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Religeopolitics: Dissidentgeopolitics and the‘fundamentalism’ of Hamasand KachLari Nyroos

Version of record first published: 19 Oct 2007

To cite this article: Lari Nyroos (2001): Religeopolitics: Dissident geopoliticsand the ‘fundamentalism’ of Hamas and Kach, Geopolitics, 6:3, 135-157

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Religeopolitics:Dissident Geopolitics and the

'Fundamentalism' of Hamas and Kach

LARI NYROOS

This article highlights the close relationship of religion and geopolitics in general andwithin religious fundamentalist ideologies in Palestine/Israel in particular. A newconcept of 'dissident geopolitics' is used to circumvent state-centrism of Tuathailiancritical geopolitics and, furthermore, a new theoretical framework of 'religeopolitics' iselaborated and utilised in the following case study to pinpoint the geopolitical corewithin the ideologies of the movements of Hamas and Kach. Both movements areviolent, 'fundamentalist' and claim the Other to be the enemy and the self to be therightful owner of the territory of Palestine/Israel. The case study also shows howviolence is legitimised in relation to religion and geopolitics. Finally, suggestions aregiven to expound religeopolitics within other areas of IR scholarship, more related toeach other than ever in the post-11 September world.

Fundamentalism has flourished in the post-Cold War world where the 'rootsof conflicts are increasingly related to culture and identity'.1 The violenceconducted by fundamentalist groups is far too often, by media as well as bythe academia, culturalised and identified with generalisations such as'Muslim', 'Jewish' and 'Hindu'.2 It is sad that violent fundamentalist groupsare used as general examples of, for example, Islam, Judaism and Hinduism.True, fundamentalists claim to act in the name of religion but that does notjustify the use of bluntly generalising oversimplifications. Furthermore, theterm 'fundamentalism' has been questioned and is, as well, anoversimplification. Then, how can 'fundamentalist' ideologies beunderstood?

The question necessitates a discussion — far too rare — that is inclusive ofreligion, geography and politics (geography being the usual missing factor).Roger Stump succeeds in connecting religion and geography in the contextof 'fundamentalism'.3 We aim to connect recent scholarship of criticalgeopolitics to the path begun by Stump. A recent, widely cited, allegedattempt to connect geopolitics and 'fundamentalism' is MarkJuergensmeyer's Terror in the Mind of God in which explanations of

Lari Nyroos completed postgraduate studies in July 2001 at the London School of Economics andPolitical Science, obtaining an MSc in International Relations. Email: L.J.Nyroos@lse.ac.uk

Geopolitics, Vol.6, No.3 (Winter 2001) pp.135-157PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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religious violence are sought in the 'current forces of geopolitics and in astrain of violence that may be found at the deepest levels of religiousimagination'.4 Recognising geopolitics on grounds of critical theory, the'forces of geopolitics' do have more nuances than Juergensmeyer seems tothink. Furthermore, we argue, the territorial structure of Westphalianinternational order determines the global allocation and agenda of'fundamentalism', i.e. the specific geographical contextuality within which'fundamentalism' develops is pivotal to the shape of the phenomenon.5

We aim to deliver where Juergensmeyer fails: in connecting geopoliticsand religion. Hence, the purpose of the article is: (a) to go beyond generalisinglabels of blunt oversimplification such as 'Islamic/Jewish fundamentalism'and (b) to set up a tentative framework of 'religeopolitics' that connectsreligion, geography and politics. The 'fundamentalist' movements ofPalestinian Hamas and Israeli Kach are used as cases of 'dissident geopolitics'that operationalise 'religeopolitics' .6 Part one discusses briefly'fundamentalism' as a term as well as a phenomenon. In part two the conceptsof religion and geopiety will be examined in the contexts of geopolitics and'fundamentalism'. The third part consists of a comparative predicate discourseanalysis of the ideologies of Hamas and Kach exploring 'religeopolitics' thatjuxtaposes critical geopolitics, geopiety and 'fundamentalism'. Part four givessuggestions of advancement of religeopolitics.

'Fundamentalism'

The term 'fundamentalism' is by some traced to a specific ProtestantChristian experience that disqualifies the use of the term in the context ofother religions.7 Others do not use the term at all but prefer 'religiousextremism' or 'political religion', e.g. political Islam/Judaism andMuslim/Jewish extremism.8 We cannot, in our context of religion,geography and politics, talk about political Islam/Judaism orMuslim/Jewish extremism. Political phenomena and religion do often co-act but it is essential to draw a clear distinction between them: Islam andJudaism as religions and 'Islam' and 'Judaism' as social and politicalsystems.9 Instead of making our discussion unnecessarily complicated weprefer 'fundamentalism' leaving the many disagreements considering theterm open to further discussion.

Bruce Lawrence defines 'fundamentalism' as 'the affirmation ofreligious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criticismnor reduction; it is expressed through the collective demand that specificcreedal and ethical dictates derived from scripture be publicly recognisedand legally enforced'.10 Following Roger Stump, we go beyond Lawrence'sdefinition and place 'fundamentalism' in its contemporary context, that is,

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today's Westphalian international order. Thus, firstly, 'fundamentalist'groups share the following features:

a conviction that contemporary trends pose a threat to their religiousfaith and the worldview associated with it; a sense of ideologicalisolation from the rest of the world; a commitment to the preservationof the certainties embodied in their religious traditions; their resultingself-identification as the only legitimate moral community; and anuncompromising dedication to fighting some 'other' that they identifyas the enemy of religious truth.11

Secondly, 'fundamentalism' must be recognised as a phenomenon that isconnected to geography through (a) the specific geographical contextualitywithin which it develops,12 and (b) 'an inherent spatial dimension expressedthrough assertions of territoriality: that is, through attempts to exert controlover the meaning and uses of particular portions of geographical space'.13

Religion, Geography, Politics

'Modernists' today, such as Fred Halliday and Mark Juergensmeyer, definereligion as a set of ideas and discourses.14 As argued by Talal Asad, this'modern' notion of religion distorts our understanding of non-Western post-Reformation religions since it is uniquely a construction of liberal Westernmodernity.15 Asad's critique may be valid. However, it disregards geographyand its implications on religion.

The post-1945 wave of decolonisation completed the mapping of theworld into a territorial structure of the Westphalian international order -established with the Peace of Augsberg (1555) and the Congress ofWestphalia (1648) - of 'distinct and sovereign states whose boundarieswere defined by international agreements'.16 One of the main principles ofWestphalia was cujus regio, ejus religio (the ruler determines the religion ofhis realm) that privatised or nationalised religion in international publiclife.17 'It was in the seventeenth century ... that the earliest systematicattempts at producing a universal definition of religion were made."8

Hence, on the level of Western post-Reformation social consensus orideology, the definition of religion changed from the 'medieval' matter ofthe group to the 'modern' matter of the individual,19 coinciding with theestablishment of Western nation-states.

The international system of nation-states and the concept of the nation-state itself were both invented and coerced by the West upon the rest of theworld and, since definition of religion is relative to the international systemand its components and power structure,20 geography affected definitionalpractices. Geography is a 'product of histories of struggle between

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competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy and administerspace'.21 Meaning is imposed, i.e. 'geo-graphed'.22 'Geo-graphing' is apolitical act and, thus, geopolitics is a 'particular mode of representingglobal space'.23 In the seventeenth century, with the establishment of aWestphalian international order, the understanding of geography changedtogether with the definition of religion: from a 'medieval' representation ofa divine order of vertical and hierarchic organisation of places (i.e.sacred/profane and celestial/terrestrial) to a 'modern' representation ofhorizontal organisation of coexistent sovereign places of so-called 'nation-states'.24

Human beings - defined as animal symbolicum that lives 'in a newdimension of reality' created by language and symbolism - have a deepdread of disorder and, hence, religion functions to fulfil the profound needfor order.25 The Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldoun argued in the fourteenthcentury that '[w]ith the help of [the senses of hearing, vision, smell, tasteand touch], man takes the pictures of the sensibilia, applies his mind tothem, and thus abstracts from them other pictures'.26 Considering that theactions of humans are 'well arranged and orderly' and actions of non-humans are 'not [as] well arranged and orderly'27- one could assert that(upper-case, 'universal') Reality is chaotic, and that is why humans wouldtry to arrange it by entering an orderly 'new dimension' of (lower-case,'particular') reality. This reality is (these réa l i té are) structured byperceptions of Reality (unintelligible chaos) using the human instruments oflanguage and symbolism that construct realit/es (intelligible order). In thiscontext, religion and geography create new dimensions of reality throughlanguage and symbolism that fulfils human beings' profound need fororder.28 Hence, 'human territoriality, in the sense of attachment to place,differs ... from the territoriality of animals unburdened by symbolicthought'.29

John Kirtland Wright termed the connection between religion andgeography 'geopiety'.30 'This assumes a sense of belonging to, andownership of, homeland as an exclusive right emanating from a divine, orother supernatural, claim to territory.'31 Geopiety is the product of 'religiousgeography' that, in Stump's words, 'focuses on religion's role in shapinghuman perceptions of the world and of humanity's place within it; itsprimary concerns are the role of theology and cosmology in theinterpretation of the universe'.32 Geography is closely linked to the'architecture of enmity', that is, how 'territorially elaborated collectivitieslocate themselves in the world and thus how they practice the meanings ofself and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for regarding othersas threats or antagonists'.33 In the case of 'fundamentalism', religion andgeography are used simultaneously in an 'architecture of enmity': as in

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Stump's definition of 'fundamentalism', mentioned above, as 'anuncompromising dedication to fighting some 'other' that they identify asthe enemy of religious truth'. If 'fundamentalism' seeks authority over aterritory that is referred to in holy scripture it is done by referring to aparticular religion/theology (dimension of reality) and particulargeography/cosmology (dimension of reality) that are operationalised in acontext of current/sought order (dimension of reality) producing anarchitecture of enmity.

Both Islam and Judaism are monotheistic religions with manysimilarities, for example the recognition of Abraham (Ibrahim/Avraham) aspatriarch and first prophet. An example of religiopolitical friction creatinggeographies is Kamal Salibi's attempt in The Bible Came from Arabia togeo-graph the sacred biblical sites from Palestine/Israel to the Asir districtsouth of Mecca, Saudi Arabia.34 Consequently, Salibi represents sacredglobal space through archaeology (sight), linguistic and etymologicalmethodology (cite) and geo-graphing (the cite of site).35 Thus, Salibiexemplifies clearly the interplay between religion, geography and politics,i.e. religeopolitics.

Gearöid Ö Tuathail and John Agnew suggested that geopolitics 'shouldbe critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by whichintellectuals of statecraft "spatialize" international politics in such a way asto represent a "world" characterised by particular types of places, peoplesand dramas'.36 The discipline of critical geopolitics

is concerned as much with maps of meaning as it is with maps ofstates ... [B]oundary drawing practices ... are both conceptual andcartographic, imaginary and actual, social and aesthetic. Criticalgeopolitics is particularly interested in analysing the interdigitation ofall these practices, in examining how certain conceptualspatializations of identity, nationhood and danger manifest themselvesacross the landscapes of states and how certain political, social andphysical geographies in turn enframe and incite certain conceptual,moral and/or aesthetic understandings of self and other, security anddanger, proximity and distance, indifference and responsibility.37

In this context, religions in different enmities are pivotal in today's world as'we witness a simultaneity of structural globalisation and culturalfragmentation'.38 The authenticity of the units of the system - the nation-states - as the legitimate arbiters of their own internal affairs may be a givenfact in international affairs but not necessarily recognised by the populationof these states.39 'Fundamentalism', as noted above, perceives today's worldas a threat and does not recognise the legitimacy of the prevailing order.

Furthermore, geopolitics must not be viewed as a singularity, but as a

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threefold typology of practical, formal and popular geopolitics.40 Practicalgeopolitics is the geopolitical reasoning of state leaders and foreign policybureaucracies; formal geopolitics, the 'strategic communities' of academiaand think tanks; and popular geopolitics, the popularisation of geopoliticalreasoning of practical and formal geopolitics through the means of massmedia, cinema, novels, cartoons etc. These three types of geopoliticalreasoning result in a spatialisation of boundaries and dangers, i.e. anarchitecture of enmity. However, the three-folded geopolitical world map ofmeaning is statecentric and does not provide a framework for geopoliticsand religion. Therefore, in order to make way for the multi-disciplinarynature of geopolitics,41 a fourth typology should be included. We choose tocall it dissident geopolitics.

The notion of dissident geopolitics is based on Paul Routledge'sapproach to critical geopolitics that emphasises social movements.42 Hence,it 'challenges] the power of both the state and international institutions toenact particular economic and political programs'.43 Social movements havepreviously been included within the analysis of the state. However, intoday's global era of mobility, movement and rapid informationdistribution, social movements cannot be treated as reducible to states; theypresent alternatives and challenge, and they are increasingly organised on aregional and international level. Thus, the need for a notion of dissidentgeopolitics in the geopolitical world-map of meaning in the post-Cold Warworld is pivotal as 'fundamentalism' - that perceives today's world as athreat and does not recognise the legitimacy of the prevailing order - hasflourished and we have witnessed a resurgence of religion that transgressesWestphalian borders.44 The dissident geopolitics of 'fundamentalism' act inrelation to, and against, practical, formal and popular geopolitics, and viceversa.

Dissident geopolitics is to be used together with the concept of geo-power, in our context 'geo(theo)power' (slightly modified in order to jolt itfrom state-centrism): the functioning of geographical knowledge not as aninnocent body of knowledge and learning but as an ensemble oftechnologies of power concerned with the production of (sacral) territorialspace.45 Thus, geo(theo)power is a power-knowledge relationship withpower and knowledge directly implying one another, i.e. '[t]here is nopower relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge,nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same timepower relations'.46 Remember the discussion on 'fundamentalism' abovewhere we, drawing on Stump and Robert Sack, placed the phenomenon in'an inherent spatial dimension expressed through assertions of territoriality:that is, through attempts to exert control over the meaning and uses ofparticular portions of geographical space'.

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In sum, 'fundamentalists' make use of geo(theo)power becomingdissident geopoliticians and operationalising religeopolitics: the tools ofpower/knowledge of religion, geography and politics. In other words,'fundamentalists' geo-graph territory (cite the site) through geo-piouspractices (cites) and, consequently, create an architecture of enmity withinthe Westphalian international order (sight the cite) in which they are forcedto act, which they seek to abolish. It is this kind of a 'map of meaning' weshall now turn to: the 'fundamentalist' religeopolitics of Palestine/Israel.

Religeopolitics in Palestine/Israel: The Dissident Geopolitics of Hamasand Kach

Violence has long been a common denominator between the antagonists inthe territory of Palestine/Israel; Islam/Judaism symbolises the territory asMuslim/Jewish homeland and 'fundamentalist' movements legitimateviolence for the sake of supremacy over it. 'Fundamentalist' ideologies areoften surprisingly similar;47 in the cases of Palestinian Hamas and IsraeliKach their ideological core is sui generis based on geography: a territorialclaim in the name of God (Allah/Elohim) for the supremacy over the so-called 'Holy Land' (al-Ard ul-Muqaddasa/Eretz ha-Kodesh) with itsturbulent epicentre of the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount (al-Haram ush-Sharif/Har ha-Bayit) in Jerusalem (al-Quds/Yerushalayim).

The Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine (Harakat ul-Muqawamafi Filastin) - 'nick-named' Hamas ('Zeal') - was established in 1988 byrenegade leaders of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)- among them Shaykh Ahmed Yasin, today spiritual leader of Hamas. TheMB is originally an Egyptian movement founded by Hasan al-Banna in1928. In contrast to the Palestinian MB renouncing violence, Hamasadvocated a violent resistance against Israel and participated actively in thefirst Palestinian Intifada-uprising (1987-92) with its military-wing ofIzzedin Qassam Battalions {Kata'ib 'Izz id-Din il-Qassam) that since hasbeen active throughout the 1990s as well as in the second Intifada thaterupted in 2000.48

Kach ('Thus') originates from the Jewish Defense League (JDL), agroup formed by Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1968 in New York. He lateremigrated to Israel and established an Israeli JDL branch that changed itsname to Kach and was established as an Israeli political party, elected to theKnesset in 1984 and subsequently banned in 1988. Kahane was assassinatedin 1990 and splinter-group Kahane Chai ('Kahane lives') was establishedby Kahane's son Binyamin Zev Kahane (assassinated on 31 December2000). Both Kach and Kahane Chai were outlawed in 1994 after BaruchGoldstein's attack at Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of the Patriarchs {al-Haram ul-

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Ibrahimi/Me'arat ha-Makhpela) in Hebron (al-Khalil/Khevron) killing 29Muslims. However, the movements are today de facto existent in anunderground loosely knit organisation called Koach ('Power'). Hence, sincethe name-changes do not signify changes in ideology, the most well-knownof Kach is used for the sake of convenience.49

The connection religion-geography-politics will now be illustrated byuncovering the concepts of territory and violence within the ideologies ofHamas and Kach. How is territory perceived, defined and claimed for? Bywhat reasoning is violence legitimised for the sake of supremacy overPalestine/Israel? The method of discourse analysis we use focuses onlanguage practises of predication, i.e. the verbs, adverbs and adjectives thatattach to nouns.

Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sortof thing, with particular features and capacities. Among the objects soconstituted may be subjects, defined through being assigned capacitiesfor and modes of acting and interacting ... [A] text never constructs onlyone thing. Instead, in implicit or explicit parallels and contrasts, otherthings (other subjects) will also be labelled and given meaningfulattributes by their predicates. A set of predicate constructs defines aspace of objects differentiated from, while being related to, one another.50

Hamas's Discourse of Territory

The common worldview of Islam, and the worldview of Hamas, is centredon the conceptualisation and categorisation of the world into the 'Abode ofPeace' (Dar ul-Islam),5' and the 'Abode of War' (Dar ul-Harb).sl In IslamicShad'a law all territory under the rule of Islam is perceived as an abode ofpeace.53 It is territory that must not be abandoned.54 However, the territoryper se is not of central interest but rather the universal Islamic Umma(community) of all Muslims which is the boundary drawing entity of theIslamic world.55 Shari'a law 'binds individuals with respect to the Muslimcommunity they belong to, not to the territory they live in'.56 The people ofa territory and their allegiance to Islam is the deciding factor on whether todesignate a territory as an abode of peace or war, a mere proclamation thatit 'belongs to Islam' is not enough.57

In the discourse of Hamas, the status of the territory is perceived as anabode of war due to the 'occupation' of the land by the 'Zionist entity', i.e.the state of Israel. Palestine was designated as an abode of peace whenconquered by the 'Islamic Army' of Caliph Umar in 638 AD and thereforeforbidden to abandon: '[GJiving up any part of Palestine is like giving uppart of its religion.'58 Hamas, in a metaphorical geographical sense,perceives 'Muslim Palestine' (Filastin ul-Muslima) as 'the heart of the

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earth, the meeting of the continents, and the lure of the avaricious'.59

Spiritually and metaphysically, it is a site of 'evil' (i.e. 'Zionistoccupation'), and a site of struggle, Jihad, to 'conquer, break and annihilateevil' and replace it with 'truth' : an Islamic State.60 Alluding to past 'heroes'or martyrs (ash-Shuhada ') and 'Soldiers of God' (al-Miijahidun),61 MuslimPalestine is also a site of sacrifice:

The Muslims have had full - not partial - right to Palestine forgenerations, in the past, present and future. This is not only the rightof the Palestinians or the Arabs alone, and no Palestinian generationhas the right to concede the land, steeped in martyrs' blood.62

The goal is, in a cosmological sense, to 'connect earth and heaven witha strong bond' .63 It will be realised by 'raising the banner of Allah on everyinch of Palestine'64 and thus 'the call may be broadcast over the Minaretsproclaiming the Islamic state' .6S Muslim Palestine is geographically definedas stretching 'from the [Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] sea',66 i.e. theterritory of the League of Nations British Mandate of Palestine (LNBMP)between 1946 and 1948,67 which today includes the territories under controlof the State of Israel and the Palestine National Authority, excluding theoccupied and annexed Golan Heights. Therefore, Muslim Palestine is arestoration of the borders of the mandate, mainly because a cleardemarcation of 'Palestine' did not exist before the British rule.68 However,the discursive focus of Hamas is placed on narrating Palestine as 'Muslimland'. It is Hamas's 'firm belief that the territory

[i]s an Islamic Waqf [endowment] upon all Muslim generations till theday of Resurrection. It is not right to give it up nor any part of it...This is the legislation in the Islamic Shari'a, and the same goes for allthe lands accessed and consecrated by Muslims at the time ofconquering for all Muslim generations till the day of Resurrection.And so it was when the leaders of the Islamic Army, after conqueringIraq and Sham [i.e. Syria], sent [a letter] to the Muslims' Caliph'Umar ibn al-Khatab, asking for his advice concerning the accessedlands ... They [the Caliph in consultation with the companions ofProphet Muhammad] came to the decision that the benefits andblessings of the land should stay in the hands of its owner. As for itsreal ownership, it should become a trust for the Muslim[s] ... and thistrust is permanent as long as the heavens and the earth last.69

This discourse produces knowledge of the territory as a Waqf, a holyIslamic endowment 'for all Muslim generations till the day ofResurrection'. The concept of Waqf was established during the eighthcentury AD, and therefore mentioned neither in the Koran (al-Qur'an) nor

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the Sunna of the Prophet.™ In a historical Islamic context, the religiousestablishment owned Waqf-endowment land for the purpose of buildingreligious units, e.g. mosques, centres of religious education, andcommercial units or cultivation whose profits were devoted to the poor."Furthermore, Waqf land is 'static' in the sense that its ownership cannotchange, not even in times of political or social unrest.72 This understandingof Waqf is interfering with Hamas's discourse. Firstly, Waqf is expressed asan 'endowment of land', the entire territory of Muslim Palestine, 'promisedfor the future Muslim generations' by Caliph Umar. Secondly, Caliph Umarruled 634-644 AD, in the seventh century, and therefore could not havedesignated Palestine as a Waqf using that term.

The claim functioning without firm historical-theological supportrequires a fortification of the holiness of the land. Palestine is emphasisedas having a 'special place in the Islamic creed',73 due to the special and holystatus of Jerusalem in Islam. It was towards the Aqsa mosque {al-Masjid ul-'Aqsa) on the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount in Jerusalem that Muslimsfaced during prayer in the formative period of Islam, i.e. the Aqsa mosquewas the first Qibla, direction to which Muslims turn in praying, in Islam.74

Furthermore, Jerusalem is the site of Prophet Muhammad's midnightjourney to the seven heavens (al-Isra' wal-Mi'raj), and therefore, a holysanctuary third in order after Mecca and Medina.75 It is threatened by the'Zionist plan' on 'demolishing [the] Aqsa [mosque] and building the so-called 'Third Temple' [in Hebrew: ha-Beyit ha-Shlishi] on its present site'.76

Jerusalem has a pivotal position in Hamas's iconography that has a wide-ranging effect of 'spill-over' resulting in that Muslim Palestine, and notonly Jerusalem, is the 'holy soil' of the Midnight Journey.77 Hence, not onlyJerusalem, but Muslim Palestine is a metaphysical 'soil' tremendously hardto concede sovereignty over. Consequently, emphasis is continuouslyplaced on all of the land as religiously laden: 'As far as the ideology of theIslamic Resistance Movement is concerned, giving up any part of Palestineis like giving up part of its religion'.78

Kach's Discourse of Territory

There is a distinction between the State of Israel {Medinat Israel) and the Landof Israel (Eretz Israel): the State is 'the hand of G-d [i.e. God]. It was createdas proof of His existence and power to [the] world',79 whereas the Land is the'Holy Land', the territory of the Jews given by God for the purpose of creatinga holy society.80 It is 'a holy and special and separate Jewish land'.81 The sourceof the claim to the Land of Israel, Eretz Israel, is in the Torah. The Jews weregiven a specific land and commanded to live there. The following passage inthe Torah is alluded to: 'And I will give unto thee [Abraham] and to thy seedafter thee ... all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be

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MAP 1. MUSLIM PALESTINE/LAND OF ISRAEL

Cyprus

MEDITERRANEAN SEASyria

-'/Jawlan/Golan SYRIAN DESERT

Saudi Arabia

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their G-d'.82 Thus, the 'entire Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people,alone. There are no other legitimate claimants'.83

The borders of the Land of Israel is defined by Kach in allusion 'fromthe wilderness and Lebanon, from the river, the river Euphrates, even untothe uttermost sea',84 and 'from the river of Egypt unto the great river, theRiver Euphrates'.85 However, there is no general agreement on the exactborders of the Land of Israel within the Zionist/Judaic discourses. Some(maximalist) scholars believe the biblical definition to include most ofmodern Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.86 The biblicalreference is wanting as a geographical definition since it lacks a 'fourthborder': the boundary to the south. In an interview, Kahane includes asouthern border in his definition:

The southern boundary goes up to El Arish, which takes in all ofnorthern Sinai, including Yamit. To the east, the frontier runs alongthe western part of the East Bank of the Jordan river, hence part ofwhat is now Jordan. Eretz Israel also includes part of the Lebanon andcertain parts of Syria, and part of Iraq, all the way to the Tigris river.87

The Land of Israel, in Kahane's definition (which he calls 'minimal'),includes the LNBMP, the Jordan Valley, Wadi al-Araba and the Amman-Irbid area, part of the Sinai Peninsula, south Lebanon, the Syrian Desertstretching from Damascus to the outskirts of Baghdad (see Map 1). TheKach definition seems to be of a maximalist character even though it is a so-called 'minimal' definition. This due to its deviation from the canonicalreference in that the eastern border of the Land of Israel stretches to theTigris river, beyond Euphrates. In regard of the western boundary, thedefinition seems to take a minimalist standpoint in that it stops short of mostpart of Sinai (stretching to Al Arish and Yamit). Indeed, some scholars havedefined the 'river of Egypt' not as the Nile but a wadi, the bed of a stream,on the north coast of Sinai.88

Rabbi Meir Kahane's son, Binyamin Zev Kahane, goes a step further inthe case of Lebanon and argues that all of it is a 'holy part of Israel, more[so] than the Golan'.89 Furthermore,

[t]he Jew is forbidden to give up any part of the Land of Israel. Theland belongs to the G-d of Israel and the Jew, given it by G-d, has noright to give away any part of it. All the areas past liberated (includingthose currently under the 'Palestinian Authority'), or areas which maybe liberated in the future, must be annexed, made part of the State ofIsrael, and populated by Jews as rapidly as possible.90

Thus, Israel should have declared after the 1967 war, when having territorialcontrol from the Suez to the Golan Heights, that '[a]ll this land is ours,

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historically; it is Jewish from the times of the Bible; it is officially ours andit will never be abandoned'.91

A Palestinian state is contested by Kach arguing that Judaism, is a 'land-centred faith',92 and 'a people-oriented belief'.93 Thus, Judaism 'disdains theidea that a piece of land takes precedence over a people, that a piece of landdecides the status of the people living in it. Judaism states that a peopledefines the land'.94 The 'imagined Palestinian community' is contested by acounter-narrative:

There is no 'Palestine' or 'Palestinian people' ... The Roman EmperorHadrian changed the name of our land trom [sic] Judea - the landof[sic] the Jews, to 'Palestina' - the land of the Philistines, aftercrushing Bar Kochba's revolt. It was the Roman design to destroy theJewish people by erasing the name of our homeland ... Israel will liveforever; 'Palestine' never was even born.95

Therefore, a Palestinian state co-existing side by side with a Jewish state isout of the question, since the designation of 'Palestine' and 'Palestinians' islooked upon as a construction and a corruption of a fraud. If there are no'Palestinians', then neither are there a people who can 'define the land'.

Hamas's Discourse of Violence

Jihad is a term most often connected in a 'Western mind' with the notion of'holy war'. However, there is no exact equivalent in Arabo-Islamicvocabulary for the Christian theological notion of 'holy war'.96 Thejuridical-theological meaning of Jihad is 'exertion of one's power in Allah'spath, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His wordsupreme over this world'.97 Faced with persecution, Muslims have twochoices, either emigration (Hijra) from the abode of war, or Jihad. It is truethat one of the meanings of Jihad is warfare in the form of a defensivewarfare. Jihad is also a non-violent notion, an obligation on all Muslims to(a) exert themselves in order to realise the will of God, (b) lead virtuouslives, and (c) extend the Umma-community through preaching, educationand so on.98

The resistance of Hamas against the 'Zionist entity' is expressed interms of Jihad, both as a struggle by violent and non-violent means: Jihad isthe 'methodology' of Hamas.99 In a less emphasised fashion, Jihad isunderstood as a non-violent struggle: 'The good word, excellent article,beneficial book, aid, and support, if intentions are pure, so that the bannerof Allah is the most-high, is a Jihad for the sake of Allah."00 Hamas

looks forward to fulfil the promise of Allah no matter how long ittakes because [Prophet Muhammad] says: The Last Hour would not

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come until the Muslims fight against the Jews and the Muslims wouldkill them, and until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone ora tree and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim or Servant of Allahthere is a Jew behind me; come and kill him; but the tree of Gharqadwould not say it, for it is the tree of the Jews.101

Jihad is obligatory for every Muslim when 'an enemy occupies some ofthe Muslim lands ... In the struggle against the Jewish occupation ofPalestine, the banner of Jihad must be raised'.102 Both men and women areobligated to fight the enemy by Jihad as Mujahidun: 'Soldiers of God'.103 Itis the task of God's soldiers to conduct the Jihad 'against the occupier as alegitimate right of an oppressed people'.104 It is the only form of resistancebecause ' [t]here is no solution to the Palestinian Problem except by Jihad' .105

Kach's Discourse of Violence

The concept of 'Love of Jewry' {Ahavat Israel) advocated by Kach,commits to defend all Jews, that are part of the 'great body' of Israel,wherever they might be in need. It is the obligation of a Jew to do all that isnecessary to defend another Jew. Therefore, 'violence is never good butsometimes necessary',106 i.e. 'Jewish violence to protect Jewish interests isnever bad"07 The commitment to 'Love of Jewry' is alluded to in the Torah:'Thou shalt not stand idly by your brother's blood',108 allowing a broadframework of violence in the conflict laden 'Holy Land', and the raisond'être of revenge and vengeance by violent means. Hence, violenceaccording to Kach is legitimised in certain situations by a so-called 'Jewishprinciple of pre-emptive self-defence' found in the Jewish religious 'code ofidea' of Halakha: 'if one comes to slay you, arise and slay him first'.109Therule is not limited to a situation 'where one is pointing a gun to your head',but 'one is permitted to anticipate potential danger to one's life' and act.110

Therefore, '[w]e must "rise up" ... and think a few logical steps ahead sothat we can kill the murderous trespasser [i.e. the Palestinians] before it istoo late'.111

The 'Arab-Jewish issue' is more than a political dispute to Kach: 'it is areligious war."12 A 'war against evil' that is 'part and parcel to the goal ofbringing good to the world'.113 ('He who sheds the blood of the wicked isconsidered as having brought a sacrifice."14) The proposed reaction againstthe first Palestinian Intifada issued by the Kach movement in 1989 wasuncompromising: "The Jewish State must put an immediate end to the Arabuprising by any and all means necessary."15 Judaism speaks of

'a time to love and a time to hate, a time for war and a time for peace'with the need and commandment to love the good and hate the evil, toseek peace but to go to war against the wicked, with vengeance, at the

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proper time, an obligation, in order to show that there is ... justice inthe world."6

The Palestinian Intifada was thus a time for war. Kach argued for allowingthe Israel Defence Forces 'the free use of weapons against stone-throwersand other attackers of Israelis, as well as permission for Jewish civilianstravelling in the occupied territories and under attack, to use their weaponsfreely in the same manner as soldiers'.1"

Conclusion: Discourses of Dissident Religsopolitics

The first purpose of the article was to go beyond generalising labels of bluntoversimplification such as 'Islamic/Jewish fundamentalism'. We havedescribed the discursive practises of Hamas and Kach asking: How isterritory perceived, defined and claimed for? By what reasoning is violencelegitimised for the sake of supremacy over Palestine/Israel? The answers tothese questions are illustrated in a map of meaning/architecture of enmitybelow (Table 1). Focusing on language practises of predication we can drawthree conclusions as regards understanding the 'fundamentalist' ideologiesof the movements.

Firstly, Hamas and Kach make use of geo(theo)power becomingdissident geopoliticians engaging religeopolitics: the tools ofpower/knowledge of religion, geography and politics. In other words,Hamas and Kach geo-graph territory (site/cite) into an entity (sight) throughgeo-pious practises (site/cite) and, consequently, create an architecture ofenmity within the Westphalian international order in which they are forcedto act. Hamas, contrary to Kach, is forced to refer to the colonial post-Ottoman cartographic production of Palestine due to the lack of referencesin Islamic holy scriptures to the borders of the territory. The production ofWaqf is used for the purpose of creating theological legitimacy for theclaim. For Hamas the central reference in Palestine is Jerusalem due to thestatus of holiness it is allocated in the Islamic scriptures. The discursivepractise of 'land steeped in blood' produces geopiety. Kach's production ofthe Land of Israel is less complicated because of the many references inholy scripture. However, the production of a counter-narrative vis-à-visPalestinian production of knowledge is pivotal. The claim to the territory isdefined by the people, i.e. by the divine promise of the land to the Jewishpeople, whereas Hamas's claim is defined with reference to Islamic law.

Secondly, in the case of Palestine/Israel the territory is a site of frictionbetween two religious claims, two geographies but only one internationalorder. The ultimate goal of Hamas's dissident geopolitics is to abolish theWestphalian international order and instead create an Islamic internationalorder globally. The goal of Kach's dissident geopolitics is to abolish the

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TABLE 1DISSIDENT GEOPOLITICS: MAP OF MEANING/ARCHITECTURE OF ENMITY

The 'Islam' of Hamas The 'Judaism' of Kach

TERRITORY

Sight of Muslim Palestine:'from the river to the sea'i.e. LNBMP

Site/Cite of Centrality:'heart of the earth; meeting of the continents'Site/Cite of Eternity:'permanent trust for the Muslims; not right togive it up nor any part of it'

Site/Cite of Holiness:'holy soil of the Midnight Journey; specialplace in the Islamic creed; Muslim; Waqf;giving up part of it is like giving up part ofreligion'Site/Cite of Evil:'Zionist occupation, Other; abode of war'

Site/Cite of Threats:'threatened by a Zionist plan'Site/Cite of Sacrifice:'steeped in martyrs' blood; Jihad'

Site/Cite of a State:'every inch of it will be under the bannerof Allah, a future Islamic State'Site/Cite of Geo-graphing:'defined by law'

Sight ofEretz Israel:'from the wilderness to the river to thesea'i.e. LNBMP, western Jordan, (northern)Sinai, (south) Lebanon, Syrian Desertfrom Damascus to Baghdad (Tigris river)Site/Cite of Centrality:'special; separate'Site/Cite of Eternity:'never to be abandoned; no right to giveaway any part of it'Site/Cite of Holiness:'holy; given by G-d for the purpose ofcreating a holy society; belongs to theG-d of Israel, Jewish, thus forbidden to itsgive up any part'Site/Cite of Evil:'illegitimate claimants, Other; religiouswar'Site/Cite of Threats:'threatened by murderous trespassers'Site/Cite of Sacrifice:'defence of Jewry; ours historically(historical sacrifice)'Site/Cite of a State:'State of Israel, the hand of G-d'

Site/Cite of Geo-graphing:'defined by people'

LEGITIMISATION OF VIOLENCE

'only as an obligatory Jihad, no othersolution; against a vicious Nazi-enemy;against the Jewish occupation of Palestine;right of an oppressed people; predicted bythe Prophet; God's will'

'commitment of defence of Jewry; toprotect Jewish interests; pre-emptive self-defence; anticipation of potential danger;against the "murderous trespasser",attackers of Israelis, the wicked at the propertime, sometimes necessary, an obligation;religious war against evil, part of bringinggood; to demonstrate justice'

Westphalian international order regionally in order to release the Land ofIsrael and set it under Jewish authority, a Jewish regional order, i.e. theinternational context is of no interest. Thus, the 'fundamentalism' ofHamas's 'Islam' and Kach's 'Judaism' is a religious and a geopolitical'dimension of reality' of dissident geopolitics functioning in the map of

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meaning and architecture of enmity of Palestine/Israel and'Islam'/'Judaism'.

Finally, 'fundamentalism' must be placed in geographical contextuality,that is, in the case of Hamas and Kach, in the territorial structure of theWestphalian international order. The 'fundamentalism' of Hamas and Kachis not Islamic and Judaic in the sense that it is a product of religion; they areproducts of religion connected to geography within a framework of politics,i.e. authority and power. Consequently, 'fundamentalism' andgeo(theo)power go hand in hand within the framework of dissidentgeopolitics; as discussed above, fundamentalism attempts to exert controlover the meaning and uses of particular portions of geographical space andit is uncompromisingly dedicated to fighting the contemporary order, e.g.the enemy 'other'. Dissident geopolitics do take us beyond generalisinglabels.

Expounding Religeopolitics

The second purpose of the article was to set up a tentative framework of'religeopolitics' that connects religion, geography and politics. Studying thedissident geopolitics and 'fundamentalism' of Hamas and Kach we havebeen able to do this. We demonstrated how 'fundamentalist' ideology worksdiscursively in Palestine/Israel and how it relates to the 'forces ofgeopolitics'. Our initial discussion on religion was connected to geographythat in turn was hooked to geopolitics. The case studies of Hamas and Kachwere pinned down to a map of meaning/architecture of enmity (Table 1)illustrating their dissident geopolitics and 'fundamentalism', i.e. theirdiscourses of dissident religeopolitics. These discourses showed clearsimilarities with regard to the notions of dissident geopolitics,geo(theo)power, geo-graphing, architecture of enmity and the Westphalianinternational order. As tentatively demonstrated in this article, it is withinthese notions that the framework of religeopolitics vis-à-vis'fundamentalism' ought to be set up.

Palestine/Israel is probably the most clear and workable case whenconnecting scholarship of 'fundamentalism' with religion and geopolitics.Nevertheless, religeopolitics can be applied to other 'fundamentalist'movements as well as other areas of scholarship. An area not dwelled on hereis that of nationalism; Anthony D. Smith's recent attempt to connectnationalism and religion could be fruitful ground to expound religeopolitics.118

Furthermore, scholarship within international relations in general and foreignpolicy analysis in particular can also take advantage of the concept."9

There is no reason to leave religeopolitics within particular micro levelsof 'fundamentalism' and dissident geopolitics. The resurgence of religion

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within the globalised international system in the post-Cold War era is anarea of study where religeopolitics can be engaged on the macro level.States, such as the Taliban state of Afghanistan, make use of religeopoliticsthat, consequently, due to its state-centricity is under the typology ofpractical, formal and popular geopolitics. In that context, dissidentgeopolitics would be the opposition to the state's world-view.

If the attacks of 11 September 2001, on the World Trade Center and thePentagon, are traced to 'fundamentalist' perpetrators and ideology thenreligeopolitics ought to be one of the tools to understand the enemy that weare up against.120 Hence, the 'fundamentalists' have taken their challengeagainst the Westphalian international order to a new level. It is now of theutmost importance that we under no circumstances make use of a discourseof 'religious war', 'cultural showdown' or 'clash of civilisations'. If we do,we as well operationalise religeopolitics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Andreas Behnke, University Adjunct at the Department of Political Science, StockholmUniversity, helped with valuable comments and invaluable encouragement. David Newman,editor of Geopolitics, gave suggestions that improved the end-result; two anonymous refereesprovided fair critique and helpful comments on an earlier draft. Gabriella Huseini and SettarHavuccuoglu, PhD students at the Department of Oriental Languages, Stockholm University, andMichal Reshef, PhD student at the department of Social Policy, London School of Economics,proof-read the Arabic and Hebrew transliterations of an earlier draft. Remaining errors are mine.

NOTES

1. Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Wæver, 'In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objectsfor Securitization', Millennium 29/3 (2000) p.705. Samuel Huntington's 'Clash ofCivilizations' is the most debated example recently: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash ofCivilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon and Schuster 1997).Huntington's definition of 'civilisation' makes use of religion as the 'central definingcharacteristic' (p.47).

2. For an illustration of our point, see Huntington (note 1).3. Roger W. Stump, Boundaries of Faith: Geographical Perspectives on Religious

Fundamentalism (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).4. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence

(Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press 2000) p.6.5. Stump (note 3) p.2.6. The choice of these two particular cases fell on the range of publicity they have gained. The

less public 'fundamentalist' movements of Islamic Jihad and Gush Emunim could havebeen used as well. Furthermore, the study is not restricted to Palestine/Israel and can be usedglobally as will be argued in the last part.

7. See Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, 'On the Modernity, Historical Specificity and InternationalContext of Political Islam' in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds), Political Islam: Essays fromMiddle East Report (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1997) p.3.

8. See Beinin and Stork, Political Islam (note 7); Peter Berger (ed.), The Desecularisation of

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the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999); R. ScottAppleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham:Rowman and Littlefield 2000).

9. Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the MiddleEast (London and New York: I.B. Tauris 1996) pp.1-2.

10. Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age(London and New York: I.B.Tauris 1990) p.27; cf. Michael Donelan's concept of 'fideism'in Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990).

11. Stump (note 3) p.14.12. Ibid. p.2.13. Ibid. p.3; and, Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986).14. Halliday (note 9); Juergensmeyer (note 4).15. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and

Islam (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1993), p.28; see also ScottM. Thomas, 'Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence ofReligion and the Transformation of International Society', Millennium 29/3 (2000) p.821n.18.

16. Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press 1975) p.45.

17. Thomas (note 15) p.820.18. Asad (note 15) p.40.19. Dumont, Louis, 'Religion, Politics and Society in the Individualistic Universe', Proceedings

of the Royal Anthropological Institute for 1970, p.32; Asad (note 15) p.28.20. See Asad (note 15).21. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London:

Routledge 1996) p.l.22. That is, 'geo-graphing' is to organize space for the sake of occupation and administration

and is consequently employed in the power struggle between competing authorities.23. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and

Beyond', in Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds), Rethinking Geopolitics (Londonand New York: Routledge 1998) p.22.

24. Michel Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', Diacritics 16 (1986) pp.22-7; Michael Shapiro,Reading the Postmodern Polity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1992)pp.108-10; and R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory(New York: Cambridge University Press 1993) pp.l25-40).

25. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New York: Bantam Books 1944) p.28; Clifford Geertz,The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books 1973). Michael Donelan's fideiststates that '[m]an's life is unbearable without a power beyond himself that will help bear it',Donelan (note 10) p.39.

26. Ibn Khaldûn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, translated by Franz Rosenthal(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1967) p.333.

27. Ibid. p.334.28. For good illustrations, see David E. Sopher, Geography of Religions (Englewood Cliffs:

Prentice-Hall 1967).29. Yi-Fu Tuan, 'Geopiety: A Theme in Man's Attachment to Nature and to Place', in David

Lowenthal and Martyn J. Bowden (eds), Geographies of the Mind: Essays in HistoricalGeosophy (New York: Oxford University Press 1976) pp.11-39.

30. John Kirtland Wright, Human Nature in Geography: Fourteen Papers, 1925-1965(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1966) Ch.14.

31. David Newman, 'Metaphysical and Concrete Landscapes: The Geopiety of HomelandSocialization in the "Land of Israel'", in Harold Brodsky (ed.), Land and Community:Geography in Jewish Studies (Bethesda: University Press of Maryland 1997) pp. 153-82.

32. Roger W. Stump, 'The Geography of Religion: Introduction', Journal of CulturalGeography 7 (1986) p.l. Cf. David E. Sopher, 'Geography and Religion', Progress inHuman Geography 5 (1981) p.518.

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33. Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis andLondon: University of Minnesota Press 1997) p.xi. Identity is not sui generis the self, it isalso about the designation of the difference of the Other; see William E. Connolly,Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca and London:Cornell University Press 1991). Difference enables the self to determine itself in relation towhat it is not.

34. Kamal Salibi, The Bible Came from Arabia (London: Jonathan Cape 1985). On biblicalgeographies, see Chris C. Park, Sacred Worlds: An Introduction to Geography and Religion(London and New York: Routledge 1994) pp. 11-12.

35. For a rewarding methodological and deconstructive discussion on sites, cites and sights seeÓ Tuathail (note 21) pp.69-110.

36. Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, 'Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical GeopoliticalReasoning in American Foreign Policy', Political Geography 11 (1992) p.192.

37. Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, 'Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics: Towards aCritical Geopolitics', in Ó Tuathail and Dalby (note 23) p.4. Emphasis added.

38. Bassam Tibi, 'Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicised Islam', Millennium29/3 (2000) p.848.

39. See Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress 1987) pp.255-6.

40. See Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 'Introduction', in Ó Tuathail and Dalby (note 23) pp.4-5.41. See David Newman, 'Geopolitics Renaissant: Territory, Sovereignty and the World Political

Map', in David Newman (ed.), Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity (London FrankCass 1999) pp.l-16.

42. Routledge defines a social movement as 'a heterogeneous formation that comprises myriad(and at times conflicting) interests and identities (e.g. of gender, race, class, sexuality, etc.)that constitute an analytical and political-cultural terrain of contestation in which thehegemonies of state, the development project, aspects of modernity (economic growth,progress) can be explored, defined, and challenged'. Paul Routledge, 'Critical Geopoliticsand Terrains of Resistance', Political Geography 15/6-7 (1996) p.511; and Paul Routledge,'Going Globile: Spatiality, Embodiment and Mediation in the Zapatista Insurgency' in ÓTuathail and Dalby (note 23) p.257 n.3.

43. Routledge, 'Going Globile' (note 42) p.241.44. Nota bene, dissident geopolitics is not constrained to religious movements and, thus, can be

applied to all social movements that challenge the power of state and internationalinstitutions to enact alternative programs. For example, the recent anti-globalisationmovements and their ideologies are excellent examples of dissident geopolitics affecting theworld-map of meaning and the architecture of enmities.

45. Cf. Ó Tuathail (note 21) p.7.46. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon 1980) p.59.47. See Lawrence (note 10).48. For background on Hamas, see Ziad Abu Amr, 'Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and the Origins of

Hamas', in R. Scott Appleby (ed.), Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders ofthe Middle East (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1997); Hisham Ahmad,Hamas Study (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs),available online at <http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/Hamas-Text/>;and Hamas Homepage, at <http://www.palestine-info.net/hamas/index.htm>. On theoperations of Izzedin Qassam Battalions see 'Hamas Operations: The Glory Record' atHamas Homepage, <http://www.palestine-info.net/hamas/index.htm>.

49. For background on Kach, see Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991); Ehud Sprinzak, Brother AgainstBrother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the RabinAssassination (New York: The Free Press 1999); and Kahane Homepage, at<http://www.kahane.org>.

50. Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique ofResearch and Methods', European Journal of International Relations 5/2 (1999) p.232.

51. Literally, 'Abode of Islam'. Islam translates 'submission' and shares the root (S-L-M) of the

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word for 'peace' : Salant. Thus, 'Abode of Peace' can also be found as Dar us-Salam in e.g.Albert de Biberstein Kazimirski, Dictionnaire arabe-français (Paris: Maisonneuve 1860).

52. There is a third possible status for territory, also acknowledged by Hamas: the 'Abode ofConciliation' (Dar us-Sulh). It is a state of temporary truce (Hudna) with the enemy in orderto regain strength, and is not to be understood as a permanent peace nor a recognition of theenemy.

53. Cf. Donelan (note 10) p.49.54. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 'War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law',

in John Kelsey and James Turner Johnson (eds), Just War and Jihad: Historical andTheoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Tradition (New York,Westport and London: Greenwood Press 1991) pp.215-17.

55. Michael Nordberg, Profetens folk: Stat, samhälle och kultur i Islam under tusen år [ThePeople of the Prophet: State, Society and Culture in Islam over One Thousand Years](Stockholm: Tiden 1988) pp. 115-16.

56. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press1955) p.155.

57. Ibid.58. Hamas, Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, Hamas (Palestine, 18

Aug. 1988), Article 13. Hereafter, in order to spare space, the Charter of Hamas isabbreviated 'CH' and followed by '§ ' and number of article (e.g. CH§13). For a translation,see Muhammad, Maqdsi, Journal of Palestine Studies 22/4 (1993) pp.122-34.

59. CH§34.60. CH§9.61. Mujahidun is derived from the same root as Jihad: J-H-D.62. Hamas, Communiqué No. 28: Islamic Palestine from the River to the Sea (Palestine, 18 Aug.

1988) translated in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones: Communiqués fromthe Intifada Underground (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 1994) p.239.

63. CH§12.64. CH§6.65. CH§9.66. A definition expressed in Hamas's unofficial journal Filastin al-Muslima Sept. (1990) p.44,

quote translated in Andrea Nüsse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas (Amsterdam:Harwood Academic Publishers 1998) p.52; and also found in Hamas, Communiqué No. 49:The Second Year of the Uprising (Palestine, 27 Oct. 1989), translated in Mishal and Aharoni(note 62) p.266.

67. LNBMP was established in 1920 and included also Transjordan. However, in 1922 theLNBMP was divided into two administrative districts. In 1946, the eastern district ofTransjordan gained independence becoming the 'Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'. Theabbreviation is onwards in the paper understood as the LNBMP of 1946-48, i.e. excludingTransjordan.

68. The Ottomans, who ruled Palestine/Israel 1516-1917, cartographed the territory into threesanjaks (Turkish: sancàk) - i.e. the subdivision of the chief administrative division (vilâyet)of the Ottoman Empire - of Acre (Akka), Jerusalem (Kudüs), and Nablus.

69. CH§11.70. Nordberg (note 55) p.237. Sunna is the compiled literature concerning the normative

example of Prophet Muhammad.71. See Jan Hjärpe, Islam: Lära och livsmönster [Islam: Teachings and Model of Living]

(Stockholm: Nordstedts 1992) p.63.72. Nordberg (note 55) p.239.73. Filastin al-Muslima July (1990) p.27, quote translated in Nüsse (note 66) p.47.74. The direction of prayer was later changed towards Mecca. See the Koran, 2:141-4 and

2:148-9.75. CH§14-15.76. Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine (Hamas), Communiqué of 27 October 1998: The

Wye River Memorandum of 23 October 1998 - Its Indications and Consequences, accessedat <http://www.palestine-info.net/hamas/index.htm> on 14 May 1999.

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156 GEOPOLITICS

77. Hamas, Communiqué No. 28, translated in Mishal and Aharoni (note 62) p.240.78. CH§13.79. Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea, Policies and Programs of the Authentic Jewish Idea, article 8,

accessed at <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Delphi/3141/jewidea.htm> on 2 Feb. 1999.Hereafter, abbreviated PP followed by '§ ' and number of article (e.g. PP§8).

80. See PP§12; and Rabbi Meir Kahane, The Arabs in Eretz Israel accessed at <http://www.geocities.com/~yodyn/writings/arabs.htm> on 2 Feb. 1999.

81. Rabbi Meir Kahane, The Ideology of Kach: The Authentic Jewish Idea (Kach pamphlet,n.d.) p.21.

82. Bereshit (Genesis) 17, quoted in Kahane (note 81) p.20.83. PP§12.84. Deuteronomy 11:24, quoted in Rabbi Meir Kahane, Our Challenge: The Chosen Land

(Radnor: Chilton Book Company 1974) preface.85. Genesis 15:18, quoted in Rabbi Meir Kahane, They Must Go (Brooklyn and Jerusalem: The

Institute of the Jewish Idea 1981) p.268.86. Donald Harman Akenson, God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and

Ulster (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1992) p.175. See also: BaruchKimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies - University of California 1983) pp. 16-17.

87. Interview with Rabbi Meir Kahane in Raphael Mergui and Philippe Simonnot, Israel'sAyatollahs: Meir Kahane and the Far Right in Israel (London and Atlantic Highlands: SaqiBooks 1987) pp.54-5.

88. Akenson (note 86) p.175.89. Binyamin Zev Kahane, A Time for Soul Searching: 'Let Thousands of Lebanese Citizens be

Killed, as Long as the Hair on the Head of an Israeli Soldier does not Fall!' (Oct. 1997),translated by Lenny Goldberg, Political Commentary, accessed at <http://www.kahane.org>on 3 Feb. 1999.

90. PP§14.91. Rabbi Meir Kahane, A Mezuza (17 Nov. 1972), accessed at <http://www.geocities.eom/~

yodyn/writings/mezuza.htm> on 2 Feb. 1999.92. Kahane (note 81) p.20.93. Rabbi Meir Kahane, Uncomfortable Questions for Comfortable Jews (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle

Stuart 1987) p.163.94. Rabbi Meir Kahane, Israel: Revolution or Referendum? (Secaucus, NJ: Barricade Books

1990) p.167.95. PP§15. See also Kahane (note 81) p.10.96. Bruce Lawrence, 'Holy War (Jihad) in Islamic Religion and Nation-State Ideologies' in

Kelsey and Johnson (note 54) pp.141-2.97. Khadduri (note 56) p.55.98. See Christer Hedin, 'Kampen för Guds sak: Jihad i texter och teologi' [The Struggle for the

Cause of God: Jihad in Texts and Theology], Svensk religionshistorisk årsskrifl 5 (1996)pp.45-80.

99. The motto of Hamas: 'Allah is its Goal. The Messenger [i.e. Prophet Muhammad] is itsLeader. The Quran is its Constitution. Jihad is its methodology, and Death for the sake ofAllah is its most coveted desire.' CH§8.

100. CH§30.101. CH§7. Allusion from Imam Muslim, Sahih Muslim (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf 1976),

translated by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, vol. 4, Hadith 6985, p.1510.102. CH§15. Jihad is traditionally considered as a responsibility for the whole Umma —

community - and not an individual matter. See Nüsse (note 66) pp.72-4103. CH§12. In CH§17, the role of the Muslim woman in the 'battle for the liberation' is

expressed as 'no less than the role of the man, for she is the factory of men'.104. Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine (Hamas), Communiqué No. 183: In

Remembrance (Amman 11-17 June 1997), translated by MSANEWS <msanews-ed@faith.mynet.net>, accessed at <http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/199706/19970618.2.html> on 20 May 1999.

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105. CH§13.106. Kahane, The Story of the Jewish Defense League, (Radnor: Chilton Books 1975) p.142.107. Ibid. Original emphasis.108. Leviticus 19:16, quoted in Kahane (note 106) p.125.109. Quoted in Kahane (note 81) p.11.110. Binyamin Zev Kahane, 'Parshat Mishpatim: Normal People Think Ahead', Judean Voice

Newsletter, <jsid@dorsai.org>, translated by Lenny Goldberg, posted on 12 Feb. 1999.111. Ibid.112. PP§17.113. A comment on Baruch Goldstein's attack on Muslim worshippers in the Ibrahimi

Mosque/Cave of the Patriarchs, Hebron. Binyamin Zev Kahane, 'Purim: Drinking forClarity', Judean Voice Newsletter, <jsid@dorsai.org>, translated by Lenny Goldberg,written in 1998, posted on 26 Feb. 1999.

114. Tanchuma Pinchas, quoted in Kahane (note 81) pp.11-12115. Kahane (note 81) p.15.116. Kahane (note 93) p.159.117. Kahane (note 81) p.25.118. Anthony D. Smith, 'The "Sacred" Dimension of Nationalism', Millennium 29/3 (2000)

pp.791-814.119. For example ('recycling' Palestine/Israel) the decision to divide the city of Hebron between

Palestinians and Israelis was motivated by considerations of the religious communities ofHebron (religion), religious geography (Hebron as cite/site of Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of thePatriarchs) and geopiety (Hebron as the burial cite/site of Abraham). Thus, thereligeopolitics of Hebron is pivotal to the power elites of Palestine and Israel, to the futureof Jerusalem, and to the question 'How peace?'. As an example of the general connectionbetween IR and religion, see Millennium 29/3 (2000) special issue on 'Religion andInternational Relations'.

120. The final draft of this paper was submitted four days after the tragic events in New York,Washington DC and Pennsylvania.

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