Recasting Child Protection following Munro

Patrick Ayre

Department of Applied Social Studies

University of Bedfordshire

Park Square, Luton

email: pga@patrickayre.co.uk

web: http://patrickayre.co.uk

The background

Widespread and persistent concern over standards

Far reaching reforms Little evidence of improvement, in

England at least

Key themes

Failure to learn from experience Lack of effective engagement with

research Process and procedures prioritised over

outcomes and objectives

Key themes

Targets and indicators prioritised over values and professional standards

Compliance and completion prioritised over analysis and reflection

The proceduralisation, technicalisation and deprofessionalisation of the social work task.

Munro and the Mission Statement Fallacy

In the ‘mission statement fallacy’, it is

assumed that if one asserts an objective

with which all relevant stakeholders agree

strongly in principle, this objective will be

realised in practice.

How did we get where we are now? Deprofessionalisation Part of a wider trend Managerialism, McDonaldisation and

the audit culture Management by external objectives Professionals not to be trusted

How did we get to where we are now?

Research

Legal and adversarial context of child protection

Child abuse scandals

Scandals

Public pillorying

Public enquiry with many recommendations

Law and guidance from the government

Climatic conditions

Climate of fear

Climate of mistrust

Climate of blame

Responsible journalism at its best“Today The Sun has demanded justice for Baby P — and vows not to rest until those disgracefully ducking blame for failing the tot are SACKED”

“The fact that Baby P was allowed to die despite 60 visits from Haringey Social Services is a national disgrace.

I believe that ALL the social workers involved in the case of Baby P should be sacked - and never allowed to work with vulnerable children again.

I call on Beverley Hughes, the Children's Minister, and Ed Balls, the Education Secretary, to ensure that those responsible are removed from their positions immediately”.

(The Sun, 13 November 2008)

Climatic conditions

Climate of fear

Climate of mistrust

Climate of blame

Climate of mistrust

‘Child stealers’ who ‘seize sleeping children in the middle of the night’; ‘abusers of authority, hysterical and malignant’, ‘motivated by zealotry rather than facts’ or ‘like the SAS in cardigans and Hush Puppies’.

On the other hand, they are ‘naïve, bungling, easily fobbed off’, ‘incompetent, indecisive and reluctant to intervene’ and ‘too trusting with too liberal a professional outlook’.

Climate of mistrust

The safeguarding worker who took a child away

from its parents

The safeguarding worker who failed to take a child

away from its parents

Climatic conditions

Climate of fear

Climate of mistrust

Climate of blame

Trusting procedures

Procedural proliferation

Blaming and training

The myth of predictability

Blaming and training

Causes of accidents can be traced to ‘latent failures and organizational errors arising in the upper echelons of the system in question Accident sequences begin with problems arising in management processes such as planning, specifying, communicating, regulating and developing.

Latent failures created by these organisational errors are ‘transmitted along various organizational and departmental pathways to the workplace where they create the local conditions that promote the commission of errors and violations (e.g. high workload, deficient tools and equipment, time pressure, fatigue, low morale, conflicts between organizational and group norms and the like’ (Reason, 1995 p.1710). In this analysis, ‘people at the sharp end are seen as the inheritors rather than the instigators of an accident sequence’ (Reason, 1995 p.1711).

Procedures as a net to catch problems

Procedures as a net to catch problems

Procedures as a net to catch problems

Procedures as a net to catch problems

But what are the principles:

Child centred system

Family usually the best place for a child but…

Importance of relationships

Early help is better for children

Variety of available response

Evidence based practice

Uncertainty and risk are inevitable: risk sensible, not risk averse

What we should measure is whether children are receiving effective help

KPIs: Ministers and managers

Outcomes hard to measure, process easy

Easy to obtain, easy to digest (but what do they tell us?)

Quality = KPI scores

False sense of security

Distort resource allocation

?A third of the mix

KPIs: On the front line

Learn by doing

What is important in what I do?

What is good practice?

Supervision: qualitative or quantitative?

Redesigning the system

We need:Clear understanding of the capabilities required by staff,operational structure and systems which enable direct work and values continuity of worker Robust selection process Clear view on what local regulation is absolutely necessary

Redesigning the system

Sufficient professional development activity for the necessary skills set

Frequent case consultations to explore and reflect on direct work and plans

Frequent case supervision for to reflect on service effectiveness and case decision-making

Managers to observe practitioners’ direct work with children and families

Redesigning the system

Teaching culture, where all managers involved in case consultation, direct work with children and families and teaching theory and practice

Learning culture which results in the organisation knowing its service and making adjustments to facilitate its effectiveness

To listen to children families and frontline staff

The basic questions

What are most important challenges facing Middlesbrough in reshaping its services in the light of Munro?

What are the greatest obstacles which lie in the way of progress?

What are the greatest strengths we have in meeting these challenges?

How much progress have we made so far?