rank consensus and experimentally induced changes in interpersonal evaluations

Psychological Reports, 1977, 41, 1331-1338. @ Psychological Reports 1977

RANK CONSENSUS AND EXPERIMENTALLY INDUCED CHANGES I N INTERPERSONAL EVALUATIONS1

W. DAVID PIERCE University of Albert2

Summary.--Changes in participation and mediated outcomes of top and bottom members were used to alter interpersonal evaluations in discussion groups varying in rank consensus. Bottom members consistently improve in evaluation C

with increased participation. Top members do not decline in evaluations with decreased participation once rank consensus is established. Consensus appears to operate more through status credits than equity processes. Finally results of evaluation changes due to changes in mediated outcomes are supportive of exchange theory and the giving of starus for valued contributions.

Previous research has demonstrated that participation and control over group rewards may be important determinants of status changes (Bavelas, er al., 1965; Blau, 1967). However, long-term interaction may counter these effects as groups achieve stable status hierarchies.

Blau (1967, pp. 126-127) argues that group members exchange respect and approval for an individual's contributions. This implies that highly ranked members share valued outcomes or reinforcers with others in return for their esteem. Changes in the evaluation of an individual thus depend on changes in the ability to provide valued outcomes. But Thibaut and Kelley (1959) suggest that, given stable expectations for outcomes, evaluations become relatively independent of prese'nt rewards. This implies that groups with established hierarchies will not change evaluations of top and bortom members with changes in ability to mediate valued outcomes.

Another basis of esteem is performance. Rewards for verbal activity increase participation of low status members, thereby increasing their social rank (Bavelas, et al., 1965). Hayes and Meltzer (1972) confirm these findings re- gardless of actual verbal content. However, changes in participation may fail to alter ranks within established groups. Sherif and Sherif (1969, p. 161) re- port an increase in rank consensus over time, and Homans (1961, p. 150) argues that consensus confers status and status itself becomes a basis for further esteem. The high ranked member actually builds status credits which operate to reduce the impact of performance deviations (Hollander, 1958). Participa- tion will not govern evaluations of top members once consensus has formed.

On the other hand, equity theory argues that, given a stable history of differences in status and performance, al l abrupt promotions or demotions are inequitable (Burnstein & Katz, 1972, p. 416). Considerations of equity imply that changes in participation will not alter evaluations of top or bottom mem-

'This research which builds on the author's dissertation was partially supported by a minor granc from the University of Alberta. My thanks extend to J. C. Moore, Jr., J. Gartrell, R. Silverman, L. Kennedy and W. Harrell for comments and advice. Tentre of Experimental Sociologg, Department of Sociology.

1332 W. D. PIERCE

bers once consensus has formed. When Bavelas, et al. ( 1965) found changes lor low status members, their groups had only short interaction histories, i.e., 10 rnin., and presumably, low rank consensus. The observed improvement in rank may not generalize to groups with high consensus. It is important, there- fore, to investigate participacion and concrol of outcomes as conditions for evaluation of high and low ranked members in groups varying in interaction time and degree of consensus.

METHOD Subjects were 1 2 female undergraduate students aged 18 to 21 yr. selected

for expressed need of money. Four subjects composing Group A received $50.00 to attend 16 1-hr. sessions. Eight subjects composing Groups B and C received $90.00 to attend 18 2-hr. sessions. All agreed to forfeit the attendance payment if they terminated the study. Group members discussed cases to achieve a solution. Subjects were seated in cubicles which allowed cornmunicacion but restricted information about evaluations or rewards and also the personal charac- teristics of others. Throat-microphones, ostensibly provided to monitor group functioning, were inputs to reinforcement program equipment. Participation and reinforcers were tracked by recorders and counters.

Every 15 min. subjects indicated their evaluations. A voting indicator be- fore each person allowed for assessment of the "contribution-of-ideas" by group members on a Likert scale from poor ( 1) to very good (4) . Also a reinforcement device in each cubicle provided points for participacions ( 3 sec. of speaking time). Points gained registered on a counter above an amber signal light and points lost registered above a blue light. Subjects traded points (gains minus losses) for money ( 2 cents a point) after discussion periods.

Baseli~te sessions monitored parcicipation and votes. Low Talk sessions involved participation reinforcement. A talk encouragement contingency was applied to the lowest participator involving a point gained for three participations on the average and a point lost for 20 sec. of silence. Others received a point gained for 20 sec. of silence. Also top parricipators lost a point for three participations on the average. The second and third participators respectively lost a point for every 8 or 16 participations. High Talk sessions reversed the treatments applied to the top and bottom members of Group A subsequent to Low Talk. A Low Share treatment scipulated that the lowest ranked member received a poinr gained for three participations on the average and a point also registered simultaneously on the gains-counter of the other members. High Share reversed the point sharing to the highest ranked member of Group A. For Group A (reversal design) order of treatment was not assessed;" but was for Groups B and C (operant design). No information on reward was given.

"A fourth group, with shorter history of interaction, is dropped from the experimental analysis because procedural problems created suspicion and devaluing of points.

CHANGES IN INTERPERSONAL EVALUATIONS

RESULTS The stability of the status hierarchy prior to experimental treatments is

assessed by an indirect measure of rank consensus. Total votes given a member during initial baseline were ranked and agreement assessed with Kendall's W (Siegel, 1956). In accord with Slater ( 1965), Group A has low consensus on vote assignment ( W = .34). However, both Group B ( W = .78, p < .01) and Group C ( W = 93 , P < .01) with longer histories of interaction achieve high agreement on vote assignment.

Time-series analysis handles dependency in observations, or auto-correlation, for data based on a single individual (Glass, et al., 1975). These techniques can compliment a visual analysis of trend data (Jones, et al., 1977). Typically the structure of auto-correlation suggests a least-squares model for analysis of pre- and post-intervention. When the structure cannot be assessed because of few time points a first-order moving average model has general utility for behavioral data (Gottman, 1973). W e use this model to test ch~nge in level due to experimental treatments? A t statistic with degrees of freedom based on number of observations minus the estimated parameters ( d f = N - m) permits inferences concerning treatment effects (Bower, et al., 1774). These t values are only reported when they clarify the visual analysis of trend. In d cases, however, results addressed are significant at p < .05 (two-tailed).

Effects of Changes in Participation The basic data are the frequencies of participation and votes received, ex-

cluding self-votes, for No. 1 (top) and No. 4 (bottom) of initial baseline. Figs. 1 and 2 indicate that, as expected, the Low Talk treatment increases participation of No. 4 and decreases participation of No. 1 in all groups. While No. 1 of Group B fails to demonstrate a level change, an analysis of slope indicates a significant downward effect ( t = -5.02, df = 4, p < .01).

Fig. 1 shows a significant vote improvement by No. 4 of Group A and a nlarked decline in votes for No. 1 during Low Talk. These effects are reversed with High Talk treatment. Clearly participation exerts a strong influence over votes when consensus is low. Also No. 4 of the high consensus groups, Fig. 2, shows vote improvements during Low Talk although nonsignificantly in Group C ( t = 1.79, df = 13, f l < . l o ) . While this group has the highest consensus, the lowered vote increase may be attributed to carry-over effects of Low Share. Thus participation changes produce vote changes for bottom members. regard- less of consensus. However, vote increases by No. 4 of Group A are at the expense of the top member while No. 4 improves at the expense of a third ranked member in Group B. Notably vote gains by this member of Group C do not entail a significant decline by any other member. Finally NO. 1 of

'The data were also analyzed assuming an autocegtessive model. There is no change in the results when this alternative model is employed. The Glass, el d. (1975) techniques are robust and misidentification of a model will generally not drastically alter conclusions.

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Low Hi Share Shars

FIG. 1. Trend analysis of participation and votes for Group A

3 6 9 11 I4 16

One Hour Sessions

Groups B and C shows lictle vote decline. While this member of Group B decreases to a second ranked position there is no change in level of votes for No. 1 of Group C where consensus is highest.

If votes reflect evaluations expressed during interaction, then several results demonstrate the influence of evaluations on level of participation. The initial baseline of NO. 1 in Group B suggests that votes are high and participation rises to meet the level of votes. Also, the effects on votes of No. 4 of Group A during High Talk appear to continue into return-to-baseline. The lowered votes seem to prevent recovery of participation ( t = 0.01, df = 9, n.s.). Member No. 1 of Group B also fails to show participation recovery following Low Talk. Notably the votes received by this member do not improve during baseline. These results indicate that participation- adjusts to the level of expressed evaluation when extra-group influences are removed.

I t is important that differences between No. 1 and No. 4 on both participation and votes are established in d groups prior to Low Share treatment.

Effects of Medidted Oatconzes Figs. 1 and 2 indicate that participation of members No. 1 and No. 4 is not

consistently related to Low Share treatment. Although participation increases

CHANGES IN INTERPERSONAL EVALUATIONS

Group B Group C

Two Hour Sessions. Two Hour Sessions

FIG. 2. Trend analysis of participation and votes for Groups B and C

for NO. 4 of Groups A and C, this is not confirmed for this member of Group B. Also there is no change in participation for No. 1 of Groups A and B while this member of Group C actually increases in participation. However, level of votes for No. 4 is increased in all groups. The amount of vote increase is, however, ordered by the degree of rank consensus. No. 4 of Group A demonstrates the most improvement in votes while No. 4 of Group C shows the least improvement. Votes received by No. 1 are not affected by Low Share. Also return-to-baseline following Low Share in Groups B and C indicates no change in votes for No. 1, which suggests lack of impact of Low Share for these members. Analysis shows that No. 4 increases in votes but there is no decline in votes for any other member in all groups.

Subjects completed a detailed questionnaire which assessed various aspects of the study including awareness of reward procedure^.^ Questionnaires were

'Specific questions were addressed to each subject regarding the reward procedures including, what kind of information did the signal indicator provide and how did you acquire the points on the counters? Also, a question asked subjects to indicate "the purpose of the signal indicator and its information for the study." A second set of questions assessed knowledge of the voting indicator, the use of the vote information, and how voting related to other aspects of the study.

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scored with 1 indicating "no idea of how points were received," 2 indicating "some insights into point allocation" and 3 "a dose description of the allocation of points." Six subjects were scored as 1, five a s 2, and one as 3. All bottom members received scores of 1 when the experimenter was blind. A third ranked member of Group B was quite aware of the Low-talk contingency. She reported that points were given "to get me to shut-up" and acting in accord with this hypothesis she was highly effective at gaining points and money. Other questions assessed awareness of the vote changes and the importance of votes for the study. Basically none of the subjects expressed the connection between points, participation, and votes. These results suggest that experimental de- mands to change votes were low, subjects were not aware of vote changes and could not link voting to the purpose of the study, and reinforcement contingen- cies govern verbal behavior even when awareness is low (Icoffer, eb al., 1977).

Drscussro~ AND CONCLUSION Bavelas, et al. (1965) show that changes in participation influence social

rank in groups with brief histories of interaction. This relationship is supported here by the vote improvement of bottom members in groups with much longer interaction histories. But highly ranked members do not change in evaluation with marked decreases in participation once consensus is established. Thus the relationship between participation and rank of top members seems to depend on the degree of rank consensus. Such findings emphasize the importance of consensus for rank stability of leaders in natural settings. Here leaders may encounter task situations which do not support current levels of performance. Apparently consensus and the status process it generates provide for a period of time where performance may decline witl~out status loss. In Group C of this study the leader reduced participation for six experimental hours without any change in evaluation of members.

The exact processes which make decline in performance less important remain unclear. Previously we linked consensus to status building (Homans, 1961; Hollander, 1958) and equity processes (Burnstein & Katz, 1972). The strongest test of equity theory implies no change in evaluations of top and bottom members once high consensus obtains. However, the findings indicate that bottom members do improve. Equity implications seem to diminish improvement in evaluation of bottom members and influence the strategy of re- assignment of evaluation. Observations that bottom members improve at the expense of the leader only when consensus is low may reflect the considerations ol' equity of high consensus. It seems, however, that consensus does not operate through equity processes. The rank stability of top members is more easily interpreted as the operation of status credits. The leader builds credits to deviate but others must receive their evaluations on the basis of current performance.

The Bavelas research and the present study have emphasized the relation-

CHANGES IN INTERPERSONAL EVALUATIONS 1337

ship of participation and evaluation. Results for baseline periods suggest the reciprocal nature of this relationship. In some instances participation appears to meet the level of expressed evaluation. These observations argue that evaluations are important consequences to member performances in everyday group interaction. As social reinforcers (Bandura, 1977), expressed evaluations reg- ulate and select the level of activity "appropriate" lor a given member and thus help to create and maintain differences among group members. This reasoning implies that changes in status and participation may be achieved by altering information on member evaluations.

Bottom members consistently improve in evaluations when they mediate valued outcomes to others. These findings are in line with Blau (1967) and the exchange of contributions for status. An examination of the experiment suggests that other conditions are also important. Others had no alternative sources for monetary rewards and points were allocated on an intermittent basis. These conditions work to increase the group's dependency on the bottom member and status is allocated as a balancing mechanism equalizing the former power advantage (Emerson, 1969, 1972). While further research is required, i c appears that these conditions produce status changes even when the group has a long interaction history where expectations of outcomes are well established. The findings suggest that groups with higher consensus "resist" evaluation changes (Thibaut & Icelley, 1959) but all evaluations increase.

Top members do not decline in evaluation when bottom members control valued outcomes. An analysis of the experimental operations, in retrospect, suggests the reasons for this maitenance of evaluation. Members were not given an opportunity to associate top members with the point reinforcers and hence there was no experience of withdrawal of reward. It would be expected that simultaneous withdrawal of valued outcomes from the high ranked member and -

the production of reward by the bottom member is essential to invert the social ranks. Also more rapid change of rank may occur if the top member, who initially provides positive outcomes, now administers negative reinforcers while the bottom member mediates the rewarding events. This rapid change is men- tioned in Jennings' (1937) account of the "overnight" rise of an isolate to a prominent group position.

In conclusion the findings of the present study demonstrate that participation and control of valued outcomes are important determinants of social rank. However, high consensus can reduce the impact of participation for evaluation of leaders. Also consensus can operate to reduce improvement of evaluation of bottom members induced by either changes in participation or control of outcomes. While the design of this study permits a detailed experimental analysis of social processes, the limitations of this research should be noted. Since we opted to study a restricted number of groups, the results

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may not generalize to a population of groups exposed to experimental treatments. However, the findings of the bottom member are in line with Bavelas who used a statistical groups design. In addition the controlled circumstances and monetary reinforcers of the experiment while necessary for testing theoret- ical ideas (Zelditch, 1969) may limit the direct application of results to everyday settings. Further research may investigate these findings in less controlled situations with more natural reinforcers and thus provide for systematic repli- cation (Sidman, 1960). Finally in this research consensus is treated as an attribute variable which is only indirectly measured. A study of rank consensus would ensure observed effects are due to consensus processes.

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Accepted October 24, 1977.

rank consensus and experimentally induced changes in interpersonal evaluations

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