relational autonomy, liberal individualism and the social construccion of selves

JOHN CHRISTMAN

RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM,AND THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF SELVES

Philosophical suspicion of the normative presuppositions of liber-alism have often focused on the alleged hyper-individualism of theconception of autonomy and the autonomous person operating atits center. Communitarians, feminists, theorists of identity politics,and others have claimed in different ways that the model of theautonomous agent upon which liberal principles are built assumes aconception of human identity, value, and commitment which is blindto the embeddedness of our self-conceptions, the fundamentallyrelational nature of our motivations, and the overall social characterof our being. Feminists have been especially vocal in the claim thatthe idea of autonomy central to liberal politics must be reconfiguredso as to be more sensitive to relations of care, interdependence, andmutual support that define our lives and which have traditionallymarked the realm of the feminine.1

Emerging from this discussion is a view of the autonomousperson that is structured so as to fully embrace this social concep-tion of the self. Relational autonomy is the label that has beengiven to an alternative conception of what it means to be a free,self-governing agent who is also socially constituted and whopossibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of inter-personal relations and mutual dependencies.2 Relational viewsof the autonomous person, then, valuably underscore the socialembeddedness of selves while not forsaking the basic value commit-ments of (for the most part, liberal) justice. These conceptionsunderscore the social components of our self-concepts as well asemphasize the role that background social dynamics and powerstructures play in the enjoyment and development of autonomy.However, when conceptions of relational autonomy are spelled outin detail, certain difficulties arise which should give us some pausein the utilization of such notions in the formulation of principles of

Philosophical Studies 117: 143164, 2004. 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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justice, especially those motivated by feminist and other liberatoryconcerns. In this paper, I want to take a closer look at the conceptionof relational autonomy as it has been developed in some recent workand to suggest some friendly amendments to those views, amend-ments which share the call for greater attention to the social natureof the self but which, in the end (and with much qualification), directus back to a kind of individualism in the concept of the autonomousperson, a move that is necessary if that idea is to do the theoreticaland normative work that both liberal theorists and some of theirfeminist critics want it to perform.

RELATIONAL SELVES AND RELATIONAL AUTONOMY

Taking off from the various criticisms of the hyper-individualismof traditional liberal theories, many writers from different quartershave insisted that a better understanding of the subject of prin-ciples of justice sees persons as relational and socially constitutedin fundamental ways. Insofar, then, as the autonomous person func-tions as a central idea in moral and political reflections, such aperson should be conceived as fundamentally and irreduciblyrelational.3

It is certainly true that any plausible philosophical or politicaltheory must take into account the various ways in which humansare socially embedded, intimately related to other people, groups,institutions, and histories, that they experience themselves and theirvalues as part of ongoing narratives and long traditions, and thatthey are motivated by interests and reasons that can only be fullydefined with reference to other people and things. But there are anumber of ways of expressing the idea that selves are constitutedby their relations with other persons and other external factors. First,the thesis in question can be understood as a metaphysical claim,such that relations with other persons, institutions, traditions, and soon are seen as essentially part of the person (either at a time or overtime).4 Alternatively, the social self thesis can be understood as acontingent psychological claim about a persons self-concept, valuestructure, emotional states, motivational set, or reflective capacities.Such views consider interpersonal interaction (or social dynamicsmore generally) as a constitutive element of psychological states and

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processes while viewing such interactions as (in principle) alterableand shifting (that is, contingent).5

The metaphysical version of this claim, at least in some of itsforms, should be met with some skepticism. Surely, to conceive ofthe self as an individual devoid of necessary connections to society,intimate others, cultural traditions and so on is to misunderstandthe perspective and interests of persons as social entities. But it isequally important to understand the logical gap between the rejec-tion of a metaphysical individualism in this realm and the embraceof a metaphysically relational conception of the self.6 For it is onething to deny that persons can always or should always be conceivedwithout essential reference to social context, and it is quite anotherto claim that they should be conceived with a particular referenceto some aspect of social context. The latter, relational, conceptionof self at least when posed as a metaphysical claim runs therisk of ignoring the very variability, contingency, and temporallyfluid nature of human existence that motivates the rejection of old-style individualism. Just as conceiving of persons as denuded ofsocial relations denies the importance of such relations to the self-understandings of many of us at various times in our lives, to definepersons as necessarily related in particular ways similarly deniesthe reality of change over time, variability in self-conception, andmultiplicities of identity characteristic of modern populations.

Moreover, it is quite unclear that any particular conception ofself or the person can serve broadly as a model for normativethinking in a wide variety of contexts, for identity is variableaccording to the theoretical or practical setting in which it is askedto operate. Self-conceptions (and so selves) change over time andvary considerably across contexts.7 In some areas, embodiment andphysicality are prominent aspects of our existence and hence mustbe included as a core element in models of the self (biological andmedical models come to mind); while in other areas, racial or genderidentity figures saliently, and in still others relational dynamics suchas being a parent or caring for a dependent matter the most. Concep-tions of the self should not be offered as monolithic and all-purpose,for what counts as our self will vary according to the point ofasking for the model. And a wide array of philosophical and psycho-logical methodologies are in play in framing that question, all of

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which yield fundamentally different conceptions.8 In addition, thereis evidence of cultural variations in self-concepts relating to thedegree of interdependence and inter-relatedness that figures in self-schemas.9 Finally, conceptions of the self often fail to adequatelydistinguish the different localities for the function of a self whichthe models are meant to capture; these include the self as the seatof agency, the self as object of introspective consciousness, theself-schema which frames reflection and memory, the object ofrecognition by others and social specification, and so on.10

Nevertheless, as others have noted, there is nothing about a socialconception of self that is incompatible with an individual concep-tion of autonomy.11 Indeed, insofar as autonomy requires somemeasure of internal integration of the disparate elements of the self,and the self is constituted by social elements, then one cannot beautonomous relative to those social elements unless one exists inenvironments that allow their full manifestation. For one can claimthat I am autonomous just in case I can turn a reflective eye to certainaspects of my character, even if those aspects can only be definedrelative to external relations I have (or have had) with others. Ifpolitical institutions and social patterns have the effect of distancingme from those connections by which I, in part, define myself, andif upon due reflection I experience profound self alienation when Irealize the extent of this distancing, then those social patterns thatinduce this phenomenon are inimical to autonomy.12 So not only isautonomy not resistant to support for communal and social struc-tures that shape and undergird human identities, it in fact demandsthem.

Still, several writers have taken up the mantle of the rela-tional view by promoting a relational approach to autonomyitself, a subject to which we now turn. What I will argue is that,while I support the emphasis on relational elements of autonomy,some versions of the relational conception problematically importa perfectionist view of human values into the account of autonomyand thereby threaten to undermine the usefulness of the concept incertain theoretical and practical contexts in which it is often seen tofunction.


RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, DIFFERENCE,AND PERFECTIONIST POLITICS

In order to assess the plausibility of any central but contestedconcept, such as autonomy, it is necessary to specify the theoreticaland practical context in which that concept is understood to func-tion. Not only does the idea of autonomy set the boundaries of anti-perfectionism and anti-paternalism in principles of justice, it also(and relatedly) specifies the characteristics of the adult citizen whoseinterests and perspective mold those principles of justice and democ-racy. Such a conception must express sensitivity to the multipledifferences among citizens involving patterns of thought, modes ofidentity, religious and other value commitments, and the like. Theautonomous person (so-conceived) has certain fundamental interestswhich principles of justice are designed to protect; such a personhas a perspective through which those principles gain their basicjustification and ongoing legitimacy; autonomous persons are theparticipants in democratic processes which (depending on onesview) compliment or constitute those just principles by which theyand their co-citizens are bound and guided.13

It is for these reasons that a hyper-individualist conception ofautonomy is so problematic, for it presents a model of the citizenas fundamentally separated or able to easily become separated fromall connections with intimate others, surrounding culture, and otheridentity-constituting elements of the social environment. There-fore, a more robust conception of relational autonomy has beensuggested.

Relational autonomy does not refer to a single account butis rather, as Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar put it, anumbrella term which refers to all views of autonomy that sharethe assumption that persons are socially embedded and that agentsidentities are formed within the context of social relationships andshaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such asrace, class, gender, and ethnicity.14 But what also must be true tomake a conception of autonomy uniquely relational or socialis that among its defining conditions are requirements concerningthe interpersonal or social environment of the agent.15 In partic-ular, to mark out such accounts from others in the literature, socialconditions of some sort must be named as conceptually necessary

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requirements of autonomy rather than, say, contributory factors.16However, only a few have spelled out precisely the social conditionsthat are being referred to in such alternative conceptualizations.Since a full survey of these views cannot be undertaken here, I willfocus on representative samples of such accounts.

Autonomy has come to be understood in this literature asrequiring competence in reflection and decision making and (onsome views) authenticity of the values, desires, and so on thatconstitute the person and motivate choice.17 Proceduralist views,to which relational accounts are often said to contrast, hold thatautonomy obtains when the processes by which a desire, value, andthe like comes to be developed are of the proper sort, independentof the content of such a desire, value, etc. Substantive views, bycontrast, demand that particular values or commitments must be partof the autonomous agents value or belief corpus. This contrast inviews, we will see in a moment, will be at the heart of the discussionof the viability of relational views of autonomy.18

Most who call for alternative, relational, accounts of autonomyfocus on the authenticity conditions typically specified in receivedmodels, conditions such as that the agent must identify with firstorder elements of the self in order to be autonomous.19 As JenniferNedelsky has put it, the process of finding ones own law specifiedin traditional accounts of autonomy the processes of establishingthe authenticity here referred to can only occur in social conditionsthat foster certain types of human relationships. While traditionalaccounts of authenticity refer only to the isolated agent reflectingon his or her own desires, relational accounts think of autonomy interms of the forms of human interactions in which it will developand flourish.20

Notice, however, that this specifies the conditions that allowautonomy to develop rather than the conceptual conditions thatdefine it. Writers like Nedelsky are surely correct that discussions ofautonomy have focused on the individual agent as if he were ableto develop an authentic set of values and desires without the caringsupport of various others and the social structures that contributeto human self-development. And moreover, feminists have power-fully claimed that relationships that are necessary for the growth anddevelopment of healthy personalities are often ignored in accounts


of autonomous personhood, most likely because of a devaluationof the traditional feminine roles of educator, mother, and caretaker.In addition, feminist concerns of this sort point to the ways thatmany of us find our authentic selves only in relation to variousothers (those we care for as well as cultural traditions, communities,and causes). Authenticity conditions that fail to mention thecontributory role of those relationships serve to valorize the lifeof the separated individual and to denigrate the social and inter-personal aspects of many or all of our lives. However, if theselessons were all taken to heart, as they should be, we might stilldefine autonomy as an individual undertaking, as a set of capacitieswhich a person, apart from others, might exercise.21 For reasons thatwill emerge as we proceed, I want to focus, then, on relational viewsthat see interpersonal and social factors as conceptually necessaryfor autonomy.

One of the most developed and powerfully defended accountsof social autonomy has been put forth by Marina Oshana,who insists that autonomy should be seen as a socio-relationalpheonomenon.22 This is in contrast to the purely internalist,psychological accounts that pepper the literature (accounts that,for our purposes, can be seen as equivalent to the procedural viewsmentioned earlier). Oshana faults internalist accounts of autonomyfor running afoul of our intuitions in cases where agents seemto accept social conditions that deny their dignity, stature as anindependent agent, and essential self-determination. Such essen-tially subjective accounts (p. 81) are also unacceptably individual-istic.

Oshana defends this view by describing a series of cases whichillustrate the way that internalist conditions of autonomy come upshort: they consistently ignore the importance of various socialconditions that, while at some level are acceptable to the person,are fundamentally oppressive and restrictive. Examples includevoluntary slavery, a subservient housewife, a religious devotee, anda conscientious objector. The structure of these cases is familiar,in that they follow in line with the happy slave examples thatare often mentioned in this context. We are to imagine personsthat meet all the conditions of competence and authenticity thatinternalist accounts of autonomy demand, but choose to enter or

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continue in conditions which deny them the basic opportunities forself-determination that mark autonomy. Such cases, Oshana claims,systematically offend our intuitions that the autonomous person isin control of her choices, her actions, and her will, that she is ableto meet her goals without depending upon the judgments of othersas to their validity and importance. . . . [While she] may require theassistance of others in meeting those goals, she decides which ofthem are most important (p. 82).

As a replacement for the individualist, internalist accounts thatrender this result, Oshana puts forth a provocative alternative viewof autonomy. On her account, autonomy obtains only when socialconditions surrounding an individual live up to certain standards. Inaddition to allowing the person to develop critical reflective abilitiesand procedural independence (of the sort internalists demand), thesurrounding social conditions in which the autonomous personresides must allow her significant options,23 they must ensure thatshe can defend herself against psychological and physical assaultwhen necessary or against attempts to deprive her of her rights, shemust not be forced to take responsibility for others needs unlessagreed to or reasonably expected, and they must allow her to pursuegoals different from those who have influence or authority overher (pp. 9495). In all autonomy attaches to persons in light oftheir socio-relational standing and not merely their current or pastpsychological states (p. 96).

Oshana says much in support of this view that, regrettably,cannot be brought out in this brief treatment. However, there areelements of this view that pull us in different directions, and itwill be fruitful I think to trace them out.24 First, as fundamentallysocial as this account appears, there are curiously individualisticelements to it that bear emphasis. In cases where a person authenti-cally and competently remains in a condition of strict obedience, aproceduralist will count her as autonomous if the (rather stringent)conditions of authentic acceptance are met. This mirrors theassumption that selves, at least in some ways and in some instances,should be seen as constituted by the social and interpersonaldynamics that surround them. But Oshanas view insists that tobe autonomous, she must, as an individual, maintain the ability topursue goals different from those who have influence and authority


over her. This view is in some tension with the idea that personsshould be understood to be constituted by social relations (in someways or in some instances), at least when those identity constitutingrelations are overly authoritative.

This points to the fact that views like Oshanas actuallycombine substantive, perfectionist, conditions for autonomy thatautonomous agents must have certain value commitments and/ormust be treated in certain normatively acceptable ways with socio-relational conditions. Proceduralists defend their views in part inorder to be able to utilize the concept of autonomy in as broad avalue terrain as possible; indeed such views are often called value-neutral accounts in that they attempt to define autonomy withoutdirect reference to the content of the value systems that defineand motivate agents. What views like Oshanas rest upon is theclaim that certain substantive value commitments such as the viewthat I must obey my superiors unconditionally are conceptuallyinconsistent with autonomy.

But there is in fact a tension between the perfectionist aspectof the relational view and its anti-individualism. The latter aspectshows itself in the need to not only make room for but reify thesocial nature of the person, her values, and her psychology. Theperfectionist strain, however, appears in the form of the denial ofpurely procedural, that is, content-neutral conceptions of autonomy.Relational theorists who decry procedural views on the grounds thatthey would allow voluntary slavery to masquerade as autonomy arein fact supporting a conception of autonomy which is an ideal ofindividualized self-government, an ideal that those who choose strictobedience or hierarchical power structures have decided to reject.Those whose value conceptions manifest relatively blurred linesbetween self and other, who downplay the value of individualizedjudgments and embrace devotion to an externally defined norma-tive structure (which may include obedience to particular humanauthorities) stand in defiance of the normative ideals that relationalviews of autonomy put forward. It is one thing to say that modelsof autonomy must acknowledge how we are all deeply related; itis another to say that we are autonomous only if related in certainidealized ways. I will return to this issue momentarily.

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We are discussing these issues largely in the context of liberalapproaches to justice and the person, but the point I am makingextends beyond that scope. For theorists who decry the potentiallyexclusionary implications of liberal conceptions of the person so-called difference feminists for example should be doublyconcerned about conceptions of relational autonomy that connectthat term and the status of responsible agency, equal standing,and so on that relates to it to modes of social life that not allwomen and men embrace. Liberation from oppression must beundertaken within a normative framework that leaves the most roomfor disparate voices, even those who endorse traditional and author-itarian value systems, for it must be accepted, in principle at least,that many women and marginalized people will embrace traditionalconceptions of social life and cultural roles that offend western,liberal ideals of individual self-sufficiency. While some version ofthat ideal is certainly worth defending, it is dangerous to couch thatdefense in the definition of the autonomous person.25 I will return tothis point below.

We should be also be clear about another point: all I mean byperfectionism here is the view that values and moral principles canbe valid for a person independent of her judgment of those valuesand principles.26 Such a view implies that there are certain intrinsicvalues grounded in human nature perhaps that should guide indi-vidual and social action independent of the endorsement of thosevalues by minimally rational, autonomous individuals. This is notthe same as requiring certain normative conditions of autonomyitself, where, for example, it is argued that to be autonomous, onemust have value commitments stronger than simply what is subjec-tively desired, commitments grounded in considerations external tothe self (strong evaluations in Charles Taylors phrase).27 Thecritique of relational autonomy being considered here merely claimsthat viewing non-authoritarian relations as constitutive of autonomyimplies that certain values egalitarian ones of this sort arevalid for individuals even if they (ex hypothesi) authentically andfreely reject them. It may well turn out that autonomy does requirecommitment to values grounded in considerations external to theself, but it should not require that those values are valid independentof the persons authentic embrace of them.28 But the point here is


that conceptions of autonomy should not imply perfectionism of thesort described.

One might argue, however, that seeing autonomy in a waythat allows the possibility of autonomous but thoroughly obedient(passive, unquestioning, etc.) persons makes it highly questionablethat such a trait has value. Why would we value the character-istic of autonomy if, by definition, one can be autonomous butsubservient?29 The value of autonomy is not a topic I can take uphere, but let it suffice to say that an anti-perfectionist conceptionof autonomy of the sort I outline here has value simply because itconstitutes, in part, the human agency and capacity for authenticchoice that grounds respect for ourselves and other persons.30Insofar as a person has authentically embraced even (what wemight call) oppressive social status or subservient roles, that persondeserves respect insofar as her judgment about those roles hasthe same formal features as our own judgment about our ownlives. Moreover, collective political decisions have binding force onindividual citizens in part because they are chosen by free, authenticco-citizens under conditions of optimal choice; to say that suchdecisions are binding implies (by virtue of a complex argument leftout here) that we value the ability of those co-citizens to authen-tically judge for themselves. Both these positions can be consistentlyheld without requiring that the content of the judgments in questionreflect a high regard for personal independence or other values of thesort that views such as Oshanas demand of the autonomous agent.

In addition to writers defending relational views, many othershave claimed that proceduralist, value-neutral accounts fail toadequately identify autonomous agents, because of the way thatsome oppressed and dominated individuals might neverthelessendorse many of their first order commitments and connections (thevery ones forced upon them by their oppressive circumstances).Proceduralist accounts leave the door open for labeling such personsas autonomous in counter-intuitive ways, such that only substantiveviews of autonomy are plausible.

Recall that on procedural accounts of autonomy, that conditionobtains when a person has (hypothetically perhaps) reflected uponelements of herself and endorsed (or failed to be deeply alienatedfrom) those elements. And it must be admitted that merely reflecting

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upon ones values and identity will not be sufficient to secure theauthenticity of those elements of the self. So more must be saidof this requirement to meet the challenge being considered here.That reflection must be undertaken free from the influence of factorswhich we know severely restrict free consideration of ones condi-tion and ones options. The hypothetical self-endorsing reflectionwe imagine here must be such that it is not the product of social andpsychological conditions that prevent adequate appraisal of oneself.This includes ability to assess the various aspects of ones being,and the freedom from those factors and conditions that we knowindependently effectively prevent minimal self-understanding. Aperson who endorses his decisions while in an uncontrollable rage,or while on heavy doses of hallucinogenic drugs, or having beendenied minimal education and exposure to alternatives does notadequately reflect in this way. A general test for such a require-ment might be this: a person reflects adequately if she is able torealistically imagine choosing otherwise were she in a position tovalue sincerely that alternative position.31 That is, her reflectiveabilities must contain sufficient flexibility that she could imagineresponding appropriately to alternative reasons (where appropri-ately and reasons are understood from her own point of view).Adequate reflection requires that a person can see herself doingotherwise, under at least some imaginable conditions; otherwiseshe is not manifesting a true capacity to consider her own internalstates.32 Such a requirement needs much more description anddefense of course, but a fully worked out notion of adequate reflec-tiveness could, in principle, be worked out which (a) did not reston specific contents concerning the values and norms a persons ismoved by in her reflections, but which (b) rules out cases wherereflective self-endorsement simply replicates the oppressive socialconditions that autonomous living is meant to stand against.

In this way, the person who engages in subservient devotion toexternal authorities (or who leads a lifestyle of the sort describedin the critiques of proceduralist autonomy being considered) isonly autonomous if she would not reject those conditions whilereflecting adequately (in the way just described). The contentionbeing defended here is that one is autonomous in a way worthvaluing even if one exhibits this autonomy in conditions and rela-


tionships that we (quite rightly) would label oppressive. Defendersof relational views go astray at times when they include relationalconditions for autonomy that effectively rule out freely choosing alife of strict obedience. Insofar as the self is socially constituted, itis counterintuitive to claim that such a self is only autonomous ifshe can break away from those very social conditions, authoritarianthough they are, that constitute her being. As long as she maintainsthe ability to adequately reflect on those conditions and embracethem, I argue that we should continue to label her autonomous.

A final point, however, about the grounds that are usuallyoffered to reject overly individualist views of autonomy: Proceduralaccounts are most often taken to task for their inability to counte-nance social identity in virtue of their emphasis on detached reflec-tion and self-endorsement (or non-alienation) from aspects of theself.33 These critiques, then, focus on the authenticity conditions inmodels of autonomy. However, the real failing of those accountslies in the competency conditions that are typically (and oftenincompletely) laid out as necessary for autonomy.

Individualist, procedural views of autonomy include conditionsof both competence and authenticity. Competence conditions typi-cally refer to such things as self-control, capacities for rationalthought, and freedom from debilitating pathologies, systematic self-deception, and so on.34 But, as feminists and other relationaltheorists have been insisting, many life patterns (particularly forwomen and marginalized groups, according to some) cruciallyinvolve intertwined personalities, close relations of care and depend-ence, embedded cultural identities and values, and the like. Forautonomy to pick out the ability of persons to lead lives that theycan fully embrace as their own, then surely people need to developthose abilities that are central to interpersonal relations of a varietyof sorts. So while I cannot spell out a list of such competences here,and other (non-proceduralist) theorists have done much to do so intheir own views most notably Diana Meyers35 let me note that itis competency conditions in proceduaralist views of autonomy thatare problematic insofar as they do not include or make room forthe wide variety of capacities for care, intimacy, social interaction,and the like that will be crucial for socially embedded persons toflourish.36

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But our main focus here is on the claim by defenders of relationalautonomy that, on the one hand, autonomy should be defined interms of social dynamics, but, on the other, this label should be with-held from those persons enmeshed in social dynamics and powerrelations of particular sorts. In what follows, I want to suggest whyunderstanding autonomy in this way threatens to rob that concept ofits usefulness as a marker of the (equal) moral and political statusthat principles of social justice (of a certain sort) depend upon.

AUTONOMY AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT

As I noted earlier, the concept of autonomy functions to define andmark the citizen-subject of principles of justice, where fair termsof cooperation, the meanings of social goods, and basic rights andneeds articulated in those principles mirror the perspective of theautonomous person. Further, insofar as democratic processes andother modes of collective choice play an instrumental or constitutiverole in the derivation of such principles, autonomy indicates thecharacteristic of persons who are candidates for full participationin those collective decision-making processes.

To adopt a thoroughly relational view of autonomy is to see itas a property, not merely of an individual and her capacities, but ofthe relations that comprise those conditions. To protect autonomy inthis way is to protect those relations. What is powerful about theseviews is the emphasis they place on securing the social conditionsthat are required for the enjoyment of autonomy, conditions relatingto education, social structures and opportunities, access to basicresources, housing, and so on.37 But relational views that see socialconditions as not only supportive of autonomy but definitive of itcarry with them a danger that autonomy-based principles of justicewill exclude from participation those individuals who reject thosetypes of social relations demanded by those views.

In Oshanas view, for example, a person who adopts the lifestyleof strict obedience is not autonomous despite having done so withno sign of constrained reflection or manipulation, or a failure onher part to give her preferences for this lifestyle whatever measureof deliberation it merits. Now certainly such a person is beingoppressed, and her social condition, if it is in any way enforced


by surrounding conditions or institutions, does not manifest equalstatus in ways that liberal theories of justice certainly want topromote (concerning, for example, equal access to social resources).But to say that she is not autonomous implies that she does notenjoy the status marker of an independent citizen whose perspectiveand value orientation get a hearing in the democratic processes thatconstitute legitimate social policy.38

Just institutions are built upon and must help foster the operationof public reason, which in turn generates, if they are successful, thegrounds of legitimacy for those institutions.39 Public deliberationalso generates the substance of just principles and correlative socialpolicy, principles and policies that determine which social relationsmust be allowed as part of freely chosen life paths and which areto be prohibited or discouraged as indicative of unjust or restrictivehierarchies of power.

Distinguishing such relations involves, in part at least, the testi-mony of those involved, including the voices of the marginalizedand discriminated within the ranks of these contested social institu-tions and practices. To label such persons non-autonomous becausethey do not stand in the proper social relations to their allegedsuperiors means that deliberations about the meaning of equalityand legitimate authority is circumscribed to exclude voices whoare otherwise (by hypothesis) competent and authentic in ways thatprocedural accounts of autonomy require (standards which, it bearsrepeating, are high enough that virtually all imaginable cases ofvoluntary slavery would fail to meet them).40

Further, all agree in this context that another function of theconcept of autonomy is to mark out the parameters within which aperson is immune from paternalistic intervention; it is, as Oshanawrites, the value which paternalism fails to respect (p. 82).Consider, then, that a women who has chosen a family situation inwhich her husband makes all significant decisions, and she acceptsthe subservience described earlier. Despite her authentic, competent,and sober acceptance of such situations (again, by hypothesis), herlack of relational autonomy should we accept that view wouldallow other agents and representatives of coercive social institutionsto intervene to relieve her of this burden and to restore her autonomy(at least in principle). This implication should be troubling, however,

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not merely out of a knee-jerk reverence for individual rights andprivacy but from the recognition of the social reality that thereare any number of women and men who have accepted valuesystems that inscribe traditional and severe hierarchies of powerand authority. The bases for these decisions vary from religiousdevotion to ideological commitment (for example to the ideal of thegood wife). While those of us who shudder at the prevalence ofsuch value systems in a purportedly egalitarian society might workhard to make such practices socially unacceptable, it is difficult toendorse the position that such systems of belief must be ruled out ofcourt with the blunt edge of autonomy. It is one thing to publicallycriticize modes of social practice that denigrate their participants,but it is another to define autonomy in a way to claim that thoseparticipants are not fully functioning agents at all.41

For these reasons, I suggest that we distinguish closely relatedbut importantly different aspects of relational views. It is one thingto claim that social conditions that enable us to develop and maintainthe powers of authentic choice and which protect the ongoing inter-personal and social relationships that define ourselves are all partof the background requirements for the development of autonomy.This is a powerful contribution to the discussions of autonomy todate made by feminist (and other) defenders of relational concepts.(Indeed, I have tried to suggest that greater attention to thesesorts of factors should be given in the competence conditionsof procedural accounts of autonomy.) It is another thing, however and a more dangerous and ultimately problematic move, I haveargued to claim that being autonomous means standing in propersocial relations to surrounding others and within social practices andinstitutions. Taking this position, I have argued, turns the conceptof autonomy into an unacceptably perfectionist idea that carrieswith it the danger of exclusion and overarching paternalism thatattention to autonomy should well protect against. The lesson ofrelational theories, then, is that socially constituted and interperson-ally embedded selves, in all their varieties and complex perspectiveson value and justice, are autonomous only when that variable andmultiplex position in those social relations reflects the authentic andself-imposed standards of the free person. In this way, relationaltheories have taught us how far we should go in the direction of


seeing justice as concerning social dynamics as well as individualchoice, but they also point to the dangers of reifying any particularset of such dynamics as the only ideal to be taken into account in thepublic deliberations constitutive of justice itself.42

NOTES

1 See, for example, Allison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa,NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, 1983), p. 29.2 The most often cited source for the call for a new notion is Jennifer Nedelsky,Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, Yale Journalof Law and Feminism 1 (1989), pp. 736. See also Marina Oshana PersonalAutonomy and Society, Journal of Social Philosophy 29(1) (Spring, 1998),pp. 81102. For an overview, see the essays in Catriona Mackenzie and NatalieStoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency,and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). For an excellentsurvey of the critical issues, see especially Mackenzie and Stoljar Introduction:Autonomy Reconfigured, same volume, pp. 331.3 The dimensions along which a self can be seen as non-individualized arenumerous, and calling the self simply relational suggests merely a dyadicdynamic constituting the self. But theorists in the tradition I am describing, ofcourse, accept multiform elements as constitutive parts of the person (not merelyrelations with some particular being). That said, however, I will use the termrelational and social more or less interchangeably in this context to refer tothe non-individualized conceptions I am considering.4 Naomi Scheman claims, for example, that certain affective states, and manymental states in general, that partially define individuals can only be specified insocial terms. To be in love is to be in love with someone, she writes. SeeIndividualism and the Objects of Psychology, in S. Harding and M. Hintika(eds.), Discovering Reality (Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1983), p. 232; see alsoScheman, Engenderings: Constructions of Knowledge, Authority, and Privilege(New York: Routledge, 1993). For discussion of this issue, see Louise Antony, IsPsychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology?, Hypatia 10 (1995), pp. 157174. For a response to Antony, see Scheman, Reply to Louise Antony, Hypatia11(3) (1996), pp. 150153.5 For an excellent survey of points parallel to this, see Stoljar and Mackenzie,Introduction: Autonomy Reconfigured. Also, see Linda Barclay, Autonomyand the Social Self, in Mackenzie and Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy,pp. 5271, George Sher, Three Stages of Social Involvement, in BeyondNeutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chap. 7, DavidWong, On Flourishing and Finding Ones Identity in Community, in PeterFrench et al. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIII (South Bend, IN:University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 324341, and Jack Crittenden, Beyond

160 JOHN CHRISTMAN

Individualism: Reconstituting the Liberal Self (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1992).6 For an interesting discussion of whether the logic of identity always andeverywhere implies an unacceptable repression of difference, see Allison Weir,Sacrificial Logics: Feminist Theory and the Critique of Identity (New York:Routledge, 1996).7 For a penetrating discussion of themes parallel to this, see Diana T. Meyers,Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood, in John Christman and JoelAnderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Also, for an interesting argu-ment that conceptions of both autonomy and the self should be more sensitive tothe temporally extended nature of our lives, see Genevieve Lloyd, Individuals,Responsibility, and the Philosophical Imagination, in Mackenzie and Stoljar(eds.), Relational Autonomy, pp. 112123.8 For discussion of the historical development of theories of the self see SusanHarter, Historical Roots of Contemporary Issues Involving Self-Concept, inBruce A. Bracken (ed.), Handbook of Self-Concept: Developmental, Social, andClinical Considerations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996), pp. 138,and Kenneth J. Gergen, The Concept of Self (New York: Holt, Rinehard, andWinston, 1971), pp. 112. The monolithic models of the self I am describing canbe contrasted with purely political conceptions which posit provisional modelsof personhood, not as accurate accounts of our psychological profiles, but asrepresentative schemas used for the purposes of generating political principles.See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,1993), pp. 2935, 7288.9 See H.R. Markus and S. Kitayama, Culture and the Self: Implications forCognition, Emotion, and Motivation, Psychological Review 98 (1991), pp. 224253.10 For discussion, see the essays in Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear(eds.), Models of the Self (Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic, 1999) and RoyBaumeister, The Self, in Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey(eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1998),pp. 680740.11 Mackenzie and Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Reconfigured, p. 8. Seealso, Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1989), Chap. 5, Jack Crittenden Beyond Individualism: Recon-stituting the Liberal Self.12 Robert Bellah and his colleagues, for example, underscore the ways thatcertain individuals in the U.S. experience a rash of inner conflicts which resultfrom being unable to engage sufficiently in the self-constructing communal inter-actions that their own sense of flourishing demands. This shows that autonomy inmy sense is being undermined by those social tendencies that induce this result.See Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in AmericanLife (New York: Harper & Row, 1985).

THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 16113 Also, while non-autonomous persons will not be candidates for the fully func-tioning citizen described here, it should not be seen as following that their interestsand the interests connected with the networks of dependence and interaction ofwhich they are a part, should not play a crucial role in the fashioning of justprinciples. But the non-autonomous agent will not represent those interests herselfin the various fora which constitute the derivation and application of social prin-ciples by which basic institutions are constructed. For discussion of the role ofdependency in theories of justice (and the limitations of traditional liberalism inthis regard) see Eva Feder Kitay, Loves Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, andDependency (London: Routledge, 1999).14 Mackenzie and Stoljar, Introduction, p. 4.15 The terms relational and social do not mean the same thing, and it wouldbe instructive to examine their different connotations and implications, giventhe variety of motivations for such non-individualized accounts. For example,relational views seem to express more thoroughly the need to underscoreinterpersonal dynamics as components of autonomy, dynamics such as caringrelations, interpersonal dependence, and intimacy. Social accounts imply, Ithink, a broader view, where various other kinds of social factors institutionalsettings, cultural patterns, political factors might all come into play.16 The most often cited source for the call for a new notion is Jennifer Nedelsky:see, e.g., Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities. Foran argument that autonomy may well not be able to shed its atomistic baggage,see Lorraine Code, The Perversion of Autonomy and the Subjection of Women:Discourses of Social Advocacy at Centurys End, in Mackenzie and Stoljar(eds.), Relational Autonomy, pp. 181212.17 For discussion, see the Introduction to The Inner Citadel: Essays on IndividualAutonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); for a more recent discus-sion, see my Autonomy, in Christopher B. Gray (ed.), The Philosophy of Law:An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), pp. 7273.18 See, for example, Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Chapter 1, Lawrence Haworth,Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1986). Cf. Bernard Berofsky Liberation from Self: A Theoryof Personal Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapter6, and Diana Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1989), Part II. Also, see my Autonomy and Personal History,Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), pp. 124.19 I refer to elements of the self rather than simply desires for reasonsRichard Double and others have put forward, namely that conceptions ofautonomy that see only desires as the focal point will be too narrow, as peoplecan exhibit autonomy relative to a wide variety of personal characteristics, suchas values, physical traits, relations to others, and so on; any element of body,personality, or circumstance that figures centrally in reflection and action shouldbe open to appraisal in terms of autonomy. See Double, Two Types of AutonomyAccounts, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22(1) (March, 1992).

162 JOHN CHRISTMAN20 Nedelsky, p. 12.21 For a similar distinction, see Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy and Social Rela-tionships, in Diana T. Meyers (ed.), Feminists Rethink the Self (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1997), pp. 4061, esp. 5758. Notice also that, despite the label,relational autonomy is still meant as a characteristic of individuals, not the groups,relationships, or social collectivities in relation to which autonomy is enjoyed. Topursue the latter route would mean that only we are autonomous, not I inrelation to you and them.22

Personal Autonomy and Society. Parenthetical page numbers in the textrefer to this article.23 This is a condition that Joseph Raz makes central to his conception ofautonomy, see The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986),pp. 372377.24 While my purpose here is not to criticize Oshanas view directly, there areelements of it that need to be reconsidered I think. For example, the conditionthat autonomy obtains only when the person is protected from physical threat istoo strong, as most women in most societies cannot be fully protected in this way;moreover, many people such as firefighters, police officers, and military personneltake on roles that subject them to extreme danger, yet we would not call them non-autonomous.25 In making this point, I am sensitive to the claim that definitions of autonomyare not at fault for robbing oppressed individuals of their voices, rather the socialconditions that put such people in a position of strict obedience accomplishedthis. But the question of what counts as oppressive social conditions, as distin-guished from lives of devotion to sacred authority or unquestioned tradition, mustbe answered in light of all authentic voices; and the purpose of an account ofautonomy is to determine such authentic agency in order to proceed to conductthat very inquiry.26 This account is, I think, largely co-extensive with the view of perfectionismput forth by Thomas Hurka, though it is not equivalent to it. See his Perfectionism(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 3. Note also that according to thesense of perfectionism I define, Will Kymlickas liberalism is not perfectionistin its conception of the autonomous person, since he includes an endorsementconstraint on all values valid for free citizens. See Liberalism, Community andCulture, pp. 913.27 See Charles Taylor, What is Human Agency?, in Human Agency andLanguage: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985).28 I am grateful to Catriona Mackenzie for comments which induced this clarifi-cation. For a discussion of autonomy in a political context which touches on thisissue, see my Autonomy, Self-Knowledge and Liberal Legitimacy in Autonomyand the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays.29 This interesting point was made by Marina Oshana in commentary on thispaper.

THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 16330 For an argument for the relation between autonomy and respect, thoughone that relies on a conception of autonomy different from mine, see ChristineKorsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1995).31 A development of an idea similar to this (though not couched in the contextof a proceduralist conception of autonomy) can be found in Catriona MackenzieImagining Oneself Otherwise, in Stoljar and Mackenzie, Relational Autonomy,pp. 124150.32 Cf. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 372377, where he arguesthat autonomy requires an adequate range of options. Notice, however, that therequirement I am proposing is importantly different: I am not claiming that anautonomous person must face actual open options but only that, in order to be ableto reflect adequately she be able to imagine alternative choices under (counter-factually) optimal conditions. Moreover, these alternative are defined subjectively,on my view, not, as with Raz, from a purely philosophical, external, viewpoint.For discussion of a similar point, see my Liberalism, Autonomy, and Self-Transformation, Social Theory and Practice 27(2) (2001).33 See, for example, Mackenzie and Stoljar, Introduction: AutonomyRefigured, pp. 1317.34 For discussion of this condition, see my Liberalism, Autonomy, and Self-Transformation.35 See Self, Society, and Personal Choice.36 As Virginia Held has said in a different context, we should view maturity. . . as competence in creating and sustaining relations of empathy and intersub-jectivity Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993),p. 60.37 For a discussion of the way that some poverty-related welfare policiessystematically undercut the provision of such conditions, see John Christman,Autonomy, Independence, and Poverty-Related Welfare Policies, Public AffairsQuarterly 12(4) (October, 1998), pp. 383406.38 Paradoxically, use of a substantive conception of autonomy in order to excludethose participants living under (arguably) oppressive value systems such aswomen under some versions of religious fundamentalism for example impliesthat the victims of oppression have lower moral status, are less morally responsiblefor their choices, and (depending on ones view) less eligible for participationin democratic deliberation (if autonomy is necessary for all these) than theiroppressors. For the latter will presumably enjoy the freedom from restrictions,abilities to resist authority, and the like which merit the label autonomy in asubstantive, relational sense (depending on the details of those views).39 This is a complex and controversial process of course. For discussion, see, forexample, Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1996).40 For discussion of whether it is really possible to freely choose slavery,see Oshana, Personal Autonomy and Society, pp. 8990 and ThomasHill, Servility and Self-Respect, in Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge:

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Cambridge University Press, 1991). For an elaboration of this view of the roleof autonomy in conceptions of democratic deliberation, see my Autonomy,Self-Knowledge, and Liberal Legitimacy, in Autonomy and the Challenges toLiberalism.41 For a deconstructive account of the motivations and perspectives of conser-vative women, see Andrea Dworkin, Right Wing Women (New York: PerigeeBooks, 1983).42 An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Pacific Division APA, SanFrancisco, April, 2003. The present version has benefitted from commentary byCatriona Mackenzie and Marina Oshana as well as helpful comments by Diana T.Meyers, for all of which I am very grateful.

Department of PhilosophyPenn State UniversityUniversity Park, PA 16802E-mail: [email protected]

relational autonomy, liberal individualism and the social construccion of selves

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