r egulation managerial economics lecturer: jack wu

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REGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

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Page 1: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

REGULATIONManagerial Economics

Lecturer: Jack Wu

Page 2: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

REGULATION

natural monopoly potentially competitive market asymmetric information externalities public goods

Page 3: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

NATURAL MONOPOLY

Average cost minimized with single supplier large scale/scope economies relative to market demand

Page 4: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

MARGINAL COST PRICING

Require provider set price equal to

marginal cost supply quantity

demanded

demand

marginal cost

Page 5: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

AVERAGE COST PRICING

Require provider set price equal to

average cost supply quantity

demanded

demand

marginal cost

average cost

Page 6: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

RATE OF RETURN REGULATION

maximum rate of return on rate base disallowed profit returned to users

Page 7: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

POTENTIALLY COMPETITIVE MARKET

Economies of scale/scope are small relative to market demand technology market demand

Page 8: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

STRUCTURAL REGULATION

Bar franchise holder from vertically related markets

prevent monopoly from extending market power

Page 9: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

MORAL HAZARD IN MEDICINE

supply

inflated demand

true demand

quantity (million hours a mth)

pri

ce (

$/h

our)

a

b

Page 10: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

RESOLVING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY

mandatory disclosure regulation of conduct structural regulation

Page 11: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

EMISSIONS

marginal cost to society

quantity (tons/year)

marg

. co

st/b

enefit

($/t

on)

35

8000

marginal benefit to society

Page 12: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

EMISSIONS FEE

user fee

quantity (tons/year)

marg

. co

st/b

enefit

($/t

on)

35

8000

marginal benefit to society

Page 13: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

ACCIDENTS

marginal cost to driver

quantity (units of care)

marg

. co

st/b

enefit

s

marginal benefit to society

Page 14: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

PUBLIC GOODS

legal framework enables excludability copyright patent

trade-off incentive for knowledge creation economically efficient usage of information

Page 15: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

PUBLIC PROVISION

For some public goods, practically difficult to enforce exclusion national defense clean air fireworks

Page 16: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

CONGESTIBLE FACILITIES

social marginal cost varies with usage resolve through user fee = social marginal

cost time usage

Page 17: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

DISCUSSION QUESTION

The demand for electric power in Sol Province is p = 20 - 20q, where p and q represent the price in thousands of dollars and quantity in Megawatt hours, respectively. Suppose that an electricity plant generates power at a constant marginal cost of $1000 per megawatt hour up to a capacity of 10 megawatt hours. Sol Province requires the plant to implement marginal-cost pricing.

 

Page 18: R EGULATION Managerial Economics Lecturer: Jack Wu

DISCUSSION QUESTION

Illustrate the price and quantity with marginal cost pricing.

Suppose that demand grows to P=20-0.1q. At a price of $1000 per megawatt hour, what is the minimum number of plants needed to produce the quantity demanded?