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Libya in the Mist Italy at the Crossroad between Diplomacy and

Interventionism

Written By Valentina Cantori & Giulia Formichetti

February 2016

Report No

02

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Updated at 16th February

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Summary

Libya in the Mist ....................................................................... 4

Abstract .....................................................................................4

Libya, Italy, and the War on Terror........................................ 7

Introduction .............................................................................7

1. Libya, the “stateless state” between jihadism and

international intervention ......................................................8

2. The international military intervention: a “total”

war? .........................................................................................15

3. Conclusions: geopolitical consequences of Italian

Interventionism ......................................................................22

Libya and Italy relations Historical approach .................... 29

Foreign policy between national interests and political

solutions ...................................................................................... 29

1. Italy and Libya in the Past: A “Privileged

Partnership” ...........................................................................29

1.1. Italian foreign policy to Libya before the “Day of

Rage” .......................................................................................29

1.2. Italian national interests towards Libya: Illegal

migration and natural resources .........................................34

1.3. Italian foreign policy after the “Day of Rage” ........ 38

2. Italy and Libya in the Present ...................................... 40

2.1. On the Frontline? ......................................................... 40

2.2. The exacerbation of the migrant and the energy

crises 42

2.3. Western Interventionism: in the name of what and

under which mandate? ......................................................... 46

3. Conclusions. Italy and Libya in the Future: A

political solution a long-term strategy ............................... 48

References (part 1) .................................................................. 50

References (part 2) .................................................................. 54

About the Authors .................................................................. 61

Libya in the Mist

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Libya in the Mist

Italy at the Crossroad between Diplomacy

and Interventionism

Abstract

Following the statement by Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr. on Monday, January 25,

concerning the planning of a new military intervention in Libya in order to tackle the

increasing threat posed by IS in the Mediterranean area, other European countries,

including Italy, have pledged their support to this future campaign which, according

to Dunford, might begin in a matter of weeks. The shift in the international approach

to the Libyan “knot” needs be analyzed in order to understand the reasons

underpinning it as well as the possible future scenarios that might unfold from a new

military intervention in the country. The present paper is divided in two macro-

sections, each one adopting a specific point of view to investigate the Libyan knot.

Indeed, on the one hand, the first one specifically analyzes the present scenario and

gives a socio-political interpretation to the Libyan puzzle, by using sociologic

categories to argue against an interventionist approach. On the other, the second one

sheds light on the relations between Libya and Italy, proving how the European

country has always been driven by the primary needs of protecting national interests

while structuring its strategy towards Libya.

In details, the first macro-part of this paper is structured along three main

subsections. The first one will shed light on the recent political developments that have

interested Libya, addressing both the rapid spreading of jihadism in the country since

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5

the ousting of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 and the failure of the diplomatic

mission led by the UN envoy Martin Kobler. The second section will adopt a macro-

approach to the analysis of the planned international intervention in Libya, in which

Italy is willing to play an important role. Specifically, drawing from a reinterpretation

of the sociological approach to war put forth by Carl von Clausewitz, the paper aims

to demonstrate how the planned international military intervention in Libya is likely

to transform into an “absolute” or “total” war, according to von Clausewitz’s model,

thus being characterized by an ever-increasing and escalating level of violence. Last,

the third section will deal with the possible future consequences of this highly violent

military intervention as far as Italy’s security is concerned, demonstrating how an

escalation of violence in Libya is likely to produce undesired effects, legitimizing IS

rhetoric of Western Crusaders and lending credibility to its Manichean ideology.

The second macro-section will instead adopt a historical approach, by providing

an insight into Libyan-Italian relations in the past, in the present, and in the future,

following the same three-step structure, as in the previous half of the report. First, the

paper will elaborate on the “Privileged Partnership” Italy and Libya built after the

colonial period and during the decades under Colonel al-Qadhafi’ up to the uprisings.

It will also analyze how this partnership, focused on economic investments,

cooperation in the energy sector, and in the fight against illegal migration, was favored

by the Italian need to protect its national interests of territorial security and economic

stability. Secondly, the analysis will turn to present times, when Italy has been forced

to review its foreign policy towards Libya, to provide an appropriate answer to the

international pressure and to safeguard the national interest of participation to the

international community coalition and to play a significant role in the Mediterranean

basin. Eventually, the second part will investigate both the legality and the utility of

Libya in the Mist

6

leading a military intervention in Libya. The third and last section will then draw

the conclusions over possible future relations between the two counterparts, which

should be based on the rehabilitation of an interlocutor – being the Libyan

government – that now is instead fragmented and without identity.

February 2016

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Libya, Italy, and the War on Terror

A Socio-Political Analysis of the International Intervention in

Libya and its Geopolitical Consequences on Libyan Stability

and Italian Security

Valentina Cantori

Introduction

Although post-colonial theories have flourished since the end of

World War II, setting the stage for the emergence of a new world order

completely freed from the “colonial gaze” of the past, recent news

about Libya seems to confirm the importance of ex-colonial ties, which

have laid the basis for certain privileged economic relationships that

shape our present world. Indeed, following the collapse of the last

attempt, made by the international community under the aegis of the

UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya), to build a unitary

government in the country, statements made by prominent U.S. and

European politicians have envisaged an international military

intervention in order, it is said, to block ISIS’ increasing expansion in

the country. And, as predicted by the pattern usually followed in the

post-colonial period, Italy is among those countries which seem to be

more willing to lead the military intervention, for reasons that range

from the need to protect Italian corporations’ interests in Libya to the

urgency to reaffirm itself as a protagonist on the international sphere

Libya in the Mist

8

and not merely a minor character acting in the shadow of the “Great

Powers” of our time.

The aim of the present paper is that of debunking and unveiling the

dynamics that led to the current stalemate in Libya, addressing the

worrying growing presence of ISIS in certain areas as well as

questioning the viability and benefits of a possible international military

intervention in a country already devastated by years of political

instability, insurgencies, and war. In doing so, both an historical and a

socio-political analysis will be carried out, framing the planned military

intervention in Libya in the most recent theories on war that have been

elaborated in the academic field.

1. Libya, the “stateless state” between jihadism and

international intervention

Dirk Vandewalle interestingly defines the kind of governmental

apparatus built by Qadhafi after the Zuwara cultural revolution in 1973

as a “stateless state” (2012: 96), highlighting the absolute centralization

of power in the Colonel’s hands and the complete absence of state

institutions that could possibly give birth to a civil society in nuce. This

definition is important to bear in mind when dealing with the analysis

of the Libyan political scenario after the General’s toppling and death,

on October 23, 2011, for three main reasons. First, the absence of a

pre-existing institutional apparatus may be considered one of the

reasons that made the post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization

February 2016

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process in the country so difficult to attain. In fact, after a first phase

dominated by the NTC (National Transitional Council), during which

the Qadhafi opposition appeared unified against the common enemy

notwithstanding the ideological differences between the various

factions, the new phase inaugurated by the election, in July 2012, of the

GNC (General National Congress), responsible for the formation of a

national parliament, saw the increase in intra- and inter-group discord.

Libya was a country to build, not to re-build. And the political actors,

most of whom had had experience neither in political life nor in state

and institution building before, quickly resorted to identity politics

abandoning the much-needed pragmatic stance that characterized the

first months of the NTC (Mezran, Alunni, 2015).

Second, looking at Libya as a “stateless state” helps us understand

why international intervention was so fundamental in 2011 to guarantee

Libyan Cleavages Source: Limes

Libya in the Mist

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the possibility of a non-negotiating attitude of the opposition factions

as well as the complete ousting of the Colonel. As Mezran puts it in his

most recent analysis (2015), opposition forces, militarily too weak to

face the regime, were nonetheless backed by the international

community.

The military and logistic backing on the part of NATO put the rebels

in a strong position against an otherwise too powerful regime, thus

making opposition unwilling to come to terms with elements linked to

the previous regime1 and adopting a non-conciliatory and non-

negotiable stance towards the conflict. Interestingly enough, this same

non-conciliatory approach is the one that led to the recent failed

negotiations brokered by the U.N. special envoy Martin Kobler, whose

appointment in October 2015 revitalized the negotiation process in

war-torn Libya (Varvelli, 2015), albeit resulting in the rejection of the

new U.N.-backed unitary government by the internationally-recognized

Parliament based in Tobrouk on January 25, 2016.

Third, the mere fact that Libya used to and continue being a “stateless

state” is an interesting starting point for analyzing the spread of jihadism

in the country, the aspect of the Libyan “knot” that seems to be the

main concern to be addressed, ranking first on Western political agenda

and worrying Libyan (pseudo-)institutional actors. Indeed, on February

3, 2016, the head of the intelligence in the city of Misrata, Isma’il Shukri,

1 The Political and Isolation Law passed by the GNC in May 2013 being a clear example

of the attempt by the new political actors to exclude from the government every

personality that could be associated with the Qadhafi regime (David, Mzioudet, 2014).

February 2016

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told the BBC that many senior commanders of ISIS have arrived in

Libya, particularly in the town of Sirte that is already under ISIS’ control,

posing an unprecedented threat to an already chaotic situation on the

ground in Libya, torn by the civil war between the two rivaling factions

of Libya Dawn, based in Tripoli and Islamist-oriented, and Operation

Karama (Dignity), based in Tobrouk, guided by General Haftar, and

more secular (even if speaking of secularism in Libya is almost

impossible since all political actors recognize the importance of religion

in the public sphere, even though they differ as far as the degree of its

importance is concerned)2. As a consequence of both the failure of the

U.N.-backed negotiation and the alarming news of an ever increasing

presence of ISIS in the country, at the anti Daesh/IS meeting held in

Rome on February 2, 2016, Western powers seriously discussed the

possibility of a military intervention in the country to prevent ISIS from

gaining a stronghold few kilometers from European shores.

A digression is worth mentioning here in order to track the rise of

ISIS in Libya. On February 15, 2015, a video showing the beheading of

21 Egyptian Copts by an ISIS-affiliated group was released, marking the

presence of the Islamic State in the Mediterranean country. Since then,

ISIS, and ISIS-affiliated groups that pledged allegiance (ba’ya) to the

Caliphate, have spread in the coastal region of the country, specifically

2 Interesting here is the inaugural speech made by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the NTC chairman

after Qadhafi’s ousting on October 23, 2011, in which he proclaimed the importance of

Islam as the religion of the country on which the constitution should be based. (see The

New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/africa/revolution-

won-top-libyan-official-vows-a-new-and-more-pious-state.html ).

Libya in the Mist

12

controlling the city of Sirte and an extended area both East and West

of the city (The New York Times, Feb. 2016). In trying to analyze the

reasons why ISIS could enter the war-torn country, one can start by

looking at the area where it managed to gain territorial control. In fact,

the city of Sirte has historically been the stronghold of the Qaddafa

tribe, the one Colonel Muammar belonged to, and which has been

ostracized and excluded from any kind of political dialogue after the

toppling of the regime. Consequently, this simple fact demonstrates

how inclusion, rather than exclusion, of the various political souls of

the country is the major factor preventing the spreading of ISIS in the

region. As happened in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the ignored groups

(notwithstanding the cleavages on which they mutually differentiate

from each other, either religious, ethnic, or merely ideological) tend to

be more prone to accepting ISIS’ radical ideology not because of the

power of the ideology itself (or not only, at least), but following a

utilitarian rational calculus in the attempt to overturn the present

negative situation of the group in question (Sunni in Iraq after the

election of al-Maliki are a good example at stake [PBS Frontline, 2014]).

Furthermore, the historical legacy of jihadism in Libya constitutes

another variable that plays an important role in explaining the rise of

ISIS in Libya. Even though Qadhafi did his best to harshly repress any

Islamist insurgency, particularly frequent in the Eastern region, once a

stronghold of the Sanusi monarchy, an Islamist armed wing operated in

the country since 1990, namely the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

(LIFG) (Ashour, 2012), whose members participated in the Afghan

February 2016

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jihad in 1979. Thus, an armed struggle ideology had already been

present in the country, even after the de-radicalization phase promoted

by Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam (Ashour, 2011), violent ideology that

found fertile ground for taking root in the chaotic post-revolutionary

period. Libya, as a “stateless state,” does not stick to the internationally

recognized principle that defines a state as a political unit that exercises

the monopoly of legitimate violence on a given territorial unity. As a

matter of fact, an unspecified number of militias are de facto controlling

the territory, changing alliances, and making the situation even more

fluid and impossible to control, an environment where ISIS is likely to

thrive. Indeed, according to recent estimates, the number of ISIS

fighters in Libya has been dramatically increasing, ranging nowadays

from 5,000 to 6,500, having doubled since the fall, and likely to increase

in the short-run (The New York Times, Feb. 2016). In addition, Libya

ranks second in the list of countries for the number of ISIS’ attacks,

Libya in the Mist

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preceded only by Egypt3. This situation is alarming Western powers and

jeopardizing Italian interests in the country.

Consequently, against the background of the derail of international

diplomatic efforts to start a stabilizing political process in the country

and the concomitant rise of ISIS, Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Paolo

Gentiloni delivered a speech in which he supported a possible military

intervention in the country even in the absence of a Libyan formal

request of intrusion, following U.S. Gen. Dunford’s statement at the

end of January and echoing Secretary of State John Kerry’s words in

Rome on February 2, 2016, promising ISIS’ defeat in Libya and praising

the leadership role played by Italy both in the Iraqi intervention as well

as in Libya’s negotiation process (ANSAmed, Feb. 2016). This radical

shift in the approach on the part of the international community to the

Libyan “knot” comes with much surprise, given also the recent

3 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/map-isis-

attacks-around-the-world.html.

Gentiloni and Kerry. Source: NY Times

February 2016

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statements made by Gentiloni himself on January 15, 2016 (Farnesina,

Jan. 2016) which seemed to bank on the instruments of international

diplomacy to secure the country as the first step towards ISIS’ defeat

and the preservation of Italian strategic interests.

Thus, which will be the possible consequences of a military

intervention in Libya both on the stability of the African country and

on Italian security? Which will be the unwanted effects that it could

have on the rise of ISIS as a regional power in the Mediterranean? And,

eventually, would it be worth for Italy to take part, and lead, such an

intervention? In order to give an answer to these questions, using the

analytical instruments provided by the socio-political theories on war,

we will put forth an argumentation on the undesirability of the military

intervention, forecasting the possible future regional dynamics.

2. The international military intervention: a “total” war?

The Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) greatly

contributed to the elaboration of a theory on war by asserting that it

fundamentally constitutes a social phenomenon, which can be defined

as the “continuation of politics/policy by other means” (Sharma,

2014b). Furthermore, in his theory he distinguished between three

major types of war among which two are worth citing here for the sake

of our analysis, namely the so-called “limited war,” characterized by

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lower levels of violence, and the “total war,” which, on the contrary,

generates high levels of brutality (Sharma, 2014a)4.

Which are the conditions that give birth to either a “limited” or a

“total” war?5 According to Sharma (2014b), war is always caused by

change because it always entails an attempt at modifying the status quo.

Logically, there will always be groups inside a certain society or among

societies themselves, i.e. we can look at these dynamics both at the

societal-dyadic level and at the systemic one (Levy, 1998), that will resist

to the change in the status quo, ultimately resorting to violence under

certain conditions. In Sharma’s analysis, based on von Clausewitz’s

model, the change in the status quo that might generate war is of two

types, namely either a change in rank and status, or a change in the

institutions of rank and status. As for the first case, the change is about

who rules a certain country, society, group, or “survival units,” the latter

being the name given to the basic analytical tool used in the sociology

of war by Norbert Elias (Kaspersen, 2014). Empirically, it has been

demonstrated that a war concerning rank and status (when and if it

breaks out) will be characterized by lower levels of violence (e.g., most

4 The third category, that of “absolute war” has been left aside in the present analysis since

it presupposes the complete overlapping of both war, i.e. the political aims to be pursued,

and warfare, i.e. the actual struggling, a situation in which violence would be the end in

itself and which does not seem to find empirical evidence 5 It has to be noticed that “total” here is used here with a much broader meaning than

that usually associated with the term, especially in the historical field, where “total” wars

are considered the World Wars that interested much of the world’s state. Here is the

meaning is related to the intensity in the use of violence itself.

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of the coups in history have followed this pattern), thus making it

possible to classify it as “limited” in terms of violence.

On the other hand, as for the second case, when the dimension of

the wanted change touches the institutions, meaning legitimate power

configurations in society, aimed at preserving rank a status inside a given

survival unit, then the level of violence in the war (when and if it breaks

out) would be high and likely to increase with time, thus categorizing it

as a “total” war. Indeed, in this second scenario, the two (or more)

parties at dispute do not share a set of common rules concerning the

conduct of the war which institutions, as template of behavior to be

followed, dictate. In addition to this, by questioning the nature of the

ranking system itself, the

parties to the conflict

would not consider each

other as equals, thus

escalating the level of

violence of the conflict. In

a nutshell, while in the first

case war is conducted

under the rules of law, in the second one violence is illegitimate as it is

not regulated by a common set of shared principles.

Following this theoretical model on war, it is interesting to analyze

the current developments regarding the Libyan issue as well as the

planning of a military intervention in the country against ISIS, strongly

supported by Italy. As a starting point, few preliminary observations

Militia Fighting in Sirte. Source: NY Times

Libya in the Mist

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need be put forth. First of all, in order to determine whether the planned

international military intervention could develop into a “total” war, it is

necessary to analyze whether the stakes of the conflict pertain to the

first category, i.e. rank and status, or to the second one, i.e. the

institutions of rank and status. And the answer seems to be pretty

straightforward for everyone who has even a basic knowledge of the

kind of confrontation that has been taking place over the last few years.

The so-called Islamic State is heralding a new kind of society (even

though its ideologues assume it to mirror the ancient Islamic society at

the time of the first Companions of the Prophet, i.e. the Salaf),

completely rejecting any kind of human-made institution, given the

assumption that only God alone can be the ruler, and no other man

should have decisional power as for how society should be organized

(tawhid al-hakimiyya, i.e. the oneness of rule/government). Thus,

democracy, as the rule of the majority in respect of minorities, results

quintessentially antithetical to the Weltanschauung of ISIS’ affiliates and

to the kind of institutional state they want (and are trying to) build.

Without delving too deeply into the issue, it is nonetheless

fundamental to observe how the religious cleavage plays only a marginal

role into our analysis. Even though the War on Terror, declared after

the 9/11 attacks, has been largely portrayed as a fight between an

Islamic violent element and a secular Western one (almost equating

secular liberal democracy to a religion), things are much more complex

than this and entails the refusal to recognize the relative societal

institutions from both parties at stake and this stance on the matter can

February 2016

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help shed light on the violent and brutal dynamics that the war Italy and

other Western allies are planning to wage against ISIS in Libya might

assume. As Mustafa Akyol argues in an opinion article recently

published on The New York Times (Feb. 2016), “religion is not actually

the heart of these conflicts – invariably, politics is to blame.”

Secondly, in order to categorize this future conflict into the general

socio-political category of “total” war, an analysis of the so-called jus in

bello, i.e. the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law,

needs be in place. As is well known, ISIS does not comply to any of the

main and core principles that Western countries recognize as the basic

(humanitarian) rules that should (in line of principle) regulate the

behavior during wars. First and foremost, the distinction between

civilians/civilian objects and military objectives (Dinstein, 2010), the

case of the terrorist attacks, whose list is sadly too long to report here,

being a clear example at stake. While Western countries recognize the

existence of both a set of conventional and customary laws by which all

parties should abide, the same is not true for fighters of the Caliphate,

who abide just by the law of God (or, better to say, their own

reinterpretation and narrative of Qu’ranic prescriptions) refusing the

corpus of international laws as a human-made creation that contradicts

God’s will6.

6 For more about the way ISIS is building his state, reinterpreting and reinventing

traditional Muslim norms see: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-

15/caliphate-law.

Libya in the Mist

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On a second level of analysis, the idea that all parties to conflict are

treated equally in their rights and obligations (Dinstein, 2010) does not

apply again to the situation that is going to take place in Libya in the

fight against ISIS. The contending parties do not respect each other as

equals, a situation that is likely to lead to an escalation in the use of

violence, especially in terms of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic

State’s fighters willing to become martyrs in the name of God, putting

into practice ISIS’ martyrdom rhetoric (Devji, 2005). Thus, the political

logic of war may exacerbate the warfare, i.e. the actual fighting,

producing a high level of casualties that are likely not to be confined to

the boundaries of Libya.

Last but not least, the prohibition of reprisals is another customary

rule of international law that would not apply to the conflict Italy is

planning to take part in since ISIS strategy against the West seems to be

exactly based on this principle, i.e. punishing Western states responsible

for Crusader campaigns against the dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam).

Indeed, one of ISIS main leitmotifs in its propaganda is that of an

historical and almost mythical battle of jihadists (i.e. “true” Muslim

believers)7 against Crusaders, putting forth a dangerous as well as

stereotyping Manichean ideology that is both easy to “sell” to the public

and functional to carry out its murderous plans.

7 A re-theorization of what means to be a true Muslim that is based on the idea, first

elaborated by Sayyid Qutb and Salman al-Faraj, that jihad is not a collective duty (fard

kifeiyya), merely defensive in nature, but rather an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) that every

single Muslim should take on.

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For all the above-mentioned

reasons, the war that may start in

Libya in the next weeks might be

well classified as a “total” war

whose costs will be likely to

outnumber the benefits both for

the future of Libya as a unitary

and independent state where we

expect a democratic state-building

process will be in place, as well as

for Western countries, and Italy

above all of them, that will

position themselves at the frontline of the battle. Although, according

to Fearon (1995), war as a social phenomenon is always costly, we

forecast the cost of the planned war under analysis to be dramatically

high, given both the world dimension that the War on Terror entails

and the level of violence irrespective of human rights that it is likely to

cause.

The next section will explore the future geopolitical scenarios that

may arise were the war waged against ISIS’ positions in Libya, taking

into account both the future of Libya and, consequently, of Italian

political interests in the country, as well as the possible repercussions

that Western states will have to face against the blind logic of terror

applied by Islamic State fighters, given also the threats posed to Italian

security by ISIS’ official statements, starting from the infamous

Dabiq Magazine. Source: Ibtimes

Libya in the Mist

22

document written in Italian language and appeared on the web in

February 2015 and presenting itself as an apology of the Islamic State

political program8, to the image of the Vatican conquered by ISIS on

the front cover of Dabiq, to the latest video divulged by the Mauritanian

press agency al-Akhbar containing a statement by an Aqmi (al-Qaeda in

the Maghreb) leader accusing Italians of the colonial invasion of Tripoli

(Il Sole 24 Ore, Jan. 2016). It is not one of the aims of the present paper

to investigate the reasons why al-Qaeda, which refused to pledge

allegiance to the Islamic State, is launching this message to Italy.

Nonetheless, it is worth briefly noticing that the fluidity of alliances in

Libya, both due to tribal kinships and to the magmatic Islamist armed

groups active in the area, make it possible a future siding of Aqmi with

the “winning” ISIS, as well as the opposite might be true, being this a

strategy Aqmi is pursuing to regain power in the area in opposition to

the expansion of the Islamic State.

3. Conclusions: geopolitical consequences of Italian

Interventionism

In carrying out the present analysis of the geopolitical consequences

of an Italian intervention in Libya, siding with the Western coalition

engaged in militarily fighting ISIS, we will look at two different levels of

threats that this interventionist approach may pose. On the one hand,

the investigation will look at the possible internal scenarios that may

8 http://www.itstime.it/w/lo-stato-islamico-una-realta-che-ti-vorrebbe-comunicare-il-

documento-di-is-in-italiano-by-marco-lombardi/.

February 2016

23

unfold in Libya and their consequences on the on-going diplomatic

state-building process, which suffered a set-back after the rejection of

the unity government backed by the U.N., aimed at pacifying the

country ravaged by civil war since the Spring of 2014. Being the internal

stability of Libya of outmost importance for the preservation of Italian

geostrategic and economic interests, the analysis will show the negative

effects that, consequently, a failed internal stabilization of the country

will have on Italian relevant interests. On the other hand, the macro

level will be also taken into account, investigating how an international

military intervention would only legitimize ISIS’ Manichean ideology,

recruiting even more foreign fighters to their cause and strengthening

them, thus obtaining exactly the opposite result to the one the

intervention is aimed at achieving.

As already stated, the military intervention would have dire

consequences on the already magmatic and chaotic internal dynamics

of Libya, mainly in three respects. First of all, it will further exacerbate

the internal rivalries between the many militias of the most disparate

affiliations, which are actually exercising territorial control of the

country. In fact, it has to be noted that three main sets of affiliations

intertwine in the Libyan panorama, complicating an already composite

mosaic, namely the tribal, the regional and the political/religious ones

(Pack, 2013). Contrary to common assumptions, all the three kinds of

affiliations appear to be all but stable, being rather fluid and changing

according to the present needs of the various groups on the ground.

And this ontological fluidity of affiliations has been increasingly

Libya in the Mist

24

growing in Libya in the chaotic situation in which the country has sunk

in the post-Qadhafi period. Furthermore, as Wherey and Lacher

asserted (Foreign Affairs, Feb. 2016), the two big adversaries on the

ground, the Libya Dawn coalition and the organizations under the

Dignity operation umbrella are actually only nominally existing, being

internally highly fractured, as the map below (as of March 2015) shows9:

Secondly, waging war against ISIS in Libya could be seen by the

Islamist opposition groups, based in Tripoli and part of the Libya Dawn

coalition, as a Western tactics to intrude into the country and to

eliminate all Islamist oppositions, making the new unity government

appear as if it is surrendering Libya’s sovereignty (Foreign Affairs, Feb.

2016). This may, consequently, lead Islamist groups (or some of them)

9 http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59268.

Factional Fighting in Eastern Libya

Source: NY Times

February 2016

25

or other militias whatsoever to ally with the Islamic State, now having

territorial control in Sirte and the surrounding coastal area. Moreover,

this military intervention would characterize as completely unilateral. As

Varvelli put forth in one of his most recent commentaries (Varvelli,

Feb. 2016), until few days ago it had been considered necessary for

embarking on a military intervention in the country the ratification of

the measure from a newly elected parliament or, at least, a formal

request by Libyan factions. Thus, intervening unilaterally would appear

as a violation of state authority (even given the “stateless state” situation

in the country), further distancing the possibility of a diplomatic

resolution to Libyan instability. Ergo, the level of intra-violence would

increase dramatically, caused by the overlapping of both foreign

intervention and internal militia intra-fighting plus the already attested

high levels of violence enacted by ISIS as a standard way of “policy-

making” for the group.

Last but not least, an external military intervention of any kind would

prevent all the parties struggling on the ground from reaching that

hurting stalemate moment which will make the moment “ripe”

(Zartman, 2000) for successfully reaching conflict resolution and for

ensuring a positive outcome to the negotiations. According to the

ripeness theory, the parties at a conflict will be willing to reach a

diplomatic solution only when the moment is ripe, namely when they

reach the so-called Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) (Mezran and

Alunni, 2015), a deadlock which is negative and painful for all the

Libya in the Mist

26

parties at conflict and which is inevitably prevented from external

interference, as will be if Western allies intervene in Libya.

Form this analysis, it seems straightforward that the warfare (coming

back to the analytical tools previously presented) would characterize

itself as extremely violent, whereas it has still to be clearly understood

the political aim/s, i.e. the war dimension. Namely, which are the

political objectives that Italy and the international coalition want to

pursue? It is not still well-defined what this war is aiming for (Varvelli,

Feb. 2016): ISIS’ containment, state-building, protection of the existing

infrastructures, or what else? Without a clear-cut set of objectives, the

risk is that of embarking on (another) never-ending war that will give

ISIS the opportunity to thrive in a lacerated country.

On the other hand, looking at the macro-systemic level, as indicated

at the beginning of this section, Italy and Western allies’ military

intervention would only strengthen the kind of rhetorical propaganda

on which ISIS relies to gain new recruits and support, namely the idea

of a present-day Crusade of the West against Muslim lands. As Stephen

M. Walt insightfully asserted, “Today, U.S. efforts to ‘degrade and

ultimately destroy’ the Islamic State […] could enhance its prestige,

reinforce its narrative of Western hostility to Islam, and bolster its claim

to be Islam’s stauncher defender” (Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2015).

In ISIS’ attempt to convince its followers to embark on such a costly

project, it is fundamental to use propaganda in order to portray its

enemies as evil and, it comes with no surprise, attacking them would

February 2016

27

just be used as an empirical proof of the validity of their simplistic

dichotomic ideology of good versus evil.

Furthermore, the validation of their ideology through a direct military

attack will put Italian interests both in Libya and, possibly, in Italy at

risk. As for Libya, the economic ties of our country to the North

African state in terms of gas and oil production and supply are well

known. As reported by Stefania

Coco Scalisi (Mediterranean

Affairs, 2016), Eni CEO,

Claudio Descalzi, forecast the

doubling of the oil production

in the country by 2019, thus

stressing the extreme

importance of stability also for

the economic interests of Italy.

As for the internal

consequences, needless to say,

the possibility of direct terrorist

attacks on Italian land will statistically increase, if not for direct planned

attacks by ISIS leaderships, whose interest for Italy has still to be

proven, at least on the part of individuals inspired by ISIS propaganda,

whose examples are present all over the world, the San Bernardino

attack in California on December 2, 2015, not ISIS-claimed but ISIS-

inspired, being a pertinent instance.

Western Libya Gas Project

Source: ENI website

Libya in the Mist

28

This section aimed at demonstrating that Italian possible future

military intervention in Libya, officially against ISIS positions in the

country, as part of the War on Terror, will be counterproductive in

mainly four respects. First, if the main political aim of the international

community is that of achieving stability in Libya, then the prospect of a

military intervention will be likely to yield the opposite result, increasing

state and regional instability and preventing a Mutually Hurting

Stalemate (MHS) from taking place, thus not making the moment ripe

for fruitful negotiations between the parties at conflict. Second, the

intervention will facilitate ISIS spread in an even more divided and

lacerated country, since its Manichean ideology will be strengthened by

the use of unilateral force on the part of Western countries, lending

credibility to ISIS good versus evil narrative. Third, the military

campaign will put Italian interests at risk both in Libya, in terms of

security of oil production sites, and back home, in terms of increased

likelihood of ISIS-inspired, if not ISIS-claimed, terrorist attacks against

considerable national targets. Last but not least, according to the war

model put forth in section 2, this military intervention will be

characterized by high levels of violence, producing lots of casualties

among the civilian population, given the non-mutually recognition of

the parties at stake as equals, not accepting the same “rules of the game”

(namely, international humanitarian law). In this respect, this

intervention can be defined as a “total” war between two different sets

of institutional models on which society should be built and based.

February 2016

29

Libya and Italy relations Historical approach

Foreign policy between national interests and political

solutions

Giulia Formichetti

1. Italy and Libya in the Past: A “Privileged Partnership”10

1.1. Italian foreign policy to Libya before the “Day of

Rage”

Italy and Libya relations date back to the beginning of the 20th

century, when in the summer of 1911 the European south-peninsular

State started the Italo-Turkish war, invading the Libyan part of the

Ottoman Empire, after having put forward the first claims over it

during the 1878 Congress of Berlin and in 1902 signed a secret treaty

with France to carve up some areas of the Maghreb region. If the Italian

appropriation of the North-African territory started with the provinces

of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911, larger areas were annexed in the

1920s and under the fascist government in 1934, Italian Libya was

10 Italy’s Foreign Trade Minister, Piero Fassino, said at a trade conference in Rome in

December 1999.

Libya in the Mist

30

born11. The Italian colonial past continued to play a significant role in

shaping the relations between the two countries, when Libya was by the

time independent and

proclaimed as the

kingdom of Libya first,

and the Great Socialist

People’s Libya Arab

Jamahiria then, after the

coup of Muamar al-

Qadhafi. As a matter of

fact, the crimes and

atrocities executed by Italian colonists and the bad reputation that they

had produced as “Italiani non brava gente”12 fostered the anti-colonial and

anti-Italian sentiment. Despite of this, the relations between the two

countries never completely interrupted. Italian government already

deemed as necessary to safeguard the connection with such a close

neighbour in the Mediterranean south, for security reasons. The

partnership became an imperative when in 1959 Libya discovered oil

reserves under its soil. Al-Qadhafi coming to power seemed to cause a

diplomatic crisis (Ronzitti, 2009): hence, the anti-colonial rhetoric,

11 More on this, see Ali Abdullatif Ahmida (1994) The Making of Modern Libya, SUNY

Press; Jerary, M. “Damages Caused by the Italian Fascist Colonization of Libya,” in Ben-

Ghiat and Fuller, eds., Italian Colonialism (2005), 203-208. Nicola Labanca. “Studies and

Research on Fascist Colonialism,” in A Place in the Sun, ed. Patrizia Palumbo (Berkeley,

2003), 37-61. Jesse Russell, Ronald Cohn (2012) History of Libya As Italian Colony, Book

on demand; Segre, C.G. (1974), Fourth shore : the Italian colonization of Libya, Chicago

12 Angelo Del Boca (1988, 1994), Gli Italiani in Libia, (I e II vol.), Bari, Milano: Laterza,

Oscar Mondadori. Angelo del Boca (2005) Italiani, brava gente?. Neri Pozza.

Picture postcard of Italian colonialism period Source: nomoreblogs

February 2016

31

associated with the requests for compensation for the colonial

occupation were leitmotif of the Colonel’s attitude towards the former

colonial power. However, this never prevented the two parties from

maintaining close ties during next decades.

Since the beginning of the 1970s, Italy wanted to play a significant

role in the international arena, in particular in the nearby Mediterranean

neighbourhood, and reinforcing the ties with Libya seemed to be the

right strategy to pursue. Following this path, during the 1970s, Italy

reinforced its role as “bridge”13 between Libya and the West. Italy also

exploited Libyan economic development, by pursuing investments on

the territory: in 1974, an Economic and Scientific Co-operation

Agreement was signed in exchange for 7 million tons of oil per year.

Then, in 1976, al-Qadhafi’s Libya acquired 10 per cent of Fiat’s shares

(Merzan & De Maio, 2007). After the acme reached at the end of the

1970s, when Italy played a key role in softening Libyan opposition

towards Camp David Accords (1978), Reagan administration shifted

the international ground, by hardening the American attitude (and

consequently the European one) towards the Libyan Colonel. Facing

this change, Italy continued to pursue its realistic approach, by adopting

a “diplomatic compromise” (De Maio, 2006) to preserve economic interests

and to avoid to put in peril its political image and relations with both

the West and Libya. Following more difficult diplomatic crises,14 the

13 Merzan & De Maio, 2007 14 The terrorist attack which occurred in West Berlin’s La Belle Nightclub; the American

response which culminated in the bombing of both Benghazi and Tripoli (aimed at

destroying Qadhafi’s political regime); the missiles which Tripoli used in order to attack

Libya in the Mist

32

explicit condemnation of Libya as supporter of international terrorism

and as part of the list of the “rogue states,” and the heavy sanctions by

the international community, relations between Italy and Libya cooled

down, as the European country understood when it was the time to

please the Western partners.

However, since al-Qadhafi feared the international isolation would

have caused economic loss and disinvestments, Libya’s progressively

opened to the West at the end of 1990s, backed by Italy’s diplomatic

and political co-operation. Again Italy embodied its role of “bridge”

between Libya and Europe (Merzan & De Maio, 2007).

The normalization of relations was also facilitated thanks to a series

of bilateral agreements stipulated already at the end of the 1990s:

Agreement on Tourism (1998); Consular Convention (1998);

Agreement on the promotion and protection of investments (2000);

Agreement on Cultural Cooperation (2003).15 Three documents part of

this mosaic of agreements have a more political significance. Among

them, the “Verbal Process” of July 1998, which addressed the issue of

coordinated management of migration; secondly, the “Memorandum of

intent,” signed in December 2000 and aiming at tackling drug

trafficking, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration (Marchi,

Whitman, Edwards, 2015). Last but not least, the “Treaty of Friendship,

Italy’s southern island of Lampedusa; the bombing of the Pan Am flight no. 103 and the

subsequent UN sanctions and embargos.

15 See Benedetto Conforti, Luigi Ferraro Bravo, Francesco Francioni, Natalino Ronzitti,

Giorgio Sacerdoti, eds. (2004) The Italian Yearbook of International Law, Volume XIV.

Leiden Boston: Martinus Nujhoff Publisher.

February 2016

33

Partnership and Cooperation” signed in Benghazi in 2008, between the

General and the Italian Prime Minister at the time, Silvio Berlusconi

(Ronzitti, 2009). This document which dramatically strengthened the

ties between the Italian peninsula and the Libyan Jamahiria involved, on

top of economic and cultural cooperation, the fight of terrorism and

criminal organisations, the spilling of USD 5 billion over the next 20

years to serve the realization of basic infrastructures.16 Although the

Treaty did not explicitly declare the reason of the disbursement, it was

widely recognised that it also served the aim of compensating Libyan

population from the atrocities of the colonial period (Marchi, Whitman,

Edwards, 2015). Bearing in mind the developments of Libyan political

(dis)order and international community reaction at the beginning of the

2000s, it is interesting to call the attention to two interesting parts of the

Treaty: first, the prohibition to carry out a contentious action against

each other’s territory and to allow that each other’s territory could be

use by a third party (both state and non-state actor) to carry out such

contentious action. Secondly, article 6 of the Treaty, sealing the

commitment to respect and act accordingly with the dispositions of the

UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ronzitti,

2009).

16 As Ronzitti 2009 remarks, the 5 billion dollars are not directly handled to Libya. Rather,

they will be managed by Italy and Italian company will be in charge of the works.

Libya in the Mist

34

1.2. Italian national interests towards Libya: Illegal

migration and natural resources

The 2008 Treaty also aimed at substantiating a real partnership

between the two countries as a way to be a guarantee for Italian security,

of its territory and its citizens. Therefore, the partnership involved first

and foremost the fight against illegal migration and the collaboration in

natural resources and energy fields.

Before having an insight into the nature of these interests Italy put

on top of its list when structuring its foreign policy towards Libya, it

deems as necessary to explore the political science literature on the

nature of national interest (Abdalla A. Kashiam, 2012).

In details, national interest can be for example defined in terms of

power. In his Politics among Nations (1985), Morgenthau argued that every

political action is seen as directed toward keeping, increasing, or

demonstrating power: “Remember that the golden age of isolated normalcy is

gone forever and that no effort, however great, and no action, however radical, will

bring it back. Remember that diplomacy without power is feeble, and power without

diplomacy is destructive and blind. Remember that no nation’s power is without

limits, and hence that its policies must respect the power and interests of others.”

(Morgenthau, 1947). On the other hand, Rourke and Boyer (2000, pp.

159–196) emphasized the importance of cooperation and

interdependency in international relations. Duncan et al. (2004, p. 150)

instead overlapped the concept of national interest with the one of core

objectives, enumerating among others, “territorial security, political

independence and economic vitality.” Neuchterlein (1976) elaborated the

February 2016

35

concept of national interest as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign

state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment.”

Through the combination of the variable of national interest and that

of national government’s strategy, Italian foreign policy towards Libya

had a “clear interest-driven approach.” (Miranda, 2011)

Therefore, all the aforementioned definitions are somehow true

when analyzing Italian foreign policy to Libya. It is true that the Italian

national interest is driven by the will of affirming national power and

playing a relevant role in the Mediterranean, in face of other European

and at large Western countries. It is valid to argue that cooperation and

interdependence between Italy and Libya serve the purpose of

safeguarding the national interests of territorial security, political

independence and economic vitality, which are also the core objective

of the peninsula’s foreign policy.

Illegal migration from Africa to Italy has always been perceived as

one of the main threat to stability and security. Italian strategic position

in the Mediterranean Sea makes the country an easy channel for

economic migrants and refugees to access the Old Continent. Indeed,

the Italian shored, particularly the island of Lampedusa and Sicily, have

been witnessing the arrival of numerous boats carrying illegal migrants

from Africa, and also from Libya. The “symbolic power” (Paoletti,

2011) embodied by migration in the European and Western societies

constantly influences diplomatic relations between Italy and the

Mediterranean neighbourhood, allowing Libyan representatives – at the

time al-Qadhafi – to take advantage from it. Hence, embracing Paoletti

Libya in the Mist

36

(2011) argumentation over the “social construction of migration as a societal

threat” and “security concern”, and agreeing that “In an attempt to answer public

anxieties associated with the migrant ‘other’, Italian politicians have constructed an

‘emergency’ narrative inspired by a strongly anti-immigrant stance”, illegal

migrations started to be included among the threats to territorial and

economic security and social stability since late 1990s. By addressing the

issue and by concluding bilateral agreements with the Libyan

authorities, Italy attempted to safeguarding those interests, although in

terms of bilateral relations, the country lost a great portion of its

bargaining power vis-à-vis Libya (Paoletti 2011).

Another component of Italian foreign policy to Libya, always aiming

at safeguarding the national interest, is the collaboration and the

Libya oil and natural gas infrastructure Source: EIA

February 2016

37

partnership in the energy field. Libya is not only a member of the

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but also

the holder of Africa’s largest proved crude oil reserves, and the fifth-

largest holder of Africa’s proved natural gas reserves (US Energy

Information Administration). Libya has six large sedimentary basins –

Sirte, Murzuk, Ghadames, Cyrenaica, Kufra –, and the offshore and

about 80% of Libya's recoverable reserves are located in the Sirte basin,

which also accounts for most of the country's oil production capacity.

Libya's oil industry is run by the state-owned National Oil Corporation

(NOC), which is also in charge of implementing the Exploration and

Production Sharing Agreements with international companies. 84% of

Libyan crude oil is exported to Europe.

Natural gas is also a fundamental natural resources in the Libyan soil

and it is exported through the Western Libya Gas Project, implemented

in 2003. It arrives to Italy though the Greenstream pipeline,

implemented in 2004 to enhance Libyan capacity to export.

Furthermore, Italian energy company ENI (Ente Nazionale

Idrocarburi) has been operating in Libya since 1959 and it is historically

the most operative international company on the territory. It is evident

that Italy and Libya again boast mutual interests when the energy issue

is on the table. Therefore, if Italy needs Libyan resources to feed the

country’s societies and industries, Libya counts on Italian investments

and revenues from the sales to fill in the cashier of the Central Bank

and boost the economy.

Libya in the Mist

38

1.3. Italian foreign policy after the “Day of Rage”

The “Arab Spring” which from Tunisia attempted to swept away the

stronghold dictators in the MENA region, went successful in Libya as

well, where the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition

declared on the 17 February 2011 the “Day of Rage” as the formal

beginning of the protests. The Italian government at the time, in the

persons of Frattini and Berlusconi, respectively Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Prime Minister, underestimated the strength and the energy

of the popular movement and thought they could have gone for the

maintenance of the status quo in the “crazy” South Neighbourhood.

The escalation of the events proved the Italian authorities wrong. The

international community condemnation of the violent repressions of

the popular uprisings carried out by the Colonel’s regime were not long

in coming, and soon after in March, under the aegis of UN Security

Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, the NATO-led Operation Unified

Protector took the initiative against al-Qadhafi regime, pursuing the

protection of the Libyan population, that the government could not

guarantee anymore (R2P doctrine).17 In a very first moment, the Italian

government was not on the first line to blame the Libyan conduct;

rather, it maintained a cautious “neutrality” vis-à-vis the regime and the

rebels. Prime Minister Berlusconi stated he did not want to “disturb”

Gheddafi at such a critical moment (Miranda, 2011). Italy saw its

national interests, territorial security and economic stability – in view of

expected migratory flows and of the uncertain destiny of natural

17 See Eric Posner, 2011, Foreign Policy on the legality of the military intervention in

Libya.

February 2016

39

resources hotspots –, in peril and preferred to stand behind the front

line and meditate over the right steps to take. When the situation was

exacerbated, the Italian government became more critical towards al-

Qadhafi repressive actions, by openly denouncing them and by

consequently suspending the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation

and Partnership. It is interesting to question whether this changed tune

was in the name of “human protection,”18 or it was the consequence of

a combination of the international pressure – UNSC Resolution 1970

establishing sanctions against Libya and similar measures undertaken by

the EU Council – with Italy’s interest in remaining within the Western

mainstream (Miranda, 2011). The second option better explains the

change. Although Italy had put a strong effort in bridging the Libyan

re-integration into the international community in previous years, at that

time the country and its representatives were not a credible and reliable

counterpart. An explicit commitment with them would have wasted

Italian reputations in front of Western partners.

As a consequence, Italy took more step towards them, and it was one

of the first among EU countries to launch a humanitarian mission to

the Libyan-Tunisian border in order to assist the thousands of refugees;

it participated to the no-fly zone implemented; it offered support in the

NATO Operation by commanding its naval component aimed at

ensuring the respect of the arms embargo (Miranda 2011). As Miranda

(2011) stated, “Italy thus confirmed the prevalence of its Euro-Atlantic

18 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? Cote D’Ivoire,

Libya, and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 827–8.

Libya in the Mist

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commitments over its “special relationship” with Libya.” Furthermore, when in

October 2011, the Transitional National Council (TNC) declared Libya

free from dictatorship, Italy was the third country to recognize it as the

only legitimate interlocutor.

2. Italy and Libya in the Present

2.1. On the Frontline?

As the name suggests, the 2011 Operation Unified Protector

committed to the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas

under the threat of attack, through the establishment of a no-fly zone

and the authorization of the use of military force. Although this

defensive attitude did not imply to depose al-Qadhafi, NATO took an

active part in assisting the rebels’ campaign to overthrow the

government, with some countries sending limited ground forces, and

undertaking efforts to assassinate the Colonel in bombing attacks

(Posner 2011). The Western countries’ mission was to defend Libya

from al-Qadhafi disease, and the easiest way to accomplish this mission

was to eradicate it, relying on the rebels’ energy and discontent,

according to the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

However, this simple equation could not work in such a complicated

context like the Libyan one: ousting the dictator in charge for decades

would have apparently relieved the civilians from the existing threat, but

would have failed to address all the other consequent and imminent

ones.

February 2016

41

Today, almost five years after the “Day of Rage”, Libya is following

the path to become a failed state and this result should not be surprising.

To understand the dynamics that are driving the present Libyan

disruption, it is not enough to recognize the role played by the popular

uprisings of February 2011 and how the perpetuation of this armed

revolutionary militias structure intensified chaotic and localized power.

Rather, it deems as necessary to understand why such a chaotic and

localized power resulted as the only viable solution after the end of the

dictatorship (Toaldo, 2016). In details, the problem in Libya was not

how to hand over power from the military to the civilians, but how to

rebuilt credible and accountable governmental institutions from scratch

(Toaldo, 2016). After October 2011, the revolution gave birth to an

“organizational desert” (Kienle, 2012), and committed two mistakes:

the perpetuation of local revolutionary militia structure; the

announcement of elections without democracy, in July 2012. Libyan

society had been always characterised by tribalism, strong federalist

sentiment and decentralisation and al-Qadhafi’s dictatorship kept these

elements alive, artificially balancing different centers of power in a

context dominated by localism and regionalism. Consequently, while

tribalism was strong in pre-Qadhafi’s and during Qadhafi’s era, it came

out even stronger during the post-revolution period. In the absence of

a state, the “legitimate use of force” happened to be decentralised, as

well as the security apparatus (Toaldo 2016) and local militia were in

charge of guaranteeing protection to local communities, while

competing for the control of the former state’s assets. The plethora of

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42

actors involved at the moment in the Libyan civil warfare19 belongs to

this “decentralization of authoritarianism.”

As Chesterman et al. (2004) suggested, “states cannot be made to work

from outside” and if international assistance seems to be necessary, it is

certainly not enough to establish a legitimate and sustainable

institutional asset.20 However, recalling what said before about the link

between countries’ foreign policy and national interests, it gathers that

States could try to override the impossibility of making another State to

work from outside when national interests are in the running. In this

way, Chesterman’s theoretical assumption is denied.

2.2. The exacerbation of the migrant and the energy crises

Following the “Arab Springs”, the entire region of Middle East and

North Africa precipitated into different and country-specific deadlocks,

which are all still contributing to the instability of the area and its

neighbourhood, and affecting the lives of millions of people hit by

severe humanitarian crises. Libya is a great example of insecure country

at the gates of Europe, threatening the preservation of the results

reached after the popular uprisings by the neighbouring Tunisia, hosting

19 For more details, see The Soufan Group (2016), Libya, Extremism and the

Consequences of Collapse, New York 10019, New York: The Soufan Group. 20 Several example in the history of Western interventions in the South of the world

confirm this assumption. Afghanistan, Iraq among others.

February 2016

43

the competition between regional power which back one or the other

player in the arena,21 menacing the stability of its former colonial power.

Although the country has been experiencing such a critical situation

soon after the ousting of the dictator, the Western community in general

(USA, Great Britain and France), and Italy in particular, have turned

highly concerned to the Libyan case only recently, when the Islamic

State variable entered in the game and tip the balance against their

interests.

Recently, increased traffic of ISIS forces leaving Syria and Iraq for

Libya has been registered. The number of fighters the organization now

21 At the moment, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are supporting the east

government of Toubruk (General Haftar’s Libyan National Army, committed in the

Operation Dignity, and House of Representative). Turkey and Qatar are instead backing

the west Islamists side of Tripoli (General National Congress – Operation Dawn).

Source: Router

Libya in the Mist

44

has in Libya is estimated at between 3,000 and 5,000, while its presence

in Syria and Iraq has been reduced to 20,000 to 30,000 fighters (Haaretz,

2016). As a matter of fact, the anarchy of the country represents a fertile

ground for jihadists’ implantation. The so called Islamic State’s new

capital – after Raqqa – Sirte allows them to serve as stronghold while

seizing the territory along the coast. The country’s oil abundancy

represents another important element behind IS’s strategy for Libya. If

the competition over the energy assets was already in place among the

national players, the militants of Daesh entered the game, not with the

aim of directly holding oil facilities, rather of damaging them and

preventing the government, embodied by the Central Bank, to get

revenues from oil, to finally create “a deficit of the public funds and create

social and economic upheaval” (Gazzini, 2015). The January 2016 spate of

attacks with a double car bombing at a Petroleum Facilities Guards

outpost near Es Sider serve the outlined purpose.

One of the most evident consequences which initiates a vicious circle

is that the revenues from the oil facilities should also serve to pay the

military sub-division created in 2005 to protect the oil revenues

themselves. If their numbers already swelled to at least 12,000 after the

uprising, and their allegiances are uncertain and their fighting capacity

limited, without a decent payment, their mission misses a strong

commitment and their purpose is then nullified. As a result, the militias

could find other ways to live out of, for example the smuggling of

people across the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Libyan civil war and

consequent security instability have a direct effect in boosting the

February 2016

45

number of refugees crossing the sea. Moreover, holding Sirte, ISIS is a

mere 220 miles from the Italian island of Lampedusa, where thousands

of migrants and refugees have arrived after embarking by boat from

Libya (Wehrey and Lacher, 2016).

The popular uprisings and the consequent crisis tremendously

affected Libya’s oil and natural gas production an export: the current oil

output is just under 400,000 barrels per day, while the country produced

1.65 million barrels per day before 2011 and 594 billion cubic feet of

natural

gas in 2010. This accounted for up to 96 % of government revenue

and 65 % of GDP, allowing Libya to amass cash reserves and run a

debt-free economy for years, but also rendering it almost entirely

dependent on the import food and consumer goods.22

Today political instability and competition have visible consequences

in the economic sector. The three economic authorities, Central Bank

of Libya, National Oil Company and Libyan Investment Authority have

no accountable and unitary management, rather all the players in the

arena try to seize their assets and control a part of them. This

institutional disruption is combined with an economic turmoil, due to

the reduction of crude-oil exports and the sharp decline in international

oil prices (Gazzini, 2015).

A wider economic crisis will not only affect Libya, but also the

countries which boast national interests on its soil and from its export.

22 “Libya Country Report“, International Monetary Fund (IMF), May 2013, pp. 22-23

Libya in the Mist

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Italy is one of them, if not the first. Italy not only could suffer from the

shrunk production on natural resources, but also from the fact that the

militants could eventually seize control of Libya’s Mediterranean Sea

ports, oil terminals and even border crossings. Off-shore platforms

owned by Italian and other foreign oil firms would also come under

threat (Wehrey and Lacker, 2016).

2.3. Western Interventionism: in the name of what and

under which mandate?

In front of such a complex threat, the international community at

first implemented two remedies, the first, European-led, namely the

European Union Border Assistant Mission (EUBAM); the second UN-

sponsored, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSIMIL). Both missions

aimed at working in favour of a political solution for Libya, by

sponsoring the dialogue between the parties confronting each other in

the arena. On the other hand, the aim of the possible intervention of

the anti-IS coalition should be to tackle the Islamic State problem, to

pull back al-Baghdadi’s militants and protect the national interests of

most affected countries, with Italy among them.

According to international law this military intervention – different

from the political dialogue UN pushes for – could take place through

five possible scenarios (Ronzitti, 2015):

February 2016

47

Legitimate Defence: Italy for example could intervene, in case of an

attack from a terrorist group coming from the Libyan coast, without

asking for the authorisation from the UN Security Council;

Peacekeeping operation: following a UN Security Council

Resolution, military, police and civilian personnel, would to deliver

security, political and early peacebuilding support, without taking any

side in the fight and without using force;

Peacekeeping enforcement: under the authorisation of the UN

Security Council, a dispatch of international forces would remain stable

on the Libyan territory and would foster peace and institutional

reconstruction;

Request from the acting Libyan government: this possibility was

recently called in by Italian Minister of Defence Pinotti.23

Clearly, this implies that the UN-sponsored mission to favour

dialogue among the Libyan parties and the formation of the

Government of National Accord come out successful. Even if this

happens, Italy should still be aware that alone cannot provide sufficient

forces for an operation of the magnitude the situation in Libya now

requires. Italy – as well as the other member of the anti-IS coalition –

should also be aware of the ruinous consequences that a military

operation in Libya could provoke: launching airstrikes would only

23 Ansa, 2016, February 4, Military intervention in Libya 'not imminent' – Pinotti

http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2016/02/04/military-intervention-in-libya-not-

imminent-pinotti_66172f00-786e-4e77-8301-b16f56aa81db.html

Libya in the Mist

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further the fracture between Libya’s multiple and competing actors and

would fertilise the ground for jihadism.24 Instead, the coalition should

push for building an anti-ISIS coalition inside Libya, and made up of

Libyans. Therefore, the mission to Libya cannot have the unique focus

on defeating Daesh, but has to include the support for institutional and

national reconstruction and for a unity government in Tripoli.

3. Conclusions. Italy and Libya in the Future: A political

solution a long-term strategy

This part of the study, through a historical approach and exploring

the political science literature on national interests, has analysed the

changing relations between Libya and Italy, in light of changing

interests, and changed political arrangements. After the privileged

partnership and the deep crisis originated from the decentralisation of

authoritarianism after the 2014 civil war, Italy should again try to be the

bridge between Libya and Europe, consecrating its role as leading

political actor in the Mediterranean Sea.

Italy, on its way towards gaining the opportunity of fastening the ties

of a renewed “Privileged Partnership with Libya” should then push the

international community to solve the Libyan knot implementing a

political solution. Therefore, the main priorities that should be sake for

Libya are the rearrangement of security apparatus and the establishment

24 PXM News, 2016, February 10, What’s to be done about the rise of ISIS in Libya –

Pack http://pxw.news/whats-to-be-done-about-the-rise-of-isis-in-libya/

February 2016

49

of an economic governance. From a closer point of view, first the

legitimate use of force should be again centralised in the hands of a

legitimate and responsible government. Secondly, a sustainable, long

term, stimulating economic policy has to be put in place; and the unified

accountable management of the economic institutions has to be

guaranteed. Finally, and more than anything else, the international

community must favour the establishment of a political strategy to deal

with the country which should be taken in charge by the Government

of National Accord.

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About the Authors

Valentina Cantori

Graduated with honors in the MA Culture and Languages for

Communication and International Cooperation at the University of

Milan in 2014, where she obtained also her BA degree in Linguistic and

Cultural Mediation, with a specialization in Arabic and Islamic Studies.

After a working period spent in Egypt, she is now Teaching Assistant

at Scripps College in Claremont, CA, a member of The Claremont

Colleges Consortium. She is currently researching at Pitzer College on

Religion and Conflict-related issues in Syria and Iraq..

Giulia Formichetti

Graduated with honors in the International Relations MA at LUISS

University, in Rome, where she also obtained her bachelor degree in

Political Science. In 2013, during a semester exchange programme in

Israel and in the Palestinian territory, she worked as intern at the

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, IDC Herzliya.

Afterwards, she moved to Brussels, where she supported the team of

the Centro Nazionale delle Ricerche liason office with a project on

security and civil protection. In 2014, she worked as intern for the

Security and Defense Programme at Istituto Affari Internazionali, in

Rome. She just concluded an internship at the UNRWA Representative

Office to the EU, in Brussels.

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Ed. Mediterranean Affairs©

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

Cover image source: The Guardian

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