Ngā Māramatanga-ā-Papa (Iwi Ecosystem Services) Research Monograph Series No. 10 Charlotte Šunde 2012

CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

SYSTEMS AND THE ECOSYSTEM

APPROACH: A HOLISTIC

INTERPRETATION FOR THE IWI

ECOSYSTEM SERVICES PROJECT

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Cultural Knowledge Systems and the

Ecosystem Approach: a Holistic

Interpretation for the Iwi Ecosystems Services

Project

Ngā Māramatanga-ā-Papa (Iwi Ecosystem Services)

Research Monograph Series No. 10

(FRST MAUX 0502)

2012

Charlotte Šunde At time of writing this report (2008): New Zealand Centre for Ecological Economics, Massey University, New Zealand / Centre d’Economie et d’Ethique pour l’Environnement et le Développement, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France

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Published by Iwi Ecosystem Services Research Team Massey University and Landcare Research/Manaaki Whenua Private Bag 11052 Palmerston North New Zealand

Ngā Māramatanga-ā-Papa (Iwi Ecosystem Services) Research Monograph Series This monograph is part of the Ngā Māramatanga-ā-Papa (Iwi Ecosystem Services) Research Monograph Series. Various other reports, presentations, workshops and teaching materials have also been produced, or will be published in due course, that cover other aspects of the research programme. Collaborators in the research included Massey University, Landcare Research/Manaaki Whenua, Te Wānanga-o-Raukawa and Te Rūnanga-o-Raukawa. This, and other published reports in the series, can be downloaded from: http://www.mtm.ac.nz/index.php/knowledge-centre/publications.

“Kei ngaro pērā i te moa ngā tini uri o te taiao” “Restoring cultural, linguistic and biological diversity”

Whakatauki courtesy of Keri Opai, Taranaki ISBN 978-1-877504-09-9

ISSN 1170-8794-

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Preface

This report forms part of ongoing research on ways of approaching cross-cultural dialogue

between indigenous peoples and Western-trained scientists and resource managers,

particularly in the context of environmental management issues. It contributes to a series of

studies prepared for the Iwi Ecosystem Services Project – a joint research partnership

between the New Zealand Centre for Ecological Economics (NZCEE) and Ngāti Raukawa

(a Māori tribe from the Ōtaki region in the lower North Island of New Zealand). The

research was funded by a grant from the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology

(Contract number EOI-10106-ECOS-MAU).

The Iwi Ecosystem Services Project aims to incorporate both mātauranga Māori

(indigenous Māori knowledge) and Western scientific knowledge. It is essential to gain a

deeper understanding of the different knowledge systems and cultural worldviews involved

before attempting to engage in cross-cultural dialogue or enter into collaborative

management arrangements. This report lays important groundwork for the Iwi Ecosystem

Services Project, and subsequent cross-cultural environmental research programmes, by

outlining the main characteristics of the Western scientific knowledge system, and

indicating key aspects of an indigenous epistemology. Other researchers in this and

subsequent projects are involved in studies of indigenous knowledge systems, with a focus

on mātauranga Māori. This report is intended to complement those studies, although it has

been researched and written as a separate, stand-alone document. While this report

summarises the international literature related to cross-cultural environmental research

with indigenous people, other publications have been produced that incorporate more of

the literature specific to conducting research with tangata whenua in Aotearoa/New

Zealand (e.g., see Hardy 2010, Hardy & Patterson 2012).

The basis for the research in this report was established during 1998 as part of a visiting

scholar internship at the Resource and Environment Studies department of the University

of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. I am grateful for guidance and tutelage by the late Professor

James Kay and a network of scholars, students and practitioners who shared ideas about

complex systems thinking and its application for ecosystems and society. Foundational

ideas in this report were presented at the International Society for Systems Sciences

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conference in Toronto in 2000. Since then, I have continued to collaborate with an

international network of scientists and scholars who actively promote the ecosystem

approach to complex environmental problems and cross-cultural situations (see Šunde

2008a and others’ chapters in Waltner-Toews, Kay and Lister 2008).

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

2. Three Western Scientific Approaches ........................................................................... 3

2.1 Reductionist Method ..................................................................................................... 4

2.1.1 Epistemology ..................................................................................................... 5 2.1.2 Ecological Theory.............................................................................................. 5 2.1.3 Traditional Planning .......................................................................................... 6

2.2 General Systems Perspective ......................................................................................... 7

2.2.1 Epistemology ..................................................................................................... 7 2.2.2 Equilibrium Ecology ......................................................................................... 8 2.2.3 Environmental Management.............................................................................. 9

2.3 Complex Systems Science ........................................................................................... 11

2.3.1 Epistemology ................................................................................................... 11 2.3.2 Non-Equilibrium Ecology ............................................................................... 12 2.3.3 Resilience and Adaptive Management ............................................................ 13

3. Holism as a Cross-Cultural Concept ........................................................................... 16

4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 19

References…………………………………………………………………………………32

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List of Tables

Table 1 Comparison of Western Scientific Approaches with the Indigenous Māori Worldview

Table 2 Main Differences between Equilibrium-Centred and Non-Equilibrium

Ecology Table 3 Similarities between Complex Systems Science and Indigenous

Epistemology Table 4 Differences between Complex Systems Science and Indigenous

Epistemology

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1. Introduction Critical changes are taking place within the scientific worldview that challenge the foundations of conventional, reductionist science by asserting a complex systems awareness of nature as complex, unpredictable, interconnected, and dynamic. However, it is asserted in this report that the holistic understanding that underpins the emerging complex systems science is by no means a new perspective. In relationships with nature, many cultures reveal an appreciation of the holistic interrelatedness of life. Furthermore, they have expressed these relationships over a number of generations through complex socio-ecological arrangements interwoven with an awareness of the sacred dimension. The holistic understanding that underpins the ecosystem approach presents a strong basis for promoting cross-cultural dialogue between Western-trained scientists and indigenous peoples. The ecosystem approach draws key principles from complex systems science which, it is argued, has a number of features in common with indigenous knowledge epistemologies – namely, their holistic conceptual basis. On the other hand, it is more difficult (if not impossible) to link indigenous knowledge systems with the mechanical, rational outlook of the dominant reductionist scientific epistemology. While many indigenous epistemologies reflect a holistic understanding of nature, the systems science literature is only tentatively beginning to acknowledge and explore the connections between scientific and indigenous conceptions of nature (see Capra 1975; Berkes et al. 1998; Berkes and Folke 2002; Šunde 2003). In the past, scientists have largely ignored the importance of cultural relationships, and the value of traditional ecological knowledge and indigenous epistemologies. However, I contend that if the ecosystem approach is to have a positive influence in environmental praxis and not be limited to theory, then it must take careful consideration of the cultural relationships specific to local contexts. The first part of this report focuses on the Western scientific knowledge system in which three main approaches are identified: reductionist; general systems; and complex systems science. Each is distinguished according to epistemological foundations, with underlying philosophical tenets that correspond to major ecological theories and resource management practices. This report outlines the three scientific approaches in turn, and examines the theoretical positions underpinning the reductionist, equilibrium-centred, and non-equilibrium theories in ecology. In addition, the evolution from traditional town planning to current environmental management practice is re-evaluated in the light of complex systems theory. Novel strategies are emerging from integrative studies into complex social and ecological systems, such as resilience and an adaptive, evolutionary model for governance. A secondary aim is to highlight and clarify misconceptions in the definitions and distinctions between the equilibrium-centred theory in ecology, which underpins mainstream environmental management, and the non-equilibrium and far-from-equilibrium understanding of ecosystems as complex systems. The latter has strongly influenced ideas about ecosystem resilience, and responses such as adaptive management and the ecosystem approach. Social narratives will be briefly examined, such as the idea of a ‘balance of nature’, which supports the equilibrium paradigm and provides cultural justification for human intervention in nature to maintain such a balance. It is argued that adaptive management takes a more holistic perspective, accepting humans as part of the ecosystem; any attempt to ‘manage’ the environment must be guided by the understanding that irreducible uncertainty and complexity are inherent dimensions of such systems.

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The final aim of this report is to reconsider the concept of holism, taking into account Smuts’ 1926 definition of holism and evolution as a process of whole-making in which the whole is ‘more than the sum of its parts’. This is a term that has been misunderstood across a wide range of disciplines. In ecology it gained a bad reputation due to the misuse of holistic thinking as providing a scientific basis for National Socialism in Germany (Golley 1993). I contend that this unfortunate connotation belies the original meaning of holism. In returning to the roots, we may in fact discover the potential of holism as a conceptual ‘linking language’ between complex systems science and indigenous epistemology.

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2. Three Western Scientific Approaches In this study of the Western scientific knowledge system, three main approaches have been identified: reductionist, general systems, and complex systems science. From a philosophical stance, the three approaches may be differentiated according to their treatment of the whole and the parts (cf. Plato on the conflict between the One and the Many). However, it could be argued that only two main approaches are dominant in mainstream science: reductionist and general systems perspective; these two being most apparent because of their conflicting, polarised positions. The reductionist approach derives knowledge by reducing wholes into component parts and then analysing those parts in isolation. In contrast, the general systems perspective tends to treat the whole (ecosystem) as a ‘studiable unit’ to be managed in a relatively intact state according to conditions that maintain equilibrium. In short: reductionism biases the parts, whereas the general systems perspective favours the whole as a comprehensive, absolute entity. The reductionist method predominates in scientific disciplines such as molecular biology, chemistry and genetic engineering, while the general systems perspective has influenced evolutionary biology, systems engineering, physiology, and equilibrium-based ecology. A third approach takes the perspective that neither the parts nor the whole are ultimate; rather, relationships take precedence and the parts/whole are dependent on the observer. Complex systems science, influenced in part by the physics of thermodynamics and its emphasis on time and energy flows, shifts the focus from entities (the parts or whole) to the relationships within the whole. Here, the parts and wholes are recognised as ‘holons’ (Koestler 1978) arranged hierarchically within ever-greater wholes across a range of scales (both temporal and spatial). This approach includes the study of interrelationships within ecosystems, landscape structures and dynamics, and further extends to include biotic and human interactions with planetary dynamics. It is from this basis that the underlying principles of the ecosystem approach are considered (see Waltner-Toews et al. 2008). While it may be obvious that reductionist tendencies and those that emphasise the whole as an absolute entity are poles apart, less apparent are the differences between the general systems perspective and complex systems science. Admittedly, the latter two approaches are less obvious to the untrained eye, and therefore both tend to suffer the same criticism levelled at the so-called ‘holistic approach’ by reductionist scientists; these may, or may not, be valid. Perhaps the most important differences have been best articulated by the ecologists and practitioners who adhere to either equilibrium-based ecology (e.g., a ‘balance of nature’ ideology) or non-equilibrium and far-from-equilibrium ecology (summarised in Table 2). An appreciation of the different philosophical and theoretical bases of the generalist and complex systems sciences becomes increasingly important as they are given practical expression through scientific research and environmental management. The main features of the three Western scientific approaches are outlined in Table 1. Key characteristics are highlighted under the categories: epistemology; ecological theory; and resource management (cf. ‘mindscape’ types, Maruyama 1978). In addition, an epistemology drawn from an entirely different worldview is included; that of an indigenous knowledge system (see the right-hand column of Table 1 for a comparison with the Māori indigenous epistemology). This cross-cultural emphasis enables the changes within the scientific worldview to be appreciated in a wider context, indicating a paradigm shift underway within science and signalling a changing awareness in the Western worldview.

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Table 1 Comparison of Western Scientific Approaches with the Indigenous

Māori Worldview

WESTERN SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES INDIGENOUS

Paradigm Reductionist General Systems (Equilibrium)

Complex Systems Māori Worldview

Epistemology • parts • dualistic, atomism • nature as a

machine • humans apart from

nature • rational, logical,

analytical, objective

• whole • monistic, absolutist • nature as an

organism • humans dependent

on nature (managers)

• synthetic, rational

• holons: parts/whole • holistic (profane) • nature is dynamic • humans part of

nature (secular participants)

• abstract, conceptual

• living whole • holistic (sacred) • nature is living

relationships • humans related to

nature (ancestral responsibilities)

• rational and non-rational experiences

Ecological Theory

‘Non’ Ecology • Gleason’s

‘individualistic, concept’

• plant community result of random, independent individuals

• ‘community’ as collective entity

• biotic elements only

• plant ecology

Equilibrium Ecology • Clements’

succession • deterministic • pioneer,

competition • climax state, stable • + - feedback loops

assumes ‘dynamic equilibrium’: homeostasis

• biotic and abiotic flows

• island biogeography

Non-equilibrium Ecology • hierarchy, multi-

scale, type • limited

predictability • Chaos Theory • uncertainty,

complexity • + - feedback loops

don’t necessarily balance: non-equilibrium

• dissipative structures

• emergent properties

• everything is

interconnected • emphasis on

relationships (extended kinship)

• complexity: humility

• adapt to changes, harmonise with nature (lore)

Resource Management

Traditional Planning • rational-

comprehensive • planning zones,

property • fragmented

landscapes • engineering bias • expert specialists • quantitative bias • cultural factors

unimportant • human activities

compartmentalised • efficiency and

optimisation

Environmental Management • ecological units

(bounded) • integrated

management • interdisciplinary • large-scale

government • human and

ecosystem health, effects of pollution

Adaptive Management • ‘boundaries’ are

heuristic • decisions are based

on social choice, scientific basis

• design-based • protection of

ecosystem integrity, resilience

• change accepted and adapted to: ‘catastrophic’ events normal

Kaitiakitanga / Guardianship • tribal/cultural

boundaries • accumulated

observations and experiences (inter-generational)

• kaumātua/elders’ knowledge respected

• shamanic visions; tohunga knowledge

• sacred and secular • belief / action

related through cosmology

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2.1 Reductionist Method

2.1.1 Epistemology Reductionism has dominated Western thinking since the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries. However, the reductionist approach was also prevalent with the Greek Atomists who believed that reality was made up of an infinite number of indivisible atoms, randomly colliding in empty space (Tarnas 1991). This approach takes the whole to be merely a philosophical, abstract concept with no fundamental relevance in reality. Rather, parts and individuals are considered the primary basis of reality, so that the smaller the particles the more concrete and real they must be. Any notion of the ‘whole’ is simply the sum of its parts; a collective entity only. When taken to its extreme, this way of thinking is displayed in the individualist structure of modern, industrial civilisation, such that the notion of ‘society’ may simply be regarded as the sum collection of individuals and interest groups (Goldsmith 1993; Saul 1995). Underpinning this analytical method is the assumption that base fundamental units of reality (the laws of nature) exist and can be uncovered so that, by deduction, reality in its entirety may eventually be known (Wilson 1998). Nature is therefore regarded as something that is wholly knowable to the rational human mind. The logical conclusion is that nature is predictable and can be controlled and manipulated for human benefit. This anthropocentric arrogance has its roots in Judaeo-Christianity, which emphasised the uniqueness of human souls in superior relation to all other creatures over whom humans hold ‘dominion’ (White 1967). The philosophical revolution, in which 17th century rational philosopher René Descartes played an instrumental part, extended dualism to a dichotomy between nature and culture. His Cartesian coordinate system promoted a mathematical description of nature and the use of analytical thought. As rational beings endowed with a soul and culture, humans were given license as masters over nature (mind over matter). The 17th century scientist, Francis Bacon, further desacralised nature and claimed that since nature was merely a machine, it was not alive and therefore did not elicit respect; rather, he argued that nature should be conquered and treated like a slave! Isaac Newton’s laws of motion were well received by the post-Enlightenment scientific community. His simple, linear models were extrapolated onto life itself, regarding all phenomena as ‘machines in motion’; predictable according to mathematical formulae and rational logic. The mechanistic analogy allowed scientists to dissect nature into parts and to view each part in isolation. The parts were then analysed by specialists who had been trained to extract ‘objective’ facts by way of replicable (and therefore verifiable) scientific experiments. It was assumed that simple, linear relationships defined the parts, so that the whole could be reconstructed after the parts had been analysed and, so it was claimed, known in detail (Pepper 1984; Koestler and Smythies 1969).1 2.1.2 Ecological Theory In the biological sciences, the reductionist approach is exemplified in the studies of Henry Gleason (1926, 1939) who proposed the ‘individualistic concept’ of the plant community.2

He argued against the theory that plants in a particular area form an organic entity, or overriding deterministic whole, but instead regarded the community as “…little more than a coincidental assemblage of independent species sharing an area arbitrarily defined by the

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ecologist” (Hagen 1992: 29). The notion of a whole was disregarded by Gleason partly on the basis that boundaries of organisms were poorly defined, whereas individuals could be clearly identified and therefore counted. Gleason considered the plant community to be a result of random events only, with individual plants (both members and species) distributed independently according to environmental selection and fortuitous immigration. Gleason’s argued against ecological succession theories in favour of individualistic behaviours on three grounds: 1. environmental factors vary in space and time; 2. plants tend to disperse seeds randomly; 3. each species and individual members have a range of environmental tolerances. Reductionism continues to prevail through the mainstream Western education system which biases specialisation over general knowledge and transdisciplinary approaches to learning. Ecology was originally intended to move toward a synthesis of the sciences (McIntosh 1976), but as critics such as Goldsmith (1988) claim, it has since been largely subverted by the reductionist tendency (and quantitative, empirical ‘normal science’) such that today the academic discipline of ‘ecology’ is in fact more akin to a pseudo-biology. Mainstream ecological studies are not typically concerned with the functioning of the whole ecosystem, or necessarily with the flows that link species in a dynamic web. Rather, they focus on specific species, populations or individuals. Furthermore, abiotic elements are typically excluded from these studies, as O’Neill et al. (1986: 8) explain in their outline of the population-community approach to ecology: “The biota are the ecosystem and abiotic components such as soil and sediments are external influences.” Specialists’ studies provide detailed observations, yet their analysis tends to concentrate only on the collection of quantitative facts. For example, in the conservation movement, diversity is almost always measured as the number (rather than variety) of species or individuals (Lister 1998), and the health of certain individuals is calculated by tagging and recording weights, heights, lengths, breeding and digestive habits. The individualistic concept manifests itself in many wildlife conservation programmes (e.g., New Zealand’s species recovery programme) that focus on preserving single species rather than protecting and enhancing ecosystem integrity or ecological functions. Similarly, much so-called ‘ecological’ research and education tends to concentrate on single species, as if they were not part of a wider ecological system. While ecological monitoring has played an important part in developing a database of information about natural environments, the absence of non-quantifiable attributes and the narrow focus of biological studies have severely limited the potential for ecology to improve human-nature relationships. For example, the recovery of endangered species requires a much broader approach that ensures the protection of habitat and considers the wider ecological flows and inter-species interactions. Furthermore, there has been a strong tendency in ecology (and the sciences in general) to deny the importance of social and cultural factors. This is illustrated in the compartmentalisation of human relationships, e.g., conservation versus development interests; city for livelihood and nature for recreation. Furthermore, the treatment of nature only as a physically tangible entity denigrates others’ relationships, such as spiritual values held by indigenous peoples and other non-quantifiable values (see Šunde 2008b; Krieger 1991).3 2.1.3 Traditional Planning Traditional planning emerged out of the historic concern with spatial ordering in the built environment. The scale of concern ranged from overall design of the city to site-specific planning and the architectural form of individual buildings. The earliest town and country

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planners of the early 20th century, Ebenezer Howard and Patrick Geddes, exemplified the ‘city beautiful’ movement.4 The ideals of that social movement sought improvements in public health and safety, overall amenity and aesthetics, and later was concerned with open spaces and park planning within the urban area (e.g., Frank Lloyd Wright’s ‘Broadacre City’ theme, 1932). Since the inception of the planning profession in the early 20th century, the rational model (e.g., survey-analysis-plan) has been and remains the basic methodological approach of urban planning (Wolfe 1989). City planners and engineers were accorded the status of experts and relied upon for their technical advice and rational decision-making processes. Indeed, technical answers were sought for what were perceived as simply technical problems. Gradually the humanist concerns were put aside in favour of improvements in efficiency and function in terms of comprehensive town planning. Planning was restricted to the design of urban areas and allocation of zones with appropriate restrictions, rules and enforcement. This remains the function of many town planning departments today. The urban writer and outspoken activist, Jane Jacobs (1961), inspired a revival in community-based approaches to planning through her widely acclaimed critique of the ‘rationalist’ planners of the 1950s and 1960s. As a result of this changing emphasis, social and cultural issues were often considered less important, and the perspectives especially of minority groups were typically ignored in the decision-making process (Arnstein 1969). Similarly, wider ecological concerns that fell outside the boundaries of the city were often disregarded.3 To this extent, the city was seen as a locus of civilisation within a hinterland that functioned merely as its fuel-source. Today, the landscape of many industrial countries bears the visible marks of a mindset that, as Bohm (1980) argues, divides wholes into parts and then mistakes the fragments (parts) for ‘the way things really are’. The Cartesian grid has been extrapolated onto the landscape so that the boundaries have become the dominant physical and legal presence as, for example, the delineations of private property, planning zones, transport routes and power lines. Natural habitats and migratory paths of animals and birds are typically ignored when such human-designed artificial boundaries are imposed (Freyfogle 1998). As a result, present conservation efforts are greatly hindered by the physical and ideological divisions created by poorly-designed planning and development schemes. 2.2 General Systems Perspective 2.2.1 Epistemology The reductionist, mechanical worldview that emerged out of the Enlightenment was met with a counter-movement of the 18th and 19th centuries that came to be known as romanticism. As Pepper (1984) points out, the dualism of the rational versus the romantic can also be traced back to classical times. The two movements contrasted in a number of ways, yet they have both had important influences in the shaping of the modern Western worldview. Whereas the Enlightenment asserted rationality and reason through scientific objectivity, the romantics valued the ideals of intuition and creativity, subjective experience and spiritual relationships with nature. Reductionist scientists viewed nature as a collection of inert and spiritless atoms, while romantics based their principles on organic philosophy, viewing the natural world as a creative and living organism. The romantics contrasted their organic vision of reality where ‘the whole is everything and the parts are nothing’ with the rationalistic and mechanical philosophy of reductionist science as inorganic, where ‘the whole is nothing more than a collection of parts’. It is

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important to note that the organic vision was highly influenced by philosophical monists such as William James (1909) who emphasised the oneness of the cosmos (note that this is not ‘holism’, according to the original definition by Smuts 1926). It may be noted that the reductionist and the organic approaches present themselves along opposing ideological lines. This has led to a situation where they each reject the claims of the other on the basis of their differing philosophical and theoretical origins. For example, the dialectical nature of their differences is apparent today in the ongoing discourse between proponents and critics of James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock 1979; Goldsmith 1988). What characterised the romantics (the poets, artists and philosophers) was a ‘back to nature’ attitude and yearning to return to the lost innocence of pre-industrial Europe. These utopian moralists romanticised tribal societies for their perceived ideal, communal way of life based on simplicity, stability and harmony (e.g., Rousseau’s ‘noble savage’). Even today, indigenous peoples are widely upheld as examples of communities living in harmonious balance with ‘Mother Nature’, even if indigenous peoples have never seen themselves in those terms. The myth of the ‘balance of nature’ was extended to all ecological relationships and is today a powerful metaphor and widely-accepted social narrative (Egerton 1973; Jelinski 2005). Such observations were emphasised through the writings of a number of influential individuals in North America during the 19th and 20th centuries, including Henry Thoreau, John Muir and Aldo Leopold (see Kinsley 1995). Their contributions raised general awareness of environmental ethical considerations, and inspired calls for action in response to environmental concerns resulting from the expansion of Western industrialisation into new territories. The organic vision tends to approach nature as a unified and balanced whole. In social theories, this perspective emphasises the importance of societal associations over individual desires (e.g., socialism, communism), and the ideal of community as a harmonious whole where individuals interact in mutual reciprocity (e.g., 1970s communalism). In the absence of disruptive human influence, it is believed that nature exists in a stable state of equilibrium that has persisted over time immemorial through the repetition of patterns of order. Some proponents of this argument (such as Goldsmith 1988) hold modern, industrial civilisation responsible as the major ecological perturbation that has shattered this ‘balance of nature’. Consequently, they call for remedial action to restore the original ecological balance. However, Botkin (1990: 12-13) points out that such metaphors have been biased by static (i.e. anti-change) ideas:

As explanations of how nature works, the divinely ordered image and the mechanical image share much in common. Both lead to the idea of nature as constant unless unwisely disturbed, and as stable, capable of returning to its constant state if disturbed. Both lead to the conviction that undisturbed nature, or perhaps a nature with human beings playing their ‘natural’ roles, is good, while a changing nature is bad.

2.2.2 Equilibrium Ecology In ecology, the concept of community as a group of interdependent organisms became prevalent through the work of the American plant ecologist Frederic Clements (1905, 1916, 1936). In contrast to Gleason’s individualistic concept, Clements presented a model of plant communities as ‘super-organisms’ that followed quite regular and almost predictable stages of succession: the pioneer stage and the climax state. Presenting the sequence as following a unidirectional linear flow of time, Clements (1936) asserted that it was only inevitable that any plant community would eventually reach the climax state,

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which was entirely predictable. Jelinski (2005) attributes the deterministic aspects of succession to the product of Newtonian thinking. According to Clements’ theory, the earlier, primary stage of succession is characterised by a dynamic state of flux and therefore instability. Typically this is associated with high productivity where pioneering individuals actively compete to colonise the new environment. The species that best adapt to their physical environments in turn modify those environments and create conditions that support a favourable ecological niche. This relationship is understood in terms of simple, causal stimulus-response mechanisms: any introduced species creates a stress on the existing environment that results in an effect that alters the competitive balance. If a community is disrupted in the process of its ecological succession (by an external event) it is believed that the system may respond by regressing to its historical pioneering stage or even to ‘point zero’ where it must begin again the slow process of recovery (Major 1969). Given this interpretation, the equilibrium-centred view in ecology discourages disturbances as ‘unnatural’ because such changes are seen as external to the ecosystem and therefore ‘accidents’ (for examples, refer to Botkin 1990). Clements (1916, 1936) explained that as the plant community advanced from its embryonic stage of development, it gradually progressed through a series of stages to reach a more mature climax state. As the community matured, it progressively stabilised its environment. Therefore, the climax state was considered to be the most stable and to support the greatest diversity of species (e.g., the stability-diversity hypothesis5). In the absence of external changes, the theory held that the climax state would persist, seemingly indefinitely, with very little structural change (Clements 1905).6 However, Clements preferred to characterise the climax state as a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ to account for the constant adjustments the community made in response to environmental fluctuations. This line of thinking culminated in ecology in Eugene Odum’s landmark article in Science (1969) which explained the ecological succession process in terms of 24 ecosystem attributes, with ecosystem development visualised in terms of smooth, predictable stages from the ‘developmental stage’ to the ‘mature stage’ at climax. In the era following World War Two, the notion of feedback loops was promoted through the use of systems operations research and extended from control and communication in machines to animals (Wiener 1948). The study of cybernetics initially assumed that negative and positive feedback loops always counteracted each other: that is, when a system was thrown off balance, the feedback loop ‘kicked in’ to return the system to its original course. This confirmed the theory that the process of homeostasis was normal for an ecosystem.7 Thus it is argued that systems tend towards a stable equilibrium and oscillate dynamically around this point. Taken together, the ideas of stability and equilibrium supported a ‘balance of nature’ paradigm. Jelinski (2005: 281) suggests that: “the cultural myth and metaphorical idea of ‘balance of nature’ may have predisposed scientists to accept the equilibrium paradigm.” This perspective continues to underpin current mainstream resource management practice (Botkin 1990), despite a paradigm shift in ecology during the 1980s. 2.2.3 Environmental Management As worldwide concern over environmental pollution and its effects on human health mounted during the 1960s and 1970s, action to counteract the less desirable results of Western-style development was demanded. Further concern was raised over ‘limits to growth’, with predictions of Malthus-type human population crashes unless human growth and development are curbed (Ehrlich 1968; Meadows et al. 1972). These concerns called

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for an integrated, inter-disciplinary, and multi-professional response to resource user needs, yet tended to limit this to a top-down bureaucratic response. Resource management government departments introduced a plethora of management tools, standards and systems that aimed to regulate and control the environmental impact of development. Proponents of equilibrium-based theories propose a more ‘enlightened’ approach to research use and development which aims at a sustainable outcome in balancing economic, social and ecological needs (usually in that order). New Zealand’s Resource Management Act 1991 is an example of legislation based on the equilibrium paradigm in ecology. Typically, the environment was symbolised as a box (the ‘ecosystem concept’ as Arthur Tansley originally defined it in 19358), with flows of inputs and outputs entering and leaving the ecological system. Because the ecosystem was viewed as an ecological unit (Evans 1956), defined for example as a watershed or forest type, it was easy to interpret such systems as bounded and closed (or resistant) to outside influences (Major 1969).

Although it was recognised that energy and material flows did pass through the ecosystem, the resource management response was to regard these flows as somewhat predictable and therefore controllable. Hence the role of the resource manager required active manipulation of the ecosystem to ensure stability and maintain balance (Bormann and Likens 1969).9 Human intervention in the ‘management’ of natural resources may therefore be justified on the grounds of protecting the fragility of the ecosystem’s ‘natural balance’. This interpretation of the ecosystem concept has largely informed resource management approaches since the 1960s, in particular protected area management of so-called pristine environments. Such approaches called for efficient management of ecosystems and often employed sophisticated computer technology.10

In ecological practice there has been an upsurge of interest in wider landscape planning and management of ecosystems. This broader approach aims to understand and protect the habitat of a multitude of species, and not simply to focus on the protection or control of individual species or populations (as is the case in population ecology). Proponents argue that through direct management, habitats can be enhanced and by default species also benefit. In the conservation movement this has found expression through the principles and practice of island biogeography (MacArthur and Wilson 1967).11 The greatest triumph has been with offshore island ecological restoration programmes. Where the entire island can be managed as an ecological sanctuary, resource managers have sought to control the inflow and outflow of energy and matter through the (relatively) isolated and controllable ecosystem. This requires vigilant and ongoing direct management, monitoring and enforcement to produce the desired conditions. In so doing, conservationists have attempted to return island ecosystems to their original, ‘pristine’ state: an example par excellence of the ‘balance of nature’ myth and steady-state theory. This approach has also been met with criticism. Firstly, who decides what is the ideal or ‘original’ state of an ecosystem? Secondly, if the aim is to return the ecosystem to its state prior to human arrival (as is the case for some offshore island nature reserves in New Zealand), then as ‘museum relics’ of a pre-human existence, the human species is by implication dismissed as an ecological aberration (thereby emphasising the Western dualism between humans and nature). This is an ongoing issue of contention between indigenous peoples and park managers (e.g., conflicts between nomadic tribes and conservationists in national parks in Africa). Thirdly, the assumption that ecosystems evolve on a trajectory that can be ‘reversed’ if certain influences are manipulated and past conditions replicated holds to a fixed view of change as predictable and reversible. As Jelinski (2005: 283) explains:

“…the balance of nature and steady-state theories support the view among some

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conservationists that the best way to conserve nature is to seek out discrete ecosystems, remove human influence such as domestic grazing and fire, and re-establish natural biodiversity by stabilizing ecological processes. Such an approach largely fails. Ecosystems are dynamic (change is the real only constant) and spatially heterogeneous.”

2.3 Complex Systems Science 2.3.1 Epistemology A number of important changes within physics at the turn of the 20th century fundamentally challenged the science which underpins the reductionist-mechanist epistemology (Capra 1975, 1996). Quantum physics explored the atomic and subatomic world, revealing that the so-called foundational building blocks of reality seemed to always evade definition. This has led some quantum physicists, such as Werner Heisenberg, to conclude that no such foundations exist as objective, external entities that simply await scientific clarification. Furthermore, as a consequence of his wave-particle experiments, Heisenberg asserted that humans are not objective observers (in contrast to Descartes’ subject/object duality) but rather are participants in reality. Further insights by Heisenberg revealed an awareness of reality as characterised by inherent uncertainty, with probability (rather than Newtonian predictability) being the best that one could aim for. The very idea that foundational building blocks exist as a priori entities (either as minute particles or an all-encompassing whole) seems to be losing favour in the Western scientific worldview (Capra 1975, 1996). As many non-Western philosophies (e.g., Indian Yoga philosophy) have recognised for thousands of years, neither the part nor the whole form the basic ‘unit’ for describing reality. Arthur Koestler’s (1978) ‘holon’ (coined with etymological reference to both the whole, from holos, and the part with the suffix -on) accepts neither polar extremes as entities per se but regards all organisms as having tendencies to express themselves as either a part or a whole given the context in which they are viewed. A hierarchical perspective (Allen and Starr 1982) is key to this understanding; holons nested within other holons form a ‘holonarchy’ (Regier, in Waltner-Toews et al 2008), akin to the Russian doll effect. With Koestler’s Janus-faced holons, so-called opposites (parts and wholes) are merely different, but complementary, ways of viewing the same phenomenon. This understanding overcomes the static interpretation of objects or entities as the basis of reality with a new awareness of the primary importance of relationships (Smuts 1926; Panikkar 1989).12 Other observations contributed to an appreciation of the infinitely complex and interconnected nature of reality (Waldrop 1992). Chaos Theory, for example, recognises the non-linear interrelatedness of all phenomena, connected in a dynamic ‘web of life’ where even minor tremors in the web may bring about surprisingly large ramifications (Gleick 1987). At one end of the spectrum, quantum theory destroyed the reductionist perception of reality as composed of independent and isolated units. At the other end of the spectrum, the closed systems of classical thermodynamics, which indicated the one-way flow of time as a dismal eschatology, have been redefined with reference to living organisms as open systems (see von Bertalanffy 1950, and refer to the discussion in the next section). While these discoveries are still being elaborated in current theories of matter, what is emerging are a number of important principles derived from an awareness of nature in flux: dynamic, unpredictable, heterogeneous, and complex. These may inform a new

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epistemological direction within the Western worldview, with the potential for profound changes to current relationships between nature and culture. The dominance of dualism in the Western worldview, which has influenced the separation of humans from nature, is once again being re-questioned. The recent interest in non-Western worldviews, particularly Eastern mysticism and indigenous peoples’ ways of knowing, provides some evidence of the paradigm shift underway and adds impetus to the wider need to address pluralism (Capra 1975; Zohar 1990; Broomfield 1997). 2.3.2 Non-Equilibrium Ecology Over the last two decades, some ecologists have radically altered their theoretical stance based on recognition that equilibrium conditions are rare (and, in fact may exist only at certain spatio-temporal scales), and that disturbance events are so common that most ecosystems never reach a dynamically stable climax stage (White 1979). Rather, ecosystems are characterised by multiple equilibria, stochastic as well as deterministic processes, destabilising forces, and sometimes an absence of any equilibria (Holling and Meffe 1996). The paradigm shift in ecology occurred in the 1980s, although as Jelinski (2005) points out, profound change in a worldview is hard to accept among scientists, as it is in society as a whole. Eugene Odum was one prominent ecologist who changed his ecological thinking from equilibrium-centred ecology (Odum 1969) to the acknowledgement of ecosystems as thermodynamically open, far-from-equilibrium (Odum 1992). The emerging understanding of ecosystems as self-organising is influenced by Ilya Prigogine’s (1980) theory of dissipative structures that apply to thermodynamic phenomena that maintain themselves far-from-equilibrium (i.e. living organisms). Classical thermodynamics is appropriate to describe phenomena at equilibrium or close to equilibrium: the second law of thermodynamics means that any closed system (such as a machine) will tend toward the state of maximum probability; this being the state of maximum disorder (hence, entropy increases). Prigogine challenged the linear, deterministic assumptions of classical thermodynamics where processes were considered reversible, and instead introduced an understanding of life (open systems) as unpredictable, non-linear, increasingly complex, irreversible, subject to instability and multiple feedback loops (which could be self-amplifying), and with behavioural patterns unique to the system and its history. However, as Capra (1996: 185) cautions: “In Prigogine’s theory the second law of thermodynamics is still valid, but the relationship between entropy and disorder is seen in a new light.” Under certain conditions, entropy itself becomes the progenitor of order (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). Complexity and unpredictability characterise this emerging scientific understanding of ecological systems. In addition, ecosystems are also viewed as dynamic, constantly evolving systems that do not follow one predetermined path of progression, but to an extent are subject to changes that may not be anticipated (e.g., Chaos Theory). The change or growth that characterises ecosystems is therefore not always smooth but may also be discontinuous, attributed perhaps to unpredictable autocatalytic influences, emergent properties, or to catastrophic or surprise events such as an earthquake or volcanic eruption (DeAngelis and Waterhouse 1987; Kay 1991). While ecosystems mostly exist in an energetic ‘window of vitality’ (Ulanowicz 1997) with sufficient energy to renew themselves, under certain conditions when the ecosystem is pushed away from equilibrium to the extent that it reaches a ‘catastrophe threshold’, the system may suddenly flip into a new organisational structure. Technically speaking, the

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system reaches a bifurcation point and changes abruptly into a new attractor state. Such ‘catastrophic’ change should not always be a cause for alarm but may be a completely normal process of ecosystem evolution (e.g., the release of stored biomass through a forest fire results in a different but equally natural ecosystem type). However, if the system is pushed beyond this critical distance from equilibrium (i.e. outside its ‘window of vitality’), it may be overwhelmed and lead to chaos of a destructive nature (e.g., extreme deforestation may lead to desertification; over-use of groundwater may lead to salination of land). The main concepts underpinning the ecosystem approach to complex systems are indicated by the acronym SOHO, meaning: Self-Organising, Holarchic, Open (see Kay and Boyle 2008, and other chapters in Waltner-Toews et al., Part I: Some Theoretical Bases for a New Ecosystem Approach’). Self-organisation refers to the ability of ecosystems to ‘look after themselves’ when they are ‘left to their own devices’, i.e. when not manipulated or controlled by humans (Kay 1994). This ability also refers to the capability of a damaged ecosystem to regenerate, if it has access to ‘information’ (i.e. biodiversity) that flows through it as an open system (Lister 1998). To this extent, the focus on ecosystem health, which is a feature of equilibrium ecology and mainstream resource management approaches, can be viewed as a partial aspect of the wider need to protect ecosystem integrity. Integrity refers to the ability of the ecosystem to not only maintain its health under the normal environmental conditions, but to continue to self-organise and, with respect to its changing environment, deal with stress (Kay 1991). The holarchic perspective has implications for both ‘type’ and ‘scale’ descriptions (Allen et al. 1993). When viewed from various scales (both temporal and spatial), properties in a system may emerge at one scale where they were not previously evident in other scales. The loose hierarchical structure highlights the role of constraining factors (larger holons place limits on the embedded holons), indicating that context is important (cf. nested living systems, in Günther and Folke 1993). The holarchic perspective illustrates that the actual description of an ecosystem is a heuristic (not a pre-existing, ecological unit), as observers’ descriptions of the system will inevitably highlight different connections depending on what interests them (Weinberg 1975).13 Therefore, different ‘type’ descriptions dispel notions of observer objectivity, and encourage a more pluralistic approach to ecosystem studies (Allen et al. 1993).14 2.3.3 Resilience and Adaptive Management If resource management is to embrace the challenges presented by the complex systems view of reality, then a number of key management practices will need to be re-assessed. The logic that informs mainstream resource management practice is based on equilibrium-centred theories, although practitioners may not be aware or critical of its epistemological foundations and theoretical limitations (see Table 2). However, resource management is not only determined by ecology and the biological sciences; it is also strongly influenced by social theories and narratives (e.g., ‘balance of nature’, as previously discussed), and social movements. Such narratives justify human ‘management’ in natural processes in order to maintain balance and mitigate against undesirable changes – most often for human benefit. This is what Holling and Gunderson (2002: 27) refer to as engineered resilience. Natural resource managers attempt to emulate the homeostatic functions of an ecosystem: certain changes are resisted (e.g., forest fires, pest outbreaks); targeted species are maximised or minimised (e.g., maximum sustainable yield) to ensure diversity and therefore stability; and human presence in protected natural areas is regarded as a disturbance and therefore is restricted or forbidden.

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Holling (1978, 1986) and others are critical of resource management techniques that attempt to control so-called ‘environmental disturbances’ and to mimic or replace natural processes. A number of examples that highlight the fallibilities of attempts to manage ecosystems and social systems with respect to equilibrium-centred ideology are cited in Gunderson et al. (1995). One of the paradoxes in resource management is that deliberate attempts to control or manage ecosystems may in fact produce more turbulence (Botkin 1990). Reducing ecosystem resilience may render the system more vulnerable to external shocks that previously could be absorbed (Gunderson and Holling 2002). This was found to be the case with attempts to control changes that were internal to, and indeed necessary for, the growth of the ecosystem. Altering ecological relationships may in turn trigger unintended changes throughout the wider environment; these may then potentially escalate into unexpected, catastrophic reactions that drive the ecosystem to change completely. Observing this puzzle, Holling (in Gunderson et al. 1995: 6) asserts: “...any attempt to manage ecological variables (e.g., fish, trees, water, cattle) inexorably led to less resilient ecosystems, more rigid management institutions, and more dependent societies.” In place of Clements’ simple succession model, Holling (1978, 1986, 1995) presented a figure-eight model of ecosystem functioning. This model includes the two Clementsian stages of primary and climax states as exploitation and conservation. Extending this model to include self-organising theories, complexity and dissipative structures, two further stages are added: release and reorganisation. Holling observes that environmental management artificially restricts ecosystem functioning to the conservation stage, allowing biomass to accumulate to such an extent that the system may become over-connected and increasingly vulnerable to even small influences (e.g., old growth forest). Holling and others argue that unless a ‘mixed mosaic’ is allowed to evolve (such that release and reorganisation are accepted as part of the natural cycle of renewal and regeneration of ecosystem), then the ability of the ecosystem to self-organise following a major disturbance is greatly impaired. To some non-equilibrium theorists, Holling’s model of ecosystem dynamics is still overly deterministic, perhaps being seen as merely an extension of Clements’ theory. However, the implications of self-organisation theories for human behaviour may present the clearest argument yet with respect to complexity theory, uncertainty, and adaptive management. The implications of complex systems theory for resource management practice (as presented in the ‘new ecosystem approach’ in Waltner-Toews et al. 2008) requires an understanding ecosystems as dynamic, complex, and inherently uncertain. Uncertainty is not just an add-on to status quo management practices (e.g., the precautionary principle), but must be seen as fundamental to all activities and governance decisions (Strand 2002). In part, this is because ecosystems are characterised by surprise events and emergent properties that limit the ability to predict or anticipate ecosystem processes (instead, Kay et al. 1999 and Gallopín 2002, propose a series of narratives and future scenarios to be explored). The notion of sustainable development highlights the interconnectedness of ecological, social and economic problems. In doing so, it makes explicit that humans are part of ecosystems, adding to their complexity and dynamism. Further concerns have been raised by indigenous peoples who object to the assumed role of humans as ‘managers’ of other species as a cultural affront, indicative of Western anthropocentric bias and arrogance. In truly accepting the complexity of ecosystems, a deep humility is engendered. Egler’s (1970: 21) observation is pertinent: “nature is not only more complex that we think. It is more complex than we can think.”

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In the face of such complexity and irreducible uncertainty, perhaps the best that human societies can do is to deliberately take a less active management role with respect to the natural environment. Holling and others (Holling 1978; Gunderson et al. 1995) propose an adaptive management approach instead, requiring that observation and learning are a major part of human relationships with ecosystems. Such learning should be reflected in iterative adjustments in human behaviour, based on observed experiences and monitoring to identify ‘mistakes’ (Lister and Kay 2000). It would then appear that the literal meaning of ‘environmental management’ is an oxymoron. As Kay and Schneider (1994: 33) assert: “We will have to learn that we don’t manage ecosystems, we manage our interaction with them.” Rather than manipulating ecosystems as resource pools to exploit for the modern economic market, communities are challenged to reflect upon their own motives and consider how best to adapt modern lifestyles to reflect ecological patterns and rhythms. Lister and Kay (2000: 210) explain:

The challenge is to reform decision making, from control-orientated, predictive, and interventionist management of the environment, to adaptive, flexible, and participatory management of human activities. In these ways, adaptive planning is a process that more closely models the living systems it is intended to shape, and that is responsive to change in these systems, responding to new ecological information before critical and irreversible thresholds are crossed. In this way, adaptive management is ‘to learn to manage by change rather than merely reacting to it.’

Adaptive management and resilience are key responses in the ecosystem approach. The term 'ecosystem approach' has been actively promoted by various resource management agencies to describe a 'new' approach to project planning and environmental management that aims to integrate and balance environmental, social and economic concerns. It contrasts with the traditional, reductionist approach which typically deals with each component separately or gives priority to one set of concerns. However, it is also important to recognise that there is a difference between resource management approaches that seek to be all-inclusive, integrative and comprehensive (i.e. whole over parts), and those that adopt adaptive management as working with change (i.e. recognising the complexity, interrelatedness and dynamism of the parts in the self-organisation of the system). In this regard, an important distinction has been drawn between the integrative and comprehensive approaches as representing ‘environmental management’ (i.e. equilibrium-centred ecology), and the ‘ecosystem approach’ as underpinned by non-equilibrium ecological theory and complex systems science (see Table 2).

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Table 2 Main Differences between Equilibrium-Centred and Non-Equilibrium Ecology

‘Environmental Management’ ‘Ecosystem Approach’

• whole over parts

• humans as external managers

• holistic, holarchic, multi-scaled

• humans part of ecosystem

Equilibrium-centred (1950s-1970s) Non-equilibrium (1980s-current)

Ecosystem understood as:

• homeostatic, ‘dynamic equilibrium’

• closed and bounded

• simple, stimulus-response mechanisms

• resisting ‘external’ change

• a balanced whole (climax steady-state)

• a studiable, ecologically bounded unit

• predictable (can manage)

Ecosystem understood as:

• far-from-equilibrium tendencies

• open with exchanges

• complex, emergent properties

• adaptive to changes

• a dynamic process of whole-making

• definition dependent on observer

• uncertainty (humility & learning)

3. Holism as a Cross-Cultural Concept The emerging scientific worldview has often been described as holistic (Capra 1996). The term ‘holism’ was originally coined by General Jan Smuts in 1926, deriving from the Greek holos for whole. Holism, as Smuts intended it, refers to the process of whole-making: it embodies the conjoining of parts in a synthetic and dynamic intermeshing such that they result in a whole that is recognised as being ‘more than the sum of its parts’. That is, the functions of the so-called individual parts actually change in the process of their coming together so that the whole has a functioning that is not wholly recognised in any one of its parts not in their mere summation. Buckminster Fuller (1983) referred to this as ‘synergy’; the quality that emerges through the active interrelationships and intrarelationships of parts.15 In complex systems theory, properties that become apparent at different holarchic levels are referred to as emergent properties. This property (the ‘more’ than the sum of its parts) is not ‘stuff’ in the system, but a relationship – a quality that cannot be approached analytically because it depends on the relationship of the observer (see Weinberg 1975).16

The interpretation that Smuts intended in his description of the concept of holism has suffered much from misinterpretation and misapplication which continues today. For example, holism is typically attributed to resource management techniques that approach ecosystems as whole, ‘studiable units’ in contrast to specialist analytical studies of the ‘constituent parts’ (Egler, 1970; Evans, 1956). Yet holism was never intended to refer to a ‘whole-ism’ or any other attempts to exclude parts by asserting the whole as some sort of absolute entity or Oneness. This line is followed by the philosophical monists (James 1909) and Absolutists that Smuts clearly tried to distinguish his process-orientated definition from (see Smut 1926: 102). Neither is holism simply the integration of parts, this

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being an extension of the analytical approach to form a synthesised collective. The reductionist-integrative method is greatly problematic when applied to the study of living organisms which, by nature, are dynamic, open systems that are constantly evolving and adapting to changes (see Koestler and Smythies 1969). Attempts to know ecosystems by isolating a particular ‘object’ or relationship from the whole actually alters the dynamic make-up of that complex system in many unexpected and non-linear ways. Therefore, rather than focusing on entities per se, that is; parts or wholes (as if they were somehow exclusive absolutes), the holistic process supports a shift in thinking about reality as made up of entities to a way of thinking that recognises the primacy and importance of relationships. The holistic understanding that underpins the emerging complex systems science is by no means a new perspective for human cultures (Marsden and Henare 1992; Keith 1994; Berkes et al. 1998). Rather, many cultures’ relationships with nature reveal an appreciation of the interrelatedness of all life and, furthermore, have expressed those relationships through complex social arrangements over a number of generations (refer to literature on common property management regimes, in Berkes 1989). When viewed cross-culturally, the principles of the ecosystem approach may be seen to form an ecological reality for many indigenous cultures, so much so that they are embodied in their very cultural and social moral codes (reflected in myth, cosmology, and through social and cultural mores). Table 3 outlines some areas of suggested commonality between complex systems science and the Māori indigenous epistemology. Table 4 indicates areas where the two epistemologies differ, sometimes irreconcilably.

Table 3 Similarities between Complex Systems Science and Indigenous Epistemology

Complex Systems Science Indigenous Epistemology

� holistic (secular)

� ecological interrelationships

� protect ecosystem integrity

� ecosystems open, dynamic

� humans part of ecosystems

� ‘observers’ participate

� multiple-scales, holorachy

� adaptive

� holistic (sacred and secular)

� humans-nature interrelated

� protect life-force

� nature is living relationships

� relatedness, totem species

� collective responsibility

� inter-generational knowledge

� observations of effects (moral code)

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Table 4 Differences between Complex Systems Science and Indigenous Epistemology

Complex Systems Science Indigenous Epistemology

� secular / profane

� abstract, conceptual

� theoretical, general application

� theory not connected to practice

� individual action

� sacred and secular

� local, context-based

� unique, cultural interests

� cosmology: belief / action interlinked

� collective, ancestral obligations

Māori indigenous knowledge is based on an understanding of the interrelatedness and common genealogy of all life. Personal introductions and tribal identity relate to particular environmental phenomena such as the mountain, river, lake, and land. These formal introductions reflect a kinship matrix of interrelationships that extend beyond strictly anthropocentric definitions; hence, nature is respected as an embodiment of living relationships. Māori have developed a strong 'sense of place' which is complemented by an in-depth knowledge of their ecological locale. Such knowledge is nurtured not only as a physical necessity for survival, but also as an important part of the shared responsibility and spiritual obligation of kaitiakitanga (guardianship). As environmental guardians, Māori have an inalienable ancestral obligation to ensure the mauri (life-force) of nature is sustained or improved. In these ways, Māori ensure that they nurture both secular and spiritual relationships. To fulfill environmental guardianship responsibilities, the environment was carefully observed and monitored with respect to resource use activities. Where resources were scarce, restrictions were placed on that natural resource either indefinitely, making it tapu (sacred and therefore unable to be used for secular purposes), or as a temporary prohibition (rahui). Such conservation restrictions were enforced internally by the group as a whole who adapted behaviour according to understanding of environmental relationships. Elders were respected for their knowledge and, in particular, those with spiritual powers (tohunga) were held in high esteem. Tohunga have abilities to transcend the natural world and detect perturbations in relationships within the supernatural realms. Such insights embraced an appreciation of nature as holistic, recognising that no 'part' can be severed from the whole without also disrupting all other parts. Some ecologists (e.g., proponents of the Gaia hypothesis, bioregionalism, etc.) and indigenous peoples approach nature as an interconnected and dynamic, living whole (see Table 3). However, the spiritual interpretation of holism remains a point of contention with ecologists whose strictly secular training and dominant scientific worldview have led to a type of “secular rejectionism” of the sacred (Krieger 1991) (see Table 4).17 This has effectively limited the opportunities for ecologists and indigenous peoples to engage in cross-cultural dialogue on environmental and other issues. While it is necessary to acknowledge that scientific and indigenous peoples draw on very different methodologies (i.e. the Western scientific knowledge is secular and rational, whereas indigenous peoples include non-rational, spiritual ways of knowing), the conceptual basis to Smuts’ definition of holism may provide an opportunity for bridging conceptual gaps in understanding across cultural epistemologies.

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4. Conclusion The main focus of this report is the different scientific approaches within the Western scientific knowledge system. Other researchers will contribute work specifically on an indigenous knowledge system. Therefore, the far right column of Table 1, which highlights key characteristics of an indigenous Māori worldview, has not received the same degree of detailed attention in this report. However, the cross-cultural comparative element has been highlighted and is intended to stimulate further discussion and deeper analysis (particularly into the cross-cultural potential of the concept of holism) which may be generated within the Iwi Ecosystem Services Project. It should be noted that in the literature it has been more common to contrast differences between the reductionist scientific approach and indigenous peoples’ knowledge systems (e.g., Wolfe et al. 1992 and DeWalt 1994), than it has been to compare similarities between complex systems science and indigenous epistemology. In such circumstances, caution must be heeded to not treat different cultural knowledge systems in a too abstract or idealised manner. Cross-cultural dialogue involves real people, complex ecosystems, and often competing values. It is ultimately through dialogue that these ideas and concepts will be tested for their validity and usefulness in contributing to intercultural understanding about different cultural knowledge systems and ways of approaching the environment. In conclusion, there are two major points that can be drawn from this report: 1) The holistic understanding that underpins the concept of the ecosystem approach may offer potential as a common conceptual grounding on which mutually-beneficial relationships between complex systems scientists and indigenous peoples may be forged. 2) A growing awareness of the need to address pluralism with respect to acceptance of diverse cultural worldviews suggests that an important prerequisite to partners entering into cross-cultural dialogue is a deeper understanding and appreciation of the epistemological basis of their own worldview (Table 1) as well as an openness to learn from the ways of knowing offered by the other.

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Endnotes

1 Koestler and Smythies’ volume, Beyond Reductionism (1969), brought together the views of biologists concerned with the limitations of the analytical-synthetic method of science. For example, Weiss (in Koestler and Smythies 1969: 7) asserts: “We are concerned with living organisms, and for those, we can assert definitely, on the basis of empirical investigation, that the mere reversal of our prior analytic dissection of the Universe by putting the pieces together again, whether in reality or just in out minds, can yield no complete explanation of the behavior of even the most elementary living system.” (emphasis in original). 2 It could be argued the Gleason’s approach wasn’t an ‘ecological’ one, as it denied the interaction of species or the existence of a ‘community’ which is the every essence of ecology. 3 Krieger (1991) uses the term “secular rejectionism” with respect to the modern, secular culture that has origins in Western philosophy with René Descartes’ foundations of knowledge upon the self-certainty of the autonomous, rational subject. For Descartes, all knowledge which comes from outside a thinking individual (i.e. from tradition and other sources) is subject to distortion, so only knowledge that is attained within can be assured of certainty. Therefore, what was not ‘rational; (i.e. non-rational, spiritual experiences or intuitive insights) was then disregarded as ‘irrational’. 4 Although Geddes’ analysis of the evolution of cities was essentially ecological, it did not extend to wider ecological flows as, for example, is key to the ‘ecological footprint’ concept. See: Martinez-Alier (1987), especially Chapter Six: “Patrick Geddes’ Critique of Economics,” pp.89-98. 5 Golley (1993: 100) provides the following explanation on the controversial debate in ecology surrounding the diversity-stability hypothesis: “The idea the diversity produces stability was supported initially by observation. ... Eventually the concept was examined... and was found to be wanting. Simple systems may be stable, and species-rich communities may be unstable. No universal pattern holds. Nevertheless, the environmental movement of the late 1960s and 1970s used the diversity-stability hypothesis as a central tenet supporting conservation action, and it is still being taught as a common sense relation. Carl Linnaeus’s balance of nature concept (Egerton, 1973) remains alive and well in the popular mind.” The diversity-stability hypothesis has since been refuted on theoretical grounds by Robert May (1972a, 1972b, 1973) and since then empirical evidence has been found to be supporting May’s work (Zaret 1982). For other critiques on this debate, see Pimm (1984, 1991). 6 Clements (1905: 99) explained: “...such a climax is permanent because of its entire harmony with a stable habitat. It will persist just as long as the climate remains unchanged, always providing that migration does not bring in a new dominant from another region.” 7 With respect to organisms, Cannon (1932: 24) studied the physiological processes which maintain most of the steady states in organisms, and introduced the term ‘homeostasis’, cautioning that: “The word does not imply something set and immobile, a stagnation. It is a condition – a condition which may vary, but which is relatively constant.” 8 The ‘ecosystem’ is a biological concept referring to energy and nutrient flows through food webs. Arthur Tansley coined the term “ecosystem” in 1935 to describe his view of the organisation of nature. However, the idea behind the concept of the ecosystem has historical roots much deeper than this. For example, the “ecology” part of Tansley’s idea dates formally from Ernst Haeckel (1866) as “nature’s household”: ‘eco’ from the Greek oikos; house, and ‘system’ from the Greek sustema; set up. 9 Bormann and Likens (in Van Dyne 1969: 49-50) explain: “For individual plants, it has become necessary to understand, in detail, input and output relationships and every operation of the plant itself including the complex of interactions among its component

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parts. Operations analysis has served to elucidate these relationships, to detect weak links, and to suggest alternative linkages. As a consequence it has been possible to maximize output with a concomitant reduction of costs.” 10 New Zealand’s current resource management legislation reflects this theoretical position. For example, Part Two (Purpose and Principles) of the Resource Management Act 1991, section 7(b) states that all persons exercising functions and powers under the Act shall have particular regard to: “The efficient use and development of natural and physical resources.” 11 Cole (1996: 52) comments: “...the theory of island biogeography (MacArthur 1972, MacArthur and Wilson 1963, 1967, Williamson 1981, Wilson 1969) appears to have been a further attempt to forge ecological reality from the equilibrium-mould given to ecology in the models of Lotka (1925) and Volterra (1926). One of the principal assumptions of island equilibrium theory is that the long term biological predictions of the model are equilibrium centred and empirically flawed according to Gilbert (1980).” 12 Panikkar (1989: 136) explains: “A relationship is not ‘something’ that sets antecedently given or existent ‘other’ things in relationship; it is the very constitution of the things ‘as such.’ ...we discover that things are relationships.” (emphasis in original) 13 Weinberg (1975: 60) discusses the debate between systems writers who recognise ‘emergent properties’ and those who attack this idea as a form of ‘vital essence’. Weinberg explains: “Both are right, but both are in trouble because they speak in absolute terms, as if the ‘emergence’ were ‘stuff’ in the system, rather than a relationship between system and observer. Properties ‘emerge’ for a particular observer when he [sic] could not or did not predict their appearance. We can always find cases in which a property will be ‘emergent’ to one observer and ‘predictable’ to another.” 14 See Allen et al. (1993: 26-8) for a discussion on ‘The Dependency On Perspective.’ The authors make the important concluding point that: “Each type of system description comes from a distinctive perspective. ...Thus we come full circle; the detour through the professional environmental scientist’s view of ecosystem returns to include the ethical, cultural, biological, social, and economic human as a critical ecosystem component.” 15 Buckminster Fuller (1983: 33-4) defines 'synergy' as: “behavior of whole systems unpredicted by behaviors of any of their separate parts. Synergy is disclosed, for instance, by the attraction for one another or two or more separate objects.”

16 Weinberg (1975: 60) discusses differences between systems writers who speak of ‘emergent properties’ and those who attack this idea as a form of ‘vital essence’. Weinberg notes: “Both are right, but both are in trouble because they speak in absolute terms, as if the ‘emergence’ were ‘stuff’ in the system, rather than a relationship between system and observer. Properties ‘emerge’ for a particular observer when he could not or did not predict their appearance. We can always find cases in which a property will be ‘emergent’ to one observer and ‘predictable’ to another.” 17 Krieger (1991) uses the term “secular rejectionism” with respect to the modern, secular culture that has origins in Western philosophy with René Descartes’ foundations of knowledge upon the self-certainty of the autonomous, rational subject. For Descartes, all knowledge which comes from outside a thinking individual (i.e. from tradition and other sources) is subject to distortion, so only knowledge that is attained within can be assured of certainty. Therefore, what was not considered ‘rational’ (i.e. non-rational, spiritual experiences or intuitive insights) was then disregarded outright as ‘irrational’ and superstitious.

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