reality, symbols: society: on baudrillard's simulacra and simulation

8/7/2019 Reality, Symbols: Society: On Baudrillard's Simulacra and Simulation

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Brian Clarkston

Professor Graves

Philosophy 340

26 October 2009

Reality, Symbols: Society: On Baudrillard's Simulacra and Simulation

In the modern era, some in society have begun to question not only the nature of what is

real, but whether or not the objects of human experience are in fact real, that possibly the totality

of our experience may at some point be found to consist of illusion. Certainly, an individual may

often be of the opinion that a larger world, and increased population, serve to increase the

collective while simultaneously decreasing that available to the individual self. It has been said

that the media of late, The Matrix in particular, has led to the belief that our world is but a

simulation. An analysis of Borges and Baudrillard gives credence to this view, both arguing for a

simulated world, and postulating the reasons why. It is my view, however, after experience with

the literature, that though our world is not necessarily one of illusion, the process by which our

world ceased to be pure, unaltered reality is the technology itself that shapes our reality.

Although the concept of a simulated world that will be discussed here had mainly been

the work of Jean Baudrillard, it is first necessary to discuss the prior events which led to his

controversial theory of ontology and metaphysics. Separate from computer simulation, the idea

of a wholly simulated world can be traced back to Alfred Korzybski, a Polish American

philosopher scientist who in 1931 introduced this notion during a lecture at a mathematical


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conference in New Orleans. His view essentially was that the representation of an object is not

the same ontological element as the object itself. His argument, though far less rigorous than

many in metaphysics, is as follows:

A) A map may have structure similar or dissimilar to the original territory.

B) A map is not the territory. (Korzybski)

Korzybski's argument, after first glance appears to be valid; an object (X) cannot logically

be simultaneously in possession of qualities (A) and not (A). Notice that Korzybski's argument is

not strictly confined to paper maps, for in this instance the map of the territory refers to

conceivable representations of the territory. Nonetheless, a paper map exhibits properties similar

to the territory in depicting topology, landmarks, rivers, etc., all the while being dissimilar in

terms of composition. Invariably, other representations exist of the territory, be it in the memory

of a computer or a mind, though in any case, despite any degree of similarity, the representation

is not equivalent to that represented. Since that particular lecture, Korzybski's argument has

come to be known as the map is not the territory argument, one which would be later seized

upon by the likes of Borges and Baudrillard to explain the nature of our world.

In the last half century, the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges has come to be seen as a

figurehead in the Surrealist movement. Focusing on the language itself of fiction, he took notice

of the ideas put forth by Korzybski on simulated reality. In time, his contributions to the subject

would some to be seen as more additive than those originally put forth. Using the extrinsic worth

of simulation, Borges suggested:


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In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographer's Guild

drew a map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, coinciding point for point

with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography

saw the vast Map to be useless and permitted it to decay and fray under the Sun and

winters. (Borges)

It can be seen that, rather than defining simulation only in the present, as done by

Korzybski, that Borges uses his literary wit to tell the process by which the simulated comes to

dominate the real. Of course, such empires and maps are but plot devices, but are well executed

as to evince that out world only becomes illusory depending on the values placed upon

representation by a society.

It is tempting to assume that the embrace of representation can be compared to Marx's

opiate of the masses. However, this view would place the blame of delusion upon the

representations themselves, neglecting the valid argument, as later evinced by Baudrillard, that is

society and technology that are at fault for this described loss of reality.

Curiously, the largest contributor to this particular interpretation of existence was not a

philosopher but rather a self described cultural theorist. Though having academic origins in

translating literature at Sorbonne, the French literary critic Jean Baudrillard was quickly attracted

to the Postmodern notions he worked to translate, including Peter Weiss, Bertold Brech, and

Wilhelm Muhlmann (Turner 1). His studies soon after shifted from literature to sociology. After

studying the work of Borges, Baudrillard began to formulate his on views on the matter of

representation, culminating in his opus magnus Simulacra and Simulation:

Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept.


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Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or substance. It is the

generation of models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no

longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes

the territory precession of simulacra that engenders the territory. (Simulacra 1)

Rather than simply arguing for the existence of Borges' representation, Baudrillard

instead asserts that not only is the mental world one of simulation, but one of simulacrum a

hyperreal subjective simulation without being a representation of a real world object. In this

sense, Baudrillard argues that representation has been surpassed by simulation, in that the end

products are no longer representative of existing entities but have become entities in and of

themselves, and that the representative had come to precede the represented, that rather than the

subjective mimicking the objective, that the objective has come to mimic the subjective. While

the map and the mirror reflect external reality, something to which hyperreals are intrinsically

independent of.

The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth it is the truth which conceals

that there is none. (Simulacra 4)

According to Baudrillard, at some point in the distant past, human experience once

concerned the real, though of late the real has come to be superseded by the representative.

However, because of the hyperreal, not even this is the case anymore. In semiotics and

postmodern philosophy, hyperreality has come to represent the 'inability of consciousness to

distinguish between reality and fantasy, especially in technologically advanced postmodern

cultures.' (Hyperreality def. 1). At first glance, the existence of the hyperreal may be interpreted

by some as invalidating any guiltiness that our species may have for allowing the subjective


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world to become this Surrealist one of representation, though Baudrillard later explains that this

is not the case.

Concerning hyperreality, it evident that its effects are not ubiquitous, in that there exist

those persons who resist, doubt, or otherwise ignore the substitution of the real with the

simulated. Invariably, those naturally operating under a guise of skepticism or empirical rigor

would be either oblivious or immune to the hyperreal. In addition, those not belonging to

sufficiently technologically advanced Western civilizations would not only be unaffected by

hyperreals, but likely unaware of their existence or effects. Granted, one may argue that tribal

deities may be examples of hyperreals, though this is not necessarily the case, as proposed deities

concerning natural affairs are not so much simulated as representative of natural affairs, thus

being outside the scope of Baudrillard's simulacra. Others may be less resistant to hyperreals, for

instance those in modern societies who inevitably mistake fictional entities as real, or those who

respect symbols as entities in and of themselves.

These notions may be found by some to be predominately concerning social psychology,

so it is necessary to illustrate how the use of symbols by society constitutes a scenario with a

metaphysical nature. The polemic attitude of operational ambivalence towards simulation as

argued by Baudrillard is a worthwhile metaphysical examination in that although it focuses not

on realis qua realis, reality in the character of itself, but rather in a sense, realis qua hominem, the

nature of humanity in the character of reality. This however is not to suggest subjective

materialism a la Berkeley's esse est percipi, for though Baudrillard's simulacra deals with


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existence that is not independent of human mind, it by no means postulates that what exists is

only that which is perceived. Simulacra and Simulation merely analyzes the nature of the

relationship between society, mind, experience, and reality. Indeed, Douglas Kellner argues that

Baudrillard seems to be taking theory into the realm of metaphysics, but it is a specific

type of metaphysics deeply inspired by the pataphysics developed by Alfred Jarry in

What is Pataphysics as the science of the realm beyond metaphysics.... It will study

the laws which govern exceptions and will explain the universe supplementary to this

one; or, less ambitiously, it will describe a universe which one can see must see

perhaps instead of the traditional one....

Upon a closer examination of Baudrillard's work, I was reminded of Nietzche's work in

ethics on the transvaluation of values: rather than Nietzche's ethical counterparts, Baudrillard's

metaphysics is arrived at by documentation and analysis of the modes of action present, which

will be summarized after an observation of the extent of representation.

At this point, Borges and Baudrillard have argued for the existence of simulation, but

have not yet argued for its extent. An 'ad infinitum' approach can best be described by Bateson:

We say that the map is difference from the territory, but what is the territory.

Operationally, somebody went out with a retina or a measuring stick and made

representations which were then put on paper. What is on the paper map is a

representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map,

and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series

of maps. Always, the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is

a series of maps, ad infinitum. (Bateson)

Observe any office worker and note the extent to which they might take the modern

xerographic process for granted: not even a century ago; copies of documents had to be either

printed by hand or engraved on the plate of a printing press. Modern technology in this sense


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eases the act of creating a copy, but is it also possible that technology has led to the subjective

world becoming a copy of a copy of a copy of the objective, as Bateson suggests? To that

question, some comfort may be found by a summary of Baudrillard's analysis of the simulacra.

At this point and level of description, the concept of the simulacra may lack credence

given to it for being more speculative than descriptive. Baudrillard, like Nietzsche, now proceeds

to document the modes of his theory evolving over time, as follows:

Three types of simulacra:

1. First order: Characterized by the pre modern period, in which simulated images are

clearly placeholders of real objects.

2. Second order: During the Industrial Revolution, a time in which the distinction

between image and reality is blurred, due to the mass production of identical copies of

objects. The ability of these copies to threaten the real by imitation is noted.

3. Third order: The Postmodern age, at which time the simulacrum precedes the

original. Reality and representation cannot be distinguished. Our perception is only

simulacrum.

Though Baudrillard may attempt to entice readers into concurring with his views by use

of exaggeration, I find it rather specious for him to argue that in the present, reality and

representation are indistinguishable. Rather than engaging in hyperbole, his argument would

have likely been better conveyed by merely proposing that in the postmodern age there exists

decreased recognition of the discrepancies between the real and the representative, as reproduced

copies possess less distinguishing characteristics than similar objects produced in their own

right.


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If Baudrillard's conceptualization of the precession of simulacrum is to be believed, this

yields a very sobering summary of the past, present, and future of our perceptions. For what

reasons were images as placeholders sufficient? What caused this change? If we concur with

Baudrillard, then what does he expect of the future? According to Baudrillard, if the evolution of

existence continues with its current nature:

The end of history is, alas, also the end of the dustbins of history. There are no longer

any dustbins for disposing of old ideologies, old regimes, old values. Where are we

going to throw Marxism, which actually created the dustbins of history? (Yet there is

some justice here since the very people who invented them have fallen in.) Conclusion: if

there are no more dustbins of history, this is because History itself has become a dustbin.

It has become its own dustbin, just as the planet itself has become a dustbin.

(Baudrillard)

Clearly, some discussion is necessary to decipher this rather daft statement on the part of

Baudrillard. It seems he is engaging in hyperbole to emphatically warn against the effects of the

proliferation of symbols independent of meaning independent of society.

Despite what mistakes the human race may have made, can apathy truly culminate in the

end of existence itself? If this end of subjectivity is in fact drawing closer, at what point will it

be too late for action? To this Baudrillard defines this most critical of points:

The transition from signs which disseminate reality to signs that disseminate that there is

nothing, marks the decisive turning point. The first implies a theology of truth and

secrecy (to which the notion of ideology still belongs). The second inaugurates an age of

simulacra and simulation, in which there is no longer any God to recognize his own, nor

any judgment to separate truth from false, the real from its artificial resurrection, since

everything is already dead and risen in advance. (Hegarty)

Here Baudrillard argues that, if simulacra are allowed to precess, then there will be left no


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recognition between that which led to humanity (what Baudrillard recognizes as God but need

not be), and the state that humanity will find itself in. After this critical point, there is left no

distinction between truth and false, for any epistemological rigor ceases to exist when signs and

symbols are given more importance than that which is real.

Despite the myriads of signs and symbols present in the current social and technological

state humanity finds itself in, it seems unlikely that Baudrillard's critical point has already

arrived. After all, even with the briefest of meditations on metaphysics, it would be extremely

difficult to argue that there is already nothing left to the subjective world, be it real or

representative. Since the perception of nothing has yet to arrive, then at the very least it seems

possible that the human race may still have some degree of control over its eventual fate.

However if our species' habits are to change, an understanding of how any why simulacra

precession occurs must be obtained. On simulacra and simulation, Baudrillard arrives at the

following:

1. In modern society, signs and symbols have replaced all reality and meaning.

2. What we experience is not reality itself, but rather a simulation of reality.

3. The perceived reality is due to signs from culture and media.

4. Society has lost touch with the real world upon which our simulation is based, by

over reliance on the simulacra.

From this perspective, it seems humanity has a few options to counteract the simulacra.

Though there is little control over perspective to be had, sans chemical influence, society may

feasibly learn to control itself, by mediating cultural and media signs and their influence on


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perceived reality. However, these lacking abilities of distinction must have some cause, some

origin, which Baudrillard identifies as the following:

Origins of the lack of distinction:

The Media: Goods that are needed and goods for which a purpose is from

commerce can no longer be distinguished.

Exchange value: A discrepancy originates between the monetary value and the

functional value of an object.

Globalization: Produced goods become separated from the natural resources and

labor which led to their creation.

Urbanization: Human beings become separated from the natural world in which

we were created.

Language and ideology: Rhetorical objectives obscure rather than reveal reality

when used by powerful groups promoting their respective special interests.

If these are to be the case, if these are in fact the origins of our simulacra quagmire, then

at least there is a basis from which to counteract its effects. In that case, the following may aid in

solutions:

Possible solutions:

The Media: place greater emphasis upon wants and needs, the difference thereof;

take note on the utility of an object proportional to its aesthetics.

Exchange value: In the battle between form and function, place greater value on

the function of an object.

Globalization: Maintain a global economy focusing on fostering local autonomy.

Reduce shipping needs by distributing production.

Urbanization: Spend a greater amount of time on urban planning, in the process


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designing cities to be both more efficient and more natural. For those that can, a life

in the suburbs or rural areas may prove worthwhile.

Language and ideology: Perhaps the most difficult element to counteract, though

some preliminary measures should be viable. Improve educational standards such

that a greater proportion of society can treat rhetoric with skepticism, slowing the

progression of special interests.

Though these possible solutions are far from iron clad, they stand to serve some relief.

Rather than incessant regard to the proliferation of signs and symbols, that serving only form,

placing greater reverence to function. Rather than one's purchases replicating those of others, the

colloquial keeping up with the Jones's, make choices based on what matters to oneself.

With regard to production, there are some circumstances where distributed production is

simply not possible, an example being semiconductor fabrication plants, which often require

initial investments in the billions of dollars. It is conceivable that other situations exist which

require large economies of scale. Yes, shipment of raw materials will be necessary where they

are not available locally. Despite this, it is conceivable that shipment of raw materials, say, rolls

of steel, would be more efficient than shipment of an automobile, the finished product. Also,

decreasing the separation between producer and consumer might prove to be advantageous in

slowing Beaudillard's feared precession of simulacra.

Regardless, the effect of simulated reality on the populace has begun to appear.

Baudrillard sees the use of universalization to be in stark contrast between the Enlightenment and

the modern era.


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In the Enlightenment, universalization was viewed as unlimited growth and forward

progress. Today, by contrast, universalization is viewed as forward escape.

(Baudrillard )

In that case, it may be possible to prevent forward escape, which I interpret as

symbolizing the eventual end of the human race, ending, to borrow from T.S. Elliot, not with a

bang but with a whimper, depending on our future choices.

In the interests of epistemic and metaphysical integrity, it is necessary to discuss

criticisms of Baudrillard's work, namely those put forth by Anthony King. InA Critique of

Baudrillard's Hyperreality, King first reviews Descartes' 'malicious demon' passage in

Meditations, concluding with the Cogito. King then draws parallels between Baudrillard's

simulacra and dualism a la Descartes:

This irrevocable subject object dualism is critical insofar as the analysis of hyperreality

is concerned because it is this premiss that human cognition is founded on one particular

type of sensory experience which is shared by both Baudrillard and Descartes. (King 9)

King then proceeds to reconcile Descartes' demon with Bateson's representation ad

infinitum by recognizing that deception arises when we experience only representations for

which external verification is impossible.

I find it worthwhile to now notice that by arguing against Baudrillard by means of

verificationism, King is effectively endorsing logical positivism by utilizing one of its central

tenets. Specious though Baudrillard's arguments may be, King's criticisms are mitigated by

noting certain criticisms of verificationism. In Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism,


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Christopher Norris notes that verificationism is self refuting in that its proposition is neither

empirically verifiable nor tautologous (212).

Meanwhile, King suggests that the theoretical validity of hyperreality is weakened in that

it is both undercut by linguistic machinations and rehabilitated to foster an improved

understanding of postmodernism (15).

The integrity of Baudrillard's arguments notwithstanding, does a denial of hyperrealism

spell a defeat for all of Baudrillard's previously discussed arguments? Even King does not think

this to be the case:

...Instead of regarding the notion of hyperreality as a (failed) critical concept by which

to understand recent social and cultural transformations, we can... interpret

Baudrillard's hyperreality as part of these wider changes (King 15).

Ideological adversaries though they may be, if Baudrillard and King agree that

hyperreality plays a role in continuing change, what lessons are to be learned? Interesting though

Baudrillard's many hyperbole's may be, I believe that what should be gained is both a modest

version of his causal analysis of the precession of simulacra as well as his given details on the

origins of the lack of distinction. In this case my proposed solutions still hold.

One example common to the arguments of both Baudrillard and King is that of television.

In an analysis of Baudrillard's arguments, King states:

For Baudrillard, the technological development of the television marks a fundamental

ontological transformation in culture; television culture is of a different order from that

of all previous societies... by claiming that it captures the real, the television effectively

obliterates the real. It asks the viewers to accept the screen image as the truth, as the

direct and unmediated reality and therefore demands that the actual reality... is not


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Works Cited

Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Baudrillard, Jean. The Illusion of the End. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Borges, A Universal History of Infamy (translated by Norman Thomas de Giovanni), London:

Penguin Books, 1975.

Hegarty, Paul. Jean Baudrillard. London: Continuum, 2004.

"Hyperreal." Collins English Dictionary. 6th ed. 2003. Web. 11 Feb. 2009.

Kellner, Douglas. Entry on Jean Baudrillard. UCLA.

http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/.

King, Anthony. A critique of Baudrillard's hyperreality.Philosophy Social Criticism 24.6

(1998): 47 66.

Korzybski, Alfred."A Non Aristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics andPhysics." 1931 American Mathematical Society. New Orleans, LA. 28 Dec 1931.

Norris, Christopher. Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism. London: Routledge, 2000.

Turner, Chris. The Intelligence of Evil. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2005.

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