reasons for athenian contribution greater than spartan

8/2/2019 Reasons for Athenian Contribution Greater Than Spartan

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490 Marathon-definitely the Athenians. The Spartans were

delayed by an important religious festival (the Carneia) which

they had to observe as they were very pious re the gods.

They turned up 2-3 days later, but missed all the action!!

The inter-war years: The Athenians were much more active

in preparing for a second, and what was, they believed, aninevitably greater invasion. Themistocles was especially

instrumental in warning the Athenians and other Greek states

about this, even sending to the Delphic Oracle for a

prediction. The Spartans were more concerned about

defending the Peloponnese and their own alliance system and

planned to build a wall across the Isthmus at Corinth. The

Athenians pushed for a pan-Hellenic congress to discuss the

defence of Greece which resulted in 480 at the Isthmus and

resulted in the formation of The Greek League/Hellenic

League.

The following is worth considering:

"Although the Greek states of the mainland admired Athensfor her victory at Marathon, they looked for leadership not

to her but to Sparta. Athens had no following and her

neighbours were hostile. Spartra was the head of a great

Alliance: among her followers she counted the neighbours

of Athens-Megara, Aegina and Thebes-and she had a

practical and probably a formal alliance with Athens herself.

Her influence was thus paramount among the Greek states.



At the same time her prestige as a military power and as

leader of a military Alliance stood very high since the

crushing

defeat of Argos at Sepeia.....The whole problem of anyorganised resistance to the Persians herefore centred on

Sparta." (N.G.L. Hammond "A History of Greece to 322 B.C."

(P. 223)

Athens (sea) and Sparta (land) were made joint commanders

of the Greek forces, but Sparta was hegemon (supremecommander)

The first naval battle, at Artemisium, was commanded by the

Spartan Eurybiades who had no knowledge or experience of

naval warfare. It seems likely that Themistocles really called

the shots. A storm and lots of confusion did not result in a

clear victory

At Thermopylae, the Spartans under Leonidas and a smallcontingent of mixed local Greek states held up the Persian

advance for 3 days, but were annihilated. This did give some

time

however, to the Athenians to evacuate their city and

surrounding areas, so the sacrifice was a significant

achievement.

The turning point was Salamis, tactically the brainchild of

Themistocles and the Athenian naval commanders. The large

Ath. navy (some 200 triremes) was supplemented by

contingents from other allied states from the mainland and

the islands and Asia Minor. It turned the Persian advance

back to central Greece. The Spartans and their Peloponnesian



allies were massed at the isthmus to defend the narrow land

bridge into the Peloponnese.

The final land battle at Plataea was between the remnants of the Persian army (still overwhelmingly large) and a combined

hoplite force of Greek allies. Some states did not show up.

Athens did not distinguish itself in this battle as their generals

quarreled with the Spartans, led by Pausanias, and did not

co-operate in the lead-up and early stages of the battle. Their

conduct came close to jeopardising the overwhelmingsuccess of the battle. The Spartans were outstanding and

showed why they were the leading military power in Greece.

This victory drove the Persians from Greece.

The final encounter at Mycale, off the coast of Asia Minor

where the Greek navy, predominantly Athenian and Ath. led

routed the Persians and drove them away from the Ioniancities. The spartans did not participate as immediately after

Plataea, they returned to the Peloponnese to secure

consolidate their leadership leadership there.

I think one could conclude that both Athenians and Spartans

played important roles in different ways in different battles.The more intangible things to consider would be:

*Willingness to defend Greece

*ability to see the bigger picture and put the defence of all

of Greece before the interests of a particular polis or

region

*willingness to put differences and animosities aside for the

greater good



*willingness to co-operate and consult

*initiative in foreseeing future dangers and preparing for it

etc...etc...

Hope this is helpful to you.

Books worth consulting if you can access them:

*Hammond, as quoted qbove.

*W.G. Forrest, "A History of Sparta"

*V. Ehrenberg, "From Solon to Socrates"

*Herodotus, "The Histories"*P. Bradley, "Ancient Greece; Using Evidence" (common text)

*A.R. Burn, "Persia and the Greeks"

*P. Cartledge, "The Spartans; An Epic History" (very recent

excellent text, great info on the Persian Wars.)

reasons for athenian contribution greater than spartan

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