re-inventing democracy: practices and discourses in the spanish … · 2014-05-07 · 1...

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Re-inventing democracy: practices and discourses in the Spanish Global Justice Movement Manuel Jiménez* and Ángel Calle Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session 2007 Helsinki (Workshop: Democracy in movements). First draft, please do not cite without authors permission. *Juan March Institute ([email protected]) Abstract: In this paper we analysis conceptions and practices of internal democracy among organizations within the context of what we call the global justice movement (GJM). We focus in visions of democracy contained in written documents (organizational ideology) and, more in detailed, in information about organizational practices (or models of internal democracy) obtained from semi-structured interviews with representatives these organizations in the context of the DEMOS project (http://demos.eui.eu). The interpretation of the results considers the internal organizational democratic visions and practices as influenced by the combination of political context and identity variables. 1. Introduction

Social movements have been understood as key agents of social and political change,

contributing to the transformation of very conception and practices of democracy.

Acting in the extra-institutional domain of politics, they represent a crucial influence for

institutionalised politics: here, they not only pressure for the inclusion of their demands

into the political agenda but also carry out strategies of institutional change in order to

modify the rules of the democratic political game. But they do not only target the realm

of institutionalized politics (the state) but also contribute to the re-definition of

democracy at the societal level, among other ways, through norms (conceptions of

democracy) and practices (e.g. in internal decision-making processes) shaping their

organizational everyday life. This paper focuses on the analysis of conceptions and

practices of democracy in the social movement organizations. We can consider this

activity as influenced by the interplay of two set of factors: environmental factors (as

the political environment in which the interaction with the state takes place) and identity

factors. In this sense, organizational features do not merely reflect instrumental

adaptation to the environment (political factors) but they are also expression of values

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and norms (identity factors). As suggested by della Porta and Mosca, the organization is

therefore not just a means, but also an aim in itself (2006: 4).

More specifically this work analyses the conceptions and practices of democracy within

those social movement organizations that are taking part in the Global Justice

Movement (GJM). One of the main features of the GJM1 is the general appeal to

construct another world from a different manner (della Porta 2007). They have deployed

a sharp criticism towards international institutions as WTO, IMF or transnationals

corporations. And at the same time, they have spread new practices of organization,

including new tools for coordination and protest as the social fora, counter-summits or

new organizational umbrellas (Vía Campesina, PGA, ATTAC, etc.) that share, to a

different degree, a search for more horizontality way through which very diverse actors

and groups get together (della porta, 2007). We may expect that these processes involve

a shift from dominant conceptions and practices of democracy based on delegation of

power (representation) and majority vote towards alternatives as those based on direct

participation and deliberation or consensus-seeking.

Empirical data on conceptions and practices of democracy in the Spanish GJM have

been gathered through a social movements groups’ survey and the discourse analysis of

their documents within the research context of the DEMOS project (Demos project,

http://demos.eui.eu). In both cases we have selected a sample of Spanish social

movement organizations that have been active, through anti-globalization protests or

international social fora, in the recent cycle of global mobilizations. In order to identify

the organizational ideology (conceptions of democracy) of Spanish GJM organizations,

we carried out a content analysis of organizational information displayed online by a

sample of organizations, including statements about internal democracy in written

documents such as constitution, mission statements, the about us section, and so on,

produced by 37 Spanish these organisations during (see della Porta and Rieter 2006 and

Jiménez and Calle 2006).2 In this paper we refer to these data as DEMOS-WP3

1 The global justice movement can be defined as “the loose network of organizations (with varying degrees of formality, and even including political parties) and other actors, engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe (della Porta 2007) 2 Most of this documentation has been retrieved from the websites of the different organisations, but we have complemented it by making writing to some groups in order to demand for fundamental documents not published on their website and so offer a more complete overview of the issue of democracy in GJMs.

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(Websites data-Spain). In order to obtain information on actual democratic practices

within the groups, from January to June 2006, we carried out a survey among 60

Spanish organizations active in the GJM3, based on a semi-structure questionnaire

administered to selected activists involved in either international events or protests. We

had back 35 out of 60 (61%) of these questionnaires. In this paper, data from this survey

is cited as DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain).

In the next section we pin point some of the main organizational features of the GJM in

Spain. In the third section, we classify organizations of the Spanish GJM according to a

four-categories typology of organizational models of (internal) democracy. In the

successive two next sections these types are describe in terms of some organizational

characteristics (founding year, resources or size) and the level of institutionalization of

their interaction with the state, their political repertoire or their issue agenda. In the last

section we discuss data concerning actual participation of Spanish groups in GJM

protests events (and campaigns) as well as the subjective level of belonging to the

movement.

2. The GJM in Spain

The GJM in Spain is characterised by the central role played by the new social

movement organizations as pre-existing organizational infrastructures (ecologist, human

rights, women, etc.) and the weaker involvement of labor movement and political

parties (Jiménez and Calle 2007). Therefore, in order to understand the nature of the

GJM in Spain it is important to take into account some patterns of change in the Spanish

leftist social movement sector during the previous decade. In fact, we can consider the

very GJM as an expression of these changes. Some of the most relevant features of

these patterns of evolution are:

• In a rather close political context, interaction with authorities has been based on

the logic of conflict-access. Levels of political institutionalization tend to be rather

low and oscillating over time (depending of specific configuration of power and the

issue at stake).

3 37 were already part of the Spanish sample used for the WP3. We decided to widen the sample in order to deal with the problem of missing cases.

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• On the bases of (informal) networks and the experience of collaboration in

specific campaigns, there has been a gradual process of configuration of

movement’s collective identities. In this same sense, it is also possible to talk of the

configuration of a meta-identity under the GJM networks that permits and fosters

the convergence of different social actors under a shared self-perception of

belonging to a “movement of movements”. This confluence was evidenced in the

Campaign against the Europe of Capital and War (during the Spanish semester of

the EU in 2002) or the anti-war demonstrations of 2003 (see Jiménez and Alcalde

2002 and Jiménez 2006a).

• Following upon this, the organisational structure of many leftist social

movements has been consolidated on the basis of decentralisation and local

autonomy. Even groups that came into being under a state-wide, territorial scope

(the Conscientious Objectors’ Movement MOC, and to some extent NGDOs) have

experienced this trend towards decentralisation. The process of political

decentralisation of the state has favoured, to a different degree and form, this

process. Furthermore, there has been an overall increase in available resources

(although with notable differences in terms of sources and amounts, public funding

opportunities, membership, volunteering, relational resources).

• A new generation of activists has gradually gained a central role among these

movements by providing not only new human resources, but also new practices and

discourses (Jiménez 2006b). The dominant protest repertoire has been gradually

modified, giving way to civil disobedience repertoires and non-violent direct

actions. Discourses merge and radicalise. For instance, NGDOS have taken on

antimilitaristic or feminist demands, new collectives talk about debt relief and

democracy along with ecological debts, the antimilitarists have expanded their

definition of violence from antimilitarism to include GJM critiques, etc. We could

talk then, of the construction of a networked discourse (different conflicts which are

linked but autonomous), fed from, and feeding into, the above-mentioned meta-

identity.

Although many of the characteristics that define this movement are conditioned by

domestic politics and culture, the GJM in Spain shares common traits with experiences

in other countries:

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• From an analytical perspective, two trends or sectors that merge and are

complementary in practice, as well as other contexts, can be distinguished in the

Spanish GJM. On the one hand, there is a more reformist sector that endorses

introducing changes in the institutions and rules governing the present economic

model. This sector is represented by the World Social Forum and organisations

such as ATTAC. They are characterised by the fact that they work within the

institutions in which a sector of the NGOs develops strategies to influence

determined issues. In addition to the Spanish section of the ATTAC, this line is

represented by certain development organisations (mainly in Latin America),

especially grassroots Christian organisations. On the other hand, we find a

radical sector. Through its clearly anti-capitalist discourse and a strategy based

on contesting institutional pressure, this radical sector advocates a change in the

system, including the disappearance of institutions that endorse the current

economic model on the international front: the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and The World Bank (WB) among others. According to this sector of the

movement, social protest is in itself a political proposal and non-violent direct

action and civil disobedience is at the centre of their activity. The greatest

proponent of this sector of the GJM is the PGA (People Global Action),

represented in Spain by organisations such as the MRGs (Movimiento de

Resistencia Global) or the MAM (Anti-Maastricht Movement). Other

organisations that had already existed and came together in this sector include

Ecologistas en Acción, MOC (Conscientious Objectors’ Movement), the CGT

trade union, as well as autonomous sectors and the squatter’s movement.

• Likewise, a series of traits which are common to GJMs throughout the world are

applicable to the Spanish case and often reflect changes in the configuration of

social contestation in Spain: The key role of new technologies as tools of

communication and instruments of struggle; a revision of the protest repertoire,

particularly the notion of active civil disobedience and non-violent direct action;

the importance of decentralised, anti-hierarchical networking based on common

assemblies and horizontal structures to facilitate work between different groups

(norms of interaction based on collaboration and the socialisation of

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information); the linking of local problems to global problems, issues of a

different nature (i.e. labour and environmental) or between north and south; and

so on.

In addition to these features which hold true for most of the GJMs, there are certain

aspects that are specific to the GJM in Spain:

• The GJM in Spain is not represented by a media that is sensitive to their

demands. Thus their visibility in the public eye is limited to the varying presence

of institutional actors that support them (principally the PSOE) or media

coverage of their violent actions. From 2001 to 2003, however, when the

conservative party was in power, the political scenario favoured the episodic

convergence of social-democratic sectors with the most radical elements of the

GJM in anti-war demonstrations and rallies against education laws or the

National Hydrological Plan. Nonetheless, the PSOE’s rise to power, which led

to the closure of media opportunities, and its withdrawal from social forums and

platforms against the occupation of Iraq, have served to revive the traditional

division between members of the “alter-globalisation” movement and “social

democratic” sectors in Spain.

• Decentralised organisational structures (which differ by region and that have

been favoured by the strong presence of nationalistic elements). This has not

favoured the creation of a state-wide organisation. It has, however, permitted a

space for networking and collaboration in the form of campaigns

• The traditionally weak organisational structure of those sectors supporting

autonomous movements and in general the so-called new social movements.

Nevertheless, during the 1990s, these sectors became relatively stronger,

especially in the sphere of ecology, which alongside the rest of the trends of

change mentioned above, favoured the convergence of alter-global networks and

anti-globalisation events. The absence of left-wing (parliamentary) parties with

traditional ties to social movements to provide the movement with an

organisational foundation and resources.

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All in all, this may help to understand some features that in comparative terms

distinguish the Spanish GJM:

(1) The relative youth of many organizations.

As can be seen in table 1, the Spanish sample is different from the rest of the

surveyed countries in terms of the relative youth of many organizations: almost half

of the sample groups were created after 2000 (42% vs. 29% in the rest of the

countries).4 Novelty can be associated to two interrelated and explanatory

organizational trends: informality and groups’ generational replacement. Informality

is a traditional organizational feature in a significant part of the leftist Spanish social

movements in which the GJM is rooted (see Jiménez and Calle 2006).

Table 1 – Generational belonging of selected organizations (%) Generational belonging of selected organizations

Spain (%)

Total average (%)

Before 1968 5.6 14.0

Between 1969 and 1989 13.9 21.2

Between 1989 and 1999 38.9 36.0

After 2000 41.7 28.8

Total (N)

100.0 (32)

100.0 (212)

DEMOS-WP3 (Websites data-Spain and Europe)

(2) Small groups with limited material resources

Informality and youth are also associated with the small size of the groups and their

limited resources. The larger the material resources the greater the organizational

pressure towards professionalization (paid staff) and the articulation of a

management structures with increasing power in detriment of activists (leading to a

process of decision-making hierarchization, based on democratic practices of

delegation of power and majority voting rules). On the contrary, the greater the

weight of volunteers-activists (non-paid work) in the groups’ life the greater the

organizational pressure towards decision-making practices allowing their direct

involvement (direct participation and deliberation). 4 The smaller percentage of groups funded before 1968 can be partly explained by the authoritarian context.

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As table 2 illustrates, in the Spanish sample more than one quarter of the groups (27%)

declared not to have any budget, the higher percentage in this category; while very few

(15%) declaring a budget of over 500,000 euros (the smaller percentage in this category

among the studied countries). That is, in relative terms in Spain we find more groups

without any financial resource as well as less resourceful groups than in other countries.

However, almost half of the groups work with a budget between 10,000 and 500,000

euros. Limited financial resources have a clear translation in terms of the extension of

paid staff: almost half of the selected groups have none (the highest percentage and well

above the average for the rest of the countries). A similar number of groups have up to

15 employees, while just around 10 percent declared between 16 and 100 employees. In

contrast, more than one third of the groups (38%) count with between 16 and 100

volunteers and 28% with more than 100.

Table 2 – Main resources of the groups (%) Budget of the groups

Spain (%)

Other countries (%)

Highly variable 0.0 14.3

None 26.9 0.7

Less than 10,000 11.5 15.6

Between 10,000 and 500,000 46.2 36.1

More than 500,000 15.4 33.3 Total (N)

100.0 (26)

100.0 (147)

Paid staff

None 44.1 18.8

Up to 16 44.1 52.1

Between 16 and 100 11.8 15.2

More than 100 0.0 13.9 Total (N)

100.0 (34)

100.0 (165)

Number of volunteers

Less than 16 34.4 32.0

Between 16 and 100 37.6 33.3

More than 100 28.1 34.7 Total (N)

100.0 (32)

100.0 (147)

DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain and other countries)

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(3) The prevalence of consensual organizational practices.

In table 3 we pay attention to the importance of the various decision-making bodies

(the presidency, the executive committee or secretariat, the member’s assembly,

etc.), their decision-making method, and the number of persons taking part in those

bodies (size). As can be observed, in more than half of the surveyed groups (54%)

the assembly is said to be the most important decision-making organism. In this

respect, Spain appears as an exception in an organizational panorama usually

dominated by decisional bodies that concentrate power by delegation (executive

committees, secretariat, presidential figures, etc.). In line with these results, the

majority of the Spanish groups (62%) employ consensual decisional methods while

in other countries majority (or mixed) methods are more widespread. The

prevalence of consensual decisional methods in Spain could be related to the small

size of main decision-making bodies. Most of the organizations (60%) declared in

fact that such body is constituted by less than 30 individuals; in one forth of the

groups the main decisional body is formed by between 30 and 100 individuals;

while in just one fifth of the organizations it is formed by more than 100 individuals.

Table 3 – Characteristics of the most important decision-making body (%)

Most important decision-making body Spain

(%) Other

countries (%)

President / leader / secretary / director 2.9 12.0

Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda

31.4 49.1

Assembly / open meeting 54.3 22.3

Thematic group 2.9 4.0

Other bodies 8.6 12.6

Total (N)

100.0 (35)

100.0 (175)

Decision-making method of the main decisional body

Majority + other 38.2 57.2

Consensus 61.8 42.8 Total (N)

100.0 (34)

100.0 (159)

Size of the main decisional body

Less than 30 60.0 46.8

Between 30 and 100 23.3 26.6

More than 100 16.7 26.6

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Total (N)

100.0 (30)

100.0 (158)

Source: DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain and other countries)

(4) Low level of political institutionalisation (especially at supralocal levels)

As table 4 shows, the Spanish sample deviates from the rest of the cases analyzed for

the low number of organizations that describe their interaction with international

authorities as one of collaboration (even with restrictions): 31% versus 60% in the rest

of countries. Indifference, when not explicit refusal, is the most frequent attitude

expressed by our respondents when describing the relationship of their organizations

with public institutions. The often nonexistence of interactions with international

institutions is related to the local nature (and orientation) of many of the selected

organizations.

Table 4 - Relationship with institutions at different territorial level(%)

International institutions Spain (%)

Other countries

(%)

Refusal of collaboration 21.9 11.2

Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities 46.9 28.6

Collaboration with restrictions 6.3 28.6

Collaboration 25.0 31.7 Total (N)

100.0 (32)

100.0 (161)

National institutions





100.0 (34)

100.0 (168)

Local institutions





100.0 (33)

100.0 (166)


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The percentage of the groups that define their interaction with authorities in terms of

collaboration (especially in selective forms) increases if we refer to national

institutions. However, the frequency is still relatively lower than in the rest of the

countries. Besides, the cases of refusal of collaboration are higher than in the general

sample. This seems to be a peculiar feature of the Spanish groups (della Porta and

Mosca 2006). Although the number of cases where no significant interactions take place

decreases (from 47% of the case when referring to international institution to 38%) for

the national level, the local nature of many of these groups in a political context of

strong decentralization may partially explain these results. In fact, as we may expect

when referring to the relationship with local institutions, we found that only one fourth

of the groups define it as absent, a percentage similar to the average in the rest of the

countries. Refusal of collaboration is however still relatively high (the highest in a

cross-national comparison), while responses defining the interaction in terms of

collaboration come close (although still slightly below) the average in the rest of the

countries.

To sum up, our sampled organizations support the pattern of a more widespread

indifference or refusal of collaboration with institutions in comparison with the rest of

studied countries. This can be associated to their local nature and also to the presence of

identity (or ideological) values. In some cases this values include an explicit rejection of

the realm of institutionalised politics as a terrain for their political action. As one of the

interviewee claimed: “We never establish relationships as we are a non-violent direct-

action group” (Espacio Horizontal contra la Guerra, anti-war platform of Madrid).

According to another interviewee, “our paramount goal is to get in touch with citizens”

(Zapatista platform of Barcelona). In other instance, this results can be associated to a

more pragmatic attitude concerning their strategies towards authorities in which

participation depends on the perception of the political gains that it may entail. This

attitude seems clearer if we go down from the international to the national and the local

levels. For instance, the political group Espacio Alternativo declares that collaboration

depends on profiles of political groups in local governments and also their attitude

towards social movements. When carrying out the Consulta Social Europea to debate a

Europe “from below”, the respondent stated that links to local power could be

contingent, depending on characteristics of the local groups, but never attempting to

build up stable links.

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Finally, we completed the characterization of the organizations interaction with the

political system by looking at the sources of their funding (table 5). High dependence on

public funds can be interpreted as an indicator of political institutionalization (although

not necessarily of political co-optation). Data for the Spanish groups indicate the

relative low importance of public funds: only 28% of the groups declared to receive

institutional support compared to the 40% of the organizations of other countries. Only

the British sample offers a similar low percentage.5 Scarce institutional links and refusal

to re-propose co-optation processes of social movements by political parties in power

like the socialdemocratic PSOE, could explain this situation (Jiménez and Calle 2007).

However, non-governmental sources of income (membership fees, donations) play an

important role in the British case, while its reduced importance in the Spanish sample

seems to be compensated by a greater relevance of merchandising and similar forms of

funding (53% versus 38% in other countries). In the Spanish case (as in the British one)

the number of organizations that rely exclusively on their members to cover their

expenses is relatively high (64% versus 45% average for the rest of the countries).

Table 5 – Type of funding (%)

Sources of funding Spain

(%) Other countries

(%)

Members 87.9 80.0

Governmental 27.6 40.0

Non governmental 13.8 37.6

Sales of goods 53.3 37.6 Total (N)

100.0 (33)

100.0 (170)

Type of funding

No 12.1 14.7

Only from members 63.6 45.3

Only from governments 0.0 5.3

Both from members and governments 24.2 34.7

Total (N)

100.0 (33)

100.0 (170)

Source: DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain and other countries) NB - 2 missing cases

5 In fact relative values (but not absolute ones since the British seem wealthier) of public funding is similar in both countries, (see della Porta and Mosca, 2006:22).

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In sum, the Spanish results draw a general picture that reflects the relative importance of

small groups (more frequent than in the overall sample) and the dominance of medium-

size organizations (with a number of large organizations below the average), where

financial resources (and paid staff) are scarce. It is worth noticing that while the number

of non-paid staff is lower than the average, we find very few organizations with large

number of volunteers that usually require paid staff and professionalization to be

managed.6 The prevalence of consensual decisional methods in Spain could be related

to the small size of main decision-making bodies (and, in general of the groups), but

also to the relatively low levels of political institutionalisation.

3. Models of internal democracy

In order to assess the presence of conceptions of democracy, both in terms of discourses

as well as in terms of internal practices, we follow a two dimensions typology of

internal decision-making developed in the context of the DEMOS project (see Figure 1)

Figure 1. Typology of democratic internal decision-making

Delegation of power High Low

Low Associational model Assembleary model Consensus High Deliberative

representation Deliberative participation

Sources: della Porta, Reiter and Andretta, 2006: 12-13; della Porta and Mosca, 2007: 13). The two dimensions considered are: participation/delegation (indicating preferences or

practices for direct or inclusive participation versus indirect participation by forms of

delegation/representation) and consensus/majority (depending on the principle of

decision-making). Crossing both dimensions, we can distinguish four (ideal) types of

models of internal democracy: A deliberative participate model (that tries to maximise

participation turn out –refusing to delegate power- and applies consensual methods of

decision-making); an assembleary model (that combines direct participation of members

and majority methods of decision-making); a deliberative representative model (where,

6 Furthermore, the low mentioning of volunteering could be explained by the fact that this activity is generally identified by activists as voluntary services rather than getting involved in actions or internal coordination.

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representative mechanism of participation –delegation of power- and consensual

decision making procedures are merged; and, lastly, an associational model (mixing

delegation of power with majority criteria for reaching decisions).

A priori we may expect associational model more close to conceptions and practices of

democracy stressing traditional representative elements. We can think that social

movement organisations adopting this type of discourse and practices defend their

inclusion in the political process but without questioning the democratic principles on

which it is based. In this sense, they would represent the more politically

institutionalised sector of the GJM (typically, major trade-union and NGOs).

As mentioned above, GJM is Spain is characterised by the importance of new social

movement organizations as pre-existing organizational infrastructures (ecologist, human

rights, women, etc.) and the weaker involvement of labor movement and political

parties (Jiménez and Calle 2007). As also mentioned, this social movement sector is

characterised by a relative low level of institutionalisation (or political assimilation).

Accordingly, among the groups participating in the Spanish expression of the GJM we

might expect relatively low presence of associational models.

Table 6. Types of organizational models in Spain

Democratic models

DOCUMENTS (SPANISH SAMPLE)

DOCUMENTS (FULL SAMPLE)

GROUPS SURVEY

(SPANISH SAMPLE)

GROUPS SURVEY

(FULL SAMPLE)

Associational 24.3 51.2 14.5 26.7

Deliberative representative 21.6 13.5 25.7 33.3

Assembleary 27.0 12.7 5.7 8.6

Deliberative participative 16.2 9.4 45.7 19.0

Not classified 10.8 13.1 8.6 7.6 Total (N)

100.0 (35)

100.0 (210)

100.0 (35)

100.0 (210)

Sources: DEMOS WP3 (websites Spain and full sample) and DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain and full sample) In fact, results form both samples, considering documents produced by the

organizations or the more specific survey responses (Table 6), show a limited emphasis

on discourses and practices associated to associational model of democracy: In contrast

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with the overall survey results more than half of the selected organizations (56%) rely

on direct participation methods. The limited resort to delegation of power may be partly

explained by some “structural conditions” already mentioned (small size and budgets,

local orientation, etc.,) that can be interpreted as elements facilitating participatory

models or, in other words, reducing the pressure to delegate power in everyday

functioning of the groups. But also, it is important to take into account the low level of

political institutionalization of the new social movement sector in Spain (and the

influence of ideational factors). In the following section, we characterised in detail these

models of internal democracy according to other organizational features.

4. Typology of democracy models and organizations’ resources and interaction

with authorities.

In this section we describe the diverse organizational models according to a set of

variables related to organizational characteristics as well as in terms of the nature of

their interaction with authorities. Table 7 show information obtained through the

websites concerning their foundation period.

Table 7. Foundation Period by organizational models

associational deliberative representative assembleary deliberative

participative

Spain Europe Spain Europe Spain Europe Spain Europe

Before 1968 25.0 23.8 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Between 1969 and 1989

25.0 27.9 25.0 21.9 0.0 13.3 16.7 13.0

Between 1989 and 1999

50.0 35.2 37.5 34.4 40.0 36.7 33.3 30.4

After 2000 0.0 13.1 37.5 31.3 60.0 50.0 50.0 56.5

Total (N)

14.5 (4)

58.9 (122)

33.3 (8)

15.5 (32)

35.7 (10)

14.5 (30)

21.4 (6)

11.1 (23)

Sources: DEMOS WP3 (websites Spain and full sample)

As can be observed, both direct participation and deliberation are more frequent

practices among the youngest organizations and this pattern is similar across countries.

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In table 8 we examine the extent to which the organizational resources vary according to

our classification of groups in terms of organizational models (of decision-making).

Looking first at the financial resources (as indicated by the annual budget declared by

the organizations) we can see how large budgets tend to be associated with delegation of

power (either associational or deliberative representative) while less resourceful groups

tend to fall under the deliberative participative category.

Similarly, paid staff is more often associated with traditional democratic practices

(delegation of power and majority vote). The amount of voluntary work do not follow a

similar pattern, being the groups in the deliberative participative model those that more

often count with a lower number of volunteers. Here one should take into account that

the concept “volunteer” may involve diverse forms of engagement (a volunteer can

identify very different level of commitment: from a core/full-time activist to a few hours

per week collaborator in administrative task). In this sense, it is difficult to deduce much

about the relationship between number of volunteers and democratic functioning of the

organizations. The Spanish data only allow us to say that deliberative participative

models seems to be associated to small, but probably highly active, number of

volunteers.7

Table 8 – Main resources of the groups for different democratic models (%) Democratic Models

Budget of the groups Associational Deliberative

Representative Assembleary Deliberative

Participative Total

Less than 10,000

50.0 37.5 0.0 72.7 56.5

More than 10,000

50.0 62.5 0.0 25.0 43.5

Total (N) Missing: 12

17.4 (4)

34.8 (8)

0.0 (0)

47.8 (11)

100.0 (23)

Presence of paid staff (dummy)

No 40.0 0.0 100.0 66.7 45.2

Yes 60.0 100.0 0.0 33.3 54.8 Total (N) Missing: 4

16.1 (5)

29.0 (9)

6.2 (2)

48.4 (15)

100.0 (31)

Number of volunteers (dummy)

7 According to the Spanish WP3 report, 83.3% of deliberative participative models are involved in protests, whereas only 44.4% of associational groups are involved in this kind of actions.

17

Up to 15 20.0 11.1 0.0 53.8 31.0

More than 15 80.0 88.9 100.0 46.2 69.0 Total (N) Missing: 6

17.2 (5)

31.0 (9)

6.9 (2)

44.8 (13)

100.0 (29)

Sources: DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain) In sum, in terms of resources, the associational model among the Spanish GJM is

present among a varied types of organizations in terms of budget, which

notwithstanding tend to count with paid staff and a relative large number of volunteers.

Deliberative representative model group together a rather similar type of organizations:

they have a relative large budget and a combination of paid staff and a large base of

volunteers. The deliberative participative groups appear as “poorer” in terms of the

three indicators of resources. In general, these results indicate that delegation of power

is associated with large organizations while consensus practices not necessarily do.

The nature of the internal democratic practices can also be connected to the experience

of interactions with public institutions or the perception of the opportunities they offer

to participate. Both the political contexts (i.e. actual opportunities at different territorial

levels) and past experiences of interaction can influence the groups’ attitudes towards

institutions and, hence, the internal decision-making processes. For instance, the

institutionalization of participation can (but not necessarily) create pressure towards

delegation of power and time-efficient decision-making practices as voting instead of

consensus/deliberation.

As mentioned, in general terms, collaboration with authorities is relatively low among

the Spanish GJM, especially beyond the local level. In table 9 we focused on how

organizations adopting diverse internal democratic models relate with public institutions

at different territorial levels. As expected, those organizations adopting democratic

models based on delegation and traditional decision-making methods are more likely to

collaborate with the public institutions. In this case, no differences are appreciable

among the diverse territorial political levels. The deliberative participative groups are

the ones that present the lower values concerning institutional collaboration and tend to

concentrate at the local level. So here again, delegation of power makes a clear

difference: Direct participation arrangements are associated to low level of political

18

institutionalisation while relation between the search of consensus among differences

opinions among organizations members and the level of collaboration with authorities

does not seems so apparent.

Table 9 – Attitude towards public institutions by different democratic models (%)

Democratic Models Collaboration with institutions at different territorial levels

Associational Deliberative Representative

Assembleary Deliberative Participative

Total

Internacional 80.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 27.6% (8)

Nacional 80.0 50.0 0.0 6.3 (34.5) 10

Local 80.0 100.0 50.0 20.0 (55.1) 16

Total (N) 5 13 2 9 29

Sources: DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain)

Besides the general attitude towards relationship with institutions, we also focused on

perceptions of experiments of participatory public decision-making promoted by the

institutions (generally at the local level such a Agenda 21, participatory budgeting, and

so on) in order to involve citizens in the political process. We asked our respondents

their opinion on the capacity of this kind of experiments to improve the quality of

political decisions. The results obtained in the Spanish sample indicates the prevalence

of unclear or ambivalent judgments (52% compared to the 41% in the rest of the

countries), probably influenced by the lack of experience/knowledge (as we have

already noticed most organizations do not interact with public authorities; besides these

“experiments” are not yet very widespread). Negative appraisals are expressed more

often than in other countries: 35% mentioned at least some negative argument on this

kind of experiments. In most cases this judgment was motivated by the perception of the

instrumental orientation of these initiatives or their final goal of deviating attention

(placebo politics). As one of the interviewee stated: “we do not think that these

initiatives are real democratization processes as they only delegate minor issues to

citizens in order to integrate them in the political system”. According to other

interviewees “they end up in co-optations” (CNT), and “they do not perform real

changes” (Xarxa de Mobilitzaciò Global). Among the positive judgments, references to

their bottom-up nature or their creative dimension are very frequently mentioned. As

one interviewed claimed: “it gives a role to the citizens [in politics]” (ATTAC-Madrid).

19

According to another interviewee: “they encourage citizen’s participation” (Espacio

Alternativo).

In table 10, we consider how different types of Spanish organizations perceive these

institutional experiments of participatory decision-making. As it can be observed, the

idea that these types of experiments improve the quality of political decisions is

generally supported by those groups implementing forms of delegation of power

(probably because they themselves have experienced institutional participation). On the

other hand, highly participative groups (mostly within the deliberative participative

model) tend to be more cautious (probably because they are engaged in conflict with

local authorities or coming from horizontal grassroots movements).8

Table 10 – Attitude towards public decision-making by democratic models (%) Democratic Models Public decision-making

improves the quality of political decisions



Total

No 0.0 0.0 50.0 26.7 16.7

Yes 80.0 62.5 0.0 13.3 36.7

No definite position 20.0 37.5 50.0 60.0 46.7

Total (N) 5 missing cases

16.7 (5)

26.7 (8)

6.7 (2)

50.0 (15)

100.0 (30)

Sources: DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain)

As mentioned, the presence and relative importance of public funding can be also

interpreted as an indicator of the nature of the interaction between organizations and the

state. In fact, the relative low importance of public funds among the Spanish GJM

organizations confirmed the low level of political institutionalisation. Concerning the

different democratic models, as table 10 illustrates, those based on delegation of power

are characterized by diversification of sources, including governmental ones while

deliberation tends to be associated with less public funding and, apart from members

contributions, self-financing (sales of services, organization of parties, etc…).

Table 11 – Funding by different democratic models (%)

Sources of funding Democratic Models Total

8 Among the first kind of organizations we found migrants networks as Assemblea per la Regularització sense Condicions; and among the second one organizations like the pacifist group Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel or the agro-ecological network Bajo el Asfalto esta la Huerta.

20



Members 100.0 100.0 50.0 80.0 87.1 (31)

Governmental 60.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 22.2 (27)

Non governmental 20.0 14.3 0.0 14.0 14.8 (27)

Sales of goods/service/rent 20.0 62.5 0.0 64.3 53.6 (28)

Type of funding

No 0.0 0.0 50.0 20.0 12.9

Only from members 40.0 66.7 50.0 80.0 67.7

Only from governments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Both from members and governments

60.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 19.4

Total (N)

16.1 (5)

29.0 (9)

6.5 (2)

48.4 (15)

100.0 (31)

Sources: DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain) In sum, in the case of the Spanish GJM the type of democratic model appears clearly

associated to other organizational features. In particular, more participatory

organizations (versus those where power is delegated to a reduce number of

representative) are smaller (and count with less resources) and show lower levels of

interaction with the authorities (especially beyond the local). However, the presence of

deliberative practices (i.e. the search for consensus among participants) is not associated

to these variables. Although deliberation is more frequent among small groups (with

direct participation structures of decision-making) it is also practiced in other

organizational context (larger groups more prone to interact with authorities).

Deliberation is however distinguish by its predominance among new organizational

infrastructures, suggesting that it may be probably the main contribution or the

democratic distinguishing characteristic among the groups emerging in the recent cycle

of global mobilization.

6. Models of democracy and political repertoire and issues

The Spanish groups tend to adopt a protest profile more than the overall sample: almost

all the selected organization resort to protest (97%, the highest among the cases studied,

compare to the 74% average among the rest of the countries). Rising awareness/political

21

education is the second most often mentioned strategy (83%, slightly below the total

average), while lobbying and building concrete alternatives are, in comparative terms,

distinctively less frequent in Spain than in any other of the cases (Jiménez and Calle

2006). These results are coherent with previous results concerning organizational

structure and patterns of interaction with public authorities. The importance of protest as

a strategy and the limited resort to lobbying can be associated to radicalness but also to

political isolation (or marginality). The relative low level of groups working on concrete

alternatives stresses the residual (re-active nature) of a good deal of the surveyed

groups. This interpretation has to be contextualized taking into account at least two

considerations: 1) although informal organizations prevail in our sample (and we may

say) in the real movement’ organizational landscape, they coexist with other (more

formal) ones; 2) similarly, while the stress on the protest reactive nature of the Spanish

sample help us to establish comparative difference, this should not lead to conclude that

other strategies are not employed in the Spanish case: for instance 63% of the groups

declare to work on the elaboration of alternative proposals.

Additionally, the selected organizations do not conceive the different strategies as

mutually exclusive. This is clear also in the Spanish sample where less than one tenth of

the groups focuses on just one strategy. Here the use of three different strategies

prevails (around 40%) while the adoption of all strategies together is less diffuse than in

other countries.

We could expect that organizations adopting different democratic models could be more

likely to employ diverse strategies in order to reach their objectives. However, these

differences are not evident in the Spanish sample. As we can observed in table 12, the

only clear variance is the lowest resort to lobby strategies by groups classified within

the deliberative participative category and, in part as consequence of these, the use of a

smaller number of strategies.

Table 12 – Main strategies of different democratic models (%)

Democratic Models Main strategies of the group



Total Spain

Total

(average)

Protest 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.8 96.9 (31) 74.3

22

Building concrete alternatives

60.0 55.6 100.0 62.5 62.5 (20) 77.7

Lobbying 60.0 55.6 50.0 18.8 37.5 (12) 57.7

Political education/raising awareness

60.0 100.0 100.0 81.3 84.4 (27) 90.1

Number of overlapping strategies

0-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3

3.1 (1)

8.0

2 40.0 22.2 0.0 43.8 34.4 (11) 19.4

3 40.0 44.4 50.0 37.5 40.6 (13) 36.0

4 20.0 33.3 50.0 12.5 21.9 (7) 36.6

Total (N)

30.6 (11)

36.1 (13)

11.1 (4)

22.2 (8)

100 (32) N= 107

Source: DEMOS-WP4 (groups’ survey-Spain and full sample)

If we consider public information on the websites, this picture changes somehow. For

instance protest oriented activities and political education of citizens are more often

mentioned in the websites of groups that have been classified within the deliberative

categories, while associational (and more formal) organizations seem to be specialized

in influencing public opinion (Jiménez and Calle 2006a). These discrepancies can be

explain, at least in part, by the greater importance given to protest as an identity element

among groups adopting direct democracy and consensus practices.

In sum, groups in the Spanish GJM tend to resort to a varied type of political strategies,

however, lobbying is more rare among those adopting deliberative participatory models

and, we may think, protest is considered as an identity element among those

organizations that do not follow associational models.

Groups’ goals can also be associated to the organizational model of decision making.

We asked our interviewees to indicate the main issues of activity of their organizations.

The open answers were recoded into five categories (see table 13). Half of the selected

organizations declared to focus on international issues. Spanish groups are placed

somehow below the average for the rest of the surveyed countries (60%). However, this

result seems still too high if we consider other characteristics that a priori will lead us to

23

expect low presence of international issues in the organizations’ agenda: the local nature

of these groups as well as their limited interactions with international institutions. This

situation could be explained by the high levels of adherence to the global cycle of

protest among the Spanish GJM organizations, whereas in countries like Germany or

France the domestic agenda (unemployment, privatizations under the neoliberal agenda)

seems to have been a major boosts for the development of the GJMs (della Porta 2007).

The Spanish sample is also distinctively characterized by the lower attention to social

and the so-called new social movement’s issues than in the overall sample (showing in

both categories the lowest percentages). Although many of these organizational

infrastructures hinge their roots in the new social movements sector and nourish from

their activists, they do not reproduce their sectoral thematic agenda, but seem to pursue

shared demands with a clear horizontal or transversal nature such as democracy or

international issues.9 Besides, the local nature of many groups could explain why they

do not consider as part of the GJMs agenda their thematic/local issues.10

Do the main issues of activity vary and change moving from a democratic model to

another one? Although, we can not answer fully this question because some models

(assemblearian ones) are under-represented, is not possible to identify any clear pattern

of variation among them (see table 13).

Table 13 – Main issues of activity of different democratic models (%)

Democratic Models Main issues of activity of the group



Total Spain

Total (other

countries)

Social issues 60.0 66.7 100.0 12.5 42.9 72.7

International issues

60.0 44.4 0.0 62.5 51.3 60.5

New social movement issues

0.0 33.3 0.0 12.5 17.1 31.4

Democracy 60.0 22.2 0.0 43.8 37.1 17.4

Religion 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3

Total (N)

15.6 (5)

28.1 (9)

6.3 (2)

50.0 (16)

100.0 (32)

100.0 (207)


9 See Calle (2005) for a description of the convergence of new social movements inside GJMs through new campaigns during the nineties. 10 For instance, the anti-war platform Espacio Horizontal contra la Guerra or the feminist group Asamblea Feminista have stated their participation on campaigns (referendum about war involvement or the European Union process) but not any involvement in new social movements issues.

24

8. Relationship with the Global Justice Movement

In order to evaluate the participation of our groups in events promoted by the GJM, we

asked about their involvement in the social forum process, in counter-summits and in

global days of action. As it is shown in table 15, a majority of the surveyed groups took

part in these events. However, in comparative terms Spanish organizations seem much

more prone to engage in events with a clear protest profile. Only 54% of the selected

groups declared to have participated in any of the meetings of the world or European

social forums. This percentage is well below the total average for the other countries (in

fact it is the lowest among the national samples). Several (interrelated) reasons may

explain this low percentage: the most obvious is that, contrary to other cases (1) none of

these forums took place in Spain; additionally, (2) many groups have no resources to

participate in such events; and (3) some groups do not consider this type of encounters

as worthy assisting or do not share their philosophy.

Participation in counter-summits and global days of action is instead notably higher

(74% and 83% respectively) and above the average in the other countries’ sample.

Again, a combination of at least two (interrelated) reasons can help us understanding

these results. First, both type of events have taken place in Spain as the opposition to the

2001 World Bank meeting in Barcelona or the counter-summits organized during the

Spanish presidency of the EU (first semester 2002) or the 15th February 2003

international day against the war in Iraq (see Jiménez and Calle 2006, Jiménez 2007) or

the Mayday parades (see Mosca 2007). Second, as shown in previous sections, among

the selected Spanish groups we often find a preference for strategies with a higher

disturbing profile, in part due to the radical refusal of international institutions as central

actors of globalization. These results suggest the relatively low presence of the above

described reformist sector among the Spanish GJM.

Table 14 – Participation in movement’s events (%) Participation in movement’s events

Spain (%)

Other countries (%)

World/European social forums 54.3 83.4

National/local social forums 48.6 59.4

Counter-summits 74.3 70.9

Global days of action 82.9 76.0

25

Total (N)

100.0 (35)

100.0 (175)


A second indicator which is useful in order to examine the relationships of the sampled

organizations with the GJM refers to the subjective identification with the movement.

With this indicator we may assess the extent to which the degree of closeness of the

groups to the movement varies according to the differences in terms of their democratic

practices. Since democracy and the searching for alternative practices is central for the

movement, we may expect that the most identified and engaged groups could have

known and experimented with different democratic models through their participation

in the movement, experiencing a process of “contamination in action” (della Porta and

Mosca 2006). As table 15 shows, compared with the sample of the rest of the countries,

in general terms the Spanish groups seem highly identified with the movement: 86%

claimed a full feeling of belonging to the GJM and an additional 11% of the respondents

declared that their organizations feel part of it, although with some reservations. None

of the groups declared that they do not feel part of the movement and only one indicated

the existence of diverse feelings within the group.

Table 15 – Level of (subjective) identification with the GJM (%)

The group feels part of the movement Spain (%)

Other countries (%)

No 0.0 9.1

The group doesn’t have a shared view 2.9 3.4

Yes, but with reservations 11.4 9.1

Yes 85.7 78.3

Total (N)

100.0 (35)

100.0 (175)


Finally, we asked our interviewees which they consider as the main aims of the GJM.

As it can be observed in table 16, the Spanish groups’ perception of the movement

objectives is in line with the total averages for the rest of the countries. However, the

category “social issues” was quoted less frequently while the issues associated to new

social movements were quoted more than in the other countries’ sample. If we compare

26

this result with those concerning the groups own issue agenda (see tables 13), there are

outstanding differences (for instance, in that occasions new social movements and

social issues were selected in less cases than in average terms). These discrepancies

between the Spanish groups’ thematic agenda (which, as we have seen, differs from the

average for the greater relevance of the democracy and international issues in detriment

of social and new social movements issues) and their perception about the GJM agenda

(more close to the average perception, although stressing the focus on new social

movements issues) help us to confirm the interpretation given when commenting table

13, i.e. many of these organizational infrastructures are new ones that emerge as specific

platforms to participate in transversal (global) campaigns. However, when they think

about the global justice movement, with which they highly identify, they tend to stress

those substantive (sectoral) aims that are present in both their pre-existing organizations

(many of them linked to the new social movements sector) and in the GJM.

Table 16 – Perception of the movements’ main goals (%)

Main aims of the movement Spain (%)

Other countries (%)

Social issues 58.6 68.6

International issues 37.9 37.9

New social movement issues 65.5 53.6

Democracy / free access to information 27.6 28.1

Total (N)

100.0 (29)

100.0 (153)


We also asked our interviewees if and how their groups are engaged in other

networks/campaigns dealing with global justice issues (table 17). Only about 14%

answered negatively to this question. As for the remaining 86%, the majority of them

declared (unsurprisingly) that they are related with networks/campaigns focusing on

international issues; one third of them said that they interacted with networks/campaigns

dealing with social issues while only 12% with those focusing on national issues or on

building transnational political parties or think thanks. As in previous similar indicators

the engagement with democracy issues is relatively high: almost one third of the groups

raised it, while just a few mention new social movement issues. As for the territorial

levels of such campaigns, the large majority take place at the international level but also

27

at the national one (especially in the other countries’ sample) while the local level is

rarely mentioned.

Table 17 – Issues of networks/campaigns of the GJM (%) Issues of networks/campaigns Spain

(%) Other countries

(%)

Social issues 34.9 51.0

International issues 88.5 86.0

National issues/political parties/think thanks 11.5 14.7

Democracy 30.8 15.4

New social movement issues 7.7 11.9

Total (N)

15.4 (30)

100.0 (143)

Territorial levels of networks/campaigns

Local 7.7 3.4

Nacional 53.8 71.7

Transnacional 88.5 84.1

Total (N)

100.0 (26)

100.0 (145)


Conclusions

Spanish GJM shares some of the main features of the Spanish more leftist social

movement sector: informality and low level of political institutionalization are

reproduces in the organizational infrastructure associated to the GJM. This is not only

reflected in the high presence of small organizations (with scant material resources) but

also in their relatively newness: quite often, organizations were born in recent years to

organised specific campaigns within the recent cycle of global mobilization. At the

same time they reflect some specificity that can be associated to the cycle of

mobilization in which they emerge: the confluence of a varied set of actors is facilitated

by the emphasis on common or transversal issues (instead of the traditional on sectoral

approach to social and political problems) as those linked to the global aspect of the

diverse issues or (the lack) of democracy. In terms of internal democratic conceptions

and practices, the search for more horizontal and networking approach in the way actors

and groups get together is associated to the principle of deliberation. In these sense,

while the practices of direct participation is associated to the reduce size of the groups

and their local nature the search for consensus can be associated to the organizational

28

need to deal with a varied set of actors (including diverse level of organizational

formalization). We may think that direct participation was already present in a (radical)

Spanish movement sector characterised by small (local) groups, while deliberation

appears as new organizational norm and practice in the context of global contestation.

References

Calle, A. 2005. Nuevos movimientos globales. Hacia la radicalidad democrática. Madrid: Editorial Popular. della Porta, D. 2007. The global justice movement: an introduction, in Idem (ed) The global justice movement. Cross-national and transnational perspectives. Boulder, Co: Paradigm Publishers, pp.1-28. della Porta, D. and H. Reiter. 2006. “Organizational ideology and visions of democracy” in Idem (eds) Organizational ideology and visions of democracy in the Global Justice Movement, WP3 Report for Democracy in Europe and the mobilization of Society, a project funded by the European Commission, Contract n. CIT2-CT2004-506026, and (for the Swiss case) by the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science, Contract no. 03.0482, pp.1-58. Della Porta, D. and L. Mosca. 2006. Organizational networks, organizational structures and practices of democracy, WP4 Report for Democracy in Europe and the mobilization of Society, a project funded by the European Commission, Contract n. CIT2-CT2004-506026, and (for the Swiss case) by the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science, Contract no. 03.0482, pp. 2-60. Jiménez, M. 2006a. “Cuando la protesta importa electoralmente. El perfil sociodemográfico y político de los manifestantes contra la guerra de Irak”, Papers. Revista de Sociología, 81: Jiménez, M. 2006b. “El movimiento de justicia global: una indagación sobre las aportaciones de una nueva generación contestataria, Revista de Estudios de Juventud, 75: 29-42. Jimenez, M and A. Calle. 2006a. “Organizational ideology and visions of democracy in Spanish GJMs” in della Porta, D. and H. Reiter(eds) Organizational ideology and visions of democracy in the Global Justice Movement, WP3 Report for Democracy in Europe and the mobilization of Society, a project funded by the European Commission, Contract n. CIT2-CT2004-506026, and (for the Swiss case) by the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science, Contract no. 03.0482, pp.265-289. Jiménez, M. and J. Alcalde. 2002. “La Construcción de la Identidad del Movimiento Antiglobalización en España”, Revista Internacional de Sociología, 33: 211-235. Jiménez, M. and Calle. 2006b. “Democratic practices in the Spanish global justice movement”, in Della Porta, D. and L. Mosca. Organizational networks, organizational structures and practices of democracy, WP4 Report for Democracy in Europe and the mobilization of Society, a project funded by the European Commission, Contract n. CIT2-CT2004-506026, and (for the Swiss case) by the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science, Contract no. 03.0482. Jiménez, M. and A. Calle. 2007. “The global justice movement in Spain”, in della Porta, D. (ed) The global justice movement. Cross-national and transnational perspectives. Boulder, Co: Paradigm Publishers, pp.79-102. Mosca, L. 2006. “Mayday Parade. Movilizaciones juveniles contra la precariedad laboral”, Revista de Estudios de Juventud, 75: 75-98.

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