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Recognition and reckoningthe way ahead on victims issues

Edited by Brandon Hamber and Robin Wilson

2 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 15

Democratic Dialoguereport 15April 2003

Democratic Dialogue23 University StreetBelfast BT7 1FYTel: +44-(0)28-9022-0050Fax: +44-(0)28-9022-0051e-mail: [email protected] site: http://www.democraticdialogue.org

© Democratic Dialogue 2003ISBN 1 900281 14 7

Cover design by Dunbar DesignPhotographs by Lesley DoylePrinted by Regency Press

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Contents

Preface 4Introduction BRANDON HAMBER 5Perspectives BRANDON HAMBER 8Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve FERGUS DEVITT 24Evaluating the strategy ALAN McBRIDE 26What next? PATRICIA MacBRIDE 36Policy and possibilities MARTIN MURPHY 41Victims’ rights BRICE DICKSON 47Truth and justice MARY O’RAWE 52Society and scapegoats ROY McCLELLAND 56Conclusion ROBIN WILSON 67Contributors 78Appendix 1 82Appendix 2 83Appendix 3 86Appendix 4 90

This is the 15th report from the thinktank Democratic Dialogue. DD grate-fully acknowledges the financial

assistance for this project from Atlant-ic Philanthropies, the CommunityRelations Council and the VictimsLiaison Unit.

Comments on the publication arevery welcome. Anyone wishing to bekept informed of DD projects and eventsshould e-mail the organisation [email protected]; e-mail-ings are sent out every month or so.

Further copies of this report areavailable from DD, price £7.50 (£10institutions, £4.50 unwaged) plus 10per cent postage and packing. Our cat-alogue of publications is available,along with more information about DD

and other projects, on our web site:http://www.democraticdialogue.org.

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DD

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Preface

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This report is based on a round-tablediscussion, hosted by DemocraticDialogue in Belfast on December

16th 2002, on policy-making and theneeds of victims of the conflict in andabout Northern Ireland. The roundtable evaluated the victims strategydocument, Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve,published the previous April by theOffice of the First and Deputy FirstMinister (OFMDFM, 2002).

The strategy aims to set out ‘how theNorthern Ireland administration willdeliver practical help and services tothose who have suffered most overmore than 30 years of violence’.

This report is part of a continuingfocus by DD on victims issues, whichbegan in 2001 with DD report 13, FuturePolicies for the Past (Hamber et al,2001). That publication, again based ona round table held in late 2000, laidsome groundwork for policy in this

challenging area. At that stage, itshould be remembered, there was verylittle to go on. The first draftProgramme for Government of thedevolved executive (Northern IrelandExecutive, 2000: 20) had promised thata cross-departmental strategy ‘forensuring that the needs of victims aremet’ would be elaborated by April 2001.In fact it came a year later.

In March 2001, DD began its ownproject on policy-making on victimsissues, ‘Northern Ireland in transition:victims policy for a new era’. Mainlysupported by Atlantic Philanthropies,this aimed to widen and deepen dia-logue, within a rooted understanding ofinternational best practice and trends,and so to promote a culture of reflectiveand strategic debate on policy andpractice.

In October 2001, DD held a furtherround table, ‘Victims policy for anew era: developing a comprehensivevictims strategy’. This focused on the

Introduction

Brandon Hamber

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consultation document generated bythe Office of the First and Deputy FirstMinister (2001) in the lead-up to whatbecame Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve. Thepapers from the event were publishedelectronically (Democratic Dialogue,2001). This round table served as aforum for interested parties to discussthe document and help them preparetheir thoughts on how to respond.

It was thus only natural, onceReshape, Rebuild, Achieve had beenpublished and implementation begun,to follow this with a discussion of imple-mentation of the strategy to date. Thisreport brings together papers at theround table held in late 2002 andaccommodates a variety of opinions.

It may appear premature to evalu-ate the full impact of the strategy, butconsideration is already being given toa new strategy, to run from 2004.Moreover, the existing strategy, themainstay of official attempts to addressthe needs of victims of the conflict,remains a topical and highly-politicisedbut under-researched aspect of policy-making.

This report provides not only amplepolicy direction for a future strategybut also much analysis of the broadercontext in which attempts to makepolicy are undertaken. This is impor-tant as ‘victims issues’ are not justabout service delivery: questions ofacknowledgment, recognition and com-peting versions of the use of violence in

Northern Ireland are also raised. Manycontributors to this volume call forthese issues to be addressed head-on—embedding them in a strategy thatsimultaneously guarantees inclusive,appropriate, effective and partnership-driven services for the survivors ofthree decades of violence.

DD invited a range of victims’ groups,statutory and voluntary agencies andexperts to participate in its latest roundtable. The event, although touching onpolitically and morally sensitive issues,was highly productive—indeed, it wasan example of how different perspec-tives can be tolerated and utilised asvehicles for learning and change. Inthis sense, it showed how far theprocess has moved since the first suchDD round table in 2000, when policyconsiderations were still a matter ofcommitment rather than reality.

Victims issues are now firmly on thepolicy map, Reshape, Rebuild, Achieveis unfolding and a successor is to beprepared. This report will hopefullycontribute to enhancing implementa-tion of the current strategy, serve as abarometer of policy development andassist in shaping the future.

DD greatly appreciates the contribu-tions of all the authors, and the partic-ipants in the round table moregenerally. Their personal experiences,their ability to debate issues openly andto take risks—not to mention theirknowledge of key issues—created a

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vision of how policy can be made in thiscomplex area. The views representedhere are of course the responsibility ofthe authors alone.

References

Democratic Dialogue (2001), papers fromround table ‘Victims policy for a new era:developing a comprehensive victimsstrategy’, available at http://www.democ-raticdialogue.org/victims.htm

Hamber, Brandon, Dorte Kulle and RobinWilson (eds) (2001), Future Policies forthe Past, Belfast: Democratic Dialogue

Northern Ireland Executive (2000), DraftProgramme for Government, Belfast:OFMDFM

Office of the First Minister and DeputyFirst Minister (2001), Consultation Paperon a Victims’ Strategy, Belfast: OFMDFM

———(2002), Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve:delivering practical help and services tovictims of the conflict in NorthernIreland, Belfast: OFMDFM

DD

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Brandon Hamber

In April 2002—following some 121public and organisational respons-es—the Office of the First Minister

and Deputy First Minister launched itsvictims strategy document, Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve (OFMDFM, 2002). Thestrategy, which is to run until April

2004, aims to ‘deliver practical help andservices’ to victims and ‘those who havesuffered as a result of the conflict’.

The strategy, which is summarisedbelow, is seen by many as a very signif-icant step in dealing with the needs ofvictims and survivors in NorthernIreland. It has been broadly welcomed.Of course, however, challenging ques-tions remain.

Can such a strategy meet all thelong-term needs of victims and sur-vivors of political violence? How effec-tive is the traditional governmentpolicy-making framework for dealingwith psycho-social problems, like thosefacing victims? Can the strategy ulti-mately be translated into effective poli-cy, and then all parts of itimplemented? To what degree is anintegrated victims strategy possiblewithin the highly politicised arena ofvictims and survivors work in NorthernIreland?

Specific challenges are also evident.

Perspectives

Fruitful exchanges—the DD round table

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For example, although the strategyclearly focuses on the building of part-nerships and the developing of a moreunified governmental response, ques-tions remain as to whether the difficul-ties of doing long-term victims-relatedwork are fully anticipated. There is thematter of the extent to which politi-cians are prepared to take continuingresponsibility for victims-relatedissues.

In addition, the strategy defers—atthis stage—the issues of truth and jus-tice, restricting its focus to servicedelivery. This raises concerns abouthow fully to integrate and deal with thecomplex and varied needs of victims inthe future.

To this end, and as a follow-up to theround table hosted by DemocraticDialogue in 2001 in preparation for thestrategy, DD felt it would be useful tospend a day sharing views and develop-ing perspectives—supportive, critical orperhaps radically divergent—onReshape, Rebuild, Achieve.

The objective was to bring together arange of people with particular inter-ests to discuss and elaborate the bene-fits of (and problems with) strategicvictims-related policy-making. Thisreport deals with the perspectivesraised at the December 2002 roundtable, and presents the papers deliv-ered—thus beginning (albeit fairlyearly in the strategy’s life) the processof evaluating progress. The contribu-

tors debate the strengths of the strate-gy and the challenges it faces, offeringsome pointers towards a new strategyin 2004.

This chapter provides a summary ofsome of the key points that emergefrom the papers, highlighted at theround table. It also provides anoverview of Reshape, Rebuild, Achievefor those not familiar with its contents,thus providing a bedrock for thedebates that follow.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve, launchedin April 2002, begins by noting thatthe Programme for Government of

the Northern Ireland ExecutiveCommittee affirms that the executivewill ‘continue to pay special attention tothe particular difficulties faced by vic-tims of the Troubles’. The strategy is amajor step in meeting this commit-ment. The focus is on the delivery ofpractical help and services, and thetimeframe is April 2002 to April 2004.

It defines victims as the ‘survivingphysically and psychologically injuredof violent, conflict related incidents andthose close relatives or partners whocare for them, along with those closerelatives or partners who mourn theirdead’. The strategy thus adopts a verybroad view. It largely restricts its policyfocus, however, to services for whichthe devolved administration hasresponsibility.

The strategy sets out a range of

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actions to achieve its primary goal ofhelping ‘those who have suffered as aresult of the conflict’. It offers a broadvision of:

a society where the suffering of allvictims is recognised; a communitythat acknowledges the pain of thepast and learns lessons for thefuture; and an administration thatprovides, in conjunction with others,support and services in a proactiveand sensitive manner to meet theneeds of victims.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve argues thata set of values must underpin thisprocess: the strategy and its implemen-tation should be victim-centred, equi-table, inclusive, focused and integrated.

The document also highlights anumber of themes that run through thestrategy. For example, it emphasisesthe need for co-operation between theOFMDFM Victims Unit and the NorthernIreland Office in achieving the goals ofthe strategy, and points out that thearea-based Trauma Advisory Panels(TAPs) will be key to implementation.

This initial section of the strategyhighlights the importance of the priorconsultation as well as the broadframework required for implementa-tion. The emphasis is on actions beingspread across departments and agen-cies, utilising a number of structures.The strategy makes it clear that thedelivery of help and services is an inter-departmental responsibility and should

chime with the ‘New Targeting SocialNeed’ policy.

This fits broadly with the statedaims of the strategy, which can be sum-marised as:• improving the standard of services;• increasing awareness in government,the public sector and the public morewidely of victims’ needs;• securing the implementation of poli-cies and practices to meet these needs;• ensuring that all government depart-ments and public authorities contributein a co-ordinated fashion and in part-nership with the voluntary sector; and• meeting all commitments made tovictims in the Programme forGovernment.

The strategy sets out more than 40steps which aim to address what theOFMDFM claims were the core messagesemerging from the consultationprocess. These were:• victims want recognition of their situ-ation;• more and better information is need-ed on available services;• practical help is required, particular-ly in health, education, housing andbusiness skills;• the TAPs have an important role; and • partnerships would be vital in deliv-ering the strategy.

The steps are wide-ranging. Forexample, the strategy argues that allgovernment agencies should reflect vic-tims’ needs in their corporate plans and

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in all consultations. It promises aVictim Freephone helpline, directly tothe OFMDFM unit, as well as improvedcommunication with victims throughnewsletters, web sites and fact sheets. On health, it pledges to influence thecurrent mental-health review, ensuringvictims’ needs are reflected in it. On amore extensive scale, it aims to ‘ensurethat all relevant Health and PersonalSocial Services staff are aware ofhow to respond to the health andsocial needs of victims and theirrepresentatives’.

In education, the strategy promisesan investigation of how the EducationWelfare Service and Behaviour SupportTeams can interact with victims. Itaims to develop parenting skills, aswell as to examine how the new statu-tory curriculum for schools, currentlyin gestation, can raise awareness of vic-tims issues. In terms of housing, itundertakes to review emergency pay-ments for persons rehoused as a resultof intimidation, and to produce adviceon the role and distribution of housing-support organisations.

The final strand deals with businessskills. This section aims to ensure thatvictims enjoy better opportunities. Tothis end, it aims to raise business birthrates among disadvantaged groups,and to make available a wide range ofenterprise and start-up programmes.

The strategy also makes special ref-erence to victims in rural areas.

Specific steps are highlighted to assistwith securing help and obtaining trans-port in rural areas.

Structurally, the strategy identifiesa number of bodies that will form thebackbone of implementation. Primaryconcerns here are to find means where-by victims and victims’ groups caninteract more with policy-makers, andto ensure that the strategy worksacross government. Although it is shorton ideas as to the former, it promises toconsider suggestions, as well as toexamine the need for delivering capaci-ty-building training for victims want-ing to make an impact on policy.

Two types of organisation are to beat the core of the work, the strategyproposes. First, it seeks to empower theTAPs (funding a full-time co-ordinatorfor each), so that they can take forwardthe strategy and develop partnershipson an area basis—the panels are con-tiguous with the four health and social-services boards in Northern Ireland. Inaddition, an InterdepartmentalWorking Group (IDWG) on victims istasked with taking the strategy for-ward cross-departmentally.

At a broader level, the strategyundertakes, in conjunction with theNIO, to examine how the responsibilitiesof the latter for victims might be trans-ferred. This recognises that the needsof victims are probably best addressedthrough representative regionalstructures.

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Finally, the strategy deals with anumber of issues not directly related toits specific aims. It promises continuedco-operation with the Northern IrelandMemorial Fund, an independent grant-giving charity. The OFMDFM unit under-takes to work in conjunction withvoluntary organisations—a task forcewas anyway in train to consider thelong-term sustainability of the volun-tary sector—and it promises improve-ment in the way research is done andused in the sector.

The strategy also refers to issuesand groups relevant to improving serv-ices to victims. The potential of church-es and faith communities ishighlighted: there is a commitment toproviding information to clergy andother representatives who may be con-tacted by victims. The impact of victim-isation on children also receives amention, and a link-up with the pro-posed commissioner for children andyoung people is proposed. Learning les-sons from other countries is recognisedas important, as is celebrating theachievements of people who have beenvictimised during their lives.

Two other areas receive specificmention. The first is the question ofwhether there should be a victims’ com-missioner. Arguments for and againstare presented but the strategy notesthat ‘no clear view emerged during theconsultation’. It thus concludes that‘having considered the matter carefully,

we are not convinced of the need for aCommissioner at this stage and do notintend to proceed in this area, althoughthe situation will be reviewed in duecourse’.

Secondly, there is comment on thedifficult area of truth and justice, high-lighted in many submissions. This isdeferred pending the outcome of theconsultation by the Healing throughRemembering project, an independentinitiative. The strategy does, however,highlight the potential of story-telling—allowing people the chance tohave their individual story listened toand/or recorded—in this regard.

The strategy ends with a chapter onfunding. It highlights the varioussources available to groups, such as theEuropean Union’s PEACE II fund forNorthern Ireland and the border coun-ties in the republic and the core-fund-ing scheme administered by theCommunity Relations Council. TheOFMDFM promises, in conjunction withthe NIO and the Northern IrelandMemorial Fund, to hold informationseminars in a range of locations to pro-vide help on funding and to discusseffective monitoring and evaluation.The strategy does not, however, com-ment on compensation for victims,arguing that this ‘is an issue that hasnot been passed to the devolved admin-istration’ and therefore, again, beyondits remit.

A Strategy Implementation Fund is

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signalled in the document. This willmake available £3 million over twoyears, to assist in implementing thestrategy and to fund projects and serv-ices of benefit to victims.

Finally, the strategy promises con-tinuing monitoring and evaluation. Asub-group of the IDWG will formallyreview the strategy after nine monthsof operation, the document says, andmake recommendations for any amend-ments, or with a view to the new strat-egy due from April 2004.

As with any large government policydocument, perspectives vary onReshape, Rebuild, Achieve, depend-

ing on the relationships of individualsand groups to it. With 49 steps identi-fied to improving services to victims thedocument is difficult to evaluate enmasse. Implementation is also stillunfolding. In some senses, as PatriciaMacBride and Alan McBride (victims’representatives on the Civic Forum)both note in their chapters, it remainstoo early to assess the full impact.

Most participants at the round tablefound it encouraging that a strategyhad been developed. But criticisms andchallenges were also raised. To thisend, constant review is critical, andalready steps are being taken to consid-er what happens after this strategy’stenure in April 2004, pointing to theimportance of the contributions in thisreport.

The contributors present a range ofperspectives but share many common-alities, indicative of a growing unity ofperspective as well as the extent of dis-cussion around the strategy. Theprocess has clearly moved forward sub-stantially since the Bloomfield (1998)report. As Martin Murphy (from theNOVA project at Barnados) points out,new lines of communication have beenopened up between victims’ groups andvarious government bodies.

For Patricia MacBride, the strategyis also welcome as finally recognisingthe need to deal with issues surround-ing victims. Alan McBride welcomes itsattempts at recognition and the impor-tance the strategy gives to ‘acknowledg-ing the pain of the past’ and learninglessons.

At the same time, however, for manycontributors the strategy depends onimplementation. Fergus Devitt (outgo-ing head of the Victims Unit in theOFMDFM) cites steps which he feels arebeing turned into deliverable products.For example, housing support officersare being put in place, TAPs co-ordina-tors funded, and a Freephone helplinein the Victims Unit set up. But somecontributors remain sceptical as to theextent to which targets have been met.

Martin Murphy and Alan McBrideare less positive about exactly what hasbeen achieved. Both praise Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve for its vision, values,themes and aims, but criticise its

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abundance of actions about actions—marked by words like ‘examine’, ‘con-sider’ and ‘investigate’, which pepperthe document. Specifically, for AlanMcBride, although he acknowledges itis early days, no difference has beenmade to victims’ lives with regard topoverty, disadvantage and limitedopportunity.

Brice Dickson (chief commissioner ofthe Northern Ireland Human RightsCommission) notes that none of theaction points requires legislation, andtherefore rights are not conferred. Boththe Civic Forum victims’ representa-tives remain concerned that the strate-gy is not being fully implemented, orthat if it is this has not been properlycommunicated.

Martin Murphy argues, however,that the ‘vagueness’ in the action stepsmay reflect the context in which thestrategy was drawn up and the absenceof unity or consistency in the responsesto the consultation. And Fergus Devittcontends that, given the extent of priorconsultation, Reshape, Rebuild, Achieveis a product of the views of those uponwhom it will have most impact—name-ly, victims of the conflict.

Martin Murphy makes a distinctionbetween victims’ needs and victims’issues, with the latter being more diffi-cult to address. Mary O’Rawe(Transitional Justice Institute,University of Ulster) also talks about‘these issues’ in her chapter, and notes

that there are basic societal questionsthat must be addressed as part of creat-ing a climate for victims’ needs to bemet.

In fact, most contributors put con-siderable emphasis on the wider con-text in which victims work takes place.To this end, three broad themes runthrough most of the chapters: truth,justice and acknowledgment; reconcili-ation; and victims’ rights.

Almost all the contributors note thatthe strategy focuses on targets forservice delivery for victims, but not

justice, truth and recognition. AlanMcBride feels recognition is one of themost significant issues for victims. Formany victims, he says, there is a fear ofabandonment, of being forgotten bysociety.

The strategy defers comment onthese issues pending the subsequentlaunch of the Healing ThroughRemembering (2002) report, an inde-pendent project. Mary O’Rawe claimsReshape, Rebuild, Achieve fails toacknowledge the centrality of dealingwith the past, contradicting its statedaims of contributing to recognition andaddressing all the needs of victims.Martin Murphy detects a lack of clarityat all levels and across all stakeholdersas to final outcomes, making policydevelopment a challenge.

Patricia MacBride shares this view,adding that now the Healing Through

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Remembering report is published it isimperative that the issues of recogni-tion and remembrance are addressed.This goes hand in hand with truth andjustice. Alan McBride adds acknowl-edgment, memorials and story-tellingto the mix.

In addition, Mary O’Rawe notes thatthere are international obligations cov-ering effective investigation and justicefor victims. Especially where a statereneges on its responsibilities, this canhave consequences for building a sus-tainable peace and establishing faith inlegal processes. She argues that thereneeds to be public and official acknowl-edgment of different ‘truths’. Denial,she says, feeds into the ‘hierarchy ofvictimhood’. Roy McClelland, chair ofHealing Through Remembering,believes that establishing the truthabout events in the past is beneficial.

For Mary O’Rawe, a key challengefor any victims strategy is to acknowl-edge past deficiencies and create capac-ity to deal with truth and justice in ameaningful way. Any victims strategymust take account of the journeytowards truth. This, she argues, willnot be an easy task and truth recoverywill inevitably throw up dichotomies,polarisations and hierarchies. But ifdone genuinely this will merely berevealing realities of the conflict thatwere already there. Clearly, more needsto be said about these issues in anyfuture strategy.

As several participants noted, in itsreport Healing Through Rememberingmoved somewhat done the roadtowards truth recovery. Roy McClellandwrites that dealing with the past is asociety-wide issue, not only one for vic-tims: we all have responsibility forwhat happened and a part to play indealing with it. Truth-telling, in hisopinion, can be useful for victims.Knowledge must be accompanied byacknowledgment, and by acceptance ofresponsibility. To this end, careful con-sideration of ‘transitional justice’ is cen-tral to truth and justice for victims, forwhom justice extends to other concerns,including compensation.

For Roy McClelland, rememberingand dealing with the past is not achoice. The challenge is not about theneed to remember—rather, how to findnew ways of remembering that enablethe society to go forward. He outlinesthe work of the Healing ThroughRemembering project, paying particu-lar attention to the consultation on howbest society might remember and socontribute to healing. And he highlightssome of its recommendations, includingvis-à-vis story-telling and archiving, anannual day of reflection and a ‘livingmuseum’.

He considers truth recovery atlength, noting that some mechanismto address the truth about the pastmay be necessary. But this would needto be unique, timed correctly and

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appropriate for the Northern Irelandcontext.

Deeper thinking and development ofthis idea is needed—but RoyMcClelland is clear that the bedrock ofsuch exploration needs to be a modicumof acknowledgment by all in the widersociety, and the governments and para-militaries, of our acts and omissions.This is the platform for any furtherinvestigation. Patricia MacBride hopesthat if an appropriate truth-recoveryprocess were designed it would ensurethat no one could ever again deny thelegitimacy of the victims of the conflict.

The difficult and complex work ofdeveloping an organic model of truthrecovery remains to be done. PatriciaMacBride describes this complexitysuccinctly when she says that itrequires investigations that are ‘deeplyneutral’, even though the results will be‘deeply political’. The new victims strat-egy has to provide a meaningful andtangible steer and context for this.

Other policy developments also pro-vide some direction in this regard.Patricia MacBride notes that the cur-rent Programme for Government com-mits the government to commissioninga project to bring together a broadarchive of material about the conflict—essentially story-telling and document-ing. The strategy itself highlightsthe value of story-telling. This shouldbe guided by victims’ groups andrepresentatives.

Patricia MacBride links this devel-opment, however, back to truth and jus-tice—noting that victims and survivorsdo not simply want to archive their sto-ries. Many want to ‘solve the puzzle ofwhat happened’, and others want jus-tice. This is imperative if a new politi-cal system is to be demonstrably that.

Alan McBride thinks story-telling—sometimes using the arts—vital foryoung people. This fits neatly with therecommendations of the HealingThrough Remembering report.

Reconciliation does not receive muchattention in this report, perhapsmirroring the lack of focus upon it

across Northern Ireland. Yet implicit inmany of the papers is the need for rec-onciliation. Roy McClelland shares theview expressed by Duncan Morrow inan earlier DD report (Hamber, Kulleand Wilson, 2002), that forgiveness andreconciliation represent the sine quanon of a genuine peace process. This isno easy task, and forgiveness cannot bedemanded from victims.

The issues facing survivors and rec-onciliation of the wider society are con-nected. In Roy McClelland’s opinion,the latter thus has a role in this—in providing circumstances, condi-tions and supports for enabling andfacilitating sharing, listening andacknowledgment.

Roy McClelland also draws exten-sively on the work of René Girard. He

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uses this theoretical frame to highlightsome of the dynamics of the conflict—for example, the way groups are divid-ed and the scapegoating of individuals(victims) takes place. Importantly, how-ever, he makes the powerful point thatall have a responsibility in addressingthe legacy of the conflict. He writes:

We conveniently perpetuate the myth ofthe fringe nature of the violence,expressed by the few, but in realityendorsed, actively or passively, by themany. Even those of us who claim to beopposed to sectarianism and sectarianviolence contribute by our non-involve-ment, our ignoring the enormous legacyof our temporal myths.

Reconciliation, therefore, is about ouracknowledgment with the victims andsurvivors—as well as our listening; ourgiving space for anger, feelings of hurtand guilt to be articulated, to beacknowledged; and our responding tovictims’ and survivors’ need for an apol-ogy. This will go some way to meetingsome of the broader needs of victims.

But reconciliation cannot simply beequated with forgiveness. AlanMcBride reminds us that victimsshould not be made to feel that they aresomehow holding up progress in rela-tion to the ‘peace process’ because theyare unable to forgive and move on.Dealing with the past takes a longtime, as does genuine reconciliation.

Victims’ rights have also received lit-tle attention in the victims debatethus far. It is helpful to start with

the recognition, as does Brice Dickson,that (as obvious as it sounds) not allvictims are the same. Their needs andthe way they have been victimised aredifferent.

He points out that victims’ rightshardly feature in traditional legalthinking, because most legal rules areabout what constitutes a wrong andwho can be punished, rather than howto set something right. Even in interna-tional law the court often focuses onproving a wrong has been committedrather than trying to remedy it.Perhaps out of similar considerations,as Brice Dickson notes, the strategydoes not deal with rights: the word doesnot appear in it.

Recently, there have been moves inthe criminal-justice system more broad-ly to try to place the victim more cen-trally. There have also been recentNorthern Ireland lethal-force cases, asMary O’Rawe points out, where com-pensation has been directed by theEuropean Court of Human Rightsagainst the UK authorities.

Compensation is not a focus of thestrategy, because the issue has not beendevolved, but it does receive someattention below. Brice Dickson pointsout that the Northern Ireland schemeis now in line with that in GreatBritain. Although this tariff- (rather

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than common-law-) based approach willbe more equitable, it could mean lessfor those victimised.

The Northern Ireland HumanRights Commission believes there isscope for elevating rights to compensa-tion to a provision in a bill of rights forthe region. This will require furtherconsideration.

Roy McClelland argues that one ofthe advantages of such processes astruth commissions is that, unlikecourts, they can be victim-centred. Thiscan contribute to greater recognition oftheir rights: they can offer victims apublic voice and bring their suffering tothe attention of the wider public in away a court cannot. Despite more limit-ed legal powers a broader mandate, aswell as an ability to focus on patterns ofevents—including the causes and con-sequences of state violence—allowstruth-recovery initiatives to go muchfurther in their investigations and con-clusions than is generally possible inany trial of individuals. This, however,does not mean that non-judicial truthbodies should replace judicial process-es, as they may be complementary.

Given the history of victims’ rightsin the legal field more generally, it isclear that introducing the issue into thedebate in Northern Ireland is going tobe complex, and based on limited prece-dent. It was suggested by Brice Dicksonthat the Basic Principles of Justice forVictims of Crime and Abuse of Power

(see appendix 3) would be worthreviewing in this regard.

The first issue that will need to beaddressed, however, is whether victimsand survivors have a unique set ofrights—specifically, whether victims ofthe conflict deserve rights greater than,or in any way different from, victims ofother types of violence such as ‘domes-tic’ murders. Given there is now a strat-egy to meet the needs of victims of theconflict, Brice Dickson poses a difficultquestion. He asks if the differentiationfrom other victims is justifiable—espe-cially if two of the values underpinningthe victims strategy are equitablenessand inclusiveness.

Martin Murphy suggests that givenprevious disadvantage there is a needfor victims of the conflict to receive spe-cific attention. At the same time, hefeels, this should come with responsi-bilities. He writes that ‘our right to beheard, to challenge, to oppose, comeswith a responsibility to offer proactivesuggestions for change’.

Victims’ groups, in his opinion, havea responsibility to represent those farbeyond their own membership and toshape how monies are spent. For exam-ple, he argues, it is appropriate to high-light the lack of support from statutoryservices in the first 30 years of the‘troubles’, but this should not be a rea-son to discount efforts by the latter torespond more effectively today. Victims’groups also have a responsibility to

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maximise the benefits of emergingpartnerships and to influence howstatutory services and others use newfunding.

Although one of the strengths ofReshape, Rebuild, Achieve is that itattempts to link the victims issue toother departments and agencies, suchas in housing and education, and theprivate sector, there are still areaswhere this link is absent. For example,Brice Dickson points out that althoughthe strategy says that if a victim feelsunfairly treated by a public body he/shecan contact the parliamentary ombuds-man and commissioner for complaints,it fails to mention the Northern IrelandHuman Rights Commission or theEquality Commission in this regard.This highlights the limited degree towhich the issue of victims is beingapproached on a rights-based footing.

The absence of victims’ rights fromReshape, Rebuild, Achieve requiresurgent attention. It is firmly suggestedin this report that the right to servicesfor victims could be underpinned bylaw. Victims’ rights to truth and justiceare also critical.

In addition to these broad themes out-lined above, specific issues are alsoaddressed by the contributors. These

include:• structures to implement the victimsstrategy;• relationships between the statutory

and voluntary sectors;• health, education and housing;ex-prisoners and victims; and• devolving victims-related issues.

The issue of exactly who is responsi-ble for what in the victims arena hasbeen ameliorated by the appearance ofthe strategy, though for some thisremains unclear. The demarcationbetween the responsibilities of theVictims Liaison Unit in the NIO and theOFMDFM Victims Unit—despite publica-tion by the units of a communiqué onthe matter and it being outlined in thestrategy—is not understood by many.

For Alan McBride, dissemination ofinformation and relationships betweenstructures remain cumbersome andbureaucratic. But along with others hewelcomes the ‘joined-up’ work and part-nership approach of the IDWG and theTAPs signalled in the strategy. Thesecould make a real difference to the livesof victims.

But Patricia MacBride questions thedegree to which government depart-ments across the board are taking onvictims issues: the IDWG is not deliver-ing all that is promised, she claims. Thesituation, in her opinion, is marked bysilence from most departments.Discussions with victims’ groups andthe OFMDFM on how groups can relateto the IDWG have taken place. Todate, however, no results have beenpresented.

Alan McBride points out that the

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strategy does not clarify how victimsshould relate to policy-makers. MartinMurphy argues that network agencies,Local Strategy Partnerships (distribut-ing PEACE II funds on an area basis) andother victims-related bodies could pro-pose members for a single forum thatcould have a direct and regularly sched-uled interface with policy-makers—ideally the IDWG.

The TAPs are also mentioned by sev-eral authors. These could play a criticalrole in providing local representationon the structures Martin Murphy out-lines. That said, concerns from commu-nity groups, highlighted by PatriciaMacBride, remain—particularly thatthe TAPs are not as representative of thevoluntary sector as they should be, gen-erally being weighted toward statutoryproviders. Alan McBride feels that thevoluntary sector needs to be encour-aged to invest time in the work of thepanels and should participate, but hequestions whether there is an overallapproach for them in place.

The relationship between the statuto-ry and voluntary sectors, in provid-ing services to victims and

survivors, has been a constant featureof the victims debate. Crudely put, vol-untary groups remain suspicious of offi-cial motivation for getting involved inassisting victims, after years of neglect,and feel their work is not appreciated:Alan McBride feels strongly that there

is a value imbalance, voluntary workbeing undervalued. In turn, some in thestatutory sector remain doubtful of thequality and reach of voluntary work.But this report indicates that the situa-tion is improving, although tensionremains.

Fergus Devitt stresses the impor-tance of strong partnerships with thevoluntary sector, and across govern-ment, if the strategy is to become areality. For many community groups,however, the commitment of the statu-tory services to work in inclusive part-nership remains to be seen. PatriciaMacBride feels this problem is evi-denced by the fact that the key contactslist distributed with the strategy didnot feature voluntary organisations.

Fergus Devitt remains adamantthat the victims strategy was not anattempt to marginalise groups by mak-ing them dependent on the statutorysector. On the contrary, he would argue,the strategy is fundamentally aboutpartnership. He points out that the £3million core-funding scheme is a directcommitment to building victims’ groupsand the voluntary sector.

On funding, however, Alan McBridefeels much work needs to be done—especially around how ‘sustainability’ isdefined, never mind achieved. We needto see victims in context and not denyindividuals a sense of self and agencyby only ever defining them as ‘victims’.The issues of poverty, disadvantage and

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limited family support are as importantas what individuals have been throughas a result of violence.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve highlightsthe importance of health, educa-tion, and housing for victims,

stressing meanwhile the cross-govern-mental nature of the issues at hand.Alan McBride feels that this is funda-mentally correct and focuses on thesekey areas of need. He urges a moreinclusive appraisal of the health needsof victims and survivors, particularly inrelation to the physically injured.

He is less than encouraged by thestrategy’s preference for specific thera-pies (such as cognitive-behaviouraltherapy), at the expense of others thatvictims find helpful. An eclecticapproach may well be more appropri-ate. Other issues that may need to beconsidered in any future strategy, in hisopinion, are questions as diverse ashow to get intimidated youth back toschool in suitable locations, andwhether victims issues and the under-standing of conflict could be made cen-tral to the curriculum.

On housing, Alan McBride questionsthe degree to which the targets in thestrategy have been implemented (forexample, the review of emergency pay-ments and the introduction of a tenan-cy support service). And he calls for amore sensitive approach to the housingneeds of victims. He wonders if a

‘one-stop shop’ for victims would behelpful.

Although a controversial issue, therole of ex-prisoners in victims workwas discussed at the round table.

Patricia MacBride notes that Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve fails to mention it atall. She feels that ignoring the role ofex-prisoners in services, funding alloca-tion, reshaping and rebuilding our soci-ety—even if distasteful to some—is nothelpful.

In her opinion, ‘ex-prisoners areamongst the most highly politicisedand active people in our society, and thework of many ex-prisoner groups is atthe forefront of peace-building, educa-tion and conflict resolution … weshould use these skills for the good ofour community’. This perspective maybe difficult for some, but PatriciaMacBride does begin to touch on theinter-relatedness of victims issues.

Such an approach would fit the sys-tem-orientated and interdependencemodel adopted by Roy McClelland. Hefeels dialogue between survivors andcombatants represents a ray of lightthat guides us on the long path towardsreconciliation.

Similarly, Brice Dickson’s call for amore victim-centred approach to crimi-nal justice on the whole implies a holis-tic recognition of the challenge ofdealing with the past—including vic-tims, perpetrators and those who fall

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into both rather crude categories. Thisis critical to building reconciliation,albeit challenging and a process thatcannot be forced.

The continuing confusion between theroles of the Victims’ Unit and theVictims’ Liaison Unit raises the

question as to whether it would be bestto assign to a devolved administrationthe delivery of all services to victims.Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve itself hintsat this: ‘there is a possibility that somevictims’ issues currently dealt with bythe Northern Ireland Office, such ascompensation and criminal justice, willbe transferred to the devolved adminis-tration while the strategy is opera-tional’.

The strategy promises an examina-tion, in conjunction with the NIO, of howa transfer of responsibilities for victimsmight be administered. PatriciaMacBride contends that the consulta-tion about the strategy by the CivicForum, and the view expressed in theforum’s submission on it, demonstratedthat the NIO should have no further roleto play in service delivery to victimsand survivors. Alan McBride, althoughacknowledging that certain issues werenot devolved, feels that any devolvedadministration would have to say some-thing about compensation, truth andjustice—as well as questions of securityand the ‘disappeared’—and this viewwas shared by most contributors.

As is evident in this chapter, theremit of Reshape, Rebuild, Achieveis wide. So too are perspectives on

its achievements so far. All contributorswere encouraged that a strategy hadbeen elaborated and saw it as signifi-cant. Most were highly approving of itsunderlying principles, values and keyareas of focus. And some clear success-es were identified.

Yet, despite the array of positive andchallenging points raised about thestrategy, most share one concern—what happens next. Most recognisethat dealing with ‘victims issues’ is along-term project. Victims’ needs alsovary. More focus is needed on specificissues—for example, the needs of ruralvictims and those in interface areas,according to Alan McBride.

Most contributors also agree thatmore needs to be said in any futurestrategy about truth, justice andacknowledgment, and a context createdin which these can be constructivelyaddressed. The question of victims’rights remains wholly undeveloped.

Alan McBride feels it is importantthat victims, who have largely beensidelines in the past, should not feelabandoned as the strategy draws to aclose. Clearly some momentum hasbeen built and a process is unfolding;most want this to continue and arecommitted to shaping and participatingin this process.

The OFMDFM intends to develop a

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new strategy from 2004, in line withthe Programme for Government com-mitment to that effect. This will bebuilt on consultation, and evaluation ofthe current strategy.

It is to be hoped that the wide rangeof perspectives in this report will helpmould this process—so that all theneeds of victims and survivors of theconflict in and about Northern Irelandcan be met.

References

Bloomfield, Kenneth (1998), We WillRemember Them, Belfast: NorthernIreland Office

Healing Through Remembering (2002), TheReport of the Healing ThroughRemembering Project, available fromUnit 4, River’s Edge, 15 Ravenhill Road,Belfast BT6 8DN or at http://www.heal-ingthroughremembering.org

Office of the First Minister and DeputyFirst Minister (2002), Reshape, Rebuild,Achieve: delivering practical help andservices to victims of the conflict inNorthern Ireland, Belfast: OFMDFM

DD

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Fergus Devitt

Iwas asked to provide an update onthe current status of the victimsstrategy (OFMDFM, 2002). I could sim-

ply say the strategy is being imple-mented, in line with the targets set out.But I do not think that would do justiceto the wide range of activities that havealready taken place and will do sothroughout the life of the strategy.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve waslaunched on April 11th 2002. That fol-lowed a widespread public consulta-tion, in train when DD hosted a similarmeeting in 2001. But the consultationwas itself preceded by a round of meet-ings across Northern Ireland betweenvictims’ groups and the OFMDFM VictimsUnit, and then between ministers andvictims’ groups. The views expressedhelped to shape the consultation paperand the 121 responses to it informed, inturn, Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve.

The strategy is therefore very much

a product of the views of those uponwhom it will have the most impact. Itcontains 49 specific actions spreadacross departments. As they are imple-mented, these will make a practical dif-ference to the day-to-day lives of thosemost affected by the conflict. Progresshas already been made in many areas.This includes: • specialist housing support officersbeing put in post;• establishing a Freephone helpline tothe Victims Unit;• undertaking a housing benefit aware-ness campaign;• publicising widely the work of theVictims Unit; and• funding a co ordinator post in each ofthe Trauma Advisory Panels coveringthe four health and social-servicesboard areas.

Other work is being taken forwardin education, health and enterprise. Atraining package has been developedfor civil servants in ‘front-line’ posts. In

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve

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Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve we alsomade a commitment formally to lettingvictims, victims’ groups and other inter-ested parties know how we were pro-gressing. We planned to do that aroundApril 2003.

At a recent victims conference, Ispoke about the importance of partner-ships and I would like to emphasisethat. The parts of government chargedwith dealing with victims issues can-not, and will not, act in isolation. Wemust ensure that we continue to buildon the strong partnerships that havebeen established with the voluntaryand community sectors, and acrossdepartments and agencies.

I would also like again to refute theunfounded suggestion that the victimsstrategy is in some way an attempt tomarginalise groups by making themdependent on the statutory sector. Thelaunch of the new £3 million core-funding scheme confirms just howwrong that interpretation was.

While it’s important to look at thedifference the current strategy is mak-ing to people’s lives, it is also importantfrom a policy perspective to think aboutwhat happens next. We are alreadydoing so. Bearing in mind that it tookaround 22 months from a standingstart for the Victims Unit to developand publish the strategy, this is clearlynot an overnight process.

The current strategy runs until2004, and we are committed in the

Programme for Government (NIO, 2002)to putting a new strategy in place from2004, building on the progress made.Given that it is now 2003, this does notleave a lot of time.

In mid-2001, we conducted a piece ofresearch into how victims viewed serv-ices. In the spring or early summer of2003 we will be carrying out follow-upresearch, to assess improvements inprovision and what differences peoplehave noticed as a result of the strategy.That will inform a consultation paper,which will be the forerunner of the newvictims strategy we plan to have inplace around March 2004.

I would emphasise, in conclusion,that we are committed to working posi-tively with victims’ groups to take thisagenda forward. It is important, howev-er, to reflect that thousands of victimsare not in groups, and we must alwaysbe conscious that what we do must pos-itively affect them too.

References

Northern Ireland Office (2002), Buildingon Progress: Priorities and Plans for2003-2006, Belfast: OFMDFM

Office of the First Minister and DeputyFirst Minister (2002), Reshape, Rebuild,Achieve: delivering practical help andservices to victims of the conflict inNorthern Ireland, Belfast: OFMDFM

DD

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Alan McBride

Astrategy to meet the needs of vic-tims is important. In this context,Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve has to be

welcomed.I would applaud the Victims Unit for

the vision that is clearly set out in thestrategy. A key phrase is ‘recognition ofthe suffering of all victims’. It is nothelpful to talk in terms of a ‘hierarchyof victims’. Not all victims have thesame degrees of innocence or guilt, butthe pain and sense of loss that sufferinginflicts on families is equally felt by all,regardless of circumstance. The strate-gy recognises this fact.

The strategy seeks to ‘acknowledgethe pain of the past’ and to learn les-sons for the future. This is importantbecause, if we are to recover from ourtraumatic past, we must learn the les-sons of history. Recently, I had thepleasure of visiting the United Statesas a member of the Healing Through

Remembering project. While there, wemet various initiatives and projectsfocused on similar issues. One was sim-ply called Facing History and Our-selves.1 This project runs study coursesfor students and teachers on Germanyin the 30s and 40s, creatively applyingthe learning on prejudice and intoler-ance to modern-day society.

Moreover, the strategy aims to deliv-er ‘services that meet the needs of vic-tims’. Meeting these needs is vital if weas a society are ever to know real peace.This is, however, a long-term objectiveand some of those coming forward forhelp were victimised many years ago. Ifthis issue is not dealt with satisfac-torily it will always remain a bone ofcontention.

More broadly, I would congratulatethe unit for the sound value base thatunderpins the strategy—making itvictim-centred, equitable, inclusive,focused and integrated. The issues thatthe document identifies as key are

Evaluating the strategy

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also correct: recognition, access andinformation, health, education, housingand the needs of rural dwellers. Ofcourse, there are other, much bigger,issues for victims that have yet to bedevolved—such as, compensation, jus-tice and security.

On the other hand, I found the doc-ument hard to read. The language wasnot user-friendly and there was noexecutive summary. This fits with abroader concern about consultationsand government strategies. Surely, ifan objective of consulting individualsand groups is to encourage them to‘have their say’, then to produce a docu-ment that is full of ‘civil-service speak’is counterproductive. This is especiallytrue in relation to ‘victims’, as many ofthose most affected come from areas ofhigh deprivation and educational dis-advantage.

On top of this, many of the actionpoints are aspirational (see below). Idid find the use of target dates good,but I do not know if they have beenmet. I checked the Victims Unit website but found nothing to assist withthis—there is clearly a need for aprogress report. There is a lack of infor-mation that people can tap into to findout what is going on. In addition, noteveryone is comfortable with comput-ers, or will use the freephone number.This has been the experience of mem-bers of WAVE, where I work with youngpeople. I am also concerned about those

who do not go to groups.All of this adds up to ‘not much

change on the ground’. I say this inrelation to my experience with victimswho use the WAVE centre where I work.I have seen no difference with regard totheir poverty, disadvantage and limitedopportunity. If the strategy is targetingthose most in need, then it is obviouslytaking a while to get through, or maybethe issue is the dissemination of infor-mation and people are not sure whathelp is available. Organisations likeWAVE have a role to play in providingthat information, but it must again beremembered that not everyone attendsa group.

Finally, the work with victims islong-term, yet this strategy only takesus up to 2004. I know that funding willrun out then and that other responsibil-ities might be devolved, but victims andtheir representatives need to beassured that they will not be aban-doned. This is a very real concern.

Let me now turn to some more spe-cific issues.

Recognition is a huge issue for thosewho have suffered in the ‘troubles’—that is, ‘that their suffering and the suf-fering of their loved ones will not beforgotten’. This point came home to meduring the Healing Through Remem-bering project consultation with WAVE

members. Among issues discussedwas the fear of abandonment, being

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forgotten by society or being made tofeel that victims were somehow holdingup progress in relation to the ‘peaceprocess’ because they were unable toforgive and move on.

The strategy commits the govern-ment and its departments to:• reflecting victims’ needs in their cor-porate planning;• including victims in public consulta-tions;• providing additional training for civilservants dealing with victims; and• exploring how art, sport, poetry andmusic might be used as therapeutictools in helping victims express theirexperiences.

This is part of recognition, but realrecognition—the recognition that vic-tims find meaningful—is bigger thanthis. It is more than inclusion in publicconsultations and corporate planning:it is about acknowledgment, memorialsand story-telling. Could the unit play arole in promoting and exploring theseprocesses? I was particularly struck bythe concept of using art and sport as away of helping victims articulate theirstories. Two such initiatives are beingdelivered at WAVE.

The first is called Every Picture Tellsa Story. This is a youth project lookingat story-telling through art and storiesthat include the themes ‘loss of a lovedone’, ‘sense of community’, ‘the peaceprocess’, ‘interface violence’, ‘under-standing conflict’ and ‘a day in my life’.

The second is called Fair Play. Again ayouth project, this addresses communi-ty relations by looking at sport—forexample, the history of Gaelic sports. Italso poses the question ‘what is fairplay?’ and asks how this can be playedout in society.

This is a good way of helping youngpeople to talk through their experi-ences, and therefore help them in thehealing process. Perhaps, as part of thestrategy, the unit could look at waysthat good practice of this type could beshared with other groups.

Health is another issue of vital impor-tance to victims, yet this is notreflected in the strategy. The recom-mendations included do not go farenough and it is not an exhaustive listof health needs.

There is no mention, for example, of:those who suffered a physical injury asa result of the ‘troubles’, estimated atabout 40,000 people. There is no refer-ence to their health needs and no men-tion of research that might informpolicy in relation to them. The sameapplies to those who suffered disfigure-ment, including how the trauma affect-ed their job opportunities and quality oflife, or what provision can be made forthem.

In addition, those with addictionissues are neglected. It is well estab-lished that many who suffered inthe ‘troubles’ turned to alcohol and

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tranquillisers. This was certainly myexperience, as well as of others I haveworked among. Before Sharon, my wife,was murdered in 1993, I did not drinkat all. My life revolved around the fam-ily and church. But all that changed.

I suppose it was my way of gettingthrough. I was feeling so angry andsorry for myself that whenever I got myfour-year-old daughter off to bed Iwould often drink myself to sleep. I alsorecall a man who told how he used toget drunk and drive out to the grave-side of his murdered son, where hewould throw himself down and ‘cry likea child’.

I also noticed no mention of the useof alternative therapies. Yet theseremain very popular with those whohave suffered trauma: at WAVE there isa waiting list. Those who avail them-selves of such therapies indicate thatthey feel more relaxed. While this evi-dence is anecdotal, surely there is aneed for research to determine effec-tiveness. If alternative therapies arejudged to be effective, then they shouldbe widely available and generouslyfunded. This would be bound to saverevenue that would otherwise be spenton such things as sleeping aids.

In a similar vein, a worker to headup each of the Trauma Advisory Panelsis to be welcomed. But concentrating onan assessment of the need for cognitive-behavioural therapy in each board areacan mean that other therapies that

might be more relevant are denied. Aneclectic approach might well be moreappropriate.

Finally, one of the health actionpoints recommends that research becarried out to determine whether coun-selling would be helpful for victims whoapply for access to coroners’ inquestpapers. I doubt if the research is neces-sary: counselling should be made avail-able to all who want it as a matter ofcourse.

Through my work as a youth worker, Ihave come to realise that there aremany difficulties faced by young peoplein relation to education. The impact ofthe ‘troubles’ is a factor, but povertyand limited family support are just assignificant and need to be taken into

Disadvantage on its own is quite enough to cope with

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account when developing the strategy. For example, one young person I

work with, whose father was shot deadin 1994, was having trouble at school.He was continually truanting and fail-ing to do any work. The school wassympathetic and blamed much of thedifficulty on his father having beenmurdered. But this annoyed the youngperson, who suggested that his wholelife experience was being analysed inrelation to his father’s death. He said:‘Everything that happens to me isblamed on my da’s death, it’s like that’sall there is to my life. I just hate school,I hated it when my da was alive andthat hasn’t made any difference. I wishpeople would stop blaming everythingon it.’

This has been confirmed inresearch. The Civic Forum (2002)undertook a study of educational disad-vantage. Focus groups comprising indi-viduals who had experienced variouslevels of educational disadvantage wereset up. The findings concluded thatwhile the ‘troubles’ had played a part, amore significant contribution stemmedfrom poverty and inadequate support.

I congratulate the strategy for high-lighting issues to be addressed, all ofwhich have no doubt been barriers pre-venting young people getting a goodeducation. But again they do not go farenough and the strategy is not suffi-ciently specific. I appreciate thatresearch is needed before a strategy

can be put in place, but much of thishas already been done. Words like‘examine’, ‘investigate’ and ‘consider’tell us nothing of the action required tocombat the problems listed.

I have a number of other concerns inrelation to education. One is intimida-tion: the incidence of intimidation isrising, yet I have seen little sign ofalternative programmes aimed at get-ting intimidated youth back into school.Here is another example from my work:

Stephen is 12 years old and has notbeen at school, or had any education-al provision for six months. His fam-ily has suffered intimidation and hashad three different addresses duringthis period. Stephen’s mother hasput his name down for a local schoolof her choice but has been informedby the school that there are no placesavailable. Another school has beensuggested by the Department ofEducation, but this school is 2 milesaway and would involve Stephenhaving to go past a few ‘flashpoint’areas. His mother says: ‘He’s boredstiff. Nothing to do but go down tothat corner and throw stones. I wishhe could get into school, but there’sno way I am sending him all the wayup there past those’uns.’

Intimidation is also problematicbecause it is often difficult to determinewhere the intimidation is coming from.For example, an education welfare offi-cer phoned WAVE about a young personwho had been threatened and was not

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attending school out of fear. The officerwanted advice as to whether the servicecould accompany the youth to schooland verification of the threat. We triedto do this, but found it impossible. Thepolice were unable to give us the infor-mation needed, and Base 2—a projectworking with these issues specifically—was difficult to contact. There is a needfor clearer structures around verifyingthreats: Base 2 does good work but oneproject is inadequate to deal with thescale of the problem.

Putting victims issues on the schoolcurriculum would be a welcome move.WAVE commissioned research into theeducational needs of young peopleaffected by the conflict. This highlight-ed the importance of addressingmatters such as death and conflict aspart of the core curriculum. These sub-jects are addressed in other conflictareas, for example, Israel/Palestine.The research (McGreevy, 1999: 18)found:

The issues of loss, bereavement, andpolitical conflict were addressed or‘skimmed over’ as topics in subjectareas such as history, religion andPSE [personal and sexuality educa-tion]. A topic which is fully integrat-ed into the curriculum and exists inthe day to day interactions betweenpupils and staff will have more of animpact than if it is treated as onlypart of the curriculum, or not part ofthe official curriculum at all.

This must happen as a matter ofcourse: these issues must be addressedin core subjects and not relegated to thefringes of school life, or left up to thegoodwill of a member of the teachingstaff.

Education welfare officers andbehavioural support teams interactingwith victims’ groups would also be wel-come. Recently at work, as a result ofdiscussions with a case worker at theseagencies, I found myself betterinformed and therefore in a better posi-tion to make a positive interventioninto the lives of two young people atrisk. This, however, was a uniqueepisode in three years of working inthis area.

In a broader sense, the whole notionof partnership needs to be examined. Istill feel there is an imbalance: some-times voluntary-sector workers are notvalued by the statutory sector; skillsthat exist are often not recognised. Idwelt on this in my input to the previ-ous DD round table.2 Perhaps the TAPswill address it.

Housing is another matter of greatconcern to victims. Once again, thestrategy identifies many of the keyareas where assistance could be provid-ed but it does not go far enough. I haveconcerns that some of the target datesfor action might not have been met. Icontacted the Northern IrelandHousing Executive to inquire about the

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‘review of emergency payments’, the‘introduction of a tenancy support serv-ice’ and the ‘use of housing officers toprovide specialist information to vic-tims’—issues highlighted in Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve. The person I spoke todid not know about the first two, and inrelation to housing officers said therewas one in Ballymena to look after oldpeople and people with disabilities.

The Victims Unit assures us thatspecialist housing officers have beenappointed and I don’t doubt this. Mypoint is on communication. If someonein need phoned up the housing execu-tive, this is the response they would belikely to get, which was far from help-ful. And, being likely to be quite dis-tressed, they might not phone again.Those handling calls in various depart-ments need to be informed of what isavailable to signpost people—perhapsthe notion of a ‘one-stop shop’ for vic-tims would be helpful in this regard.

There is a need for sensitivityaround rehousing. For example, aCatholic family I have been workingwith was intimidated out of northBelfast and then rehoused in aProtestant housing estate in Coleraine.Two boys in the family, aged ten and 11,would not go out for fear of beingattacked. Eventually they did go outand actually made some friends, but todo so they had to take on a ‘loyalist’identity. They would often go and watchthe bands, and attend ‘11th night’

bonfires. They also wrote loyalist graffi-ti on schoolbags and gable walls. Thiscreated problems when they tried tovisit relatives where they used to live.

There is also a need to improve theprocess of getting people out of certainareas. The current system is ad hoc.For example, recently WAVE dealt with awoman who had been forced from herhome in a rural community and sent toa Salvation Army hostel in Belfast. Thewoman was terrified. Not only had shelost her home but she had had to cometo the city. She had no idea where shewas, had no contact with family orfriends and found herself sharing a hos-tel with drug addicts and alcoholics.

That said, those who want to stay intheir own homes should be allowed todo so. This means providing financialassistance to home-owners who want toprotect their property, such as throughgrilles on windows.

Finally, the process of making adap-tations to houses for those with a dis-ability should be speeded up. I know ofa recent case of a double amputee beingtold they would have to wait threeyears. And a man who lost a leg in abomb in north Belfast was moved to apurpose-built house in Newtownards,because it would take so long to adapthis own home.

I am not from a rural area. I do not pre-tend to understand all the difficultiesrural dwellers experience. I do know,

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however, that access to services isseverely limited. In this regard, thestrategy says little except to signpostpeople to other agencies. I have severalconcerns about this:

The strategy suggests contactingthese organisations via their web sites.But many victims are poor and do notown a computer or are not, in anyevent, computer-literate.

Rural community transport can becostly. WAVE has used it, in Ballymoney(Co Antrim) and Omagh (Co Tyrone),to bring young people to programmes.A round trip could cost up to £70, mak-ing the delivery of programmes veryexpensive.

The document appears to pass thebuck, as there is no mention of the par-ticular issues faced by rural dwellers—isolation, for example, and the fact thatmany are living in hostile environ-ments. Access to health care, especiallychronic pain relief and other supportservices, is problematic. And, recently,two women from the republic had tocancel their attendance at a trainingevent in Omagh because of a threat toparticipants from the other side of theborder.

Clearly, the needs of those living inrural communities must be fullyanalysed.

I will bring this chapter to a close bylooking at the structural issues in thestrategy. Following the consultation

document that led up to it, somerespondents called for an organisation-al chart to help individuals and groupsmake sense of the victims constituency,what help is available and from whom.The chart that has been generated isnot clear: it is cumbersome and overlybureaucratic.

In relation to the interaction withpolicy-makers mentioned in the strate-gy, there is no clear view as how tomake this happen. Not much is knownabout the IDWG, or what authority it hasto make things happen. As to finding areplacement for the Touchstone adviso-ry group of victims’ representatives, Iam not sure this is necessary: it couldbe a function of the TAPs.

Much of the work of the TAPs has sofar been ad hoc rather than strategic.The fact that each panel now has a full-time worker should go some way toaddressing this. If the panels are to ful-fil their potential, however, there willneed to be a fair balance between statu-tory and voluntary workers. One prob-lem that needs to be tackled is how toencourage those from the communityand voluntary sector to invest time inthe work.

Last year I attended a residentialwith the Eastern TAP. I found the expe-rience very rewarding and got to knowlots of people from the statutory sector,but I was disappointed that not manyfrom the voluntary sector were there.Also, how do we combat inconsistency

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of representation, when many commu-nity workers are on short-termcontracts?

I know that the Victims Unit is notpart of the Northern Ireland Office, butas the potential transfer of the relevantresponsibilities from the NIO to adevolved administration is not likely tohappen for some time, it is clear that astrategy is required concerning suchissues as compensation, truth and jus-tice. These were ditched by the strate-gy, as well as matters concerningsecurity and the ‘disappeared’.

Then there is the Northern IrelandMemorial Fund. Again, I realise this isa separate charity, not under the con-trol of the OFMDFM. But it receives sub-stantial assistance from that sourceand there are concerns—particularly inrelation to the refusal to support fami-lies whose loved ones were murdered by‘Direct Action Against Drugs’ (a para-military front organisation) or whohave been victims of vicious ‘punish-ment’ beatings.

Refusing payment to these familiesadds support to community rumour andtrial by media, in the absence of due-process convictions by a court of law. Iwould also raise concerns about theability of the board to address the vari-ety of victim experiences not represent-ed on it. There needs to be someaccountability to government, as a keyfunder of this charity.

On funding more broadly, the

problems groups have experienced arewell documented: PEACE II is not hittingthe ground and there is a slow turn-around on letters of offer. But there areadditional, specific, queries.

First, what is meant by ‘sustain-ability’? Does it mean that money willbe found from other sources? Or does itimply that groups will provide theirown income by charging for services,doing their own fundraising and rely-ing more heavily on volunteers? Theexperience of WAVE is that our fundrais-ing—for example, through a sponsoredcycle and our gala dinner—brings insome money, but only a fraction of whatis needed to provide the service on offer.

Secondly, on core funding, the cur-rent round is due to expire in 2004. Arethere plans to continue it? If not, Iwould question the commitment of gov-ernment to the long-term care of thosedirectly affected by the ‘troubles’—andwork with victims is long-term. I wouldcaution against creating a ‘victimsindustry’, but the fact remains thatsince the signing of the Belfast agree-ment many who were bereaved in the70s, 80s and 90s have come forward forhelp.

In summary, the most valuable thingabout the strategy is that it is there:we have it and it is a start. Many

important issues are addressed, suchas health, education, housing andrecognition. The ‘joined-up’ work and

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partnership approach of the IDWG andthe TAPs should make a real differenceto the lives of victims.

But people need to be kept informedof progress. I wait expectantly for theformal review of the strategy. I want tosee if the targets have been met. I alsowant to see the strategy respond toemerging needs—for example, arisingfrom the high levels of violence atinterfaces.

The strategy also has to go further.More work needs to be done on:• recognition—greater understandingof what this means to victims;• health—a more inclusive appraisal ofneeds, particularly in relation to thephysically injured;• education—getting intimidated youthback to school in a suitable location andmaking victims issues and the under-standing of conflict central to the cur-riculum; and• housing—protecting home-ownerswho want to remain in their ownhomes, and more broadly being sensi-tive to the housing needs of victims.

If those most affected by the ‘trou-bles’ are to enjoy the benefits of peace,then these issues and others must beaddressed. The vision and values thatthe strategy is built upon make it clearthat this is the intention of govern-ment. Victims and their families willjudge its success by the changes itmakes to their lives.

References

Civic Forum (2002), Can Do Better:Educational Disadvantage in theContext of Lifelong Learning, Belfast:Civic Forum

McGreevy, Noreen (1999), ‘The school expe-rience: the boys story’, paper printed inSpit the Bricks (WAVE youth conferencereport), Belfast: WAVE

Footnotes

1 See http://www.facing.org for more information.2 paper available at http://www.democraticdialogue/vic-tims.htm

DD

36 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 15

Patricia MacBride

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve was wel-comed by many, particularly thoseworking with victims and survivors

of the conflict. This was based on theassumption that finally the politicalinstitutions were taking account of thespecific issues, problems and obstaclesfaced by victims and survivors, andthose who work on their behalf.

Many issues are covered by thestrategy, but I would like to focus onjust a few: its vision and values; thecommitment to co-operative working;the responsibilities of the ‘devolved’ and‘reserved’ parts of the administration;recognition and remembrance; and theway forward. Although Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve does address funding,space here would be insufficient ade-quately to analyse that tangled web.

The vision the strategy upholds is of:

A society where the suffering of allvictims is recognised, a community

that acknowledges the pain of thepast and learns lessons for the futureand an administration that provides,in conjunction with others, supportand services in a proactive and sensi-tive manner to meet the needs ofvictims.

I will examine three elements: theterms ‘proactive’ and ‘sensitive’ and thephrase ‘in conjunction with others’.

There is a sense on the ground thatthe administration views Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve in itself as a proactivestep in dealing with victims issues. Weknow, of course, that the strategy isonly truly proactive when its recom-mendations are implemented. I havenot closely monitored the timetable forimplementation and whether all thetargets set have been achieved, but Iwould expect to be kept informed if theywere. To date, the only information Ihave received from any statutoryagency came from the WesternEducation and Library Board tellingme how its education welfare service

What next?

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was available to assist those still atschool who identified as victims, andoffering to meet to discuss the specificrequirements of our client group.

I applaud the western board formeeting the commitment to investigatehow its services can interact with vic-tims and victims’ groups, but I wouldlike to know about other departments.One would expect that if they weremeeting their commitments they wouldshout it from the rooftops, but fromwhere I sit the silence is deafening.

The term ‘sensitive’ is subjective andneeds to be interpreted in light of thevalues underpinning the strategy:victim-centred, equitable, inclusive,focused and integrated. If victims andsurvivors are treated with dignity andrespect for their circumstances, ifequality in service delivery is achievedand if services are co-ordinated throughpartnership working, then the strategycan truly said to be sensitive, but thisremains to be proven.

Which brings me to the statementthat services would be delivered in con-junction with others. A fundamentalfailure of Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve inthis respect was that the accompanying‘key contacts list’ only included infor-mation on the statutory sector. Giventhe strategy is aimed at individuals, aswell as those who participate in groups,the lack of information on servicesavailable in the community and volun-tary sector limits choices for those

seeking help for the first time. It hasled to accusations of the administrationmerely paying lip-service to the notionof strategic partnerships.

Officials from OFMDFM have recentlyheld meetings with representatives ofvictims’ groups where broad discus-sions have taken place, including onhow best these groups can interact withthe IDWG. Many in the community andvoluntary sector anxiously await theirproposals in this regard.

The role of the TAPs in this workingrelationship is important, but the pan-els are only as effective as their mem-bership is reflective. If a panel is overlyweighted with statutory members, thenany arrangements for co-operativeworking may end up as governmentdepartments talking among them-selves. Indeed, it would not be unrea-sonable to weight any group of panelrepresentatives working in conjunctionwith the IDWG in favour of membersfrom the community and voluntarysector.

If relationships are to develop in thisway, then the panels will have to be fur-ther resourced and organised so as toensure the broadest possible spread ofrepresentation, best-practice principlesand open and transparent operation.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve under-took by March 2003 to ‘examine in con-junction with the NIO how a potentialtransfer of its responsibilities for vic-tims might be administered’. Confusion

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exists as to which branch of govern-ment (the Victims Unit in the OFMDFM

or the Victims’ Liaison Unit in the NIO)should be pursued for what purpose.The view of many who responded to theCivic Forum during the consultation onthe strategy—a view reflected in theforum’s submission—was that the NIO

should have no further role to play inthe delivery of services to victims andsurvivors.

The reasoning behind this wasstraightforward: the devolved adminis-tration was in place with regionallyelected representatives, familiar withlocal issues, who could be held account-able for their shortcomings—they werebest placed to develop and deliver thestrategy. The duplication of depart-ments did not add value to the service.The strategy action point, however,gave no concrete commitment to change(even though the strategy predated thesuspension of the institutions inOctober 2002).

Moving on to recognition andremembrance, Reshape, Rebuild,Achieve neatly sidestepped this issue. Itwas able to do so because its consulta-tion period overlapped with that for theHealing Through Remembering proj-ect. But the latter having produced itsreport (Healing Through Remem-bering, 2002)—a useful tool, which canbe adapted in many ways—the govern-ment can no longer fail to deal with thisissue, which is so divisive yet so central

to healing for victims of the conflict.Recognition and remembrance go

hand in hand with truth and justice.The latest draft Programme forGovernment (NIE, 2002) committed thedevolved administration to commis-sioning a project to bring together abroad archive of material about theconflict. It would allow victims torecord their experiences in a belief thatsuch a recording would provide recogni-tion for that victim. This archive wouldbe made publicly accessible and be usedas an educational resource, with vic-tims and victims’ representatives hav-ing contributed to the design of theproject.

In the revised plans issued by thedirect-rule administration in December2002, this commitment was restated insummary form (NIO, 2002: 19).

Victims do not want simply to recordtheir stories and hear what theyalready know. Projects such as thisarchive need to go further: solving thepuzzle of what happened, assigningresponsibility and making use of theircredibility and power to establish aclear difference between the currentand previous political systems. Butthey can only be effective if, in the longrun, they see themselves as a compo-nent of a much broader process. Thismust involve the re-establishment ofthe rule of law, in which the role of jus-tice is fundamental.

Truth-seeking processes are difficult

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and the idea of any such process takingplace in Northern Ireland needs to becarefully scrutinised. On the one hand,the investigations need to be deeplyneutral, yet on the other the resultswill be deeply political. The complexityand the focus on reconciliation makethe task of providing a balanced prod-uct challenging, but it is a challenge theadministration needs to grasp.

Despite having failed in some areas,the South African Truth andReconciliation Commission had onevery positive effect. The commissionand the publicity surrounding itensured that no one could subsequentlylegitimately claim that they did notknow the perversity reached by theapartheid régime. If a truth-tellingprocess in Northern Ireland wouldensure that no one in this society coulddelegitimise any of the victims of theconflict, I would not only welcome butembrace it.

Many worthy targets are set by thestrategy, but some that should havebeen included were not. Perhaps one ofthe most contentious issues thatReshape, Rebuild, Achieve failed toaddress is the role of ex-prisoners inservices, funding, reshaping andrebuilding our society.

Although there are many who find itdistasteful to talk about ex-prisoners,perpetrators, ex-combatants, paramili-taries—or whatever pejorative termi-nology they choose—in the same

context as a strategy for victims, itwould be a fundamental failure toignore their role. Ex-prisoners areamong the most highly politicised andactive people in our society, and manyex-prisoner groups are at the forefrontof peace-building, education and con-flict-resolution. We should use theseskills for the good of our communityand the benefit of those whose circum-stances are not of their own making.

It is still too early to decide whetherthe strategy is truly making a differ-ence. Many of the action points have atimetable of implementation in 2003,and some set for 2002 had not beenimplemented at the time of writing. Iwould like to see Reshape, Rebuild,Achieve reviewed early in 2003, to mon-itor how and what actions have beenimplemented, to take into accountissues that were not fully encompassedand to give an honest appraisal ofwhether all the actions are realisticallyachievable.

In conclusion, some thought needs tobe given to what happens when thestrategy’s timeframe is up in 2004.Does government simply walk away,believing it has fulfilled its responsibil-ities? The next step is to formalise theworking relationship between theadministration and the community andvoluntary-sector groups working withvictims and survivors—to ensure that,if this is the position, we do not let themget away with it. DD

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References

Healing Through Remembering (2002), TheReport of the Healing ThroughRemembering Project, available fromUnit 4, River’s Edge, 15 Ravenhill Road,Belfast BT6 8DN or at http://www.heal-ingthroughremembering.org

Northern Ireland Executive (2002), DraftProgramme for Government, Belfast:OFMDFM

Northern Ireland Office (2002), Buildingon Progress: Priorities and Plans for2003-2006, Belfast: OFMDFM

41DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 15

Martin Murphy

Iwill begin with some thoughts on thecurrent victims strategy, what hasbeen accomplished so far, what has

not as yet and possible reasons why, aswell as my sense of its value in shapingthe way forward. I will then considervictims’ rights in terms of thestrategy—specifically, how rights andtheir related responsibilities might beexercised in lobbying for policy change.Finally, I will suggest some realisticmeans to link victims and policy-makers more effectively.

In October 2001, I gave a presenta-tion at the DD forum where the OFMDFM

consultation paper was being dis-cussed.1 I congratulated the office onthe extent of the consultation. But Iraised questions as to the substance ofthe draft action plan. I referred to thevagueness of some of the language, sug-gesting there was little definite by wayof actions or decisions.

The problem of competitivenessbetween groups and agencies was high-lighted and traced to the funding struc-tures, beginning with PEACE I andcontinuing through the first core-fund-ing programme: funding arrangementshad arguably been tokenistic and, up tothat point, as divisive as productive.Finally, that paper suggested that weconsider more closely what we meanwhen we speak about issues and needs,and that we distinguish between theseconcepts more clearly in setting achiev-able goals.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve was pre-sented five months later. I was keen toidentify what might have changed inrespect of the above points. Initially, myassessment was very little. Reading thedevelopment and delivery section, Iwas once again struck by its vague-ness—the abundance of actions aboutactions—and disappointed by theprevalence of words like ‘examine’, ‘con-sider’ and ‘investigate’. In terms of its

Policy and possibilities

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‘vision’, ‘values’, ‘themes’ and ‘aims’, thestrategy is very clearly and positivelydefined. I was therefore left asking whyso much, in a practical sense, was leftso loosely defined in a documentdesigned to point the way forward.

I have since tried to understand thislooseness through my own work withdifferent individuals and groups. Theconsiderable consultation on the strate-gy had resulted in a massive response.My question of ‘why the vagueness?’began to shift to ‘is it, in reality, a prob-lem or a symptom?’ I wondered if thelack of definitive action was the resultof an absence of unity or consistency inthe responses to the consultation.

My previous paper suggested thatthe enormous and varied range ofissues for victims in a post-conflictNorthern Ireland contrasted with therelatively small and consistent range ofexpressed physical and psychologicalneeds. This is certainly the experiencein my everyday work. Social justice, forexample, often couched in terms ofneed, I would define as an issue. Here’sa composite example of the type of situ-ation NOVA staff encounter daily:

A family referred to NOVA have lost theirfather due to the actions of gunmen. Thefamily consists of the mother, a pre-adolescent daughter and a teenage son.Even more tragically, the mother and sonwitnessed the murder. The member ofstaff meets the family to try to contract aprogramme of work. Problems identified

include the recurring nightmares andflashbacks experienced by mother andson and their general state of exhaustionduring the day, exacerbated by anincreased sense of danger all around. Thedaughter has become withdrawn at homeand school. All agree it would be useful ifthe above problems were addressed. Atthe same time, the mother was injured inthe attack and requires ongoing treat-ment, yet she finds it difficult to availherself of services due to her feelingsaround the circumstances of her injuries.It is five years now since the father wasmurdered and no one has been caught.The mother for some time has evendoubted the motivation of the authoritiesto bring the guilty to justice. She hasjoined a group made up of people whohave experienced similar tragedies. Theyshare with each other some commonexperiences, like the lack of responsefrom the authorities and the absence ofunderstanding on the part of someschools. Some of their GPs have been won-derful or terrible, depending on the indi-vidual’s own opinion, in their willingnessto prescribe tranquillisers and anti-depressants. Other GPs have been ableto signpost counselling services.Significantly, members choose not toshare all experiences, like the fact thatthey now sleep only a couple of hours anight, that they use tablets or alcohol toease the hurt, or that their child who waspreviously dry at night is now wettingthe bed again. As the group’s identitystrengthens, they collectively focus oncommon areas of concern, like seekingjustice and recognition. They questionthe description of Northern Ireland asbeing at a point of post-conflict and feellet down by a political process that

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continues to evolve without appearingto acknowledge their experiences andongoing difficulties.

Everyone here will identify the needsand issues in this pen picture. Wewill vary in our judgments of what

are issues and what are needs. I makethe distinction, however, to identifyemotional and physical needs that canbe readily targeted through direct ther-apeutic support, or addressed throughstructural or policy changes in healthor educational services.

If we look at the current victimsstrategy, we can identify its more con-crete targets as being those addressingsuch provision. These correspond withsome of the few very specific recom-mendations, such as around cognitive-behavioural therapies or the use ofsports, arts and media.

Yet Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve alsoexists within the context of the issues,including those of justice and recogni-tion, described in the pen picture.These are more difficult to define interms of solutions. I would ask you torecall who you identified as the mur-derers. Were they paramilitaries orpolice/army? How did this help youdefine solutions to the family’s prob-lems? If you were to consider the oppo-site scenario, in terms of perpetrators,what would those solutions look like?Then think of others, possibly not pres-ent, and how their solutions might vary

according to the details. It directlyrelates to the question of how policy-makers begin to respond to victims’demands and frame these in strategiesand policies.

I do not wish to stick rigidly to thisneeds-issues dichotomy. But it is auseful framework for interpretingReshape, Rebuild, Achieve, highlightingits potential and its limitations. Notleast, it offers an explanation asopposed to a criticism of some of thegaps—seeing these as symptomatic ofthe larger context. It helps explain, forexample, such sentences in the deliverysection as ‘consult with … to considerincluding victims in their targetaudiences’.

What is the context then, given thatwe are now over four years beyond theBloomfield (1998) and Social ServicesInspectorate (1998) reports? What haschanged? Have we moved forward?

Let me first suggest a broader wayof thinking about this, in the context ofvictims’ rights. In his book Man’sSearch for Meaning, Victor Franklreflected on his experiences as a Jewsurviving four Nazi concentrationcamps, while losing every member ofhis family except one sister. In identify-ing what moved him beyond that partof his life to fulfil what remained,and in so doing suggesting whatshould inform others in their struggles,he declared: ‘I recommend that theStatue of Liberty on the East Coast be

44 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 15

supplemented by a Statue of Respons-ibility on the West Coast.’

He proposed that what charac-terised survival and subsequent growthwas the ability to recognise and exer-cise personal choice, however small,whenever possible. In the concentrationcamps this was extremely limited,given that often arbitrary decisionsspelt death for so many. But, even then,where choice did lie was in acceptingthat there might be survival, that theremight be future opportunities.

So what are victims’/survivors’rights, and what are their responsibili-ties? They are, quite simply, citizens’rights and responsibilities. The chal-lenge is: how can victims and/or sur-vivors be facilitated more fully toexercise these rights and responsibili-ties? The question I would highlight iswhether special treatment should be anend in itself or a means to an end. Is itappropriate, for example, to target vic-tims as groups when promoting busi-ness skills and enterprise initiatives, orshould this be achieved, at an individ-ual level, by more victims-sensitiveeducation and training?

As a social worker in London in the80s, I first encountered the debate as towhether equal opportunity was suffi-cient, or positive discrimination neces-sary, to promote life-chances vis-à-visrace, age, gender and so on. Interest-ingly, I observed a similar debate in themedia in South Africa when I visited in

2000. Being a white male, I somehowfelt a particular need to demonstratemy grasp. Once, in a job interview, Ioffered the analogy of the 400-metrerace. The objective is to give each run-ner an equal chance to cross the linefirst, but because of the disadvantagesimposed by the shape of the track uponthose allocated outer lanes, each run-ner is given a different starting positionto compensate for this structuralinequality. It is personal effort andapplication that then determines theoutcome.

If, because of our personal history orcircumstances, we have a right tounique treatment, we also have aresponsibility to use this to put us on apar with fellow citizens. Our right to beheard, to challenge, to oppose, comeswith a responsibility to offer proactivesuggestions for change. In the sameway, it is appropriate to highlight thelack of support from statutory servicesin the first 30 years of the ‘troubles’.But this should not be a reason to dis-count efforts made by the latter torespond more effectively today.

So what has changed since theBloomfield report? Other factors andevents have coexisted with Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve but it is importantthat Northern Ireland now has a docu-mented victims strategy—one that hasevolved out of extensive consultation.That engagement has continued, sothat lines of communication exist that

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were not present, even two years afterBloomfield. It was supplemented whenthe OFMDFM Victims Unit commissionedan independent evaluation of the firstcore-funding programme.

Those recommendations, acted onby the unit in preparing the next fund-ing programme, will do much to pro-mote the types of partnershipsuggested in Bloomfield, and to reducethe atmosphere of competition acrosssectors, so prevalent hitherto. I havealready seen evidence of this in my con-tacts with victims’ groups. Added to allthis, we have concrete recognition, bymeans of the Strategy ImplementationFund, that more clearly targeted statu-tory services for victims require addi-tional resources.

As suggested earlier, however, vic-tims’ groups have a responsibility tokeep these lines of communicationopen, to maximise the benefits ofemerging partnerships, and to influ-ence how statutory services and othersuse new monies. I emphasise groups,because they have opportunities toinfluence in a way not readily availableto individual victims. In a sense, theyhave a responsibility to represent thosefar beyond their own memberships.

This leads to my final question: howcan victims best be linked with poli-cy-makers in the future? I agree

with the bulk of opinion that a victims’commissioner is not the answer—not

least because of the near impossibilityof finding the single, ‘right’ person torepresent such a diverse group. Thatsaid, there are already examples ofeffective practice that offer cluestowards an appropriate mechanism. Irefer to the networking agencies suchas Breaking the Silence in Belfast, andthe work of the Local StrategyPartnerships in rural areas. In addi-tion—and directly related to the strate-gy document—the TAPs are developingtheir work across the health-boardareas, aided by the appointment ofco-ordinators.

It is an obvious progression for thesenetwork agencies and panels to proposemembers for a single forum that couldhave a direct and regular interface withpolicy-makers. Ideally, this should bethe IDWG. Those proposed would beresponsible for representing wider vic-tims’ interests, while simultaneouslyacting as a conduit for information fromgovernment agencies. To hark back toan earlier theme, it would be the con-stituent members’ right to expect ‘prod-uct’ from this forum and theresponsibility of policy-makers todemonstrate that they viewed it notas a talking shop, but as an agent fordecision-making.

I see Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve as astrategy in progress—one that requiresrefinement. Its gaps are clear, but wemust acknowledge why these mightexist. There is a lack of clarity at all

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levels and across all stakeholders as towhat final outcomes might look like.What exactly should the strategy beasking policy-makers to do? A key ques-tion is whether a programme shouldfocus on securing unique status for vic-tims, or on facilitating their reintegra-tion into the community.

I have suggested what victims mightneed to do to make any strategy work.We are a society, like any other, thatchooses to move on. Above all else, wecrave normality. Policy-makers mustrespond to this. That can place conflict-ing demands on victims and thoseworking with them, but they need torecognise and acknowledge this. Thepolicy-maker has a responsibility inmanaging it, but so too does thevictim—who is, first and foremost, acitizen.

I will finish with a therapeutic inter-vention our service users sometimesfind helpful when exploring possibili-ties. It is called the ‘miracle question’and in the context of this discussionwould go something like this: suppos-ing, when we go to sleep tonight, a mir-acle takes place and the perfect victimsstrategy is created, what would be thefirst difference we would notice tomor-row morning?

References

Bloomfield, Kenneth (1998), We Will

Remember Them, Belfast: NorthernIreland OfficeSocial Services Inspectorate (1998), Livingwith the Trauma of the ‘Troubles’, Belfast:Department of Health, Social Services andPublic Safety

Footnotes

1 paper available at http://www.democratic-dialogue/victims.htm

DD

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Brice Dickson

Rights are what the law guarantees.Human rights are what the lawguarantees because it considers

them to be fundamental entitlementsin the age in which we live. What qual-ifies as a human right evolves overtime, and is still evolving. Do childrenhave the human right not to besmacked? Do prisoners have the humanright to vote in elections? Decidingwhat are simply rights and what arehuman rights is a somewhat steriledebate, so I will confine my attention towhat the rights of victims should be.

Victims need and want certainthings. Even a brief time spent withvictims, however, leads to the conclu-sion that the things they need and wantdepend on (a) the nature of their vic-timhood and (b) the personality of theindividual. When we are consideringwhat rights victims should have, weshould bear in mind this truism: not all

victims are the same. The nature of victimhood differs

according to the nature of the wrongthat has been committed. The wronghas two aspects: the act itself (thekilling, the assault, the threat) and itsconsequences (the death, the injury, thefear). Deciding what rights victimsshould have requires regard for both.The former aspect calls for such rightsas recognition, acknowledgment andapology. The latter implies rights likecompensation and access to services.

What is, for the most part, irrele-vant to victims is the motivation of theperson who committed the act. The factthat one perpetrator’s motive may havebeen more laudable than another’s islittle comfort to the victimised. A deadparent, child or sibling is still dead, alost arm or leg still lost.

Some victimising acts, in any event,are motiveless: the drunk driver whokills a pedestrian has no motive,because the act was in a real sense

Victims� rights

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unintended. When addressing victims’ rights in

Northern Ireland one has to addressthe question whether victims of the‘troubles’ are deserving of greater, or inany way different, rights from victimsof other wrongs (for example, ‘domestic’murders, ‘ordinary decent robbery’ orcausing death by reckless driving). Ifso, it cannot be because they are morenumerous (more people were killed bybad driving during the conflict yearsand there were many times more vic-tims of theft). It may be because specialmeasures have been put in place for theperpetrators (an early release schemeand special funding for ex-prisoners), sospecial measures are deemed appropri-ate for the victims. And of course theBelfast agreement makes particularprovision for victims of violence (seeappendix 1).

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve relatesonly to ‘violent, conflict related inci-dents’. The purpose of the strategy is to‘help those who have suffered as aresult of the conflict and the definitionshould be seen in that light’. The firstquestion to ask, perhaps, is why is it solimited? If a strategy is in place to pro-vide support and services in a proactiveand sensitive manner to meet the needsof conflict-related victims, why is astrategy not in place to meet the needsof other victims? Is the differentiationjustifiable, especially if two of the val-ues underpinning the victims strategy

are equitableness and inclusiveness?

In traditional legal thinking thephrase ‘victims’ rights’ hardly fea-tures. This is because most legal

rules are about what constitutes awrong and what remedies are availableif a wrong has been committed.Students of the law are introduced tovictims’ rights primarily through theircourse on ‘tort’ law, which covers suchtopics as the civil wrongs of negligenceand trespass (to the person, goods orland). Questions examined include: forwhich of the consequences flowing fromthe civil wrong is the tortfeasor (theperson who committed the wrong)liable? how is the compensation due tothe victim to be calculated? and whatduty does a victim have to mitigate his/her financial loss?

Students of the criminal law do notspend much time on the rights of vic-tims, because the purpose of the crimi-nal law (at least in the Anglo-Americantradition) is to ensure that the statepunishes people for breaking its rules,not to compensate people who are thevictims of those breaches. Students willneed to consider victims in this contextonly when looking at the position of vic-tims in the witness box.

In recent years, however, a move-ment has developed to give victimsmore attention in criminal law. Thiswas exemplified in the prime minister’sspeech last year explaining that Home

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Office bills on crime would help put vic-tims at the heart of the criminal-justicesystem. Already some reforms havebeen introduced in Northern Ireland’ssystem, as a result of the passing of theJustice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002.This allows, for instance, victims to beinformed in advance when a perpetra-tor is due for release, whether tem-porarily or permanently. These newrights can apply to various types of vic-tim, not just those related to the con-flict (see appendix 2).

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve does notdeal with victims’ rights. I do not thinkthe word ‘rights’ appears even once inthe document. It focuses entirely onadministrative steps that will be takento develop and deliver the strategy.Chapter two of the document sets out—in a long list of bullet points—the meas-ures to be taken to achieve the aims ofthe strategy (although the seven head-ings used seem to relate more to thekey messages coming from the consul-tation than to the previously statedaims). None of the action pointsrequires legislation, and they thereforedo not confer rights.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve dismissesthe idea of a victims’ commissioner. Itpoints out that if victims feel that theyhave not been treated fairly by a publicbody they can contact the Office of theParliamentary Ombudsman and Com-missioner for Complaints. No mentionis made of the role of the Equality

Commission or the Northern IrelandHuman Rights Commission in this con-text, which suggests that victims’ rights(even to equality) are not deemed thatimportant. The human rights commis-sion has the power (although fewresources) to give financial assistanceto a victim of an alleged breach ofhuman rights who wants to obtain aremedy in court proceedings.

While it is obviously crucial that vic-tims’ needs for services be met, it issurely also important—both symboli-cally and strategically—that the rightto such services be underpinned by law.If it is not, then the services are contin-gent upon the administrative will of theday. One administration may choose toreduce or even abolish certain services.Legal underpinning could help to pro-tect against erosion.

The European Convention on HumanRights is not particularly helpful inthis context. It is more concerned

with establishing whether something isor is not a breach of rights than withproviding a remedy to a victim of abreach.

Article 13 says: ‘Everyone whoserights and freedoms as set forth in thisConvention are violated shall have aneffective remedy before a nationalauthority notwithstanding that the vio-lation has been committed by personsacting in an official capacity.’ TheEuropean Court of Human Rights has

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not interpreted this provision verydynamically and on many occasions ithas held that its own declaration thatsomething is a breach of the conventionis in and of itself ‘just satisfaction’ forthe applicant.

In recent years, however, there hasbeen a tendency to award compensation(for example, £10,000 to each of thefamilies of those killed by the army atLoughgall in 1987). Article 13 was notincorporated into UK law by the HumanRights Act 1998. Instead, section 8 ofthat act conferred on a court whichfinds that something has been a breachof convention rights the power to ‘grantsuch relief or remedy, or make suchorder, within its powers as it considersjust and appropriate’.

International human-rights treatiesbeyond the European Convention onHuman Rights are not any more ful-some on victims’ rights. But in 1985 theUN General Assembly passed a resolu-tion outlining Basic Principles ofJustice for Victims of Crime and Abuseof Power (see appendix 3). The Com-monwealth Secretariat has recentlyissued a document expanding on these.

When it comes to compensation,legal underpinning is particularly sig-nificant. Laws are required to specify(in primary legislation) the principlesin accordance with which compensationwill be calculated and (in secondary leg-islation) the tariffs applicable at anyparticular time.

Recent changes to the criminalinjuries compensation scheme (in forcefrom May 2002) provide for greaterequity within Northern Ireland, andbetween Northern Ireland and GreatBritain, but they mean that many peo-ple in the region are now entitled to lesscompensation than they would havebeen before the changes. Lawyers havelost out too. The human rights commis-sion believes there is scope for elevat-ing rights to compensation to aprovision in a Northern Ireland billof rights (see appendix 4, clause8(b)(2)(b)).

The victims strategy also leaves toone side the question of truth and jus-tice. The Healing Through Remem-bering (2002) report has addressed this,but more work remains to be done. Thehuman rights commission has includeda rather vague provision in its proposedbill of rights (see appendix 4, clause8(a)).

Questions remain to be answered bythe commission, however. Why shouldvictims be singled out as a groupdeserving of protection through the billof rights? If they are deserving, arethere are any other such groups? Howwould the government’s duty to takeassociated measures (for example, toestablish victims’ loss and perpetrators’responsibility) be enforced? And, like-wise, how would the mooted right to‘the highest possible level of social careand support’ be enforced? DD

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References

Healing Through Remembering (2002), TheReport of the Healing ThroughRemembering Project, available fromUnit 4, River’s Edge, 15 Ravenhill Road,Belfast BT6 8DN or at http://www.heal-ingthroughremembering.org

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Mary O’Rawe

Any discussion of a strategy for vic-tims needs to begin where NorthernIreland is now—in a transitional

and very fragile moment. Reshape,Rebuild, Achieve claims to recognisethe suffering of all victims, and thatservices will be established proactivelyand sensitively to meet the needs of all.The strategy aims to take cognisance ofthe pain of the past and learn lessonsfor the future.

At the same time, however, the doc-ument fails to acknowledge the central-ity of dealing with the past in terms oftruth, public acknowledgment and jus-tice. This issue was delegated, or rele-gated, to the report of the HealingThrough Remembering (2002) project.This fails to recognise key issues whichmust be incorporated to ensure thevision behind the victims strategy is asall-embracing as it claims.

The UN Declaration of Basic

Principles of Justice for Victims ofCrime and Abuse of Power (appendix 4)cites ‘access to justice’ first in its list ofminimum standards of which victimsmust be assured. The Belfast agree-ment recognises that acknowledgmentof suffering is key to reconciliation. TheNorthern Ireland Human RightsCommission’s victims’ rights projectprovides another example, amongmany, where issues such as informa-tion, the right to have someone heldaccountable and equality of status withother victims are placed at the forefrontof strategies and services.

Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve is—inmarked contrast—silent on truth andjustice. This attempt to compartmen-talise is fundamentally flawed, notleast because a critical aspect of secur-ing victims’ rights is official acknowl-edgment of their pain and its causes.Accountability is also key. In failing todeal adequately with these issues a dis-service is done, not only to individual

Truth and justice

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victims but to society. If a state fails tomeet its international obligations, interms of effective investigation and pro-vision of justice, there are implicationsfor how well peace can be built andsustained.

This is starkly evidenced in relationto victims of state violence. The failurepublicly to acknowledge the truth ofwhat happened in these cases sets up adichotomy between these and other vic-tims. This is wrong and unhelpful. Italso misses an opportunity to establishconfidence in the independence of legalprocesses, which could engender thelegitimacy necessary to help effectiveadministration of justice.

Truth recovery necessitates a safespace in which all stories can be told.More than this, however, there needs tobe public and official acknowledgmentof the different truths experienced bydifferent people. International obliga-tions require at a minimum that statesundertake an effective and promptinvestigation into establishing thosetruths. This is all the more importantwhere official discourse has been boundup with denial of real experience.

Official discourse in NorthernIreland has, too often, allowed one‘truth’ or one version of events to be pri-oritised and accorded more respect.This dominant truth has, historically,admitted no space for victims who donot conform to the ‘model’ laid down.This allows a ‘hierarchy of victimhood’

to flourish and gets in the way of realhealing.

Equal access to services is one thing,but if history does not accord equal sta-tus to all victims, this will sow seeds ofalienation and frustration which willinevitably create problems. As one com-mentator has insightfully argued (NíAoláin, 2002: 588), ‘These cases repre-sent an enormous accountability gapfor the State. The story about thesecases is a missing narrative about therole of the State during the conflict … Itis not evident that the incrementalreforms to investigative processes inNorthern Ireland will be capable ofdelivering a legal vehicle sufficient tovoice that narrative.’

If incremental legal reform willnever tell the whole story, and if exist-ing structures do not have the capacityto tell the whole narrative, surely a keychallenge for a victims strategy is toacknowledge past deficiencies and seekto create that capacity in meaningfulways.

It is not that there are pat answers,but the dialogue and journey must befacilitated. Issues of information as toevents surrounding the death of lovedones, public and official acknowledg-ment and apology all need to be put tothe forefront of the debate.International human-rights obligationsaround effective, independent andprompt investigation, the place accord-ed to victims and their families in

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relevant legal processes, and the neces-sity of prosecutions or amnesty all needto be revisited and worked through.1

Issues of truth and justice are inher-ently bound up with service delivery. Itis painful to pick this apart. The veryprocess of truth recovery will inevitablythrow up dichotomies, polarisations,hierarchies—but the experience of theconflict is that these are already thereand must be worked through. Wherebetter to acknowledge this, or situatethis working through, than in the strat-egy for victims?

Hard issues require to be tackled—perpetrators as themselves victims, vic-tims as perpetrators being just oneaspect of this journey. The process itselfmay throw up more victims or indicatefurther unresolved and previouslyunacknowledged trauma, but this initself is important to recognise in serv-ice planning and delivery.

The true extent and impact of vic-timhood is not currently apparent. Weare only touching the surface in manyways—and an effective victims strategyneeds to facilitate and take account of ajourney towards truth. The HealingThrough Remembering (2002) reportrecognises this and goes part waythere, but stops short of decreeing aparticular system through which truthrecovery might happen.

Its analysis is that the moment isstill not right for a truth commission,or for another similar process to be

superimposed on the political dynamicsat play. At all its different levels, peopleare already advancing and exploring arange of processes to bring us closer totruth, justice and an understanding ofwhat brought each of us to where weare. Equally, there are processes andmindsets which feed on fears and suf-fering, and stymie progress to real heal-ing. The whole issue is fraught andcomplex—but this is not a reason fornot engaging with it.

The Healing Through Rememberingreport counsels that more thoughtneeds to be given to the hard issues, tojust what shape truth recovery shouldtake. Such processes can damage aswell as heal—sometimes the two areinterdependent—and there is a realneed to ensure that whatever is set upor allowed to develop organically takeson board the dangers and the sensitivi-ties of moving us forward.

A comprehensive and effective vic-tims strategy must therefore beapproached at a number of levels, withintertwining and parallel aspects. Itmust recognise that victims as individ-uals have different needs at differenttimes—that ‘victims’ are not a mono-lith. It must similarly recognise thatthere are basic societal issues whichmust be addressed as part of creating aclimate for victims’ needs to be met.This includes respecting internationalhuman-rights norms aimed at prevent-ing such tragedies from recurring.

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What is clear, however, is that truthand justice cannot be left out of theequation or seen as an add-on. If thedefinition of ‘victim’ is problematic, def-initions of ‘truth’ and justice’ are inher-ently more problematic but still worthgrappling with. Peace will only comethrough legitimacy. Legitimacy needsto be created, and the victims strategyneeds to acknowledge this and worktowards its creation. As Prof Ní Aoláin(2002: 590) concludes,

The State must lead the responsewith imagination and openness … [I]fthe State seeks to escape or minimiseits past, it will inevitably meet itagain. A vehicle for exposing andexamining the past is required.Without it, the long list of unresolved… cases will continue to linger at themargins of political debate and legalprocess, stymying the capacity of allsuch systems to move forward.

If we are truly serious about peace,healing, justice and reconciliation, thevictims strategy needs to open the doormore fully to a vision which encompass-es the right to truth.

References

Healing Through Remembering (2002), TheReport of the Healing ThroughRemembering Project, available fromUnit 4, River’s Edge, 15 Ravenhill Road,Belfast BT6 8DN or at http://www.heal-ingthroughremembering.org

Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala (2002), ‘Truth telling,accountability and the right to life’,European Human Rights Law Review 5

Footnotes

1 See, for example, recent findings of the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights on article 2—the right to life:McCann and Others v UK judgment of September 27th1995, series A, no 324; Kaya v Turkey judgment ofFebruary 19th 1998 Reports of Judgments andDecisions 1998-I; Kelly and Others v UK judgment ofMay 4th 2001, Shanaghan v UK judgment of May 4th2001, McKerr v UK, judgment of May 4th 2001, HughJordan v UK, judgment of May 4th 2001; no 37715/97,[section 3], judgment of May 4th 2001; McShane v UK,judgment of May 28th 2002

DD

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Roy McClelland

Our problem does not lie in ourtechnology but in our minds.

On the need to overcome trendstowards self-destruction, on

the need for new ways of thinking,understanding, logic, ethics.

Albert Einstein

This paper starts from the findings ofthe Healing Through Rememberingproject, which sought answers to the

question ‘how should we remember theevents connected with the conflict inand about Northern Ireland so as toindividually and collectively contributeto the healing of the wounds of our soci-ety?’ While the project and its report(Healing Through Remembering, 2002)have been based on consultation of awide range of individuals and groups inNorthern Ireland (and further afield),this paper also looks outside our ownconflictual situation for insights—

insights which have informed the proj-ect too.

Roberta Bacic draws attention to theduality between individual victims andthe wider community (Bacic, 2001).Both are important but, as sheobserves, it is important for victimsthat responsibility for moral and socialreconstruction lies with the wider com-munity: we all have responsibility for,and a part to play in, dealing with thepast.

Alex Boraine, president of theInternational Centre for TransitionalJustice and advisor to the project, hasbeen resolutely of the view that someform of truth-telling could have enor-mous benefits for victims of our conflict.Truth-telling has several importantaspects for victims.

First, victims need to share theirtruths; they need to be heard. Secondly,victims who have survived and thefamilies of victims need truth; theyneed information. A third aspect is

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restorative truth. As Dr Boraineobserves, for healing to be possibleknowledge is not enough: knowledgemust be accompanied by acknowledg-ment, by acceptance of responsibility.

Such an acknowledgment can con-tribute to justice for victims. Given thecomplexities of our conflict, responsibil-ity casts a long historical shadowthrough today’s society. We need toembrace not just past events butresponsibility for dealing with pastevents, for responding to the needs ofvictims, for dealing with memory at asocietal level—for remembering, forhonouring, the memories of those whohave suffered most in our long andbloody conflict.

Restorative truth takes us directlyto consider justice—justice for victims.As noted by the authors of Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule, which focusedon Latin America and eastern Europe,there is a difficult tension between thedesire to bury the past and the ethicaldemand to confront past wrongs(O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead,1986). While acknowledging the diffi-culty of this dilemma, it cannot beavoided and we ourselves have someresponsibility to try to resolve it—‘theworst of bad solutions would be to tryand ignore the issue’.

Priscilla Hayner directs our atten-tion to ‘transitional justice’. This isa range of processes to deal with asociety in transition: addressing past

injustices, assisting reconciliation, giv-ing victims their respect and prevent-ing repetition of the cycle of violence(Hayner, 2001). Transitional justice,carefully considered, is a notion centralto truth and justice for victims.

While most of the issues thatemerge from consideration of the truthneeds of victims can be subsumedunder justice obligations, justice forvictims extends to compensation andretribution.

The Healing Through Rememberingproject has been premised on theview that remembering is an impor-

tant part of psychological and socialhealing in the context of conflict. It isalso grounded in the reality thatremembering is inevitable. The chal-lenge for us is thus to find new ways ofremembering that enable us to go for-ward as a community.

The project has been inspired by anumber of initiatives, including theconsultations that preceded it encapsu-lated in the All Truth is Bitter report(NIACRO and Victim Support NorthernIreland, 1999). This signalled the needto consider transitional processes andfor a broad programme of peace-build-ing. This would acknowledge the painof individuals and communities, as wellas offering recognition and acknowledg-ment of injustices.

The project set itself the task ofseeking the views of all those affected

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by the conflict. Encouragingly, the widevariety of suggestions advanced inresponse bore little relationship towhat would be regarded as traditionalalignments. There springs from thisproject a convergence of ideas andoptions for transitional processes—newpossibilities for being faithful to ourhistories, for giving dignity to our pastand for respecting and acknowledgingall those individuals and communitieshurt within it.

The project board understood itsresponsibility, however, as more thanpassively reflecting a list of options. Asmembers of the wider community, wehave collectively felt a moral responsi-bility to try to chart a way forward.Core to our deliberations was the viewthat finding the right relationship toremembering and truth is fundamentalin dealing with our past. The reportoffers six recommendations for healingthrough remembering, of direct rele-vance for the truth and justice needs ofvictims.

We have recommended story-tellingand the archiving of our stories as a tes-timony to our individual and collectiveexperiences. Story-telling is an essen-tial part of the truth-recovery process:it is essential to being heard and from itacknowledgment is possible. This pro-cess requires broad community sup-port, transcending historical divisions,to give voice to those individuals andcommunities who have suffered as a

result of the conflict.We need temporal aids to remem-

bering. We need to pause, think andreflect. We are persuaded of the needfor an annual day of reflection—toremember all those who have beenaffected by the conflict, to learn fromthis experience, to learn how not torepeat the experiences of the past andfor our children to reflect, rememberand learn.

We need structural aids to remem-bering. We recommend a living muse-um as a dynamic memorial to all thoseaffected by the conflict, where accesscan be gained to active memories ofevents by members of the community,by our children.

Truth-recovery processes receivedmost attention and comment in thesubmissions to the project. This wasalso the area of greatest challenge andcontroversy. In general, there was sup-port for some form of truth-recoveryprocess, although most submissionsqualified this support and raised poten-tial concerns. A recurring theme wasthe need for an appropriate process,specific to our own situation, encom-passing the ‘horizontal’ (intercommu-nal) as well as ‘vertical’ (state versusindividual) aspects of the conflict.

The need for recognition of the suf-fering caused to victims was stressedtime and again. Submissions alsostressed the importance of truth in theprocess of coming to terms with past

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hurts. It was also clear that the conceptof a truth commission meant very dif-ferent things to many of those makingsubmissions.

The board pondered this issue care-fully. We are persuaded that somemechanism to address the truth

about the past may well be necessary.There emerges from the submissions aclear call for a deeper exploration andthe board recommends that a formaltruth-recovery process be given carefulconsideration. An essential first step isacknowledgment and the project stress-es the importance of individual andcollective acknowledgment of our con-tributions to the conflict, to the painand suffering.

It is only on the basis of acknowledg-ment and truth that reconciliation cantake place. Acknowledgment should beby all organisations and institutionsengaged in the conflict, including theBritish and Irish states. It also requiresacknowledgment, by the wider commu-nity, of our acts and our omissions. Theboard takes the view that acknowledg-ment is the bedrock for truth recovery.

The aims and potential gains thatcould derive from such a processinclude:• clarification and acknowledgment ofunresolved truths;• responding to the needs of victims,including the need for information andacknowledgment;

• identifying the responsibilities forpast violence of institutions, includingstates, and in so doing contributing tojustice in a broad sense;• contributing to reconciliation andpeace-building; and• bringing forward recommendationsfor change that will reduce the likeli-hood of further conflict.

While any proposed commission ontruth recovery will need to be groundedin the particular context of our historicconflict, there is much to be gained bydirecting our attention away fromNorthern Ireland and scanning widerhorizons. There are lessons to belearned from other countries whichhave gone, or are going, through simi-lar experiences. The Healing ThroughRemembering project has been greatlyenriched by the input from internation-al sources, including visits by RobertaBacic, Priscilla Hayner and AlexBoraine. The observations that followare, however, personal.

It is instructive to review the goals,methods of working and achievementsof official truth-finding initiatives else-where. From scrutiny of such initia-tives, including the very thoroughreview of more than 20 truth commis-sions by Hayner (2001), there areinsights relevant for our situation and,in particular, our obligations to victims.

Non-judicial truth bodies are notseen to replace judicial processes. Inthis regard it is worth noting the limits

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on truth-finding in the usual judicialprocess. The function of the judicialprocess is to investigate the accusedperson and ensure that the criminalstandard of proof has been satisfiedwith respect to specific charges. Thevery focus, on the accused, sets limitsto what truth may or may not bedelivered.

Truth-finding initiatives serve avery different purpose. One fundamen-tal difference is their primary focus onvictims: truth commissions are victim-centred. Such an approach offers vic-tims a public voice and brings theirsuffering to the attention of the widerpublic. Despite more limited legal pow-ers, their broader mandate, focusing onpatterns of events—including the caus-es and consequences of state violence—allows truth-recovery initiatives to gomuch further in their investigationsand conclusions than is generally possi-ble in any trial of individuals. Thisbreadth and flexibility represent signif-icant strengths, with the result that atruth commission report is usually of afar better quality than any previoushistorical account.

Interviews with victims, character-istic of truth commissions, allow adetailed account of the patterns of vio-lence over time and across regions, lit-erally recording a hidden history.Indeed the work of truth commissionshas often been described as ‘lifting theveil of denial’ about widely known but

unspoken truths (Hayner, 2001: 25).The chair of the South African TRC,Archbishop Desmond Tutu, assertedthat the commission had contributedmore to uncovering the truth about thepast ‘than all the court cases in the his-tory of apartheid’. (Meredith andRosenberg, 1999: 316).

This points to the regenerative pos-sibilities of a truth initiative—possibil-ities for restoration and reconciliation.Truth, dealt with in this way, providesnot just knowledge but acknowledg-ment—public acknowledgment, stateacknowledgment, acknowledgment byall the organisations that have con-tributed to the conflict. Such acknowl-edgment can help heal social wounds.

From the victims’ and survivors’ per-spective, issues surrounding recon-ciliation are among the most

difficult, yet victims and survivors arecentral to finding ways forward. Whilethe Belfast agreement suggests that apeaceful and just society would be atrue memorial to victims, an importantcounterpoint is presented by DuncanMorrow. He writes (Morrow, 2001: 29)that ‘forgiveness and reconciliation arethe sine qua non of any peace thatmoves beyond the absence of war’.Being reconciled is fundamental to astable peace in our society. At its heartis a healing of broken relationships,particularly at community level.

As Hayner suggests, one of the goals

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of truth-recovery work is breaking thecycle of revenge. From her review of ini-tiatives and many encounters with sur-vivors, she concludes that ‘victims oftensay that they cannot forgive their per-petrators, and have no desire or abilityto reconcile, until those who causedthem pain acknowledge their acts’(Hayner, 2001: 28). This resonatesstrongly with the consultation findingsof the Healing Through Rememberingproject, and from conversations withvictims and survivors. Indeed, it is onlythrough reflection on conversations Iam privileged to have had with sur-vivors that I feel able to comment onthis difficult and challenging issue—reconciliation.

One survivor recently told me that‘the road to reconciliation is not to for-give and forget but to remember andrepent (regret)’. For the survivor, shesaid, it is about ‘letting go of the hurt,letting go of revenge’. Another survivorsaid: ‘I need to hear, from combatants,“I was wrong”—we need shared stories,we need space for story-telling toachieve a level of understanding.’ In thesame conversation, I heard from a for-mer paramilitary: ‘I am (was) responsi-ble—part of a machine.’ And this fromanother: ‘I was wrong and I want to tellyou what was behind the motives.’

This dialogue between survivors andcombatants represents a ray of lightthat guides us on the long path towardsreconciliation. It also points to the

responsibilities of the wider communi-ty. These include providing circum-stances, conditions and supports to

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enable such sharing, listening andacknowledging, thus making reconcilia-tion a possibility.

No one is under any illusion aboutthe difficulty or the length of this jour-ney. The prize is building or rebuildingrelationships, relationships not haunt-ed by hatred and past conflicts. Ourchildren can be the real beneficiaries.

We need to recognise that possibili-ties for reconciliation exist at both indi-vidual and community levels. While thefocus of our current considerations is onour obligations to victims, the reconcili-ation issues for survivors and for thewider community are interconnected.The community has responsibilities forfacilitating reconciliation for individu-als, for individual victims and sur-vivors. Reciprocally, the insights gainedthrough the meetings between sur-vivors and combatants signal the possi-bilities for reconciliation at thecommunity level.

The challenge of reconciliation—addressing the underlying problemof fractured relationships—is part of

a canvas wider than our historic con-flict. The Faith in Politics Group hasprovided much-needed insight into thepossibilities for reconciliation. It notesthe comment by the late political scien-tist Frank Wright, that ‘we develop inrivalry with each other’ individuallyand collectively (Faith and PoliticsGroup, 2002).

In exploring the possibilities for rec-onciliation we need to recognise andrespond to our individual and collectiveviolence—the violence within our-selves, within our community. This sig-nals a paradigm shift, grounded in thework of René Girard (Girard, 1987) andRoel Kaptein (Kaptein, 1993).

A central thesis in Girard’s work isthat the controlling mechanisms in thehuman psyche are not just undetectedbut systematically falsified by romanticevasions. Girard invites us to considera challenge to the myth of personalautonomy—that ‘I am I’, that ‘you areyou’. This he refers to as the romanticlie and he affirms that the relation-ships in which we find ourselves funda-mentally determine who we are. Tounderstanding human conflict, he in-troduces what is called the mimeticrivalry-scapegoat model.

Mimesis—that is, our capacity forimitation—is one of two central ele-ments in Girard’s anthropologicalmodel. He identifies different aspects.There is a cohesive side—for example,the parent-child relationship, in whichthe parent is the model for the child,or the teacher-pupil relationship. Butthere is another, potentially destruc-tive, side—the mimesis of desire, orrivalry. For Girard, human beings aremoved at the most fundamental levelby a drive towards unconscious imita-tion, of not only the behaviour but alsothe attitude of others.

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Girard directs attention to thisinter-individual mimetic process.Desire (acquisitive mimesis) derivesnot from the object but from the desir-ability of the object for the other. Thismimesis of desire, both in its acquisi-tive and conflictual aspects, is forGirard the true unconscious andderives not from within the individualbut from the relationship between indi-viduals. This is the paradigm shift. It isa recognition of the mimetic origins ofthe unconscious—the mimetic originsof desire and the crucial role thatmimetic desire, rivalry, plays in medi-ating human drive and behaviour,including human conflict.

Just as mimesis is everywhere, so isthe mimesis of desire. It begins early inour development, with admiration ofour models. But conflictual mimesis isinevitable: just as we admire and thusdesire the objects of our models, ourmodels are drawn to a defence of theirown claims. This draws attention to thedangerousness of mimetic desire andthe origins of human conflict. ForGirard, mimesis is widespread in thenatural world, but it is especially pres-ent in humankind.

Kaptein has suggested that controlof mimetic desire—rivalry—in the ani-mal kingdom is achieved through hier-archical patterns of dominance whichhave been well described. Kapteinsuggests that the problem for earlyhumankind was a breakdown in

dominance patterns, because ofhumankind’s intense mimetic desire,leading to an escalation of rivalry andconsequent violence.

Girard and Kaptein postulate thatthe emergence of culture provided ameans for controlling the violence ofrivalry among humankind. This pointsto the second core element of Girard’snew anthropology—the scapegoatmechanism. If rivalry can be consideredat its simplest as a game where twopeople engage, scapegoating can beseen as a game for three. Picture thesituation:

Two adults squabbling (mimeticdesire). At the periphery of the situa-tion a ‘foreigner’ accidentally entersand notices the squabbling. Theattention of the squabblers is drawnto the arbitrary other. One can antic-ipate the response: ‘what the xxxx areyou looking at?’ The intruder isalready in a risky situation and canquite quickly become the target of thesquabblers’ irritability—the irritabili-ty that pre-existed between them. Ittakes very little for the two to directtheir irritability at the outsider.

Two things have happened in aninstant. First, the stranger has becomethe target of aggression. Secondly, thesquabbling between the other two hasdisappeared and they are united. Thisis the victimisation process, the scape-goat process. We note the arbitrarinessof the victim: ‘why me?’ The victim was

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not some problem individual to startwith, but was quickly labelled by theother two as a problem.

For Girard this is at the core of thestability of old culture—the mechanismthat brings peace and stability to agroup. It is founded on the scapegoatprocess and divides one group fromanother, or what we now recognise as‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’—the in-group being the ‘good’ people, the out-group the ‘bad’. The insights from thismodel have relevance for understand-ing cultural violence and conflict,including our own.

If Girard’s new anthropological per-spective has validity, insights into oursituation begin to emerge. First, tempo-ral mimesis (identification), historicmyths of victimhood and scapegoating,have had an enormous impact in recentand current situations for Protestantsand Catholics alike. Each group is per-ceived to be ‘the baddies’, the scape-goats, by the other. We fight to preventbeing scapegoated and the situation isamplified by the spatial mimesis ofpresent-day rivalry and violence andthe endemic insecurity and fear thataccompanies it (Morrow, 1995).

A second insight from Girard’sanalysis is that all are involved mimet-ically—all are inevitably caught up,part of the process. No one is on thesidelines: we all play a part because ofthe power of mimetic forces, the rival-ries, the insecurities. We conveniently

perpetuate the myth of the fringenature of the violence, expressed by thefew but in reality endorsed, actively orpassively, by the many. Even those of uswho claim to be opposed to sectarian-ism and sectarian violence contributeby our non-involvement, our ignoring ofthe enormous legacy of our temporalmyths.

For reconciliation to be a possibility,we must deal with the past. Hereagain the Girardian analysis illumi-

nates, as we recognise ourselves asinevitable participants in the mimeticconflictual process—not just passiveobservers. For the Faith in PoliticsGroup (2002), reconciliation is built on‘forgiveness, repentance, truth and jus-tice’. Applying the Girardian analysis,we are participants, and reconciliationtherefore is about our acknowledgmentwith the victims and survivors—our lis-tening; our giving space for anger, forfeelings of hurt and guilt to be articu-lated, to be acknowledged; our respond-ing to their need for an apology.

Progress in the quality of peace inNorthern Ireland is inextricably tied upwith our ability to ask for, and grant,forgiveness from and to one another(Morrow, 2001). A cornerstone of recon-ciliation is ‘that all citizens reflect onand confess their mistakes, misconcep-tions and in extreme cases unlawfulactions’ (Hamber, Kulle, Wilson, 2001:91). Such actions begin to address the

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needs of victims. These responses by the wider com-

munity—our acceptance and acknowl-edgment of our responsibility—can inthe same moment break the reversescapegoating of so-called perpetrators(scapegoaters), and introduce possibili-ties for stopping the cycle of violence.Out of such acts of reconciliation andrestoration arise new possibilities forsurvivors and combatants: ‘truth andmercy have met together; peace andjustice have kissed’ (psalm 85: 10).

Reconciliation is also about lookingforward. This includes public acknowl-edgment and recognition of the needs ofvictims and survivors, public responsi-bility for repair and compensation. It isalso about recognition and acceptanceof ‘the other’. This is more than simplyequality: it is about belonging together,about shared community, about inter-dependence. The Faith in PoliticsGroup (2002) considers ‘living togetherin difference’ as core to reconciliation—recognising and accepting difference asan enriching reality.

Reconciliation is a journey—it is along haul—but like all journeys itbegins with the first steps. Severalspiritual giants in our communityhave already taken these first steps,such as Gordon Wilson and MichaelMcGoldrick. They have provided uswith footprints to follow, as SeamusHeaney writes, ‘on the far side ofrevenge’.

References

Bacic, Roberta (2001), ‘Dealing with thepast—Chile: a case study of humanrights and human wrongs’, personalcommunication

Faith and Politics Group (2002), A Time toHeal: Perspectives on Reconciliation,Belfast: Faith and Politics Group

Girard, René (1987), Things hidden sincethe foundation of the world, London:Athlone Press

Hamber, Brandon, Dorte Kulle and RobinWilson, (2001), ‘Conclusion: FuturePolicies for the Past’, in Hamber, Kulleand Wilson (eds), Future Politics for thePast, Belfast: Democratic Dialogue

Hayner, Priscilla (2001), UnspeakableTruths: Confronting State terror andatrocity, New York: Routledge

Healing Through Remembering (2002), TheReport of the Healing Through Remem-bering Project, available from Unit 4,River’s Edge, 15 Ravenhill Road, BelfastBT6 8DN or at http://www.healingth-roughremembering.org

Kaptein, Roel (1993), ‘Freedom in relation-ships’, distinguished scholar lecture,Belfast: Queen’s University

Meredith, Martin and Tina Rosenberg(1999), Coming to Terms: South Africa’sSearch for Truth, New York: PublicAffairs

Morrow, Duncan (1995), ‘Violence and thesacred in Northern Ireland’, Violence,Mimesis, Culture 2: 145-164

——— ‘Forgiveness and reconciliation’, inHamber, Brandon, Dorte Kulle andRobin Wilson (eds), Future Politics forthe Past, Belfast: Democratic Dialogue:Belfast

NIACRO and Victim Support NorthernIreland (1999), All Truth is Bitter: ADD

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Report of the Visit of Doctor AlexBoraine, Belfast: NIACRO and VictimSupport Northern Ireland

O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe CSchmitter and Laurence Whitehead,(1986), Transitions from AuthoritarianRule: Tentative Conclusions aboutUncertain Democracies, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press

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Robin Wilson

Aclear thread has run through theevolving discussion on victims ofthe Northern Ireland conflict (see

Hamber, Kulle and Wilson, 2001), par-ticularly insistently in the round tableon which this publication is based. Thisrests on a dichotomy contributors havevariously described in terms of servicesversus truth and justice (Hamber andothers), ‘needs’ versus ‘issues’ (Murphy),and the consequences of a wrong versusthe wrong itself (Dickson).

Addressing services, targeting needsand dealing with the consequences ofwrongs is the easier aspect, and thetemptation is to focus upon this—andthe victims—alone. But it has beenpowerfully argued, by Mary O’Raweand others, that truth and justice, thewider issues at stake and the acknowl-edgment of wrongs can not be avoided ifNorthern Ireland is ever to become a‘normal’ civic society.

Let us start, however, with the easi-er part—which, of course, on closerscrutiny, is not easy at all. On the con-trary, what is immediately apparentfrom discussion of the victims strategyas an instance of a policy challenge isthat if one had substituted for ‘victims’throughout the words ‘victims of do-mestic violence’ , or even ‘single par-ents’ or ‘the long-term unemployed’,many of the same difficulties wouldhave been raised.

These are difficulties such as:• securing ‘joined-up’ approaches bydepartments and agencies;• translating a strategy into tangiblechange on the ground;• the interface between ‘front-line’ staffand individual ‘clients’;• relationships between the statutoryand voluntary sectors; and• reaching out to individuals who arenot in organised groups.

The ‘victims’ question, then, is inone sense a particularly sensitive case

Conclusion

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of the challenge of shifting governmentfrom a focus on what particular depart-ments conventionally ‘deliver’ toresponding to what individual citizensand groups need—it rarely being thecase that the latter coincides with theformer, including because new needsare always emerging (as in AlanMcBride’s example of the effects ofrecent interface violence).

The very category of ‘victims’ of theconflict as a group with specific needswas not even officially recognised untilthe Bloomfield (1998) report. Only inthe recent strategy has a more broadlyacceptable definition of ‘victim’ beenestablished. The risks of frustrationand alienation are thus considerable.

For a start, no one ‘victim’ has only asingle need, that one department oragency can conveniently meet, buthe/she requires holistic attention.Secondly, as Brice Dickson stresses, notwo ‘victims’ are the same but eachrequires individually specific consider-ation. Thirdly, any individual’s needsshould (hopefully) change with time, asthey come to terms with their loss—Martin Murphy hints at a progressionfrom a state of dependent ‘victimhood’,where no one wants to be, to an activecitizenship marked by control overone’s life.

And, fourthly, if it is insensitive tofail to recognise when an individualpresents with problems that are con-flict-derived, there is also a danger, as

Alan McBride highlights, of ‘pigeon-holing’ someone as a ‘victim’ when—likeall the rest of us—they have a range ofother problems in their lives withwhich they struggle to cope, as well asmatters they deal with confidently.

There are, of course, no miraculousanswers to these complexities. One,however, is clear: a ‘victim-centred’approach is essential, including toensure the individual does not feelobjectified by government in a mannerthat recalls their victimisation. Thecommitment of Reshape, Rebuild,Achieve in this regard may explainthe general support for its vision andvalues.

Another answer is to recognise thereare never perfect and once-and-for-allanswers. Solutions to such problems asare thrown up in this arena—as in somany others—will always be a matterof judgment, provisional and subject torevision. Awareness of this reality mayunderpin the apparent support for aregion-wide policy forum on victims’issues, as suggested by Martin Murphy,where answers could be debated andthrashed out with the direct in-volvement of victims’ representatives,individual victims, experts and practi-tioners. The TAPs, with a sufficientlyinclusive membership, could take onthis role at an area level, in so far asthis is not already happening.

Such forums could assist evidence-based policy-making, via research and

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evaluation of the range of interventionswith victims—and be more representa-tive than the IDWG. They could discussand disseminate good practice acrossthe statutory/voluntary interface, forinstance on the difficult issue of the bal-ance between conventional and alterna-tive therapies raised by Alan McBride.They could address to what extent spe-cialist, victim-centred voluntary organ-isations in the field can provide serviceson behalf of government, and if so howthese should be monitored, evaluatedand developed.

The evolution of the discussion onvictims may be reflected in the settingaside of the idea, originally advocatedby Bloomfield (1998), of a victims’ com-missioner. The impossibility, as MartinMurphy put it, of a single person actingas a conduit for such a complex set ofproblems would support the emergingalternative of a forum—albeit requiringguarantees of genuine governmentengagement. In theory at least (this ismuch harder in practice), responsibilityshould be across the board, rather thanconfined to one person.

Outreach to isolated—indeed, per-haps self-isolated—‘victims’ outwiththe sphere of organised self-help andlobby groups presents particular chal-lenges. Some may have found ‘denial’ acoping strategy. Others may feelembarrassed about talking about theirfeelings. Others may feel they shouldbe ‘independent’ and not seek help from

government. Others again may feel bit-ter towards authorities for whom theymay appear to have become a politicalliability. The excellent ‘Legacy’ series ofshort story-telling on BBC Radio Ulsterrevealed a great reservoir of hurt fromthe past, which stubbornly refuses to goaway.

All this suggests that, beyond theefforts of the OFMDFM and NIO units andin addition to the helpline, there maybe a need for a well-publicised and wel-coming ‘one-stop shop’ which victimscould be encouraged to approach, asAlan McBride suggests. This servicecould be contracted to an existing vol-untary organisation, properlyresourced.

Recognising that victims’ needs areoften citizens’ needs means ensuringthat policy in this area is not walled offfrom related policy domains—such as‘community relations’ and social inclu-sion. Yet the community-relations

It may be in the past—but that doesn’t mean it’s over

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review (OFMDFM, 2003) does not men-tion victims’ issues—perhaps because itrather superficially roots communalpolarisation in segregation, rather thanin the underlying intolerance that RoyMcClelland insightfully addresses.There is also a risk that the very exis-tence of a victims strategy means thatother policy-makers can feel they canignore the issue. The Programme forGovernment ought to provide the vehi-cle for a more integrated approach.

Social exclusion is often experiencedas indignity. And one contributor at theround table spoke of how victims needto ‘regain power and dignity’. Whichbrings us to the wider set of chal-lenges—where a victim-centred ap-proach must, all the more, be thelodestar.

In discussing the issues of truth andjustice—dealing with the wrongrather than its consequences—it may

perhaps again assist to stand back andprovide some context. And let us startwith the palpably heightened sensitivi-ties felt by many victims, at first sightparadoxically, since the ceasefires weredeclared in 1994.

It has become fashionable over thelast decade to describe NorthernIreland’s status as ‘transitional’,though few are so indelicate (given thecontinuing, indeed intensified, ‘union-ist’ versus ‘nationalist’ antagonism) asto suggest where the transition is to.

Yet in fact Northern Ireland appearsstuck—stuck in a state of polarisationand low-level violence, disappointingthe hopes of many that the Belfastagreement would mark the requiredstep change towards ‘normality’.

There is a widespread sense that (invarious connotations) ‘justice’ has beendenied, and different ‘truths’ continueto compete, as Mary O’Rawe points out.Northern Ireland is, in that sense, in astill ‘troubled’ climate of moral hazard.This may best be described, referringback to Martin Murphy’s composite vic-tims group, as ‘pre-post-conflict’.

In that context, the issues identifiedthroughout this report will not go away.Yet the bind is that, by their veryapparent intractability and with theirexplosive affective dimensions, the ideathat they might be resolved by a ‘truthcommission’ will always seem a reallygood one … best deferred for anotherday. How can this dilemma be resolved?

This is even harder than the prob-lems posed above in terms of services.And this chapter is neither the first northe last word on the subject. But, guid-ed by victim-centredness, there aresome further pointers to a way forward.Roy McClelland’s quotations from vic-tims are relevant in this regard: theysuggested that ‘forgive and forget’should be replaced by ‘remember andrepent’ and that someone had to be will-ing to acknowledge ‘I was wrong’.

First, we should avoid counterposing

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‘truth’ and ‘justice’, as much of the pub-lic debate has implicitly done—rather,they go hand in hand. The origins ofthis difficulty lie in the excessive resortin Northern Ireland to the SouthAfrican case, often selectively appropri-ated as a model.

As Hayner (2001) points out, theSouth African truth commission was anoutlier among the more than 20 thathave emerged around the world. Thepower of the formerly dominant whiteminority meant that truth could only bepursued if extensive immunity was pro-vided to the servants of apartheid.Justice was accordingly sacrificed,much to the chagrin of many victims ofthe régime, who felt themselves pawnsin a political power game (Hamber,2002).

As Brice Dickson makes clear, jus-tice is something to which victims of awrong are entitled. To deny them thatright is to compound injury by injustice.(If they decide as a personal choice notto pursue the perpetrator, out of a spir-it of forgiveness—and this may per-versely be empowering and facilitatemoving on from ‘victimhood’—that isquite a different matter.) The interna-tional trend in recent years, albeit con-tested by unilateralist powers, has beento bring otherwise violent state andsub-state actors to account, such as bythe special tribunal on ex-Yugoslaviaand the new International CriminalCourt.

In this view, it is right to insist boththat the outstanding disputed cases ofthe exercise of lethal force by the policeand army in Northern Ireland be fully(re)investigated—particularly in thelight of the adverse ruling on four casesby the European Court of HumanRights in May 2001—and that thecases of the IRA ‘on the runs’ advancedby Sinn Féin at the Weston Park talksthat summer be heard before a court oflaw, rather than they being amnestiedby administrative fiat.

Human rights in Northern Irelandare often misunderstood as about chal-lenging state abuses alone. They arealso about rendering the state account-able for its complicity or negligence inthe face of injustice. There are continu-ing, legitimate, concerns about collu-sion involving apparatuses of theBritish state in (among others) thehigh-profile deaths of the lawyers PatFinucane and Rosemary Nelson, whichremain under investigation at time ofwriting and must be pursued to a con-clusion, wherever that goes. And agreat injustice continues to be done tothose intimidated out of NorthernIreland by paramilitaries—perhaps4,500 families (Belfast Telegraph,March 20th 2003)—whom it is political-ly convenient for the state to ignore.

Secondly, as I hope is already appar-ent, we should avoid counterposing onekind of victim to another. As BriceDickson reminds us, equality is itself a

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fundamental human right and inequal-ity a denial of the common humanityfrom which such rights derive.

In this light, the excessive focus on atruth commission has also obscured theother important ways in which thewider concerns of victims can beaddressed. The Healing ThroughRemembering (2002) proposals for a‘day of reflection’ and a ‘living museum’have yet to be given the attention theymerit. It could be a hugely importantassertion to victims that they are nei-ther invisible nor alone if a special dayand a special place were set aside tocherish them and recognise the inhu-manity they have suffered.

Morrissey and Smyth (2002) haveprovided a useful steer through themoral minefield here. On the one hand,they reject the claim that everyone inNorthern Ireland is in some sense a‘victim’. To compare the inconvenienceothers have faced with the traumaassociated with death and injury istotally insensitive. And with all dueregard to the social determinants of vio-lence, the self-serving suggestion thatperpetrators were really themselves‘victims’ (though they may have beenvictims too) is a gross act of denial thatwould leave victims in the bizarre posi-tion of being expected to believe that noone had perpetrated a wrong againstthem at all.

On the other hand, Morrissey andSmyth stress, exclusivist definitions of

victimhood must be equally rejected.Any talk of ‘real’ or ‘innocent’ victims—as if those on the ‘other side’ were ‘unre-al’ or ‘had it coming to them’—is toindulge in an insidious hierarchy of vic-timhood, which can only sustain aseamy competitive struggle, dancing onthe graves of those irretrievably lost.

At best, such a ‘single-identity’ focus(which, by the by, there is no obligationon the wider public to fund) wouldentrench divisions and surely block the‘transition’ to a ‘post-conflict’ scenario.At worst, the danger would be of contin-uing to fight the ‘war’ in the sense ofdefending the legitimacy of the human-rights abuses committed hitherto byone or other protagonist (paramilitaryor state). Inclusive approaches, by theTAPs for instance, offer a better way.

It is right to insist, as PatriciaMacBride argues, that all victims—including those of state violence—deserve equal legitimacy of recognition.But, if so, it must by the same token berecognised that no ‘targets’ (police,army, paramilitary) during NorthernIreland’s years of lead were ‘legitimate’ones.

Thirdly, reconciliation is only possi-ble, as Hamber, Kulle and Wilson(2001) argued, if allied to repentanceand reparation. As Brice Dickson pointsout, the motivation of the perpetrator isof little consequence to the victim, sorationalisation is of little use. An Irishcolleague of mine, listening back in the

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70s to an English Trotskyist rehearsehow we had to distinguish in NorthernIreland ‘the violence of the oppressorfrom the violence of the oppressed’,exploded with the obvious rejoinderthat it hardly mattered whether youwere killed by ‘the oppressor’ or ‘theoppressed’: you were still dead.

In terms of repentance and repara-tion, what is required, at minimum, isacknowledgment that a wrong has beendone: selective statements of regret,whether by ‘loyalists’ in 1994 or the IRA

in 2002, while welcome, fall some wayshort. A British government apology,surely inevitable, also awaits the out-come of the long-running Saville tribu-nal into lethal shootings by the army on‘Bloody Sunday’ in Derry in January1972.

Without such fulsome acknowledg-ment, there can be no consensus onobjective human-rights standards—such as the near immutability of theright to life. And so there can be noassurance that Northern Ireland willever become ‘normal’ in the future.

Fred Halliday (1998) makes clearthat resort to violence, whether by stateor sub-state groups, is subject to twolegitimacy requirements. First is jus adbellum, the right to wage war in and ofitself, gauged against the availability ofdemocratic and legal alternatives. This,for example, the African NationalCongress enjoyed because apartheidresisted all democratic challenges. But

‘republican’, and ‘loyalist’ paramili-taries in Northern Ireland did not,given the reform programme securedby the civil-rights movement in the late60s and the introduction of direct rulefrom Westminster—a democracy, how-ever imperfect—in 1972.

Second is jus in bello—whether theuse of violence is legitimate in the con-text of international human-rights andhumanitarian norms, such as whetherit is proportionate, whether civiliansare safeguarded and whether inhumantreatment is abjured. The ANC campswhere alleged informers were tortureddid not comply with these constraintson the ‘armed struggle’; hence the ANC’sembarrassment when the TRC reportedon such abuses.

Again the actions of Irish paramili-taries were overwhelmingly illegiti-mate, particularly the huge civiliancasualties recklessly or intentionallywrought. This was less consistentlytrue of the ‘security forces’, but theblanket repression of the army in theearly days of the ‘troubles’, the use oftorture by the police in the later 70s,‘shoot-to-kill’ by both in the early-mid80s and of course the horror of BloodySunday were all clearly illegitimate.

On this basis, there can be no retro-spective justification of violence inNorthern Ireland, variously in thename of a ‘war on terror’, the ‘armedstruggle’ or ‘God and Ulster’. If anyagency or group were to succeed in such

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legitimation, it would mean we wouldbe condemned to repeat the past, asothers resorted to the same claims inthe future. Some of the ‘continuity’offered by republican fringe groupsalready has that character.

If we are to make progress, it is truethat victims must, eventually, ‘let go’ oftheir wounds, as again one of RoyMcClelland’s interlocutors says. But itis also true that those responsible fortheir victimisation must accept thatresponsibility. Dialogues between vic-tims and combatants—though only ifvoluntarily entered into on all sidesand sensitively brokered—may helpmend relationships.

Last, but not least, however is thewider responsibility of all citizens, andit is here that the comments of RoyMcClelland are most apposite. We allhave a role in reproducing therival/scapegoating syndrome he identi-fies, thereby entrenching division into‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ camps, andso the antagonism that leads to vio-lence in a context of constitutionaluncertainty. In so far as we are complic-it in that syndrome—including byblaming everything on ‘men of violence’as if they were men from Mars—we areall guilty of sins of omission.

Now, if it is wrong to wallow in theclaim that we are all victims, it isequally an illegitimate diffusion ofresponsibility to say we were all perpe-trators. But while less tangible and less

lethal than those of violent commission,these sins are no less critical in inhibit-ing Northern Ireland from taking thepath to normality. It is particularlyincumbent on those citizens from theProtestant community to recognise theweight of responsibility transmittedfrom the past by the ‘factory of griev-ances’ that was, for half a century,Unionist Northern Ireland. Far too fewprotested at the time; too few continueto admit that this was an undemocrat-ic, because monopolistic, régime.

Truth recovery is appropriate for the‘vertical’ aspects of our conflict, such asBloody Sunday. And the special natureof this atrocity, in terms of the egre-gious abrogation of human-rightsnorms by the state, should not bediminished by competitive claims forinquiries into contemporaneous para-military mayhem. But when it comes tothese more ‘horizontal’ aspects—farmore substantial in terms of the bodycount—the problem is not so much toolittle truth as too many competing‘truths’, amid a denial of responsibilityall around.

There are two, complementary, waysone could approach this dilemma. Onewould be to establish an inquisitorialbody, charged with elaborating a com-plex, coherent and comprehensive nar-rative of the ‘troubles’. Rather thanfocusing on individual cases—on whichconventional legal proceedings can andshould continue—it would chart the

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course of the conflict, assess its causesand allocate responsibility in a nuancedand evidence-based fashion. Such abody would more likely include histori-ans and social and political scientiststhan lawyers.

Much of the course of the conflict—and, in particular, its human cost—hasalready been charted in the publica-tions of the ‘Cost of the Troubles’ proj-ect, such as Fay, Morrissey and Smyth(1999), as well as other journalistic oracademic writing.

As to causes, there has for manyyears been a consensus among theintellectuals—as characterised by thelate John Whyte (1990), in his huge lit-erature survey—that the NorthernIreland conflict is primarily ‘internal’,rather than being ascribed to themalevolence of the British or Irishstates (as republicans and loyalists hadrespectively averred). Whyte added thethought experiment of imagining thateither of the latter was removed fromthe equation, asserting that the conflictwould remain largely unaffected.

Calling the conflict ‘internal’ alsorelativised the mainstream unionistand nationalist positions withinNorthern Ireland: it takes two to tan-gle, one might say, highlighting oncemore the role of ‘moderates’ in repro-ducing division. More recently, the fur-ther delegitimising adjective has beenadded, following the wars of Yugoslavsuccession, of ‘ethno-nationalist’ (Hayes

and McAllister, 1999)—again, appliedto both ‘unionist’ and ‘nationalist’ sides.

Carrying that debate into the widersociety could attenuate the unionist-nationalist antagonism, as well as dele-gitimating resort to violence, and sohelp Northern Ireland become ‘normal’.The aim would be to trump the various‘truths’ advanced in self-righteous fash-ion by political and paramilitary actorsin Northern Ireland’s notorious ‘blamegame’. No one would likely emergeblame-free but all could come to amature comprehension of the past,rather as we all have to do as we reflectas adults on our lives.

Indeed, this could be a key elementin moving Northern Ireland on to a‘grown-up’ politics. And, looking tofuture generations, such an independ-ent and authoritative version of thepast could be incorporated into therevised common curriculum in theregion’s schools, as well as contributingto the new citizenship strand.

The more accessible such a report,or reports, could be the better. And thisis where the second, more disparate,approach comes in. It is to encourage awide range of actors, particularly vic-tims, to tell their stories and—in partic-ular—to listen to the stories of others insituations of dialogue. Recording,archiving and, in turn, discussing suchnarratives would involve the progres-sive addition of unique pieces to anevolving jigsaw—never complete but

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with the overall picture becoming everclearer.

This would draw out the complexhuman dilemmas arising from a cli-mate of division, insecurity and vio-lence, helping to contextualise whysome resorted to the use of violencethemselves, as well as bringing to thefore the intense human reality of vic-timisation, obfuscated by the masculin-ist, military and paramilitary rhetoricof ‘targets’ and ‘kills’. It is a process,again, already under way (see, forexample, Smyth and Fay, 2000).

The two parts of this approach todealing with the past would cometogether in as far as the second couldprovide much raw material—in morethan one sense—for the first, and giveit a human dimension.

Any discussion of responsibility cannot be complete without addressing thespecific roles of the members ofNorthern Ireland’s political and para-military élites.

We may as well recognise that para-militaries—as collective organisations,as distinct from individual members orex-members—will never fully embracethat responsibility, in any arena. Theday they did would be the day they dis-banded, leaving their members in apsychological state rather like manyveterans of unreconstructed EuropeanCommunist parties after the SovietUnion collapsed—traumatised by theimplication that their lives had been

devoted to an ignoble cause. Indeed, it is critically important that

Northern Ireland’s ‘troubles’ are notallowed to be redefined in hindsightfrom their searing inhuman and sectar-ian reality into a legitimate ‘armedstruggle’ (from whatever factionalstandpoint), reducing the victims to‘collateral damage’. The truth thatmust prevail is one moored in interna-tional human-rights and humanitariannorms, the only truth that does justiceto the victims.

And that puts the spotlight on topolitical leadership.

Politics, said Max Weber, is a voca-tion. And it has to be part of the callingof politicians in divided societies to actresponsibly, to moderate identities andto point the way to a more conciliatoryfuture. The small non-communal par-ties in Northern Ireland excepted, it ishard to say that any of the leaders ofthe main ethnic groupings have consis-tently covered themselves in glory inthis regard. Indeed, some of the mostvisceral debates in the assembly havehad victims as their (notional) subject.

Political leaders could begin torepent, including on our behalf, byagreeing to participate in a non-parti-san day of reflection. By demonstratinga commitment to a common memorial-ising of the past, not only they, but alsoall the victims of Northern Ireland’s‘troubles’, could hope that, finally, apage had been turned. DD

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References

Bloomfield, Kenneth (1998), We WillRemember Them, Belfast: NorthernIreland Office

Fay, Marie-Therese, Mike Morrissey andMarie Smyth (1999), Northern Ireland’sTroubles: The Human Costs, London:Pluto Press

Halliday, Fred (1998), Irish Nationalismsin Perspective, Belfast: DemocraticDialogue

Hamber, Brandon (2002), ‘Rights and rea-sons: challenges for truth recovery inSouth Africa and Northern Ireland’,unpublished paper

Hamber, Brandon, Dorte Kulle and RobinWilson (eds) (2001), Future Politics forthe Past, Belfast: Democratic Dialogue

Hayes, Bernadette and Ian McAllister(1999), ‘Ethnonationalism, public opin-ion and the Good Friday Agreement’, inRuane, Joseph and Jennifer Todd (eds),After the Good Friday Agreement:Analysing Political Change in NorthernIreland, Dublin: UCD Press

Hayner, Priscilla (2001), UnspeakableTruths: Confronting State terror andatrocity, New York: Routledge

Healing Through Remembering (2002), TheReport of the Healing ThroughRemembering Project, available fromUnit 4, River’s Edge, 15 Ravenhill Road,Belfast BT6 8DN or at http://www.heal-ingthroughremembering.org

Morrissey, Michael and Marie Smyth(2002), Northern Ireland After the GoodFriday Agreement, London: Pluto Press

Office of the First Minister and DeputyFirst Minister (2003), A Shared Future:A Consultation Paper on ImprovingRelations in Northern Ireland, Belfast:OFMDFM

Smyth, Marie and Marie-Therese Fay(2000), Personal Accounts from NorthernIreland’s Troubles: Public Conflict,Private Loss, London: Pluto Press

Whyte, Nicholas (1990), InterpretingNorthern Ireland, Oxford: ClarendonPress

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Contributors

Fergus Devitt

Fergus Devitt was at the time of the round table head of the Victims Unit in theOffice of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and had been so since theunit was established in July 2000. Before joining the civil service he worked in man-agement in the private sector and within the civil service he has worked in a varietyof departments and agencies. He has an honours degree in business and economicsand a masters in business administration. He has now moved to a new post withinthe OFMDFM dealing with public-private partnerships.

Brice Dickson

A graduate of the University of Oxford and the University of Ulster, Brice Dicksonwas the first professor of law to be appointed at the University of Ulster, in 1991. Heis on secondment from that post for a six-year period while he serves full-time as thefirst chief commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, whichwas created in 1999. He was called to the Northern Ireland Bar in 1976 and was for-merly a lecturer in law at Queen’s University Belfast. He has published widely onaspects of Northern Ireland’s law, European human-rights law and comparative law.He was a member and, for two years, deputy chair, of the Equal OpportunitiesCommission of Northern Ireland (1990-96) and a member of the Law ReformAdvisory Committee (1997-2000). He was a Churchill fellow on bills of rights inSouthern Africa in 1994.

Brandon Hamber

Brandon Hamber was born in South Africa and currently works in Belfast, where heis a research associate of Democratic Dialogue. He is a clinical psychologist bytraining and was an honorary fellow in the School of Psychology at Queen’sUniversity Belfast in 2001-02. Before moving to Northern Ireland, he co-ordinated

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the transition and reconciliation unit at the Centre for the Study of Violence andReconciliation, where he remains an associate. He is is a board member of the SouthAfrican-based Khulumani victims support group. He works mainly in the area ofviolence and trauma, and co-ordinated the centre’s project focusing on the Truth andReconciliation Commission. He was a visiting Tip O’Neill fellow in peace studies atthe Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) in Northern Ireland in1997-98. Previously he was the recipient of the Rockefeller resident fellowship(1996) and was a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Violence in Sao Paulo,Brazil. He has written widely on the South African Truth and ReconciliationCommission, the psychological implications of political violence, and the process oftransition and reconciliation in South Africa and abroad. Recently he edited thebook entitled Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland andSocieties in Transition, which was published by INCORE /University of Ulster.

Martin Murphy

Martin Murphy is service manager of NOVA. He has managed this project since itwas set up in 1998 as a response by Barnardos, Craigavon & Banbridge Health andSocial Services Trust and the Southern Health and Social Services Board to addressthe needs of those psychologically traumatised by the ‘troubles’. It provides indvid-ual and family counselling, as well as psycho-education and skills training for vic-tims and community groups. Aa psychology graduate, Martin later qualified as asocial worker and has worked in a number of settings in England and NorthernIreland over the last 16 years, including mental health and physical and learningdisabilities. Last year, he was made a fellow of the Human Givens Institute, a train-ing organisation that promotes cognitive-behavioural approaches in therapy and, inparticular, Ericksonian brief therapy.

Alan McBride

Alan McBride is a youth worker with the WAVE Trauma Centre. He is also a victims’representative on the Civic Forum. Currently, he is serving as a member on theboard of the Healing Through Remembering initiative.

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Patricia McBride

Patricia MacBride is one of the two victims’ representatives on the Civic Forum. Sheworks for the Bloody Sunday Trust in Derry, where she is responsible for the devel-opment of the Bogside History Centre, a community museum chronicling the recenthistory of the city of Derry and its role in the conflict. She is active in several com-munity organisations, including the Local Strategy Partnership for the area, theBogside and Brandywell Initiative, is a governor of her local school and an advocateof Irish-medium education. She began working on victims issues after attending con-ferences and meetings organised by Relatives for Justice.

Roy McClelland

Professor Roy McClelland of the Department of Mental Health at Queen’sUniversity Belfast is assistant head of the School of Medicine there. He is also aconsultant psychiatrist at Belfast City Hospital Trust. He is chairman of the IrishAssociation of Suicidology and a trustee for the Northern Ireland Centre for Traumaand Transformation.

Mary O’Rawe

Mary O’Rawe graduated with a first class honours degree in English and FrenchLaw from the University of Kent at Canterbury in 1990. She holds an LLM in humanrights, emergency law and discrimination from Queen’s University, Belfast and prac-tised as a barrister from 1991 to 2000. Currently in the Transitional JusticeInstitute of the University of Ulster at Jordanstown, her research interests lie inhuman rights, criminal justice and policing. Her publications include (with Dr LindaMoore) Human Rights on Duty: Principles for Better Policing—International Lessonsfor Northern Ireland (CAJ, Belfast 1997); ‘Accountability and police complaints inNorthern Ireland: leaving the past behind?’ in Goldsmith A and C Lewis (eds),Civilian Oversight of Policing: Governance, Democracy and Human Rights, (HartPublishing, 2000); ‘A new beginning for policing in Northern Ireland?’ in Harvey, C(ed), Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland, (HartPublishing, 2001). Mary has also spent time in South Africa and researched issuesin relation to the right to truth, the place of amnesty in international law and the

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role of truth commissions.

Robin Wilson

Robin Wilson has been the director of Democratic Dialogue since its inception in1995. With Prof Rick Wilford, he is joint leader of a research team in NorthernIreland monitoring the outworking of devolution, part of a UK-wide project co-ordi-nated by the Constitution Unit, of which they are honorary senior research fellows.Previously, he was for eight years editor of the current-affairs magazine Fortnight.He is a member of the advisory council of the Dublin-based think tank TASC, of theboard of the Institute of Governance at Queen’s University and of the NorthernIreland Community Relations Council. He is currently an adviser to the Council ofEurope programme on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue.

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Appendix 1

Extracts from the BelfastAgreement

(Rights, Safeguards and Equalityof Opportunity)

Reconciliation and Victims ofViolence

11. The participants believe that it isessential to acknowledge and addressthe suffering of the victims of violenceas a necessary element of reconcilia-tion. They look forward to the results ofthe work of the Northern IrelandVictims Commission.

12. It is recognised that victims have aright to remember as well as to con-tribute to a changed society. Theachievement of a peaceful and just soci-ety would be the true memorial to thevictims of violence. The participantsparticularly recognise that young peo-ple from areas affected by the troublesface particular difficulties and will sup-port the development of special commu-nity-based initiatives based oninternational best practice. The provi-sion of services that are supportive andsensitive to the needs of victims willalso be a critical element and that sup-port will need to be channelled through

both statutory and community-basedvoluntary organisations facilitatinglocally-based self-help and support net-works. This will require the allocationof sufficient resources, including statu-tory funding as necessary, to meet theneeds of victims and to provide for com-munity-based support programmes.

13. The participants recognise andvalue the work being done by manyorganisations to develop reconciliationand mutual understanding and respectbetween and within communities andtraditions, in Northern Ireland andbetween North and South, and they seesuch work as having a vital role in con-solidating peace and political agree-ment. Accordingly, they pledge theircontinuing support to such organisa-tions and will positively examine thecase for enhanced financial assistancefor the work of reconciliation. An essen-tial aspect of the reconciliation processis the promotion of a culture oftolerance at every level of society,including initiatives to facilitate andencourage integrated education andmixed housing.

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Appendix 2

Sections 68-70 of the Justice(Northern Ireland) Act 2002

Victims of crime

68 Information about dischargeand temporary release of prisoners

(1) The Secretary of State must make avictim information scheme and mayfrom time to time make a new schemeor alterations to a scheme.

(2) A victim information scheme is ascheme requiring the Secretary of Stateto make available information aboutthe discharge or temporary release ofpersons serving sentences of imprison-ment in Northern Ireland imposed inrespect of the commission of offences(‘imprisoned offenders’) to victims ofthe offences who wish to receive it.

(3) A scheme—

(a) must require that informationas to the month in which it is antic-ipated that an imprisoned offenderwill be discharged is to be madeavailable under the scheme, and(b) must require that, unless it isnot reasonably practicable to do so,the fact that the temporary release

of an imprisoned offender is beingconsidered is to be made availableunder the scheme.

(4) A scheme may require that otherinformation relating to the dischargeand temporary release of imprisonedoffenders is to be made available underthe scheme including, in cases of adescription specified by the scheme orin which the Secretary of State consid-ers it appropriate, the date on which itis anticipated that an imprisonedoffender will be discharged or tem-porarily released.

(5) A scheme may provide that in cir-cumstances of a description specified inthe scheme, or in particular circum-stances in which the Secretary of Stateconsiders it appropriate, a person whois not the actual victim of the offencebut was directly affected by it is to beregarded for the purposes of the schemeas a victim of the offence (as well as anyactual victim).

(6) A scheme may provide that in cir-cumstances of a description specified inthe scheme, or in particular circum-stances in which the Secretary of Stateconsiders it appropriate, a person otherthan the actual victim of an offence is tobe regarded for the purposes of thescheme as a victim of the offence(instead of an actual victim).

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(7) A scheme must specify how victimsare to indicate that they wish to receiveinformation under the scheme.

(8) The Secretary of State is notrequired to make information availableunder a scheme—

(a) if he believes that to do so wouldadversely affect the well-being ofthe actual victim of an offence or aperson who is regarded for the pur-poses of the scheme as being a vic-tim of an offence by virtue ofsubsection (5),(b) if he believes that to do so wouldthreaten the safety of any person,or(c) in other circumstances specifiedby the scheme.

(9) A scheme may make different provi-sion in relation to—

(a) different descriptions of impris-oned offenders, or(b) imprisoned offenders convictedor sentenced at different times.

(10) ‘Discharge’ includes release—

(a) on licence, or(b) in pursuance of a grant of remis-sion, (whether or not subject to con-ditions); and ‘discharged’ is to beconstrued accordingly.

69 Views on temporary release

(1) If a person who is the victim of anoffence for the purposes of a schemeunder section 68 makes to theSecretary of State representationsfalling within subsection (2) theSecretary of State has the obligationsspecified in subsection (3).

(2) Representations fall within this sub-section if they are to the effect that thetemporary release of a person serving asentence of imprisonment in NorthernIreland imposed in respect of the com-mission of the offence would threatenthe safety, or otherwise adversely affectthe well-being, of—

(a) the actual victim of the offence,or(b) a person who is regarded for thepurposes of the scheme as a victimof the offence by virtue of section68(5).

(3) The Secretary of State must—

(a) have regard to the representa-tions in deciding whether the per-son should be temporarily releasedand, if so, any conditions to whichhe is to be subject, and(b) inform the victim of any suchdecision.

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70 Supplementary

(1) In sections 68 and 69 references to aperson serving a sentence of imprison-ment include a person aged 18 or overwho is—

(a) detained pursuant to directionsof the Secretary of State underArticle 45 of the Criminal Justice(Children) (Northern Ireland)Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1504 (N.I. 9)),or(b) detained in a young offenderscentre as the result of an order ofthe Crown Court.

(2) In sections 68 and 69 references to aperson serving a sentence of imprison-ment in Northern Ireland—

(a) include a person who, in conse-quence of a restricted transfer fromNorthern Ireland, is serving part ofa sentence of imprisonment inanother part of the UnitedKingdom, but(b) do not include a person who, inconsequence of a restricted transferfrom another part of the UnitedKingdom, is serving part of a sen-tence of imprisonment in NorthernIreland.

(3) ‘Restricted transfer’ has the samemeaning as in Part 2 of Schedule 1 tothe Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c. 43).

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Appendix 3

Declaration of Basic Principles ofJustice for Victims of Crime and

Abuse of Power

Adopted by General AssemblyResolution 40/34 of 29 November

1985

A. Victims of Crime

1. ‘Victims’ means persons who, individ-ually or collectively, have sufferedharm, including physical or mentalinjury, emotional suffering, economicloss or substantial impairment of theirfundamental rights, through acts oromissions that are in violation of crimi-nal laws operative within MemberStates, including those laws proscrib-ing criminal abuse of power.

2. A person may be considered a victim,under this Declaration, regardless ofwhether the perpetrator is identified,apprehended, prosecuted or convictedand regardless of the familial relation-ship between the perpetrator and thevictim. The term ‘victim’ also includes,where appropriate, the immediate fam-ily or dependants of the direct victim

and persons who have suffered harm inintervening to assist victims in distressor to prevent victimization.

3. The provisions contained hereinshall be applicable to all, without dis-tinction of any kind, such as race,colour, sex, age, language, religion,nationality, political or other opinion,cultural beliefs or practices, property,birth or family status, ethnic or socialorigin, and disability.

Access to justice and fair treatment

4. Victims should be treated with com-passion and respect for their dignity.They are entitled to access to the mech-anisms of justice and to promptredress, as provided for by national leg-islation, for the harm that they havesuffered.

5. Judicial and administrative mecha-nisms should be established andstrengthened where necessary toenable victims to obtain redressthrough formal or informal proceduresthat are expeditious, fair, inexpensiveand accessible. Victims should beinformed of their rights in seekingredress through such mechanisms.

6. The responsiveness of judicial andadministrative processes to the needsof victims should be facilitated by:

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(a) Informing victims of their roleand the scope, timing and progress ofthe proceedings and of the disposi-tion of their cases, especially whereserious crimes are involved andwhere they have requested suchinformation;

(b) Allowing the views and concernsof victims to be presented and consid-ered at appropriate stages of the pro-ceedings where their personalinterests are affected, without preju-dice to the accused and consistentwith the relevant national criminaljustice system;

(c) Providing proper assistance tovictims throughout the legal process;

(d) Taking measures to minimizeinconvenience to victims, protecttheir privacy, when necessary, andensure their safety, as well as that oftheir families and witnesses on theirbehalf, from intimidation and retali-ation;

(e) Avoiding unnecessary delay in thedisposition of cases and the execu-tion of orders or decrees grantingawards to victims.

7. Informal mechanisms for the resolu-tion of disputes, including mediation,arbitration and customary justice orindigenous practices, should be utilized

where appropriate to facilitate concilia-tion and redress for victims.

8. Offenders or third parties responsi-ble for their behaviour should, whereappropriate, make fair restitution tovictims, their families or dependants.Such restitution should include thereturn of property or payment for theharm or loss suffered, reimbursementof expenses incurred as a result of thevictimization, the provision of servicesand the restoration of rights.

9. Governments should review theirpractices, regulations and laws to con-sider restitution as an available sen-tencing option in criminal cases, inaddition to other criminal sanctions.

10. In cases of substantial harm to theenvironment, restitution, if ordered,should include, as far as possible,restoration of the environment, recon-struction of the infrastructure, replace-ment of community facilities andreimbursement of the expenses of relo-cation, whenever such harm results inthe dislocation of a community.

11. Where public officials or otheragents acting in an official or quasi-offi-cial capacity have violated nationalcriminal laws, the victims shouldreceive restitution from the Statewhose officials or agents were responsi-ble for the harm inflicted. In cases

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where the Government under whoseauthority the victimizing act or omis-sion occurred is no longer in existence,the State or Government successor intitle should provide restitution to thevictims.

Compensation

12. When compensation is not fullyavailable from the offender or othersources, States should endeavour toprovide financial compensation to:

(a) Victims who have sustained sig-nificant bodily injury or impairmentof physical or mental health as aresult of serious crimes;

(b) The family, in particular depen-dants of persons who have died orbecome physically or mentally inca-pacitated as a result of such victim-ization.

13. The establishment, strengtheningand expansion of national funds forcompensation to victims should beencouraged. Where appropriate, otherfunds may also be established for thispurpose, including in those cases wherethe State of which the victim is anational is not in a position to compen-sate the victim for the harm.

Assistance

14. Victims should receive the neces-sary material, medical, psychologicaland social assistance through govern-mental, voluntary, community-basedand indigenous means.

15. Victims should be informed of theavailability of health and social servic-es and other relevant assistance and bereadily afforded access to them.

16. Police, justice, health, social serviceand other personnel concerned shouldreceive training to sensitize them to theneeds of victims, and guidelines toensure proper and prompt aid.

17. In providing services and assistanceto victims, attention should be given tothose who have special needs becauseof the nature of the harm inflicted orbecause of factors such as those men-tioned in paragraph 3 above.

B. Victims of Abuse of Power

18. ‘Victims’ means persons who, indi-vidually or collectively, have sufferedharm, including physical or mentalinjury, emotional suffering, economicloss or substantial impairment of theirfundamental rights, through acts oromissions that do not yet constitute

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violations of national criminal laws butof internationally recognized normsrelating to human rights.

19. States should consider incorporat-ing into the national law norms pro-scribing abuses of power and providingremedies to victims of such abuses. Inparticular, such remedies shouldinclude restitution and/or compensa-tion, and necessary material, medical,psychological and social assistance andsupport.

20. States should consider negotiatingmultilateral international treatiesrelating to victims, as defined in para-graph 18.

21. States should periodically reviewexisting legislation and practices toensure their responsiveness to chang-ing circumstances, should enact andenforce, if necessary, legislation pro-scribing acts that constitute seriousabuses of political or economic power,as well as promoting policies and mech-anisms for the prevention of such acts,and should develop and make readilyavailable appropriate rights and reme-dies for victims of such acts.

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Appendix 4

Clause 8 from the Human RightsCommission’s proposed Bill of

Rights, (September 2001)

(a) Victims of the conflict

1. With a view to promoting the princi-ples of truth and reconciliation in theaftermath of a lengthy period of con-flict, the Government shall take legisla-tive and other measures to ensure thatthe loss and suffering of all victims ofthat conflict and the responsibility ofState and non-State participants areappropriately and independently estab-lished and/or acknowledged.

2. All victims of the conflict have theright to the highest possible level ofsocial care and support in accordancewith their needs, particularly in respectof personal security and access tohealth care, income support, employ-ment, training and education and forthose purposes to be protected from anyunfair or discriminatory treatment.

(b) The rights of victims for thefuture

1. ‘Victims’ means persons who,

individually or collectively, have suf-fered harm, including physical or men-tal injury, emotional suffering,economic loss or substantial impair-ment of their fundamental rights,through acts or omissions that are inviolation of criminal laws. A personmay be considered a victim regardlessof whether the perpetrator is appre-hended, prosecuted or convicted andregardless of the familial relationshipbetween the perpetrator and the vic-tim. The term also includes, whereappropriate, their family, their depen-dants, those with whom they have aclose relationship and persons whohave suffered harm in intervening toassist victims in distress or to preventvictimisation.

2. Legislation shall be introduced togive effect to the following rights:

(a) the right of every victim to betreated with compassion and respectfor his or her dignity.

(b) the right of every victim to obtainredress by way of restitution or com-pensation through formal or infor-mal procedures that are expeditious,fair, inexpensive and accessible.

(c) the right of every victim tohave the crime in question investi-gated thoroughly, promptly andimpartially.

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(d) the right of every victim to beinformed of the progress of anyrelevant investigation and to havehis or her concerns taken intoaccount in the conduct of any rele-vant legal proceedings.

(e) the right of every victim to rea-sonable assistance during the trial ofany person charged in connectionwith the crime in question.

(c) Violence against women

1. The State shall take all appropriatemeasures to prevent and eliminate allforms of violence against women andgirls whether physical, mental or emo-tional.