r02 - turner 1976 - the real self

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Th eR e a lSelf 79

R E A D I N G 4

T h eR e a lSel f :F r o mInstitutiontoI m p u l s eR a l p h H. Turner Unive r s i t yof Ca l i fo rn i a ,Lo sAngeles

It isproposedthat people variously recognize their real selves eitherin feelingsa n dactionso fa n institutionala n dvolitional nature, sucha s ambition, mo rality,a n daltruism,o r i n t h ee x p e r i e n c eo fimpulse, sucha s undisciplined desirea n d t h ewishto make intimate revelationsto other people.A shift towardth e impulse poles e e m st o b eunderw a y a n dmightb e plausiblye x p l a i n e db ychanging cu ltural definitionso freality, mod ified termso fsocial integration, shiftingpatternso fdeprivation,o r n e wopportunitiesa n dconsequences. Many standard sociologicala s s u m p t i o n sabout social control are incompatible with the new pattern of self-identification.

The [...] idea of a self-as-object permitsme todistinguish amongthe various feelingsan d ac-tions that emanatefrom my person. Some emana-tions I recognize as expressions of my real self;others seem foreignto the real me. I take littlecredit andassume little blamefor the sensationsan d actions thatar e peripheralto my real self(Turner, 1968). Others are of great significance,because they embodymy true self, goodor bad.The articulation ofreal selves with social struc-ture shouldbe amajor linkin thefunctioningan dchange of societies. This approach to linking per-son and social structure is especially compatible

with symbolicinteractionistan d phenomenologi-ca l perspectives,i h a istress the ongoing creationof reali tyby each m e m b e rof society.

The aim ofthis paperis to elaboratea dimen-sion of self-conception thatma y have importantimplications forsociological theoriesof socialcontrol an d other aspectsof societal functioning.To varyingdegrees, people acceptas evidenceoftheir real selves either feelings and actions withan institutional focus or ones they identify as

strictly impulse.There are suggestive signs thatrecent decades have w itnesseda shift in thelocusof self awayfrom the institutional pole and to-ward that of impulse. Thisshift may have alteredsubstantially th e world of experience in whichpeople orient themselves, setting it apartfrom th eon e that much established sociological theoryde -scribes. [. ..]

Institution and Impulseof Loci of Self

The self-conception is most frequently described

sociologically by na min g the rolesthat are pre-eminen tin i i .In a good example ofi h i sapproach ,Wellman(1971) findsthat the self-conceptions ofboth blackan d white adolescents can be charac-terized on thebasis of the same set of identitiesnamely, their age, gender, family, religion, race,ethnic heritage,an d their roles as students, ath-letes, and friends. Studies comparing the p lace ofoccupationan d work in the life organizationsofvarious groups of workers (Dubin, 1956; Wilensky,

1964) likewise relate the self-conception to par-ticular roles in society.

Self-conceptions can also be compared on thebasis of distinctionsat a more abstract level.Th erelationshipbetween sc lr an d social order is putin morecomprehensive terms when we distinguishbetween self as anchoredin institutions an d selfas anchoredin impulse.

To one person,an angry outburstor theexcite-ment of extramaritaldesire comesas an alien im -petus that superficially beclouds or even danger-ously threatens the true self. The experience is realenough and mayeven be persistent an d gratify-ing, but it is still not felt as sign ifying the real self.The true self is recognized in acts of volition, inth e pursuit of institutiona lized goals, and not inthe satisfaction of impulses outside institutionalframeworks. To another person,th e outburstordesire is recognizedfearfullyor enthusiasti-callyas anindication thatthe real self is break-ing through a deceptive crust of institutional be-havior. Institutional motivationsar e external,artificial constraints and super-impositionsthatbridle manifestations of the real self. One playsthe institutional game when he must, but only atthe expense of the true self. Th e true self consistsof deep, unsocialized, innerimpulses. Ma d desireand errant fancy are exquisite expressions of theself.

Again, conscientious acceptanceof group obli-gations and unswerving loyalty can mean that thereal self ha s assumed firm control an d overcometh e alien forces.But for those who find out whotheyreally are by listening to the voice of impulse,the same behavioris a meaningless submissiontoinstitutional regimens and authoritarianism. Amother's self-sacrifice for her child is the mea-sure of her real self when seen through institu-tional eyes,and it is a senseless betrayalof theparent's true being to those wh o find personal re-

ality in the world of impulse.It is no acc ident t h a i this polari ty para l l e l sFreud's classic distinction between id and super-ego. To Freud, the id wasmore truly the personand the superego merely an external imposition.As he turned to examinations of society, he ex-pressed th e same conviction w henhe wrote, "Ourcivilization is entirely based up on the supp ressionof instincts" (1931,p. 13), and when he proposeda relaxation of social norms an d standards as a

solution to the discontents of m odern civilization(1930).This position sharply contrasts w ith a viewsharedby many w ritersan d exemplifiedin Park'sassertion that "the role we are striving to live uptothis mask is our truer self (1927, p. 139).Although in other writingsPark sometimesex -pressed adifferent conviction,hi s statement epito-mized the institutional locus of self, wh ile Freudlocated the self chieflyin the worldof impulseuntil his belated concessions to ego.

T h e K e yDifferences

Several crucial differences between the two con-trasting loci of self can bebriefly stated.

1. Under the in stitution locus, the real self is re-vealed when an individual adheresto a highstandard,especially in theface of serious temp-tation to fall away. A person shows his truemettle underfire.Under th e impulse locus,th ereal selfis revealed when a person does some-thingsolely because he wants tono t becauseit is good or bad or noble or courageous or self-sacrificing, but because he spontaneouslywishes to do so. , , ,

2. To impulsives,the true self is something to bediscovered. A youngperson drops out ofschoolor out of thelabor forcein order to reflect uponand discoverwho hereally is. To the institu-tional, waiting aroundfor self-discovery tooccur is ridiculous. The self is something at-tained, created, achieved, not something dis-covered. If vocational counseling to help th eindividualfind his peculiar niche has elem entsof the impulse conception of self, the idea thata person ca nmake of himself whathe will, thatone chooses a task an d then worksat it, is theview of institutionals. The contrast is well stated

in a contemporary p rescription for effective liv-ing, writtenfrom the institutionalperspective:

So if we reach a point of insight at which webecome disgustedly awareof how w estage our-selves, play games,an d ingratiate others,to saynothing of using defense mech anisms and strat-egies, and if atthis point w e want to enrich lifeby findinghonest, deeply felt, loving interactionswith others, it is tempting to believe that we canchange simply by opening a door and letting out


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our "true" unsullied impulses. Change is neverso simple. W hat is really involved is not the re-leasing of a trueself but the making of a newself, onethatgradually ranscendsth elimitationsand pettinessof the old. (W hite, 1972,p. 387)

3. Under th e institution locus,th e real self is re-vealedonly when theindividualis in full con-trol of his faculties and behaviors. Allport(1955) locates the self in planning and voli-tion, in contrast to impulse. "Whenth e indi-vidual is dominated by segmental drives, bycompulsions,or by thewindsof circumstances,he has lost the integrity that comes onlyfrommaintainingmajor directions of striving" (pp.50-51). W hen controlis impaired by fatigue,stress, alcohol, or drugs, an alien self displacesthe true self. Thedangerof any ofthese condi-tions is that after repeated experiencesthe in-dividual may lose the capacity to distinguishbetween the true self and the counterfeit andbecome progressively less ableto resume con-trol and reinstate the true self. If use of alcoholis viewed with favor, it is only on conditionthat the user is able to practice moderation or"hold hi s liquor," m aintaining controlin spite

of alcohol.Bu t under th e impulse locus,th e true self isrevealed only wheninhibitions are lowered orabandoned.In a magnificent statementof aninstitutionalperspective, Wordsworth(1807)called upon Duty,"stern daughterof the voiceof God," for relieffrom the "weight of chance-desires" and for "arepose that everis the same."Bu t let the barest suspicion arise thata gooddeed ha s been motivatedby a sense of duty,and it loses a ll value as a clue to self in the eyesof the impulsive. For some impulsives drugsand alcoholare aidsoftenindispensabletothe discovery of self, forwithout themsociallyinstilled inhibitions irresistibly overpowerth e

true self. A participant in a Los Angeles"love-in" in 1971 said: "It'sa place wh ere peopleca nget out, get smash ed, get stoned, or wh atever.A love-in is a place to get awa yfrom the apart-ment. It's like beingout and touching peoplefor a change, rather than working with paperand working with inanimate objects. It's likebeing out in the real world for a change."

4. Hypocrisy is a concern of both types, but theword means different thingsto each. For theinstitutionals, hypocrisy consists of failing to

live up to one's standards.Th e remedy is notto lower standardsbut to make amendsan dadhere to the standardsth e next time.If one'sfailings persist, he ceases to represent himselfas what he cannot be, so that he at least es-capes the charge of hypocrisyby presentinghimselfonlyas w h a the is. For theimpulsives,hypocrisy consistsof asserting standardsan dadheringto them evenif the behaviorin ques-tion is not whatth e individual wantsto do andenjoysdoing.One whosets exacting standardsfor himselfand bydint of dedicatedeffort suc-ceeds in livingup tothem is still a hypocriteifhe m ust suppress a desire to escapefrom thesestrict demands. Altruism,in the traditionalsense of responding toduty and setting one'sown interestsaside, is a penultimate hypocrisy,compou nded by the proba bility that it is a dis-simulated self-seeking and manipulation. Theinstitutional goalis correspondence betweenprescription and behavior; the goal ofimpulsivesis correspondence betw eenimpulseand behavior:hypocrisyin either instanceis alack of the appropriate correspondence.

5. In the light of the foregoing differences,thequalities that makea performance admirablediffer. Th epolished, error-free performance,inwhich the audience forgets the actor and seesonly th e role being played,is themost admiredby institutionals.Whateverth e task, perfectionis both th e goal and the means by which thereal selffinds expression. Bu t impulsivesfindtechnical perfection repellingan d admire in-stead a performance that revealsth e actor'shuman frailties. They are in harmony with themotion picture star system,in which GregoryPeck, John Wayne,an d Gina Lollobrigida,rather thanth e characters they playin a givenpicture, are the centers of attention. EdSullivan's popular appeal, generally attributed

to his very awkw ardne ss and ineptitude, is in-comprehensible to theinstitutionals.Of course,the specific cues for spontan eity have changed,so a youn ger generation of impulsives no longerresponds to these starsas did anolder genera-tion.

6. The difference between discovery and achieve-ment also suggests adifference in time perspec-tive. Th e self as impulse meansa present timeperspective, while the self as institution meansa future time perspective. Institutionals, who

The Rea lSelf 81

build themselves a real world by making com-mitments, havedifficulty retaining a vital senseof self whenth e future perspectiveis nolongertenable. Th e malaise of retirement is a com-mo n indicationof this pattern.In contrast,free-dom from past commitmentsis heralded po -etically in the popular song "Gentle on MyMind," by John Hartford.

7. Just as hypocrisy takes ondifferent meaningswithin the two pa tterns, individualism isfoundin both settings withdifferent implications. Th eindividualistis one who rejects some kind ofsocial pressure tha t threatens his true identity.Bu t there aredifferent kinds of pressure. In oneview, social pressures can divert a personfromachievement,from adherence to ethical stan-dards, an d from other institutional goals.Th erugged individualists of 19th-century Americathought in these terms. Children were imbuedwith an individualistic ethic in order to protectthem from peer group pressures toward medi-ocrity or compromise of principle, eitherofwhich m eant failureto realize th epotential thatwas the true self. But individualism can alsobe a repudia t ion of the ins t i tu t ionalan d

,

interindividualclaims that compete withim-pulse. Th eindividualistmay beprotecting hinvself against a conspiracy to force'-him nto in-stitutional molds,to make him do hisduty, orto aspire. Both types wouldagree thatone mustresist th e blandishmentsof friends and thethreats of enemies in order to be true to him-self. But the institutional individua list is mostattentive to pernicious pressureson the side ofmediocrity an d abandonmentof principle; th eimpulsive individualist sees clearlyth e socialpressures in league with a system of arbitraryrules an d false goals.

Both institution and impulse loci allow for in-

dividualistic and nonindividualistic orientations.W ehavefound it useful to emp loy a crosscuttingdistinction betweenindividual'and social anchor-ages for the self. Institutionals stress either achieve-ment, a relatively individual goal,or altruism,asocial aim, as the road to self-discovery. Some-where betweenthe twolies adherenceto an ethi-ca lcode wh ich will vary accordingto whether eth-ics is viewed as applied altruism or a forum forindividual achievement. Impulsivesma y stress thesimple disregardof dutiesand inhibitionsin order

to gratify spontaneous impulses; thisis essentiallyan individual routeto self-discovery.Or they ma yseek self-discovery through expressing p otentiallytabooed feelingsto other personsan d therebyat-tain a state of interpersonalintimacy that tran-scends th e normal barriers betweenpeople.

It is essentialnot to confuse these alternativeanchorages with the question of whether peopleare preoccupied with maintaining appearances orconforming insteadof "being themselves." Describ-ing a mass gathering of youths, a student wrote,"People tend to forget how they would hope tocome across, and instead act as their true selves."This is a terse statementof howparticipantsfelt inthe situationand expressesthe pointof view of animpulse self-anchorage.But from aninstitutionalperspective, the same youths appearto betumblingover one another in their anxiety to comply withthe latestyouthful fad and toavoid any appearanceof being square. The institutional hopes thatafterpassing through this stageth e youths will "findthemselves," discovering their special nichesin theinstitutional system.Th e self-anchorage deter-mines which kinds of behav ior seem genuine andwhichar e concessions to appearances.[...]

Concerning this initial statementof the twolociof self, the reader should bearin mind thatspeci-fying polar types such as these is merely a way tostart thinking abou t variationin the sense of self.Except on the fringes of society, we areunlikelyto find theextremes. Elementsof both anchoragesprobably coexist comfortably in the average per-son. Yet differences among groups of people inkey facets of self may be ofsufficient importancethat their experience of each other is noncongru-ent, and little true communication can occur.

A Contemporary Trend

It is my speculative hypothesisthat over th e pastseveral decades substantialshifts have occurredaway from an institutionan d towardan impulseemphasis. Accountsof the "new sensibility"inAmerican culture (Bell, 1970,p. 59) or of"con-sciousness III" (Reich, 1970) alreadyassociatemany of the same features with theyouthful pro-test of the 1960s. But itwouldbe shortsightednotto see theshift in a more extended historical con-text or to overlook th e possibility of rural-urbandifferences, class differences,an d differences


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among national cultures,as well as generationaldifferences. Arevolutionary consciousnessoftenunwittinglyadopts perspectivesthat have beengrowing in establishedsociety,frees them fromaccommodation toother aspectsof f U i ' V s u / i e t y ,an d appliesthem to a contemporarya i s i s .

Thereis nothingnovel inattendingto changingvaluesoverthe last fewgenerations.But Isuggestthat thechangesbe viewedas a shift in w h a tar econceivedas valid indications of wha t isreal aboutourselves and ourassociates, tellingus whether

w e really knowa person or not. Distinguishingth e real from the unreal is a matter of intuition,not of logic. Faultless logic that concernsunrealobjects falls on deaf ears.A shifting locus of selfmeansthat successive generationsare talking aboutdifferentworldsof reality.At theheartof each arethe sharedan d socially produced intuitions throughwhichpeople identify their true selves.

Literary themesoften presageshifts in popularconsciousness. E xaminingthe writingsof JamesFrazer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Joseph Conrad, Tho-ma s Mann, and Sigmund Freud, Lionel Trilling(1961) traces the theme that we must accept thereality ofthose huma n impulses that w ere judgedunacceptableby an artificial an d unreal civiliza-tion. H e identifies"a certain theme whichappearsfrequently in modern literaturesofrequently,indeed, and in so striking a manner, that it may besaid to constitute one of the shaping andcontrol-ling ideas of ourepoch. I can identify it by callingit the disenchantmentof our culture with cultureitselfit seems to me that the characteristicele-ment ofmodern literature,or at least of the mosthighly developed modern literature, is the bitterline ofhostilityto civilization w hich runs throughit" (p. 26).

I have already noted Freud's penchant for theimpulse perspective. Perhaps thegreatest impactFreud had on themodern worldwas to discredit

normativebehavioran d conscienceas manifesta-tions of our i ' r u eselves and toelevate impulsestothat position.Under hi s aegis,guiltha s ceased tobe the redemptive experience through whichth ereal self reasserts itself and has become an exter-nal impedimentto personal autonomy. Lynd (1958)exemplifiesthis newer intuitionof reality wh ensh ewrites, "Livingin termsof guiltan d righteous-ness is livingin termsof the sanctions an d taboosof on e immediate culture.To some extent such liv-ing is necessary for everyone. Livingin termsofthe confronting ofshameandallowing shame

to become a revelation of oneself andone's soci-etymakes way forliving beyondthe conventionsof a particular culture.It makes possiblethe dis-covery of anintegritytha tis peculiarly one'sow nn n : iof thosecharacteristicallyhumanqualitiesthatare at thesamet imemost individualizingan dmostuniversal"(p- 257).

Concernwithdiscoveryof the true self, vaguelyidentified as a set ofimpulses that have beenre-pressedor dissipated und erinstitutionalconstraint,turnsup as anovel elementin thepolitical process

of recent years.It became a prominent themeinyouth movements, minority movements,an dwomen 's movements duringth e 1960s (Tu rner,1969). Miller (1973) traces the"politicsof the trueself" back to the poet William Blake and showstha tviolenceis conceivedof as theultimate formof self-expressionan d self-discoveryin the writ-ings ofFanon an d Sartre.

The term"soul" ha s often been used in muchthe same sense as our term"true self." It can befound in the workof poets as differentas RichardLovelace and William Wordsw orth. But its mean-ing haschangedto suit prevailing conceptionsofpersonal reality.A century ago the soul was es-sentially a moral force. As secular psychologybrought th e term into disrepute,it disappeared,sank into obscurity,reemerging todescribe a spe-cial quality attributedto blacks. It retains its char-acter as a dynamic force, but a supposedlack ofinhibition is a crucialcriterion of "soul."

Miller and Swanson (1958) documented chang-ing conceptions of child rearingas new middle-class parents evinced less concern about internal-ized controls and more about social adjustmentthandid parentsfrom the old middleclass. In stud-ies of another stagein life, students,as they pro-gressed throughcollegeor university, werefoundto look more favorably on the expression of im-pulses (Feldman and Newcomb, 1969, p.34). If

the inner-directed personof Riesmanet al.(1950)ha s much in commonwith ou r institutional,th eother-directedpersonma y have beena transitionaltype, clinging to the institutional frameworkfo rhi s identity but finding a way to accept constantchange. Perhaps the total repudiation of institu-tional identities is the p roduct of a grow ing senseof unreality inall roles that comesfrom the other-directed person's efforts to be all his roles. In theworld of business,the shift is from th e view thathumanrelations take careof themselves w hen tasksare effectively managed to theposition that human-

T h e R e a l S e l f 83

relations engineeringis essentialto effectivepro-duction. Ineducationth e progressive movementpromoted aconceptionof thechildin termsof hisimpulses, and not merely hislearningand conduct.Rieff 's (1966)depiction ofculturalchangeas "theshiftingbalanceof controlsan d releases" (p . 233)an d his account of the "triumph of the therapeu-tic" describea historical change toward greaterimpulsiveness.

Lifton (1970) hasdescribeda typeof personal-ity he believesis becoming much more commonthroughout thedeveloped world.H is "proteanm a n " has no true shapeof his own butassumesvaried shapes accordingto circumstance. Exceptfor the fact that Riesmanet al.describe other-di-rection as a mode of conformity, "protean man"ma y be a newname for the same kindof person.Bu t th e idea that rapid social change makesfixedidentities unworkable has also inspired Zurcher(1972, 1973)to identify th e "mutable self as aphenomenon unique to the present generation.Zurcher citesas evidence for the "mutable selfhis discovery that students no longer answerKuhn'sTST asthey usedto. Early use of thepro-cedure produced mostly"B mode" responses,meaning that th e subject identified himself withvarious institutionalizedroles an d statuses. No wstudents give principally"C mode" responses,whichspecify characteristic modes of acting, feel-ing, and responding.

"C mode" responses clearly attenuateth e link-age between self and institutional anchorage. Thereal self is m arked by characteristicorientations-attitudes,feelings, desiresrather th an character-istic placement in social organiz ation. Youngpeople find self-realizationin patterns thatar eviewedapartfrom their institutional settings. Con-sistent with this evidence is the contemporary viewthat, on meeting a stranger, it is inappropriate toask where he comesfrom, what he does, and

whether he ismarried,or tocategorizehim inotherways.Instead,on e seeks to know hi m throughhi stastes and hisfeelings. [. ..]

Sentiments

Much of thespontaneousjoy that lubricatesth efunctioning of social orders resides in thesocialsentiments.Love is of paramount importanceamong thesentiments. Because sentiment seemsto expressth e inner person,in contrastto external

behaviorthatmay becontrived, people seek agree-ment onsigns by whichto tell genuinefrom falsesentiment. Thechoiceof cues reflectsth e anchor-age of self. Self-as-impulse canfeel love as genu-i n e ,as a truereflectionof self, only when itarisesan d persistsas aspontaneousattachment, untram-meled by promises, covenants,an d codes of be-havior.Sentimentis not helped alongby a facili-tative social order:it eruptsin spite of the orderan d threatensit. The less organizationan d prepa-ration, themore easilycan theindividual discoverhi s true sentiments.Institutional, on the otherhand,understand loveas something that requireseffort to attainan d preserve.Th e infatuationthatexplodes impulsively is undependable and unreal.The institutional seeks to learn how to achieve truelove andturnsfor guidanceto such documentsasPaul's chapteron love in the NewTestament (1Cor. 13). Thecontrasting perspectivesare repre-sented in the analysisof popularsex manualsbyLewis andBrissett(1967).Manuals popular withmarried middle-class people in the1940s an d1950s are institutional in orientation. Theyofferreadersan opportunityto enhancethe vitalityan dmutualityof sexual experience, leading to a deeper

union of the two selves. But Lewis andBrissettread the manualsfrom th e impulsive perspective.Strippedof theinstitutionalperspective, the questfor mutual self-attainmentbecomes sheer, mean-ingless "work." Thus, they writeof "sex as work."To the extent to which the self-locus has movedaway from institutions,th e correlations found byBurgess andCottrell (1939), Burgessan d Wallin(1953),an dLocke (1951) with persistencean d lovein marriagema ybecome increasingly invalid,an dnew and different indicators ma y becomerel-evant.

The Meaningof Ritual

In 1930,an article entitled "Ritua lth e Conserver"(Cressman)appearedin theAmerican JournalofSociology.It elaboratedth e crucial part playedbyritual in sustainingth e Catholic churchand itsdoctrines. To a contemporary reader, the paperseems peculiarly unconvincing.To thosewho findnot only religious ritual but also marriage ceremo-nies, funeralan d memorial services, initiation cer-emonies, andgradua tion exercises devoidof mean-i ng , it is unclearho w ritual couldad d vitalityan dreality toanything.Ye t plainly manypeoplehave


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been, and continue to be, moved deeply by par-ticipationin collective ritual,and formany peoplededication to institutional goals and forms isstrengthenedin this way.Th e locus of self mustbe closely intertwined withth e a b i l i t yto gain avital experience from engagingin collective ritu-als. It wouldbe prematureto label on e causean dth e othereffect, but theimpulsive'sself-fulfillingprophecy that he will not experience hisreal selfthoughtparticipationin institutional ritual con-trasts withth eequallyself-fulfillingprophecy fromthe institutional.

Bu t the matter cannot be reduced to adifferen-tial receptivity to ritual. W riting on the"collec-tive search for identity," Klapp(1969) describesthe contemporary p overty of ritual, then insists that"ritual is the prime symbolic vehiclefor experi-encing emotions and mystiques together with oth-ersincluding asense of oneself as sharing suchemotions ..." (p . 118).In theplace of traditionalforms, there have arisen new rituals that partici-pants experience as spontaneousoutpourings in-stead of institutional routines. Sitting on the floorin a circle and singing to the accompaniment ofguitars takes theplace of sitting in rows on pews

an d listeningto anorgan. Rock festivalsan d love-ins are only the more dramatic rituals, for eventhe conventional partying rituals ofmiddle-classestablishmentarians areexperiencedas a welcomecontrast to institutional routine. Here, then,is an-other set of rituals that have meaning and vitalityas opportunities for experiencing a selfthat con-tains more impulse than institution.

Ritual is commonly viewed as a support of theinstitutional order, and Klapp's "poverty of ritual"does indeed characterize many of the forms thathave been employed to strengthen a collectivesense of institutional commitment. But it isdoubt-ful that there is any poverty of ritual today in thoseforms that increaseth e vitality of an impulsiveview of self.

R E F E R E N C E S

Allport,G . W.(1955).Becoming: Basic considerationsor apsychology of personality. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-sity Press.

Bell, D. (1910).Qu o warranto.Public Interest,19 , 53-68.

Burgess, E.W ., & Cottrell, L S. Jr. (1939).Predicting successor ailure in marriage.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Burgess, E. W., &Wallin, P. (1953).Engagementand mar-riage. Chicago: Lippincott.

Oressman, L. S(1930).Ri tua lthe conserver.AmericanJour-na l of Sociology, 35,564572.

Dubin ,R. (1956). Industrial workers' world.Social Problems,3, 131-142.

Feldman,K. A., & Newcomb,T. M. (1969).Th e impact ofcollege on students.Vol. 1. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its discontents.London:Hogarth.

Freud, S. (1931).Modern sexual morality and modern ner-vousness.New York:Eugenics.

Klapp, O. E.(1969).Collectivesearch/or identity.New York:Holt, Rinehart & W inston.

Lewis, L.S., & Brissett, D. (1967). Sex as w ork: Astudyofavocational counselling.Social Problems,15 , 8-17.

Lifton, R. J. (1970).Boundaries: Psychologicalman inrevo-lution. New York: Random House.

Locke, H. J.(1951). Predicting adjustment in marriage.Ne wYork: Holt.

Lynd, H. M. (1958). On shame and the search for identity.New York:Harcourt,Brace.

Miller, D. R., &Swanson,G. E.(1958). The changing Ameri-can parent. New York: Wiley.

Miller, S. (1973). Th e politicsof the 'TrueSelf.' Dissent, 20,93-98.

Park, R. E. (1927). Human nature and collective behavior.American Journalof Sociology, 32, 733-741.

Reich, C. A.(1970). The greening of America. New York:Random House.

Rieff, P. (1966). The triumph of the therapeutic.New York:Harper& Row.

Riesman,D., Glazer, N., & Denney, R . (1950). The lonelycrowd. New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress.

Trilling,L. (1961). Th e modern elementin modern literature.Partisan Review, 28, 9-25.

Turner, R. H.(1968). Th e self in social interaction.In C. Gor-don and K. Gergen(Eds.), The self in social interaction(pp. 93-106). Ne wYork: Wiley.

Turner, R. H. (1969). The theme of contemporary social move-ments. British Journalof Sociology, 20, 390 05.

Wellman, B. (1971). Social identities in black and white.So-ciological Inquiry, 41, 57-66.

White, R. W. (1972). The enterprise of living: Growthandorganization in personality.New York: Holt, Rinehart &Winston.

Wilensky,H. L. (1964). Varietiesof work experiences.In H.Borow (Fd ), Man in c;world

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