republic of the philippines sandiganbayan quezon...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OFPHILIPPINES,

GREGORIO MICLATCAMILING, JR., et al.,

Accused.

Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067For: Violation of Republic Act No.

3019, Section 3 (e) and six(6) counts of falsificationunder Article 171 (4) of theRevised Penal Code

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, S.J., J. andFERNANDEZ, B., J.

For resolution is accused Editha B. Santos' ((Motion forJudicial Determination of Probable Cause" dated November 23,2016.1

In support of her subjectavers, among others, th~

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et al.

1. She is not a member of the officein charge with theprocurement and she was not a member of the Bidsand Awards Committee (BAC);2

2. Commission on Audit (COA)Circular No. 2003-004dated July 30, 2003, specifically prohibits the ChiefAccountant and personnel of accounting units to beregular members of the Bids and AwardsCommittee;3

3. The COAdid not find the accused-movant liable forthe commission of the alleged splitting and the sameshould be accorded great weight and respect;4

4. She only exercised a lawful and ministerial duty inaccordance with existing rules and regulations inaffixing her signature on the disbursementvouchers;5

5. She did not give unwarranted benefit to the suppliersince her act of signing the disbursement voucherswas for purposes of certifying cash availability andcompleteness of the attached documents;6

6. She did not falsify any public document;7 and

7. The reliance of the Officeof the Ombudsman on thecases of People v. Aguilos8 and People v. Damaso9

is misplaced.lO

The accused-movant also contends she did not conspirewith her co-accused in the commission of the alleged splittingof the questioned procurement directives and purchaseorders;ll that the Officeof the Ombudsman lacks evidence to

/72 pp. 321-322, Record3 p. 322, Record4 p. 323, Record5 p. 324, Record6 p. 330, Record7 p. 331, Record8405 SCRA 134 (2003)986 SCRA370 (1978)10 p. 333, Record11 p. 319, Record


prove the allegation of conspiracy between her and her co-accused in the commission of the said unlawful act; 12thatthere is no clear connection between the alleged act of splittingof the procurement directives and purchase orders and her actof signing the questioned disbursement vouchers; 13that heronly involvement in the questioned transactions is hercertification of the availability of cash and the propriety andcompleteness of the supporting documents;14and, that her actof affIXingher certification on the questioned disbursementvouchers does not establish nor indicate the existence ofconspiracy. IS

She invokes the case of Sistoza v. Desierto,16 where theSupreme Court held:

In the instant case, there is no direct evidence thatpetitioner Sistoza acted in conspiracy with the officersand members of the PBAC and the other implicatedpublic officials. He did not himself participate in thebidding procedures nor was he involved in the award ofthe supply of tomato paste to Elias GeneralMerchandising. Plainly, the accusation against him restsupon his signature on the purchase order and hisrepeated endorsements thereof notwithstanding hisknowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the leastprice. The Ombudsman concluded that these actsconstituted manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or evengross inexcusable negligence resulting in undue injury tothe govemment.

We disagree with the conclusions of the Officeof theOmbudsman. We have meticulously analyzed thearguments raised by the parties in the various pleadingsand motions, together with their documentary evidence,which all formed the basis for the issuance of thequestioned resolutions, and we are convinced that/!

12/d13 p. 321, Record14/d15 p. 328, Record16388 SeRA 307 (2002)


probable cause exists to warrant the filing of chargesagainst petitioner Sistoza for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e),RA 3019.

To begin with, before manifest partiality, evident badfaith or gross inexcusable negligence may even beconsidered, the Office of the Ombudsman shoulddetermine with certainty the facts indicative of themodalities of committing a transgression of the statute.

Simply alleging each or all of these methods is notenough to establish probable cause, for it is well settledthat allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can wededuce any or all of the modes from mere speculation orhypothesis since good faith on the part of petitioner aswith any other person is presumed. The facts themselvesmust demonstrate evident bad faith which connotes notonly bad judgment but also palpably and patentlyfraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquityor conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or illwill.

Clearly, the issue of petitioner Sistoza's criminalliability does not depend solely upon the allegedlyscandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure forwhich prosecution may perhaps be proper. For even if itwere true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that thebidding had been rigged, an issue that we do not confrontand decide in the instant case, this pronouncement alonedoes not automatically result in finding the act ofpetitioner similarly culpable. It is presumed that he actedin good faith in relying upon the documents he signedand thereafter endorsed. To establish a prima facie caseagainst petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e),RA3019,the prosecution must show not only the defects in thebidding procedure, a circumstance which we need notpresently determine, but also the alleged evident badfaith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partialityof petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchaseorder and repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made byhis subordinates despite his knowledge that the winningbidder did not offer the lowest price. Absent a well-grounded and reasonable belief that petitionerperpetrated these acts in the criminal manner hr~4


accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence ofprobable cause.17

The prosecution filed its "Opposition to Motion for JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause" dated January 12, 2017.18

The prosecution submits that the present motion of theaccused -movant is not necessary since the Court is alreadyduty-bound to make a determination of probable cause for thepurpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. 19

Moreover, it argues that the presence or absence ofconspiracy as well as the presence or absence of the elements ofa crime are evidentiary in nature and matters of defense whichare best passed upon after a full-blown trial.20 The prosecutioninvokes the case of People v. Dumlao,21 wherein the SupremeCourt held that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factualin nature and involves evidentiary matters and the same isbetter ventilated during trial where the parties can adduceevidence to prove or disprove its presence.

The prosecution likewise submits that there is probablecause to indict the accused-movant for violation of Section 3 (e)of R.A. No. 3019.22 The prosecution points out that the acts ofthe accused-movant and her co-accused clearly demonstrate acommon design towards the accomplishment of the sameunlawful purpose of giving unwarranted benefits to thesupplier, by allegedly splitting into six (6) separate procurementdirectives and purchase orders the procurement of combatclothing and individual equipment, and that the accused-movant, together with her co-accused, resorted to shopping asan alternative mode of procurement instead of competitivebidding without legal basi77

17 pp. 328-329, Record18 pp. 490-500, Record19 p. 491, Record20 p. 492, Record21 580 SeRA 409 (2009)22 p. 493, Record23 p. 494, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et ai.

The prosecution stresses that the accused-movant, aschief accountant, had the primary responsibility to verify thatarmy funds are properly disbursed and well accounted for.24 Itcites COA Circular No. 92-389 which provides that thesubmission of supporting documents does not preclude any ofthe signatories to a disbursement voucher from askingreasonable questions on the funding, legality, regularity,necessity or economy of the expenditure or transaction.25

Also, the prosecution disputes the propriety of theaccused-movant's reliance on the case of Sistoza v. Desierto.26

According to the prosecution, the ruling in the aforementionedcase is inapplicable to the present cases because of thedifferences in their factual milieu.27 The prosecution elucidatesthat in Sistoza, the Supreme Court found that there was nocause for Director Sistoza to complain or dispute the choice ofthe supplier nor investigate further since neither the defects inthe process nor the unfairness or injustice in the actions of hissubordinates were definite, certain, patent and palpable.28

On the other hand, in these cases, the prosecution pointsout, that the irregularities in the supporting documents areobvious; the dates stamped on the documents clearly show thatthe procurement directives and purchase orders preceded thoseof the advices of sub-allotment thus violating a very basic rulethat no government contract may be entered into, nor apurchase order issued without a prior sub-allotment from thebudget.29 Furthermore, the prosecution explains that DirectorSistoza was the head of the Bureau of Corrections and correctlyrelied on the assurances of his subordinates in three (3)different divisions. Accused-movant, as chief accountant,however, had the primary responsibility to attest that thedisbursement vouchers and their supporting documents werebereft of any irregularitier24 p. 495, Record25/d26 p. 496, Record27/d28/d29 p. 497, Record30/d


Finally, the prosecution argues that there exists probablecause to indict the accused-movant for falsification of publicdocuments under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised PenalCode. According to the prosecution, the accused-movant's act ofsigning the disbursement vouchers and her certification of theavailability of cash and the completeness and propriety of thesupporting documents, contributed towards the consummationof their unlawful goal, of which falsification of public documentis an integral part.31

After a thorough evaluation of the arguments raised by theparties, the Court finds the subject motion unmeritorious.

1. The filing of the subjectmotion for judicialdetermination ofprobable cause is a meresuperfluity.

To begin with, the prosecution aptly points out that thepresent motion is not necessary since the Court is alreadyduty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence ofprobable cause upon the filing of a valid Information. In thecase of De Los Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals,32 theSupreme Court ruled that the filing of a motion for judicialdetermination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, if not adeliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking~

Po~31 p. 498, Record32699 SeRA 614 (2013)


Court to weigh In on the evidence without a full-blown trial,thus:

The second is one made by the judge to ascertainwhether a warrant of arrest should be issued againstthe accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfyhimself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted,there is a necessity for placing the accused undercustody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Ifthe judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judgecannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 33 Notably,since the judge is already duty-bound to determinethe existence or non-existence of probable cause forthe arrest of the accused immediately upon thefiling of the information, the filing of a motion forjudicial determination of probable cause becomes amere superfluity,34 if not a deliberate attempt tocut short the process by asking the judge to weighin on the evidence without a full-blown trial.35

11. There is sufficientevidence whichestablishes probablecause against theaccused-movant andher co-accused.

33 footnote omitted34 footnote omitted35 emphasis supplied

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-1061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et al.

In determining probable cause, the average man weighsthe facts and circumstances without resorting to thecalibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has notechnical knowledge.36 He relies on common sense.37 A findingof probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that itwas committed by the accused.38 It demands more thansuspicion and requires less than evidence that would justifyconviction.39 A judicial determination of probable cause isdetermined to address the necessity of placing the accusedunder custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.40

In these cases, the Informations charge the accused-movant and her co-accused with violation of Section 3 (e) ofR.A. No. 3019 and falsification of public documents underArticle 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, on six (6) counts.41

Among the documents attached to the subjectInformations are the following:

1. Joint Resolution dated January 8, 2014 issued bythe Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)which foundprobable cause to indict accused Gregorio M.Camiling, Severino P. Estrella, Cesar G. Santos,Jessie Mario B. Dosado, Barmel B. Zumel, GeorgeP. Cabreros Cyrano A. Austria, Rolando F. Mineland accused-movant Edita B. Santos with thecrimes of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.3019 and falsification under Article 171 (4) of theRevised Penal Code, on six (6) counts;42

2. Joint Order dated October 30,2015 issued by theOMB which denied accused Minel, Austr/0

36 Aguilar v. Department of Justice, 705 SCRA629 (2013)371d38 Hasegawa v. Giron, 703 SCRA549 (2013)39 Viudez II v. Court of Appeals, 588 SCRA345 (2009)40 Hao v. People, 735 SCRA312 (2014)41 pp. 5-6, Record42 pp. 7-33, Record


Dosado, Cabreros and Santos' Motion forReconsideration which seeks the reversal of theOMB's finding of probable cause;43

3. Affidavit-Complaint filed by the Fact-FindingInvestigation Bureau, Office of the DeputyOmbudsman for the Military and other LawEnforcement Offices (OMB-MOLEO), togetherwith its Annexes "A" to "J-5," subscribed byZenaida C. Tabaque, Legal Assistant II, onOctober 19, 2011. 44This became the basis for theinstitution of a criminal action against hereinaccused and accused-movant;

4. Counter-Affidavit of accused Gregorio M.Camiling, Jr. which was subscribed to by him onFebruary 16,2012;45

5. Counter-Affidavit of accused Cesar G. Santos,which was subscribed to by him on March 16,2012;46

6. Counter-Affidavit of accused Jessie Mario B.Dosado, which was subscribed to by him onMarch 16, 2012;47

7. Counter-Affidavit of accused Barmel B. Zumel,together with its Annexes" I" to "12," subscribedto by him on February 6,2012;48

8. Counter-Affidavit of accused George P. Cabreros,which was subscribed to by him on March 16,2012;~

43 pp. 36-42, Record44 pp. 45-106, Record45 pp. 107-116, Record46 pp. 117-131, Record47 pp. 132-147, Record48 pp. 148-164, Record49 pp. 165-179, Record


9. Counter-Affidavit of accused Cyrano AglagubAustria, together with its Annexes "1" and "2,"which was subscribed to by him on February 16,2012;50

10. Counter-Affidavit of accused-movant Editha B.Santos together with its Annexes "A" to "F", ,subscribed to by her on February 3, 2012;51and

11. Counter-Affidavit of accused Rolando DelaFuente Minel, together with its Annexes" I" to"12," subscribed to by him on January 30,2012.52

After an assiduous evaluation of the above-mentioneddocuments, which are all part of the records of these cases,the Court finds the existence of probable cause that the crimesof violation of Section 3 (e)of R.A.No. 3019 and falsification ofpublic documents punishable under Article 171 (4) of theRevised Penal Code, on six (6) counts, have been committedand that the accused-movant and her co-accused are probablyguilty thereof.

A review of the records reveal that the followingprocurement directives were issued by accused Cyrano A.Austria, to wit:

1. Procurement DirectiveNR TOS (CCIE) 2003-04-0081dated February 11, 2003;53

2. Procurement DirectiveNR TOS (CCIE) 2003-04-0082dated February 12,200/7

50 pp. 180-202, Record51 pp. 203-228, Record52 pp. 273-300, Record53 p. 59, Record54 p. 60, Record


3. Procurement Directive NR TOS (CCIE) 2003-04-0083dated February 13, 2003;55

4. Procurement Directive NR TOS (CCIE) 2003-04-0084dated February 14, 2003;56

5. Procurement Directive NR TOS (CCIE) 2003-04-0085dated February 17, 2003;57 and

6. Procurement Directive NR TOS (CCIE) 2003-04-0086dated February 17,2003.58

The aforementioned procurement directives were chargedrespectively to Advice of Sub-allotments Nos. 2003-02/100/2200-156 to 157) all dated April 3, 2003.59

Between February 25, 2003 and February 26, 2003, thefollowingdocuments were issued by the accused:

1. Purchase Order (PO) No. 070-03,60 dated February,25, 2003 and PO Nos. 072-03,61 074-03,62 076-03,63078-0364 and 081-0365 all dated February 26, 2003issued by accused Gregorio M. Camiling, Jr. Thesepurchase orders were issued in favor of DantesExecutiveMenswear. The same purchaseordersn

55 p. 61, Record ~56 p. 62, Record

57 p. 63, Record ~58 p. 64, Record59 pp. 65-70, Record60 This Purchase Order covers the purchase of 185 sets of Gala with Green Pants at the rate of Php 5,000per unit with a total cost amounting to Php 925,000.61 This Purchase Order covers the purchase of 540 units of Pershing Caps at the rate of Php 1,800 per unitwith a total cost amounting to Php 972,000.62 This Purchase Order covers the purchase of 165 sets of Gala with Green Pants at the rate of Php 5,000per unit with a total cost amounting to Php 825,000.63 This Purchase Order covers the purchase of 540 units of White Pants and 540 units of Line Yard at therate of Php 500 and Php 850 per unit, respectively, with a total cost amounting to Php 729,000.64 This Purchase Order covers the purchase of 540 sets of Buttons and 540 units of Belt Buckles at the rateof Php 500 and Php 800 per unit, respectively, with a total cost amounting to Php 702,000.65 This Purchase Order covers the purchase of 190 sets of Gala with Green Pants at the rate of Php 5,000per unit with a total cost amounting to Php 950,000.


certified by accused Rolando F. Minel that funds areavailable·66,

2. Certificate of Purchase through Shopping67 issued byaccused Dosado covering the above-mentioned six (6)purchase orders. Therein, accused Dosado certifiedthat [1] there is no splitting of PO in the presentprocurement, [2] there is no more material time toprocure the items through normal procurementprocedures and [3] that the prices are the lowestobtainable as a result of the canvass made inaccordance with the prescribed procedure from three(3)suppliers;68

3. Abstract of Canvass and Recommendation of Awardsigned by accused Cesar Santos, Dosado, Zumel andCabreros, all members of the Bids and AwardsCommittee, wherein they certified that the abstract iscorrect and the price offered by Dantes ExecutiveMenswear is the lowest, fair and the best complyingoffer;69 and

4. Certificate of Reasonableness of Price issued byaccused Dosado certifying that the offer of DantesExecutive Menswear is in accordance with theplans / specifications called for in the canvassproposals and that the price offered by theprospective supplier is considered reasonable, beingthe lowest complying offer among the bona fidesuppliers in the local market.7o

On June 17, 2003, accused Dosado issued a Notice toProceed to Dantes Executive Menswear. Therein, DantesExecutive Menswear was informed that PO No. 078-03prepared ip. its favor had been approved.71 Subsequently, or onJune 18, 2003, accused Dosado issued Notices to Proceed

66 pp. 95-100, Record67 pp. 84-90, Record68 p. 71, Record69 pp. 77-82, Record70 p. 85, Record71 p. 93, Record


covenng PO Nos. 070-03J o72-03J o74-03J 076-03 and 081-03.72

On June 30, 2003, accused Camiling approvedDisbursement Vouchers Nos. 03-041-GSJ 03-043-GSJ 03-042-GSand 03-044-GS. Accused Estrella certified therein that theexpenses incurred were necessary and lawful. In the samedocuments, the accused-movant certified that the supportingdocuments for the questioned procurements are complete andproper and that the funds are available for payment.73 On July8, 2003, accused Camiling again approved DisbursementVouchers Nos. 03-053-GS and 03-052-GS and were likewisecertified by accused Estrella and the accused-movant.74

Based on the aforesaid record of the case, it appears,prima facie, that subject procurements could have beenpurchased under one procurement directive only. Instead, thesubject procurement was split into six (6) procurementdirectives covering an amount of less than PhPl,OOO,OOO.OOeach in order to justify the use of an alternative method ofprocurement other than the required public bidding. Further,it likewise appears from the record of the case that thesupporting documents of the subject procurement directivewere falsified in order to make it appear that the saidprocurement complied with the required procedure. Finally, allthese acts appear to have been done with the acquiescence andactive participation of the herein accused government officialswho likewise appear to have an acted in conspiracy with oneanother to achieve their com on design to circumvent theprocurernentla~ /

72 pp. 89-94, Record73 pp. 101-104, Record74 pp. 105-106, Record


111. The (1) presence orabsence of conspiracyand (2) presence orabsence of theelements of the crimeare matters of defenseand evidentiary innature; they are bestpassed upon after afull-blown trial on themerits.

(1) The presence orabsence ofconspiracy

The accused-movant avers that the Office of theOmbudsman lacks evidence to prove the allegation ofconspiracy between her and her co-accused,75 She submitsthat there is no clear connection between the alleged act ofsplitting of the procurement directives and purchase orders andher act of signing the questioned disbursement vouchers,76 andthat her only involvement in the questioned transactions is hercertification of the availability of cash and the propriety andcompleteness of the supporting documents. 77

In support of her argument, the accused-movant invokesthe case of Sistoza v. Desierto,78wherein the Supreme Courtruled in favor of the petitioner and found no direct evidencethat the petitioner acted in conspiracy with the officers andmembers of the PBACand the other implicated Offici~

75 p. 319, Record76 p. 321, Record77/d78388 SCRA307 (2002)79 p. 325, Sistoza v. Desierto, 388 SCRA307 (2002)


The Court finds the resolution of the above-mentionedissue raised by the accused-movant premature.

Jurisprudence teaches that the Court must not make adeterminative finding regarding the existence or non-existenceof conspiracy at this stage of the proceedings.

In the cases of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan80 andPeople v. Go,81 the Supreme Court ruled that the allegedabsence of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary innature, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits, thus:

It is settled that the absence or presence ofconspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiarymatters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy againstrespondent is better left ventilated before the trialcourt during trial, where respondent can adduceevidence to prove or disprove its presence. 82

The presenceabsence ofelements ofcrime

orthethe

The accused-movant insists that she did not giveunwarranted benefits to the supplier nor did she falsify anypublic document.83

It is premature at this early stage of the proceedings forthe Court to rule on the presence or absence of the elements ofthe crime charged, as held by the Supreme Court in People v.CaStillOr

80706 SCRA451 (2013)81719 SCRA704 (2014)82 emphasis supplied83 p. 331, Record84 590 SCRA95 (2009)


Moreover, it was clearly premature on the partof the Sandiganbayan to make a determinativefinding prior to the parties' presentation of theirrespective evidence that there was no bad faith andmanifest partiality on the respondents' part andundue injury on the part of the complainant. In Gov. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan,85 we held that "itis well established that the presence or absence ofthe elements of the crime is evidentiary in natureand is a matter of defense that may be best passedupon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Il86Also,itwould be unfair to expect the prosecution to present allthe evidence needed to secure the conviction of theaccused upon the filing of the information against thelatter. The reason is found in the nature and objective ofa preliminary investigation. Here, the public prosecutorsdo not decide whether there is evidence beyondreasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; theymerely determine whether there is sufficient ground toengender a well-founded belief that a crime has beencommitted and that respondent is probably guiltythereof, and should be held for trial.

She likewise asserts that she is not a member of theoffice in charge with the procurement and she was not amember of the BAC nor the procurement unit.87 Also,accused-movant claims that her act of signing the subjectdisbursement vouchers was lawful and ministerial duty inaccordance with existing rules and regulations.88

Undeniably, the issues raised by the accused-movant inher subject motion are clearly matters of defense, the validityand merits of which are best ventilated and passed uponduring the trial of the case/?1(

85521 SCRA270 (2007)86 emphasis supplied

87 pp. 321-322, Record ~88 p. 324, id89 See .Singian vs. Sandiganbayan, 706 SCRA451 (2013)


IV. The findings of theCOA in its Notice ofDisallowance datedOctober 12, 2010 is notcontrolling in thedetermination ofprobable cause by thisCourt.

The accused-movant adverts to the fact that the Notice ofDisallowance issued by the COA did not include her nameamong those employees found to be liable for the questionedtransactions.90 Allegedly, her non-inclusion is an indicationthat she was not responsible for the alleged splitting of theprocurement directives and purchase orders. 91

In Cabrera v. Marcelo)92 the Supreme Court held thatthe interest of the COA is merely administrative and itsinvestigation does not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority toinvestigate, thus:

It should be borne in mind that the interest ofthe COA is solely administrative, and that itsinvestigation does not foreclose the Ombudsman'sauthority to investigate and determine whetherthere is a crime to be prosecuted for which a publicofficial is answerable. In Ramos v. Aquino, the Courtruled that the fact that petitioners' accounts andvouchers had passed in audit is not a ground forenjoining the provincial fiscal from conducting apreliminary investigation for the purpose of determiningthe criminal liability of petitioners formalversation. Clearly then, a finding of pro~

90 p. 323, Record 4191/d

" 446 SCRA207(2004) ~


cause does not derive its veracity from the findingsof the COA,but from the independent determinationof the Ombudsman. 93

Moreover, the accused-movant argues that she merelyexercised a lawful and ministerial duty in accordance withexisting rules and regulations in affIxingher signatures on thequestioned disbursement vouchers; that her act of signing thevouchers was done after a meticulous and thorough review ofrelevant procurement, accounting and auditing rules andregulations; and, that she affIxed her signature upon beingconvinced that the required supporting documents werecomplete and the funds were available for the purpose.94 Tosupport this argument, the accused-movant invokes the caseof Sistoza v. Desierto. 95

The Court finds accused-movant's reliance on theaforementioned case misplaced.

In Sistoza, the Supreme Court held that Director Sistozadid not act with evident bad faith; neither was he inexcusablynegligent when he signed the purchase order and endorsed thesame to the Department of Justice considering that his dutiesas Director of the Bureau of Corrections entailed a lot ofresponsibility, not only on the management side, but also inthe rehabilitation and execution of convicted prisoners, publicrelations and other court-imposed duties. Thus, it wasunreasonable to require him to accomplish direct and personalexamination of every single detail in the purchase of a month-long supply of tomato paste and to carry-out an in-depthinvestigation of the motives of every public officer involved inthe transaction before affIxing his signature on the pro-formadocuments as endorsing authority.96

Here, the accused-movant is not similarly situated as

~93 emphasis supplied94 p. 324, Record95388 SCRA307 (2002)96 pp. 330-331, Sistoza v. Desierto, 338 SCRA307 (2002)


Director Sistoza since she is not a head of office. Moreover, asaptly pointed out by the prosecution, as ChiefAccountant/Head of the Accounting Unit, the accused-movanthad the primary responsibility of seeing to it that thedisbursement vouchers and their supporting documents werebereft of any irregularities. Additionally, it is jurisprudentiallysettled that the validity and merits of a party's defense oraccusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies andevidence, are better ventilated during trial proper.97

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the existence of probablecause against all the accused in these cases. Accordingly, letwarrants of arrest be issued against accused Gregorio MiclatCamiling, Jr. and Severino P. Estrella.

Accused Barmel Barbero Zumel, George PagsolinganCabreros, Cyrano Aglagub Austria, Jessie Mario Borja Dosado,Cesar Guzman Santos, Rolando Dela Fuente Minel andaccused-movant Editha B. Santos had posted bail. Thus, theissuance of a warrant of arrest against them had beenrendered moot. Correspondingly, set the arraignment of theaforementioned accused on April 20, 2017 at 1:30 in theafternoon.

Accused Editha B. Santos' "Motion for JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause" dated November 23, 2016 isNOTED.

SO ORDERED

Quezon City, Metro Manila

97 Shu v. Dee, 723 SCRA512 (2014) See also Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, 715 SCRA36 (2014), Singian,Jr., v. Sandiganbayan, 706 SCRA451 (2013) and Villanueva v. Caparas, 689 SCRA679 (2013)


ITO R. FERNANDEZsociate Justice

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