radical right dynamics in france
TRANSCRIPT
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
The Dynamics of Radical Right Party Supportand Mainstream Parties’ Programmatic Change
in France
Kai Arzheimer
University of Mainz/University of Essex
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (1/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What’s the problem (I)?
I Radical Right in Western EuropeI Roughly similar profile (the nation, law and order,
anti-establishment, immigration)I Roughly similar voters (working/lower middle classes, male,
moderate levels of formal education)I Roughly similar support?
I Support for the Radical Right highly volatile
I Accross time (within countries)I Across countries
I Demand should be roughly stable
I “Supply Side” (party) and “Contextual” (external) factors
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (2/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What’s the problem (I)?
I Radical Right in Western EuropeI Roughly similar profile (the nation, law and order,
anti-establishment, immigration)I Roughly similar voters (working/lower middle classes, male,
moderate levels of formal education)I Roughly similar support?
I Support for the Radical Right highly volatileI Accross time (within countries)I Across countries
I Demand should be roughly stable
I “Supply Side” (party) and “Contextual” (external) factors
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (2/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What’s the problem (I)?
I Radical Right in Western EuropeI Roughly similar profile (the nation, law and order,
anti-establishment, immigration)I Roughly similar voters (working/lower middle classes, male,
moderate levels of formal education)I Roughly similar support?
I Support for the Radical Right highly volatileI Accross time (within countries)I Across countries
I Demand should be roughly stable
I “Supply Side” (party) and “Contextual” (external) factors
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (2/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A possible solution: context
I Jackman and Volpert, 1996, Knigge, 1998, Lubbers, Gijsberts,and Scheepers, 2002, Golder, 2003a,b, Swank and Betz, 2003:Electoral System, Unemployment, Immigration, Welfare StateInstitutions, political space
I Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: ideological context , i. e. presenceof radical right issues in other parties’ manifestos
I Polarisation, variance, salience:
I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”issues
I Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy
I Would the radical right suffer if all other parties stoppedtalking about their issues?
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (3/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A possible solution: context
I Jackman and Volpert, 1996, Knigge, 1998, Lubbers, Gijsberts,and Scheepers, 2002, Golder, 2003a,b, Swank and Betz, 2003:Electoral System, Unemployment, Immigration, Welfare StateInstitutions, political space
I Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: ideological context , i. e. presenceof radical right issues in other parties’ manifestos
I Polarisation, variance, salience:
I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”issues
I Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy
I Would the radical right suffer if all other parties stoppedtalking about their issues?
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (3/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A possible solution: context
I Jackman and Volpert, 1996, Knigge, 1998, Lubbers, Gijsberts,and Scheepers, 2002, Golder, 2003a,b, Swank and Betz, 2003:Electoral System, Unemployment, Immigration, Welfare StateInstitutions, political space
I Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: ideological context , i. e. presenceof radical right issues in other parties’ manifestos
I Polarisation, variance, salience:
I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”issues
I Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy
I Would the radical right suffer if all other parties stoppedtalking about their issues?
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (3/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A possible solution: context
I Jackman and Volpert, 1996, Knigge, 1998, Lubbers, Gijsberts,and Scheepers, 2002, Golder, 2003a,b, Swank and Betz, 2003:Electoral System, Unemployment, Immigration, Welfare StateInstitutions, political space
I Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: ideological context , i. e. presenceof radical right issues in other parties’ manifestos
I Polarisation, variance, salience:I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”
issuesI Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy
I Would the radical right suffer if all other parties stoppedtalking about their issues?
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (3/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A possible solution: context
I Jackman and Volpert, 1996, Knigge, 1998, Lubbers, Gijsberts,and Scheepers, 2002, Golder, 2003a,b, Swank and Betz, 2003:Electoral System, Unemployment, Immigration, Welfare StateInstitutions, political space
I Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: ideological context , i. e. presenceof radical right issues in other parties’ manifestos
I Polarisation, variance, salience:I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”
issuesI Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy
I Would the radical right suffer if all other parties stoppedtalking about their issues?
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (3/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What’s the problem (II)?
I Tested this in two different multi-level models (respondentsnested in surveys/country-years)
I But: Downsian parties act strategically
I Salience could be a reaction to previous radical right success
I Our findings spurious?
I Salience a cause or a consequence of radical right success?Chicken – egg problem
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (4/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What’s the problem (II)?
I Tested this in two different multi-level models (respondentsnested in surveys/country-years)
I But: Downsian parties act strategically
I Salience could be a reaction to previous radical right success
I Our findings spurious?
I Salience a cause or a consequence of radical right success?Chicken – egg problem
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (4/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What’s the problem (II)?
I Tested this in two different multi-level models (respondentsnested in surveys/country-years)
I But: Downsian parties act strategically
I Salience could be a reaction to previous radical right success
I Our findings spurious?
I Salience a cause or a consequence of radical right success?Chicken – egg problem
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (4/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A different approach: VAR (I)
I Effect of previous radical right success very difficult toincorporate into full multi-level models
I MulticollinearityI InterpretationI Structure of the data set
I Ignore micro-level → macro-political analysis
I No cross-level inference:
I Manifestos and radical right success (as opposed to individualvotes) all system-level phenomena
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (5/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A different approach: VAR (I)
I Effect of previous radical right success very difficult toincorporate into full multi-level models
I MulticollinearityI InterpretationI Structure of the data set
I Ignore micro-level → macro-political analysis
I No cross-level inference:
I Manifestos and radical right success (as opposed to individualvotes) all system-level phenomena
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (5/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A different approach: VAR (I)
I Effect of previous radical right success very difficult toincorporate into full multi-level models
I MulticollinearityI InterpretationI Structure of the data set
I Ignore micro-level → macro-political analysis
I No cross-level inference:
I Manifestos and radical right success (as opposed to individualvotes) all system-level phenomena
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (5/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A different approach: VAR(II)
I Statistical model: Vector Auto Regression (VAR)
I Multivariate time-series analysisI Regress each variable (success/salience) on
I Its own past valuesI The other variable’s past values (4 lags = 2 years)
I Immigration and unemployment as controls
I Addresses two questions:
1. ‘Granger causality’: significant improvement of predictions?2. Dynamic analysis: short and medium-term impact of random
shocks
I So far, for France only (Eurobarometer 1980–2002)
I Limitations of data and design
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (6/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A different approach: VAR(II)
I Statistical model: Vector Auto Regression (VAR)
I Multivariate time-series analysisI Regress each variable (success/salience) on
I Its own past valuesI The other variable’s past values (4 lags = 2 years)
I Immigration and unemployment as controlsI Addresses two questions:
1. ‘Granger causality’: significant improvement of predictions?2. Dynamic analysis: short and medium-term impact of random
shocks
I So far, for France only (Eurobarometer 1980–2002)
I Limitations of data and design
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (6/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
A different approach: VAR(II)
I Statistical model: Vector Auto Regression (VAR)
I Multivariate time-series analysisI Regress each variable (success/salience) on
I Its own past valuesI The other variable’s past values (4 lags = 2 years)
I Immigration and unemployment as controlsI Addresses two questions:
1. ‘Granger causality’: significant improvement of predictions?2. Dynamic analysis: short and medium-term impact of random
shocks
I So far, for France only (Eurobarometer 1980–2002)
I Limitations of data and design
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (6/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What Are the Main Findings?
I Previous levels of salience significantly improve prediction ofradical right success
I Previous levels of radical right success do not significantlyimprove predictions for salience – no ‘Granger causality’
I Not a straightforward test of causality (would requireexperimental design)
I But circumstantial evidence in support of salience as a cause,not a consequence
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (7/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
What Are the Main Findings?
I Previous levels of salience significantly improve prediction ofradical right success
I Previous levels of radical right success do not significantlyimprove predictions for salience – no ‘Granger causality’
I Not a straightforward test of causality (would requireexperimental design)
I But circumstantial evidence in support of salience as a cause,not a consequence
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (7/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
Consequences of a flash success: nil
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 5 10
order1, rexvote, salienzmean
68% CI impulse response function (irf)
step
Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (8/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
Conclusion
I Findings for France support Arzheimer and Carter, 2006,but. . .
I Very low number of observations within France (n = 35)
I Requires interpolation
I Media content as an additional control/factor?
I Other countries in Western Europe?
I Handling of missing surveys (not a big deal in France)
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (9/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
Conclusion
I Findings for France support Arzheimer and Carter, 2006,but. . .
I Very low number of observations within France (n = 35)
I Requires interpolation
I Media content as an additional control/factor?
I Other countries in Western Europe?
I Handling of missing surveys (not a big deal in France)
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (9/11)
IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support
Conclusion
Conclusion
I Findings for France support Arzheimer and Carter, 2006,but. . .
I Very low number of observations within France (n = 35)
I Requires interpolation
I Media content as an additional control/factor?
I Other countries in Western Europe?
I Handling of missing surveys (not a big deal in France)
Thanks for your time!
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (9/11)
References
Bibliography I
Arzheimer, Kai (2009). “Contextual Factors and the ExtremeRight Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002”. In: American Journalof Political Science 53.2, pp. 259–275. url:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00369.x.Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter (2006). “Political OpportunityStructures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success”. In: EuropeanJournal of Political Research 45, pp. 419–443.Golder, Matt (2003a). “Electoral Institutions, Unemployment andExtreme Right Parties. A Correction”. In: British Journal ofPolitical Science 33, pp. 525–534.— (2003b). “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme RightParties in Western Europe”. In: Comparative Political Studies 36,pp. 432–466.
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (10/11)
References
Bibliography II
Jackman, Robert W. and Karin Volpert (1996). “ConditionsFavouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe”. In:British Journal of Political Science 26, pp. 501–521.Knigge, Pia (1998). “The Ecological Correlates of Right-WingExtremism in Western Europe”. In: European Journal of PoliticalResearch 34, pp. 249–279.Lubbers, Marcel, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers (2002).“Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe”. In: EuropeanJournal of Political Research 41, pp. 345–378.Swank, Duane and Hans-Georg Betz (2003). “Globalization, theWelfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe”. In:Socio-Economic Review 1, pp. 215–245.
Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (11/11)