of rental. The Claimant alleges that this rental arrangement was entered into without

prior agreement of herself and the other beneficiaries. It is clear however from both her

pleadings and her evidence that the Claimant had no objection to this arrangement. The

sole supporting witness for her Claim was her brother Gary Stobbart and he admitted that

he collected half the rent from the tenants for the three months in 2009. The tenants were

removed from occupying the property by the Defendant in 2011 by way of High Court

proceedings.

18. The former tenants having been evicted on February 22, 2011 the Defendant entered into

a five year lease agreement with one Peter Grongvist commencing on May 1, 2011. The

monthly rental was fixed at Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00). Sometime thereafter the

Defendant married Peter Grongvist. The Claimant alleges that this lease agreement was

entered into without consent of herself and the other beneficiaries. The Defendant

however, pleaded in her Amended Defence to Counterclaim that the beneficiaries were

aware of and consented to the occupation by Peter Grongvist of the property. There is

some indication of such awareness and consent in an email from the parties brother

Maurice addressed to Peter Grongvist dated June 7, 2011 a few days after the lease was

executed. The email is attached to the Defendant’s amended Defence and Counterclaim

as “T.S.8”. The email indicated that after talking to “Bobbi” they were in agreement

about Peter “using (renting), our island home on Gasparee Island” provided that “our

house is open to our immediate family (siblings).”

19. In 2009 that there was a falling out between Gary and his sister, the Defendant, resulting

in Gary leaving the property. Prior to that there is no evidence of any of the beneficiaries

being made to feel unwelcomed in visiting the property. There is no evidence of the

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Claimant being debarred access in 2009 or at any time thereafter. In fact during 2009 a

joint application was made by the Claimant and the Defendant for a grant of

administration of Indra’s estate.

20. The Defendant was cross-examined as to whether she understood that she was not

entitled to keep the Claimant and the other beneficiaries off the property. She maintained

that apart from a falling out with Gary when he left the property she had never stopped

any of the beneficiaries from coming to the property. She added however, that she could

not keep them from coming to the property “as long as it is not rented.”

21. Counsel for the Claimant put to her that this meant that based on the rental agreement

with Peter Grongvist the beneficiaries could not come to the property. She responded

that that was so. In fact she admitted the other beneficiaries had asked to come for a

vacation but Peter said no because he had all his private things there. The Defendant

married her tenant Peter Grongvist sometime after renting the property to him. She

therefore retains full access residing there as his wife. On the evidence, none of the

beneficiaries visited the property thereafter until 2013 when a visit was agreed to and

arranged during case management.

22. In 2012 the grant of an order for the administration of the estate was made in favour of

the Claimant and the Defendant. Thereafter this Claim was filed on April 26, 2013. The

main contention then was that the Defendant was not cooperating to have the property

vested in all the beneficiaries. The Defendant counterclaimed for her alleged equitable

interest on September 23, 2013 and then on October 7, 2013 she signed a Deed of Assent

so the property could be vested in all five beneficiaries in accordance with Indra’s Will.

23. It was only thereafter, in apparent retaliation to the claim for an equitable interest, that by

amended Fixed Date Claim and Statement of Case filed on October 20, 2014 the

Claimant added her claims for loss of use, loss of income and damages for physical

damage to the property. On March 19, 2014 the Deed of Assent took effect upon being

signed by the Registrar General.

Issues:

24. By Order dated March, 2015 of the then presiding Judge Madam Justice Jones three

issues were identified for determination at the Trial. Those issues to be determined,

modified to take into account the fact that the claim for damage to the property was

abandoned by the Claimant in closing submissions, are as follows:

a. Is the Defendant entitled to an equitable interest in the property over and above

her beneficial interest in the estate of her mother and if so what is the value of this

equitable interest?

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b. Is the Defendant indebted to the estate of her mother for loss of rental income

and/or mesne profits as a result of her actions and those of her servants and/or

agents, tenants or licensees during the period 2001 to date and if so what is the

extent of the indebtedness? And

c. Is the lease agreement dated May 1st, 2001 between the Defendant and Peter

Grongvist valid?

Submissions:

25. In compliance with the Court’s directions the Claimant filed Propositions of Law prior to

the Trial. The document filed provided in sufficient detail the Claimant’s legal

arguments in relation to the three issues to be determined. After the hearing of the oral

evidence at Trial, the Claimant’s Counsel relied on the same arguments while orally

amplifying them in closing submissions. There were no Propositions of Law filed on

behalf of the Defendant although she was represented by Counsel for the duration of the

proceedings up to the start of the Trial. At the end of the Trial during which she was

assisted, at short notice and Pro Bono by Ms. Sushma Gopeesingh, Attorney-at-Law, the

Defendant was afforded a postponement of her closing submissions which were to be

submitted in writing. The time given was one month within which she was told she

should make efforts to retain and pay for the services of an Attorney to prepare the

written submissions.

26. On the issue of the equitable interest claimed by the Defendant the Claimant relied on the

case of Wilmott v. Barber (1880)15 Ch. D 96 at pgs. 105 to 106 where Fry J. addressed

how equitable relief can be awarded based on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. He

said:

''A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way

as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights. What, then, are the

elements or requisites necessary to constitute fraud of that description? In the

first place the plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights. Secondly,

the plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done some act (not

necessarily upon the defendant's land) on the faith of his mistaken belief. Thirdly,

the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of his

own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff. If he does

not know of it he is in the same position as the plaintiff, and the doctrine of

acquiescence is founded upon conduct with a knowledge of your legal rights.

Fourthly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the

plaintiff's mistaken belief of his rights. If he does not, there is nothing which calls

upon him to assert his own rights. Lastly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal

right, must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or in the

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other acts which he has done, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his

legal right. Where all these elements exist, there is fraud of such a nature as will

entitle the Court to restrain the possessor of the legal right from exercising it, but,

in my judgment, nothing short of this will do”.

27. Counsel for the Claimant argued that the material allegations to satisfy each of the five

requirements/elements listed by Fry, J. are neither pleaded in the Defendant’s amended

Defence and Counterclaim nor set out in her witness statement. In closing submissions

Counsel for the Defendant raised a further point that by signing the Deed of Assent in

October, 2013 the Defendant acted inconsistently with her claim in the Amended

Defence and Counterclaim for an equitable interest. Counsel for the Claimant asked the

Court to find that the signing of the Deed of Assent amounted to an admission by the

Claimant that she was only entitled to one of the five equal shares in the property as

tenants in common conveyed by the Deed of Assent. Accordingly, she could no longer

claim more based on an equitable interest.

28. Another contention of counsel for the Claimant was that even if the Defendant had a

valid claim for an equitable interest she ought to have made it by action against the estate

of the deceased. He argued that she could no longer make that claim because she had

allowed the legal title in the property to be conveyed from the estate to the beneficiaries.

Thus during the course of the instant matter the Claimant and the other beneficiaries

became the legal owners of the property and the Defendant could no longer claim for her

equitable interest against the estate.

29. With regard to the quantum claimed as compensation for the equitable interest, Counsel

for the Claimant reiterated that there was no documentation attached to the sworn witness

statement of the Claimant to support a calculation of the quantum. In any event he said

the instant trial was not an appropriate forum for assessing the minute details of the

amounts claimed. Instead there ought to have been an application to surcharge and falsify

the account of the Defendant’s expenditure on the estate and such an application should

have been made against the estate.

30. Counsel underscored that from the documentation attached to the Defendant’s pleadings

some of the expenditure was for her personal use. In any event counsel asked the Court

to observe that the valuation obtained pursuant to the court’s directions showed that the

building and improvements on the property was only valued at Five Hundred Thousand

Dollars ($500,000.00) shedding further doubt on how the Defendant could have spent

over One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.000 for repairs on it. Accordingly he opined that

the Defendant’s claim to equitable relief was for an unsubstantiated figure which did not

sound plausible and that there was no legal basis for the claim.

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31. On the second issue for determination herein Counsel noted that initially the claim was

that since 2001 the property was occupied by the Defendant to the exclusion of the other

beneficiaries and that accordingly the Claimant and the four other beneficiaries are each

entitled to a one-fifth share of the rent that could have been earned from the property over

that period. In closing submissions the Claimant admitted that there was no evidence of

rental income from the property prior to 2011. Accordingly the Claimant’s submission

was that she should be paid mesne profits based on her share of the rental income earned

from Peter Grongvist from May 1, 2011 to date. The Lease agreement with Grongvist

ends on May 30, 2016. In these circumstances a realistic calculation of the one-fifth

share of rental income due to the Claimant based on a rate of Four Thousand Dollars

($4,000.00) per month for five years would be Forty-Eight Thousand Dollars

($48,000.00).

32. The submission of Counsel for the Claimant on the final issue was that the lease entered

between the Defendant and Peter Grongvist was invalid. This argument was based on

two statutory provisions. It is patent however that when both these provisions are

examined in the context of the facts of this matter they are inapplicable to determine the

invalidity of the lease.

33. The first reference on invalidity of the lease was to Section 3 of the Landlord and

Tenant Ordinance Chapter 27 No. 16 which provides:

“No lease for a term exceeding three years ….shall be valid as a lease…., unless

the same shall be made by deed duly registered; but any agreement in writing to

let ….. any land shall be valid and take effect as an Agreement to execute a lease

…., and the person who shall be in the possession of the land in pursuance of any

agreement to let may, from payment of rent or other circumstances, be construed

to be a tenant from year to year.” [Emphasis added]

34. On a plain reading of this section it is clear that it provides for an agreement for a lease to

be treated as enforceable even if it is not registered. An unregistered arrangement such as

the one entered into by the Defendant and Peter Grongvist can still have effect as a

tenancy from year to year.

35. The second reference is to Section 109(2) of the Real Property Ordinance Chapter

56:02. That section provides:

“109. (1) Subject to the powers, rights, duties, and liabilities hereinafter

mentioned, the personal representatives of a deceased person shall hold the land

as trustees for the persons by law beneficially entitled thereto, and those persons

shall have the same power of requiring a transfer thereof as they have of

requiring a transfer of personal estate. (2) All enactments and rules of law

relating to the effectof Probate or Letters of Administration as respects chattels

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real, and as respects the dealings with chattels real before Probate or

Administration, and as respects the costs of administration and other matters in

relation to the administration of personal estate, and the powers, rights, duties,

and liabilities of personal representatives in respect of personal estate, shall

apply to land under this Act, so far as the same are applicable, as if that land

were a chattel real vesting in them or him, save that it shall not be lawful for some

or only one of several joint personal representatives, without the authority of the

Court or a Judge, to transfer, lease, mortgage, or encumber such and.”[Emphasis

added]

36. It was based on this section that Counsel for the Claimant argued that the Lease with

Peter Grongvist was also invalid because there was no signature on it by the Claimant as

joint personal representative to show that the lease was not entered by the Defendant on

her own. On the evidence herein however, it is clear that at the time in 2011 when the

lease agreement was signed there were no properly appointed personal representatives of

Indra’s estate. The new grant of administration was not given until 2012 so on that basis

alone Section 109(2) is inapplicable.

37. Furthermore, on the facts of this case the Defendant’s evidence is that she obtained the

consent of the beneficiaries to rent the premises to Peter and they had no objection to him

residing there provided he allowed them to visit the property. The fact that the Claimant

waited more than three years to challenge the Lease agreement sheds doubt on her current

claim that she did not agree that Peter Grongvist could occupy the premises as a tenant.

Accordingly, even if Section 109(2) were applicable there is no proof that the lease was

in breach of its provisions since with the consent of the Claimant it could not be said that

the property was leased by the Defendant alone. There is nothing in the section to

mandate that for the lease to be valid it must actually be signed by both personal

representatives even where there is other proof of their joint agreement to the lease.

38. The Defendant was unable to retain new counsel within the month afforded her. She

filed her own written closing submission within the time directed by the Court. In her

submission she made two main points. One of the points made by the Defendant was to

urge the Court to take into account the fact that she did not have legal representation at

the stage of the matter when she was preparing her submissions and that she was not

represented during the trial. She said she was unable to do a substantial cross-

examination of the Claimant and her witness.

39. The more substantive point made in the Defendant’s closing submission was that her

expenditure on the property should be taken into account by the Court as having resulted

in an increase in the value of the estate. She underscored that the Claimant had not

assisted in the improvements of the estate and accordingly she asked that she be

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compensated for all the expenses incurred over the years from 2006 to 2013 since it

would be just and fair.

40. The Defendant relied on Section 144 of the Real Property Act Chapter 56:02 in

support of her claim. That section provides that a person against whom another is

seeking to recover property may, if they are claiming to have made improvements on the

property plead the fact of such improvements made or the value thereon and the Court

may assess the value. That assessed value must then be paid by the party claiming to

recover the property before they can be granted a writ of possession.

41. When read in context however the section is not applicable as it expressly refers only to

cases within an exceptional category at Section 143(c) and (d) neither of which is

relevant in this case. The full text of the sections is as follows:

“143.No action of ejectment or other action for the recovery of any land shall lie

or be sustained against the person registered as proprietor thereof under the

provisions of this Act, except in any of the following cases:

(a) The case of a mortgagee or an annuitant or a lessor as against a mortgagor

or a grantor or a lessee in default;

(b) The case of a person deprived of any land by fraud, as against the person

registered as proprietor of such land through fraud; or as against a person

deriving, otherwise than as a transferee bona fide for value, from or through a

person so registered through fraud;\

(c) The case of a person deprived of or claiming any land included in any grant

or certificate of title of other land by misdescription of such other land or of

its boundaries, as against the proprietor of such other land not being a

transferee thereof bona fide for value;

(d) The case of a proprietor claiming under the instrument of title prior in date of

registration under the provisions of this Act, where two or more grants or two

or more certificates of title, or a grant and a certificate of title, may be

registered under the provisions of this Act in respect of the same land:

And in any case other than as aforesaid, the production of the original grant,

certificate of title, or other instrument shall be held, both at law and in equity, to

be an absolute bar and estoppel to any such action against the person named in

such instrument as the proprietor of the land therein described, any rule of law or

equity to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided that nothing herein contained

shall prevent a plaintiff from obtaining in an action judgment for specific

of 22

performance of a contract for the sale or lease of land under this Act, nor prevent

a beneficiary entitled to call for a transfer from a trustee from obtaining a decree

for such transfer or such vesting order as hereinbefore mentioned.

(e) 144. Whenever an action shall be brought against a proprietor or person

holding a grant or certificate of title in either of the two cases excepted in the

last preceding section at paragraphs (c) and (d), if the defendant or any

person through whom he claims shall have made improvements on the land

since obtaining a grant or certificate of title thereto, then, whether he admit or

deny the plaintiff’s title, he may plead the fact of such improvements being

made, and may set a value thereon and also on the land as distinct therefrom,

and give evidence thereof at the trial, and if judgment be given for the

plaintiff, or his title be admitted, the Court or a Judge may, if he thinks the

justice of the case so requires, assess the value of the alleged improvements,

and may also separately assess the value which the land would have

possessed if the said improvements had not been made. And no writ of

possession shall issue in such case unless the plaintiff shall first pay into

Court, for the use of the defendant, the value of the improvements so assessed,

deducting only the costs, if any, to which he shall be entitled in the action; and

if the plaintiff shall fail to make such payment within three months after

judgment, the amount to which he is entitled shall thereafter be limited to the

sum separately assessed as the value of the land together with costs of suit;

and the defendant shall, upon satisfaction thereof, be entitled to retain the

land and improvements, and in either case the Registrar General shall be

entitled, under the power hereinbefore conferred, to require to be delivered up

any grant or certificate of title which shall be held by the party whose right to

the land shall have determined: Provided that in every case in which the

defendant shall be entitled to indemnity from the Assurance Fund, the

Registrar General shall be made a co-defendant, and may defend the action

either severally or jointly or may leave the defence wholly to his co-defendant,

as he shall see fit; and in no case shall the Assurance Fund be liable to the

principal defendant for any greater damages than he shall actually sustain as

the result of such action, after using all reasonable diligence in the defence

thereof.”

42. From the foregoing it can be seen that Section 144 of the Real Property Act in fact

deals with instances where there has been a wrong description of the land in a certificate

of title or where two or more certificates of title have been issued for the same piece of

land. These circumstances are not present in the instant case.

of 22

43. The Defendant also cited a Canadian case Cartwright v Cartwright, [1940] SCR 659

which would not be of relevance in the instant matter being based on different legislative

provisions. Germane to the issues herein the Defendant contradicted the Claimant’s

contention that she could have had sufficient money from rental income to cover the

expenditure incurred. She pointed out that the rental income from 2011 was only Four

Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) and this was less than even the monthly amount she paid

for a caretaker of the property. Accordingly, she made no personal gain at all from the

rental and there was no income due and owing to any of the other beneficiaries. She

contended that she has invested financially and non-financially in the property resulting

in improvements. Therefore she submitted, “I am entitled to the reimbursement of the

monies and the partition of the said property, enabling me to have the east point of the

said property.”

Law and analysis:

Equitable Interest:

44. The Defendant in her submissions placed reliance on section 144 of the Real Property

Act Chapter 56:02 (“RPA”) and upon the Canadian case of Cartwright v Cartwright to

prove an equitable interest in the property. As aforementioned these authorities relied on

are inapplicable.

45. Although the Defendant has not made submissions on any further points of law, there

remains available to her the avenue of estoppel to establish a claim for equitable relief.

The Claimant in her submissions has relied on Wilmot v Barber1 which deals specifically

with this area of equitable relief. The doctrine of proprietary estoppel was summarized as

follows in the House of Lords decision of Thorner v Major2:

“… [M]ost scholars agree that the doctrine is based on three main elements,

although they express them in slightly different terms: a representation or

assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to

the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance.”

46. In the landmark decision of Wilmot v. Barber, Fry J., considering the dicta of Lord

Cranworth in Ramsden v. Dyson3, formulated five probanda that have been applied in the

local cases of De Four v Rahim4 and Hughes v Francis

5. Succinctly put, the five main

factors to be proven in the present case are:

1 (1880) 15 Ch. D 96

2 [2009] 3 All ER 945 [29]

3 [1866] LR I HL 12g

4 CV 2007 - 1149

5 CV 2012 - 02163

of 22

i. Whether the defendant made a mistake as to her legal rights;

ii. Whether the defendant has expended some money or done some act on the

faith of her mistaken belief;

iii. Whether the claimant knew of the existence of her own right;

iv. Whether the claimant knew of the defendant’s mistaken belief; and

v. Whether the claimant encouraged the defendant in the expenditure of

money or in the other acts which she has done whether directly or by

abstaining from asserting her legal right.

47. With regard to the first factor, from the facts it is not clear that the defendant believed

that she had a right to be in the property other than in her role as personal representative

of the estate. This is supported by the Defendant’s letter of 2011 contained in the Bundle

of Agreed Documents, in which she refers to herself as the legal personal representative

of the estate according to the Letters of Administration of 2000. However, she has

proven her expenditure on the property for repairs and upkeep. The Claimant did know

of her rights to the property and knew of the Defendant’s expenditure out of her own

pocket. On the evidence there was no overt encouragement by the Claimant of the

Defendant’s expenditure; however, there is evidence of indirect encouragement by

acquiescence.

48. The concept of acquiescence was expounded upon in the case of Lester v Woodgate6:

“[26] … The court has to determine whether the words used or acts done would

reasonably convey to the other party an assurance which it was reasonable for

that party to rely upon. In such cases it is not necessary to prove that the

representor intended that his words or conduct would have that effect or was even

subjectively aware that they did so: see Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18,

[2009] 3 All ER 945, [2009] 1 WLR 776...

[27] Many of the earliest cases arose out of circumstances in which no express

encouragement in the form of words was given by the landowner but where the

other party built on or made improvements to the former's land in the mistaken

belief that he owned or had rights over it. In such cases the landowner's passive

and uncomplaining acquiescence in what is done may amount to an assurance

that the other party will continue to enjoy rights over his land on which it would

be reasonable for that party to rely...

[28] Where the conduct relied on to found the estoppel is acquiescence by the

landowner a number of different factual situations may exist. The work may well

6 (2010) EWCA Civ 199

of 22

have commenced before the landowner was aware of it and therefore without his

being given any opportunity to object. In some cases this state of affairs may

continue until the work is complete. In other cases the landowner will become

aware that the work is being carried out and will then have an opportunity to

object to its continuation.

[29] There is no doubt that if the landowner becomes aware of the work and

knows that the other party is carrying it out in the belief that he owns the land in

question or has rights over it but fails to object, his silence will be treated as a

species of equitable fraud sufficient to found an estoppel. The same will apply a

fortiori if he positively encourages that belief...”

49. However, the UK Court of Appeal in the decision of E & L Berg Homes Ltd v Grey and

Another7, advised caution in interpreting what actions constitute acquiescence:

“... I think it is important that this court should not do or say anything which

creates the impression that people are liable to be penalised for not enforcing

their strict legal rights. It is a very unfortunate state of affairs when people feel

obliged to take steps which they do not wish to take, in order to preserve their

legal rights and prevent the other party acquiring rights against them. So the

court in using its equitable jurisdiction must, in my judgment, approach these

cases with extreme care.”

50. In the present case, the Claimant’s silence prior to August, 2000 while the Defendant

undertook the repairs and upkeep amounted to acquiescence. However, in these peculiar

circumstances there is some uncertainty as to whether this acquiescence would give rise

to an equitable interest based on proprietary estoppel as both parties were evidently under

the impression that the works were being carried out in the Defendant’s role as personal

representative, without any intent or belief in a legal right beyond that to the property.

51. In Taylor Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria Trustee Co. Ltd8, however, Oliver, J

warned against the rigidity of the rules outlined by Wilmot v Barber, stating:

“The inquiry which I have to make therefore, as it seems to me, is simply whether,

in all the circumstances of this case, (emphasis mine) it was unconscionable for

the defendants to seek to take advantage of the mistake which, at the material

time, everybody shared, and, in approaching that, I must consider the cases of the

two plaintiffs separately because it may be that quite different considerations

apply to each.”

7 (1980) 1 EGLR 103

8 [1981] 1 All ER 914

of 22

52. All the circumstances of the present case must therefore be looked at to determine

whether it was unconscionable for the Claimant to take advantage of the Defendant’s

mistake as to her rights. It does appear from the evidence that the Claimant knew and did

not dissuade the Defendant from carrying out expenditure for repairs and upkeep up until

August, 2006. However, such silence while the Defendant undertook the repairs did not

amount to an encouragement that the property would belong to the Defendant.

53. There appears to have been a mistaken belief by all the parties that the Defendant acted as

the personal representative. She was encouraged by the Claimant and the other

beneficiaries to believe that in that assumed role and based on the terms of the Will she

was entitled to recover her expenditure from the estate which in effect would have meant

recovery from the property. The actions of the Claimant do not appear to be as

unconscionable towards the Defendant as to give rise to an equitable interest in the

property over and above the Defendant’s equal share. There was however a belief that

the Defendant was acting as representative for the estate. The Defendant is entitled to

recover the money expended from the estate.

Partition or Sale:

54. Section 3 of the Partition Ordinance, Chap. 27 No. 14 (“the Ordinance”) states:

“In a suit for partition, where, if this Ordinance had not been passed, a decree for

partition might have been made, then if it appears to the Court that by reason of the

nature of the property to which the suit relates, or of the number of the parties interested

or presumptively interested therein, or of the absence or disability of some of those

parties, or of any other circumstance, a sale of the property and a distribution of the

proceeds would be more beneficial for the parties interested than a division of the

property between or among them, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the request of any of

the parties interested, and notwithstanding the dissent or disability of any others of them,

direct a sale of the property accordingly, and may give all necessary or proper

consequential directions.”

55. Section 4 provides that where an applicant is entitled to a moiety or upwards then a sale

should be ordered unless there is a good reason to the contrary. This is not the situation in

the present case. There is no evidence of the consent of the other beneficiaries and

therefore there is no basis on that ground for considering sale in lieu of partition.

56. Sections 3 & 4 of the UK Partition Act, 1868 are almost identical to the local provisions

referenced. Jessel MR, considering the purpose of the UK provisions in the case of

Drinkwater v Ratcliffe9, stated as follows:

9 [1875] L R 20 Eq 528

of 22

“The 3rd section gives power to the court to sell for certain reasons. These

reasons are specified in every case but one. The reasons specified are, the nature

of the property, the number of the parties interested, the absence or disability of

some of the parties. The reasons are unspecified in one case, viz., where, by

reason “of any other circumstance,” a sale of the property and distribution of the

proceeds would be more beneficial to the parties interested than a division of the

property between or among them. Whenever that happens, and any party

interested applies for a sale, the court may direct a sale. It is an absolute power of

sale on the request of anybody, provided the court is satisfied that it would be

more beneficial for the parties interested than a division. Then the 4th section

provides that if the parties interested, to the extent of a moiety or upwards,

request a sale, the court shall sell, unless it sees good reason to the contrary –

that is, irrespective of the nature of the property, irrespective of the number of

persons, irrespective of absence or disability, irrespective of any special

circumstances which make the court think it beneficial. The parties interested to

the extent of one moiety are entitled to a sale as of right, unless there is some

good reason to the contrary shown; they have not to shew any reason for the sale,

but a reason to the contrary must be shewn.”

57. In the Valuation Report to which both parties agreed to be bound, the property is

described as irregular in shape, of moderately hilly terrain, and naturally well-drained. It

states that apart from the head of the bay which has gently sloping land where the houses

are built, the remainder of the land is steep slope. The cleared area where the two houses

stand is approximately 35,000 square feet out of the total 348,687 square feet. The

valuator inspected the condition of the main building and concluded that it was in fair

structural and poor decorative repair and recommended several minor improvements that

should be made to the building. Having considered all of the above, the value of the

entire parcel was set at Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars ($7,000,000.00) with the value

of the Buildings and Site improvements valued at Five Hundred Thousand Dollars

($500,000.00) out of that sum. The value of the building therefore appears to be less than

one-fifth share of the entire property.

58. As expressed by Ventour, J in the local decision of Rambarran v Rambarran10

, the court

should be guided by principles of fairness to all the parties. In the present case, although

the Defendant’s expenditure may not be considered sufficient to give rise to an equitable

interest, there is no doubt that she did carry out the repairs to the property. It is fair in all

the circumstances that the building be apportioned to the Defendant in the partitioning of

the land. There is no evidence that the property is incapable of being partitioned. On the

contrary the Defendant has presented evidence that it can be done. Neither is there any

10

HCA 1342 of 2005 [28]

of 22

evidence of disability on the part of any of the interested parties as contemplated by the

Ordinance.

59. There remains, therefore, only the consideration of “any other circumstance” which

makes a sale of the property more beneficial to the parties i.e. to all the beneficiaries.

There have been no reasons put forward by the Claimant to persuade the court that the

circumstances of the case demand a sale of the property in lieu of the partition. The

Claimant does not have the express support of the other beneficiaries in bringing this

action and has not proven that the majority of the beneficiaries would prefer the sale.

60. In light of these circumstances, the partition of the property is appropriate and the

Defendant should be apportioned the dwelling house and the parcel of land on which it

stands. If that said parcel of land is less than one-fifth of the entire property the

Defendant must also be given the remainder of her full share in the entire property.

61. The Defendant has not succeeded in proving an equitable interest in the property due to

her actions being undertaken under the belief that she was acting as personal

representative of the estate and not under a belief that she was entitled to the dwelling

house after distribution. However, the Defendant succeeds in her application for partition

of the property with the building and the land upon which it stands to be apportioned to

her.

Decision:

62. It is my finding that the Defendant was a witness of truth. From the meticulous records

she kept of all her expenditure as well as the fact that from the time of her mother’s death

all the beneficiaries including the Claimant left her with the lion’s share of the

responsibility for maintaining and preserving the estate, there is no doubt that she has

invested substantially in the improvement of the property. The specific quantum of the

investment is not easily assessed as within the amounts spent there is some evidence of

payments made on goods or services that would have been for the personal benefit of the

Defendant in occupying the premises.

63. Of the amounts claimed there are however certain invoices and receipts as herein above

outlined that would support the Defendant’s claim regarding expenditure of at least Five

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) which is the estimated value of the building

and improvements on the property.

64. On the issue as to whether the Defendant is entitled by law to equitable relief there is

some merit to basing such a claim on the initial acquiescence of the Claimant and the

of 22

other beneficiaries in the Defendant’s expenditure on the estate and property. It was only

from August, 2006 that there is any evidence of the Claimant warning the Defendant not

to conduct repairs at other than her own cost without the approval of the other

beneficiaries. From the documentation filed there is evidence that before August, 2006

she incurred approximately Eight Hundred and Fifty-Three Dollars and Sixty Nine Cents

($853,326.69) in expenditure.

65. The Claimant has not shown on the evidence before the court any connection with or

investment made in the property over the years. Though she had joint responsibility at

least from 2001 to try to have the estate administered she operated at arm’s length from

overseas. The Defendant on the other hand has taken charge of the estate, using her own

resources and it has become her home. It is just and equitable in my view that she is

allowed to continue to reside on a partitioned share of the property. On the other hand

there is no sound basis for a sale by public auction in lieu of partition. It is my

determination that the property must be partitioned and that the Defendant must be

allowed to have the part of the property with the estate house on it included in her part of

the property.

66. The issue as to whether the Claimant is entitled to be paid part of the rental income from

the property remains to be decided. The Defendant admits that rental income of Four

Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per month was earned from the property since May, 2011

but claims that her expenditure on the property exceeded the income earned. The

decision made herein that the Defendant is to be granted the part of the property with the

buildings is intended to compensate her based on an assessment of the true full value of

her expenditure. Accordingly, she is not entitled to also retain the full benefit of the

rental income. It is therefore my determination that the Claimant must be paid her one

fifth share of the rental income valued at Forty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($48,000.00) plus

interest thereon.

67. The issue as to the validity of the tenancy agreement with Peter Grongvist is also

determined in the Defendant’s favour. It is my finding that he was entitled to the

exclusive occupation of the property as a yearly tenant. He may remain in possession as

a tenant until May, 30, this year 2016 when the current year of tenancy ends. Thereafter

he can remain in the part of the property apportioned to the Defendant as her spouse or

otherwise as permitted by the Defendant. After the tenancy expires and up until each

beneficiary is apportioned their own separate part of the partitioned property the Claimant

must also be permitted access to the property.

68. Both parties have abandoned a number of the reliefs initially claimed herein having

voluntarily resolved certain aspects of the matters in dispute. Each party has also been

successful in an aspect of their respective claim and counterclaim. There will be no order

as to costs in the circumstances.

of 22

Order:

i) The Claimant’s claim for an order that the property be sold is dismissed.

ii) The property located in the Ward of Diego Martin in the Island of Trinidad comprising

THREE POINT TWO THREE NINE THREE (3.2393) HECTARES BE THE SAME

MORE OR LESS DELINEATED AND COLOURED PINK IN THE PLAN

REGISTERED IN VOLUME 4610 Folio 465 being remaining portion of Lands described

in the Certificate of Title in Volume 2012 Folio 363 and bounded on the North by lands of

P. Bain and by the sea on the South by lands of P. Bain by lands of Eliza Reid-Cleaver, by

Lot 1 by Lot 2 and by the Sea on the East by lands of P. Bain, by Sea the Sea by Lot 1 by

Lot 2 and by lands of L. Chofie and on the West by lands of P. Bain by lands of Eliza

Reid-Cleaver by Lot 2 and by the Sea and now described in Certificate of Title in Volume

4737 Folio 63 (now referred to as the said property) is to be partitioned forthwith into five

equal parts in lieu of sale.

iii) The dwelling house inclusive of outbuildings and the parcel of land on which it stands and

which is occupied by the Defendant is to be conveyed to her and if that said parcel of land

is less than one-fifth of the entire property the Defendant must also be allocated the

remainder of her full equal share in the entire property when the property is partitioned.

iv) The Claimant’s claim for a declaration that the lease agreement made between the

Defendant and Peter Grongvist is illegal is dismissed.

v) The Defendant is directed not to exclude the Claimant from reasonable access to inspect

the property prior to finalization of the partition.

vi) The Claimant is awarded Forty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($48,000.00) in damages together

with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the claim to the

date of judgment for loss of rental income from the property.

vii) Each party is to bear her own costs of the Claim and Counterclaim herein.

viii) Liberty to apply.

Dated this 13th

day of January, 2016

Eleanor Joye Donaldson-Honeywell

Judge

With research assistance by: Christie Borely

Attorney-at-Law

Judicial Research Counsel 1

Appendix I

COMPANY NAME DATE RECEIPT # DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

A.Moses & Sons 22/01/07 549 Grass cutter parts/sprayer nozzle

$ 201.19

A. Mohammed Hardware 20/02/06 41778 Gypsum Mud

$ 299.00

A.Mohammed Hardware 20/02/06 41779 Paint supplies

$ 110.40

Total

$ 610.59

$ 610.59

Budget Marine Trinidad 12.04.2007 31463891 boat repair supplies

$ 1,898.14

Budget Marine Trinidad 02.05.2007 31466739 boat supplies

$ 738.37

Budget Marine Trinidad 08.05.2007 31467497 painting supplies

$ 847.35

Budget Marine Trinidad 19/09/06 31428054 painting supplies

$ 288.62

Budget Marine Trinidad 02.05.2007 31466740 boat part

$ 49.88

Budget Marine Trinidad 20.04.2008 31523638

replacement steering cables, parts

$ 1,277.58

Budget Marine Trinidad 03.03.2006 31400147 boat steer wheel

$ 153.26


$ 119.00


$ 100.96

Budget Marine Trinidad 10.04.2007 31463413 Fibreglass repair supplies

$ 4,427.68


$ 50.63

Budget Marine Trinidad 07.02.2007 31474807 Fasteners

$ 59.64

Budget Marine Trinidad 15.11.2007 31496415 boat parts

$ 570.40


$ 175.92

Budget Marine 03.04.2007 31462698 Fibreglass repair supplies

$


AMOUNT

Trinidad 1,870.93

Budget Marine Trinidad 18.12.2006 31445217 boat parts

$ 2,218.37

Budget Marine Trinidad 18.12.2006 31445222 Hose

$ 5.12

Budget Marine Trinidad 26.04.2007 31465958 Fasteners

$ 76.51

Budget Marine Trinidad 27.03.2007 31461717 Sealer

$ 33.43

Budget Marine Trinidad 26.10.2007 31492741 plumb supplies

$ 31.57

Budget Marine Trinidad 01.05.2007 31466468 electrical supplies

$ 12.60

Budget Marine Trinidad 26.06.2007 31474101 electrical/dowell

$ 99.11


$ 100.95

Budget Marine Trinidad 05.09.2007 31484326

nuts,washers.thradrod for jetty repair

$ 474.03


$ 233.66


$ 637.61


$ 127.51

Budget Marine Trinidad 14.04.2008 31521254 float switch

$ 232.93


$ 325.86

Budget Marine Trinidad 05.06.2008 31529137 boat repair supplies

$ 720.21

Boaters Shop 14/03/06 791 painting supplies

$ 75.72

Total

$ 18,033.55

$ 18,033.55

Bhagwansingh's 21/04/08 20485492 Plywood

$ 487.60

Bhagwansingh's 12.06.2007 20841222 Household

$ 161.00

Bhagwansingh's 24/04/06 20133369 Sthil trimmer

$ 3,534.44

total

$ 4,183.04

$ 4,183.04


AMOUNT

Arno Warnaar 15/05/06

Dinghy for transport to mainland

$ 5,580.00

Belix/Leed 31/05/06

Purchase of Boston Whaler- safer boat

$ 35,000.00

Ian Ibrahm 05.07.2007

Purchase of Pirogue, no engine

$ 25,000.00

Shiya Jugool 07.05.2007

Outboard engine for pirogue

$ 8,000.00

Blare Electrical 03.06.2006 53466 Electrical supplies

$ 1,425.09


$ 465.75


$ 115.00

Boaters Shop 18/07/06 1024 tool supplies

$ 201.16

Boaters Shop 07.01.2006 7 paint supplies

$ 382.89

Total

$ 76,169.89

$ 76,169.89

Courts 13.06.2006 551076332 Appliances

$ 3,248.00

Redeye Spec. Transport 13.06.2006

Delivery Charge - Courts POS to Chag

$ 600.00

Courts 19.07.2006 551077328 Appliances

$ 6,096.00



$ 600.00

Courts 20.07.2006 551077371 appliances/furniture

$ 4,199.00



$ 600.00

Courts 03.08.2006 551077637 furniture/ttwasher

$ 6,448.00



$ 600.00

Courts 04.08.2006 551077673 app/furniture

$ 2,793.00



$ 600.00

Courts 12.04.2007 551084933 app/furniture

$ 8,648.00



$ 600.00


AMOUNT

Courts 29.11.2006 559013921 dryer cord/vent kit

$ 266.00

Courts 19/05/07 551085910 Furniture

$ 2,893.00

Redeye Spec. Transport 19/05/07


$ 600.00

Courts 16.05.2007 557032205 kitchen shelf

$ 399.00

Courts 04.08.2006 551077668 Chair

$ 299.00

Courts 08.06.2007 557032393 Matress

$ 899.00

Courts 04.08.2006 551077667 Satelite Dish – TV

$ 1,443.90

Courts 04.08.2006 551077670 Washer

$ 1,499.00



$ 600.00

Courts 29/11/06 12691 box spring n frame

$ 2,347.00

Redeye Spec. Transport 29/11/06


$ 600.00

Total

$ 46,877.90

$ 46,877.90

Coloured Fin Ltd. 16/05/06 12476CA watersupply

$ 4,593.33

Coloured Fin Ltd. 30/04/07 830 Watersupply

$ 3,839.85

Target Discount Store 24/03/06 173519 Basic household supplies

$ 717.58

Total

$ 9,150.76

$ 9,150.76

Peter Corbin - Electrician 03.06.2006

Electrical rewiring/repairs Estate House

$ 5,000.00


rewiring/repairs Est. Caretaker House

$ 2,500.00


Electrical rewiring/repairs Estate – Jetty

$ 1,500.00

Total

$ 9,000.00

$ 9,000.00


AMOUNT

Rampersad & Co. 22/08/2000

Legal fees Total $ 48,333.00

$ 48,333.00

Rampersad & Co.

legal fees owing Total $ 105,600.00

$ 105,600.00

H & S Momammeds Hardware 12.12.2006 321085/86

House/Property epair Materials

$ 5,822.45

0 12.12.2006

Material Transport by sea

$ 900.00

H & S Momammeds Hardware 25/09/07 9754/1543/3676


$ 9,960.98

SLS Transport 13/07/07


$ 500.00



$ 900.00

H & S Momammeds Hardware 21/05/07 6443


$ 2,128.15



$ 4,806.78



$ 500.00



$ 805.00



$ 494.50

H & S Momammeds Hardware 07.06.2006 309981


$ 701.50



$ 612.03



$ 4,599.54



$ 1,500.00



$ 2,327.60


AMOUNT



$ 500.00



$ 2,329.00



$ 900.00



$ 25.30



$ 1,849.20



$ 308.20



$ 598.00



$ 2,628.90



$ 500.00



$ 676.20



$ 511.75



$ 1,742.82

SLS Transport 05.04.2006


$ 300.00



$ 139.36



$ 864.23



$ 1,095.38

H & S 12.05/06 302527 House/Property epair

$


AMOUNT

Momammeds Hardware

Materials 161.00



$ 1,393.80



$ 3,531.88



$ 900.00



$ 467.36



$ 531.88



$ 3,273.02



$ 900.00



$ 161.20



$ 34.50



$ 1,660.60



$ 900.00



$ 4,069.14



$ 900.00



$ 230.00



$ 1,415.65

H & S Momammeds 05.05.2006 301705/706


$ 535.90


AMOUNT

Hardware



$ 4,828.85



$ 900.00



$ 1,414.60



$ 900.00



$ 791.20



$ 3,722.55



$ 1,500.00



$ 161.00



$ 3,850.05



$ 900.00

H & S Momammeds Hardware 11.08.2006 318536/537/540


$ 13,114.12



$ 1,200.00



$ 5,186.50



$ 900.00



$ 82.80



$ 3,389.98



$ 900.00


AMOUNT



$ 4,908.20



$ 900.00



$ 1,389.25



$ 648.60



$ 3,258.45



$ 900.00

Total

$ 128,338.95

$ 128,338.95

FT Farfan & Sons 04.07.2006 2228355 Sander

$ 458.74

FT Farfan & Sons 10.10.2006 258243 Star nut for cutter

$ 23.95

FT Farfan & Sons 04.07.2006 228334 Property lawn/yard maintenance

$ 739.82

FT Farfan & Sons 21.06.2007 332419 Property lawn/yard maintenance

$ 494.20

FT Farfan & Sons 03.07.2006 228032 Chain saw

$ 3,000.00

K. Mohammed Hardware 03.06.2006 117334


$ 1,224.75



$ 1,112.05



$ 500.00

K. Mohammed Hardware 17/02/06 116955


$ 2,919.85



$ 900.00



$ 300.00



$ 216.34

K. Mohammed 04.05.2006 118619 House/Property epair

$


AMOUNT

Hardware Materials 1,217.54



$ 101.25



$ 738.00



$ 1,222.45



$ 900.00



$ 6,297.97



$ 900.00



$ 328.00



$ 306.76



$ 271.40



$ 241.50

House/Property epair Materials Total

$ 24,414.57

$ 24,414.57

King's Hardware Ltd. 26/05/07 67983/82 Household

$ 1,834.20


$ 1,969.30

King's Hardware Ltd. 17/11/06 58619 Household

$ 909.57


$ 817.65


$ 1,161.33


$ 326.60

Total

$ 7,018.65

$ 7,018.65

LP Marine 19/11/07 049469-10505 Boat/repairs. Maintenance

$ 86.25


$ 101.50

LP Marine 03.03.2006 019503-10500 Boat/repairs. Maintenance

$ 239.20


AMOUNT


$ 213.83


$ 43.70


$ 54.58

Marc One Marine Supplies 30/04/07 37807

Boat/repairs. Maintenance

$ 1,338.19

Marc One Marine Supplies 05.01.2007 37820


$ 410.79



$ 57.96



$ 564.28



$ 215.97



$ 967.47



$ 369.15



$ 157.24

Marc One Marine Supplies 25/04/07 37767


$ 715.68

Mr SignSuppl 23.02.2007 17148 Electric supply house

$ 408.08


$ 2,612.52


$ 17.25


$ 652.57


$ 349.83

Modern Electr 06.08.2006 145014 Electric supply house

$ 66.47

Modern Electr 06.12.2006 145207 Electric supply house

$ 31.39

Norther Hardw 08.11.2006 0 Electric supply house

$ 396.21

N.Dherri & CO 05.02.2007 27606 Electric supply house

$ 34.50

New Age Electr 01.04.2006 836 Electric supply house

$ 5,500.00

Total $ $


AMOUNT

15,604.61 15,604.61

Peake Trading 27.07.2007 50116485 Estate house repair parts

$ 212.00


$ 600.28

Peake Trading 28/07/06 3212 Estate house repair parts

$ 409.74


$ 2,360.49


$ 2,101.51


$ 122.31

Peake Trading 05.04.2006 7S152842 Estate house repair parts

$ 305.33


$ 392.19

Peake Trading 28/06/06 3S520371 Estate house repair parts

$ 695.46


$ 676.95


$ 1,453.23


$ 242.91

Peake Trading 05/17//06 516559 Estate house repair parts

$ 72.45


$ 122.31


$ 232.62


$ 18.40


$ 399.00


$ 568.79


$ 5,499.42


$ 727.68


$ 508.02


$


AMOUNT

1,827.65


$ 275.51


$ 1,112.66

Pricemart 29.12.2006 176155 Estate house repair parts

$ 2,299.99

Quong Sing Hardware 25/10/06 22101 Estate house repair parts

$ 339.30

Quong Sing Hardware 05.01.2007 41627 Estate house repair parts

$ 2,289.85


$ 671.45


$ 34.95


$ 146.00


$ 809.80


$ 89.25

Island Home Property Ass 22/04/07 6641 Offload material fee

$ 120.00


$ 196.40

Yips Variety Store 24/03/06 002A0048 Estate house repair parts

$ 206.99

EZDoes ItLtd. 17.02.2006 4575 Estate house repair parts

$ 46.00

Classy Fabric's 19/07/06 5025 Estate house repair parts

$ 655.78

Mike's Electronics 07.11.2006 53729 Estate house repair parts

$ 110.00

Mike's Electronics 17/07/06 53577 Estate house repair parts

$ 440.00

Mathura AutoParts 07.06.2007 155821 Estate house repair parts

$ 59.00

Miguel Moses 10.02.2006 17239 Estate house repair parts

$ 97.50

Jimmy Aboud Textiles 04.11.2006 58945 Estate house repair parts

$ 347.65

Lawn Mower Plus 06.12.2007 7380 Estate house repair parts

$ 225.00

Island Home Property Ass 05.01.2007 5598 Estate house repair parts

$ 40.00


AMOUNT

Island Home Property Ass 15/01/07 5569 Estate house repair parts

$ 160.00

IAM & Co. 08.09.2006 324 Estate house repair parts

$ 203.00

IAM & Co. 04.03.2006 36168 Estate house repair parts

$ 335.00

Espy Trading 24.05.2006 no # Estate house repair parts

$ 953.00

Espy Trading 08.06.2006 no # Estate house repair parts

$ 2,347.00

A.K Electrical 24/02/07 43915 Estate house repair parts

$ 64.40

R&D Gunnes Electrical 26/02/07 308 Estate house repair parts

$ 28.00

L. Rambaran 22/05/07 no # Estate house repair parts

$ 2,500.00

Shiloh Enterprises 02.06.2007 693 Estate house repair parts

$ 301.30

Shiloh Enterprises 21/02/06 1139 Estate house repair parts

$ 51.75

Affordable Elegace 17/02/06 240606 Estate house repair parts

$ 172.89

Southern Supplies Ltd. 08.11.2006 813176 Estate house repair parts

$ 407.25

Coating Specialist Ltd

2617 Estate house repair parts

$ 1,958.59

Sigma Coatings 08.08.2007 2706 Estate house repair parts

$ 517.50

TrintoGas Ltd. 10.04.2006 134803 Estate house repair parts

$ 2,537.28

Ships Carpenter 04.10.2007 118 Estate house repair parts

$ 267.20

Affordable Elegace 17/02/06 244464 Estate house repair parts

$ 194.25

Yufe's 08.02.2006 930925 Estate house repair parts

$ 353.97

William H. Scott 05.06.2006 552941 Estate house repair parts

$ 62.10

Reliable Parts 19/07/06 59699 Estate house repair parts

$ 225.01

Caribbean Water Treatment 07.10.2007

Estate house water purifier

$ 10,701.10

Total

$ 54,502.41

$ 54,502.41


AMOUNT

T & TEC 13/01/06 06013108-0102 01088 Arears Michael Stobbart

$ 11,991.01

T & TEC

Feb 2006 to current

$ 48,400.00

$ 60,391.01

$ 60,391.01

Alex Katmaroo - Caretaker

02/06-10/06

Salary $3000/mth-Rec. Att.

$ 27,000.00

John Hinds - Caretaker

01/07-06/07


$ 24,000.00

John Hinds - Caretaker

07/07-02/08


$ 40,000.00

Total

$ 91,000.00

$ 91,000.00

Robert Auerbach/Phoenix 31.08.2013 16

Est.House/Jetty repairs (1999) Total

$ 361,500.00

$ 361,500.00

Two Stars Gen Contracting 31.08.2007

Est.House/Caretaker/Jetty repairs Total

$ -

\

Appendix II

COMPANY NAME DATE RECEIPT # DESCRIPTION AMOUNT K. Mohammed Hardware 03.01.2006 117195

House/Property epair Materials $ 201.19

SLS Transport 03.01.2006 Material Transport by sea $ 299.00

Boaters Shop 07.01.2006 7 paint supplies $ 110.40


House/Property epair Materials $ 1,898.14

Yufe's 08.02.2006 930925 Estate house repair parts $ 738.37

Miguel Moses 10.02.2006 17239 Estate house repair parts $ 847.35



EZDoes ItLtd. 17.02.2006 4575 Estate house repair parts $ 49.88

Affordable Elegace 17.02.2006 240606 Estate house repair parts $ 1,277.58

Affordable Elegace 17.02.2006 244464 Estate house repair parts $ 153.26




Peake Trading 18.02.2006 7S149685 Estate house repair parts $ 4,427.68

A. Mohammed Hardware 20.02.2006 41778 Gypsum Mud $ 50.63

A.Mohammed Hardware 20.02.2006 41779 Paint supplies $ 59.64

Shiloh Enterprises 21.02.2006 1139 Estate house repair parts $ 570.40





Budget Marine Trinidad 03.03.2006 31400147 boat steer wheel $ 2,218.37

LP Marine 03.03.2006 019503-10500 Boat/repairs. Maintenance $ 5.12






IAM & Co. 04.03.2006 36168 Estate house repair parts $ 12.60






Boaters Shop 14.03.2006 791 painting supplies $ 233.66

COMPANY NAME DATE RECEIPT # DESCRIPTION AMOUNT

Target Discount Store 24.03.2006 173519 Basic household supplies $ 637.61

Yips Variety Store 24.03.2006 002A0048 Estate house repair parts $ 127.51



Peake Trading 31.03.2006 7S152442 Estate house repair parts $ 325.86

New Age Electr 01.04.2006 836 Electric supply house $ 720.21






SLS Transport 05.04.2006 Material Transport by sea $ 3,534.44


TrintoGas Ltd. 10.04.2006 134803 Estate house repair parts $ 35,000.00





Bhagwansingh's 24.04.2006 20133369 Sthil trimmer $ 1,425.09













Arno Warnaar 15.05.2006 Dinghy for transport to mainland $ 6,096.00

Coloured Fin Ltd. 16.05.2006 12476CA watersupply $ 600.00

Peake Trading 17.05.2006 516559 Estate house repair parts $ 4,199.00



Espy Trading 24.05.2006 no # Estate house repair parts $ 6,448.00




Belix/Leed 31.05.2006 Purchase of Boston Whaler- safer boat $ 600.00


Electrical rewiring/repairs Estate House $ 8,648.00


Blare Electrical 03.06.2006 53466 Electrical supplies $ 600.00



William H. Scott 05.06.2006 552941 Estate house repair parts $ 2,893.00



Espy Trading 08.06.2006 no # Estate house repair parts $ 399.00

Courts 13.06.2006 551076332 Appliances $ 299.00

Redeye Spec. Transport 13.06.2006 Delivery Charge - Courts POS to Chag $ 899.00

















FT Farfan & Sons 03.07.2006 228032 Chain saw $ 1,500.00

FT Farfan & Sons 04.07.2006 228334 Property lawn/yard maintenance $ 5,822.45

FT Farfan & Sons 04.07.2006 2228355 Sander $ 900.00




Mike's Electronics 17.07.2006 53577 Estate house repair parts $ 900.00


rewiring/repairs Est. Caretaker House $ 2,128.15




Boaters Shop 18.07.2006 1024 tool supplies $ 805.00

Courts 19.07.2006 551077328 Appliances $ 494.50


Classy Fabric's 19.07.2006 5025 Estate house repair parts $ 612.03


Reliable Parts 19.07.2006 59699 Estate house repair parts $ 4,599.54

Courts 20.07.2006 551077371 appliances/furniture $ 1,500.00

Redeye Spec. Transport 20.07.2006 Delivery Charge - Courts POS to Chag $ 2,327.60





Electrical rewiring/repairs Estate – Jetty $ 900.00


Courts 03.08.2006 551077637 furniture/ttwasher $ 1,849.20



Courts 04.08.2006 551077673 app/furniture $ 598.00

Courts 04.08.2006 551077668 Chair $ 2,628.90



Courts 04.08.2006 551077667 Satelite Dish – TV $ 511.75

Courts 04.08.2006 551077670 Washer $ 1,742.82





Modern Electr 06.08.2006 145014 Electric supply house $ 864.23

H & S Momammeds Hardware 11.08.2006 318536/537/540





Peake Trading 24.08.2006 3948 Estate house repair parts $ 900.00



$ 222,006.64