regret, remorse and the work of remembrance: official responses to the rwandan genocide

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Rwandan GenocideRegret, Remorse and the Work of Remembrance: Official Responses to the

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REGRET, REMORSE AND THEWORK OF REMEMBRANCE:

OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO THERWANDAN GENOCIDE

NESAM MCMILLAN

La Trobe University, Australia

ABSTRACT

In 1994, countries and institutions across the world failed to prevent, or stop, theRwandan genocide. Since then, however, many national and international officialshave travelled to Rwanda to express their remorse and regret regarding the interna-tional failure to halt the genocide. Their statements of regret constitute the officialresponse to the international failure from the governments and institutions that havebeen implicated in this occurrence. This article analyses the three most well-knownof these political speeches, in order to explore how they come to terms with theinternational failure. Departing from existing analyses that focus on the apologeticcharacter of these speeches, in this article, I focus on their confessional elements.Understanding these speeches as confessional acts draws attention to their self-interested nature as attempts by these political leaders to configure the internationalfailure as their personal ‘sin’ and then confess its occurrence in order to demonstratetheir enlightenment and secure their redemption. In highlighting the self-focusednature of these official responses to the international failure, I demonstrate how theyultimately display the same indifference to the suffering of the Rwandan Tutsis assignified by the international failure itself.

KEY WORDS

apology; confession; lessons learned; political response; Rwandan genocide

IN RECENT years, Bill Clinton has repeatedly expressed remorse at hisfailure to prevent the Rwandan genocide. ‘Rwanda . . . as I say over andover again, it’s one of my greatest regrets’ (Clinton, 2004). His admission

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does not stand alone. Since 1994, many national and international officialshave undertaken ‘pilgrimages of contrition’ to Rwanda (Ghosts of Rwanda,2004). On such journeys, they visit memorial sites, lay commemorativewreaths and speak to survivors of the genocide, before turning to the inter-national news media to express their personal remorse for the internationalfailure to stop the genocide. Their statements of regret constitute the officialresponse to the international failure from the governments and institutionsthat have been most implicated in this occurrence.1 But what does it mean tosay sorry, to feel regretful about the international failure now?

In this article, I critically analyse the three most well-known politicalspeeches regarding the international failure to halt the Rwandan genocide,namely those of the (then) American President, Bill Clinton, the (then)Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan and the (then) PrimeMinister of Belgium, Guy Verhofstadt. I ask how these official statementsmake sense of the international failure and come to terms with this occur-rence. Only surfacing after societal criticism of the international responsehad begun to consolidate, these speeches are as much a response to publiccondemnations of the international failure as they are a response to the eventitself. They represent an opportunity for Clinton, Annan and Verhofstadt toredeem themselves in front of their constituencies, by acknowledging thereprehensibility of the international failure and providing an official, andauthoritative, account of it (see, in another context, Scraton, 2004). As such,they constitute a means for these leaders to achieve a sense of ‘closure’regarding this now contentious historical occurrence (see Pratt and Gilligan,2004: 2).

The redemptive function of these speeches can be traced to their confes-sional nature. Thus, while existing analyses of these texts discuss them asapologies, in this article, I seek to explore their confessional elements. Thespeeches are confessional in both their form and their function: not only dothey invoke religious rhetoric, but they also function as a means for Clinton,Annan and Verhofstadt to configure the international failure as their personal‘sin’ and then confess its occurrence in order to demonstrate their enlighten-ment and secure their redemption. The sense of resolution produced throughthese speeches is also due, however, to their content: the way in which theyframe the international failure as a regrettable mistake, from which lessonscan be learned. Within this rhetorical framework, the focus is shifted fromthe errors of the past to the promise of a future in which a purportedly global‘we’ may use the lessons learned from the international failure to halt thegenocide in Rwanda to prevent another genocide.

Yet, the closure and resolution offered by these three speeches are artifi-cial – the international failure cannot be so easily contained. Thus, this articlecritically analyses these three important political responses to the genocide,in order to unsettle their attempt to both fix the meaning of the internationalfailure and close the issue of its implications. In the first section, I introducethe three speeches that constitute my focus, as well as outlining my analyticalapproach to them (as confessions rather than apologies). The second section

86 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 19(1)



then examines how these confessions figure the international failure as aregrettable event from which lessons can be learned. Then, in the thirdsection, I draw attention to the way in which these confessions operate toredeem their orators, by demonstrating their enlightenment. In critiquingthese official reactions to the international failure, this article seeks to raise thepossibility of thinking, speaking and writing otherwise about the meaning andimplications of this event.

‘SINS OF OMISSION’

In 1994, countries and institutions across the world failed to prevent, or stop,the Rwandan genocide. Faced with the methodical extermination of theRwandan Tutsis, nation states and the United Nations (UN) refused to namethe killings as ‘genocide’. Inside and outside the United Nations structure,many countries were reluctant to provide the economic, political and militaryresources required for a concerted international response to the violence.Accordingly, the United Nations peacekeeping force that was in Rwanda atthe time of the genocide was not afforded the means or the mandate to effect-ively protect the Rwandan Tutsis from the persecution that they were facing.In fact, this force was actually reduced after the genocide began, when theBelgian government withdrew its contingent from the force after 10 of itspeacekeepers were strategically murdered in the first few days of the killings.Thus, as the Rwandan Tutsis congregated in schools, churches and hospitalsin hope of protection, national and international leaders failed to adequatelyrespond to their cries for help.

Since 1994, however, there have been three prominent political ‘apologies’for the international failure that have been received as important officialacknowledgements of this event, both inside and outside the Rwandan nation.Firstly, there is the speech given by Bill Clinton, as the President of the UnitedStates of America, when he visited Rwanda during what has been called his‘apology tour’ of Africa (see Swain, 2005). Since its delivery, this speech hassparked societal controversy and debate, becoming the subject of academiccommentary (see e.g. Negash, 2006); public commentary (see e.g. Kelly, 1998);documentaries (see e.g. Ghosts of Rwanda, 2004); and feature films (see e.g.Sometimes in April, 2005). Clinton delivered his now famous, or infamous,speech in March 1998, when he stopped over in Rwanda for a period of threehours, during which time he remained within the confines of the airport (TheTriumph of Evil, 1999). While he was at the airport, Clinton did meet withsurvivors of the genocide, but the short and superficial nature of his visitarguably reflected less concern for the specificity of the Rwandan genocideand the people that it affected than for a broader international audience. Aswill be discussed later, although Clinton physically spoke to the Rwandanpeople, I contend that his words – and the knowledge of the genocide heendeavoured to impart through his words – were actually addressed to adifferent, non-Rwandan, audience.

MCMILLAN: REGRET, REMORSE AND THE WORK OF REMEMBRANCE 87



Clinton’s speech canvasses the details of the genocide, the reprehensibilityof the international failure and his vision of the future. He begins with apurportedly authoritative description of the genocide, which encompassesthe date that it started, the dynamics of the killings, their distinctly genocidalnature, the estimated death toll, the preparations for the killings and the roleof the Rwandan government in them. He then gives a much briefer overviewof the international failure – ‘We did not act quickly enough after the killingbegan. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become a safe havenfor the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightfulname: genocide’ – before moving on to outline a five-point plan for thefuture. This plan relates to both the Rwandan genocide and genocide ingeneral, involving: the establishment of better early warning systems foridentifying genocide; improvements in the international community’s abilityto act in the face of genocide; financial assistance from external countries toassist the reconstruction of Rwandan society; the consolidation of the ruleof law through Rwandan and international justice mechanisms; and thepursuit of individual accountability for those guilty of international crimes.In focusing on both the Rwandan genocide and genocide in general, Clintonframes the 1994 Rwandan violence as an example of a broader phenomenon,or – in his words – a greater ‘evil’.

Secondly, in 1998, Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the UnitedNations, also visited Rwanda and spoke about the international failure.However, this speech was not received well by the Rwandan government; hewas criticized for his failure to accept UN responsibility for the genocide(Negash, 2006: 92). In this 1998 speech, Annan focused on Rwandan respon-sibility for the killings, referring to the genocide as ‘a horror that came fromwithin’ Rwandan society and explaining to the Rwandan people that ‘youand only you can put an end to the violence’ (Annan, 1998). Interestingly,however, a later speech given by Annan in 2004 (around the tenth anniver-sary of the genocide) has received much wider public attention and support(see BBC News, 2004; Hoge, 2004) and has thus become an important officialrepresentation of the international failure. Annan gave this speech at aMemorial Conference for the genocide in New York, while a version of itwas delivered by his representative, Ibrahim Gambari, in Rwanda itself. Anindication of the Rwandan government’s acceptance of this second speech ofAnnan’s is that an excerpt from it appears in the exhibition at the KigaliMemorial Centre in Rwanda.

Perhaps in response to criticisms of his earlier speech, Annan’s (2004a)oration starts with a recognition of the international failure: he states that‘[t]he genocide in Rwanda should never, ever have happened . . . The inter-national community failed Rwanda.’ He then critiques the internationalfailure as a regrettable mistake, which he attributes to both a dearth of ‘politi-cal will’ and various errors of misperception. In the second half of his speech,he turns to discuss how the United Nations has responded to the post-genocide situation in Rwanda through aid and the establishment of the Inter-national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In an effort to draw out the broader




implications of the international failure, Annan also underscores the im-portance of using the experience of the international failure to motivate arenewed sense of global commitment to the prevention of genocide. Hisspeech, thus, ends on an optimistic note as he – like Clinton – maps out avision of what the international failure to prevent the Rwandan genocidemight motivate a global ‘us’ to do.

Thirdly, while attending the commemorations of the sixth anniversary ofthe genocide in Rwanda (in 2000), the Prime Minister of Belgium, GuyVerhofstadt, offered a direct apology to the Rwandan people for his govern-ment’s failure to prevent the genocide. He was also present in Rwanda forthe tenth anniversary of the genocide, where he both attended the commem-orations and opened a memorial for the Belgian peacekeepers who weremurdered during the genocide (Negash, 2006: 98). Similarly, Verhofstadt’sspeech is not solely concerned with the Rwandan experience of the genocide– he makes it clear that he is present at the sixth anniversary commemora-tions to remember both the Belgian peacekeepers and the Tutsi victims whowere killed in 1994. Nevertheless, his speech – unlike Annan’s 1998 one – hasbeen endorsed by the Rwandan government. In his oration at the tenthanniversary of the genocide, the Rwandan President, Paul Kagame (2004),noted that Belgium (and the United States of America) ‘had the decency toapologise’ for the international failure and an extract of Verhofstadt’s speechalso appears in the exhibition at the Kigali Memorial Centre.

As with Clinton’s speech, Verhofstadt’s speech is divided into three sections,in which he addresses the genocide, the international failure and the future,respectively. In contrast to Clinton’s speech, however, Verhofstadt’s orationis less comprehensive and informative, and more solemn and emotional.Rather than describing how the 1994 killings occurred, Verhofstadt (2000)draws attention to their legacy, describing memorials to the genocide as sites‘of horror and atrocity’, at which victims were slain who now ‘haunt thecollective memory of humanity’. Like Annan, Verhofstadt (2000) then attrib-utes the international failure to regrettable ‘errors’ and ‘misconceptions’,before apologizing for his country’s role regarding this failure. Verhofstadt’sfocus is, therefore, on Belgium’s part in the international failure, even thoughhis speech can be situated within a much longer historical trajectory, alsoencompassing Belgium’s prior colonization of Rwanda (see Kerstens, 2008).Despite this context, though, his speech remains similar to Clinton’s andAnnan’s, in terms of its focus (namely, the international failure) and its func-tion (as discussed below). In line with both Clinton and Annan, Verhofstadtalso concludes his speech on a more optimistic note, by expressing his wishesfor a positive future for Rwandan society and Africa in general.

In their respective statements, Clinton, Annan and Verhofstadt all speakon behalf of the country or institution that they represent. In their represen-tative capacity, these leaders all acknowledge both the genocidal nature of thekillings and the international failure to stop them. That is, addressing publiccriticism of their government’s or institution’s failure to name the killings asa ‘genocide’ in 1994, these speeches constitute a belated public acceptance




that the killings in Rwanda did constitute a genocide. Thus, Clinton (1998)unambiguously states that the international community ‘did not immediatelycall these crimes by their rightful name: genocide’. With respect to the inter-national failure, all three leaders acknowledge the responsibility of the‘international community’ regarding this event. Clinton (1998), for example,stated that ‘[t]he international community . . . must bear its share of respon-sibility for this tragedy’.

In concert, these political statements are commonly referred to as apologies.They are either accepted as genuine apologies (regarding Verhofstadt, seeNegash, 2006: 85) or critiqued as ‘quasi-apologies’ (regarding Clinton, seeGibney and Roxstrom, 2001: 932). Accordingly, these speeches can be, andhave been, evaluated in relation to established knowledge about what consti-tutes a genuine apology. Drawing on existing scholarship regarding apologies,Thompson (2008: 32) characterizes an apology as a statement that containsan acknowledgement of the wrong in issue, an acceptance of responsibilityfor this wrong, an expression of regret for its occurrence and a promise ofnon-repetition.2 This analytical framework clearly illuminates certain aspectsof the statements and provides some tools for evaluating them. For example,drawing on Thompson’s definition, it is possible to appreciate how all threespeeches constitute an acknowledgement of the wrong of the internationalfailure, incorporate sentiments of remorse and regret and contain a promiseof non-repetition (to be discussed below).

Furthermore, this definition can also be used to draw attention to the factthat only Verhofstadt accepts responsibility for the international failure onbehalf of his country and offered a formal apology for it. In 2000, heproclaimed: ‘[i]n the name of my country, I bow before the memory of thevictims of the terrible genocide of 1994. In the name of my country and mypeople, I ask you to forgive us.’ His frankness regarding his country’sinvolvement in the international failure can be contrasted with the speechesof Clinton and Annan. Although these latter two leaders speak on behalf oftheir respective country and institution, they do not accept responsibility onits behalf. Clinton infamously rationalized his administration’s response tothe genocide as a product of his personal failure to ‘appreciate’ the nature ofthe 1994 killings. In his 1998 speech, he explains to the Rwandan people that‘[i]t may seem strange to you here . . . but all over the world there were peoplelike me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciatethe depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this un-imaginable terror’ (Clinton, 1998). Meanwhile, Annan (2004a) notes that theUnited Nations disregarded important ‘[w]arnings’ of the genocide, but alsodirects attention towards the actions and inactions of its member states byclaiming that the international failure was ultimately a product of a lack of‘political will’. Thus, Clinton and Annan explain (or justify) their inadequateresponses to the Rwandan genocide, but they do not acknowledge theresponsibility of their respective country and institution or offer a directapology to the Rwandan people on its behalf.

It is on the basis of its justificatory nature that Clinton’s speech is mostoften deemed to be a ‘quasi’ or ‘psuedo’ apology (see Gibney and Roxstrom,




2001: 932; Negash, 2006: 88, respectively). In line with contemporary under-standings of a genuine apology as an unfettered, unencumbered recognitionof a wrong (see e.g. Tavuchis, 1991: 17), Clinton’s attempt to rationalize hisresponse to the genocide is condemned as an inadequate apology. Yet, it isnotable that if academic analyses of the recent phenomenon of state apolo-gies are to be applied to the speeches (see Gibney and Roxstrom, 2001: 929,933), even Verhofstadt’s frank apology can be impugned on the bases that he,firstly, does not explain which specific Belgian actions he was apologizingfor (he makes no reference, for example, to the withdrawal of the Belgiancontingent) and, secondly, does not acknowledge the historical context of hisapology (namely, the context of Belgium’s colonization of Rwanda).

However, while these speeches can be and have been analysed as apologies,in this article I want to highlight their confessional nature. These speeches,that is, can be conceptualized as confessions, as opportunities for Clinton,Annan and Verhofstadt to disclose their personal sins in order to be forgivenfor them. Their status as confessional acts is traceable to both the languagethat they employ and the logic on which they rely.3 Annan (2004a), forexample, explicitly invokes confessional rhetoric in his claim that ‘[t]he inter-national community is guilty of sins of omission’. In a less overt way, how-ever, the speeches also rely on a confessional logic according to which Annan,Clinton and Verhofstadt seek to acknowledge their personal failures regard-ing the Rwandan genocide in order to be freed of such past sins. Focusingon the confessional character of the speeches thus draws attention to, firstly,their personalized nature and, secondly, their redemptive function.

In these speeches, Annan, Verhofstadt and Clinton frame the internationalfailure to prevent the Rwandan genocide as a personal error. As I noted atthe beginning of this article, Clinton refers to the international failure as ‘hisgreatest regret’ as the President of the United States of America; while Annan’sspeech pertains not only to the failure of the UN institution, but also toAnnan’s personal mistakes as the Head of the Department of PeacekeepingOperations at the UN during the 1994 genocide. He describes his personalfailure regarding the Rwandan genocide as a ‘painful memory’ that has‘influenced much of . . . [his] thinking, and . . . actions, as Secretary-General’(Annan, 2004a). In their analysis of confessions, Foucault (1978: 58) and Beard(2007: 35) have demonstrated how confessions can function as a method of‘pronouncing’ and ‘exchanging’ a ‘truth about oneself’ (Beard, 2007: 35). Ina similar vein, in their speeches, Clinton, Annan and Verhofstadt produce theinternational failure as a personal sin, a personal truth that only they candisclose. Thus, Verhofstadt (2000) refers to his acknowledgement of the sinfulnature of the international failure as a personal realization – a ‘conclusion hearrived at’ – after a lengthy period of self-reflection.

The confessional nature of these speeches is also exemplified by theirredemptive function. Understood within a predictable system of religious‘justice’, the speeches can be appraised as a means for Clinton, Annan andVerhofstadt to confess their sins in order to be freed of them. Beard (2007)has demonstrated how the confessional system prior to the Middle Ages,based on submission to the mercy of God, was superseded by a framework




of confessional justice in which the sinner confessed in lieu of the redemp-tion that was guaranteed to follow (see also Foucault, 1978: 62). She chartshow ‘[s]in had become an object of exchange . . . the confession of sin isreturned in exchange for a pure, Christian self’ (Beard, 2007: 33).4 Accord-ingly, in delivering their speeches, these leaders can be understood to beconfessing within a system of religious justice in which redemption fromtheir sins ‘naturally’ follows their words. Within this rhetorical framework,the injustice of the international failure is overcome through their acknow-ledgement of it and expressions of remorse regarding it.

Thus, while an apology can only lead to redemption or forgiveness if it isaccepted by the party to whom it is directed (see Tavuchis, 1991: 18), the actof confessing ensures the confessor is redeemed through their self-disclosure.As such, Verhofstadt is the only one of the speakers to actually ask theRwandan people for forgiveness and, therefore, leave himself, and his country,open to rejection. Accordingly, even though existing knowledge aboutapologies can highlight the qualified and restricted nature of these officialacknowledgements, critical scholarship on confessions draws attention totheir self-focused and self-interested nature as attempts by these politicalleaders to configure the international failure as their personal sin and thenconfess its occurrence in order to demonstrate their enlightenment and securetheir redemption. Moreover, through a personalizing of the internationalfailure, the ‘sins’ of these leaders stand in for those of the nations and insti-tutions that they represent and their confessions function to absolve bothindividual, and nation and institution.

The speeches of Clinton, Annan and Verhofstadt, that is, are arguablydirected at achieving a sense of closure with respect to a now contentious andcriticized historical event (see Pratt and Gilligan, 2004: 2). Their ability toeffect a form of closure is attributable to, firstly, their framing of the inter-national failure (they adopt a progressive understanding of time and historyin order to present the international failure as a regrettable mistake fromwhich lessons can be learned) and, secondly, their confessional nature (asconfessions, they performatively redeem their speakers for their past ‘sins’).It is these two aspects of the speeches that I discuss, in turn, in the tworemaining sections of this article.

LESSONS LEARNED: THE WORK OF REMEMBRANCE

‘We cannot change the past’, Clinton states in his 1998 speech, marking thepast of the international failure as a distinct and closed historical period. Inanother speech, Annan (2004b) expresses a similar sentiment when he statesin relation to the genocide and the failure that ‘[s]uch crimes cannot bereversed. Such failures cannot be repaired. The dead cannot be brought backto life.’ Yet, while past errors cannot be remedied, the past – according tothese leaders – can be reviewed to provide lessons for the future. Thus, inlight of the unchangeability of the past, Annan proceeds to ask ‘So what can




we do?’ Although it is Annan who poses this question (in a separate speechfrom the one I am focusing on), all the speeches provide an answer to it. Theycollectively contend that the past, even though it is unchangeable, canprovide a series of lessons for the future.

In this production of the international failure as a regrettable mistake fromwhich lessons have been learned, these official responses adopt a particularconception of time and history. They understand time through the notion ofprogress. Berkhofer (1995: 126) describes progress ‘as a way of interpretingand emplotting history . . . a methodology and a moral outlook’. Similarly, aprogressive idea of time – the belief that the passage of time results in theprogress or advancement of the human race – is employed in the officialresponses, in order to place the international failure to prevent the Rwandangenocide in the past, as well as transforming this event into a set of lessonsfor the future. This view of history and historical review figures the past andpresent in a relationship of linearity (the past precedes the present that givesway to the future) and superiority (from the present it is possible to identifythe truth or mistakes of the past) (Berkhofer, 1995: 126).

Yet, even though these speeches claim to be based on a linear understand-ing of time, they are actively involved in the construction of a particularproduction of the past and its implications. Although these leaders purportto deduce lessons for the future from the ‘facts’ of the past, they perceive andframe the past in terms of the knowledge and imperatives of the present (seeFoucault, 1977; Zehfuss, 2007). In the speeches, ‘[t]ime is reversed: the past,inasmuch as it exists, becomes what it “is” because of the present, retrospec-tively’ (Zehfuss, 2007: 107). For example, all three leaders emphasize thedistinctly genocidal nature of the 1994 killings. However, as noted earlier,when the killings actually occurred, they were not recognized (at least notofficially) as a ‘genocide’. As such, for Clinton to declare in 1998 that ‘geno-cide’ was the ‘rightful name’ for the 1994 violence (see above) is to read the‘facts’ of the past in light of the knowledge of the present. Moreover, as I willdiscuss later, not only do the speeches represent the past in light of theknowledge of the present, they also produce the past in a manner that servesthe needs and imperatives of the present.

Their adoption of a linear and progressive approach to the events of thegenocide and the international failure also draws attention away from theway in which this event affected and continues to affect the world. This senseof the past can arguably be seen in a documentary film entitled Keepers ofMemory (2005), which includes a scene of a local commemoration ceremony.Standing in a circle of people in the dark, at a small nighttime ceremony, anunnamed survivor is pictured speaking desperately of her family memberswho were killed during the genocide: ‘I remember all of them and I cry allthe time. I remember, I remember’ (Keepers of Memory, 2005). I do not wantto definitively interpret what her words mean, or what she intended them tomean, but – to me – they gesture towards the very presence of the past in‘present’ life. Her words seem to suggest that the very loss that was, in onesense, experienced in 1994, has also been experienced continually since then,




remaining with her ‘all the time’. By underscoring the contiguity of the pastand the present, her words arguably deny the form of closure that is effectedthrough official responses, which generally guide their audience’s attentionaway from the past, by entreating them to focus on the promise of the presentand the future.

The progressive reading of time and history employed in the speechesdoes, however, enable the event of the international failure to be imbued withsome productive possibility. As the past is figured as a closed historical period,the focus of official responses shifts to the ‘promise of the future’ (see, in amore general context, Douzinas, 2000: 15). Clinton, Annan and Verhofstadtappropriate the bodies of the Tutsis who died during the genocide in orderto show how their deaths can be accorded some value. Configuring theirdeaths as ‘their sacrifice’, the three speakers explain that their deaths compel‘us’ to pursue certain goals, namely to ‘recognize our common humanity’through the prevention of a future genocide (Annan, 2004a). In the context ofthese official responses, the productive lessons that are understood to emergefrom the international failure predominantly entail a renewed commitmentto human rights protection and genocide prevention throughout the world.

In the speeches, it becomes clear that such a prospective preventative actwill be an effort undertaken in the service of a greater ideal or system ofbelief. As confessions, the official speeches thus constitute pledges to (re)joina community of faith united by a higher ideal, namely the good of (common)humanity (see Beard, 2007; see also Hymer, 1995: 44).5 In the three speeches,the Rwandan genocide is transformed into simply one example of the greaterevil of inhumanity. Verhofstadt (2000) describes the genocide as ‘the mani-festation of an evil which haunts the heart of man and which is eating awayat all contemporary societies’; while Clinton (1998) believes that it represents‘the capacity for people everywhere to slip into pure evil’. The reason that theRwandan genocide, in particular, and genocide, in general, are evil is becausethey constitute a threat to ‘our common humanity’. As Clinton (1998) mostclearly explains:

believe me, after over five years of dealing with these problems I know it is notthe division between Hutu and Tutsi, or Serb and Croatian and Muslim inBosnia, or Arab and Jew, or Catholic and Protestant in Ireland, or black andwhite. It is really the line between those who embrace the common humanitywe all share and those who reject it.

In his statement, Clinton reduces these geographically, historically and cultur-ally distinct conflicts to a common register: they all constitute battles betweenthose who strive for good (common humanity) and those who practice evil(inhumanity). Occupying the self-announced position of an expert (‘believeme, after over five years of dealing with these problems I know’), Clintonframes the Rwandan genocide as simply one manifestation of greater evil andinhumanity in the world.

Within the belief system endorsed, and produced, through official speeches,the injustice of the Rwandan genocide is interpreted as requiring a renewed




commitment to human rights through the prevention of genocide. Thelessons learned from the international failure to stop the Rwandan genocideare to be applied to a future, similar event. Cast as an evil assault on the goodof humanity itself, the Rwandan genocide is interpreted to require a renewedcommitment to ‘a stronger sense of global kinship’ (Annan, 2004a) and to ‘ourcommon destiny and our humanity’ (Verhofstadt, 2000) in order to ‘banishthis greatest crime against humanity’ (Clinton, 1998). An investment in andpromotion of humanity – signified by an act of prevention – is needed toovercome the inhumanity signified by the crime of genocide.

This commitment to preventing a future genocide not only raises thepromise of a future good act, but also provides a measure of comfort in thepresent. In her analysis of cultural understandings of bystanderism in relationto the Holocaust, Dean (2004: 104–5) argues that post-hoc approaches tobystander indifference articulate societal desires and fears. She suggests thatthese sentiments express a ‘longing that “we” would have done or will dosomething differently when the time comes, accompanied by an equallypowerful fear that we will not’ (Dean, 2004: 105). The renewal of the post-Holocaust pledge of ‘never again’ in relation to the Rwandan genocide alsofunctions to provide some immediate solace for the wish and fear that ‘we’will act differently. Thus, Annan frames the measure of our progress as afunction of whether an internationalized ‘we’ can be sure that we will act toprevent the next genocide. He asks whether ‘we’ are ‘confident that, con-fronted by a new Rwanda today, we can respond effectively, in good time?’(Annan, 2004a). This test of our surety can provide ‘us’ with an immediatesense of whether ‘we’ are following the path of the good.

Not only are ‘we’ constituted as a community committed to the goodthrough a future act of prevention, but this community is performed pre-emptively through the pledge ‘never again’. In this vein, Annan (2004a) readsthe commemoration of the genocide as an opportunity – an opportunity to‘be united in a way we were not 10 years ago’. For Annan (2004a), ‘globalsolidarity’ does not need to be found in the prevention of a genocide, ratherit can be grounded in the post-hoc pledge of ‘never again’ and the commem-oration of a genocide that was not prevented. Rather than merely a futurepromise, this pledge is thus an end in itself, ‘affirming’ and constituting acommon humanity that is united by both its acts and its commitment to act(see also Dean, 2004: 80). ‘Never again’ becomes a commemorative practiceas much as it refers to a future ethical imperative. Perversely, the commem-oration of the international failure is co-opted as a site at which a global ‘us’who failed to respond to the suffering of the Tutsis can feel a sense ofcommunal identity and purpose.

The claims that have been, and continue to be, made in relation to theconflict in Darfur are part of the same conversation started by Annan.6Commentators on Darfur claim that there are ‘troubling parallels betweenRwanda and Sudan’ with reference to the Rwandan genocide (Royce cited inSubcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations in theHouse of Representatives, 2004: 3; see also other statements made during this




hearing). The claim that they are making is twofold: firstly, that genocide isoccurring in Darfur, just as it did in Rwanda; and, secondly, that the worldis failing to intervene in the genocide in Darfur, just as it failed in Rwanda.In the logic of redemption through future genocide prevention, they high-light that we are not ‘responding in good time’ when ‘confronted by a newRwanda’ and are, therefore, still failing to fulfill our commitment to the goodof common humanity. Thus, specifically in relation to the United States ofAmerica, Mamdani (2007) argues that

[w]ith very few exceptions, the Save Darfur campaign has drawn a single lessonfrom Rwanda: the problem was the US failure to intervene to stop the genocide.Rwanda is the guilt that America must expiate, and to do so it must be readyto intervene, for good and against evil, even globally.7

Understanding an intervention in Darfur as a form of response to the injus-tice of the international response to the Rwandan genocide demonstrates theimplications of conceptualizing the Rwandan genocide as simply one mani-festation of a greater evil. Denied its status as a unique historical occurrence,the Rwandan genocide, as well as the conflict in Darfur, becomes simply anexample of a more general phenomenon. By subsuming the Rwandan geno-cide in this universalizing gesture, the injustice of the Rwandan genocide istransformed into a mistake that can be remedied through the prevention ofan unrelated conflict. This mode of understanding the international failureobscures the specifically Rwandan nature, causes and experience of the 1994violence and the response that it received. Put simply, the potential ‘utility’of the historical experience of the international failure to motivate a changein state practices regarding genocide is important, but it cannot be under-stood to ameliorate the devastating consequences of the international failureto halt the Rwandan genocide.8

Importantly, these understandings of the Rwandan genocide adopt theperspective of the national or institutional bystander or spectator to geno-cide.9 Throughout their speeches, Annan and Clinton (and, to a lesser extent,Verhofstadt) speak on behalf of a ‘we’, the ‘we’ who did not intervene toprevent the Rwandan genocide; while the terms ‘they’ and ‘them’ referreductively to the Rwandan and other peoples subjected to suffering acrossthe world. Clinton, for example, articulates this binary opposition when heexplains to his Rwandan audience that it does not matter ‘whether we’retalking about Rwanda or some other distant troubled spot’. He elucidates fora Rwandan ‘them’ what they look like from the perspective of the Westernbystander: simply one example of a distant troubled spot. As Fassin (2007)has highlighted in another context, these official responses, therefore, adopta contradictory, and divisive form of humanitarianism. That is, although theofficial speeches are premised upon an appeal to a common humanity and abelief in the universal implications of certain events of human suffering, theyare also based upon a binary and hierarchical distinction between a Western‘us’ (who is figured as the ‘agent’ of humanitarianism) and a Rwandan, orsimply African, ‘them’ (who may either be ‘saved’ or, as mentioned earlier,




‘sacrificed’) (see Fassin, 2007: 507, 519). Within this representational schema,the Rwandan, or African, ‘objects’ of such Western humanitarian assistanceare ‘essentialized’ – the specificity of their circumstances and experiencesdownplayed through their portrayal as generically suffering humans in needof assistance (see Fassin, 2007: 512, 517).

It is within this discursive context that the Rwandan genocide is trans-formed into an event that Western nations and international institutions canlearn from. As noted earlier, the bodies of the Tutsis who were killed, andnot saved, during the genocide are read as a ‘sacrifice’ (see Annan, 2004a)made for the sake of the future good. Through a progressive understandingof history, their sacrificial deaths become the grounds for the present andfuture redemption of the bystander to genocide through their pledge thatsuch a crime will never happen again. This is a profoundly appropriative wayof understanding the international failure, in which this intensely Rwandanexperience is borrowed, or appropriated, to form part of a Western narrativeof humanitarian progress. The next section continues to underscore theappropriative nature of the three political speeches, by demonstrating howthey function as a means for these leaders to save face in front of their ownconstituencies. That is, only enhancing their contradictory nature, althoughthese speeches are grounded in a rhetoric of universal human rights, they areaddressed – on a practical level – to nationally and institutionally boundedcommunities (see Asad, 2000).

PERFORMATIVE REDEMPTION

As I have noted, Clinton, Annan and Verhofstadt all delivered their speechesnot only in the wake of the genocide, but also in the presence of vociferouspublic criticism of their government’s or institution’s response to the geno-cide (see McMillan, 2008). As such, their speeches function to address bothof these ‘events’. In fact, they are arguably more a response to contemporarypublic condemnations of the international failure, than they are a responseto the genocide and the failure themselves. That is, concerned with the socialcost of the international failure for their countries and institutions, I wouldargue that the official responses constitute self-interested attempts to save facein the aftermath of this event. Addressed towards a non-Rwandan audience,the speeches can be read as attempts by these political actors to demonstrateto their constituencies their enlightenment since the international failure (seeBilder, 2006; in relation to other forms of official response, see Scraton, 2004:64), as well as affording them with an opportunity to reaffirm the status ofthe countries and institutions that they represent as global saviours.

On a structural level, the function of the official responses as methods ofpolitical redemption is revealed by the audience that they address. Clinton’swords make it apparent that he is directing his comments, although deliveredin front of a Rwandan audience, to another constituency. He begins hisspeech in anticipation of the international audience that will hear his words,




by stating: ‘It is my hope that through this trip, in every corner of the worldtoday and tomorrow, their [the Rwandans’] story will be told’ (Clinton,1998). He then proceeds – as previously mentioned – to describe the killingsin detail. He describes them, however, in the third person, explaining that‘people gathered seeking refuge . . . [a]nd when they were found, the old andthe sick, women and children alike, they were killed’ (Clinton, 1998). Clinton(1998) then turns to address his immediate Rwandan audience in the secondperson: ‘as you know better than me’, he concedes, the genocide ‘took at leasta million lives’.

The illogical nature of explaining the Rwandan genocide to those wholived through it and indeed ‘know it better than Clinton’ is explained throughreference to his intended audience. In his reference to a Rwandan ‘they’ hespeaks to an audience other than his immediate one. He assumes a position ofknowledge regarding the genocide and seeks to disseminate this knowledgeto an anticipated global, and especially an American, audience. In a similarvein, Annan delivered his speech outside the borders of the Rwandan nation,in front of an audience of international scholars and leaders. His confessionwas performed for this audience, while his representative acted as a mouth-piece for his words in Rwanda. Thus, Annan and Clinton both confess inorder to redeem themselves in front of their constituencies: it is to them thatthey address their remarks. Meanwhile, as noted earlier, Verhofstadt clearlyframes his speech and presence in Rwanda as a function of both his remorseregarding the genocide and his wish to commemorate the deaths of theBelgian peacekeepers during this time. In this way, he is more open about thetwo audiences – the Rwandan people and the Belgian public and the familiesof the peacekeepers – to whom he speaks.

Directed towards their national and international constituencies, the expres-sions of remorse of these leaders become a mode through which they canportray themselves as reformed individuals by performatively proclaimingtheir enlightenment. Thus, Annan (2004a) refers to his personal transforma-tion since the genocide, by explaining: ‘I believed at that time that I was doingmy best. But I realized after the genocide that there was more that I couldand should have done to sound the alarm and rally support.’ Verhofstadt(2000) also speaks of his personal journey since the 1994 genocide, explain-ing that – as a member of the Belgian commission of inquiry into the inter-national failure – he ‘worked hard to understand this terrible event’ (see alsoKerstens, 2008: 193). He then admits that, as a result of this process, the‘conclusion’ he arrived at is ‘staggering’ (Verhofstadt, 2000). In establishingtheir ability to see the errors of their past ways, the speeches of Clinton,Annan and Verhofstadt serve a ‘governance’ function (see, in another context,Pratt and Gilligan, 2004: 2). That is, they operate as a means for these govern-mental and institutional leaders to acknowledge societal controversies regard-ing the international failure, thereby re-establishing their legitimacy andauthority by demonstrating that they can now appreciate the errors of theirpast ways.

Accordingly, in striking contrast to his public attitude to the genocide atthe time that it was occurring – that ‘[w]e cannot solve every such outburst




of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces’ (citedin Kelly, 1998: 677) – Clinton more recently explained:

I feel terrible about it [the genocide] because I think we could have sent 5,000,10,000 troops there and saved a couple hundred thousand lives. I think wecould have saved about half of them. But I’ll always regret that Rwandan thing.I will always feel terrible about it. (Clinton cited in Ghosts of Rwanda, 2004)

Despite his contention, cited earlier, that ‘[w]e cannot change the past’, in thisstatement above, Clinton attempts to re-perform it. He constitutively imaginesa different past in which the United States of America did intervene to stopthe genocide, and would have been able to protect ‘a couple hundredthousand lives’. The imprecision of his statement – he refers to ‘a couplehundred thousand lives’ and ‘that Rwandan thing’ – exposes Clinton’s dis-regard for the specificities of the Rwandan genocide and the lives that werelost during it. The Rwandan genocide to Clinton is a ‘thing’, not an event orexperience that is significant enough to name, but a ‘thing’: an undefined, butexistent, entity. Notably, his cavalier reference to the thousands of lives thathis nation could have but did not save, contrasts starkly with PresidentKagame’s (2004) assertion at the tenth anniversary of the genocide, that wemust remember the victims of the genocide ‘not as statistics, not as a name-less, faceless, anonymous mass of humanity but as our mothers, fathers,sisters, brothers, our children. They were all special in their own way. Theyall had their dreams.’

In their performances of self-enlightenment, there is also some attempt bythese leaders to show how their governments and institutions have acted asglobal saviours in the wake of the genocide. Annan (2004a) speaks of theefforts undertaken by the UN in helping the Rwandan people – the UN, heassures his audience, is ‘present throughout the country – clearing mines,repatriating refugees, rehabilitating clinics and schools, building up the judi-cial system, and much else’. Similarly, Verhofstadt (2000) emphasizes how theBelgian nation is helping the Rwandan people post-genocide. Such assistance,however, is portrayed in the official responses as a form of benevolent aid,motivated by goodwill rather than any form of reparation or compensationfor the international failure (see also Negash, 2006). It is framed as a form ofethical contrition that is neither mandated nor obligatory, which is structuredupon a discriminatory relationship between a caring, Western ‘us’ and a needy,African ‘them’. The Belgian Prime Minister is the only person to allude to thepotentially obligatory nature of such aid and assistance programmes (referringto ‘the duty of solidarity of the international community towards Rwanda’)and he does not do so in any detail (see Verhofstadt, 2000). Thus, in thespeeches, the suffering of the Rwandan Tutsis is appropriated as a means forgovernments, institutions and their leaders to re-establish their legitimacy.

Accordingly, as with national acts of remembrance and commemoration,these international speeches serve particular political functions. Bell (2006) andEdkins (2003) highlight the way in which official forms of memorializationcan produce certain identities and operate to legitimate certain governmentpractices and policies. Similarly, through the emphasis on their ‘benevolent’




actions in Rwanda post-genocide, the speeches of Clinton, Annan andVerhofstadt actively promote an image of their respective countries and insti-tutions as global saviours (see also McMillan, 2008), Meanwhile, Clinton’sreference to the fact that his government should have intervened militarily tosave the Rwandan Tutsis from the genocidal violence they were facing func-tions to legitimate a particular policy and practice, by framing armed human-itarian intervention as the best response to global suffering (see more generallyOrford, 2003). It is in this sense that their narration of the past and presentis based not only on the knowledge of the present (see above), but also onthe needs and imperatives of their present governance.

In many ways, the attempts of these leaders to save face have been success-ful. For example, despite his role in the international failure (as Head of theUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations), Kofi Annan was later pro-moted to the apex of his institution, becoming Secretary-General of the UnitedNations (see also Barnett, 2002: 179). Meanwhile, historical understandingsmay prove that Clinton will be remembered almost as much for his remorseregarding the international failure, as he is for his involvement in the failureitself. It is foreseeable that Clinton’s personal commitment to establishing aidprojects in Rwanda and to repeatedly professing remorse for his responseto the genocide will work to repair any damage this event caused to his inter-national image. For Clinton, Annan and Verhofstadt, their willingness toacknowledge their wrongdoings has ironically contributed to societal under-standings of their moral and ethical nature. As their acts of confession takethe place of the wrongs they have committed, it thus becomes clear that theredemptive nature of such speeches is a product of both their delivery andtheir reception.

THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF CLOSURE

In critiquing the confessional speeches of Annan, Clinton and Verhofstadt, Ihave not sought to suggest that they should not have apologized for the inter-national failure. The publicity surrounding and societal support for thesegovernmental responses to the international failure evince their societal signi-ficance. It is actually because these speeches constitute such socially importanttexts that I have sought to analyse them, in order to make visible the groundsupon which they imagine and respond to the international failure to stop theRwandan genocide. Delivered by heads of state and the leaders of interna-tional institutions, these political speeches are enunciated with the power ofthe state imbued in them (see Scraton, 2004: 49). Produced and consumed asauthoritative renderings of the international failure, these confessions are keycultural locations at which the meaning and significance of the internationalfailure have been negotiated and proclaimed. It is, thus, on the basis of theirsocietal importance that I have endeavoured to question and critique the wayin which they come to terms with the international failure.

By framing the international failure as a regrettable mistake from whichlessons can be learned, these speeches function to generalize the Rwandan




genocide (as simply one manifestation of the broader phenomenon of geno-cide) as well as obscuring the specifically Rwandan experience and implica-tions of this event. As such, the intensely Rwandan experience of the 1994genocide is appropriated, or borrowed, as an event from which a Western‘we’ can productively learn. Moreover, analysed as confessional acts, theseofficial responses can be understood as, at least partially, self-focused attemptsby national and international leaders to demonstrate their own enlightenmentand secure their own redemption in front of their own constituencies. Theypursue this goal by affirming a linear and progressive understanding ofhistory, in which the past is produced as unchangeable and the focus is placedon the future. The official speeches, therefore, pursue a form of closureregarding the international failure in two senses: firstly, by ‘facing up’ to thepast within a confessional mode of justice that enables them to simultaneously‘move on’ from it, and, secondly, by placing the international failure in anuntouchable past.

In the ‘rush to closure’ (see Alvarez, 1998) that characterizes the officialresponses, the space to think and rethink the international failure, from differ-ent perspectives, is passed over. However, the meaning of the internationalfailure cannot be so easily fixed and so finally proclaimed. Thus, at the tenthanniversary of the genocide, in his statement of remorse regarding hisgovernment’s actions during the genocide, the then South African President,Thabo Mbeki (2004), did not seek to provide a sense of resolution regardingthe issues surrounding this event. To the contrary, he sought to articulate thosequestions that might still require attention, by asking, among other things:

What did we as Africans do to stop the slaughter?

If we did nothing, why did we do nothing?

Why did the United Nations, set up to ensure that genocide, as occurred whenthe Holocaust was visited on the Jewish people, did not recur anywhere in theworld, stand by as Africans were exterminated like pernicious vermin . . . ?

Was it enough merely to say ‘sorry’ on the part of those who had the humility,courage and honesty to say ‘sorry’? (Mbeki, 2004)

His questions are not the only ones that may be posed, but his articulationof them indicates that he acknowledges that there has not been (and I wouldsubmit, can never be) a final and authoritative rendering of the meaning andsignificance of the international failure. Other – as yet unarticulated – queriesmight be, for example, what are the legal responsibilities of these leaders andtheir governments? Or, what continuing obligations might these leadersand their countries and institutions have towards the survivors of the geno-cide?10

It is such ongoing questioning that is stymied by the official responsesto the international failure that I have critiqued, which instead aim to closethe issue of the international failure and shut off further examination of itsimplications. Yet, these speeches also epitomize the reason why the interna-tional failure needs to be thought about in different and alternative ways. Asconstituent parts of a self-focused mode through which governmental and




institutional actors have come to terms with their own implication in theinternational failure, these texts underscore the importance of searching forways of thinking about the international failure that actually engage with thesuffering of the Rwandan Tutsis. For the existing speeches are not focused ona relation between those Rwandans who died or survived during the genocideand those non-Rwandans who failed to respond to their persecution. Rather,they are concerned with the relation between certain leaders and their com-munities, between particular nations and institutions and their members (seealso McMillan, 2008). As such, despite all attempts to evince their enlighten-ment through such speeches, these political leaders ultimately display thesame lack of interest in the persecution of the Rwandan Tutsis as signified bythe international failure itself.

NOTES

The author greatly appreciates the comments of those who critically reviewed earlierversions of this article: Nicola Henry, Karl Smith, Raelene Wilding, Tania Lewis,Yoriko Otomo, Anastasia Powell, Claudia Slegers and Anne-Maree Sawyer. Thankyou also to the two anonymous referees for their thoughtful and helpful commentsand suggestions.

1. Such speeches have also been accompanied by governmental and institutionalcommissions of inquiry (see e.g. Belgian Senate, 1997; United Nations, 1999).

2. It should be noted, however, that there is significant academic debate aboutwhat constitutes a legitimate apology (see Bilder, 2006; Tavuchis, 1991). Mypoint in selectively drawing upon Thompson’s (2008) definition is to demon-strate how existing scholarship about apologies can highlight certain aspects ofthe political speeches. However, as discussed below, I am more interested inwhat existing scholarship on confessions can illuminate about them.

3. Interestingly, this same confessional language can be seen in academic descrip-tions of these speeches (see e.g. Negash (2006: 85) who refers to them as ‘sinsof omission’), even though these same academic analyses do not analyse thespeeches as confessional acts (see also Kerstens, 2008).

4. Beard (2007: 37) also notes, however, that the redemption achieved throughconfession was always postponed, as confession ‘could never redeem the sinnerin this world’. Yet, I contend below that the political speeches I am analysingachieve a more immediate form of redemption.

5. For a critique of the contemporary endorsement of the concepts of ‘humanity’and ‘human rights’ as uniting global principles, see Douzinas (2002).

6. Mamdani (2007), e.g., observes that ‘the seeds of the Save Darfur campaign liein the tenth-anniversary commemoration of what happened in Rwanda’.

7. There are, of course, differences – as well as similarities – between both theconflicts in Rwanda and Darfur and the international reluctance to stop them(see also Straus, 2006). For example, while the international failure regarding theRwandan genocide has been attributed to the unimportance of the Rwandannation, Grono (2006: 628) observes how the non-intervention in Darfur is morerelated to the global importance of Sudan and the Sudanese government.

8. Thus, Annan (2004a) does note that the fact that ‘[w]e cannot undo the past’should also lead ‘us’ to ‘help Rwandans . . . build a new society together’ (seealso, to a lesser extent, Clinton, 1998). Yet, the predominant focus of these




speeches is on the implications of the international failure for future globalresponses to genocide.

9. Similarly, Dean (2004) demonstrates how historical scholarship on the indiffer-ence of German citizens to the Holocaust adopts the view of the bystander to,rather than the victim of, Nazi persecution.

10. This issue is occasionally raised in considerations of the international failure,such as the Organization of African Unity’s (2000) report into this event, whichrecommended that there should be financial reparations paid by those coun-tries, like Belgium, who have been implicated in the international failure.

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regret, remorse and the work of remembrance: official responses to the rwandan genocide

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