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Removal and Destruction of

Syrian Chemical Weapons

Chemical Demilitarisation Branch


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UN Investigation of CW Use in Syria §  UN team (including OPCW and WHO

experts) arrived in Damascus on 18 August 2013

§  Alleged chemical attack occurred in suburb of Damascus on 21 August 2013

§  UN team accessed sites of alleged attack from 26 to 29 August 2013 Ø  Team took samples, interviewed

witnesses and examined munitions Ø  A UN led Investigation report (released

in September 2013) concluded that CW was used

Ø  UN Team had no Mandate to investigate who did the attack


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Operation Platform: OPCW-UN Joint Mission §  As a result of OPCW Executive

Council decision and UN Security Council Resolution:

§  OPCW-UN Joint Mission was established in October 2013 Ø  Support base established in Cyprus Ø  OPCW and UN established

coordinated trust funds Ø  Agreement concluded between

OPCW, UN and Syria concerning status of OPCW-UN Joint Mission for elimination of Syrian CW (“SOMA”)


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8 December 2014

4

Declaration of Syrian Chemical Weapons

14 September accession to the CWC

2013 14 October CWC Entry

into Force

23 October submission of Initial Declaration

§  Syria declared possession of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, Abandoned Chemical Weapons, other CW-related facilities and Riot Control Agents, import of chemicals for Chemical Weapons program and for industrial purposes.

§  Ten (10) amendments to initial declaration received until 1 December 2014

19 September Disclosure


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Syria Chemical Weapons Inspections §  Objectives: Elimination of Syrian CWs and Verification of

Syrian Declarations: §  Initial inspections of CW production and storage facilities §  Destruction of CW production capabilities §  Destruction of CW munitions and some chemicals on-site §  Planning for removal of chemicals from Syria in order for quick

destruction

§  30-35 OPCW inspectors organised as multidisciplinary inspection teams plus supporting staff in Damascus

§  Security situation in Syria: serious impacts on planning but manageable


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Syria CW Programme: Declared Chemicals Category 1 chemicals: §  Seven (7) different chemicals §  Chemical warfare agents or chemicals used in the binary chemical weapon systems §  Approximately 1,040 tonnes

Category 2 chemicals: §  Thirteen (13) different chemicals §  Approximately 260 tonnes

§  Approximately 1,300 tonnes total declared chemicals


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Syria CW Programme: Storage of Chemicals

Mustard tanks in Storage facility DF tanks and sealed valve

███


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Syria CW Programme: Storage Facilities §  Syria declared twelve (12) Chemical Weapons

Storage Facilities (CWSFs)

§  OPCW inventoried all declared chemicals in CWSFs

§  OPCW verified that all declared chemicals were removed from CWSFs and CWSFs were closed

§  OPCW verified that all declared chemicals were removed from Syria (except Isopropanol destroyed inside Syria)


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Syria CW Programme: Production Facilities §  Syria declared twenty-seven (27) Chemical

Weapons Production Facility (CWPF); §  Such facilities were render not operational when

Syria acceded the Treaty; §  All production equipment were verified as

destroyed on October and November 2013; §  OPCW verified so far the destruction of thirteen (13)

CWPFs §  Eight mobile units §  Five above-ground structures


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Syrian CW programme: Precursors Production

CW Precursors Production Facility


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Transfer of Chemicals Outside of Syria §  Syria packed and transferred chemicals from storage sites

to Port of Latakia by road, using equipment provided by the Assisting States Parties and UN

§  OPCW verified that all chemicals were inventoried, packed and moved to port of Latakia;

§  OPCW verified the leaving chemicals in Port of Latakia: §  Random sampling and on-site analysis for agent characterisation §  Verification of OPCW applied seals on drums, tanks, cylinders and

maritime containers used to carry chemicals §  Visual observation


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Inventory and Packing

HF tanks before

HF tanks after packing inside shipping container

HF cylinder sealed by OPCW with IMDG designation


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Transfer Operation: International Fleet §  Taiko:

§  Norwegian vessel carried category 1 and 2 chemicals to Finland and category two chemicals to US

§  ArkFutura §  Danish vessel carried category 1 chemicals (DF and HD)

for tarnsloading to Cape Ray. In addition, some category 1 chemicals and 2 chemicals to UK and Finland

§  Cape Ray: §  US vessel equipped with Field Deployable Hydrolysis

System to neutralise DF and HD on board


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Transfer of chemicals by International Fleet


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Chemicals Destruction Outside of Syria Destruction of chemicals was organised through in-kind contribution of some States Parties (US, UK and Germany) or in commercial disposal facilities (Finland and US)

§  Cape Ray-US vessel §  In-kind contribution by US §  Received and completed destruction of 20 tonnes of sulfur mustard

and 580 tonnes of DF §  Ekokem-Finland

§  Commercial facility selected by tender process §  Received and completed destruction of 320 tonnes of category 1 & 2

chemicals §  Destroying DF effluents resulted from Cape Ray operation (28%

progress) §  Ellesmere Port High Temperature Incinerator-UK

§  In-kind contribution by UK §  Received and completed destruction of 200 tonnes of category 1 & 2

chemicals;


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Cape Ray: Field Deployable Hydrolysis System


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Destruction outside of Syria §  Mexichem-UK

§  In-kind contribution by UK §  Will destroy 7 tonnes of HF by January 2015

§  Veolia ES Technical Solutions- US §  Commercial facility selected by tender process; §  Received 65 tonnes of category 2 chemicals §  Completed 65% of destruction

§  GEKA, Munster-Germany §  In-kind contribution by Germany §  Destroying HD effluents resulted from Cape Ray

operation (36% progress)


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Destruction of chemicals Progress

Total Amount

Amount Destroyed Destroyed (%)

1,046,981 kg 1,046,981 kg 100.0%

261,040 kg 231,856 kg 88.8%

1,308,021 kg 1,278,837 kg 97.8%

*

**

Total Amount

Amount Destroyed Destroyed (%)

Fluorinated effluents (DF) Ekokem, Finland 5,867,000 kg 1,617,320 kg 27.6%

Effluents containing Sulfur (HD) GEKA, Germany 333,520 kg 120,235 kg 36.1%

● Total amount comprises the quantities of Category 1 chemicals which have been transferred outside of Syria and which have already been destroyed in Syria (isopropanol).

● Total amount comprises the quantities of Category 2 chemicals transferred outside of Syria● Amount destroyed comprises the quantities of Category 2 chemicals destroyed by the commercial facilities

Total Category 2**

Total Chemicals (Cat. 1 and 2)

Effluents

Progress in Destruction of Syrian Chemicals and Related MaterialsAs of 1 Decmber 2014

Total Category 1*

● Amount destroyed comprises the quantities of Category 1 chemicals destroyed outside Syria (by the commercial facilities and on the Cape Ray) and destroyed in Syria (isopropanol);


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Conclusions §  OPCW since November 2013:

§  Inspected all Syrian Chemical Weapons Storage Facilities and verified that all were emptied

§  Verified that 100% of declared chemicals were either destroyed in Syria or removed form its territory

§  Verified that 98% of removed chemicals have been destroyed

§  Verified that all accessible Chemical Weapons Production Facilities were inspected and disarmed;

§  Verified that half of production facilities were destroyed and the other half are planned to be destroyed by 2015


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Complete Chemical Demilitarisation: Way Forward

§  OPCW continues verification of another fourteen (14) CWPFs yet to be destroyed by 2015 §  Five tunnels §  Seven hangers §  Two structures (not accessible currently due to their

location within the anti- government forces controlled areas)

§  Declarations Assessment Team §  Fact Finding Mission


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Challenges §  Internal

§  Unprecedented operation for OPCW §  Time constraints due to Executive Council expedited timelines §  Unforeseen situations made planning difficult §  Lack of some of required expertise and technical skills within TS §  Legal interpretations/ Treaty complications §  Lack of required policies

§  External §  Political pressure and debate between States Parties §  Security situation in Syria §  Public Opinion, NGOs, Social Media §  Logistics challenge §  International Maritime Regulations


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Thank You

removal and destruction of syrian chemical weapons together for a world free of chemical weapons...

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