October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law (Part 1)Posted on November 27, 2010 by Carlos Roberto Z. Lopez

Here are selected October 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Accion Publiciana; nature and purpose.  An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.  Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.  Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010.

Appeals; dismissal of appeal on purely technical ground not favored.   Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system.  Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254, the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.  In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage. Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010.

Appeal; dismissal of appeal on purely technical ground not favored.  As a final note, it is worthy to emphasize that the dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness.  The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities.  Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 164757, October 18, 2010.

Appeal; effect of failure to attach material and relevant documents to petition.  The foregoing preliminary matters thus clarified, we find that the CA cannot be faulted for dismissing the petition for review ZFMC filed pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules by way of appeal from the 30 June 2003 decision in O.P. Case No. 5613.   A perusal of said petition shows that, instead of formulating its own “concise statement of the facts and the issues involved” as required under Rule 43 of the Rules, ZFMC merely quoted the first ten (10) pages of the 25 June 1985 decision in MNR Case No. 4023.  Altogether oblivious of the missing third page of its copy of said decision and the relevant facts it resultantly omitted, ZFMC also appended copies of only the following documents to its petition, viz.: (a) the decision in O.P. Case No. 5613; (b) its motion

for reconsideration thereof; and, (c) the 30 September 2003 order denying said motion for lack of merit.  Despite being alerted to the deficiencies of its petition in the CA’s 30 January 2004 resolution directing the submission of the pleadings filed before the MNR and the Office of the President, ZFMC stubbornly maintained, that said documents were no longer necessary since the undisputed facts of the case were already narrated in the 25 June 1984 decision rendered in MNR Case No. 4023.

While it is admittedly the petitioner who decides at the outset which relevant documents will be appended to his petition, it has been held that the CA has the duty to ensure that “the submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory.  The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition.”  With the third page missing from ZFMC’s copy of the 25 June 1985 decision in MNR Case No. 4023 and the particulars it omitted as a consequence, we find that the CA’s directive for the submission of the pleadings the parties filed in said case and in O.P. Case No. 5613 was clearly necessary for the proper appreciation of the facts and the issues relevant to the petition before it.  Considering that a petitioner’s failure to attach material and relevant documents to his petition is a sufficient ground to dismiss it, the CA correctly dealt with ZFMC’s failure to comply with its directive by dismissing the petition pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43 of Rules which provides as follows:

Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

Still insisting on the superfluity of the submission of said pleadings in its 28 July 2004 motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, ZFMC had, of course, requested for reasonable time within which to comply with the CA’s earlier directive.  In the twenty-two months which elapsed from the filing of said motion up to the denial thereof in CA’s resolution dated 21 June 2006, however, the record shows that ZFMC miserably failed to submit the pleadings filed by the parties before the MNR and the Office of the President.  To our mind, ZFMC’s omission was fatal when viewed in the light of the above-discussed deficiencies of its petition and its added failure to submit copies of the very orders it sought to be affirmed by the CA, i.e., the BFD Director’s orders dated 8 May 1974 and 11 November 1974.  By and of itself, a party’s failure to comply with the CA’s directive without justifiable cause is also a ground for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (h), Rule 50 of the Rules.

Granted by the CA an extension of fifteen (15) days from 25 October, 2003 or until 9 November, 2003 within which to file its petition for review, it does not likewise help ZFMC’s cause any that it was only able to do so on 24 November 2003.  Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege.  Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory.  Zamboanga Forest Managers Corporation vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply Company, et al., G.R. No. 173342. October 13, 2010.

Appeal; effect of failure to file appellant’s brief on time; court’s discretion.  Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioners’ contention that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in

not dismissing the LBP’s appeal on the ground that the latter failed to file its Appellant’s Brief on time.

In The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the basic rules with respect to the issue of non-filing of appellant’s brief with the CA and its consequences, to wit:

(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant’s brief is filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the rules;

(2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial or mandatory;

(3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the appeal;

(4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the court’s leniency it is imperative that:

(a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality;

(b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice;

(c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;

(d) there is no contention that the appellees’ cause was prejudiced;

(e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.

(5)   In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and

(6)  Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate court’s indulgence except:

(a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;

(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or

(c) where the interests of justice so require.

In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Natonton v. Magaway is apropros:

As held by the Court in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), “(T)he expiration of the time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties. Even after the expiration of the time fixed for the filing of the brief, the reviewing court may grant an extension of time, at least where no motion to dismiss has been made. Late filing or service of briefs may be excused

where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by reason of the delay or where there is no contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced.”

Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant’s brief on time. However, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory. It is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically. The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant’s appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.

We observe that petitioners’ arguments are based on technical grounds. While indeed respondents did not file their brief seasonably, it was not mandatory on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss their appeal. As held by this Court in the above-cited cases, late filing of brief may be excused. In other words, the dismissal of respondents’ appeal on that ground is discretionary on the part of the Appellate Court.

Significantly, there is no showing that petitioners suffered a material injury or that their cause was prejudiced when respondents failed to submit their brief promptly. What is clear is that the latter incurred delay in the filing of their brief because when the deadline fell due, they were not yet represented by a new counsel.

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice, have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As applied to the instant case, in the language of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, technicalities “should give way to the realities of the situation.”

It is true that in the instant case, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss. However, the same was submitted only after the CA had already granted the LBP’s motion for extension of time to file its brief and such brief was already filed with the appellate court.  In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, this Court excused a delay of nine (9) days in the filing of a motion for extension of the appellant’s brief holding that:

In the higher interest of justice, considering that the delay in filing a motion for extension to file appellant’s brief was only for nine (9) days, and normally, the Court of Appeals would routinely grant such extension, and the appellant’s brief was actually filed within the period sought, the better course of action for the Court of Appeals was to admit appellant’s brief.

Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked when they arose from an honest mistake, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party. The Court can overlook the late filing of the motion for extension, if strict compliance with the rules would mean sacrificing justice to technicality.

Based on the abovequoted ruling, with more reason should the LBP’s delay in filing its second motion for extension be excused, because such delay was only for five days.  Moreover, the LBP was able to file its Appellant’s Brief within the second period of extension granted by the CA.

In the same manner, in Heirs of Victoriana Villagracia v. Equitable Banking Corporation, the petitioners therein failed to file their Appellant’s Brief with the CA within the reglementary period. They also failed to file their motion for extension before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. In relaxing the application of the procedural rules and, thus, allowing the appeal to be reinstated, the Court held as follows:

However, in the instant case, we are of the view that the ends of justice will be better served if it is determined on the merits, after full opportunity is given to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. It is far better to dispose of the case on the merits, which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be too strict with procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. The rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation because of the higher objective they seek, which is the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. In Republic v. Imperial [362 Phil. 466], the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., stressed that the filing of the appellant’s brief in appeals is not a jurisdictional requirement. But an appeal may be dismissed by the CA on grounds enumerated under Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The Court has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court.

In the case at bench, without touching on the merits of the case, there appears a good and efficient cause to warrant the suspension of the rules. Petitioners’ failure to file the appeal brief within the extended period may have been rendered excusable by force of circumstances. Petitioners had to change their counsel because he was appointed judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Their new counsel had to go over the six (6) volumes of the records of the case to be able to file an intelligent brief. Thus, a few days of delay in the filing of the motion for extension may be justified. In addition, no material injury was suffered by the appellees by reason of the delay in the filing of the brief.

Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.

In the instant case, the LBP’s delay in filing its Appellant’s Brief is justified by the fact that the Legal Services Department of the LBP underwent re-organization resulting in the retirement and transfer of the remaining lawyers, cases and personnel from one department to another as well as in the merger and dissolution of other departments within the LBP.  In its Manifestation, which petitioners did not dispute, the LBP claimed that by reason of the abovementioned re-organization, the lawyer handling the present case actually received a copy of the Resolution of the CA setting the deadline for the filing of its Appellant’s Brief only on May 21, 2001, four days after the expiration of the period granted by the CA. Besides, there is no indication that the LBP intended to delay the proceedings, considering that it only filed two motions for extension to file its brief.  As adverted to by this Court in De Leon, the dismissal of the LBP’s appeal,

together with the other appeals it had filed, will have a great impact not only on the LBP as the financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but also on the national treasury and the already depressed economic condition of our country.  In other words, the instant case is impressed with public interest. As such, and in the interest of substantial justice, the Court finds that the same must be decided on the merits.  Based on the foregoing discussions, the Court finds that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss respondent LBP’s appeal.  Jorge L. Tiangco, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 153998, October 6, 2010

Appeal; effect of failure to serve required number of copies of appellant’s brief; court’s discretion. Petitioners also assert that the LBP’s appeal filed with the CA should have been dismissed on the ground that the LBP failed to serve two copies of its Appellant’s Brief to petitioners. Petitioners argue that under Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the appellant is required to serve two copies of his Brief on the appellee and that, in relation with the said Rule, one of the grounds for dismissing an appeal under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the same Rules is the failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his Brief or Memorandum within the time provided by the Rules.  The Court is not persuaded.  Indeed, Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court requires the appellant to serve two copies of the appellant’s brief to the appellee. However, the failure to serve the required number of copies does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal. Thus, this Court held in Philippine National Bank v. Philippine Milling Co., Inc. that:

[P]ursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, “(a)n appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee” upon the ground, among others, of “(f)ailure of the appellant x x x to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief,” within the reglementary period. Manifestly, this provision confers a power and does not impose a duty. What is more, it is directory, not mandatory.

The CA has, under the said provision of the Rules of Court, discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss respondent’s appeal. Although said discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case, the presumption is that it has been so exercised.  It is incumbent upon herein petitioners, as actors in the case at bar, to offset this presumption. Yet, the records before the Court do not satisfactorily show that the CA has committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the LBP’s appeal.  There is no question that the LBP was only able to serve on petitioners one copy of its appellant’s brief. However, settled is the rule that a litigant’s failure to furnish his opponent with a copy of his appeal brief does not suffice to warrant dismissal of that appeal.  In such an instance, all that is needed is for the court to order the litigant to furnish his opponent with a copy of his brief.  In the instant case, with much less reason should the LBP’s appeal be dismissed, because petitioners were served with the LBP’s brief, albeit only one copy was given to them.  The Court would be dwelling too much on technicality if the appeal is dismissed simply on the ground that LBP failed to furnish petitioners with two copies, instead of only one, of its appeal brief. Indeed, there is no showing, and the Court finds none in the instant petition, that such procedural lapse on the part of the LBP resulted in material injury to the latter. Jorge L. Tiangco, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 153998, October 6, 2010

Appeal; factual findings of Court of Appeals generally binding on Supreme Court.  In asking us to determine which of the parties has a better right to possess the property, we are asked to resolve a factual issue, involving as it does the weighing and evaluation of the evidence

presented by the parties in the courts below. Generally, such an exercise is not appropriate in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to resolve only questions of law. Moreover, the factual findings of the CA, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

Since the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, we would normally be precluded from re-examining the factual circumstances of this case. However, it appears that the RTC and the CA, in concluding that Urbina has the right to lawfully eject the Modestos from the lot in question, have greatly misapprehended the facts of this case. Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010.

Appeal; factual findings of Court of Appeals and Intellectual Property Office (IPO).  Petitioners raise the factual issue of who the true owner of the mark is. As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts. However, such rule is subject to exceptions.

In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that:

We are very much aware that the rule to the effect that this Court is not a trier of facts admits of exceptions.  As we have stated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA:

[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA

are conclusive and binding on the Court.  However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, the records will show that the IPO and the CA made differing conclusions on the issue of ownership based on the evidence presented by the parties.  Hence, this issue may be the subject of this Court’s review.  E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. and Engracio Yap vs. Shen Dar Electricity Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010.

Appeal; factual findings of Court of Appeals and trial court entitled to great respect.  Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims of ownership and possession with a preponderance of evidence.  Petitioners now argue that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence.  They ask the Court to review the evidence of both parties, despite the CA’s finding that the trial court committed no error in appreciating the evidence presented during trial.  Hence, petitioners seek a review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition.  A question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.  “Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.”

Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari.  There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.  Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.  The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners’ claims.  Their factual findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.

In any case, even if petitioners’ arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of respondent’s father are well-taken, it will not suffice to defeat respondent’s claim over the subject property.  Even without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondent’s claims of prior possession and ownership were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial evidence.  We agree with the trial court’s observation that, in the ordinary course of things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest over the same.  The fact that respondent’s documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned

their right to the property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same. Moreover, respondent’s version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves.  The only difference is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the Smith family, while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission to petitioners.  Given the context under which the parties’ respective statements were made, the Court is inclined to believe the respondent’s version, as both the trial and appellate courts have concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.  Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010.

Appeal; factual findings of lower courts generally binding on Supreme Court.  Clearly, the petition disputes the factual findings of the CA, which, in turn, merely affirmed the factual findings of the RTC.  It is settled that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. Inquiry into the veracity of the CA’s factual findings and conclusions is not the function of the Supreme Court, because this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it our function to reexamine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties.  While it is true that there are well-established exceptions to this principle, petitioner in this case has failed to show that this case falls under one of such exceptions.  The RTC and the CA both found that respondent was not in default on the monthly payments of his loan obligation.  These findings are supported by the evidence on record.

At the time of foreclosure – April 1999 – respondent’s savings account deposits showed a balance of P852,913.26.  This was more than enough to cover whatever amortizations were due from him at that time. Moreover, the Amortization Schedule shows that, as of April 27, 1999, respondent’s loan account with the bank totaled only P269,023.38.  The same schedule shows that, by March 27, 2000, he had “0.00” balance left to pay, meaning he had paid his loan in full. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Pedro P. Buenaventura G.R. No. 176479, October 6, 2010

Appeal; factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies.  Next, petitioners challenge the CA’s reversal of the factual findings of the BLA that Shen Dar and not EYIS is the prior user and, therefore, true owner of the mark.  In arguing its position, petitioners cite numerous rulings of this Court where it was enunciated that the factual findings of administrative bodies are given great weight if not conclusive upon the courts when supported by substantial evidence.  We agree with petitioners that the general rule in this jurisdiction is that the factual findings of administrative bodies deserve utmost respect when supported by evidence.  However, such general rule is subject to exceptions.

In Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, the Court established the rule of conclusiveness of factual findings of the CA as follows:

Jurisprudence teaches us that “(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals x x x is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive.  As such this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.  This rule, however, is not without exceptions.” The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by this Court:

(1)  when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2)  when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(3)  when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6)  when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7)  when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;

(8)  when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and

(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Thereafter, in Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the above principle to factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:

Proceeding by analogy, the exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of factual findings of the Court of Appeals, enumerated in Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, can also be applied to those of quasi-judicial bodies x x x.

Here, the CA identified certain material facts that were allegedly overlooked by the BLA and the IPO Director General which it opined, when correctly appreciated, would alter the result of the case.  An examination of the IPO Decisions, however, would show that no such evidence was overlooked.  E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. and Engracio Yap vs. Shen Dar Electricity Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010.

Appeal; factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies (in this case, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission [CIAC]) accorded respect.  Despite petitioner’s attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the CIAC.  It insists that its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for respondent’s use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the supposed agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay based on the principle of unjust enrichment.  Petitioner also questions the amounts awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the work left unfinished by respondent.  As reiterated by the Court in IBEX International, Inc. v. Government Service Insurance System, to wit:

It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.  In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.

This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, we said:

In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process.

A perusal of the records would reveal that none of the aforementioned circumstances, which would justify exemption of this case from the general rule, are present here.  Such being the case, the Court, not being a trier of facts, is not duty-bound to examine, appraise and analyze anew the evidence presented before the arbitration body.

XXX XXX XXX

Again, these issues are purely factual and cannot be properly addressed in this petition for review on certiorari.  In Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Dynamic Planners and Construction Corp., it was emphasized that mathematical computations, the propriety of arbitral awards, claims for “other costs” and “abandonment” are factual questions.  Since the discussions of the CIAC and the CA in their respective Decisions show that its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reason why this Court should not accord finality to said findings.  Verily, to accede to petitioner’s request for a recalibration of its evidence, which had been thoroughly studied by both the CIAC and the CA would result in negating the objective of Executive Order No. 1008, which created an arbitration body to ensure the prompt and efficient settlement of disputes in the construction industry.   Thus, the Court held in Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, that:

x x x The Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that such body had “misapprehended facts” and will not pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they might be as “legal questions.” The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose the arbitrators themselves; they must have had

confidence in such arbitrators. The Court will not, therefore, permit the parties to relitigate before it the issues of facts previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal, save only where a clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual conclusions, the Arbitral Tribunal committed an error so egregious and hurtful to one party as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction.

As discussed above, there is nothing in the records that point to any grave abuse of discretion committed by the CIAC. Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. vs. RRN Incorporated, G.R. No. 172525, October 20, 2010.

Appeal; modes of appeal from decisions of regional trial court.  In Murillo v. Consul, we had the opportunity to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) by petition for review under Rule 42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

XXX XXX XXX

Here, petitioner’s appeal does not only involve a question of law. Aside from the trial court’s ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint, petitioner likewise questioned the other basis for the trial court’s ruling, which refers to previously decided cases allegedly upholding with finality the ownership of the Malabanans over the disputed property. As correctly argued by petitioner, the question of whether the ownership of the Malabanans has in fact been sustained with finality is factual in nature as it requires the presentation of evidence.  Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.  Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelo B. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010

Appeal; period to appeal; “fresh period rule.” Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.  In Sumiran v. Damaso, we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period rule:

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, to wit:

Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the present Petition was already pending before us. x x x.

x x x x

With the advent of the “fresh period rule” parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.

The “fresh period rule” is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken “within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.” The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,”      x x x.

x x x x

The “fresh period rule” finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted — from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of “final order” appealed from.

Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of “fresh period rule,” expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive

operation of statutes. The “fresh period rule” is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger of violating anyone else’s rights.

XXX XXX XXX

In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003.  Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution.  The RTC-Branch 227 denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on February 20, 2004.  On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal.  Clearly, under the fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610.  Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010.

Appeal; period to appeal; “fresh period rule;” retroactivity.  Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity:

The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus:

The determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. (Emphases supplied.)

Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010.

October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law (Part II)Posted on November 28, 2010 by Carlos Roberto Z. Lopez

Certiorari; improper remedy.  A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order, or resolution of the CA, as in this case, may file before this Court a verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure within 15 days from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from. Petitioners, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari under

Rule 65, an improper remedy. By availing of a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the petition merits outright dismissal.  Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. v.. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010

Certiorari; not available to set aside denial of motion to dismiss in absence of grave abuse of discretion.  An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By “grave abuse of discretion” is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. In the instant case, Global did not properly substantiate its claim of arbitrariness on the part of the trial court judge that issued the assailed orders denying the motion to dismiss. In a petition for certiorari, absent such showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or ill motive in the disposition of the trial judge in the case, we are constrained to uphold the court’s ruling, especially because its decision was upheld by the CA.  Global Business Holdings, Inc. vs. Surecomp Software B.V., [G.R. No. 173463. October 13, 2010]

Certiorari; period to file.  The petition before the CA was filed out of time. A perusal of the allegations in the subject petition reveals that though it sought the nullification of the February 2, 2004 Decision of the RTC, what it questioned was the RTC’s resolve to render a judgment before trial pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.  Said section provides,

Sec. 4. Judgment before pre-trial. – If, after submission of the pre-trial briefs, the court determines that, upon consideration of the pleadings, the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the parties, a judgment may be rendered, the court may order the parties to file simultaneously their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from receipt of the order. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment, either full or otherwise, not later than ninety (90) days from the expiration of the period to file the memoranda.

As correctly pointed out by the Farmix Group, it is very clear that the issues raised in the subject petition pertained to previous orders of the RTC – the November 12 and December 3, 2003 Orders – submitting the case for decision.

The November 12, 2003 Order was received by WINCORP on November 13, 2003. It then filed a Manifestation and Motion adopting the UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration of said order and even raised additional arguments. Thereafter, the RTC issued the December 3, 2003 Order denying UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration but there was no mention of WINCORP’s manifestation and motion.

Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies specifically prohibits the filing of motions for reconsideration, to wit:

Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. – The following pleadings are prohibited:

(1) Motion to dismiss;

(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial;

(4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and

(5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

With the above proscription, the RTC in the first place should not have issued the December 3, 2003 Order denying the UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration, which WINCORP adopted. The remedy of an aggrieved party like WINCORP is to file a petition for certiorari within sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed order and not to file a motion for reconsideration, the latter being a prohibited pleading. Here, WINCORP should have filed the petition for certiorari before the CA on or before January 12, 2004.  It was, however, filed only on February 13, 2004. With that, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for being filed late.

Even if the sixty (60)-day period will be reckoned from WINCORP’s receipt of the December 3, 2003 Order, the petition for certiorari was still filed out of time since it should have been filed on or before February 2, 2004.

This Court can only conclude that WINCORP filed the petition for certiorari supposedly assailing the February 2, 2004 Decision as a subterfuge to make it appear that it was filed on time when in truth it was assailing an earlier order, the period for which to assail the same has long elapsed.  Westmont Investment Corporation vs. Farmix Fertilizer Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 165876, October 4, 2010

Certiorari; requirement that respondents be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1.  Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. etc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno etc., et al. Vs.

Hon. Eduardo Ermit., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.  vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines etc. et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461.October 5, 2010

Consolidation.  At this juncture, considering that both the Receivership Case and the Certiorari Petition have yet to be resolved, we now come to terms with the central issue of whether the consolidation of these cases is proper under the circumstances.  Consolidation of cases is governed by Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which materially states:

Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

It is well recognized that consolidation of cases avoids multiplicity of suits, guards against oppression and abuse, prevents delay, clears congested court dockets, simplifies the work of the courts and seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to litigants.  Generally, consolidation applies only to cases pending before the same judge and not to cases pending in different branches of the same court or in different courts.

Yet in appropriate instances and in the interest of justice, cases pending in different branches of the court or in different courts may be consolidated, consistent with the rule in our jurisdiction that leans towards permitting consolidation of cases whenever possible and irrespective of the diversity of the issues for resolution.  Hence, consolidation of cases is proper when the actions involve the same reliefs or the same parties and basically the same issues, or when there is real need to forestall the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered in the cases, provided that the measure will not give one party an undue advantage over the other, or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

Indeed, the objectives of judicial economy and simplicity sit well with the prospect of consolidating the two subject cases.  We take note that the Certiorari Petition in this case is only a pending incident in the Receivership Case, which is the main action and in which a motion for the recall of the April 30, 2000 Order of the hearing officer is still awaiting resolution before Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati, where the case was transferred.   Thus, the outcome of the Certiorari Petition will definitely have a bearing on the Receivership Case, involving as they do the same focal issue of whether or not Excap had been found in possession of Bancapital’s assets and requiring substantially the same evidence on that matter.  In other words, conducting separate trials of the cases would only entail substantial duplication of time and effort not only by the parties but also by the courts and could terminate in the two courts rendering conflicting decisions.  Bank of Commerce vs. Hon. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, etc., et al., G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010.

Contempt; indirect contempt. Indirect contempt of court is governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.-After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as

may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. x x x.

Do the acts of respondents Enriquez and Sia in filing a motion for partial execution; of LA Calanza in granting the writ of execution and applying or not applying established jurisprudence; and of Sheriff Paredes in serving the notice of sale of the real property owned by petitioner fall under the above enumeration? We answer in the negative.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. However, such power should be exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive, principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect, without which the administration of justice will falter or fail. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. It is true that, at the time of the filing by Enriquez and Sia of the motion for the partial execution of the LA decision which directed their reinstatement, the decision had already been reversed by the NLRC, and such reversal was affirmed by the CA. The case was then on appeal to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We find that their motion

for partial execution was a bona fide attempt to implement what they might have genuinely believed they were entitled to in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence. This is especially true in the instant case where the means of livelihood of the dismissed employees was at stake. Any man in such an uncertain and economically threatened condition would be expected to take whatever measures are available to ensure a means of sustenance for himself and his family. Clearly, Enriquez and Sia were merely pursuing a claim which they honestly believed was due them. Their act is far from being contumacious.

On the other hand, LA Calanza, on motion of Enriquez and Sia, issued the writ of execution considering that at the time of the application of the writ, this Court had yet to decide G.R. No. 172812. LA Calanza opined that so long as there is no finality yet of the decision reversing a ruling of the LA awarding reinstatement, the same should be enforced. This was how he interpreted this Court’s pronouncements in Roquero and Zamora; that “even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.” But as we clearly discussed in Bago v. National Labor Relations Commission, while it is true that the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision is immediately executory, the reversal thereof by the NLRC becomes final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the parties. That the CA may take cognizance of and resolve a petition for the nullification of the NLRC decision on jurisdictional and due process considerations does not affect the statutory finality of the NLRC decision. It then logically follows that, at the time of the application for the writ ¾ since the Court eventually sustained the NLRC and the CA decisions in G.R. No. 172812 ¾ no issue of payroll reinstatement may be considered at all after the reversal of the LA decision by the NLRC. Still, the erroneous issuance of the writ of execution by LA Calanza can only be deemed grave abuse of discretion which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari and not a petition for indirect contempt. No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

Finally, Sheriff Paredes, in serving the notice of sale, was only performing his duty pursuant to the writ of execution. No matter how erroneous the writ was, it was issued by LA Calanza and was addressed to him as the sheriff, commanding him to collect from petitioner the amount due Enriquez and Sia. In the event he failed to collect the amount, he was authorized to cause the satisfaction of the same on the movable and immovable properties of petitioner not exempt from execution. Thus, any act performed by Sheriff Paredes pursuant to the aforesaid writ cannot be considered contemptuous. At the time of the service of the notice of sale, there was no order from any court or tribunal restraining him from enforcing the writ. It was ministerial duty for him to implement it.

To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Labor Arbiter Roderick Joseph Calanza, et al., G.R. No. 180699. October 13, 2010.

Counsel; withdrawal of appearance.  Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure in case of withdrawal of counsel.  It states:

RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Sec. 26.  Change of attorneys. – An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court.  He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

Under the first sentence of Section 26, the withdrawal of counsel with the conformity of the client is completed once the same is filed in court.  No further action thereon by the court is needed other than the mechanical act of the Clerk of Court of entering the name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving written notice thereof to the adverse party.

In this case, it is uncontroverted that the withdrawal of respondent Samsung’s original counsel, V.E. Del Rosario and Partners on 19 October 2000, was with the client’s consent.  Thus, no approval thereof by the trial court was required because a court’s approval is indispensable only if the withdrawal is without the client’s consent.  It being daylight clear that the withdrawal of respondent Samsung’s original counsel was sufficient as the same carried the stamp of approval of the client, the notice of mediation sent to respondent Samsung’s original counsel was ineffectual as the same was sent at the time when such counsel had already validly withdrawn its representation.  Corollarily, the absence of respondent Samsung during the scheduled mediation conference was excusable and justified.  Therefore, the trial court erroneously dismissed Civil Case No. 97-86265.  Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010.

Counterclaims; permissive counterclaims; improper dismissal even if docket fees are due and unpaid.  Be that as it may, the trial court was incorrect in dismissing Bayerphil’s counterclaim for non-payment of docket fees.   All along, Bayerphil has never evaded payment of the docket fees on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory.  It has always argued against Calibre’s contention that its counterclaim was permissive ever since the latter opposed Bayerphil’s motion before the RTC to implead the Sebastian spouses.  Lastly, Bayerphil’s belief was reinforced by Judge Claravall’s October 24, 1990 Resolution when she denied Calibre’s motion to strike out Bayerphil’s counterclaim.  Thus:

With respect to the motion to strike out the counterclaim, the Rejoinder and Reply of CALIBRE mentioned two reasons to support it.  These are: 1) that the counterclaim is not against the opposing party only, and 2) that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is totally unrelated to the latter’s claim against the Sebastian spouses because they are “not the same.”

To resolve the issues abovementioned, the elements of a compulsory counterclaim are thus given:

A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances are present: 1) that it arises out of the, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, 2) that it does

not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and 3) that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. (Javier vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 605)

The provisions of Section 8, Rule 6 must necessarily be mentioned also.  To wit:

Sec. 8, Rule 6.  Counterclaim or cross-claim in the answer. – The answer may contain any counterclaim or crossclaim which a party may have at the time against the opposing party or a co-defendant provided, that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim and can, if the presence of third parties is essential for its adjudication, acquire jurisdiction of such parties.

The rules and jurisprudence do not require that the parties to the counterclaim be the original parties only.  In fact, the presence of third parties is allowed, the only provision being their capacity to be subjected under the court’s jurisdiction.  As regards the nature of the claims of the parties, neither is it required that they be of the same nature, only that they arise from the same transaction or occurrence.

It cannot be gainsaid that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.  Rules on the payment of filing fees have already been relaxed:

1.  It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2.  The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3.  Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

It is a settled doctrine that “although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment x x x should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive period.”  “The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed.  It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period.  Chapter 3, Title V, Book III of the Civil Code is the principal law governing prescription of actions.”

In accordance with the aforementioned rules on payment of docket fees, the trial court upon a determination that Bayerphil’s counterclaim was permissive, should have instead ordered

Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees for the permissive counterclaim, giving it reasonable time but in no case beyond the reglementary period.  At the time Bayerphil filed its counter-claim against Calibre and the spouses Sebastian without having paid the docket fees up to the time the trial court rendered its Decision on December 6, 1993, Bayerphil could still be ordered to pay the docket fees since no prescription has yet set in.  Besides, Bayerphil should not suffer from the dismissal of its case due to the mistake of the trial court.  Calibre Traders Inc., Mario Sison Sebastian and Minda Blanco Sebastian vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010.

October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law (Part III)Posted on November 29, 2010 by Carlos Roberto Z. Lopez

Counterclaims; tests to determine if compulsory.  Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner’s counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA’s view that petitioner’s counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner’s claim for the recovery of rentals.  The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC’s rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor.  Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al., G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010

Docket fees; GSIS not exempt from payment.  Petitioner [GSIS] further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same, considering petitioner’s exemption from all kinds of fees.

In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the

GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress.  Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.

In said case, the Court ruled that:

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence − fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al., G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 201 0

Ejectment; forcible entry and unlawful detainer distinguished.  Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.  In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1.  Who may institute proceedings, and when.– Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding

or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.  In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building “after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.”  Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October   11, 2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer.  An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies with the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand; and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.  Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer; allegations constitute case of unlawful detainer.  In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer:

x x x x

3.  Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land involved in the instant case covered by TCT No. 222603 containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which property was place under community mortgage program (CMP);

4.  Other defendants in the instant case are all member and officers of defendant AMARA who, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth entered into the premises herein and constructed their temporary houses and office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from using the premises thus, depriving the same of its prior possession thereof;

5.  On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort defendants, in conspiracy and collusion with each other, defendants as representative of Heirs of Antonio and Hermogenes Rodriquez, the alleged owner of the property at bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff, lodge before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, seeking to annul plaintiff title;

6.  Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless, baseless and malicious suit, plaintiff demanded defendants to vacate the premises, but the latter pleaded with the former to be given a one (1) year period within which to look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas of defendants, coupled with plaintiff’s benevolence was repeatedly extended by said plaintiffs tolerance of occupancy thereof, but under such terms and conditions.  Due to failure to comply with their undertaking despite repeated demands therefor plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter upon defendants;

7.  Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants propose to become members of plaintiff, as qualification to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the CMP, to which plaintiff agreed and tolerated defendants possession by giving the same a period until the month of December 1999, to comply with all the requirements pre-requisite to the availing of the CMP benefits but failed and despite repeated demands therefor, thus, the filing of a complaint with the Baranggay and the issuance of the certificate to file action dated February 8, 2000;

8.  As time is of the essence, and the fact that the defendants are mere intruders or usurpers who have no possessory right whatsoever over the land illegally occupied by them, trifling technicalities that would tend to defeat the speedy administration of justice formal demand is not necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No. 24910 R Feb. 7, 1964) however, to afford a sufficient period of time within which to vacate the premises peacefully another oral and formal demands were made upon the same to that effect, and demolish the temporary office and houses they constructed on plaintiff’s property and instead defendants again, as representative to alleged “Estate of Julian Tallano” filed a complaint for ejectment against plaintiffs former President, Hon. Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as civil case no. 4119, lodged, before branch 11 of this Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused to peacefully turn over the property they intruded upon in fact they even dared plaintiff to file a case against them boasting that nobody can order them to vacate the premises;

9.  Defendants’ letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged actual receipt of plaintiffs two (2) formal demands letters.  Thus, “the issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman” dated September 25, 2000;

10.  As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of the undersigned counsel in order to immediately institute the instant suit for which services plaintiff agreed to pay the amount of P35,000.00 plus P3,500.00 per court appearance;

x x x x

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners’ stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA.  Petitioners’ continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP.  Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated.  The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land.  Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.  Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.  Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer; complaint sufficiently alleges cause of action for unlawful detainer. Based on the foregoing, we have held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4)  within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In this case, respondent’s allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the MeTC over the subject matter. Thus, we accord respect to the CA’s findings, to wit:

A review of the Complaint readily reveals that land titles were issued in the name of the respondent after it purchased the land referred to as the Bayanihan Compound through the

Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.  The lots allocated to the petitioners formed part of the Bayanihan Compound which they received as members/beneficiaries of the respondent.  However, their refusal to pay the monthly amortizations despite demands resulted in their expulsion as members and loss of recognition as beneficiaries of the lots in question.  Even when the case was referred to the barangay, no settlement was reached.  Petitioners likewise did not conform to respondent’s demand to vacate the premises and return its possession.  As such, respondent sought to recover possession of the said lots by filing a case for ejectment within a year after final demand.

Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer; sole issue is physical or material possession of property, independent of claim of ownership.  As to petitioners’ argument that MAHA’s title is void for having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised.  In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.  Since the only issue involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate action.  Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010

Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; notice   requirement .  In Olizon v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded on the purpose for giving notice of the foreclosure sale; and if such purpose could be attained by publication alone, then the absence of actual posting should not nullify the sale.  Thus:

We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects than posting on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than that posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its location may be, which caters only to a limited few.  Hence, the publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law.  By such publication, a reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale.  Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property.  If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.

In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the sale through the newspaper publication.  There is completely no showing that the property was sold for a price far below its value as to insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing or

even an intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and respondent bank.  This being so, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, will not justify the setting aside of the sale.

Olizon squarely applies in this case.  It is not disputed that the Notice of Sale was duly published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks.  Respondents did not allege, much less prove, any mistake or omission in the published Notice of Sale calculated to deter or mislead bidders, depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price; or sale of the mortgaged properties for a price far below their value as to insinuate bad faith; or collusion between Notary Public Magpantay, who conducted the sale, and petitioner.  Hence, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, shall not justify the setting aside of the foreclosure sale.  Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.

Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; requirement that debtor be in default.  Foreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation.  It is a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when the debt remains unpaid at the time it is due.  In a real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, to have the property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to the obligation.  RCBC’s own Amortization Schedule readily shows the applicability of Article 1176 of the Civil Code, which states:

Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the interest, shall give rise to the presumption that the said interest has been paid.

The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been paid.

Respondent’s passbooks indicate that RCBC continued to receive his payments even after it made demands for him to pay his past due accounts, and even after the auction sale.   RCBC cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the deposits were “not withdrawn.” It is not respondent’s fault that RCBC did not withdraw the money he deposited. His obligation under the mortgage agreement was to deposit his payment in the savings account he had opened for that purpose, in order that RCBC may debit the amount of his monthly liabilities therefrom. He complied with his part of the agreement.  This bolsters the conclusion of the CA that respondent had no unpaid installments and was not in default as would warrant the application of the acceleration clause and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale of the property.   Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Pedro P. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 176479, October 6, 2010

Factual findings of administrative agencies generally accorded respect   and even finality .  Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally respected and even accorded finality because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling under their specialized jurisdiction. Given that the LMB is the administrative agency tasked with assisting the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the management and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, we defer to its specialized knowledge on these matters.   Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos

Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010.

Injunction; preliminary injunction; nature of remedy and evidence relied on.  It must also be pointed out that there was a preliminary issue – that of the parties’ respective petitions for injunction – that had to be determined before the resolution of the main case. When the case was transferred from the SEC to the RTC, only the matter of the petitions for preliminary injunctions had been heard and submitted for resolution. The hearings to resolve the petition to nullify the Foundation’s Amended By-laws were yet to be held.

An injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits of the case.  A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence.  The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete, for only a “sampling” is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.

An order granting a preliminary injunction is not a final resolution or decision disposing of the case.  It is based on a preliminary determination of the status quo and on petitioner’s entitlement to the Writ.  Thus, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated. There may be vital facts to be presented at trial which may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ.  The trial court needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to put the main controversy to rest.   As such, even as respondents claim that the RTC correctly ruled that the Amended By-laws are not valid, they are still contesting the latter’s finding on the number of qualified apostles.  This only further underscores the need for trial to determine which of the parties’ claims are true and relevant.   There are other questions raised that cannot be answered in the present petition, and nothing less than a full-blown trial is needed in order to test the conflicting claims of the parties.  Manuel D. Recto, et al. vs. Bishop Federico O. Escaler, S.J., et al., G.R. No. 173179, October 20, 2010.

Judgment; finality.  Elemental is the rule of procedure that the nature of a pleading is to be determined by the averments in it and not by its title. Hence, while petitioner’s Motion (to Recall the April 19, 2000 Order) was so denominated, it is not difficult to see that the remedy it was seeking was actually a reconsideration of the dismissal of the Receivership Case.  This Motion, to reiterate, does not appear to have been acted upon by the hearing officer at any time during the interim that the subject order was issued and the two cases were eventually transferred to Branches 138 and 142 of the RTC of Makati.   In particular, when the Receivership Case was transferred to Branch 138, petitioner’s Motion to Recall was still a pending incident in the case.  With the transfer of the records to the said court, the accompanying duty to resolve the motion likewise had devolved on the said court.  In other words, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the Receivership Case has not yet attained finality, as indeed the motion seeking reconsideration of its dismissal had not been acted upon by the hearing officer himself and had not yet, in fact, been acted upon by Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati.  Moreover, the November 23, 2000 Order of the SEC En Banc reads in full:

Under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Securities and Exchange Commission, parties in an intra-corporate dispute are allowed to file a petition for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders of the Hearing Officer based on grave abuse of discretion.  Such remedy was allowed by the

Commission in order for it to have oversight power over the acts of the Hearing Officer.  With the passage [of] Republic Act 8799 otherwise known as the “Securities Regulation Code,” the jurisdiction of the Commission over intra-corporate dispute was transferred to the regular courts.  With the transfer of this function to the regular courts, the oversight power of the Commission en banc over the acts of their Hearing Officers, has now become functus officius. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari herein shall no longer be acted upon by the Commission and denied due course.  A copy of this order, together with the records of the case, [is] hereby forwarded to the Regional Trial Court where the main case shall be heard for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.

As can be gleaned from the aforequoted order, the SEC En Banc has chosen not to act on the Certiorari Petition which principally assailed the October 22 and December 16, 1999 Orders of Hearing Officer Bacalla respectively accepting the Committee Report and denying reconsideration, precisely because it acknowledged that it has lost jurisdiction over the petition as a result of the supervening transfer of jurisdiction over the case to the trial court.   This is evident in its recognition of the fact that by virtue of the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, it has thereby also lost the oversight power to correct abuses of discretion in the issuance of interlocutory orders by its hearing officers.  More to the point, it likewise ordered the transfer of the records of the case to the trial court where it may supposedly be heard for further consideration.  On these observations, it is clear that this Order could not have written finis to the Certiorari Petition for the basic reason that the SEC En Banc, at that given point, could no longer validly act on the same —much less to rule on the merits of the petition.  Bank of Commerce vs. Hon. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, etc., et al. G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010.

Judgment; finality.  Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court – not even the Supreme Court – has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.

Admittedly, the rule that a judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified admits of exceptions in special cases.  In filing the petition at hand, however, ZFMC has once again hindered the proper appreciation of the facts of the case by failing to submit copies of the BFD Director’s orders dated 8 May 1974 and 11 November 1974, a complete copy of the 25 June 1985 decision in MNR Case No. 4023 and the pleadings the parties filed before the MNR and the Office of the President. Even if we were, therefore, to excuse ZFMC’s procedural lapses before the CA, there would still be a paucity of bases for the reversal of the 30 June 2003 decision in O.P. Case No. 5613.  Zamboanga Forest Managers Corporation vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply Company, et al.,  G.R. No. 173342. October 13, 2010.

Judgment; finality; party cannot re-litigate claims already resolved with finality.  In their Memorandum, respondents’ claim that CMTC cannot purchase real estate or invest its funds in any purpose other than its primary purpose for which it was organized in the absence of a corporate board resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. T-76183, issued in favor of the CMTC, should be nullified; the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel have regularly performed their official duty when they conducted the public bidding; Fernando,

as former owner of the subject property and former member of the GSIS, has the preemptive right to repurchase the foreclosed property.  These additional averments cannot be taken cognizance by the Court, because they were substantially respondents’ arguments in their petition for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and docketed as G.R. No. 156609. Records show that said petition was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated April 23, 2003, for petitioners’ (respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. [The petition was also denied for lack of proof of the petition on the adverse party and its failure to attach the affidavit of service of copy of the petition on the adverse parties. (Id. at 190.)] Said resolution became final and executory on June 9, 2003.  Respondents’ attempt to re-litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with finality by the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be allowed.  Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al., G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010

Judgment; immutability; exceptions.  As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.  In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.

Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Galman v. Sandiganbayan,  Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications Commission, and Republic v. de los Angeles, we reversed our judgment on the second motion for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations Commission,  we did so on a third motion for reconsideration.  In Cathay Pacific v. Romillo  and Cosio v. de Rama, we modified or amended our ruling on the second motion for reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals, Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, Manotok IV v. Barque, and Barnes v. Padilla, we recalled entries of judgment after finding that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice.  In Barnes, we said:

x  x  x  Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.  Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle.  The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain be “just” when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed?  To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor.  It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these standards have been met.  Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.  As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of just compensation have been settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled jurisprudence on the issue alone accords this case primary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of grounds, all the rulings we have established in the past.  More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved – agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century.  This reform program and its objectives would suffer a major setback if the government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in implementing the needed reforms.  Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda that the Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and abuse, to the idea of revolution.  This linkage, to our mind, remains valid even if the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of the agrarian reform program.

As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice.  As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.

x  x  x  x

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.

Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, we had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the

other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, “should give way to the realities of the situation.

We made the same recognition in Barnes, on the underlying premise that a court’s primordial and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment.

Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and erroneous conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn the assailed Resolution. We shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the rectification, we shall let the opportunity pass.  Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010.

Judgment on the pleadings. At the outset, we lay stress on the Court’s policy that cases should be promptly and expeditiously resolved. The Rules of Court seeks to abbreviate court procedure in order to allow the swift disposition of cases. Specifically, special strategies like demurrer to evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and summary judgment were adopted to attain this avowed goal. Full-blown trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered on the basis of the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions of the parties.  In the instant petition, the Court is confronted with the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Makati City RTC. Petitioners claim such adjudication on said papers and attachments is proper.  The petitioner’s position is impressed with merit.

Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that “where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.”  Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore, based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the annexes, if any, without consideration of any evidence aliunde.  When what is left are not genuinely issues requiring trial but questions concerning the proper interpretation of the provisions of some written contract attached to the pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is proper.

From the pleadings, the parties admitted the following facts:

(1) EIB is the stockbroker of petitioners.

(2) Petitioners and EIB entered into a SDAA, Annex “1” of EIB’s answer, which governed the relationship between petitioners as clients and EIB as stockbroker. Sec. 7 of the SDAA provides:

7. Lien

The client agrees that all monies and/or securities and/or all other property of the Client (plaintiffs) in the Company’s (defendant) custody or control held from time to time shall be subject to a general lien in favour of Company for the discharge of all or any indebtedness of the Client to the Company. The Client shall not be entitled to withdraw any monies or securities held by the Company pending the payment in full to the Company of any indebtedness of the Client to the Company. The company shall be entitled at any time and without notice to the Client to retain, apply, sell or dispose of all or any of the [client’s] property if any such obligation or liability is not discharged in full by the client when due or on demand in

or towards the payment and discharge of such obligation or liability and the Company shall be under no duty to the client as to the price obtained or any losses or liabilities incurred or arising in respect of any such sale or disposal. Subject to the relevant law and regulation on the matter, the client hereby authorizes the Company, on his/its behalf, at any time and without notice to the client’s property if any such obligation or liability is not discharged.  (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the SDAA that all monies, securities, and other properties of petitioners in EIB’s custody or control shall be subject to a general lien in favor of the latter solely for the discharge of all or any indebtedness to EIB.

(3)  From June 2003 to March 2004, petitioners, through their broker, EIB, bought 60,790,000 KKP shares of stock at the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE).

(4)  On various dates in July and August 2003, petitioners bought 16,180,000 DMCI shares of stock through EIB likewise at the PSE, while 16,000,000 DMCI shares of petitioners were transferred to EIB by Westlink Global Equities, Inc. Thus, a total of 32,180,000 DMCI shares of stock owned by petitioners were placed in the custody or control of EIB.

(5)  On April 1, 2004, petitioners ordered the sale of 60,790,000 KPP shares to any buyer at the price of PhP 0.14 per share. The KPP shares were eventually sold at PhP 0.14 per share to interested buyers.

(6)  Petitioners failed to reacquire or buy back the KPP shares at PhP 0.18 per share after 30 days from date of transaction.

(7)  As petitioners failed to deliver funds to EIB to honor the buy-back obligation, not to mention the cash account obligations of petitioners in the amount of PhP 70 million to EIB, EIB had no recourse but to sell the DMCI shares of petitioners to reacquire the KPP shares.

(8) Thus, on various dates in June 2004, EIB, without petitioners’ knowledge and consent, sold petitioners’ 32,180,000 DMCI shares at the controlling market price. EIB later sent sales confirmation receipts to petitioners regarding the sale of their DMCI shares, said receipts containing the common notice, which reads:

All transaction[s] are subject to the rules and customs of the Exchange and its Clearing House. It is agreed that all securities shall secure all my/our liabilities to e.securities and is authorized in their discretion to sell all or any of them without notice to we/us whenever in the opinion of e.securities my/our account is not properly secured.  (Emphasis supplied.)

(9)  EIB sent statements of accounts to petitioners showing the sale of the DMCI shares which uniformly contained the following notice:

This statement will be considered correct unless we receive notice in writing of any exceptions within 5 days from receipt. Please address all correspondence concerning exceptions to our OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT. Kindly notify us in writing of any changes in your address.

(10)  On January 12, 2005, petitioners wrote EIB demanding the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI shares.

(11)  On January 12, 2005, EIB rejected petitioners demand for the return of the DMCI shares, as those were already sold to cover the buy back of the KPP shares.

(12)  Petitioners’ prayer is the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI shares by EIB to them.

The principal issue in petitioners’ complaint is whether EIB can be compelled to return DMCI shares to petitioners based on the alleged unauthorized disposal or sale of said shares to comply with the buy back of the KKP shares. The threshold issue raised in the answer is the lack of jurisdiction over the complaint due to the alleged nonpayment of the proper docket fees. Affirmative defenses presented are that EIB disposed of the DMCI shares pursuant to Sec. 7 of the SDAA, and the notices of sale, ratification and laches.

Based on the admissions in the pleadings and documents attached, the Court finds that the issues presented by the complaint and the answer can be resolved within the four corners of said pleadings without need to conduct further hearings. As explained by the Court in Philippine National Bank v. Utility Assurance & Surety Co., Inc., when what remains to be done is the proper interpretation of the contracts or documents attached to the pleadings, then judgment on the pleadings is proper. In the case at bar, the issue of whether the sale of DMCI shares to effectuate the buy back of the KKP shares is valid can be decided by the trial court based on the SDAA, Notices of Sale, Sales Confirmation Receipts, the letters of the parties, and other appendages to the pleadings in conjunction with the allegations or admissions contained in the pleadings without need of trial. The Makati City RTC is, therefore, correct in issuing the October 18, 2005 Resolution granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The CA nullified the October 18, 2005 Resolution on the ground that there are other issues that must be resolved during a full-blown trial, ratiocinating this way:

While it may be true that the Appellant has already admitted that the sale of the DMCI shares was for the purpose of buying back the KPP shares and that such admission strengthened Appellees’ claim that the sale of the DMCI shares is a nullity, there were other issues raised by the Appellant that can only be threshed out during a full blown trial, viz: the average price of the KPP shares of stock, the scope of the collaterals stated in the Notices of Sale and the monetary claims of the Appellant against the Appellees.

To the mind of the Court, these matters are not genuinely triable issues but actually minor issues or mere incidental questions that can be resolved by construing the statements embodied in the appendages to the pleadings. The facts that gave rise to the side issues are undisputed and were already presented to the trial court rendering trial unnecessary.  Pacific Rehouse Corporation, et al. vs. EIB Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010.

Jurisdiction; bar by laches. For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998.  They maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples.

As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings.  This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the

agreement of the parties.  Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint.

An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence.  In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction.  Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.” Wisely, some cases have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.

In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed to do so.  Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  When the case reached the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein.  It was only after receiving the appellate court’s adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration.  The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.

In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot be ignored.  If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.  At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC.  They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.  When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.  Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted by petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza.  In the cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA.  They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the IPRA.  Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial court’s jurisdiction.

When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom.  In their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL’s resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the enactment of IPRA.  But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial court’s ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts — that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again.  This practice cannot be allowed.  Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ theory

about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.  Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010.

Jurisdiction; determined by allegations in complaint.  Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend on the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. Neither can it be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. The test for determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.  Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs.. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010

Jurisdiction; jurisdiction by estoppel. Considering the foregoing discussion, we find no need to remand the case to the trial court for the resolution of Bayerphil’s counterclaim.  In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, we discussed the rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not, thus:

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter.  Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court).  This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146).  Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.  In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

“The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.  If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel’ (5 C.J.S., 861-863).  However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had jurisdiction.  Here, the principle of estoppel applies.  The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.”

In this case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the counterclaim although it erroneously ordered its automatic dismissal.  As already discussed, the trial court should have instead directed Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable time.  Even then, records show that the trial court heard the counterclaim although it again erroneously found the same to be unmeritorious.  Besides, it must also be mentioned that Bayerphil was lulled into believing that its counterclaim was indeed compulsory and thus there was no need to pay docket fees by virtue of Judge Claravall’s October 24, 1990 Resolution.  Petitioners also actively participated in the adjudication of the counterclaim which the trial court adjudge to be unmeritorious.  Calibre Traders Inc., Mario Sison Sebastian and Minda Blanco Sebastian vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010 .

Jurisdiction; payment of docket fees. EIB asserts that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the complaint on account of insufficient dockets fees. Although petitioners paid a total of PhP 120,758.80 in legal fees with the RTC, EIB argues that what was paid is based merely on petitioners’ prayer for moral damages of PhP 3 million, exemplary damages of PhP 3 million, and attorney’s fees of PhP 2 million, but not including petitioners’ claim for PhP 4.5 million as actual damages as averred in paragraph 9 of the complaint.  Thus, EIB, relying on Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Manchester) and Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, maintains that the RTC should not have entertained the case.

It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. A plain reading of the prayer does not show that petitioners asked for the payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million.  The reliefs asked by petitioners in the prayer are:

1. Upon the filing of the Complaint, a writ of preliminary attachment be issued ex parte against defendant pursuant to Section 2, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;

2. After trial, judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant as follows:

On the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – declaring void the sale by defendant of the 32,180,000 DMCI shares of stock of plaintiffs and directing defendant to return to plaintiffs the latter’s 32,180,000 DMCI shares of stock, or in the event the return thereof is not possible, holding defendant liable under Articles 1888,1889,1909 and other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.

On the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION – directing defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00;

On the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION – directing defendant to pay plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00; and

On the FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – directing defendant to pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000,000.00 and such amounts as may be proven at the trial as litigation expenses.

Other just and equitable relief are likewise prayed for.

Since the prayer did not ask for the payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million, the clerk of court correctly assessed the amount of PhP 120,758.80 as docket fees based on the total amount of PhP 8 million consisting of PhP 3 million as moral damages, PhP 3 million as exemplary damages, and PhP 2 million as attorney’s fees.

In disputing the fees paid by petitioners, respondent relies on our ruling in Manchester, where we said that “all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.”

EIB insinuates that petitioners, by alleging the substantial loss of PhP 4.5 million from the sale of the DMCI shares but not specifying the amount in their prayer, circumvented the Manchester ruling to evade the payment of the correct filing fees. This postulation is incorrect. It is clear that

petitioners demanded the return of the DMCI shares in the prayer of the complaint and NOT the alleged loss in the value of the shares. If the DMCI shares are returned, then no actual damages are suffered by petitioners. A recall of the averment in par. 9 of the complaint shows that the alleged loss of PhP 4.5 million to petitioners resulted from the sale of DMCI shares at PhP 0.24 per share when they acquired it at PhP 0.38 per share. More importantly, the court was proscribed by the Manchester ruling from granting actual damages of PhP 4.5 million to petitioners, because precisely the alleged damages were never sought in the prayer. Ergo, EIB’s attack on the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction must fail.  Pacific Rehouse Corporation, et al. vs. EIB Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010 .

Jurisdiction; Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of Commission on Elections (COMELEC). First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that Mitra’s petition failed to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.  They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the COMELEC’s findings of fact to be final and non-reviewable.  The COMELEC’s submission in this regard – that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari – is wholly erroneous.  This submission appears to have confused the standards of the Court’s power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitra’s petition before the Court.

To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via a petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.  Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground, i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.   The basis for the Court’s review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that “[U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.   This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause – “except as hereinafter provided.”

In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (although with a different reglementary period for filing) and not to an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, except as therein provided.  In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:

The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.

The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power, pointedly states that –

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

 

This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.

 

Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC’s position that patently confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.  Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010 .

Jurisdiction; Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of COMELEC; review of factual issues. We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents’ proposition that the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction.  Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution and the Rules of Court provide, we stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues.  As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in a certiorari case the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence.  One such exception is when the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable.  In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.

Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitra’s submissions and arguments on grave abuse of discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material representation to deceive the electorate.  In fact, Mitra’s petition plainly argued that the COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false representation.  We completely addressed this issue and, in the process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.

Second, the private respondents contend that the COMELEC did not use subjective non-legal standards (i.e., interior decoration of the room) in arriving at its decision; it merely stated how it perceived Mitra’s alleged residence.  The private respondents additionally claim that the quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the findings of the COMELEC should be clear and

convincing evidence, which level of evidence does not obtain in the present case.  The assailed COMELEC ruling speaks for itself on the matter of the standards the COMELEC used.  We found that the COMELEC plainly used a subjective non-legal standard in its analysis and thereby, the COMELEC used wrong considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitra’s residence at the Maligaya Feedmill is not the residence contemplated by law.  We reiterate that the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on the photographs of Mitra’s Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could not have been a residence because of its assessment of the interior design and furnishings of the room.  Thus, the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more than this, it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack of the qualities of a home that the Second Division wanted to see.  To quote:

The pictures presented by Mitra of his supposed “residence” are telling.  The said pictures show a small, sparsely furnished room which is evidently unlived in and which is located on the second floor of a structure that appears like a factory or a warehouse.  These pictures likewise show that the “residence” appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any [personality] which would have imprinted Mitra’s personality thereto such as old family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years.  In fact, an appreciation of Mitra’s supposed “residence” raises doubts whether or not he indeed lives there.  Verily, what is lacking therein are the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it one’s residence.  Perhaps, at most, and to this Commission’s mind, this small room could have served as Mitra’s resting area whenever he visited the said locality but nothing more.

This observation coupled with the numerous statements from former employees and customers of Maligaya Feed Mill and Farm that Mitra’s residence is located in an unsavory location, considering the noise and pollution of being in a factory area, and that the same, in fact, had been Maligaya Feed Mill’s office just a few months back, militates against Mitra’s claim that the same has been his residence since early 2008.  These information make it clear to this Commission that this room is not a home.

Thus presented, the COMELEC’s requirement of what should be considered a “residence” cannot but be a highly subjective one that finds no basis in law, in jurisprudence, or even in fact.

Third, we cannot likewise agree with the private respondents’ theory that the quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the factual findings of the COMELEC should be clear and convincing evidence, as it misappreciates that we nullified the COMELEC’s findings because it used the wrong considerations in arriving at its conclusions.  The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan, Palawan.  While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.  As our Decision discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.  To convince us of their point of view, the private respondents point out that we (1) totally disregarded the other evidence they submitted, which the COMELEC, on the other

hand, properly considered; (2) disregarded the import of the effectivity of the lease contract, which showed that it was only effective until February 28, 2010; and (3) disregarded the evidence showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile of origin.  These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision.  At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents’ misleading points in order to clear the air.

1.  The private respondents’ reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove Mitra’s claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced.  This argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred and was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties.  That a lease is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice.  What is important is that it is renewable at the option of the parties.  In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply continues and is deemed renewed.

2.  In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitra’s alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009 allegedly showing Mitra’s signature.  To recall, we found that based on the records before us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra.  Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined the recently submitted colored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding; the “alleged signature” appears to us to be a mere  hazy “superimposition” that does not bear any resemblance at all to Mitra’s signature.  We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value.  It did it not at all carry Mitra’s signature; his secretary’s positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latter’s participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.

3.  The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010, from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.  This late submission was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan.  The Certification pertinently states:

This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.  However, the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.

This certification is issued to MR. BENJAMIN KATON a resident in Penida Subdivision, Puerto Princesa City for whatever legal purposes may serve him best.

We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons.  First, it was filed only on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for resolution.  Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not prove anything; it is, on its face, contradictory.  On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is “on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in

Aborlan.” Under what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.

At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitra’s business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case.  Not only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and other witnesses.  Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010 .

Litis pendentia; requisites.  Moreover, this Court rejects the contention of petitioners that the RTC and the CA erred in not dismissing the complaint of respondent on the ground of litis pendentia, in view of the pendency of the HLURB case.  The requisites of litis pendentia are the following: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.  The causes of action and, logically, the issues in the two cases, are clearly different, each requiring divergent adjudication.  In short, while there is identity of parties, there are different issues, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for between them. Contrary to petitioners’ posture, not all the elements of litis pendentia are present.  Appropos is the CA’s ruling:

The suit filed with the HLURB involves:  (1) the reinstatement of the petitioners as members of the respondent, which was their community association; (2) a call for regular annual meetings; (3) elections for board of directors; ([4]) an accounting of funds; and ([5]) the annulment of the board resolutions which expelled them as members and disqualified them to be beneficiaries of the housing program.  On the other hand, the ejectment case has in issue the better right of the petitioners or of the respondent to the physical possession of the lots occupied by petitioners. Clearly, therefore, no identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for exist in both cases. Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010

Mediation; effect of failure to appear. In Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, this Court accentuated that mediation is part of pre-trial and failure of the plaintiff to appear thereat merits sanction on the part of the absent party.  This court held:

A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated 16 October 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court grant judges the discretion to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at mediation proceedings.

A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA considers mediation a part of pre-trial and provides sanctions for the absent party:

12. Sanctions.

Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such sanctions as are provided

under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.

Under Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, failure of the plaintiff to appear at pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the action:

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.  The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court.  A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010 .

Mootness. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.”  David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010 .

Motions; motion for reconsideration. We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondents’ arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision.  Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting reconsideration.  The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties’ original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall require.  Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010 .

Motions; period to file motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.  As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.  The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already

beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.  Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 .

Oral argument. We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondents’ arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision.  Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting reconsideration.  The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties’ original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall require.  Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010 .

Parties; foreign corporation; capacity to sue; estoppel. The determination of a corporation’s capacity is a factual question that requires the elicitation of a preponderant set of facts.  As a rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations doing business in the Philippines cannot file suits in the Philippines.  This is mandated under Section 133 of the Corporation Code, which reads:

Sec. 133.  Doing business without a license. – No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines, but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

A corporation has a legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.

The exception to this rule is the doctrine of estoppel. Global is estopped from challenging Surecomp’s capacity to sue.  A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without license may sue in Philippine courts a Filipino citizen or a Philippine entity that had contracted with and benefited from it.  A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it.  The principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.   Global Business Holdings, Inc. vs. Surecomp Software B.V., G.R. No. 173463. October 13, 2010

Pleadings; certification on forum shopping; authority of President to execute on behalf of corporation even without board authorization. In Hutama-RSEA/Super Max Phils., J.V. v. KCD Builders Corporation, Hutama as petitioner therein questioned the verification and certification on non-forum shopping of respondent KCD which the latter attached to its Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the RTC.  According to Hutama, KCD’s president did not present any proof that he is authorized by the corporation to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In explaining the requirement of verification and certification against forum-shopping

and upholding the authority of the president of the corporation to execute the same sans proof of authority, this Court has this to say:

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.  The party does not need to sign the verification.  A party’s representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.

On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

It is true that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers.  However, it is settled – and we have so declared in numerous decisions – that the president of a corporation may sign the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping.

In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, we held that the lone signature of the University President was sufficient to fulfill the verification requirement, because such officer had sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.

In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. CA, we held that in the absence of a charter or by-law provision to the contrary, the president of a corporation is presumed to have the authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within the scope of his or her usual duties.  Moreover, even if a certain contract or undertaking is outside the usual powers of the president, the corporation’s ratification of the contract or undertaking and the acceptance of benefits therefrom make the corporate president’s actions binding on the corporation.  (Citations omitted.)

Moreover, this Court’s pronouncement in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, reiterated in PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Workers Organization v. PNCC Skyway Corporation and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation v. Tablante, on the authority of certain officers and employees of the corporation to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping is likewise significant, to wit:

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors.  A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors.  Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors.  This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.  In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping;  in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines Inc., v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis.  The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being ‘in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition’.     (Citations omitted.)

From the foregoing, it is clear that Albao, as President and Manager of Cebu Metro, has the authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping even without the submission of a written authority from the board.  As the corporation’s President and Manager, she is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.   In addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the scope of her authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of the corporation’s business and her usual duties in the absence of any contrary provision in the corporation’s charter or by-laws.  Having said this, there is therefore no more need to discuss whether the authority granted to Albao under Board Resolution No. 2001-06 is only limited to representing Cebu Metro in the court hearings before the MTCC or extends up to signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping on appeal.  Again, even without such proof of authority, Albao, as Cebu Metro’s President and Manager, is justified in signing said verification and certification. Thus, the CA should not have considered as fatal Cebu Metro’s failure to attach a Secretary’s Certificate attesting to Albao’s authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and dismissed the petition or should have reinstated the same after Cebu Metro’s submission of the Secretary’s Certificate showing that Board Resolution No. 2001-06 confirmed the election of Albao as the corporation’s President and Manager.  Moreover, the fact that the Board of Directors of Cebu Metro ratified Albao’s authority to represent the corporation in the appeal of the MTCC Decision in Civil Case No. R-44430 before the RTC, CA, and this Court, and consequently to sign the verification and certification on its behalf by the passage of Resolution No. 2004-05 confirming and affirming her authority only gives this Court more reason to uphold such authority.   Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 164757, October 18, 2010 .

Pleadings; certification on forum shopping; necessity of board resolution; subsequent compliance does not excuse failure to comply with requirement in first instance. In particular, on the matter of the certificate of non-forum shopping that was similarly at issue, Tible pointedly said:

x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory.  The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a party’s failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable.  x x x [Emphasis supplied.]

This same rule was echoed in Mediserv v. Court of Appeals where we said in the course of allowing a liberal justification:

It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.]

To be sure, BPI’s cited Shipside case also involved the absence of proof – attached to the petition – that the filing officer was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certification. In the Motion for Reconsideration that followed the dismissal of the case, the movant attached a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that ten (10) days prior to the filing of the petition, the filing officer had been authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to file said petition.  Thus, proper authority existed but was simply not attached to the petition. On this submission, the petitioner sought and the Court positively granted relief.

In the present case, we do not see a situation comparable to the cited Shipside. BPI did not submit any proof of authority in the first instance because it did not believe that a board resolution evidencing such authority was necessary. We note that instead of immediately submitting an appropriate board resolution – after the First Union and Linda filed their motion to dismiss – BPI argued that it was not required to submit one and even argued that:

The Complaint can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there was no certification against forum shopping.  The Complaint has.  The provision cited does not even require that the person certifying show proof of his authority to do so x x x.

In fact, BPI merely attached to its opposition a special power of attorney issued by Mr. Kabigting, a bank vice-president, granting Asis and Ong the authority to file the complaint.   Thus, no direct authority to file a complaint was initially ever given by BPI – the corporate entity in whose name and behalf the complaint was filed.  Only in its Reply to the Comment to plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss did BPI “beg the kind indulgence of the Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his substitutes.  Even this submission, however, was a roundabout way of authorizing the filing officers to file the complaint.

BPI, interestingly, never elaborated nor explained its belatedly claimed inadvertence in failing to submit a corporate secretary’s certificate directly authorizing its representatives to file the complaint; it particularly failed to specify the circumstances that led to the claimed inadvertence. Under the given facts, we cannot but conclude that, rather than an inadvertence, there was an initial unwavering stance that the submission of a specific authority from the board was not necessary.  In blunter terms, the omission of the required board resolution in the complaint was neither an excusable deficiency nor an omission that occurred through inadvertence.  In the usual course in the handling of a case, the failure was a mistake of counsel that BPI never cared to admit but which nevertheless bound it as a client.  From this perspective, BPI’s case is different from Shipside so that the ruling in this cited case cannot apply.

Under the circumstances, what applies to the present case is the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which states:

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.

We thus hold that the dismissal of the case is the appropriate ruling from this Court, without prejudice to its refiling as the Rules allow.

We end this Decision by quoting our parting words in Melo v. Court of Appeals:

We are not unmindful of the adverse consequence to private respondent of a dismissal of her complaint, nor of the time, effort, and money spent litigating up to this Court solely on a so-called technical ground.  Nonetheless, we hold that compliance with the certification requirement on non-forum shopping should not be made subject to a party’s afterthought, lest the policy of the law be undermined.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168313. October 6, 2010

Pleadings; failure to state cause of action. We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC-Branch 227 should not have dismissed respondent’s complaint for damages on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.  According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.   When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde.  The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein.

Respondent made the following allegations in support of his claim for damages against petitioners:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

28.     After the promulgation of the Metropolitan Trial Court of its Decision dated August 3, 1999, ordering the [herein respondent] and all person claiming rights under him to –

(a)         Vacate the leased premises;

(b)         pay the [herein petitioners] the sum of P306,000.00 as unpaid rentals from May 23, 1997 to November 22, 1998; and

(c)         pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;

But while said Decision was still pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court, the [petitioners], through [petitioner] Manaloto, already distributed copies of said Decision to some of the homeowners of Horseshoe Village, who personally know the [respondent].  This act is a direct assault or character assassination on the part of the [respondent] because as stated in the said decision, [respondent] has been staying in the premises but did not or refused to pay his monthly rentals for a long period of time when in truth and in fact was untrue.

29.     That from the time the said decision was distributed to said members homeowners, the [respondent] became the subject of conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of which [respondent’s] good name within the community or society where he belongs was greatly damaged; his reputation was besmirched; [respondent] suffered sleepless night and serious anxiety.  [Respondent], who is the grandson of the late Senator Jose Veloso and Congressman Ismael Veloso, was deprived of political career and to start with was to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman within their area which was being offered to him by the homeowners but this offer has started to fade and ultimately totally vanished after the distribution of said Decision.  Damages to his good names and reputations and other damages which he suffered as a consequence thereof, may be reasonably compensated for at least P1,500,000.00 as moral and consequential damages.

30.     In order to deter [petitioners] and others from doing as abovementioned, [petitioners] should likewise be assessed exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.

A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.  We find that all three elements exist in the case at bar.  Respondent may not have specifically identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined from the allegations in his complaint.

First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and reputation.  Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name.  This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct.

Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondent’s good name even though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case.  As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”  A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct.  We expounded in Sea Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that:

XXX                               XXX                                XXX

Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent’s “dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind” under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which provides:

XXX                               XXX                                XXX

Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages for acts and actions referred to in Article 26, among other provisions, of the Civil Code.

And third, respondent alleged that the distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe Village homeowners of copies of the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case, which was adverse to respondent and still on appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, had no apparent lawful or just purpose except to humiliate respondent or assault his character.  As a result, respondent suffered damages – becoming the talk of the town and being deprived of his political career.

Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records.

It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records and documents.  However, this is not a case of the public seeking and being denied access to judicial records and documents.  The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners of the MeTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting negatively respondent’s good name and reputation among said homeowners.  The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute between petitioners and respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was then still pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners’ intentions for distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-parties in the case.  While petitioners were free to copy and distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter’s good name and reputation in the community.  Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010 .

Pleadings; failure to state cause of action; hypothetical admission. We cannot subscribe to respondent’s argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for damages, hypothetically admitted respondent’s allegations.  The hypothetical admission of respondent’s allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.  A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the parties.  Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010 .

Procedural rules; cannot be discarded with mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor.  Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial

merit.  As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business.  By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.  Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 .

Procedural rules; instance where strict application is unwarranted. Herein respondent Samsung instituted Civil Case No. 97-86265 before the RTC, to recover the amount it claims to have lost due to the negligence of petitioner Real Bank, Inc., clearly a property right.  The substantive right of respondent Samsung to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be diminished by an unwarranted strictness in the application of a rule of procedure.  In Calalang v. Court of Appeals, this Court underscored that unless a party’s conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the court should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end.  In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

While not at the fore of this case, it may be stated that the state of the court docket cannot justify injudicious case dismissals.  Inconsiderate dismissals, even without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea or a solution to the congestion of court dockets; while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties.  In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of cases before the court.

Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties in Civil Case No. 97-86265 are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues in a full blown trial.  Besides, petitioner Real Bank, Inc. would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with Civil Case No. 97-86265 as it is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010 .

Procedural rules; liberal application must be justified by ample reasons.  This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it imposes.  The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping are requirements that – as pointed out by the Court, time and again – are basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.  Thus, we cannot simply and in a general way apply – given the factual circumstances of this case – the liberal jurisprudential exception in Shipside and its line of cases to excuse BPI’s failure to submit a board resolution.  While we may have excused strict compliance in the past, we did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping.  In other words, the rule for the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form and substance, remains to be a strict and mandatory rule; any liberal application has to be justified by ample and sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from, the mandatory character of the rule.  The rule, its relaxation and their rationale were discussed by the Court at length in Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association where we said:

Much reliance is placed on the rule that “Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.  In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.”  This rule must always be used in the right context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end result.

It must never be forgotten that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld, and the suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception.  This Court previously explained:

The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.  It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party.  Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.  These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice.  Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot v. Court of Appeals, et al., that:

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings.  It is a mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.  This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood.  As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.  Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

x x x x

x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons them may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.  x x x While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution.  Justice eschews anarchy.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168313. October 6, 2010

Procedural rules; strict and rigid application avoided to secure substantial justice. As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice.  As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.

x  x  x  x

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.]

Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, we had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, “should give way to the realities of the situation. [Emphasis supplied.]

We made the same recognition in Barnes, on the underlying premise that a court’s primordial and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment.  Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010 .

Writ of possession; issuance not ministerial where third party holds property adversely to judgment debtor.  This rule, however, is not without exception. Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made to apply suppletorily to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6, Act 3135, as amended, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. Section 33 provides:

Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given.

If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period

of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.

The same issue had been raised in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Icot, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood Association, Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.), Inc., and Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, and we uniformly held that the obligation of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.  The purchaser’s right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter.  In this case, petitioner opposed the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground that he is in actual possession of the mortgaged property under a claim of ownership. He explained that his title to the property was cancelled by virtue of a falsified deed of donation executed in favor of spouses Peñaredondo. Because of this falsification, he filed civil and criminal cases against spouses Peñaredondo to nullify the deed of donation and to punish the party responsible for the falsified document. Petitioner’s claim that he is in actual possession of the property is not challenged, and he has come to court asserting an ownership right adverse to that of the mortgagors, the spouses Peñaredondo.

The third party’s possession of the property is legally presumed to be based on a just title, a presumption which may be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property.  Through such a judicial proceeding, the nature of the adverse possession by the third party may be determined, after such third party is accorded due process and the opportunity to be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property only after he has been given an opportunity to be heard, conformably with the time-honored principle of due process.  The Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, as Article 433 thereof provides:

Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises  disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.

One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The “judicial process” could mean no less than an ejectment suit or a reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.  The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by respondent, strictly speaking, is not the kind of judicial process contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.  Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court where an action for foreclosure is filed before the

RTC where the mortgaged property or any part thereof is situated, any property brought within the ambit of Act 3135 is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed property, who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor, is given no opportunity to be heard on his claim. It stands to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process.

The Court cannot sanction a procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against petitioner, an unwitting third party possessor who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would amount to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention.  Hence, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act 3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster of petitioner from the lot subject of this instant case, particularly in light of the latter’s opposition, claim of ownership and rightful possession of the disputed properties.

In granting respondent’s petition, the appellate court cited Ancheta v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. and PNB v. Sanao Marketing Corporation.  The invocation of these cases is misplaced.  These cases involved the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession pending the determination of the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure proceedings filed by the mortgagor or by at least one of the mortgagors who was a party to the foreclosure proceedings. We held then that the pendency of such determination is not a bar to the issuance of the possessory writ as no discretion is left to the issuing judge.  The above-cited cases have different factual milieu which makes them inapplicable to the present case. In Ancheta and PNB, the oppositors were parties to the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings; in the present case, the oppositor was a third party who was a stranger to the mortgage and who did not participate in the foreclosure proceedings. Moreover, in Ancheta and PNB, the oppositors objected to the issuance of the writ because of the pendency of a case for the annulment of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings; while petitioner herein objected because he is in actual possession of the foreclosed property and he is claiming the right of ownership adverse to that of the mortgagor, the spouses Peñaredondo.  These factual circumstances in the instant case call for the application not of Ancheta and PNB but of the other set of cases thoroughly discussed above declaring that the issuance of the possessory writ is not a ministerial duty of the RTC judge.   Emmanuel C. Villanueva vs. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation, G.R. No. 177881. October 13, 2010

Writ of possession; nature and instances of issuance. A writ of possession is an order of the court commanding the sheriff   to place a person in possession of a real or personal property.  It may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, either 1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or 2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond or of a separate and independent action.  It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed within one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the  property and can demand that he be placed in possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.  Time and again, we have held that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. Upon the filing of an ex parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court issues the order for a writ of possession. The writ of possession issues as a matter of course even without the filing and

approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new TCT in the name of the purchaser.  Emmanuel C. Villanueva vs. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation, G.R. No. 177881. October 13, 2010

 

Special Proceedings

Writ of Habeas Corpus. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH was “life threatening”; although Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisande’s mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail because she was charged with a non-bailable offense.  Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner So’s and accused Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of – confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases – should be illegal or unlawful.

Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:

Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:

Section 1.  Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. In Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan, P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, we qualified:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, we intoned:

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for

treatment of a supposed mental condition.   In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare’s Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.

Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.”

Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court.  In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said:

We are also not swayed by [David So’s] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elena’s confinement at NCMH was lawful.

Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt.

Finding no merit in [David So’s] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010 .

 

Other Proceedings

Appeal; petition for review is correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Petitioners contend that the proper mode or remedy that should have been taken by the LBP in assailing the Decision of the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, is a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal.  The Court does not completely agree.  This same issue was squarely addressed and settled by the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, wherein it was ruled that a petition for review is indeed the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Therein, the Court held that “Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted.”

However, in a Resolution issued by the Court en banc, dated March 20, 2003, which ruled on the motion for reconsideration filed by the LBP, the Court clarified that its decision in De Leon shall apply only to cases appealed from the finality of the said Resolution. The Court held:

x x x  LBP pleads that the subject Decision should at least be given prospective application considering that more than 60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals are in danger of being dismissed outright on technical grounds on account of our ruling herein. This, according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only on LBP as the financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also on the national treasury and the already depressed economic condition of our country. Thus, in the interest of fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses the need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give substantial consideration to the appealed cases.

x x x x

On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts, as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on [a ruling issued by the CA holding that an ordinary appeal is the proper mode], LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.

Hence, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the prospective application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of our Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair play, but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules of procedure shall not impair substantive rights.

x x x x

We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP’s right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to the motion for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

In the present case, the LBP filed its Notice of Appeal on September 1, 1998. Thus, pursuant to the ruling that De Leon shall be applied prospectively from the finality of this Court’s Resolution dated March 20, 2003, the appeal of the LBP, which was filed prior to that date, could, thus, be positively acted upon. Jorge L. Tiangco, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 153998, October 6, 2010

Intra-Corporate Controversies; motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies specifically prohibits the filing of motions for reconsideration, to wit:

Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. – The following pleadings are prohibited:

(1) Motion to dismiss;

(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial;

(4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and

(5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

With the above proscription, the RTC in the first place should not have issued the December 3, 2003 Order denying the UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration, which WINCORP adopted. The remedy of an aggrieved party like WINCORP is to file a petition for certiorari within sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed order and not to file a motion for reconsideration, the latter being a prohibited pleading. Here, WINCORP should have filed the petition for certiorari before the CA on or before January 12, 2004.  It was, however, filed only on February 13, 2004. With that, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for being filed late.  Westmont Investment Corporation vs. Farmix Fertilizer Corporation, et al.,   G.R. No. 165876, October 4, 2010

Intra-Corporate Controversies; pre-trial and judgment before pre-trial. Further, the conduct of a pre-trial is mandatory under the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies. Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules provides:

Section 1. Pre-trial conference; mandatory nature. – Within five (5) days in Rule 3 hereof, whichever comes later, the court shall issue and serve an order immediately setting the case for pre-trial conference and directing the after the period for availment of, and compliance with, the modes of discovery prescribed parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs. The parties shall file with the court and furnish each other copies of their respective pre-trial brief in such manner as to ensure its receipt by the court and the other party at least five (5) days before the date set for pre-trial.

Rule 4, Section 4 further states:

Sec. 4. Judgment before pre-trial. – If, after submissionof the pre-trial briefs, the court determines that, upon consideration of the pleadings, the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the parties, a judgment may be rendered, the court may order the parties to file simultaneously their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from receipt of the order. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment, either full or otherwise, not later than ninety (90) days from the expiration of the period to file the memoranda.

However, the RTC never ordered the submission of the parties’ pre-trial briefs. Neither were they made to submit their memoranda. Earlier in the proceedings, both parties were ordered to submit their memoranda on the issue of whether the RTC should proceed with the hearing of the case on the merits. Both parties agreed that it should.   They believed that the case was not yet ripe for final disposition and that the RTC should proceed to hear the case on the principal prayer for the nullification of the Amended By-laws of the Foundation.  Thus, petitioners said:

Therefore, in so far as the Petitioners [herein respondents] are concerned, there appears to be three remaining matters that needs (sic) to be resolved: the nullification of the by-laws, the proscription from the enforcement of the recently amended by-laws by the respondents and the matter of the attorney’s fees. Petitioners [herein respondents] may have presented evidence on the first two but the third cause of action does not appear to have been ventilated as yet. There is also the matter of the compulsory counterclaim of the Respondents [herein petitioners], which was not yet likewise heard. This would verily take this case out of that classification of being ready for final resolution or disposition of the intra-corporate dispute.

On the other hand, respondents said:

However, the SEC has not ruled yet on the parties’ respective formal offer of Exhibits relative to the injunction issue; and was yet to hear the main case where one of the main reliefs prayed for was the declaration of the nullity of the assailed amended By-laws.

Likewise, the Judgment of the RTC is bereft of any justification for dispensing with the pre-trial and trial. There was no discussion of any agreement by the parties to dispense with the trial and submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. In fact, because there was no pre-trial, it remains unclear exactly what issues are to be resolved by the trial court.  Manuel D. Recto, et al. vs. Bishop Federico O. Escaler, S.J., et al., G.R. No. 173179, October 20, 2010 .

Registration proceeding (application for issuance of Certificate of Ancestral Land Title); does not constitute litis pendentia over reivindicatory case. The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding.  It also seeks an official recognition of one’s claim to a particular land and is also in rem.  The

titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of “officially establishing” one’s land as an ancestral land.  Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time immemorial.  As aptly explained in another case:

It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title.  Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.  A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.  Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise apropos is the following explanation:

The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property.  The Torrens system does not create or vest title.  It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x  If the [respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership. (Emphasis supplied)

A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership.  In fact, if it is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title transferred to his name.

Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.  or litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.”  The third element is missing, for any judgment  in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case.  Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case.

Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners’ contention that respondent committed forum-shopping.  Settled is the rule that “forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.”  Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010 .

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages; scope. Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case.  Her stance is unavailing.  The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1.  Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.  The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.  The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”  A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.  There is only room for application.  As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.  This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.  It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intention.”  Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”  Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 .

Writ of Amparo. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH was “life threatening”; although Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisande’s mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail because she was charged with a non-bailable offense.  Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner So’s and accused Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of – confinement and custody for habeas corpus and

violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases – should be illegal or unlawful.

Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:

Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:

Section 1.  Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. In Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan, P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, we qualified:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, we intoned:

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The

essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition.   In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare’s Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.

Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.”

Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court.  In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said:

We are also not swayed by [David So’s] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elena’s confinement at NCMH was lawful.

Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt.

Finding no merit in [David So’s] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010 .

 

Evidence

Actual damages; evidence required. As to Rudlin’s counterclaim for reimbursement of its expenses in repairing the defective waterproofing, not a single receipt was presented by Rudlin to prove that such expense was actually incurred by it.   Under the Civil Code, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.   The award of actual damages must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and nonsubstantial proof.  The testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera on the total cost allegedly spent by Rudlin in repairing the waterproofing works does not suffice. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact of damage but must depend upon competent proof that they have indeed been suffered by the injured party and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable as to the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts that could provide the gauge for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages were borne.  Financial Building Corporation vs.. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin International Corporation, et al. vs. Financial Building Corporation, G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No. 164347. October 4, 2010

Burden of proof in action to annul foreclosure proceedings. It is an elementary rule that the “burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.”  In Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly ruled that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact, to wit:

Further, as respondent bank asserts, a mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of establishing that fact. Petitioners failed in this regard. Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the petitioners.  As well said by the respondent appellate court:

“. . . Under the circumstances, there is a basis for presuming that official duty has been regularly performed by the sheriff. Being a disputable presumption, the same is valid unless controverted

by evidence. The presumption has not been rebutted by any convincing and substantial evidence by the appellee who has the onus to present evidence that appellant has not complied with the posting requirement of the law. In the absence therefore of any proof to the contrary, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stays.” (Emphases supplied.)

In this case, it was respondents who instituted Civil Case No. 01-1564 seeking the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgaged properties on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of the law on the posting of the notices of sale.  Thus, the burden falls upon respondents to prove the fact of non-compliance; but respondents miserably failed in this regard.  Respondents did not present any evidence at all to establish that the notices of sale were not posted as required under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.  Instead, respondents merely focused on how Notary Public Magpantay’s Certificate of Posting was worded, and emphasized on technicalities and semantics.  Respondents insist that the phrase “on the 15th day of November 1999, I have caused the posting of three (3) copies of Notice of Sale” in the Certificate of Posting meant that Notary Public Magpantay posted the notices for only one day, i.e., on November 15, 1999.  This is a rather specious interpretation of the aforequoted phrase.  It is more logical and reasonable to understand the same phrase as to mean that the notices were posted beginning November 15, 1999 until the issuance of the certificate on December 9, 1999.  There is also no basis to require the notary public’s certificate to exactly state that the notices of sale were posted at “public places.”  Notary Public Magpantay’s use of the words “conspicuous places” in his certificate already satisfactorily complies with the legal requirement for posting.  The adjective “public” may refer to that which is “exposed to general view,” and “conspicuous” is a synonym thereof.

Moreover, it bears to stress that the Certificate of Posting is actually evidence presented by the petitioner to establish that copies of the Notice of Sale were indeed posted as required by Act No. 3135, as amended.  Without presenting their own evidence of the alleged lack of posting, respondents contented themselves with challenging the contents of said certificate.  As plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 01-1564, respondents must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the petitioner’s.  In addition, despite any defect in the posting of the Notice of Sale, the Court reiterates its ruling in previous jurisprudence that the publication of the same notice in a newspaper of general circulation is already sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law.  Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010 .

Burden of proof in civil case. Nevertheless, we further declare that the Court of Appeals erred in already awarding moral and exemplary damages in respondent’s favor when the parties have not yet had the chance to present any evidence before the RTC-Branch 227.  In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.  It is incumbent upon the party claiming affirmative relief from the court to convincingly prove its claim.  Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof under our Rules.  In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis.  Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.  Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned.  It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.  Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence.  It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and

conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.  Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty.  It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

We cannot subscribe to respondent’s argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for damages, hypothetically admitted respondent’s allegations.  The hypothetical admission of respondent’s allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.  A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the parties.  Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010 .

Foreign law; burden of proof; processual presumption. As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.  Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.  It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.  The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

ATCI Overseas Corporation, et al. vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010

Foreign law; no judicial notice of foreign law.  The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven.  To prove a foreign law,

the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25.  What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.  The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy (Arabic to English)  of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of “Excellent” albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.  Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated.  Thus the subject certifications read:

x x x x

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in order.  This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)

ATCI Overseas Corporation, et al. vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010

Formal Offer of evidence; not required in proceedings before Bureau of Legal Affairs of Intellectual Property Office. Preliminarily, it must be noted that the BLA ruled that Shen Dar failed to adduce evidence in support of its allegations as required under Office Order No. 79, Series of 2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, having failed to formally offer its evidence during the proceedings before it. The BLA ruled:

At the outset, we note petitioner’s failure to adduce any evidence in support of its allegations in the Petition for Cancellation. Petitioner did not file nor submit its marked evidence as required in this Bureau’s Order No. 2006-157 dated 25 January 2006 in compliance with Office Order No. 79, Series of 2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings.  x x x

In reversing such finding, the CA cited Sec. 2.4 of BLA Memorandum Circular No. 03, Series of 2005, which states:

Section 2.4.  In all cases, failure to file the documentary evidences in accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of the rules on summary proceedings shall be construed as a waiver on the part of the parties. In such a case, the original petition, opposition, answer and the supporting documents therein shall constitute the entire evidence for the parties subject to applicable rules.

The CA concluded that Shen Dar needed not formally offer its evidence but merely needed to attach its evidence to its position paper with the proper markings, which it did in this case.

The IP Code provides under its Sec. 10.3 that the Director General of the IPO shall establish the procedure for the application for the registration of a trademark, as well as the opposition to it:

Section 10.  The Bureau of Legal Affairs.  The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following functions:

x x x x

10.3. The Director General may by Regulations establish the procedure to govern the implementation of this Section.

Thus, the Director General issued Office Order No. 79, Series of 2005 amending the regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, Sec. 12.1 of which provides:

Section 12. Evidence for the Parties

12.1. The verified petition or opposition, reply if any, duly marked affidavits of the witnesses, and the documents submitted, shall constitute the entire evidence for the petitioner or opposer. The verified answer, rejoinder if any, and the duly marked affidavits and documents submitted shall constitute the evidence for the respondent. Affidavits, documents and other evidence not submitted and duly marked in accordance with the preceding sections shall not be admitted as evidence.

The preceding sections referred to in the above provision refer to Secs. 7.1, 8.1 and 9 which, in turn, provide:

Section 7. Filing of Petition or Opposition

7.1. The petition or opposition, together with the affidavits of witnesses and originals of the documents and other requirements, shall be filed with the Bureau, provided, that in case of public documents, certified copies shall be allowed in lieu of the originals. The Bureau shall check if the petition or opposition is in due form as provided in the Regulations particularly Rule 3, Section 3; Rule 4, Section 2; Rule 5, Section 3; Rule 6, Section 9; Rule 7, Sections 3 and 5; Rule 8, Sections 3 and 4. For petition for cancellation of layout design (topography) of integrated circuits, Rule 3, Section 3 applies as to the form and requirements. The affidavits, documents and other evidence shall be marked consecutively as “Exhibits” beginning with the letter “A”.

Section 8. Answer

8.1. Within three (3) working days from receipt of the petition or opposition, the Bureau shall issue an order for the respondent to file an answer together with the affidavits of witnesses and originals of documents, and at the same time shall notify all parties required to be notified in the IP Code and these Regulations, provided, that in case of public documents, certified true copies may be submitted in lieu of the originals. The affidavits and documents shall be marked consecutively as “Exhibits” beginning with the number “1”.

Section 9. Petition or Opposition and Answer must be verified¾ Subject to Rules 7 and 8 of these regulations, the petition or opposition and the answer must be verified. Otherwise, the same shall not be considered as having been filed.

In other words, as long as the petition is verified and the pieces of evidence consisting of the affidavits of the witnesses and the original of other documentary evidence are attached to the petition and properly marked in accordance with Secs. 7.1 and 8.1 abovementioned, these shall be considered as the evidence of the petitioner. There is no requirement under the abovementioned rules that the evidence of the parties must be formally offered to the BLA.  In any case, as a quasi-judicial agency and as stated in Rule 2, Sec. 5 of the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, the BLA is not bound by technical rules of procedure. The evidence attached to the petition may, therefore, be properly considered in the resolution of the case.  E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. and Engracio Yap vs. Shen Dar Electricity Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010 .

Judicial Notice. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA).  The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law. The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.  The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging” of petitioners.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.  The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts

evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.  As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge.  But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.  (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice.  Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.  Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. etc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno etc., et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.   vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines etc. et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al.,   G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461.October 5, 2010

Parol Evidence Rule; evidence of written agreement. On the issue of the correct total contract price, we hold that Rudlin failed to substantiate its claim that the contract price stated in the Construction Agreement (P6,933,268.00) was not the true contract price because it had an understanding with FBC’s Jaime B. Lo that they would decrease said amount to a mutually acceptable amount.  Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.  Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, “[t]he failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto.”  Assuming as true Rudlin’s claim that Exhibit “7” failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.  Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the

parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term “agreement” includes wills.

Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision.  Such exception obtains only where “the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument.  In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.”  Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlin’s evidence is admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the contract.  But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and Rudlin found mutually acceptable.  As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the purported actual contract price as they did not testify thereon.  Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement did not at all mention the total contract price.  Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to the execution of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00 which FBC had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents.  Financial Building Corporation vs.. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin International Corporation, et al. vs. Financial Building Corporation, G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No. 164347. October 4, 2010

Positive testimony stronger than negative testimony. Contrary to the dissent’s view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmill’s customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary weight, since these statements are in nature of negative testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspe’s testimony, cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008.  It is well-settled in the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.  Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010 .

Presumptions; conclusive presumption; tenant estopped from denying title of landlord. Finally, the Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of the foreclosed properties.  The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant or lessee.  According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, “[t]he tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.”  The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees carries with it a recognition of the lessor’s title.  As lessees, then respondents are estopped to deny their landlord’s title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord.  This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.          The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the RTC:

Further, this Court upholds the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under the equitable principle of estoppel.  [Herein respondents’] admitted execution of the Contract of Lease alone establishes that they do not have any cause of action or are estopped from impugning the validity of the subject extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.  In the Contract of Lease, [respondents’] clearly acknowledge that the subject extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended; that they failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the redemption period; and that [petitioner] has valid and legal right and title as absolute owner of the foreclosed properties.  [Respondents] failed to mention or question the validity of the Contract of Lease in their Complaint.  There being no evidence presented that [respondents] executed the Contract of Lease by mistake or through violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, [respondents] are bound by the stipulations therein and to the consequences thereof.  Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010 .

Presumptions; disputable presumption; suppression of evidence. Incidentally, the dissent’s invocation of the adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is erroneous, since it does not arise when the evidence is at the disposal of both parties.  In the present case, the required proofs of commercial transactions the dissent cites are public documents which are at the disposal of both parties; they are not solely under the custody of Mitra and can be easily obtained from the municipal offices of Aborlan had the private respondents been minded to do so.  The bottom line is that no such evidence was ever presented in this case, and none can and should be considered at this point.  Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010 .

Question of law distinguished from question of fact. And in Leoncio v. De Vera, this Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the

evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.  Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelo B. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010

Question of law distinguished from question of fact. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., the Court elucidated on the distinction between questions of law and fact:

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled.  A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts.  A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.  Though this delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.  Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.  If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.  Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno [G.R. No. 63680, 23 March 1990, 183 SCRA 630] is illustrative on this point:

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.

It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners.  But this situation does not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.

The main issue in the case at bar is whether the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents’ mortgaged properties was valid.  The resolution of said issue, however, is dependent on the answer to the question of whether the legal requirements on the notice of sale were complied with.  Necessarily, the Court must review the evidence on record, most especially, Notary Public Magpantay’s Certificate of Posting, to determine the weight and probative value to accord the same.  Non-compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue.  The resolution thereof by the lower courts is binding and conclusive upon this Court.  However, this rule is subject to exceptions, as when the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in conflict. Also, it must be noted that non-compliance with the statutory requisites could constitute a jurisdictional defect that would invalidate the sale.  Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010 .

January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial LawPosted on February 15, 2013 by Carlos Roberto Z. Lopez • Posted in Philippines - Cases, Remedial Law • Tagged appeal, certiorari, contempt, ejectment, evidence, execution, forum shopping, injunction, judgment, litis pendentia, mandamus, pleadings, support, unlawful detainer • Leave a comment

Here are select January 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process as additional ground. A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. “The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an affective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.”

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013

Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in CA does not toll fifteen-day period to appeal; rule suspended in exceptional cases to serve substantial justice. The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. However, in previous cases we suspended this rule in order to serve substantial justice.

In Barnes v. Padilla, we exempted from the operation of the general rule the petitioner whose motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. In the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 30, 2004, we held that:

A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioner’s counsel was

understandably confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyer’s negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.

More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215 in Civil Case NO. Q-99-37219, as both are patently erroneous. x x x

Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension of the rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law, involving the issue of forum shopping, and not a factual matter involving the merits of each party’s respective claims and defenses relating to the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase the subject property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraint of technicalities.

After a conscientious view, we hold that a suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the delay of one week and two days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration was not occasioned by negligence on the part of petitioner’s lawyer in charge of the case, the latter having a valid excuse to immediately take leave of absence in view of her father’s sudden demise. There is likewise no showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro; G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013

Certification against forum shopping; SPA designating counsel to sign must be executed if party-pleader cannot sign. The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.

In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the guidelines respecting non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions of which are as follows:

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, xxx, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons’.

xxxx

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a “certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.” Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013

Certification against forum shopping; non-compliance is not curable by subsequent submission unless there is substantial compliance or special circumstance. In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed Anderson’s Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013

Contempt of Court; definition. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013

Ejectment; possession   de facto ; distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013

Execution; issuance of writ is trial court’s ministerial duty once decision is final; writ of execution must conform to dispositive portion of judgment; order of execution which varies tenor of judgment is void. In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse.

It is undisputed that the CA Decision dated September 29, 2006 is already final and executory. As a rule, once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty. The writ of execution, however, must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.

Clearly, the RTC exceeded its authority when it insisted on applying its own construal of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision when its terms are explicit and need no further interpretation. It would also be inequitable for the petitioners to pay and for the respondents, who did not appeal the CA decision or questioned the deletion of the 12% per annum interest, to receive more than what was awarded by the CA. The assailed RTC order of execution dated December 21, 2009 and the alias writ of execution dated May 17, 2010 are, therefore, void. Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment, or for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita Navarro; G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013

Forum Shopping; definition and nature. “Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable decision. x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congest our court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt.” Estrellla Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas; G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013

Grave abuse of discretion; proper ground in a petition for certiorari but not in a petition for review on certiorari. It is to be noted that the above issues raised by petitioner alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA, which is proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, but not in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Heirs of Faustino C. Ignacio v. Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013

Hierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non-observance results in dismissal. We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Banez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:

The court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences, the strictness of the policy is

designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it, the Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons justify an exception to the policy. xxx

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of his or her grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Interlocutory and Final orders; distinction. This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows:

xxx A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.”

xxxx

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the court is “interlocutory” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable. As above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013

Interlocutory and Final orders; application to provisional remedies especially to support pendente lite.  The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support, and conjugal

assets. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013

Interlocutory and Final orders; remedy against interlocutory order is not appeal. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013

Judgment; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013

Jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction in civil cases; voluntary appearance. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.

In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, we had occasion to state:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed

and submitted to the court for resolution. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013

Litis pendentia; elements. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013

Parties; authority of private counsel to represent local officials in suit. The present case stemmed from Special Civil Action 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages. The damages sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence petitioner cannot be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel, explaining:

it can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof.

In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In one case, We held that where rigid acceptance to the law on representation of local affairs in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And in Alburra v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. Romeo Gontang, in his official capacity as Mayor of Gainza, Camarines Sur v. Engr. Cecilia Alayan; G.R. No. 191691. January 16, 2013

Parties; dropping of parties; remedies for joinder or misjoinder. Under the Rules, parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Indeed, it would have been just for the collection court to have allowed Estrella to prosecute her annulment case by dropping her as a party plaintiff in the collection case, not only so that she could protect her conjugal share, but also to prevent the interests of her co-plaintiffs from being adversely affected by their conflicting actions in the same case. By seeking to be dropped from the collection case, Estrella was foregoing collection of her share in the amount that may be due and owing from the sale. It does not imply a waiver in any manner that affects the rights of the other heirs.

While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her – amending the complaint and filing a motion to drop her as a party – she committed a mistake in proceeding to file the

annulment case directly after these remedies were denied her by the collection court without first questioning or addressing the propriety of these denials. While she may have been frustrated by the collection court’s repeated rejection of her motions and its apparent inability to appreciate her plight, her proper recourse nevertheless should have been to file a petition for certiorari or otherwise question the trial courts denial of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff, citing just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or misjoinder of parties are the proper subject of certiorari. Estrella Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas, G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); contents; not an absolute rule that will lead to dismissal; liberal construction. The court significantly pointed out in F.A.T Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc. that the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute rule whose violation would automatically lead to the petition’s dismissal. The Rules of Court has not been intended to be totally rigid. In fact, the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court “may require or allow the filing of the such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, or documents, as it may deem necessary within such periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate”; and “[i]f the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice.” These provisions are in keeping with the overriding standard that procedural rules should be liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and accepts such findings as conclusively and binding unless any of the following exceptions, obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. However, none of the aforementioned exception applies herein. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is well settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. This Court, in numerous instances, has had the occasion to explain that it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. As a rule, the Court

respects the factual findings of the CA and of quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR, giving them a certain measure of finality. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the findings of fact are conflicting. Heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, et al. v. Ruben S. Afable, et al., G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; applicable to expropriation cases. This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be raised in a petition brought under Rule 45, as such petition may only raise questions of law. This rule applies in expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on this Court. An evaluation of the case and the issues presented leads the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.

Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court sitting as an expropriation court may, after hearing, accept the commissioners’ report and render judgment in accordance therewith. This is what the trial court did in this case. The CA affirmed the trial court’s pronouncement in toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CA’s identical findings of fact concerning the issue of just compensation should be accorded the greatest respect, and are binding on the Court absent proof that they committed error in establishing the facts and in drawing conclusions from them. There being no showing that the trial court and the CA committed any error, we thus accord due respect to their findings. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Heirs of Spouses Pedro Bautista and Valentina Malabanan, G.R. No. 181218. January 28, 2013

Petition for review on   certiorari   (Rule 45); review errors of judgment; orders granting execution are interlocutory and should be subject of petition for   certiorari   under Rule 65; exceptions. The petition filed in this case is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitions filed under this rule bring up for review errors of judgment. It is an ordinary appeal and the petition must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth and discussed. The present petition, however, assails the RTC Order of execution dated December 21, 2009 and alias writ of execution dated May 27, 2010. It is a settled rule that orders granting execution are interlocutory orders; hence the petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This is categorically provided in Rule 41, viz:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be applicable.

No appeal may be taken from:

x x x x

(f) An order of execution;

x x x x

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the writ of execution varies the judgment. Thus, in Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. V. Court of Appeals the Court acknowledged that, in the past, it considered an appeal to be a proper remedy when it is perceived that the order varies, or may not be in consonance with, the essence of the judgment. Other exceptions include: (1) There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (2) Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (3) It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (4) The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (5) It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.

In such case, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some remedy available to the aggrieved party. Likewise, the Court, in the interest of equity or when justice demands, may interchangeably treat an appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, and vice versa.

In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita Navarro, G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013

Pleadings; relief. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Tecson, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement, it is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice, which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of the complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the complaint. xxx The raison d’etre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he know that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of the Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies “the sporting idea of fair play” and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard thereon. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; abuse of discretion if writ issued despite absence of clear legal right. The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion if the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses which are damnum absque injuria. In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the “grave and irremediable” financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156’s enforcement, finding such prejudice “inequitable.” No doubt, by importing used vehicles in contravention of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk, however, was self- imposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for an injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum absque injuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District Collector of Customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; requirement of actual and existing right. Petitioners’ argument fails to impress. The CA did not nullify the October 15, 2004 Order merely because of the interchanged pages. Instead, the CA determined that the applicant, Vitaliano, was not able to show that he had an actual and existing right that had to be protected by a preliminary injunction. The most that Vitaliano was able to prove was a future right based on his victory in the suit. Contrasting this future right of Vitaliano with respondents’ existing right under the GIS, the CA determined that the trial court should not have disturbed the status quo. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013

Preliminary injunction; requirement of clear legal right. It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right clearly founded in or granted by law. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District collector of customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; requisites. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:

Sec.3. Grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a)        that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists un restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b)        that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c)             that a party, court, agency, or a person doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the right of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual

As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an existing legal right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; distinction between excess of jurisdiction, acts without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari.

In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.

Excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing that there is a reason for the court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the

correctness of the assailed decision or resolution. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro, G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013

Special Civil Action for   Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; an extraordinary remedy; judicial and quasi-judicial functions. The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari as well as to grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.

As provided in Section 1, Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature.

The Central Bank Monetary Board (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions, and branches and agencies thereof. It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case. Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. & Eduardo B. Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, Represented by its Chairman, Governor Armando M. Tetangco, Jr., etc., G.R. No. 192986. January 15, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); requisites; burden of proof For a special civil action of certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board or officer, must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); when available. The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. “The sole office of the writ of certiorari,” according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

xxx is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner

by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64; proper mode of review of COMELEC en banc Resolutions not relating to pre-proclamation controversies. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said Resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or to the composition and the proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy. Kamarudin K. Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections and Rolan G. Buagas, G.R. No.192289. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation. The court of law must allow the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence. This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; when available. Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when “any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court.” The main objective of mandamus is to compel

the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; compels performance of ministerial duties. A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

Unlawful detainer; nature. Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas, G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013

Unlawful detainer; failure to pay rentals and expiration of lease as grounds. We find that the RTC’s ruling upholding the ejectment of Hertz from the building premises was proper. First, respondent failed to pay rental arrearages and utility bills to Optima; and second, the Contract of lease expired without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation thereof at least 90 days prior to its expiration. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013

Unlawful detainer; award of monthly compensation and attorney’s fees. As to the award of monthly compensation, we find that Hertz should pay adequate compensation to Optima, since the former continued to occupy the leased premises even after the expiration of the lease contract.

Finally we uphold the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P30, 000 and judicial costs in the light of Hertz unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the leased premises, thus forcing Optima to file the instant case in order to protect its rights and interest. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013

Special Proceedings

Settlement of Estate; claims include quasi-contract and contingent claims; In Maclan v. Garcia, Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as

possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner, he set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of the estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).

The court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v O’Brien, it explained that the term “implied contracts,” as used in our remedial law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept “implied contracts” as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

Settlement of Estate; specific rules on settlement prevail over general rules. We read with approval the CA’s use of statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogate generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

Other Proceedings

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; requisites. Based on Section 4 of E.O. No. 1008, in order for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction, two requisites must concur: “first, the dispute must somehow be related to a construction contract; and second, the parties must have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration proceedings.” The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; monetary claims under a construction contract. In William Golangco Construction Corporation v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, we declared that monetary claims under a construction contract are disputes arising from “differences in interpretation of the contract” because the “matter of ascertaining the duties and obligations of the parties under their contract all involve interpretation of the provisions of the contract. Following our reasoning in that case, we find that the issue of whether respondent-spouses are entitled to collect on the performance bond issued by petitioner is a “dispute arising in the course of the execution and performance of [the CCA]

by reason of difference in the interpretation of the contract documents.” The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; performance bond. A careful reading of the Performance Bond reveals that the “bond is coterminous with the final acceptance of the project.” Thus, the fact that it was issued prior to the execution of the Construction Contract Agreement does not affect its validity or effectivity.

In fact, in Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Anscor Land, Inc., we rejected the argument that the jurisdiction of CIAC is limited to the construction industry, and thus cannot be extended to surety contracts. In that case, we declared that “although not the construction contract itself, the performance bond is deemed as an associate of the main construction contract that it cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The Performance Bond is significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract that there can be no doubt it is the CIAC which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or connected with it.” The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013

Election Cases; review extends only to final decisions or resolutions of COMELEC en banc and not to interlocutory orders issued by a division. The petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail and interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division is amiss. “A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the ordr in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.

x x x

Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Governor Sadikul A. Sahali and Vice-Governor Ruby M. Sahali v. Commission on Elections (First Division), Rashidin H. Matba and Jilkasi J. Usman, G.R. No. 201796. January 15, 2013

Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act; prospective application of the law. Sec. 146 of the FRIA, which makes it applicable to “all further proceedings in insolvency, suspension of payments and rehabilitation cases xxx except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice,” still presupposes a prospective application. The wording of the law clearly shows that it is applicable to all further proceedings. In no way could it be made retrospectively applicable to the Stay Order issued by the rehabilitation court back in 2002. Situs Dev. Corporation, et al., v. Asiatrust Bank, et al., G.R. No. 180036. January 16, 2013

HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Section 1 of PD No. 957 limits the HLURB’s jurisdiction to three kinds of cases: (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or

condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. While paragraphs (b) and (c) limit the HLURB cases to those between the buyer and the subdivision or condominium owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman, (a) is broad enough to include third parties to the sales contract.

Jurisprudence consistently recognizes the rationale behind the enactment of PD No. 957 – to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming developers. For this reason, the Court has broadly construed the jurisdiction of the HLURB to include complaints for annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Indeed, in Manila Banking Corporation v. Spouses Rabina, even if the mortgagee bank was under receivership/liquidation, the Court declared that the HLURB retains jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of the mortgage:

The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. To disassociate the issue of nullity of mortgage and lodge it separately with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience to the parties and would not serve the ends of speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the laws vesting quasi-judicial powers in the agency. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Pridisons Realty Corporation, Antonio Gonzales, Bormacheco, Inc., Nazario Santos, Teresita Chua Tek, Charito Ong Lee, and Ernesto Sibal, G.R. No. 155113. January 9, 2013

Intra-corporate disputes; elements. Thus, to be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the case: (a) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations; and (b) the nature of the question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties’ rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. So long as these two criteria are satisfied, the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over it. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013

Intra-corporate disputes; application to dissolved corporations. It bears reiterating that Section 145 of the Corporation Code protects, among others, the rights and remedies of corporate actors against other corporate actors. The statutory provision assures an aggrieved party that the corporation’s dissolution will not impair, much less remove, his/her rights or remedies against the corporation, its stockholders, directors and officers. It also states that corporate dissolution will not extinguish any liability already incurred by the corporation, its stockholders, directors or officers. In short, Section 145 preserves a corporate actor’s cause of action and remedy against another corporate actor. In so doing, Section 145 also preserves the nature of the controversy between the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.

The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from continuing its business. However, despite such dissolution, the parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The dissolution does not automatically convert the parties into total strangers or change their intra-corporate relationships. Neither does it change or terminate existing causes of action, which arose because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause of action involving an intra-corporate controversy remains and must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite the subsequent dissolution of the corporation. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7,

Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013

Just compensation; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013

Evidence

Evidence; conclusive presumptions; estoppel against tenants. The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows:

Sec. 2.Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

x x x x

(b) the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño vs. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013

February 2013 Philippines Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Posted on March 11, 2013 by Carlos Roberto Z. Lopez • Posted in Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law • Leave a comment

Here are select February 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Actions; cause of action; elements; failure to state a cause of action is ground for dismissal. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(a)         The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b)         The correlative obligation of the defendant and

(c)         The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of. A perusal of the Amended Complaint in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation of any act or omission on the part of respondents which supposedly violated the legal rights of petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013

Actions; moot and academic principle. Verily, in Gancho-on v. Secreatry of Labor and Employment, the Court emphatically stated that:

It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

Applying the above pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in the instant petition in view of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced. There was no longer any purpose in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Orders dated October 31, 2001 and April 10, 2002 since any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. By the very admission of PLDT, it can no longer be compelled to undo its act of blocking the telecommunication calls and data from the Philippines to Hong Kong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since, effectively, there were no more circuits to speak of.

Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an affirmance or an invalidation of the challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be gleaned from the above discussion, and as succinctly put by PLDT in its Memorandum, there is nothing more for the RTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter would be a mere

surplusage. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Eastern Telecom Philippines; G.R. No. 163037. February 6, 2013

Actions; moot and academic principle; nature and exceptions. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Although the controversy could have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two positions by Agra, the Court should still go forwards and resolve the issue and not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the well-recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading review.

It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was as issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by reason of its transcendental importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation further calls for the review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In other words, many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed. Dennis A.B. Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013

Actions; separate trials; exception to the general rule; rationale. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.

The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), a provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal Courts (US Federal Courts), x x x.

The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and parameters whose application in this jurisdiction may be warranted because our rule on separate trials has been patterned after the original version of Rule 42(b). There is no obstacle to adopting such principles and parameters as guides in the application of our own rule on separate trials. This is

because, generally speaking, the Court has randomly accepted the practices in the US Courts in the elucidation and application of our own rules of procedure that have themselves originated form or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the Federal Courts and the various US State Courts.

x x x

Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a “single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts.”

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, et al.; G.R. No. 169677. February 18, 2013

Appeals; issues raised for first time on appeal and not raised in proceedings in lower court are barred by estoppel. As to the first issue, there is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of respondents’ Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Amended Complaint was not raised by petitioners before the RTC. Neither was this issue raised in their Comment to respondents’ petition for certiorari filed with the CA. It was only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision that this matter was raised. It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013

Contempt; distinction between criminal and civil contempt. In People v. Godoy, this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the

purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it cleat that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant’s intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court’s order is not a defense in civil contempt. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.; G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013

Contempt; contempt akin to libel and principle of privileged communication may be invoked in contempt proceeding. In People v. Castelo, the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:

While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of the appellant.

Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.; G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013

Execution; execution pending appeal; not a bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits. First of all, as held in Legaspi v. Ong, “[e]xecution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal. O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge; G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013

Execution; execution of RTC judgment does not automatically mean that issues on appeal have become moot and academic; Moot and academic principle. Moreover, even assuming that the writ of execution in the instant case were not void, the execution of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening event that would automatically moot the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana, which is pending before the CA. otherwise, there would be no use appealing a judgment, once a writ of execution is issued and satisfied. That situation would be absurd. On the contrary, the Rules of Court in fact provides for cases of reversal or annulment of an executed judgment. Section 5 of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there should be restitution or reparation as warranted by justice and equity. Therefore, barring any supervening event, there is still the possibility of the appellate court’s reversal of the appealed decision – even if already executed – and, consequently, of a restitution or a reparation.

In any case, the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana cannot, in any way, be characterized as moot and academic. In Osmena III v. Social Security System of the Philippines, we defined a moot and academic case or issue as follows:

A case or issue is considered not and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness – save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.

Applying the above definition to the instant case, it is obvious that there remains an unresolved justiciable controversy in the appealed case for accion publiciana. In particular, did respondent-spouses Oria really encroach on the land of the petitioner? If they did, does he have the right to recover possession of the property? Furthermore, without preempting the disposition of the case for accion publiciana pending before the CA, we note that if the respondents built structures on the subject land, and if they were builders in good faith they would be entitled to appropriate rights under the Civil Code. This Court merely points out that there are still issues that the CA needs to resolve in the appealed case before it. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013

Execution; effects of void writ of execution; requirement of good reason in execution pending appeal. In any case, proceed to rule that because the writ of execution was void, all actions and proceedings conducted pursuant to it were also void and of no legal effect. To recall, this Court affirmed the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84632, annulling the RTC’s Omnibus Order granting the Motion for Immediate Execution pending appeal. We affirmed the CA Decision because of the RTC’s failure to state any reason, much less good reason, for the issuance thereof as required under Section 2, Rule 39. In the exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to issue a writ of execution pending appeal, we emphasize the need for strict compliance with the requirement for the statement of good reason, because execution pending appeal is the exception rather than the rule.

Since the writ of execution was manifestly void for having been issued without compliance with the rules, it is without any legal effect. In other words, it is as if no writ was issued at all. Consequently, all actions taken pursuant to the void writ of execution must be deemed to have not been taken and to have had no effect. Otherwise, the Court would be sanctioning a violation of the right of due process of the judgment debtors – respondent-spouses herein. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013

Hierarchy of courts; exceptions. Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourse  should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of certain exceptions under well-defined circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition; when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy; when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our immediate and direct handling of the case. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013

Judgments; immutability of judgments. The issue on the nullity of Maniego’s title had already been foreclosed when this Court denied Maniego’s petition for review in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011, which became final and executory on 19 January 2012. It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This is without prejudice, however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete what he paid to Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will be unjust enrichment by Poblete. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013

Judgments; pro hac vice; nature. Petitioners point out that this Court has had occasion to grant a motion for new trial after the judgment of conviction had become final and executory. In People v. Licayan, all the accused were convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to death by the trial court. More than two years after their conviction became final and executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court. They attached thereto the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by two of their co-accused in the case, to the effect that Lara and Licayan had not participated in the commission of the crime. Since the OSG also recommended the opening of the case, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of newly discovered evidence.

It is worth pointing that the motion in Licayan was granted pro hac vice, which is a Latin term used by courts to refer to rulings rendered “for this one particular occasion.” A ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013

Judgments; void judgment; nature and effect; may be resisted in any action or proceeding. A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.

x x x

Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: “x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head.” Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Placido and Clara Dy Orilla; G.R. No. 194168. February 13, 2013

Liberal construction of the rules. In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Motions; notice and hearing requirements; effect of non-compliance; notice requirement in the issuance of preliminary injunction. A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service, save only for those that the courts can act upon without prejudice to the rights of the other parties. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon.

x x x

The notice requirement is even more mandatory when the movant asks for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or a TRO. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, no preliminary injunction shall be granted without a hearing and without prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined, the prior notice under this requirement is as important as the hearing, as no hearing can meaningfully take place, with both parties present or represented, unless a prior notice of the hearing is given. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013

Motions; motion to dismiss; defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; exceptions. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded in the answer are deemed waived, with the following exceptions: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription of the action. Clearly, petitioner cannot change its defense after the termination of the period of testimony and after the exhibits of both parties have already been admitted by the court. The non-inclusion of this belated defense in the pre-trial order barred its consideration during the trial. To rule otherwise would put the adverse party at a disadvantage since he could no longer offer evidence to rebut the new theory. Indeed, parties are bound by the delimitation of issues during the pre-trial. Licomcen, Inc. v. Engr. Salvador Abainza, etc.; G.R. No. 199781. February 18, 2013

New trial; newly-discovered evidence; requisites. Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridel’s extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the police on Plaridel’s apprehension.

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term “newly-discovered.” The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water. Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013]

Parties; duty of party to inform court of counsel’s death. The Court strikes down the argument that the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 did not attain finality because petitioner’s

counsel, who died while the case was pending before the CA, was unable to receive a copy thereof. The CA was correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary circumstance in this case that would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious consideration. In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., the Court explained that it is the party’s duty to inform the court of its counsel’s demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact shall be considered negligence on the part of said party. Expounding further, the Court stated:

x x x It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm.

x x x They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsel. x x x x

In Ampo v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained the vigilance that must be exercise by a party:

 x x x x

Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where a party, such as petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.

Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA if the death of its counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the places or law office designated by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The case then became final and executory when no motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period therefor. O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge; G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013

Partition; stages; requisites. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an addition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013]

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; rationale for the rule; exceptions. The inconsistent postures

taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.

Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.

While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand. Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); questions of fact generally not reviewable; exceptions; difference between question of fact and question of law. We note that the matters raised by petitioner ATI involve questions of fact which are generally not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as the Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1 thereof provides that “[t]he petition x x x shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.”

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issued does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; 7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the findings of the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly

considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.; G.R. No. 177116. February 27, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised, subject to exceptional circumstances which are not present in this case. Hence, factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us. In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by Maniego. In addition, the evidence is preponderant that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the genuineness of the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is essentially a question of fact, we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh the evidence again. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. We stress the settled rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. A question, to be one of law, must not examine the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties; otherwise, the question is one of fact. Whether an express trust exists in this case is a question of fact whose resolution is not proper in a petition under Rule 45. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); change of theory on appeal generally not allowed. Second, we find that the petitioner changed the theory of his case. The petitioner argued before the lower courts that an express trust exists between PALII as the trustee and the HEIRS as the trustor-beneficiary. The petitioner now asserts that the express trust exists between PALII as the trustor and UCPB as the trustee, with the HEIRS as the beneficiaries. At this stage of the case, such change of theory is simply not allowed as it violates basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Our rulings are clear – “a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case was decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change [it] on appeal”, otherwise, the lower courts will effectively be deprived of the opportunity to decide on the merits of the case fairly. Besides, courts of justice are devoid of jurisdiction to resolve a question not in issue. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013

Pleadings; amended complaint; nature. Moreover, respondent’s filing of their Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint may not be considered as a circumvention of the rules of procedure. Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. In the present case, the Amended Complaint is, thus, treated as an entirely new complaint. As such, respondents had every right to move for the dismissal of the said Amended Complaint. Were it not for the filing of the said Motion, respondents would not have been able to file a petition for certiorari before the CA which, in turn, rendered the presently assailed judgment in their favor. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013

Service of Pleadings; petition should be served on counsel of party; effect of service on party represented by counsel of record; exceptions. Lastly, under our rules of procedure, service of the petition on a party, when the party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013

Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); reglementary period. First, we find that the present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to the private respondents’ position, the 60-day period within which to file the petition for certiorari is counted from the Republic’s receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying the latter’s motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point – “In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.” Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013

Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); requisites. The following requisites must concur for a Petition for Certiorari to prosper, namely:

“(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Salvacion Villanueva, et al. v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 178347. February 25, 2013

Special Proceedings

Writ of amparo; nature; special proceeding. The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

x x x

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced. Secretary

Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of amparo; procedure. Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The judge or justice then makes an “immediate” evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted “with the attendant circumstances detailed”. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to lie liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim relies are necessary.

The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside form identifying the issues in the case, Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any patter or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (v) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.

There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper ans appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough o that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of Amparo; writ is an interlocutory order. The “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. x x x

This “Decision” pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The “Decision” is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of Amparo; the Return is the proper responsive pleading; memorandum is a prohibited pleading. First the insistence on filing an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

x x x

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the writ of Amparo. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of Amparo; difference between the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and the actual order called the Writ of Amparo.  The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes the availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondent that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as “granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.” Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Evidence

Administrative proceedings; quantum of proof; substantial evidence. It is well-entrenched that in an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty to justify affirmative findings. Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodrigo v. Mapoy and Don Emmanuel R. Regalario; G.R. No. 197299. February 13, 2013]

Civil cases; quantum of proof; preponderance of evidence; evidence of fraud. In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their proponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. The extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

As to fraud, the rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence. Moreover, fraud is not presumed – it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Spouses Nilo Ramos and Eliadora Ramos v. Raul Obispo and Far East Bank and Trust Co.; G.R. No. 193804. February 27, 2013

The Recognizance Act of 2012: Giving the Poor “More in Law”Posted on April 12, 2013 by Ricardo Ma. P.G. Ongkiko • Posted in Criminal Law, Philippines - Law, Remedial Law •

In our criminal justice system, one kind of injustice, that victimizes only the poor, happens every day whenever an accused, who has the right to post bail to attain liberty during the course of the trial of his criminal case, is not able to enjoy such right because he cannot afford to post bail for his release. This reality tramples upon the social justice mandate of our Constitution and has caused great injustice to the poor, especially those who are wrongly accused of the crime for which they have been charged and arrested.

There is a recent legislation that seeks to address this problem: Republic Act 10389 or the Recognizance Act of 2012 (“RA 10389” or the “Act”), which was signed into law by President Benigno S. Aquino III on March 14, 2013, and which is intended to promote restorative justice amid problems confronting the criminal justice system such as protracted trials, prolonged resolution of cases, inability to post bail bond, and congestion in jails.

Right to Bail and to Be Released on Recognizance

The right to bail emanates from the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven by an independent, competent, and unbiased court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. However, for a person accused of a crime, who is poor and belongs to the marginalized and depressed sector of society, this right more often than not is too costly, thereby making it practically futile. The right to recognizance, under RA 10389, seeks to address this.

Recognizance, as an alternative to posting bail, is defined under the Act as: “a mode of securing the release of a person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due to abject poverty. The court where the case of such person has been filed shall allow the release of the accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the custody of a qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused resides.”

The term used is “release on recognizance.” The reputable person entrusted with the accused’s custody will then have the burden of bringing the accused to court when his presence is required by such court.

Recognizance as a Matter of Right

In its statement of policy, the Act provides that the right of persons to be released on recognizance is affirmed except those charged with death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

Section 5 the Act states that to be released on recognizance is a matter of right when the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, and the application for such is filed before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. For criminal proceedings before the Regional Trial Court, the application should be filed only before conviction.

Moreover, Section 12 of the Act provides that the release on recognizance shall not be allowed in favor of the accused after the judgment has become final or when the accused has started serving sentence.

Requirements

Among the requirements for recognizance are: (a) a sworn declaration by the person in custody of his or her indigency or incapacity to post bail; (b) a certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development office of the municipality or city where the accused actually resides, that the accused is indigent; (c) the person in custody should have already been arraigned; (d) notification by the court of the application for recognizance on the city or municipal sanggunian where the accused resides; (e) proper documentation of the accused through photos of all sides of the face and fingerprinting; and (f) notification by the court on the public prosecutor of the date of hearing on the application within 24 hours from the filing of the application.

Disqualification

An accused can be disqualified from availing of release on recognizance on any of the following grounds:

1. the accused has made untruthful statements in his or her affidavit;

2. the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime aggravated by reiteration;

3. the accused had previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid justification;

4. the accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;

5. the accused is a flight risk;

6. there is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the case; or

7. the accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to the new crime he/she is being accused of.

The court may also order the arrest of an accused released on recognizance (1) if he fails to appear at the trial whenever required by the court; (2) if there is a manifestation under oath by any person, which found meritorious by the court after a summary hearing and after giving the accused the opportunity to be heard; (3) if the accused has been sued for the commission of another offense involving moral turpitude and the mayor or public prosecutor recommends his arrest; or (4) if he commits an act of harassment against private complainant, prosecutor or witnesses in the case pending against him.

The Act took effect on April 6, 2013, fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette and two national newspapers.

January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Rulings on Remedial LawPosted on February 17, 2014 by Carlos Roberto Z. Lopez • Posted in Philippines - Cases, Remedial Law • Leave a comment

Here are select January 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Action to annul judgment or final order; jurisdiction. In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg.129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter

was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a new  procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that “[t]he annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.” Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; lack of jurisdiction; types. Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil 949 [1918]), “in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.” But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; nature. The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals (681 SCRA 580, 586-587 [2012]), viz:

“A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper. x x x”

The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment

or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; prescriptive period. The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; requisites. The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as “a last remedy,” is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches.

The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. Fraud is extrinsic, according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA 168, 180 [1996]), “where the unsuccessful party has been  prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit,  being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.”

The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions,

specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner;

(b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Appeal; trial court’s factual findings as affirmed by CA are binding on appeal. To start with, considering that the Court of Appeals (CA) thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, the Court is bound to uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court’s factual findings as affirmed by the CA are binding on appeal due to the Court not being a trier of facts. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; covers questions of law only; exceptions. The Court has consistently held that as a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of law only. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, subject to the following exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the  judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply  briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. Rodolfo Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; effect of failure to file motion for reconsideration within 15-day reglementary period. The Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual questions may not be raised. Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be raised before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts.

Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual findings of trial court, when affirmed by CA, are binding on Supreme Court. Considering that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court, the Court affirms the judgment of the CA upholding Eduardo’s exercise of the right of repurchase. Roberto could no longer assail the factual findings because his petition for review on certiorari was limited to the review and determination of questions of law only. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365. January 15, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review limited. Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to emphasize that our task in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the CA. The allegations of incorrect computation of the surety bond involve factual matters within the competence of the trial court. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners’ assignment of errors calls for the Court to again evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the property and whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of fact which are beyond the Court’s ambit of review under Rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Ejectment; immediate execution of judgment; requisites for stay. The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals (286 SCRA 437, 444-445 [1998]) is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:

 As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of

the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Herminia Acbang v. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014.

Execution; Terceria; when proper. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the property:

 “[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of he court which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the  property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant’s possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.”

Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Execution of judgments; Immediate execution in Small Claims cases. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.

Execution of judgments; rationale. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it as the “life of the law,” ratio legis est anima, this Court has zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Grave abuse of discretion; concept. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Here, while

the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.

Grave abuse of discretion; concept. It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Judicial power; issuance of protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the  jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Judgments; enforceability of money judgments. It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Judgments; Law of the case; concept. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.

Judgments; remedies of third person claiming property taken by sheriff. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the  judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Jurisdiction; concurrence of jurisdiction and hierarchy of courts. To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he run afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Supreme Court. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.

Jurisdiction; Justiciable question; definition. The Court clarified, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political – question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Jurisdiction; Small Claims cases. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.

Motions; motion to extend time to file motion for reconsideration prohibited in all courts except in the Supreme Court. While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. This rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon (226 Phil. 144 [1986]) wherein it was held that:

 Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the

Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014.

Motion for reconsideration; effect of non-filing. At the outset, the Court noted that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s September 4, 2012 Decision; only the Office of the President, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of our ruling reinstating Gonzales.

This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action.

If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Pleadings; Defense and objections not pleaded either in motion to dismiss or in answer are deemed waived; exceptions. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.

Pleadings; Failure to allege compromise efforts in complaint not jurisdictional defect. Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among members of the same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v. Versoza (135 Phil. 84, 94 [1968]), a case for future support which was dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that there was no such allegation of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a compromise and as such the absence of the required allegation in the complaint cannot be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:

 The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the court below.

To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., allowed an amendment which “merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action, because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action.” We there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista, that an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to muto proprio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.

  Pleadings; motu proprio dismissal . Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.

Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin (422 Phil. 222, 230 [2001]), cited in Katon v. Palanca,  Jr. (481 Phil. 168, 180 [2004]), the Court held:

 “x x x [T]he muto proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio [sic] dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to  be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may muto proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.”

Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.

Preliminary injunction; improper where act sought to be enjoined is already consummated. Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or consummated act). Hence, since the

consummation of the act sought to be restrained had rendered Sps. Alindogs injunction petition moot, the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether improper. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.

Res judicata ; conclusiveness of judgment . Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planters Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and conclusive on the parties.

The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.

All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014.

Writ of possession; nature. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v United Overseas Bank Phils. (616 SCRA 353) which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:

The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014

Other Proceedings

Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Function of Punong Barangay   purely executive in nature. The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Extra-judicial foreclosure; ministerial duty to issue writ of possession to purchaser; exception. It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either

during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. To this end, the Court, in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada (579 Phil 454 [2008]), citing several cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of the court.

The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural  Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno (693 SCRA 110 [2013]), citing the case of China  Banking Corp., the Court illumined that “the phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.” In other words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation (633 SCRA 173 [2010]), the third person must therefore claim a right superior to that of the original mortgagor. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.

Protection Order under Section 15 of RA 9262; concept. In Garcia v. Drilon (699 SCRA 352, 401 [2013]), wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in  jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational  basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could

be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required  before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. x x x

Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under Section 15 of RA 9262; court’s authority to issue ex parte. Clearly, the court, under Section 15 of RA 9262, is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Evidence

Admissions; contradiction. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners’ admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Best evidence rule; concept and exception. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in

custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. x x x The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro, G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Burden of proof in civil cases; quantum of evidence. Land Bank failed to prove that the amount allegedly “miscredited” to Oñate’s account came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its clients. It is worth emphasizing that in civil cases, the party making the allegations has the burden of proving them by preponderance of evidence. Mere allegation is not sufficient. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Emmanuel C. Oñate,G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014.

Hearsay rule; entries in official records as exception. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Judicial notice; discretionary notice of records of other cases. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to “take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.” They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.

  Offer of evidence; court considers evidence only when formally offered; exceptions . Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit:

 Section 34. The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence which may not  be admissible for the purpose it is being offered.

However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v. Mate the Court in Heirs of Romana Saves, et al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al. (632 SCRA 236 [2010]), enumerated the requirements for the evidence to be considered despite failure to formally offer it, namely: “first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.” In People v. Vivencio De Roxas et al. (116 Phil 977 [1962]), the Court also considered exhibits which were not formally offered by the prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial by the counsel of the accused.

In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can be seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity of a person or a thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person, subject or article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be. Rodolfo Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014.

Preponderance of evidence; definition. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014.

Question of law distinguished from question of fact.  A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v.

Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365. January 15, 2014.