religion and politics in turkey

Religion and Politics in Turkey

James G. Mellon*

Abstract

For the student of religion and politics, Turkey represents a distinctive case in that Turkey is aconstitutionally secularist state in a predominantly Islamic country. The Kemalist revolutionsought to downplay the influence of Islam and Ottomanism, and to promote secularism and a spe-cifically Turkish nationalism. Recently, the emergence of Islamism (or Islamic revivalism) that hastaken place in much of the world has affected Turkey, as well, in that, in the face of oppositionfrom committed secularists, Turkey has recently re-elected a government with roots in IslamismThis article surveys some of the issues raised by these developments.

Introduction

Not many years ago, this author wrote on this same topic, the relation between religionand politics in modern Turkey (See Mellon 2006). What that article says continues tohold true but it has inevitably become dated. Some of what seemed uncertain becomesclearer with time. In the case of Turkey, the success of the AKP or Adalet ve KalkinmaPartisi (Justice and Development Party) Government in remaining in power and inretaining the support of a major part of the electorate has gone some way in answeringconcerns that some had not long ago about the future of Turkish democracy in the faceof Islamic revivalism. Islamism (or Islamic revivalism), sometimes referred to somewhatinappropriately as Islamic fundamentalism, refers to a sense that Islam should serve notonly as a source for private belief and practice but also as a source for life in the publicsphere. The concept embraces a broad range of quite diverse manifestations in differentcontexts. While it can and sometimes does take violent forms, it need not, and typicallyhas not in the Turkish case. While Islamism typically reflects disenchantment withWestern values, the relationship between Islamism and modernization is often ambiguous.Islamists have been disposed to utilize advanced technology to propagate their interpreta-tion of Islamic values. When the AKP was first elected in 2002, it was not the firstoccasion that an Islamist party came to power in Turkey, a predominantly Islamic societywhich constitutionally enshrines secularism, but it was the first Islamist or arguablyIslamist-inspired party to remain in power and to be re-elected in the face of tensionsbetween Islamist and Kemalist elements, including the military, which had forced out anumber of previous governments. When the AKP came to power, it was by no meansself-evident that the military and the Constitutional Court would accept such an outcomefor long. Tensions increased when the AKP proposed one of their leaders, Abdullah Gul,for the Presidency.

Historical Background

The Kemalist Revolution of the 1920s and 1930s in Turkey reflected frustration andshame at the way in which the once-powerful Ottoman Empire had been humbled

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throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century as the Empire laggedeconomically and technologically behind the other European powers and as the rise ofnationalist movements removed more and more territory from the Empire’s sovereignty.Kemalism was a nationalist movement, and the Kemalist regime aggressively implementedpolicies designed in imitation of those of the Western powers with the aim of closing theeconomic, technological and military gaps between Turkey and the Western powers.Lewis observes that ‘…the political and intellectual leadership of Turkey made a con-scious choice for the West and for a Western identity’ (Lewis 1999, p. 136). It is notedby Cornell that ‘To modern and self-assured Turks it is self-evident that they belong toEurope and the West – a view against which Westerners often react with astonishmentand perhaps naivety, despite the fact that Turkey has long belonged to the westerngroup in many international connections and participates in a great variety of westerncooperative organizations’ (Cornell 2001, p. 23). McCarthy remarks on the rejectionof Ottomanism in the drive to foster a specifically Turkish nationalism (McCarthy2001, p. 216). Karpat suggests that Turkish historiography sought to find pre-Islamicand pre-Ottoman roots for Turkish nationalism (Karpat 2001). Paradoxically, this driveto imitate Western Europe represented fundamentally a Turkish nationalism. Kemalismreflected nationalism in other ways, as well. Yavuz notes that ‘Kemalism is an ideol-ogy, which aims at state autonomy from domestic and international forces with thegoal of creating a modern (that is, secular) and homogeneous (Turkish) nation-state’(Yavuz 2009, p. 27). Islam was perceived as having acted as a conservative forceretarding progress, and as a consequence, the Kemalist regime pursued policiesdesigned to suppress the public influence of Islam. The regime was aggressively secu-larist but not in the way in which North Americans, for example, might understandthe term according to which there is a separation of church and state. Pope and Popenote that the state pays the salaries of imams and stipulates the content of homilies,remarking that ‘This curious paradox is reflected in society, where defenders of secu-larism insist on maintaining state control over religion, believing the 1,300-year-oldlaws and social dictates of Islam to be incompatible with modern pluralist democracy.The Islamists, on the other hand, have been in favour of a more liberal attitude thatwould make religion truly separate from the state’ (Pope & Pope 1998, p. 317).Secularism in the Kemalist sense meant that Islam was subordinated to the state, andused as an instrument for furthering aims of the state. Kemalism was nationalist, aswell, in the sense that it actively replaced the Ottoman approach which identifiedallegiance to the Empire and faith in Islam as binding forces in a multinational empirewith a specifically Turkish nationalism. One outcome of this has been the reluctance tocountenance any sort of accommodation to Kurdish nationalist demands or even toacknowledge the existence of a Kurdish national minority.

The implications of the Kemalist Revolution touched on practically every aspectof Turkish life. For the first time, surnames were required. Ottoman first names werediscouraged in favour of names that hearkened in some way to a presumed pre-OttomanTurkish past. The calendar was changed. The study of Western music was encouraged.Words from Persian or foreign languages were removed from the Turkish dictionaryand numerous new words constructed out of presumed Turkish roots were added to aTurkish language established as the official language. The Western European alphabetreplaced Arabic and Persian script. Even clothing was affected by political changes andimbued with political symbolism. The fez had represented an earlier accommodation toWestern styles, replacing the traditional turban but permitting men to touch the floorin prayer with their foreheads while still covering their heads. With the Kemalist

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Revolution, the fez was replaced with the European hat. But it was changes in women’sattire that continue to be controversial. Kemalists not only discouraged the veil forwomen but expelled women who chose to wear the veil from universities and in onecase from the national legislature (See Howe 2000; Chapter 9, ‘The Headscarf War’;Rabasa and Larrabee, pp. 60–63; and Acar 1993, p. 230). Many Islamist women havechosen to wear the veil, even accepting expulsion from universities.

Recent discussions have more often considered changes in the Islamist movementbut the Kemalist movement, as well, has experienced some evolution in recent years.Bagdonas asserts that ‘…the present period does not represent the dissolution of theKemalist hegemony but can best be understood in terms of the resurfaced clash betweensecurity-centred and democracy-centred interpretations of Kemalism’ (Bagdonas 2008,p. 101). The Turkish state under Kemalism used images of Ataturk to legitimize theregime but in recent years individual Kemalists have displayed similar images, sometimesmodified to show a more human side of Ataturk, to assert that Kemalism continues tohave popular support. Ozyurek observes that in the face of a popular Islamist movement,there has been a trend towards what she calls ‘nostalgic Kemalism’ or ‘neo-Kemalism’(See Ozyurek 2006). She suggests that the sense that Kemalist values of secularism,nationalism and modernization were threatened inspired nostalgia for the early years ofthe Kemalist revolution, especially among the bureaucratic elite that had dominatedTurkish society under Kemalism but which found that dominance undermined by therise as a consequence of liberalization of a new entrepreneurial elite. Admission into theEuropean Community and now into the European Union has for many years been anaspiration for Turkey of Kemalists. This reflects the emphasis within the Kemalisttradition on identifying Turkey as a European power. One of the ironic and paradoxicaloutcomes, however, of the pursuit of European Union membership has been that Turkeyhas been under pressure to improve its record on democratization and human rights.This makes it awkward for the Turkish military which has traditionally seen itself asthe guardian of the Kemalist legacy to act against what some would view as an Islamistgovernment in the way that the military in the past undermined previous Islamistgovernments. It also adds to pressure to relax restrictions on the use of the Kurdishlanguage. While the predominant view among Kemalists continues to view admission tothe European Union as a highly desirable goal, there are elements among Kemalistswhose Turkish nationalism leads to a rejection of the European Union.

Recent Developments

The same issue divides Islamists, some of whom continue to take the view that Turkeyshould give priority to identifying itself as part of the broader Islamic world, rather thanenhancing the influence of Europe. This view no longer reflects the predominant viewamong Turkish Islamists. The Kemalist regime was traditionally very dirigiste, – that is, itemphasized a strong state as the prime instrument of development – and the liberalizationof the 1980s under the Ozal Government set in motion trends in which an emergingentrepreneurial middle class sought influence alongside the more traditional Kemalist elite,which was drawn from the military and government bureaucracy. The traditional prestigeof the state has been diminished over time by corruption and ineffectiveness. Szyliowiczrefers to the response to the earthquake of August 2000, suggesting that ‘The weakness ofthe state apparatus and the obstacles that inhibit the emergence of a strong civil societybecame particularly evident in the aftermath of the disastrous earthquake that struck thewestern part of the country in August 2000’ (Szyliowicz 2003, p. 204). He observes that

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‘Corruption had permitted poor construction and misappropriation of funds and resourcesby Red Crescent officials, the civilian and military responses were poorly planned, unco-ordinated and inadequate, and government officials showed little empathy for the victims’(Szyliowicz 2003, p. 204). One result has been that the impetus for the Islamistmovement has come primarily not from a conservatism of the poor and uneducated butfrom this emerging middle class, especially among families that have relatively recentlyacquired wealth and education, and moved from rural areas to the cities. White attributesthe success of the Islamist movement not only to the strength of religious belief but, aswell, to populism and what she refers to as a ‘politics of the vernacular’ mobilizing at alocal grass-roots level (White 2002). These developments have influenced the evolution ofthe Islamist movement, making it much more supportive of Turkey’s bid for membershipin the European Union.

Indeed, the current AKP (Justice and Development Party), accused of being Islamistby Kemalist critics, has tended to avoid characterizing itself as Islamist. Some Kemalistsinterpret this as a disingenuous attempt on the part of the AKP to escape the legalprohibitions that led to the outlawing of such previous Islamist parties as the MNP orMilli Nizam Partisi (Party of National Order), the MSP or Milli Selamet Partisi (Party ofNational Salvation), the RF or Refah Partisi (Welfare or Prosperity Party) and the FP orFazilet Partisi (Virtue Party). Until the AKP, these were effectively reconstitutions of thesame party following the legal prohibition of its predecessor. One can see a growth overtime in support for Islamist parties and for Islamism. For example, from 1980 to 1989,the enrolment in Quranic schools rose from 70,000 to 155,000, the number of mosquesrose from 55,000 in 1984 to 65,000 in 1989, and the number of individuals making thepilgrimage increased from approximately 11,000 in 1979 to 92,000 in 1988 (Szyliowicz2003, p. 202). Brotherhoods (or tarikatlar), like the Nakshibendi, tended until recently toemphasize cultural, rather than political, Islam. Foundations (or vakiflar) have undertakensocial welfare functions. Islamic schools (or _Imam-Hatip) have expanded since the 1950sfrom their original purpose of educating future clergy, and there is currently controversyabout whether graduates should or should not be considered for admission into universityfaculties other than theology on the same basis as graduates of state schools. In 1984,the Welfare Party (RP) received 4.4% of the popular vote. In 1987 it received 7.7%, in1989 9.8%, in 1991 17%, and in 1995 21% (Szyliowicz 2003, p. 197). A short-lived(1996–1997) coalition government led by Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan fell asa result of a ‘soft coup’ undertaken by the military. This event seems to have influencedboth the military and the Islamists, making the military more reluctant to act against thecurrent regime lest the military undermine its own support and inclining Islamists toavoid direct challenges to the military. It also seems to have motivated adherents of theNakshibendi order and of the Nur movement, who had previously supported centre-rightparties and shunned Islamist parties, to move towards support for the AKP. Yavuzobserves that with the ‘soft coup’ of 1997 ‘For the first time, these pro-state, centre-rightMuslim groups asked hard questions about the legitimacy of the Turkish military. Theconservative and Islamic sectors of the population turned against the self-declared missionof the military and sought to free the state and their own liberties from the hegemony ofthe military by supporting the EU process’ (Yavuz 2009, p. 16). Some qualifications arein order. Some of the support for the AKP reflects disaffection with parties preceding itin government. It is not clear to what degree there has been an actual rise in Islamism,given that some of the heightened profile of Islamic practice in public can be ascribed tothe movement of new groups from rural areas into the cities, and from poverty into anemerging entrepreneurial class. With urbanization and affluence, young people from



newly urbanized families are entering institutions like the universities bringing with thempractices like wearing the headscarf. For many Kemalists, such headscarves are viewedas symbols of traditionalism and backwardness. For many of those who wear them,however, it may reflect a symbol of their faith that makes it possible for them to enterinto an unfamiliar world. In spite of the connotations associated in the minds ofKemalists, it would be misleading to interpret headscarves as simply reflecting notions ofrelegating women to positions of deference. Reality is more complicated. Typicallywomen have made their own decision to wear headscarves, and assert that, for them, itenhances their sense that they can engage in society. The AKP has sought to relaxprohibitions on head-scarves but has been reluctant to force the issue. The FethullahGulen movement, concerned with education and culture rather than politics, takes theposition that accommodation to secularism on this point may be advisable in the interestof enhancing educational opportunities for believers.

However, with the shift to the AKP came not simply a new name but a generationalshift in leadership from figures like Necmettin Erbakan who were traditional Islamistsantipathetic to Kemalism to figures like Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul whoreflected the new middle class, who appreciated its frustrations with the corruption andpetty politics with which the Kemalist regime had come to be identified, and who hadcome to the view that Turkish society, while frustrated and disillusioned with the statusquo, was not prepared to surrender many of the social changes of the twentieth century.In 2003, when the AKP achieved its big breakthrough with 34.3%, the more traditional-ist and confrontationalist Islamist SP or Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) won only 2.5% ofthe vote. Many of these new figures learned their political skills within the Islamist move-ment and in their private lives show their faith but have accepted limits to the capacity ofgovernment to implement an Islamist agenda. In part, this would seem to reflect anacceptance on their part of elements of Kemalism as part of a national consensus. Whilesome Kemalist elements persist in viewing any government with Islamist ties as beinginherently illegitimate, other Kemalists accept the AKP Government as having been dem-ocratically elected, and some, while not necessarily sharing the AKP’s ideology, havevoted for it on the basis of its relatively honest and competent government. Yavuz notesthat ‘…in Turkey the Islamic movements have been neither antimodern nor backward.Rather they are identity and justice-seeking movements’ (Yavuz 2003, p. 266). Yavuzsees the AKP as a party of communitarian or conservative democracy that, in the face ofglobalization, has little choice but to pursue liberal economic policies in spite of theexpectations of the economically marginalized that a party with Islamist roots might bemore interventionist. Given the conflicting expectations, the AKP, according to Yavuz,‘…is a party of social services (hizmet partisi), rather than being ideological; and it is extre-mely insecure vis-a-vis the state and the outside world, and it seeks to overcome thissense of insecurity by freeing Turkish society from the state’s ideology and removing allobstacles to private initiative’ (Yavuz 2009, p. 113). Turam suggests that polarization haseased as moderates have come to the fore among both Kemalists and Islamists. Turamobserves that ‘…the decline of the radical voices of both Islamism and laicism opened theway for a constructive reinterpretation and adjustment of Ataturkism.’ (Turam 2007,p. 144) and suggests that ‘The portrayal of Turkish society as deeply divided along thelines of Kemalism and Islamism is becoming a problematic overgeneralization, whichmisses their parallel historical transformations’ (Turam 2007, p. 145).

The Kemalist Revolution sought to subordinate Islam to the state, and to suppressthe Ottoman heritage in favour of specifically Turkish elements. This effort to emphasizethe distinctively Turkish elements of society came to be reflected not only in new

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interpretations of the past but in the arts and architecture, as well. One can point to theuse of Hittite symbols in the architecture of Ankara, the new capital chosen by Ataturk.The Islamist movement has reflected a resurgence in Islam outside of the supervisionof the state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs. Globalization has also had an impact in thatthe effort to achieve economic competitiveness has led to enhancement of the cosmopoli-tan, on the one hand, and to an attempt at branding – that is identifying what a city likeIstanbul aspiring to the status of a global city has that is distinctively its own – that hasled to a revival of Turkey’s Ottoman heritage. Paradoxically urban development andheritage preservation in Istanbul has come to emphasize the cosmopolitan and theOttoman at the expense of the Turkish. Houston considers the uneven effects of thesedevelopments on two different neighbourhoods in Istanbul (Houston 2001; Part I).Islamists made important gains in the national municipal elections of 1994, winning inIstanbul, Ankara and other major cities. This provided an opportunity to demonstrate inpractice a declared commitment to honest and effective service. One manifestation of thiswas change in the regulation of public space ruling out, for example, alcohol consump-tion in restaurants in urban parks, to provide congenial public space in which those whopractise their faith can still recreate with their families (See Houston 2001; Part I). Yavuzwrites that ‘This reconstruction of Ottoman identity has been at work for the last threedecades and has recently been articulated in art, literature, cuisine and politics. Islamicmovements in Turkey have always emphasized the Ottoman legacy in order to offer analternative source of shared identity’ (Yavuz 2009, p. 95). Schleifer observes that‘Nationalism is nothing new in Turkey. Yet, for much of the last century, it has meantrejecting the country’s Ottoman history. Today it means claiming it’ (Schleifer 2009,p. 32). Kasaba and Bozdogan note that ‘In popular culture, media and public discourse,one encounters numerous manifestations of ‘‘Ottomania’’’ (Kasaba & Bozdogan2000, p. 12). Among the implications is a shift from the Kemalist notion of Turkishnationalism in the direction of recognition of ethnic diversity. Kasaba and Bozdogansuggest that Turkey is changing as this ethnic diversity is becoming more accepted, asIslamist parties come to be seen as more legitimate political actors, and as globalizationspurs increased liberalization (Kasaba & Bozdogan 2000). Heper, however, ascribes theweakness of civil society to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the lack of incentivefor Kemalists in the early Republic to encourage the development of civil society, giventheir concern that rapid Westernization and modernization not be impeded (Heper 2000).

Current Debates

Until recently the academic literature focused on the implications of continuing tensionsbetween Kemalism and Islamism and dealt with issues like whether the military mightonce more intervene to bring down an Islamist government. Such questions invariablyinspired discussion on the consistency of such an intervention in the name of the defenceof the Kemalist legacy with the support for democratization and civilian government thatwas viewed by many as an integral element of that legacy. It should be noted that evenadmirers of Ataturk himself concede that his practice was not always consistent with hisexpressed beliefs. Over time his legacy has taken on some ambiguity. It is only fair to saythat even with the restraint imposed on the military by the expectations of the EuropeanUnion and international public opinion and with a growing acceptance in Turkish societyof the legitimacy of a party like the AKP, such concerns are not entirely a thing ofthe past. Some Kemalist elements continue to mistrust the AKP. Rouleau observes that‘Perhaps the most poignant irony of Kemalism today is the fact that the ‘‘Father of the



Turks’’ unalterably opposed any intervention by the armed forces in the affairs of state –a principle that his admirers have consistently violated for the last 40 years’ (Rouleau2000, p. 104). Howe takes the view that ‘…for all their good intentions, the militaryhave weakened Turkish democracy by their regular interventions and constantsupervision. They should show their faith in Ataturk’s revolution’ (Howe 2000, p. 249).Kinzer asserts that ‘It is in his true image, not in the distorted one promoted by themodern Kemalist elite, that the new Turkey must be shaped’ (Kinzer 2001, pp. 50–51).Keyman notes that the persistence of religious feeling manifests itself in political terms viaIslamist parties, economic terms via organizations like the Independent Business andIndustrialist Organization (the MUS_IAD or Mustakil Sanayaci ve Isadamlari Demegi), andcultural terms via, for example, the headscarf controversy. The effort to control religiousexpression in the name of secularism has, he argues, created a legitimacy crisis. Theoutcome, he argues, is that ‘…Turkish secularism needs to be reformed in such a waythat its state-centric mode of governing can be transformed into a democratic secularpolitics of secularism. What is needed in this context is a ‘‘democratic secular imaginary’’as a more dialogical, tolerant and accommodating strategy of living withdifference, enabling us to understand religious claims to difference in their own right andapproaching them emphatically and critically’ (Keyman 2007, pp. 228–229).

Nevertheless, increasingly discussion is turning to two other issues. The first is how tocharacterize the AKP – as an Islamist party, a formerly Islamist party, an Islamist-inspiredor influenced party, or as something else entirely. Jenkins writes that ‘Claims byopponents of the AKP that it wants to establish an Islamic state are probably exaggerated.But the AKP’s denials that it has a religious agenda are equally misleading. Islam informs,even if it does not dictate, the AKP’s policies’ (Jenkins 2008, p. 7). Dagi advances theview that ‘Having broken away from its origins, the AKP today stands squarely inthe centre-right band of the political spectrum, representing rising forces that haveconsiderable numbers and growing weight in society (due not least to economic growth),but who have long felt relegated to the sidelines of public life by strongly entrenchedbureaucratic state elites’ (Dagi 2008, p. 30). He asserts that ‘In sum, looking at the AKP’splatform, its public discourse, its social base, and above all its record in government, onedoes not see an Islamist faction, but rather a globalist, market-oriented, pro-Western, andpopulist political party’ (Dagi 2008, p. 30). Yavuz depicts the AKP as a conservativedemocratic party, rather than as an Islamist one (Yavuz 2009). Fuller expresses reserva-tions about Yavuz’s view that the AKP has moved from being an Islamist party, assertingthat he, Fuller, deems the AKP ‘…to be a form of Islamist party – one that is not onlymoderate but, more important is also exploring the very concept of what it means tocombine religious values with political life’ (Fuller 2008, p. 52). Rabasa and Larrabeeexamine four possible scenarios – the first, that the AKP continues to govern as moder-ates; the second, that ‘creeping Islamization’ takes place; the third, that the courts shutdown the AKP as a violation of constitutionally entrenched secularism; and the fourth,that the military intervenes (Rabasa & Larrabee 2008, Chapter 6, ‘Future Prospectsand Implications’). Since their book came out, the Constitutional Court rejected theargument that the AKP should be outlawed as unconstitutional, and military interven-tion, while still a possibility, has become more awkward and potentially damaging toTurkey’s image. The first scenario is probably the most likely. The second, ‘creepingIslamization’ is feared by some Kemalists almost as much as they fear an outright Islamistgovernment.

The second is whether the Turkish model for democracy in a predominantly Islamicsociety is something that can or should be applied in other predominantly Islamic

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societies. It is asserted by Fuller that ‘By accommodating rather than suppressing Islamistexpression of many popular grievances, Turkey has set important precedents for theMuslim world’ (Fuller 2004, p. 55). Fuller suggests that the AKP and the Fethullah Gulenmovement may each in its own way be fostering a rethinking of the relation betweenIslam and the state, moving towards notions not of state control over religion or viceversa but of state neutrality with respect to religion, and towards the notion of a nationalIslam that can be sensitive to local conditions without the loss of a sense of a universalIslam. Like the Nur movement, the Gulen movement represents an understanding ofIslam that is traditionalist but sympathetic to the pursuit of prosperity. Some view thismovement that eschews the direct political action of parties like the AKP as being fairlymoderate but others distrust the movement’s assistance to students, which they see as aneffort to socialize young professionals. The military and some Kemalists have indicatedconcern that, in their view, the Gulen movement may be infiltrating the police andbureaucracy. Adherents to such apolitical traditionalist Islamic movements as the Nur andGulen movements tended to support Ozal’s Motherland Party or ANAP (AnavatanPartisi), rather than Erbakan’s Welfare (Refah) Party, but now seem more likely tosupport the AKP. Fuller hypothesizes that ‘A form of nationally expressed Islam – onethat accepts but is independent of the state structure and its often state-controlled ulema– may be of particular relevance to other Muslim countries’ (Fuller 2008, p. 62).Noyon argues that the ‘Turkish experiment’ could have implications for the broaderIslamic world, observing that ‘Though Turkey’s struggle for identity and its secu-lar ⁄ Islamist split have not been resolved, huge strides have been made. Turkey’s experi-ence could argue that the rise of an Islamic current, far from being a sign ofretrogression and authoritarianism, may paradoxically signal the way forward, towards amore vibrant society and a more authentic democracy’ (Noyon 2003, p. 80). Yavuzcautions that ‘As opposed to many who believe otherwise, it is very problematic to useTurkey as a model of Islamic democracy and the Turkish experiment is unlikely to berepeated in other Muslim countries’ (Yavuz 2009, p. 115). Turam similarly adopts theview that ‘In general, the idea of Turkey as a model for the Middle East suffers fromfar too many flaws to be fully covered here. The Turkish trajectory cannot beexplained by either the unique characteristics of Islam and Islamists in Turkey or byAtaturk’s heritage of authoritarian modernization and the laicist republic’ (Turam 2007,p. 154). A further issue that has long inspired discussion, the future of the Kurds,continues to inspire discussion.

Conclusion

In a future election, the AKP may be re-elected, or as often happens in democracies, theymay be defeated, and a new party or parties may come to power. None of that is likelyto alter the fact that the range of opinion considered legitimate has been broadened.As elsewhere, some militant Islamists will never accept the sort of compromise andpragmatism implicit in democratic practice, and some secularists will always find publicexpression of religious faith to be illegitimate, but, for most, Turkish democracy isbecoming consolidated. While the current differences can be viewed as an entrenchedsecularist Kemalist elite valuing bureaucratic and military values and enjoying dominancein the bureaucracy and military being challenged by a newly affluent and newly urban-ized entrepreneurial elite feeling marginalized in spite of wealth and bringing with themthe beliefs and practices of Islam, and such an interpretation contains more than a littletruth, one would not want to dismiss the genuine philosophical and religious differences



at issue. It does seem that Islamism in Turkey has tended to avoid both the extreme ofleft-wing radicalism and the extreme of right-wing reaction and has come to be associ-ated with a religious traditionalism that can and often does coincide with market capital-ism and entrepreneurial attitudes. Only time can tell whether problems will arise for aparty like the AKP given expectations among the disadvantaged that an Islamist partyshould be more aggressive in assisting the poor. What all this may portend for otherpredominantly Islamic societies continues to be debated.

Short Biography

James G. Mellon is interested in the relationship between religion and politics, and thisinterest has been reflected in articles published in such journals as Totalitarian Movementsand Political Religions, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, the Journal of Military and StrategicStudies, and the Journal of Conflict Studies. He has also published on such topics as politicalphilosophy and urban studies in such journals as the Nashwaak Review, the CanadianJournal of Urban Research, and Ethics, Place and Environment. He graduated with a Bachelorof Arts from Saint Francis Xavier University, a Master of Arts in Political Studies fromQueen’s University (Kingston, Ontario), a Masters in Urban and Regional Planningfrom Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario), and a Ph.D. degree in Political Sciencefrom Dalhousie University. He has taught at Mount Allison, Lakehead, Saint Mary’s andDalhousie Universities. Current research interests include religion and politics, politicalphilosophy, and the role of culture and ideas in international relations.

Note

* Correspondence address: James G. Mellon, 3343 Westerwald Street. Apt. 14, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3N 2S6,Canada. Email: [email protected].

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