G.R. No. 201363               March 18, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.

On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge22 for the same offense. The CA stressed this point when it said:

It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view. 1âwphi1 PO3 Renato de Leon saw appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white powderly substance. PO3 Renato de Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having arrested him twice before for the same illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow suspicion. The third time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of plastic wrapper appellant was holding and scrutinizing also contained shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record. He would have been irresponsible to just ‘wait and see’ and give appellant a chance to scamper away. For his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an equally familiar face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with him through the aid of a tricycle driver. Appellant’s act of running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leon’s reasonable suspicion that appellant was actually in possession of illegal drug. x x x23

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.

It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on "personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is unquestionably not what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be strictly construed.24

Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.25 It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.

In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.

Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the case of People v. Tudtud:31

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.

Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

                                                                                   ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, v People of the Philippines                    G.R. No.  170180

he onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[45] Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence.  This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.  Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.

 Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this “[c]annot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.”[46] Moreover, where the circumstances

are shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.[47]

Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as “an especially vicious crime,”[48] and “one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society,”[49] for those who become addicted to it “not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding members of society,”[50] whereas “peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction.”[51] Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s exoneration from criminal liability.  

 IV.

 A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind

the courts to exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the

determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be “[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.”[52] In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the law.

 

Antiquera V People of the Philippines

Ruling of the Court

The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.

The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that

the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:

THE COURT:

Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?

A – It was partially open Your Honor.

Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?

A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?

A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.

x x x x

Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a police officer?

A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…

Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the interior of the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?

A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening because you did not know what was happening inside?

A – Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.17