Queering the Conatus: Bodies, Desire, and Political Legitimacy in Spinoza’s The Ethics

Brian Rose PHIL 260

Davis 1 December 2008

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Queering the Conatus: Bodies, Desire, and Political Legitimacy in Spinoza’s The Ethics

In expressing how Spinozist ethology progresses from an examination of

particular things to an examination of compounded, socialized relations, Gilles Deleuze

formulated an intriguing set of questions to articulate the pursuit of many modern

philosophical projects; he writes,

[N]ow it is a question of knowing whether relations (and which ones?) can compound directly to form a new, more “extensive” relation, or whether capacities can compound directly to constitute a more “intensive” capacity or power. It is no longer a matter of utilizations or captures, but of sociabilities and communities. How do individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad inifinitum? How can a being take another being into its world, while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations and world? (Deleuze 628)

These questions are particularly relevant to the contemporary philosophical project of

queer theory, certain scholars therein contributing an innovative reanalysis of Spinoza’s

The Ethics, wherein the ethical scope once applied to particular bodies is now projected

toward identities and political categories. It is the intention of this paper to consider

Spinoza’s conatus as manifest in the queer production of desire; that the mutualism of

reasoned desire to difference, as well as the positive recognition of its own difference

through the rational aspect, establish the queer political body as a “multiple open

system;” that the multiplicity of queer identities allows for greater affectivity between

bodies, and thus greater potential for action and power (which, in social context, is a

representation of political legitimacy).

In order to undertake such an examination of queer identity in terms of Spinozist

metaphysics, it is first necessary to understand why Spinoza lends himself to the

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consideration of queer theory. To answer this, we look to the essence of queer oppression,

which is the obstacle that must be surmounted in order to attain political legitimacy.

Scholar Catherine Mary Dale states, “Unlike other kinds of oppression that do not

separate a body and its actions . . . homophobia is precisely the oppression that does: it

separates what a body is from what it can do, thus marking a difference ‘between an

ontology and a pragmatics’” (Dale 2). Indeed, all queer oppression seems to locate the

conflict outside of the individual’s concrete identity; whereas racism locates conflict in

the objective identity of the victim, homophobia and similar prejudices locate conflict in

the relations in which the victim partakes.

Dale continues, “[Elizabeth] Grosz remains committed to locating both sexual

difference and the sex of the love object as factors that crucially underpin lesbian and gay

political projects. But these factors become a problem when demands for the right to

same-sex relations . . . are susceptible to charges of political illegitimacy” (Dale 4). In

consideration of the context of queer oppression, insomuch as it separates a body from its

actions, it is reasonable to assert that any foundation of queer political legitimacy would

necessarily reconcile this synthetic separation (meaning that it would equate identity with

the actions thereof, thereby establishing a firmer defense for said actions, as well as

subject them to the influence of reason. Spinozist metaphysics provide excellent

justification of queer theory in that, for Spinoza, a body’s power is determined by its

actions (i.e. its relation to itself and to other bodies); the conceptualization of a body in

the context of its actions in relations, originally devised in order to establish greater

power within the body itself, will now establish greater power within the queer political

body.

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Spinoza defines a body as “a mode which expresses in a certain determinate

manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered an extended thing” (Spinoza

216). Each individual body is not substance but a mode; therefore, its existence is

intrinsically derived from affectivities shared with other bodies. He writes: “Every

individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot

exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause

other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence” (200). All action is

conditioned by external causality; the obvious implication of this being that a body only

exists so long as it acts or is acted upon, and therein lies its identity. This applies to all

particular things, but is applicable on a compounded social level in terms of queer

dynamics, as this paradigm is specific response to the source of its political illegitimacy.

Since queer is subjugated by its relations, it can only transcend this subjugation by

establishing its identity as a relation, therein expanding its affectivity and increasing its

potential for activity, ergo power.

In Part II of The Ethics, Spinoza writes: “The ideas of modifications of the human

body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct,

but confused” (Spinoza 240). These ideas of modifications are confused because they are

determined by external causes, as perceived after “the common order of nature.” Spinoza

continues, “[A]t such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of

regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and

contrast . . . it regards things clearly and distinctly” (241). From this we may suppose that

the only distinct ideas we may possess are those of which our own mind is the cause.

Therefore, if we are to regard queer identity as a relation (which is a modification of the

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body), it must necessarily be regarded in reason so as to emphasize “points of agreement,

difference, and contrast” between particular identities within the queer arena. Queer

becomes “like the vital force of Spinoza's natura naturans, a materiality that is always in

the process of reinventing itself, which William Connolly has described as ‘a world of

diverse energies and strange vitalities that whirls around and through [us]’” (Bennett 356).

This consideration of difference is intrinsically active, produces the most clearly-

understood ideas, and therefore enables political cohesion to exist among particular, and

often disparate, identities within queer.

Spinoza writes, “The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by

external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the

external body. . . . Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a

variety of bodies, together with the nature of its own” (Spinoza 232). Modal relations of

bodies entail the natures of all involved bodies; in terms of queer, this mutual recognition

of natures is the basic structure of queer dynamics: discarding irrelevant phenomenal

details in order to consider the true nature of the entity with which one is interacting. This

not only determines the nature of the perceiver, but the way in which the perceiver

perceives himself; considering his own nature in a state of confluence with other natures,

the human being’s understanding of himself is redefined.

Since queer avoids specific definitions, it is concerned with an indeterminate set.

Dale writes:

As a multiplicity queer is equated with an indeterminate number of bodies or groups at any given time, and these appear as aleatory and undetermined potential. In acknowledging its difference from itself, queer upsets the usual mechanisms of social recognition: social identity

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implies the division of potential social relations into designated sets and individuals. (Dale 5)

Rather than another category for which to define oneself, queer’s identity is not concrete

but modal, wherein “[s]olid identities such as gay and lesbian are seen as regimenting the

sexual diversity and singular relations that characterize queer” (Dale 3). This dynamic of

difference in queer provides the greatest potential for diverse impressions, and therefore

greater number of perceptions.

Spinoza’s radical reconsideration of God is indicitave of the reconsideration that

queer identity must necessarily undergo. Spinoza states, “The idea of God, from which an

infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one” (Spinoza 219). Like

Spinoza’s revision of God as a pantheistic determinism that manifests as modal relations,

queer must be revised not as a categorical noun, but as a deterministic system which

defines itself by the modal continuity within itself – namely, the pluralistic relations of

disparate identities, harmonized only by the recognition of mutual difference. This

emphasis of difference allows the greatest diversity of bodies to affect one another in an

active sense, and therefore establishes greater power. However, it is only through the

rational understanding of these relations that this power is established.

Gilles Deleuze, through his analysis of Spinoza, has attempted to apply such

revisionist ontologies to humanity. Jane Bennett writes, “Deleuze and Guattari, in a

similar vein, locate humanity within a single cosmic flow of ‘matter-movement’ . . . This

is not a world, in the first instance, of subjects and objects, but of various materialities

constantly engaged in a network of relations. It is a world populated less by individuals

than by groupings or compositions that shift over time” (Bennett 354). The contingency

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of these groupings is not dissimilar to populations of sexual deviancy that “shift over

time;” and this contingency is reflected in the relation of queer identity.

For Catherine Mary Dale, the relations within queer occur through Spinoza’s

account of “common notions”:

The practical process of forming active affections is bridged by what Spinoza calls "common notions." . . . This entails questioning the structure of a body by observing its relations with other bodies in order to ascertain what is common between them and thereby to enable their production of joyful affects . . . Spinoza says that common notions are able to form even with bodies that do not agree in nature. In terms of the disparate nature of queer, the theory of common notions transforms queer as an identity into queer as a relation. (Dale 8-9)

Because common notions may unite two bodies that do not agree in nature, queer is able

to encompass a variety of regimenting categories, while itself being an alliance of mutual

desire for difference and a state of relations.

The undetermined potential which arises out of the indeterminate set of queer

bodies will necessarily manifest as desire to fulfill itself through the conatus; desire

therefore becomes an inexhaustible resource of the queer identity, which may be

rationally utilized to advance its own power. Spinoza writes, “The endeavour [conatus],

wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the

actual essence of the thing in question” (Spinoza 271). Since fully engaging reality

necessitates active relations within and without a body, fully engaging the political arena

requires active relations within and without a political body. Queer’s will to power

(derived through the conatus) necessitates active relations within an identity, and

therefore bolsters political legitimacy.

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Spinoza writes, “Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived,

as determined to a particular activity by some modification of itself” (Spinoza 308).

Desire determines the particular activity of an identity through its relations with and

modifications by external identities as well as itself. He later states, “An emotion, which

is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof”

(383). Desire is passive in that it is determined by the modification of a body; it is active

in that it propels a body to persist in its own being; desire can only achieve this status if it

is tempered by reason. Of this, Dale posits, “Queer advocates the creative action of desire

advancing the notion of pleasure for its own sake” (Dale 10).

Active relations is the key to developing power within a body; namely, the queer

political body. Spinoza writes, “I say that we act . . . when through our nature something

takes place within us or externally to us, which through our own nature can be clearly and

distinctly understood” (Spinoza 263). Spinoza emphasizes the act of understanding

through our own nature – in other words, conceiving identity not in terms of objective

categories, but rather how we act upon and relate to other bodies (i.e. disparate identities).

Modal queer identity is defined by relations of difference and characterized by a rejection

of categorical heteronormativity; by recognizing “points of agreement, difference, and

contrast” (241) inclusive of our own identities, we provide a foundational structure of

queer political legitimacy; this identity of relations supercedes identities of mere

distinctions (i.e. sexual orientation, fetishisms, and gender ambiguity), which are not

modal relations but rather material categories that are “perceived after the common order

of nature” and do not constitute the essence of identity. Dale clarifies: “Queer, like

Spinoza's unknown body . . . is [because it is an indeterminate system] continuously able

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to increase its relations with bodies, its joyful passions, and therefore, its power of

acting” (Dale 9).

Any system of relations is “useful to man” in proportion to how greatly it

promotes affectivity between human bodies. Spinoza writes, “Whatsoever disposes the

human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways,

or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so,

in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or of

affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways” (349). Queer, as a modal system

of relations, can promote greatest affectivity with a focus upon its own difference. Dale

writes:

A positive expression of difference is a difference that is not structured by negation. This pure difference expresses the immanence of the multiple and the one, rather than the eminence of this over that, of one or many, of identity or chaos. Pure difference is the positive play of all events (effects) and their productions. There is no essential identity nor loss or lack, only affirmation. Thus queer denotes the inclusion of its own difference. (Dale 4-5)

Queer relations are founded upon mutual desires of difference. Though many categories

inclusive within queer (i.e. lesbian, transvestite, sadomasochist) contrast in the objects of

desire, their common essence is a desire for difference, the point of reference for which is

heteronormative value structures; the rationalized mutuality of desire is therefore the

essence of queer identity, the implications of which are vast.

In terms of queer, it is reasonable to abstract a contingent concept of difference as

the object of desire for the queer identity, rather than establish identities based on

absolute or concrete objects of desire; these absolute, material desires are less likely to be

subject to the rational aspect as more contingent concepts such as queer, and

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consequently material desire is unable to become active relations between disparate

bodies and increase the power of the inclusive identity. Dale writes, “In Spinoza's Ethics,

distinctions between bodies are not hierarchical because the judgment of bodies is no

longer based on a morality of superior and inferior species or genus. . . . Rather, it

apprehends new alliances and irreconcilable differences and treats them as no less than

productive” (Dale 5).

Bennett, writing on Spinozist conceptions of bodies and relations, writes, “What

Spinoza and Deleuze and Guattari here suggest to me is . . . a (necessarily speculative)

onto-theory that presumes that matter has an inclination to make connections and form

networks of relations with varying degrees of stability” (Bennett 354). Speaking of the

conatus, Spinoza states, “The more every man endeavours and is able to seek what is

useful to him – in other words, to preserve his own being – the more is he endowed with

virtue” (Spinoza 337). If what is useful man is the greatest possible amount of affectivity

between him and other bodies, then he will necessarily form relations of stability with

those which will provide him the opportunity to undergo the conatus; queer is such a

relation, as its indeterminate nature maximizes the possible relations between bodies.

Dale writes, “Queer is an aesthetics of relations intent on securing good encounters by

capitalizing on joyful passions. . . . Queer's own proper object is its movement and

undetectable change, and identity breaks this up” (Dale 10).

Reason is the key element in distinguishing queer as a modal identity and

increasing its political power. Spinoza writes, “Man, in so far as he is determined to a

particular action because he has inadequate ideas, . . . can only be [said to act in

obedience to virtue] in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands”

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(Spinoza 338). Desire without reason is passive, and therefore impotent in the context of

power and political legitimacy; to attain virtue, desire must be “in accordance with the

dictate of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one’s self” (338). Spinoza

writes that harmony is compromised by men’s obedience to passions. If queer remains a

relation of passivity (externally, as passive to homophobia; or internally, as passive

within its inner relations), no harmony will exist between the subsistent identities.

Spinoza states, “In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always

necessarily agree in nature” (343).

As Bennett explains, humans within relation to other modes is a constant,

unavoidable state. Therefore the Spinozist goal “to exercise a greater degree of self-

direction regarding one's encounters” become more to “alter the quality of our encounters

but not our encountering nature”; she continues by clarifying that “a thing has power by

virtue of its operating in conjunction with other things” (Bennett 354). By altering the

quality of our encounters through reason and the production of desire for difference,

queer becomes a new stable, legitimate political force.

Dale writes, “The Spinozist accumulation of joyful passions and their conversion

through common notions to active affects and adequate knowledge offers a practical and

ethical definition of queer. The ethics of queer emphasizes the idea that ethics is not a

stand but a way of life” (Dale 10). This re-appropriation of ethics into the existential

sphere is necessary not just in terms of queer, but in ethics in general. It is perhaps best

epitomized by Spinoza when he states, “Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue

itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise,

because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts” (Spinoza 405). Through

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appropriating queer desire and tempering through reason, we “rejoice” in the passions

that affect us, and thereby transcend passivity into activity. As an active force with

constant means of manufacturing desire, queer is thereby able to attain maximized

political legitimacy through a re-working of Spinozist metaphysics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY

Spinoza, Benedict de. “The Ethics.” Trans. R.H.M. Elwes. The Rationalists. New York: Anchor Books, 1974. 179-406.

SECONDARY

Bennett, Jane. "The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter." Political

Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy 32.3 (01 June 2004): 347-372. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Ramsey Library, Asheville, NC. 26 Nov. 2008 <http://0-search.ebscohost.com.wncln.wncln.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PHL1784981&site=ehost-live>.

Dale, Catherine Mary. "A Queer Supplement: Reading Spinoza after Grosz." Hypatia: A

Journal of Feminist Philosophy 14.1 (01 Dec. 1999): 1-12. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Ramsey Library, Asheville, NC. 26 Nov. 2008 <http://0-search.ebscohost.com.wncln.wncln.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PHL1668942&site=ehost-live>.

Deleuze, Gilles. “Ethology: Spinoza and Us.” Trans. Robert Hurley. Incorporations. Eds.

Jonathan Crary, Sanford Kwinter. New York: ZONE, 1992. 625-633.