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The Naxalite Movement in India from Independence-Present: Theoretical and Pragmatic

Challenges of Counterinsurgency within the Framework of a Constitutional Democracy

Cody William Punter

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Rudra

Chaudhuri. As my supervisor, Dr. Chaudhuri imparted me with invaluable knowledge and

helped guide me in the right direction. Our conversations, whether during formal

meetings or in our more informal exchanges were always engaging. His enthusiasm both

as a professor and supervisor were a source of inspiration throughout my research and

writing of this paper. Without him this piece of scholarship would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank my professors, especially Antaol Lieven and Rudra Chaudhuri

who both taught my course on the Conduct of Contemporary Warfare. It was thanks to

their course that I was introduced to the issue of the Naxalite insurgency in India, and I

would not have been able to write about such an engaging topic without their support.

I would also like to thank my family for their moral and financial support. They have

continually provided me with the opportunity to expand my personal and academic

horizons. It is to them, above all that I would like to dedicate my dissertation.

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Introduction

It is an object of paramount importance that the cause which gave rise to [those

disturbances] should be fully understood and such measures adopted as are deemed

expedient to prevent a recurrence of similar disorders

Judicial Authorities in Calcutta - 1831 1

When India became an independent country in 1947, it became the worlds largest

democratic state. Since then it has gradually sought to establish a predominant presence in

South East Asia while seeking a greater role amongst developed countries in the West. In

recent years, it has become widely acknowledged as a world power in large part to the

exponential growth of its economy as a result of the governments policies of economic

liberalisation in the 1990s. While this has indeed raised its clout and reputation on the

international stage, the exponential growth of the economy has been paralleled by that of

an indigenous Maoist insurgency, which has challenged the political foundations upon

which this growth rests, for the past 60. The greatest challenge the insurgency has put

forward has been its rejection of the legitimacy of the Indian government based on the

abdication of its legal and constitutional duties to the most disenfranchised and politically

vulnerable social groups as set out in the constitution. In refuting the authority and

legitimacy of the Indian government the Maoist groups has presented itself as rival

political faction which has been able to achieve a great deal of popular support of the

populations which it claims to represent. By 2006, the extent of the political control

exerted by Maoist insurgency especially in the central region of India resulted in the

Indian Prime Minister declaring that the insurgency was the countrys number one

security threat.2

1Guha,Ranjit(1980)p3.2PMs speech at the Chief Ministers meet on Naxalism. April 13, 2006.

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According to one estimate, up to 74,000 sq km or Indian territory is under the

direct control of the Maoists (also known as the Naxalites).3 Moreover, as of 2007, the

Cabinet Secretary stated that the Maoists officially had a presence in 182 districts in 16

states. However, while the extent of the Maoist presence is alarming and disturbing for

the government, it is the exponential rise in Naxal-related violence over the past ten years

that has led to growing discontent about the movement. Over the past five years over 10,

000 civilians and security personnel have lost their lives as a result of Naxal Violence

with 2,732 deaths being reported in 2009 as against 1,769 in 2008.4 Despite the increasing

levels of violence, the Indian government has so far failed to come to terms with the

political issues which are raised by the growth and of the insurgency and has simply

resorted to trying to stop violence with violence.

While there has been a great deal written on the insurgency, the majority of what

has been written in English has been journalistic/editorial in style and content. As a result,

available literature on the topic of the insurgency has been either overly biased, or

narrative in nature, with little attempt to place the insurgency within a social scientific

frame of analysis. Moreover there has been little attempt to critically assess and compare

the theoretical underpinnings of Maoism and Indian democracy within a historical

context. Finally there has been little academic literature which has sought to critically

apply a comprehensive theory of contemporary counter-insurgency to the current situation

in India. Therefore this paper seeks to set the development of Maoist ideology against that

of Indian democracy within a historical narrative whilst evaluating the states response to

the Maoist insurgency within the framework of contemporary counterinsurgency theory.

The goal of this approach is premised on the belief that the political element

involved in both the development of the insurgency and the subsequent state response to it

3Singh,Harindar(2010)p4.4HindustanTimes,July06,2010.

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has been largely neglected. As the central tenet of counter-insurgency theory is that the

government must have a clear political aim to challenge that of the insurgent5, the need to

understand the development of the political ideologies of both Maoism and democracy is

fundamental to understanding how to formulate an effective counterinsurgency campaign.

Indeed if the Indian government is to be successful in carrying out a counterinsurgency

campaign it will have to acknowledge the primacy of political aims in determining its

overall strategy.

It should also be noted that the scope of this paper will be limited to the central

regions of India. This is because of the 85 million Indians who are officially classified as

scheduled tribes 70 million of them live in the heartland of India comprising the regions

of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Marahartra and

Rajasthan.6 Thus while the government claims that 16 states are affected by Naxalism,

this paper will be focusing specifically on those areas with tribal populations.

Furthermore, of those states special attention will be given to Orissa, Andhra Pradesh

West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkand, and especially Chhattisgarh, as these states form a region,

otherwise known as the Red Corridor, which is the focal point of both insurgent and state

violence. Finally, although the Naxalite movement currently has many front

organisations, this paper will be focusing mainly on the current incarnation of the

Communist Party of India (Maoist). In addressing the insurgency in this manner, the

paper will be divided into three chapters.

The first chapter hopes to examine two separate but closely connected issues.

First it shows how Left-Wing ideologies in India, adopted from Maoism and Marxism-

Leninism, were used to politically mobilise peasant insurgencies, thus representing a

fundamental shift in the nature of peasant insurgency in India. Having established that, it

5Nagl,John(2005)p29.6Guha,Ramchanrda(2007)p3305.

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then demonstrates how the political ideology of the movement was crystallised and

subsequently transformed through external repression and internal splits resulting in the

development of a more sophisticated political ideology.

The second chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines how after

having changed its political direction, the Maoist movement was able to exploit the states

failure to address problems related to the poverty, underdevelopment and fundamental

legal rights of tribals. In doing so the Maoist movement was able to establish itself as a

rival political ideology to that of the state leading to a broad support base amongst

impoverished rural areas which the movement came to control. The second part of the

chapter examines how at the turn of the Millennium the developmental and political

aspects of Maoism were accompanied by an increase in violence. The state responded to

this by resorting to violence without addressing the political and developmental

grievances of local populations, thus leaving the insurgency un-defeated.

The final chapter demonstrates how the states current response to the Naxalite

insurgency has failed to draw on its own experiences and contemporary lessons of

counter-insurgency. Moreover, the chapter suggests that in contrast to traditional counter-

insurgencies, as a constitutional democracy, India faces specific challenges related to its

institutional deficiencies and the high standards set by its legal framework. It then

concludes that failure to overcome these challenges has resulted in a crisis in the political

aim of the states counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately fails to overwhelm the

political ideology of Naxalism.

In analysing and comparing the simultaneous development of the Maoist and

democratic political traditions in India, this paper hopes to show that the democratic

government of India has the resources to undermine the Naxalite insurgency. However

this is dependant on it having a clear political aim, through which it can confront the

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political challenges raised by the insurgency, and which is essential in order to bring a

peaceful settlement to the insurgency.

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Chapter 1

A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political7General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedongs central committee.

During the colonial period, peasant insurgencies were a common form or resistance to the

injustices of un-even land distribution, Indias caste system, and colonial repression.

Between 1946-1951, in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, India faced its first

insurrection of the post-colonial era and its single largest insurrection on its soil since the

1857 war of independence.8 While it was the later and much smaller rebellion in

Naxalabri that would give the Maoist movement in India its title, it is this movement that

provided the foundations for modern Left-oriented revolution in the name of social justice

and agrarian reform in India. What made it different from all the previous insurrections

and insurgencies that the Indian government and the East India Company had dealt with,

was that it was openly encouraged and organised by the Communist Party as a struggle

against forced labour, illegal exactions, unauthorised evictions and more generally the

feudal rule of the Nizam.9 It thus marked the beginning of a trend where peasant

resistance to the social injustices they were subject to were not simply sporadic acts of

defiance and violence organised by peasants in the name of peasants; they were now

being mobilised by educated members of the Indian intelligentsia with a view to securing

a political end.

The first introduction of Communism as a form of revolutionary struggle in

Telangana was a demonstration of the potency of the movements organisation and

ideology. Firstly it showed that when combined with the organisational capacity of the

Communist Party, high levels of peasant grievance could be effectively mobilised with

7Galula,David(1964)p89.8Singh,Prakesh(2006)p4.9Singh,Prakesh(2006)p5.

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concrete results. This is evident in that during the five years in which the insurgents were

fighting, they were able to establish control over approximately 3,000 villages.10 It also

showed that such control cost dearly in terms of human life as around 4,000 people were

killed in the struggle.11 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, drawing on theories of

Marxist-Leninism and Maoism, the Communist Party purported to offer an alternative to

the state-led development paradigm, which was inadequate for addressing Indias well-

entrenched feudalism.12 Thus, although the Telangana insurrection was quelled in 1951

without having achieved their intended radical agrarian reforms, it left an indelible mark

on the history of peasant struggles and insurgency in India.

However, while the revolutionary leftist ideology was a potent tool, it was by no

means a single coherent line of thought something that became only too evident in the

lead up and subsequent aftermath of the events in Naxalabri. The rebellion itself, which

only lasted 72 days, was the result of a skirmish that erupted between a tribal youth who

was attacked by a landlords goons when he went to plough his land. This resulted in the

retaliation of the tribals in the area, who went about trying to forcefully capture back their

lands. While the rebellion had been unplanned and resulted from indigenous grievances,

a group of ultra-left ideologues regrouped to form the All India Coordination Committee

of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in May 1968 and proclaimed Allegiance to

the armed struggle and non-participation in the elections13 In effect the AICCR was to

form the armed revolutionary counterpart to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) the

party in power in West Bengal under the United Front.

However, while it all of those who formed the AICCCR agreed on the topic of

non-participation in government, in the immediate aftermath its formation, the AICCCR

10Ibid(2006)p5.11Ibid(2006)p5.12Chakrabarty,BiyutandKujur,RajatKumar.(2010)p41.13Iibd.(2010)p42.

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began to show internal rifts based on disagreements as how to best wage armed struggle.

The main point of contention to arise was over the question of class annihilation, with

AICCCR members basically split between two schools of thought. One was led by Charu

Mazumdar who maintained the need for immediate annihilation of class enemies, the

other by Kannhai Chatterjee who believed that the anihhalation of class enemies should

only take place after building up massive organised forces.14 This was to result in a split

of non-parliamentary leftist revolutionaries into two groups the Maoist Community

Centre (MCC) led by Chatterjee and the Communist Part of India (Marxist-Leninist) led

by Mazumdar.

Of those issues which were creating the greatest rifts were the topics of

annihalation, the use of firearms and the dependence on the petty bourgeois intellectual.15

Mazumdar was himself aware of the negative effects that this could have on the

movement and answered by attacking dissidents as centrists while vigorously defending

the party line of with an emphasis on the annihilation of class enemies.16 This constant

defence of class annihilation as a tactic was part of Mazumdars obsession with

revolutionary violence. Indeed, Mazumdar claimed that violence especially against class

enemies jotedors, bourgeois compradors was the key to achieving revolutionary

success. He decscribed his model for revolutionary success as follows:

rely on the the poor and landless peasants; educate them in Mao Tsetung

Thought; adhere firmly to the path or armed struggle; build guerrilla forces

and march forward along the path of liquidating the class enemies [authors

emphasis]; only thus can the high tide of struggle advance irresistibly.17

14Kujur,Rajat(2008)p3.15Singh,Prakesh(2006)p41.16Ibid.p42.17Ghosh,SunitiKumar(2009)p249.

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One of the results of this obsession was that it saw Mazumdar constantly looking to

exploit opportunities for open conflict. In particular he sought to harness the adventurism

and aggressiveness of disaffected male youths in urban areas. Indeed, although the

ultimate goal of Mazumdars revolution was to liberate India from feudalism by inciting

peasants to overthrow those who oppressed them, there was an almost tacit

understanding that the peasants could only become a revolutionary force after it was acted

upon by the revolutionary youth and students and by the working class.18

Mazumdars belief in the need to inspire those who were oppressed through

guerrilla violence would in effect become the modus operandi of the CPI (M-L) in the

years between the Naxalabri uprising in 1967 and Mazumdars death in 1972. Throughout

this period, various CPI (M-L) cadres operated across India. As per Mazumdars doctrine,

they largely carried out violence in urban areas. In West Bengal, where there had been

links between the AICCR and student movements before the formation of the Party,

youths and students were incited to start an iconoclastic campaign against Gandhi and

Nehru.19 Throughout Calcutta and its surrounding villages these campaigns manifested

themselves in the form of book burnings, attacks on educational institutions, and the

targeting and killing of landlords and security personnel. Similar attacks were organised

an carried out in other parts of the country under the initiative of the CPI (M-L) with

schools, businessmen and policemen being attacked in Districts across Bihar, Orissa and

Uttar Pradesh.20

As a result of the partys emphasis on bourgeois-led guerrilla conflict with specific

attention being paid to urban areas, the peasantry and their grievances came to occupy an

auxiliary role. As Kanu Sanyal, who was a key figure within the party pointed out, we

18Dasgupta,Rajeshwari(2006)p1924.19Ghosh,SunitiKumar(2009)p224.20Singh,Prakesh(2006)p71.

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had not faith in the heroic peasant masses we, the petty bourgeois leadership, imposed

ourselves21 Thus although the CPI (M-L) under Mazumdar claimed to be fighting against

the antiquated feudalism that restricted the rights and freedoms of tribals, they were

themselves guilty of using the tribals for their own ideological ends. While this may have

been justified at the time as a necessary measure for the achievement of a revolution, the

reality is that it had an alienating affect within tribal areas.

This alienation was further compounded by the state-response which the CPI (M-

L)-led violence invited especially in West Bengal. In response to the Maoist violence,

the government of India in conjunction with state governments undertook Operation

Steeplechase in the bordering districts of West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. 22 During this

period, a joint force of army and police personnel was organised and given increased

mandates for the carrying out of arrests and application of violence with the

implementation of acts such as the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Acts

(1970) and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971).23 After being carried out for

forty days, the operation was deemed a victory for state forces. Although it did not

achieve any clear political goals, Operation Steeplechase was deemed a success based

on the large amount of casualties inflicted upon CPI (M-L) cadres and their supporters

and the number of people arrested across all three states. As a result, violence dropped as

did the stealing or arms, but most importantly the administration was able to restore the

peoples confidence in the state.24

Thus although severe measures were required against the CPI (M-L) the

immediate threat which it posed to state-order was put down with relative ease. Amongst

21SanyalinDasgupta,Rajeshwari(2006)p192522Singh,Prakesh(2006)p99.23Ghosh,SunitiKumar(2009)p22724Singh,Prakesh(2006)p100.SinghpointsoutthatinBirbhumforexampleofthe

400knownactivistsknownintheareaonly150werecaught.

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those peasants who were fighting for the improvement of their social and economic

standing, many felt the Party betrayed them by placing its own political ideologies ahead

of their own political goals. That the need to seize power was put ahead of their own

agendas for agrarian reform was already an issue of contention; but that the move to seize

political power could be put down so easily and lead to further setbacks for tribals

increased the strain between the Party leadership and its tribal supporters. Thus in the end,

Mazumdars strategy and its subsequent failure had a demoralising effect on the peasants

and ended with considerably weakened support from various peasant association.25

The failure of Mazumdars tactical line also led to increased tensions amongst the

ideological proponents of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism in India leading to debates over

its political strategy and how best to implement it. At the core of the majority of

disagreements of various factions during the 1970s was whether the teachings of Mao Tse

Tsung were to be strictly adhered to, or whether there was room for variation and

adaptation. Mazumdar, who had been heavily influenced by Mao, believed that Maos

teachings were universally applicable and had to be strictly adhered to. However, in

seeking to achieve the level of success which Mao had in China, Mazumdar was keen to

achieve political ends faster than could be possible and his aim of achieving total

revolution in India by 1975 was inconceivably far-fetched given the circumstances of the

time. Moreover, he failed to predict that violence, especially in favour of urban targets

and educational institutions would have an alienating affect rather than an inspiring one.

Furthermore in seeking to adhere strictly to the Chinese model, Mazumdar was

neglecting some of the differences which existed, and which Mao himself had pointed

out, between the revolutionary situation in China as compared to other countries. 26 In this

regard, Mazumdars line of thought failed to take into account two major differences

25Ahuja,PratulandGanguly,Rajat(2007)p266.26Ibid248.

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between India and China. Firstly, India is home to a wide range of nationalities, religions

and languages whereas at the time of Maos revolution in China 94% of the population

were Hans.27 Secondly, one of the successes of Maos revolution is that it provided a

means of unifying China, which at the time of his revolution, had no central government.

India on the other hand, not only had the tradition of a centralised bureaucratic state

dating back to British rule, but ever since independence it had been subject to its own

unifying process under the democratic ideology of Nehru. As such, Mazumdars

revoltuonary goals for India based on strict adherence to Mao Tsetung Thought faced the

dual challenges of extreme regional divisions while having to contend with a rival

nationalist democratic ideology which was becoming increasingly entrenched in Indian

political culture.

The recognition of the shortcomings of Mazumdars strict adherence to Maoism

and the nature of Indias regional differences would ultimately lead to endless splits and

divisions throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s. While many different lines of thought

emerged with the death of Charu Mazumdar and the failure of his revolutionary model,

one of the general conclusions reached amongst most parties was that pure military

struggle should be limited, and greater emphasis given to peasant struggles. Further

weight was added to this point when the Chinese communist issued a message in 1970 in

which they disapproved of annihilation carried out by secret squads and disagreed with

the view that guerrilla warfare was the only way to mobilise people against the enemy. 28

Indeed, if anything was to be learned from the failures of Mazumdars movement, it was

that Maos revolution did not provide the template for a successful revolution to be

replicated under the circumstances of 1970s India. However, while the failure of the

Naxalabri uprising had exposed the shortcomings of Mazumdars tactic of annihilation

27Ibid.p292.28Krishnaji,N.(1980)p1615.

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and the CPI (M-L)s overestimation of the capacity for a pan-Indian revolution, it did not

undermine the socialist-egalitarian ideology or the communist capacity for large-scale

organisation of disaffected populations. Rather, the decades following Naxalabri would

prove that Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was a versatile ideology that could be adapted to a

variety of settings and be employed to achieve the level of support which Mazumdar had

sought for the success of his revolution. Thus the idea of class annihilation was dropped

with an emphasis being placed on trying to come up with an Indianised version of

Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.29

ii

Having seen the Naxal movement swiftly crushed by 1972, through the arrest, death, and

fleeing of large numbers of its cadres, the Naxalite movement became scattered and

regionalised. However it would be wrong, as is often done in the literature on the history

Naxalism, to suggest that the period of rivalry and splits represents a lull in the movement

as a whole. As K.P Singh has pointed out, the various splits and dissensions during the

1970s 80s and 90s should be viewed as a process whereby each regional split led to a

faction seeking to increase its individual base of support thus leading to a growth in

organisational progress as opposed to regression.30 During this time there remained some

small factions operating in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, which upheld

allegiance to Mazumdars line of class annihilation. However, for the most part, their

tactics remained relatively unsophisticated and unpopular. As a result they were put down

with relative ease by authorities conducting extensive police operations.31

29Chakrabarty,BiyutandKumarKujur,Rajat.(2010)p46.30Singh,P.K.(2008)p14.31Singh,Prakesh(2006)pp115-119.

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Those who supported the goals of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism in India recognised

that Mazumdars interpretation of Maoist ideology was crude and unsuited to the Indias

socio-economic condition. Thus one group that had belonged to the CPI (ML) formed a

new party called CPI (M-L) Liberation based in Bihar, and proceeded to undertake a

project of course-correction. As part of correcting the mistakes of the past, the group

suggested that greater emphasis should be put on mass peasant struggles while pure

military armed struggle should be limited in an attempt to provide an Indianised version

of Masixm-Leninism-Maoism.32 Moreover, implicit in the turn away from Mazumdars

ideology was an understanding that a swift revolution was not possible given the

circumstances of Indian social and political culture. Thus Mazumdars pipe dream of

overthrowing the Indian government by 1975 through a united struggle was abandoned in

favour of small scale regional organisation with an emphasis on winning over local

populations.

In keeping with this program of establishing themselves at a grassroots level the

Maoists sought to establish control over areas that were isolated and ignored by states

development and security initiatives. There were several reasons for this. Firstly in

choosing to establish themselves where the majority of the population was living below

the poverty line the revolutionaries faced a greater chance of mobilising populations in

favour of a new peoples revolution.33 Secondly, the areas chosen tended to be

characterised by their hilly and forested terrain, thus making them inaccessible to security

personnel. The combination of these two factors meant that the Naxalites would be able to

exert a combination of sympathy amongst and control over the tribal populations without

government interference.

32Kujur,Rajat(2008)p3.33Garg,Ruchir(2008)p27

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Of those groups who were able to garner popular support in remote tribal areas

over the next few decades, the Maoist Communist Centre and the Peoples War Group

were to become the most influential. The two groups had developed in different regions

along different lines. The PWG emerged in the period after the Emergency as a

reactionary response to the authoritarian repression which communist and Naxalite

leaders had faced and to the gradual acceptance of the parliamentary methods conceded

by the CPI (M-L) Liberation. 34 Meanwhile the MCC had existed since 1969 under the

name of Dakshin Desh and had evolved parallel to Mazumdars CPI (M-L) in opposition

to its brazen policies.35 Indeed, despite the emphasis placed on the splits within the

Naxalite movement during the 1970s and 1980s, with the PWG having renounced the

policies of predecessor, both it and the MCC came to a more sophisticated understanding

of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

In effect the central goal of their ideology remained that of their archaic

predecessor: the liberation of the people from all exploitation and the dictatorship of the

ruling classes through the violent overthrow of the Indian government.36 However the

strategy through which they hoped to achieve this was far more sophisticated than the CPI

(M-L)s had been. According to the PWG the success of an Indian Revolution was

dependant on liberating the countryside first through area wide seizure of power,

establishing guerrilla zones and base areas and then encircling the cities and finally

capturing power throughout the country. 37 Similarly the MCC, which was based out of

Bihar, proclaimed the need for a protracted peoples war along the lines set out by the

PWG and differed only in its emphasis on guerrilla warfare. The strategy of both the

34Singh,Prakash(2006pp.121-131.35Chakrabarty,BiyutandKujur,RajatKumar.(2010)p53.36Kujur,Rajat(2008)p7.37Chakrabarty,BiyutandKujur,RajatKumar.(2010)p52.

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groups thus showed a better understanding of the contemporary political, social and

military situation in which they were trying to establish themselves.

Indeed the evolution of strategic thinking amongst the PWG and the MCC was

apparent at the tactical level. While the leaders of the PWG did not completely give up

the notion of attacking security forces, the main points of their programs consisted in

concentrating on issues which directly affected tribals. Of those issues which PWG

claimed to give primacy were: the redistribution of land; enforcing payment of minimum

wages to the farm labour; imposing taxes and penalties; holding peoples courts;

enforcing a social code.38 Thus rather than simply attacking the governments inability to

ensure some of these social services, the members of the PWG attempted to win over

local population by providing an ideological and more importantly a material

alternative to the state as a benefactor and protector.

In seeking to gather support for their cause from local populations the various

Naxalite groups made a concerted effort to establish a strong presence in those areas

which were most isolated from the governments security forces and most ignored by its

development and social policies. As such, PWG was able to rapidly establish a strong

base in the Telangana region where it had chosen to base itself in 1980 given the

favourable terrain and the well-established history of popular rebellion in that area.

Meanwhile the MCC chose to set itself up in Bihar where it competed with the more

moderate Liberation as well as Party Unity. A few short years after having established

itself in Telangana, PWG was able to spread its influence across the borders of Andhra

Pradesh and into the Southern regions of Orissa and the Chhattisgarh region of Madhya

Pradesh as early as 1982. Meanwhile MCCs overtly military line became increasingly

influential amongst tribals in the central regions of Bihar.

38Singh,Prakesh(2006)p133.

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Regardless of the feasibility of these strategic aims, whether it was Liberation,

MCC or Party Unity in Bihar or PWG in Andhra Pradesh, at the grassroots level,

considerable bases of support were developed over the following decades. The range of

support varied from tribals in areas where the Naxalites established themselves, to those

who took up arms to form part of its military program. Thus, rather than having found

itself defeated by government repression in the wake of the Naxalabri uprising, the

revolutionary left in India was able to evolve and expand its sphere of influence, thereby

presenting an increasing threat to the authority and legitimacy of the Indian state by the

end of the century.

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Chapter 2

On the 26th

January 1950 [the founding of Indian Republic with its new Constitution], we

are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in

social and economic life we will have inequality.39

B.R. Ambedka Chair of the committee that drafted the Constitution.

When they were drafting the Indian constitution, the founders of Indian democracy sought

to redress the injustices suffered by tribals during the colonial period. At the time of

Indian independence, Nehru proclaimed the dawn of an independent Indian democratic

state would be tasked with the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and

inequality of opportunity40. Acknowledging some of the deep-seeded historical divisions

which were inherent in Indias caste society, Nehru presented his Objectives Resolution

to the Constituent Assembly of India on December 13, 1946. In it he proclaimed that

adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas and

depressed and other backward classes41 Subsequent legislation represented an attempt

by the state government to address these issues.

The two most important steps taken by the government in this respect were the

abolition of the caste of untouchables as a legal classification as well as the abolition of

the Zamindari system. The classification of individuals as untouchables was traditionally

accepted as part of Indias caste system and had meant that those individuals classified as

such were given lower legal status than those of higher castes. The implications of this

categorisation meant that untouchables were frequently treated as less than human and

were subject to a variety of injustices from not being allowed to draw water from

39Sen,Amartya(2005)p36.40Dreze,JeanandSen,Amrtya(1997)p5.41Guha,Ramachandra(2007)p3305.

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communal wells, to be subjected to lynching or burning over trivial matters, without

recourse to due legal process.42

The Zamindari system was equally a feature of Indias caste system, which saw

upper-caste members owning large amounts of land and often using this land to exploit

landless peasants by charging extortionate rents and interest rates. Moreover their legal

status as owners of the land permitted them to evict rentiers without proper cause, often in

the interest of generating a greater profit. The intention of the abolition of the Zamindari

system was to revoke the right of private intermediaries to control the land revenue

system with the goal of clearer definitions of private property rights with respect to land

ownership.43

However ground-breaking and well-intentioned these constitutional measures may

have been, in the years following their implementation, those populations who were most

marginalised by Indias uneven caste system, continued to face persecution and hard-ship.

On the one hand this was due to the lack of legal and pragmatic re-enforcement that these

initiatives received. Thus as Deze and Sen have pointed out, even with the abolition of the

Zamindari system land ownership structure in India has remained relatively unchanged

over the last forty years.44 On the other the Indian government failed to implement wider

reaching reforms which might provide more robust welfare to under-privileged tribals in

terms of political, gender, educational, healthcare, and legal rights.

Part of the problem has been the way in which the India economy has grown.

According to Jayati Ghosh, the models for economic growth in India since Nehru have

been plagued by a pattern of growth which has been fundamentally unbalanced and in

crucial respects unsustainable, [] as it failed to provide minimum basic needs to the

42Ahuja,PratulandGanguly,Rajat(2010)p255.43Dreze,JeanandGazdar,Haris(1997)p37.44Ibid.p37-8.

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bulk of the population and allowed for the persistence of absolute poverty among a fairly

large section of the population45 Over the last forty years, whether under Nehru or during

the period of rapid economic liberalisation in the 1990s under the guidance of the IMF,

India has been unable to implement institutional changes at the local level, thus leaving

landed proprietors and rich farmers to profit most in rural areas through maximising

short-term gains without regard for the needs of tribal populations.

Indeed, in 2004 a Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of

Tribal Land and Its Restoration concluded that the development paradigm pursued since

independence has aggravated the prevailing discontent among marginalised sections of

society.46 The inefficiency of Indian development in providing for the most marginalised

sections includes lack of basic necessities in terms of access to food, clean water,

healthcare and education. The list goes on to include the adminstrations failure to

implement protective regulations in scheduled areas, resulting in land alienation, forced

eviction from land, dependence on money-lenders and often compounded by blatant

violence by state functionaries.47

In and of themselves, these shortcomings point to the failure of Indian democracy

to deliver the promises of the constitution from which the government derives its

legitimacy. However when held up against the spectre Naxalism these shortcomings

provided for the encroachment of an opposing ideology which was able on prey the

failures of the state. Indeed, as John Mackinlay has pointed out, one the main

characteristics contributing to the support of an insurgency is that there must be an

overwhelming sense of grievance for the insurgents to manipulate.48 With its ideological

45Ghosh,Jayati(1998)p169.46Banerjee,Sumanta(2008)p11.47Ibid.p11.48Mackinlay,John(2010)p22.

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turnaround in the late 1970s, the Maoists began to prove time and again that it was well

aware of this fact.

Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 1990s, the Maoists displayed a cautious and well-

organised approach to winning over local support in tribal areas. Already by the late

1970s the PWG, which was based in Telangana in the North of Andrha Pradesh set about

creating committees to isolate certain areas in order to assess and exploit the grievances of

the local tribal populations. Henceforth groups of Forrest Committees were created for the

jungle areas and Regional Committees for the plains areas.49 Furthermore, small squads or

dalams comprising between six to ten members would be organised and sent to talk to the

people and they would consult the tribals about their grievances. In particular they would

find out who was responsible for their problems. Once these individuals had been

identified usually landlords or government officials, the Maosits would go about killing

the most notorious amongst them.50

By either using direct acts of violence or simply intimidation, the armed cadres

would in effect use violence as an empowering tool, but not an end in itself. Indeed, in

contrast to the class annihilation which was seen as a strategic end in itself, the selected

application of violence as a tactic at a local level was intended to be more symbolic. In

this sense, the cautious application of force by Maoists can be explained as a form of

Propaganda of the Deed at the local level.51 Kumar Himanshu gives the example of how a

forest guard in Dantewada would punish a woman for carrying a bundle of firewood by

raping her. He would then ask for a three-ruppee fine, which if unpaid would lead to the

guard trying to extort Rs 300. The Naxalites were aware of the discontent this caused

amongst the population and would seize upon it by capturing a forest guard, trying him

49Singh,Prakesh(2006)p132.50Mukherji,Nirmalangshu(2010)p16.51Mackinlay,John(2010)p151.

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up, and having the tribals come to beat him.52 The list of methods used to gain popularity

amongst the population further include:

thrashing moneylenders and destroying promissory notes; attacks on or

sometimes elimination of people found to be harassing women; eve teasers

and those misbehaving with women being punished in praja (peoples)

courts; warning the landlords to distribute land; organising demonstrations

against the government on popular issues; and issuing statements to the

media53

Indeed the Maoists quickly learned that confronting those people and issues which the

local population viewed unfavourably was not only useful in gathering their support, but

also in driving state representatives and landowners off the land, allowing the Maoists to

take control.54

While some especially young males came to accept the Maoists because it

provided them with an outlet for violent action, there was much more to the Maoists

program which attracted tribals. For example in Dandakaranya in 1982, the Maoists saw

local agitation by Tendu collectors against exploitation and for better wages as an

opportunity for spreading their influence. During this period the PWG sent dalams into

the region and helped the tribal farmers occupy hundreds of acres of land.55 As such they

were able to empower the farmers and provide immediate results in terms of

landownership where the state had previously failed to do so.

While the government has the legal power to distribute land to the poor, it has

repeatedly failed to do so. As such Naxalite groups were able to gain influence by

performing the functions of the state in the forest areas of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,

52Kumar,Himanshu(2009)p11.53Reddy,K.Srivinas(2008)p94.54Muhkerji,Nirmalangshu(2010)p1655Garg,Ruchir(2008)p37.

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Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand.56 Although the seizure of land was not legal in

the eyes of the state, to the tribals who had suffered for generations, the Naxalites became

dispensers of justice. In those areas where Naxalites were able to gain increasing

influence throughout the 1980s and 90s, that is exactly the model that they have used for

their success by essentially providing a parallel government apparatus. Over time these

parallel governments have been able to achieve a high level of sophistication and

organisation. As armed groups gradually secured an area, they went about co-ordinating

economic, political and social reforms based on the needs of the local population.

Insofar as economic reforms are concerned, the Naxalites have made an effort to

improve land rights, increase minimum wages and secure common property resources.57

In Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites seized on the governments indifference to the wages of

tendu leaf gatherers and secured both a minimum wage as well as a pay increase for the

tribals.58 Meanwhile in Central Bihar, where the MCC has traditionally exerted a great

deal of influence, Bela Bhatia who has done extensive field research in that region since

the mid 90s has pointed to the fact that in Naxal-dominated areas there has been a

significant rise in the average wage of tribal labourers as well as an equal wage for

women.59

Over time, through their capacity to defend the territories that they occupy and

their ability to mobilise local populations, the Naxalites have been able to establish their

own system of governance and justice. Part of this has been achieved through the creation

ofgram rajya committees or Revolutionary Peoples Committees (RPC), which have

been put in place in areas under Maoist control to provide the basic functions and services

56Banerjee,Sumanta(2008)p11.57Bhatia,Bela(2005)p1542.58Banerjee,Sumanta(2008)p11.59Iibid.p1543.

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of the state.60 By incorporating the local population in the political process these

committees have been able to achieve a level of co-operation and an ad-hoc form of

peoples rule. In Dandakaranya alone the Naxalites established RPCs in 500 villages,

and it is estimated that through these committees the Naxalites were able to wield

influence over 2000 villages.61

Moreover, the Naxalites have made a concerted effort to address the lack of law

and order in areas in which they came to establish a strong presence. On top of their

ability to run parallel administrations they have been able to institute jan adalats

(peoples courts) and systems of tax collection.62 The jan adalats have traditionally

been very harsh in their verdicts with the death penalty being common. However, while

their respect for traditional legal concepts such as due process and weighted sentencing

have resulted in concern, they have continued to be held with increasing frequency. The

trials are widely publicised before taking place and the fact that up to 5,000 villagers

might attend the trial attest to their popularity.63 Indeed one of the reasons that they are so

popular is that while the ineffectiveness of the local judicial system may keep a litigant

involved in a petty land dispute tied up in court for several years, at a jan adalatthe case

can be settled in a matter of no time.64 Their system of taxation too has been criticised

as it is based mostly on profits generated from extortion, levies, and theft by the armed

cadres. However, that they have been able to profit from the corruption of contractors,

government officials, businesses, mines, factories and forest contractors point just as

60Garg,Ruchir(2008)p35.61Ibid.p35.62Jha,SanjayK.(2008)p62.63Singh,K.P.(2008)p15.64Harivansh(2008)p23.

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much to the states inability to address fundamental inefficiencies its economic and

political system as it does to the Naxalites opportunism.65

It must be acknowledged therefore, that in failing to deal with the underlying

causes of tribal disaffection, the state has effectively allowed for a rival political and

socio-economic form of governance to establish its authority in certain regions of the

country. Indeed, where the Indian government has failed to provide substantive justice and

development, the Naxalite movement has been able to distinguish itself by becoming

directly involved in a struggle to capture the minds and beliefs of the population. 66

ii

The ability of the Naxalites to take advantage of the situation in India through the spread

of their ideology and their physical occupation of rural territory has been able to continue,

more or less unchallenged up until present day. Of those achievements that are particularly

impressive has been their ability to establish liberated zones over vast amounts of land,

over which the Naxalites wield uncontested control through a combination of political

mobilisation and coercion. As of June 2010, the Naxalites were able to claim the areas of

Dantewada, Bastar, Bijapur and Narayanpur in Chhattisgarh; Malkinigiri and Rayagada in

Orissa; West and East Singhbhum in Bihar; Gadchiroli in Maharashtra; West Midnapore

in West Bengal for a total of 72,000 square kilometers as being unquestionably under their

political and military control.67 Moreover, in the majority of these areas, the Naxalite

presence has been established for decades, such that in certain areas many people have

grown knowing the Naxalite leadership as the sole source of authority in those areas. The

65Ibid.p22.66Mackinlay,John(2010)p18.67Singh,Harinder(2010)p4.

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situation is such that in some areas it is possible to come across second or even third-

generation cadres.68

Having established strong bases through their close contact with disaffected tribal

populations, various Naxalite groups believed that there was a need to go beyond

establishing the support of tribals, with the aim of achieving the intended aims of their

revolutionary ideology. The significant turning point in this respect was the convening of

the Coordination Committee of Maoist parties and Organisations of South Asia

(CCOMPOSA), where Maoist groups across South Asia including the Nepalese Maoists,

reaffirmed their dedication to armed struggle. This led to the conclusion that the erstwhile

splits in the Indian Maoist movement needed to be reconciled with the intention of

forming a unified Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) a Red Corridor spreading from

Nepal, through Bihar and the Dandakranya region to Andhra Pradesh.69

The conclusion of CCOMPOSA saw a series of mergers between Indian Maoist

groups. First came the unification of Party Unity and the PWG, which then became the

Communist Party of India (ML) (PW).70 This was followed by the 9th party congress of

the Peoples War in March 2001, where the leaders of the organisation concluded that in

order to achieve success it needed to increasingly militarise its operations. 71 This was in

turn followed by the announcement in 2003 that the two largest and most influential of

the Naxalite groups for the previous three decades MCC and PWG were merging to

form a unified command structure under the title of the Communist Party of India

(Maoist).72 This final merger confirmed the essence of what was said at the 9th congress in

2001 when the new group proclaimed in a joint press release that:

68Bhatia,Bela(2005)p1541.69Jha,Sanjay(2008)p66.70Singh,K.P.(2008)p16.71Singh,Prakesh(2009)p168.72Singh,K.P.(2008)p16.

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the immediate aim and program of the Maoist party is to carry on and

complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution.

This revolution will be carried out and completed through protracted

peoples war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and

principal task.73

Indeed, what makes the Naxalite movement different from the other insurgencies such as

those in Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir is that it rather than seeking to contest the

authority of the Indian government to exercise its sovereignty over a given area based on

racial, religious, or territorial claims, the Naxalite movement seeks to challenge the

sovereignty of the democratic state by undermining the fundmental principles justice,

governance, monopoly of violence which underpin its authority. It is thus that as of 2006

the Indian Prime Minister proclaimed that the Naxalite movement in India was Indias

single largest security concern.74

Insofar as the state is concerned, the Naxalites increased sophistication and

organisation have resulted in an increase in their guerrilla and military capacity. As early

as the mid-1980s and reaching a peak in 1991, Naxalites began employing violence to

secure their political and territorial gains.75 While levels of violence remained at a

relatively stable level for the next decade, the 9th Congress of the PWG and the

subsequent creation of the CPI (M), was accompanied with a rapid increase in violence.

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, between 2004 and 2008, 877 security service

personnel and 926 Naxalite cadres lost their lives as a result of violence between state

and Maoist forces.76 However, what is perhaps most troubling is that in this fight for

73Ramana,P.V.(2009)p753.74 PMs speech at the Chief Ministers meet on Naxalism. April 13, 2006.75Singh,K.P.(2008)p14.76MHAReportonNaxalism2008.MinistryofHomeAffairs;mha.nic.in

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authority and legitimacy between these tow factions, the number of civilians killed in

that period was estimated at 2,461.77

The prospects of further violence have only continued to grow as the Naxal

strong-holds expand their military capacity. In 2000, the Peoples War Group went about

setting up the Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) in 2000 while smaller scale

militias had been being formed since the early 1980s continued to flourish.78 Since the

formation of the PLGA, it is estimated that 10,500 professional cadres have been trained,

supplied with around 7,300 weapons, many of which are more sophisticated than the

standard issue rifles of the Indian police.79 This is supplemented by its informal militia

which consist tribals armed with traditional weapons and is considered to number around

40,000 spread across villages under Maoist control. Moreover, these armed cadres and

militia are supported by large portions of disaffected populations. For example the

peasant-worker (DAKMS front in Dandakarnya has 100,000 members while its womens

front (KAMS) has nearly 90,000.80

However impressive the support base and military capacity of the Naxalite

movement is, its goal of overthrowing the Indian government is neither realistic nor in the

better interest of disaffected populations they claim to be fighting for. This is because the

goal of the Naxalites is to advance their project of protracted peoples war by

transforming the erstwhile guerrilla zones into liberated zones. Contrary to its title, once

77Ibid.78Sundar,Nandini(2006)p3189.79Ibid.p3189;Thakur,Sankarshan(2006):ReferringtotheNaxalites,apoliceman

fromBastarcomplainedthatTheyhaveak-47s,wehave303riflesandnot enoughammunition.MorovertheuseofImprovisedExplosiveDevices(IED)

andremotemineshavemadetheMaoistsincreasinglylethal,especiallydue tothestatesinsistenceonsendingoutlargepatrolsintoNaxalareasas

opposedtosmallergroupsassuggestedincounterinsurgencytheory.80Mukherji,Nirmalangshu(2010)p17.

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an area under Maoist control becomes declared liberated, the interests of the tribals

become second order to the Maoist political program:

Thereafter, the need to establish and secure their authority, protect their

armed squads from the police and paramilitary, secure the obedience of the

people living in the area to the sanghams set up by them etc., become matters

of predominant concern.81

The result of the Maoists attempt to consolidate its political gains against the authority of

the state has thus been an increase in violence and a retardation in the progress of tribal

interests, as Maoists target schools, roads, and other government sponsored development

projects.

In theory the state has greater resources and a broader base of legitimacy than does

the Naxalite movement, and thus should be able to reassert its sovereignty by

undermining the Naxalites base of support. However in 2009 the Home Minister, P

Chidambaram claimed that As a government we cannot sit back and say what there are

underlying causes. We have to combat violence so that the civil administration can

function82. Thus, rather than seeking to undermine the politics and developmental

programs of the Naxalites, the counterinsurgency initiatives of the government have

solely focussed on the insurgency as a problem of law and order.

The central tenet of the L&O approach to counterinsurgency theory is that the

primary consideration of counterinsurgency should focus on the targeting insurgents as

they are seen as the principal cause of the breakdown of law and order. The resulting

strategy relies heavily on the use of force at the tactical level and has as its primary goal

the elimination either through intimidation, coercion or attrition of those who threaten

to destabilise the functioning of the state. Conceived of as such, Indias counter-

81Balagopal,K(2006)p2185.82HindustanTimes.October16,2009.

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insurgency approach to the problem of Naxalism centres on two pivotal assumptions

that the restoration of the authority of the state as defined in terms of law and order is the

primary goal of counter-insurgency and that anyone who gets in the way of this goal is

considered to be an enemy of the state. The resulting conflict between the state and the

Naxalites each claiming to assert their authority has led to deterioration in the rights and

general welfare of the tribals leading to their alienation.

Of those initiatives which have been the most alienating have been those taking

place in the state of Chhattisgarh. Having been consistently occupied since 1980 and

increasingly becoming the focal point of Naxalite operations, in 2005 Mahendra Karma,

the opposition leader of the Chhattisgarh assembly put forward the idea for the formation

of the Salwa Judum. The group was organised the premise that the unrest created by the

Naxalites encroachment of progress in the area could be harnessed an used to counter it.

As a result bands of men and women, especially the young were recruited, funded, armed

and assured of the assistance and the support of the state. 83 Once armed, the civilians were

grouped with police and paramilitary forces and sent to force villagers into camps located

near major roads, with a view to sanitising the villages and being able control the

population. When villagers refused to relocate the Salwa Judum responded by burning

villages and raping women.84 Upwards of 50,000 people have been displaced as a result

of the governments relocation program and been refused the right to return to their

homes.85 Meanwhile within the camps, no suitable access to employment or land has been

made while lack of food, water and shelter has seen people resort to raiding nearby

villages.86

83Thakur,Sankarshan(2006)84Guha,Ramchandra(2007)pp.3310-3311.85Balgopal,K(2006)218486Sundar,Nadini(2006)p3187.

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Moreover, while the camps were allegedly opened to protect the people who

inhabited the villages from the violence of the Naxalites, it instead led to a polarisation of

the community in which tribals look upon their fellow countryman as an enemy.87 For the

state government, this has been seen as a success as it has allowed the Chief Minister to

proclaim with impunity that those who live in the camps are with us, and those who run

away are Naxalites88 you are either with us or against us. However the government has

failed to take into account the legal, political and security implications of arming civilians

without giving them proper training or specific political goals in fighting insurgents and

using them to force fellow villagers into makeshift camps. Furthermore, there was little

consideration given to how the Maoists might respond to the movement. As a tribal living

in the camps put it First it was the dalams, now there is the dalam, the Salwa Judum and

the danger of being blamed by both for reporting to the other89.

While the Salwa Judum has been led by the state government recent efforts by the

central government to defeat the Maoist insurgency have shown that the perception of the

insurgency as a zero-sum game emanates from the centre. In the Autumn of 2009, the

central government launched Operation Green Hunt. Like the Salwa Judum, Operation

Green Hunt was premised on the need to defeat insurgents as understood in traditional

military terms. While the government has refused to employ the army90, it has relied

heavily on its paramilitary force, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in conjunction

with the state police of the districts of Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Orissa, and Jharkand.

87Kumar,Himanshu(2009)p8.88Ibidp8.89Thakur,Sankarshan(2006)90 Raju, Radha Vinod (2010) The reason for not using the army is because it is

trained to kill foreign enemies. The army has itself affirmed that it is not willing to engage with the insurgents. If it were to do so it require the

implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which would provide for the suspension of certain fundamental rights. This would

ultimately be worst than the current situation where although rights are

beingignored,theyareatleastintheoryupheld.

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With an emphasis on eliminating insurgents, the CRPF has been accused of

indiscriminately attacking unarmed tribals on the basis of their being Naxalite

sympathisers. As with the Salwa Judum, the polarisation of tribals into enemies and

friends of the state has led to an over-dependant and indiscriminate dependence on

violence often against defenceless villagers.

Not only has this had a demoralising effect on the tribals, it has equally led to the

demoralising of the troops who are carrying out the operations. This is partly because,

government forces suffered a series of devastating losses as a result of Maoist attacks

carried out as counter-offensives against Operation Green Hunt. Of those loses, one

happened to be the single largest defeat when 75 CRPF and one local police

superintendant lost their lives in a Maoist ambush in Dantewada.91

While it is these recent attacks in particular that have gathered the greatest

criticism from the Indian public, the Maoists are aware that inflicting calculated losses

upon the state forces demoralises both the troops that are meant to be fighting them and

the government that is meant to be co-ordinating that fighting. Indeed when an entire

company of CRPF officers was wiped out in the Dantewada, rather taking the opportunity

to boost morale by replacing it and sending the message the Maoist violence would be

met with retaliation, the DG (government) elected to leave the post unfilled.92 This has led

to resentment towards the state as expressed by a member of the CRPF in Chhattisgarh

who commented that We are the expendables [] We count for nothing at least not in

Dehli.93

The result of the governments counter-insurgency operations on the ground have

therefore led to disaffection and disillusionment towards the state amongst both the

91Datta,Saikat(2010)p2.92Pandey,Brijesh(2010)93Ibid.

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populations affected by the insurgency and the states own security forces. Although the

Maoists goal of overthrowing the government has been claiming that the Maoist

insurgency is the countrys single largest security threat it has failed to properly address

the political challenge that it presents to the legitimacy of the government. While it may

be argued that the Maoists have recently undermined their own political goals as a result

of their increasing recourse to violence, the reality remains that they still have the support

of and control over significant tribal areas as a result of their political and developmental

work over the past three decades. Moreover, the governments overuse of force has done

little to re-establish its own legitimacy. The current situation is thus such that, while the

Maoists will find it difficult to expand outside their current areas of operation, the Indian

state will not be able to easily restore order and legitimacy in the tribal areas that have

passed out its grasp.

If it wants to bring a conclusion to the insurgency, the government will have to

address the political bankruptcy of its current counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, as

John Mackinlay has pointed out to win back the population the state needs to have a

political idea, a strategy that overwhelms the insurgent manifesto.94 Thus, if it is to

restore the legitimacy and authority of democracy in India, the government will have to

become more self critical, accountable, and most importantly more dedicated to winning

over local populations rather than focussing on defeating its enemies.

94Mackinlay,John(2010)p6.

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Chapter 3

I can fight Naxals but not Naxalism95

Rahul Sharma, Superintendant of police in Dantewada- 2008

While the Indian government has acknowledged that Naxalism poses a threat to the

sovereignty of the state, it has consistently focused on targeting insurgents whilst failing to

counter the political challenges raised by the movement. The resulting counterinsurgency

operations which have followed from this understanding of the insurgency have depended

on traditional military strategies without consideration for the effects that its application

has on populations affected by insurgency. Moreover, the state has continually failed to

provide physical and legal protection to those who are affected by the insurgency.

Contrary to the Indian governments current approach, in drawing on theories

from classical counter-insurgency theory, the American campaigns in Iraq and

Afghanistan gradually dropped the strategy of targeting insurgents in favour of a more

sensitive and calculated approach where the objective is not to defeat an enemy as in

conventional warfare, but rather to win the hearts and minds of the local population.96

The problem with targeting insurgents is that applying a disproportionate use of force on

the part of the state adds to the strength of an insurgency by further alienating the affected

population, whose support is required for a successful operation.97 In fact, the strategy of

targeting insurgents by the American army in Afghanistan and Iraq became looked on so

unfavourably that it became known as mowing the grass, because the killing of

insurgents would only increase the resentment of local populations, leading more of them

to join in the insurgents operation.98

95Chakravarti,Sudeep(2008)p376.96Kahl,ColinH.(2007)97Goswami,Nasrata(2010)p98Berman,Eli;Felter,Joseph;Shapiro,JacobN.(2010)

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Thus the strength of a counter-insurgency strategy must be assessed not by

quantifiable data such as the number of insurgents killed, but by the extent of support from

the local population.99 In order to win hearts and minds a comprehensive strategy which

includes a mix of population security, governance reform, economic development, and

leadership targeting is required.100 The assumption of this strategy is simple in that the

more effective the government is at providing services to civilians, the more likely it is

that they will prefer the government over the insurgents.101 In order to be able to

implement the various strategies at the tactical level the central tenet of counterinsurgency

theory claims that a government must have a clear political aim102. Indeed, to win back

the population the state needs to not only have a political aim, but a strategy that

overwhelms the insurgent manifesto.103

If one were to examine the policies of the central government over the last ten

years it would appear that it had come to terms with some of the basic aspects of

counterinsurgency theory. As early as March 2000 the then Home Minister L.K. Advani

stated that the Naxalite problem is linked to economic development and therefore, the

planning for security and development must go together104. In effect the rhetoric of the

centre has changed little as the Chief Minister with the support of Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh proclaimed that the government would be implementing a new two-

pronged strategy which provided for the dual implementation of security and

development.105 Thus if one were to take the words of the governments at face value, it

99Galula,David(1964)p79.100Bittle,Stephen,(2010)101Berman,Eli;Felter,Joseph;Shapiro,JacobN.(2010)102Nagl,John(2005)p29.103Mackinlay,John(2010)p6.104Reddy,ShashidharM.(2008)p51.105Sahni,Ajai.July(2010)

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would appear that not only has the government understood the importance of

counterinsurgency theory, but it has been practising it for the last ten years.

The problem however, is that in claiming to deal with both the security and

developmental needs of the populations affected by the insurgency, the government has

relied on catchphrases and empty rhetoric without any reference to the nuts and bolts of

what is available, a coherent strategy into which these capacities can be woven, and how it

is to be implemented.106 The reality as to why the details involved in the implementation

of counter-insurgency doctrine have yet to be applied are in effect related to its inability to

deliver effective governance, which is a cornerstone of any successful counterinsurgency

operation as it is necessary for ensuring the protection and the economic and social well-

being of the affected populace.107

The situation in India is thus different from traditional counter-insurgency

operations because expeditionary armies are for the most part responsible for the conduct

of the counter-insurgency while local systems of governance are entrusted to the local

population in order to provide legitimacy to the operation. In contrast, in fighting the

Maoist insurgency the Indian government is simultaneously responsible for its counter-

insurgency operation and the fulfillment of effective governance. The reason that this is

so important for India is that it is directly responsible to its electorate and the ability to

uphold the legal, security and social functions of the state are the source of its legitimacy.

While the goal of contemporary counter-insurgency is to provide a climate in which the

post-insurgent society can maintain political systems and institutions leading to long-term

stability it would be assumed that the pre-existence of such systems and institutions in

India would be advantageous in implementing a solution which is more sensitive to the

needs of the population.

106Sahni,Ajai.February(2010)107Singh,Harrinder(2010)p4.

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However, rather than facilitate the implementation of counterinsurgency doctrine,

India has been burdened by the existence of structural deficiencies in its political, legal

and security institutions. One of the greatest problems in this regard is the culture of

corruption which is such a part of Indian political and legal culture. In 2008, the

Association for Democratic Reforms, an independent watchdog based out of New Delhi,

claimed that nearly a fourth of the 540 Parliament members face criminal charges,

including human trafficking, immigration rackets, embezzlement, rape and even

murder.108 Meanwhile, according to the corruption Perception Index in 1995, India was

ranked 35th out of 41 countries, while in 2003, it remained in the bottom third of all

countries listed, ranking 83rd out of 133 countries.109 Thus rather than having a

bureaucracy which is accountable to the law and the people in practice the bureaucracy,

both at the centre and state levels has emerged as the locus of executive power,

accountable neither to the political establishment nor to the people.110 As one former

Home Minister put it: our whole administrative apparatus is in shambles and the

organised and highly qualified civil services based on open competitive examinations, on

the brink of extinction.111

Thus one of the ironies of the Indian situation, is that in contrast to the American

military in Iraq and Afghanistan which has shown a great capacity for self-criticism,

within the upper-ranks of the police-force, the military or the Ministry of Home Affairs

there has remained unresponsive to the needs of the people. Meanwhile, deliberations in

parliament and in the public has been divided along the rigid lines set out by the Ministry

of Home Affairs with those who support development being considered pro-Maoist, while

108WashingtonTimesJuly24th,2008.109Singh,Prakash(2006)p239.Furthermore,theWorldEconomicSurveyranked India45thoutof49countriesonthehonestyofitspublicofficials.110Chitalkar,Poorvi(2010)p9.111Singh,Prakash(2006)p250.

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those who support law and order are pro-government, as if the two were mutually

exclusive. As a result there has been relatively little constructive debate concerning its

counter-insurgency doctrine and its over-reliance on force. However while it would be

easy to blame the lack of debate within the states security apparatus for this shortcoming,

it is the civil government which has failed to hold its security forces accountable to the

criticisms of the public.

One of the central problems in the respect is the gap in accountability between the

central and state governments affected by Naxalism. While the central government has

maintained that Naxalism is a threat to national security, it has continually reaffirmed that

matters of law and order and development are matters of state importance.112 Indeed while

both the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Planning Commission have continually offered

to give money to states in need of support, they have failed to provide any political

directive for the implementation of successful operations.

The result of this has been an uneven response across the various afflicted states.

Thus on one hand there has been the response of the government of Chhattisgarh which

has taken a heavy-handed initiative without any political consideration for the negative

outcomes of its operations and initiatives such as the Salwa Judum. In contrast, in Bihar,

the governments approach to Naxalism has been lax due to a mutual understanding

between the Naxalites and the ruling coalition resulting in a lack of action being taken by

the state against the Naxalites.113 Somewhere in between these two extremes there is the

state of Andhra Pradesh, which has been actively debating the need for a comprehensive

112SeeReddy,M.Shashdhar(2008)pp48-58.Thisaccounttracesthevarious

responsesofthecentralgovernmentoftotherequestsmadebythe

governmentofAndhraPradeshforassistanceintacklingtheNaxalite insurgencybetween1998and2004.Asperastatementmadeonthe10th

December2002,publicorderandpolicebeingstatesubjects,itisfor concernedstategovernmentstodevisemethodsandtakeconcretestepsto

curbLeft-wingextremistviolence.113VinodRaju,Radha(2010)

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approach to counter-insurgency since the late 1980s. As a result it has gradually adopted a

political approach and applied a series of measures at the grass roots level. In doing so it

has acknowledged the importance of gradually building up the support of the population,

using small but well-trained forces which were paid a substantial 50% remuneration114

Moreover, police stations were re-occupied, fortified with barbed wire and heavy machine

guns and given excellent lines of communication. Finally, in acknowledging the need to

arrive at a political settlement, the government in Andhra Pradesh held peace talks with

the insurgents. Although the talks broke down the fact the government and the Maoists in

the region were willing to temporarily cease hostilities to search for a need for a political

settlement to the insurgency represented a progress in the governments approach to the

insurgency

While the experience of Andhra Pradesh has been looked upon as a success at the

state-level, the reality is that the majority of Naxalites simply fled to the states of Bihar,

Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar, where police are less well equipped to counter

guerrilla warfare. The problem with this imbalance is that in leaving state governments to

tackle problems of public order no coherent police effort of the kind required to fight

counter-insurgency can be established. So far the governments idea of a co-ordinated

approach has centred on how to use the paramilitary CRPF, while guaranteeing money to

states. The problem with this is that the while the CRPF is integral to the counter-

insurgency operations it can only be employed successfully if it has the intelligence

network and security infrastructure which can only come from established well-trained

local police forces. Moreover when money is handed out without conditions and a means

of ensuring that it is used effectively, it often gets wasted and embezzled. Thus the centre

114VinodRaju,Radha(2010)

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must go beyond relying on paramilitary forces and simply giving money to states and

instead put pressure on state governments to establish effective police forces.

The implementation of a state-wide program to improve its security forces should

be premised on the success of the Andhra model. One of the greatest problems in this

respect, is that there is a severe lack of police officers across the states of Chhattisgarh,

Jharkand, Mahrastatra, West Bengal and Orissa.115 One of the most important lessons to

be drawn from Andhra Pradesh and other successful counter-insurgency campaigns is that

there cannot be any substitute for guarding the populace by ensuring [a] physical

presence116 Therefore if the government wants to implement a comprehensive security

strategy across Naxal-affected states it will have to ensure that the severe crisis in police

vacancies is filled.117 Not only that but there should be an emphasis on recruiting local

populations to fill those vacancies. Indeed, as recently experienced by the American army

in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the greatest difficulties encountered in initiating a

population centric counter-insurgency is the inability of expeditionary forces to

communicate with local populations and associate with local customs. This is just as

much the case in India where dialects vary across tribal areas. However, so far the

government has relied heavily on paramilitary forces such as the CRPF, which although

they have training in counter-insurgency, cannot provide the permanent presence and

local knowledge upon which the building of effective intelligence is based.

In order to ensure that the police focuses on protecting the population, the

government needs to ensure that the police forces are given adequate resources such as

weapons, communications, a defensible police stations and sufficient remuneration in

115Sahni,Ajai(2010)p3.116Singh,Harinder(2010)p4.117Sahni,AjaiFebruary(2010)p3. AccordingtoSahni,thedeficienciesinpoliceforcesgivenasapercentageas

respectivelyBihar33%;Orissa19%;Jharkhand21%;Chhattisgarh25%;

AndhraPradesh11%;WestBengal25%.

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order to ensure that police know that they have the support of the state. Moreover, rigid

training relating to the sensitivity required when dealing with local populations need to be

administered to any police officer who is going to be policing a Naxal affected area.

While this is fundamental to the success of counter-insurgency, it is probably the most

difficult facet of the security strategy as it is dependant on the need for a political

understanding of law and order. Even without taking into account the added sensitivity

required in a counter-insurgency, the level of corruption within the police force presents a

major challenge to successful counter-insurgency operations. Indeed according to a report

produced by Human Rights Watch in 2009, state police forces in India operate outside

the law, lack sufficient ethical and professional standards, are overstretched and

outmatched by criminal elements, and unable to cope with increasing public demands and

expectations118. If it is to win over local populations from the insurgents, the Indian

government will have to make a concerted effort to purge criminal elements from its

police force through drastic reforms and the application of the law to those forces which

are guilty of committing abuses such as torture, murder and rape.

Beyond the challenges inherent in the reform of its state police force, the central

government also faces the challenge of implementing development initiatives that are

beneficial to the populations who have been won over by the rudimentary improvements

made by the Naxalites. The governments Planning Commission recently put together a

panel of activists, journalists, professors, ex-police officers, and former politicians. It

concluded that if it is to effectively deal with the insurgency it will have to reverse the

current development paradigm pursued since independence which has aggravated the

prevailing discontent among marginalised society.119

118India:OverhaulAbusive,FailingSystem;www.hrw.org.119Banerjee,Sumanta(2010)p11.

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Howeverso far, the government has been unable to reconcile the political goals of

economic development as viewed by the central and state governments with the political

goals required in a counter-insurgency campaign. Thus, under the supervision of the

central government there have been several programs such as the National Employment

Rural Guarantee Act (NERGA) and the Backwards Districts Initiative, which have been

put in place under the supervision of the central government.120 However the

implementation of acts such as the NERGA has been poor as a result of the corrupt

bureaucracy of the state.121 Indeed of those areas that have been worst affected by

Naxalism, none have shown any serious dedication to providing sustainable development

to tribal populations. The reasons for this can be summed up by the fact that it remains in

the immediate economic interest of the state to push through development projects which

are centered on profit creation rather than jobs creation and conservation of specially

designated tribals areas.122

In part this can be blamed by pressure placed upon them as a result of the central

governments creation of Special Economic Zones under the SEZ Act of 2005, which has

essentially led to the creation of geographical regions with different economic laws to the

rest of the country in order to facilitate increased investment and economic activity.123 Of

those areas which have been designated for the implementation of SEZs, the Naxal-

affected states of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Marahastra and Karnatka, have a

variety of steel, iron and mining projects planned totaling US$ 85 billion of promised

120MinistryofHomeAffairsAnnualReportonNaxalism2009;http://mha.nic.in121SeeBanerjee,KaustavandSahaPartha(2010)p47.InmanycasestheNERGAhas failedtoevenguaranteeminimumwagesduetopoorimplementation,while

lowerlevelcorruptioningovernmentbankshasmeantthatoftenworkersdo notgetpaidatall.122SeeBanerjee,KaustavandSahaPartha(2010)123Chakrabarty,BidyutandKumarKujur,Rajat(2010)p165.

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government schemes.129 While the government is bound by Schedules V and VI to

provide for the rehabilitation of tribals displaced by development projects, it has so far

only rehabilitated 25%.130 Indeed rather than uphold the law in favour of the tribals, state

officials have been better known for manipulating land records in their own favour, in

order to claim tribal lands.131

Rather than employing laws to uphold the principle of justice as guaranteed in the

constitution and in favour of the population, the government has so far sought to use the

counter-insurgency as an excuse for flaunting the law. Take for example the issues of the

Salwa Judum. Since its inception, it has increasingly come under criticism from a wide

range of politicians, human rights activists and special reports and enquiries for its human

rights abuses and for being the product of an alliance between international and national

mining interests and the local elites, capitalising on local inter-tribe rivalries, mediated by

national and state policymakers.132 On the 10th of June 2008, the Supreme Court

acknowledged the widespread allegations of abuses on the part of the Salwa Judum by

ordering the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to investigate into the

situation in Dantewada. While this should have been an opportunity to enforce the

governments commitment to legal accountability, rather than appointing an independent

committee to conduct an enquiry, the NHRC directed its police wing to constitute a fact-

finding committee.133 The resulting conclusions were neither objective nor neutral, as

violations by the Salwa Judum effectively went uncondemned and were rather held up as

an effective extension of law enforcement. Not only were the investigators themselves

129Ahuja,PratulandGanguly,Rajat(2007)p262.130Subramanian,K.S.(2010)P25.131Chakrabarty,BidyutandKumarKujur,Rajat(2010)p118.132Maringanti, Anant (2010) p 43.133Balgopal,K(2008)p10.

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