report #6 - monarchical adaptive capacities

Mediterranean Report #6

June 2015

Monarchical adaptive capacities Why the Arab Springs generated changes in the Republican

regimes and did not affect regional monarchies?

Lorenzo SIGGILLINO

MA Economies and Institutions of the Islamic Countries

(LUISS School of Government, Rome)

June 2015

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1 Monarchical adaptive capacities

June 2015

Monarchical adaptive capacities ................................................................. 2

Introduction .............................................................................................. 2

The cultural approach: do Islamic monarchies still collapse? ................ 3

The institutional element: the capacity to implement reforms .............. 6

Decisive elements: resources and protection .......................................... 7

About the Author .................................................................................... 11

Summary


June 2015

Monarchical adaptive capacities

Why the Arab Springs generated changes in the Republican regimes and

did not affect regional monarchies?

Mr. Lorenzo Siggillino

What are generally called “Arab Springs” include a wide range of events aimed at undermining

the status quo. As a matter of fact, what happened in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen,

Bahrain, Libya, Syria did not origin from a single cause, instead the events occurred in these

countries have their own precise histories. The Egyptian and the Tunisian Republic experienced a

change in their political regimes, in Libya, Syria and Yemen three civil wars broke out, conflicts still

ongoing. On the opposite side, Moroccan, Jordanian and Bahraini monarchies were able to maintain

their institutional structure and the status quo.

Why the monarchies displayed such a high resilience capacity? According to many scholars,

monarchies have an institutional element, which make them able to hang on. Other authors state it is

due to a cultural factor. Who is right? The aim of this essay is to answer these questions.

Introduction

Since 2011, when the revolutionary

movements began in the Islamic

MENA region, some undemocratic

regimes were subject to institutional

and political transformations. Other

countries are experiencing long

transitional periods and others are

affected by civil wars which will shape

their future. What are generally called

“Arab Springs” include a wide range of

events aimed at undermining the status

quo. As a matter of fact, what

happened in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan,

Morocco, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria

did not origin from a single cause,

instead the events occurred in these

countries have their own precise

histories. Although each nation

underwent processes divergent from

other cases, three factors allows the

scholars to collect all these movements

within the same label:

1. The events happening in a

country considerably affected other

national contexts.

2. The protest movements and the

resulting transitional periods began

after December 2010 and most of

them ended before 2015.

3. Although each Arab Spring has

been different from the others under

many aspects, all the protests and

uprisings have been characterized by a

common factor: the desire to challenge

the status quo, demanding political

changes, representation, and freedom.


June 2015

Taking into account general

dissimilarities and general shared

elements, it is possible to analyze the

outcomes produced by these

movements in different countries. As

many scholars point out, the Arab

Springs affected more the republican

regimes than the monarchies. The

Egyptian and the Tunisian Republic

experienced a change in their political

regimes, in Libya, Syria and Yemen

three civil wars broke out, conflicts still

ongoing. On the opposite side,

Morocco,

Jordan and

Bahrain were

able to

maintain

their

institutional

structure and

the status

quo. Why the

monarchies

displayed such a high resilience

capacity? Many scholars explained this

by using two main arguments: the

cultural and the institutional

approaches. The aim of this essay is to

find an answer, taking these two

explanations as starting points.

The cultural approach: do

Islamic monarchies still collapse?

The scorecard of the Arab Springs

has been extremely positive for

regional monarchies, in comparison to

republics. In Saudi Arabia and Oman

protests were limited to isolated

episodes. In Qatar and United Arab

Emirates no significant opposition

mobilized. In Jordan and Morocco

youths drove movements aimed at

obtaining changes, but they failed to

involve the masses. In Kuwait

opposition towards the government

was widespread but it originated from

existing tensions between the

Parliament and the royal family, being

the national context only partially

connected to

the Arab

Springs.

Bahrain

experienced

a mass

uprising and

the ruling

family, the al-

Khalifas,

were forced

to request a Saudi military intervention.

It is fundamental to notice the eight

monarchies just mentioned have

practically absolute power; none of

them can be qualified as a

constitutional kingship. In these

countries the royal families

considerably influence the policy

making processes, parliaments or

elected parliamentary governments

instead barely have the capacity to

hinder the kings.


June 2015

According to the cultural argument,

monarchies were only marginally

affected by Arab Springs because of

the legitimacy they enjoyed thanks to

tribal relations and Islamic traditions.

This legitimacy would generate an

exceptional allegiance among the

populations, deterring them from

rising up against the monarchies. Arab

kingdoms enjoy popular support

thanks to Islamic values, tribal

relations and hereditary principles. The

Alaouite Crown of Morocco and the

Hashemite House of Jordan claim to

directly descend from the prophet

Muhammad. The Saudi King is the

“Guardian of the Holy Places” and he

is the guarantor of the Wahhabi

doctrine. The ruling families in Oman,

Kuwait, UAE, and Bahrain govern

thanks to large tribal confederations

that support them. On the opposite

side, presidents for life need constantly

to reconfirm their legitimacy by means

of political decisions, this was the case

for Mubarak and Ben Ali.

Gause and Yom claims this

explanation is not efficient because,

even if the Arab reigns did not

collapse during the 2011 revolutionary

movements, since World War II many

monarchies have fallen. If the reason

of authoritarian resistance is cultural

and it lies within tribal and religious

legitimacy, then monarchical

perpetuity should have been

guaranteed also in the past. In Egypt

the monarchy was overthrown in

1952, Libya became a republic in 1969,

the Iraqi monarchy collapsed in 1958,

the Shah in Iran was forced to flee in

1979, Tunisia became a republic in

1957, and the monarchy in

Afghanistan was toppled in 1973.

According to Gause and Yom these

examples are sufficient to falsify the

cultural argument. However, all these

regimes collapsed during the national

struggle for independence, under the

influence of the international context

or due to postcolonial logic. Tunisia

became a Republic in 1957, soon after

the country achieved independence. In

Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Iran the

national regimes were toppled because

the populations had the perception

they were not independent actors,

rather they were controlled by foreign

powers. In Afghanistan the monarchy

collapsed in 1973, due to tribal rivalries

and international influence: the coup

against the monarchy was influenced

by soviet interests and it was favored

by tribal divisions within the society.

Source: Cairo360.com


June 2015

The starting assumption was that

Arab kings are able to mobilize

exceptional support thanks to tribal

connections and Islamic values. These

factors can be sufficient to legitimate

the authoritarian rule, but this was not

true for the monarchies overthrown

during the Cold War period. Apart

from Afghanistan where the kingdom

was undermined by a deep tribal

division, the other monarchies

collapsed because they lacked

authority. Islamic values and tribal

relations can generate loyalism among

the population

but the Libyan

king, the Iranian

Shah and the

Egyptian ruler

lost legitimacy as

there was the

widespread

feeling they

economically

favored foreign

actors. Nationalism weakened popular

backing towards the governments and

at the same time the kings were not

able to ensure the support of tribal

coalitions by sharing profits.

In other words, a regime can gain

legitimacy through religious traditions,

hereditary principles and social

connections but the whole process is

strictly related to monarchical capacity

to distribute social and economic

benefits. If the monarchy fails to share

its profits, it can lose the support of its

tribal coalition, losing legitimacy and

exposing itself to regime change. Such

a situation can generate or intensify

nationalist resentments, which can

reinforce the risk of overthrow. The

capacity to distribute economic and

social benefits can deeply influence the

destiny of an Arab government, being

the latter a republic or a monarchy.

The Libyan reign led by King Idris

collapsed mainly because it failed to

distribute the economic benefits

stemming from oil. The Algerian

Republic was able to resist to Arab

Springs thanks to its economic

resources.

Apart from

the capacity to

share profits with

societies, another

factor can

considerably

condition

authoritarian

resistance: the

attitude of

foreign actors. Bahrain in 2011

experienced a radical uprising and a

Saudi intervention was needed to

guarantee the regime survival. The

Egyptian, Iranian and Iraqi monarchies

had foreign patrons, but these actors

did not prevent regime shifts, deciding

not to take action.

In conclusion, monarchies do not

seem to display cultural features able to

explain their capacity to endure.

Islamic values and tribal relations can

help royal families to obtain legitimacy,

but the latter and the ability to respond

Source: WikiCommons


June 2015

to social/political crises are dependent

on factors that lie outside monarchical

prerogatives.

The institutional element: the

capacity to implement reforms

According to the institutional

approach, monarchies can better

withstand internal pressures because

Arab kings or emirs are located on the

top of the decision-making process

and they cannot be contested. More

constraints apply to presidents for life,

who have large decision powers but

they need to bargain with other parties,

military councils and other social

organizations.

Monarchs can launch political and

economic reforms as soon as they

want and the interval of time between

the choice and its enforcement is

short. The kings enjoy uncontested

authority, as their actions cannot be

negatively evaluated through elections.

Their unconstrained power allows

monarchs to directly intervene with

reforms or promises of reform in

response to popular pressures, in order

to calm protests and avoid an unrest.

Presidents instead need to find a

solution to local discontent but then

they have to negotiate with other

political and social actors. Thus, the

implementation require a longer time

and the policies enforced are often less

radical and less effective.

The monarchical capacity to quickly

respond protest movements is further

guaranteed by the lack of opposition

within the administrations. The Gulf

royals insert cousins, brothers and loyal

figures in key political positions,

fostering regime unity and favoring the

realization of their wills.

According to Gause and Yom, this

practice allows monarchs to guarantee

their desires are pursued. At the same

time, the two scholars agree that

regional kings and emirs, not being

elected politicians, have the possibility

to intervene quickly and effectively to

calm oppositions. Yet Gause and Yom

claim monarchies do not have

institutional characteristics which make

them more able than republics to

respond popular pressures. They

explain this statement by affirming that

putting relatives in security forces,

government departments,

bureaucracies, can generate a stalemate

in national politics. Gause and Yom

think this practice entraps royal

families between their solutions to

staunch protests and the interests of

relatives and friends, considerably

reducing the kings’ capacity to take

action. This process has been

undeniable in Kuwaiti and Bahraini

political developments.

In Kuwait, democratic movements

forced the emir al-Sabah to reshuffle

the government and concede legislative

elections several times since 2006. The

emir understood that allowing the

parliament to nominate a delegate as

Prime Minister would have calmed

democratic activists, as the current


June 2015

practice provides the head of the

government is appointed by the emir

himself and usually is a relative. This

project could not be implemented

because of the opposition within the

al-Sabah family who did not want to

lose such a privilege. The same

happened with the enhancement of

public transparency, a reform largely

demanded by the Kuwaitis, which

could not be enforced due to the

emir’s family interests.

Bahraini political developments

further demonstrate that dynasticism

can instead reduce the monarch’s

ability to intervene effectively. In early

2011, protest movements demanded

the king to appoint a new cabinet but

key al-Khalifa family members, as the

Prime Minister and the military chief,

rejected this proposal.

In conclusion, monarchy displays

characteristics which make it able to

act directly, quickly and effectively in

order to resist popular pressures.

However, if monarchical regimes can

survive unrests thanks to an

institutional factor, then why regional

monarchies have fallen in the past?

Although the Libyan king, the Iranian

Shah and the Iraqi king enjoyed almost

absolute powers and all the conditions

to enforce suitable responsive policies

were met, they failed to do so and their

regimes collapsed.

Decisive elements: resources

and protection

The starting question was: Why

monarchies displayed such a high

resilience capacity? The aim of this

essay was to understand why the Arab

Springs prompted changes in

republican regimes and did not in

monarchies. As it is possible to see

from the previous paragraphs, the

answer cannot be found in the features

displayed by Islamic reigns. In order to

find a response, it is useful to shift the

investigation from “why monarchies

were able to resist?” to “how

monarchies were able to resist?”. The

ability of a regime to resist popular

pressures, regardless of its institutional

structure, mainly depends on its

capacity to maintain broad-based

coalitions and on the attitude of

foreign powers.

Regional monarchies, like local

republics, need to have popular

support and in particular they need to

build alliances with different social

constituencies. These cross-cutting

coalitions can counter oppositions

during crises and avoid excessive

protests enlargement. In Kuwait, the

al-Sabahs govern thanks to the alliance Source: flickr.com


June 2015

with Sunni merchants, the Shia

minority and local tribes. In Saudi

Arabia, the al-Sauds built a coalition

composed of the Wahhabi Islamic

establishment and

commercial/financial élite. The

monarchies collapsed in Iraq, Egypt

and Libya failed to build social

coalitions, probably because they felt

they did not need to do so. Thus, when

they faced unrests, they lacked

defenders and the regimes were

toppled. Probably this happened

because the kings of Egypt, Libya, and

Iraq thought their foreign supporters

would have prevented the overthrows.

Furthermore, large social coalitions

are based on the idea that

constituencies back the options which

best benefit them. The groups favored

by the regime unlikely foster a coup if

the new political context would

provide less advantage. This helps

explaining why protests in Jordan,

Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

failed to evolve into mass movements.

In Egypt and Tunisia, Mubarak and

Ben Ali inherited parties which had

wide social bases, but before the Arab

Springs erupted in these two countries

many groups had removed their

support. The two rulers were not

accurate observers, not understanding

how national problems were changing

the attitude of key actors. Mubarak for

instance did not realize corruption and

rampant unemployment were quickly

eroding his social backing.

This leads to the conclusion that

governments need constantly to secure

their alliances by means of profit

sharing policies. Gulf regimes

safeguard their popular support by

distributing wealth, reducing

unemployment through the

enlargement of the public sector,

imposing subsidies on energy and

goods. The Gulf monarchies, thanks to

their oil and gas reserves, can easily

allocate benefits to regime supporters.

When the Arab Springs broke out in

2011, the wealthiest monarchies

reacted promptly: Kuwait provided

$3,500 to every citizen and free food

for a year; Saudi Arabia launched a

$130 billion program aimed at creating

jobs and increasing salaries; Qatar

considerably enlarged benefits and

salaries for public servants and military

personnel. This process can avoid an

escalation in opposition movements

and can prevent their evolution into

mass demonstrations. Arab states are

now inclined to share profits with their

social bases, while in the past the

tendency was to hoard wealth rather

than distributing (Qaddafi and King

Idris in Libya, the king in Iraq, the

Shah in Iran all provide suitable

examples).

This logic applies to every regime,

republic or monarchy. Its

implementation only depends on the

will of the rulers to allocate benefits,

on government economic resources,

on the presence or absence of foreign

patrons. The Algerian Republic for


June 2015

instance had

the possibility

to use its oil

and gas

revenues,

enlarging

public

expenditures

in order to

contain strives. Algerian administration

increased salaries and built new houses,

intervening in two issues perceived

crucial by the population. Libya, Syria

and Yemen could not implement these

policies, suffering from inadequate

development and widespread poverty.

Economic resources have an

important impact on government

capacity to staunch protests. However,

not all the Islamic states are rentier

economies. When states are not oil and

gas producers their capacity to resist

popular pressures is strictly dependent

on foreign powers, which can provide

military protection and resources the

state can use to safeguard stability and

to allocate benefits. Bahrain and Oman

totally received $20 billion from Saudi

Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar.

Jordan obtained $1.4 billion from

Saudi Arabia in 2011 and aids from the

United States. The Gulf Cooperation

Council offered economic assistance

also to Morocco. These funds allowed

the kings to behave as if their states

were rentier economies. Jordan and

Oman for instance were able to

expand public jobs and price subsidies,

mitigating opposition.

Foreign

powers can

also militarily

intervene in

order to

guarantee

regime

survival or to

favor the

overthrow. In Bahrain, the aids

stemming from the GCC were not

sufficient to staunch the protest

movement and Saudi Arabia decided

to take action in order to squash it and

safeguard the al-Khalifas. Western

states on the contrary played a crucial

role in Libyan regime change, in

Qaddafi’s overthrow.

When dictators have not the

possibility to reduce discontent

through profit sharing, their

governments can be toppled. Foreign

actors can help legitimating autocratic

administrations through economic

assistance and military protection. The

will of foreign powers to protect

regimes depends on the geostrategic

value they display. Jordan has been

very important for US interests in the

Middle East, Bahrain is fundamental

for Saudi political agenda; Western

powers were not interested in

protecting the Libyan dictator Qaddafi.

In conclusion, monarchies can

probably resist popular pressures

better than republics, due to the

absence of opposition, religious

traditions and tribal connections.

However, the most important factors

Source: Nawaat.com


June 2015

seem to lie outside monarchical

prerogatives. The capacity to prevent

regime change during political crises

depends on the implementation of

profit sharing policies, which can

secure broad-based support, and on

the attitude of foreign powers, which

can make an effort in order to

safeguard or topple the governments.

June 2015


About the Author

Lorenzo Siggillino has graduated with a Master of Arts in “Economies and

Institutions of the Islamic Countries” at LUISS School of Government (Rome).

Currently, he is working as a political analyst and researcher for EPOS World View,

an Italian no-profit organization founded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

committed to safeguard human rights in the Middle East (particularly in Syria and

Iraq).

Ed. Mediterranean Affairs®

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

Info: [email protected]

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report #6 - monarchical adaptive capacities

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