puncturing the counterinsurgency myth: britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and...

8/4/2019 Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present, and Future

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ADVANCING

STRATEGIC THOUGHT

SERIES

Puncturing the

Counterinsurgency

Myth: Britain and

Irregular Warfare in

the Past, Present,

and FutureAndrew Mumford

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Advancing Strategic Thought Series

PUNCTURING THECOUNTERINSURGENCY MYTH:

BRITAIN AND IRREGULAR WARFAREIN THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Andrew Mumford

September 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-509-7


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FOREWORD

The British way of counterinsurgency warght-ing has often been held up by academics and militarypractitioners alike as a model worthy of replication byother national militaries, including the United States.In this insightful and provocative monograph, Dr.Andrew Mumford posits that the popular perceptionof British counterinsurgency efcacy from Malayaonwards has certainly not been supported by the his-torical record of consistent tactical errors in the earlyphases of campaigns and long-term strategic obfusca-tion. Mumford takes the body of experience accumu-lated by the British in the past 60 years and uses it asa rich empirical base from which to rethink issues ofimmense strategic salience, such as the state of coun-terinsurgency education in the British military sys-

tem; the utility of a hearts and minds strategy; andthe nature of coalition-based irregular warfare. Slug-gish British military lesson-learning, as seen throughMumfords 10 myths of British counterinsurgency,provides todays strategists the opportunity to under-stand the value of lesson transferral and the problemsof strategic inertia.

From the standpoint of the questionable Britishperformance in Iraq, this monograph fundamentallyassesses the arguable myth that surrounds Britishcompetency at counterinsurgency warfare, hopefullysparking a debate about the mythology of recentBritish counterinsurgency warghting.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ANDREW MUMFORD will be Lecturer in Poli-tics and International Relations at the University ofNottingham, United Kingdom, beginning in Septem-ber 2011. He is convenor of the British InternationalStudies Associations (BISA) Insurgencies and SmallWars working group. Dr. Mumford is the author ofThe Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience ofIrregular War(2011) and co-editor of International Law,Security and Ethics: Policy Challenges in the Post-9/11World (2011). He is Reviews Editor of the journal CivilWars and has previously been a Research Fellow atthe International Center for the Study of Terrorism atPennsylvania State University.


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SUMMARY

Britains numerous counterinsurgency campaignsin the post-World War II era have resulted in a gener-ally accepted academic assessment that this volume ofexperience equates to competence in the realm of ir-regular warfare. However, the British response to thecomplexities of 21st century insurgencies, particularlyin their decentralized and globally networked form,has threatened to expose this competency as a colo-nial-era myth. Quantity of counterinsurgency combatexperience has not equated to outright quality.

We cannot understand the British process of re-learning counterinsurgency since the beginning of theWar on Terror unless certain axiomatic elements arerst exposed. This monograph sets forth 10 myths ofBritish counterinsurgency performance and learning.

First among these is the allegation that the British havealways been fast learners. However, the early phasesof nearly every campaign in the classical era weremarred by stagnancy, mismanagement, and confu-sion. Indeed, this trend reveals a second painful mythregarding British counterinsurgency conduct, name-ly, the alleged British perceptivity in COIN strategicplanning. The preponderance of template solutions,however, arguably stemming from the over-hypedMalaya blueprint, has contributed to a process of bi-ased selectivity when it comes to imbibing doctrineand disseminating a lesson-learning program. Simply,Mumford concludes on the basis of such myths as thetwo above that the British scorecard in counterinsur-gency campaigns is not as impressive as recent credu-

lous historiography would have us believe.


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PUNCTURING THECOUNTERINSURGENCY MYTH:

BRITAIN AND IRREGULAR WARFAREIN THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

Britains irregular warfare experience in the post-World War II era presented the military with numer-ous insurgent challenges where the casus belli rangedfrom communism (in Malaya), to tribal supremacistland struggles (in Kenya), to socialist-inspired nation-alism (in Yemen), to the nationalist ght for an alter-native union (in Northern Ireland). It was generallyaccepted that, as the War on Terror morphed into aprotracted counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, the

large volume of British irregular warfare experiencehas equated to competence in COIN operations. Briga-dier Nigel Aylwin-Fosters (in)famousMilitary Reviewarticle in 2005, which admonished American thinkingand performance in Iraq, encapsulated the entrenchedBritish mindset of superiority when it came to COIN.1Take a leaf out of our book, Aylwin-Foster seemedto imply, as we know best.

However, the British response to the complexitiesof 21st century insurgencies, in its decentralized andglobally networked form, has exposed this competen-cy as a colonial-era myth. Quantity of COIN combatexperience has not equated to outright quality. Thisauthor holds that conventional academic and militaryperceptions of British performance in the realm of ir-

regular warfare are highly suspect. This study setsforth 10 myths regarding British COIN performance,and then seeks to invalidate them by critically assess-


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ing the efcacy of the British way of COIN, from themuch-vaunted, yet over-hyped Malayan Emergency

through the withdrawal of British combat troops fromIraq in 2009.

MYTH #1: THE BRITISH MILITARY IS ANEFFECTIVE LEARNING INSTITUTION

According to John Nagl, the British succeeded inMalayain contrast to the American failure in Viet-nambecause the British army had an organizationalculture akin to a so-called learning institution,whereby the army quickly adapted to COIN condi-tions and changed tactics accordingly.2 The array ofoperational activity, ranging from limited to total war,that the British army has experienced has arguablyled to a greater degree of pragmatism in its military

outlook. A dogmatic adherence to rigid military doc-trine has been absent, which, when compared to thegeneration-long postmortem on the failure of U.S.strategy in Vietnam, perhaps explains more than mostother factors why an almost mythic reputation has de-scended upon the British. However, this does not ex-plain, nor should it obscure, the languid application ofappropriate irregular warfare tactics and the absenceof swift strategic design. When it comes to COIN, theBritish are slow learners.

The early phases of nearly every campaign in theclassical era were marred by stagnancy, mismanage-ment, and confusion. The military was 2 years into theMalayan Emergency before it conceived of a cohesivecivil-military strategy in the form of the Briggs Plan.

The crucial early years of the troubles in Northern Ire-land were marked by displays of indiscriminate forceand an inability to modulate the response.3 The Direc-


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tor of the United Kingdom (UK) Defence Academyalso concedes that, in relation to Northern Ireland,

[I]t is easy in the light of the later success . . . to for-get the early mistakes and the time it took to rectifythem.4 As Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely rightlyobserves, the Malayan Emergency was, a much laud-ed counterinsurgency campaign, but often overlookedis the fact that in the early years . . . the British Armyachieved very little success. In COIN terms, therefore,the British have been consistently slow to implementan effective strategy and achieve operational success.Moreover, the vast body of campaign experience hasnot translated into a cogent COIN lesson-learningprocess within the British military. The very need tore-learn COIN in the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11)conict environment has undermined assertions as tothe British militarys being an effective learning insti-

tution. Such amnesia has created an imperative for thearmed forces now to hone their lesson-learning abili-ties while simultaneously adapting to the intricatechallenges of sub-state and transnational post-Maoistinsurgent violence in the third millennium.

MYTH #2: BRITISH CIVIL-MILITARY COINPLANNING IS STRATEGICALLY PERCEPTIVE

This myth points to a painful element of BritishCOIN conduct, namely, the short-circuiting of con-text. The preference for template solutions, arguablystemming from the Malaya blueprint (or Templer so-lutions, as they should perhaps be known; more onthis later), has contributed to a process of tendentious

selectivity when it comes to interpreting doctrine anddisseminating a lesson-learning program. As far backas when the rst pieces of Emergency Legislation


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emerged in 1948, the campaign in Malaya proved thatsome things had not changed in the way Britain dealt

with threats to its national security interests. Deten-tion without trial, the forced relocation of elements ofthe local populace, and controversies surrounding ex-cessive use of force, have a long heritage. It is essentialto put contemporary debates surrounding these issuesin their historical context in order to observe the his-torically derivative nature of British strategic designvis--vis COIN.

What is clear is that understanding the mercurialand complex nature of contemporary transnational

jihadi insurgency does not lend itself to any faciletemplate. Jihadist soldiers are not mere replicas of themore geographically bounded, communist-inspiredCold War enemy. Insight into the context of a con-icts origins and the insurgents motivations is essen-

tial if both the psychological and the martial aspectsof COIN operations are to be effective and nuanced.Again, this blindspot has marred British strategicperceptions. Political posturing in the wake of thewithdrawal from Iraq has masked the COIN failings,which only serves to stie meaningful reection uponthe state of strategic planning for the war. Such a lackhas led to severe strains in UK civil-military relationson the subject of COIN. With the use of a single civil-military commander now increasingly anachronistic(indeed, they were the exception and not the rule inthe British experience), there is an imperative for clearlines of communication and access of commanderson the ground to the highest echelons of government(both back home and within the host nation) if future

COIN strategy is to be effectively executed. This con-cept is increasingly important in the present era ofglobalized post-Maoist insurgency.


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MYTH #3: THE BRITISH MILITARY HAS

FLEXIBLY ADAPTED TO THE DEMANDSOF COIN

As Theo Farrell has observed, the process of Brit-ish military transformation to gain facility in network-centric warfare and to satisfy the demands of contem-porary strategy is conditioned by resource constraints,domestic politics, and military culture.5 However,none of these three elements is conducive to quickadaptation in the British case. The military culture ofthe British Army is essential to the success of COINlesson-learning, especially given the inherent aversionof the army to formalized doctrine. Pragmatic exibil-ity on a campaign-by-campaign basis has necessarilybeen evident given the absence of codied strategic

guidance (the recent exception to this was the publica-tion in October 2009 of the British Army Field Manual,Vol. 1 Pt. 10, Countering Insurgency).6 Essentially, COINlesson-learning for the British has been an ad hoc pro-cess, not historically continuous. The transmission oflessons, particularly during the late colonial era, oc-curred in large part due to the deployment of person-nel who brought with them residual notions of the bestoperational practices, based upon previous COIN ex-periencesoften outdated or inappropriatein othertheaters. This reliance on the transfer of COIN lessonsfrom dated personal experience, especially among se-nior ofcers (for example, Captain [later General Sir]Frank Kitson from Kenya to Northern Ireland) wasencouraged, if not necessitated, by the lack of an au-

thoritative doctrinal underpinning.7Yet, in the technologically-xated, nuclear-armed

mindset that dominated Cold War military thinking,


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COIN was not deemed an appropriate or even rel-evant form of warfare requiring signicant thought

or adequate training. Despite the armys plethora ofcombat experience in low-intensity scenarios, COINfell to the bottom of the British strategic pile. Still, thisonly partially explains the relative ambivalence withwhich the British military has adapted to COIN inthe Long War on Terror. A fear exists in Westernmilitary circles that the current emphasis on COIN isa temporary fad and that an undue focus on low-in-tensity and peace support operations undermines theability to conduct potential future conventional wars.8Despite these concerns, however, there is a discernibleneed to adapt to the utility of a dual-use force. Pre-paring for COIN operations can still be achieved witha degree of exibility that does not ignore traditionalhigh intensity warfare training.

MYTH #4: THE BRITISH MILITARY HAS ANINGRAINED EDUCATIONAL APPROACH TOCOIN

There is a basic, indeed inescapable, reality thatCOIN is inherently difcult to learn. It is a unique formof warfare, posing its own complex strategic prob-lems and requiring challenging tactical adaptation.This is a hurdle not unique to the British Army, as theAmerican, French, Russian, and Israeli militaries haveattested. Consequently, a reliance on training maneu-vers is rendered largely irrelevant. COIN requires amuch higher degree of education within the militaryas to the distinctive threat posed by this form of con-

ict. This education must engender a heightened levelof historical consciousness pertaining to past strate-gic and tactical successes and failures in COIN, andit must increase understanding of the contemporaryinsurgent threat.


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Although progress has been made over the pastdecade and despite the seeming ubiquity of COIN-re-

lated courses at the staff colleges, there is some indica-tion that the British military still has a way to go beforeCOIN becomes an ingrained element of armed forceslearning. A 2009 study sample of 114 ofcers at the Joint Services Command and Staff College revealedthat more than two-thirds had no knowledge of fun-damental COIN principles. The study concluded thatthere was a lack of general awareness amongst juniorofcers of military doctrine underpinning the typesof operations being routinely conducted in Afghani-stan.9 It must be noted, however, that the militarycannot learn COIN without rst understanding thenature of insurgency itself. This is a time-consumingprocess, requiring as much emphasis on nonkineticelements such as cultural learning as it does on the

kinetic training itself. This demands of military com-manders a set of characteristics and leadership skillsdifferent than regular warfare, fostering the impera-tives of cultural sensitivity and emotional intelligenceas key tools in the contemporary COIN toolbox. Therelative absence of these qualities within the Britisharmed forces perhaps explains the next myth, regard-ing British performance in Iraq.

MYTH #5: IRAQ REPRESENTED THE ZENITHOF 60 YEARS WORTH OF MODERN COINLEARNING

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki removed Brit-ish troops from the planning and execution of Opera-

tion CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS in April 2008 to ridBasra, the epicenter of British-controlled Multi-Na-tional Division South-East, of the proliferating inu-


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ence of the Mahdi Army militia of Shia cleric Muqtadaal-Sadr. This insulting gesture epitomized the degen-

eration of faith in British COIN competency. In Sep-tember 2007, keen to ensure a peaceful withdrawal totheir Contingency Operating Base at Basra Airport,the British commanders had negotiated a deal withthe insurgents: all British troops would withdrawfrom the city, and previously detained Mahdi Armymembers would be released. The fulllment of both ofthese provisos understandably led to claims that theBritish bowed to insurgent demands, even if the re-sult was a reduction in violence against British troops.Nouri al-Malikis furious reaction was thus to cut theBritish out of all responsibilities for restoring the secu-rity situation in this key southern city. British embar-rassment was exacerbated by the relative success ofthe U.S.-Iraqi operation, Operation CHARGE OF THE

KNIGHTS, in dampening the potency of the MahdiArmy in Basra.

Moreover, this operation encapsulated the frustra-tions that had been increasing even within the Ameri-can military command at the performance of theirBritish allies. In mid-2007, U.S. General Jack Keane,one of the architects of President Bushs troop surgestrategy, outspokenly criticized the British militaryperformance in Basra, stating that he was frustratedby the disengagement of British troops.10 After theBritish had pulled back from Basra Palace to the air-port in September 2007, a dejected senior U.S. intel-ligence ofcial interpreted this action as a Britishdefeat in the south.11 Thomas Ricks concurred, ar-guing that the withdrawal represented a remarkable

turnaround for the British, who in the early phase ofthe insurgency had felt rather superior to the clumsyAmericans, but who had now fallen almost silent


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since the Petraeus-implemented surge had radicallyreformed the situation in the American-occupied

provinces.12

On this reversal of fortunes, Hilary Syn-nott, the leading British political coordinator in Iraqduring the early phases of the insurgency, had warnedthat extol[ing] the merits of the British approach tocountering insurgents in southern Iraq implied thatthe British could manage such challenges better thanthe United States. . . . Synnott also noted that praisefor the British COIN effort in 2003-04 was an irritantto American military commanders, who proved re-markably sensitive on this point.13

Prominent within these debates lay the weightof the British historical experience. The lessons fromNorthern Ireland in particular were interpreted bythe Americans and British alike as having great util-ity for the British military in Iraq, able as they were to

rely upon decades of familiarity with unconventionalwarghting. Optimistic constructions of a characteris-tic British way of COIN certainly shaped expectationsnot only of what the British military would achieve inIraq. They also encouraged jaundiced perceptions ofAmerican military culture in the realm of asymmetricwarfare.14 Such intra-alliance divisions between theBritish and the Americans over COIN in Iraq argu-ably traced their roots to the nature and balance of thecoalition.15 A perception emerged among the Britishmilitary that American suzerainty over the whole ofIraq, restricting the independent ability of the Britishto forge separate civil-military solutions in Multi-Na-tional Division (South-East) (MND(SE), prevented theunfettered application of a distinctly British Way. As

a consequence of this coalition structure, one Britisharmy ofcer complained, British military policy be-came confused and suffered as it sought to serve the


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Americans.16 However, such an interpretation over-looks the fact that the insurgent campaign in Iraq was

sui generis, totally aliento the British historical experi-ence.

Moreover, the conict environment, coalition or-ganization, political restrictions, and the insurgentsglobal links all ensured that the decades-old faith inBritish COIN competence would be brought into ques-tion. Although General David Petraeus felt compelledto state that the signicance of the United Kingdomscontribution should not be underestimated,17 hisgesture is perhaps overly politic. At best, the Britishmilitary achievements in Iraq did not match the ex-pectations of 2003. Reduction of insurgent violence inBasra came initially at the price of ceding control ofthe city to the Mahdi Army, and was later achievedby the Coalition without major British military input.

The British military mission in Iraq will hardly marka glorious rst chapter in the history of that nations21st century COIN campaigning.

MYTH #6: THE BRITISH CAN DO COIN ALONE

The bruising experience in Iraq has demonstratedthat the British political establishment has no stomachfor protracted irregular wars. The desire to undertakesuch missions in the future in company with others,let alone on a unilateral basis, has been further dimin-ished by recession-induced reductions to the Ministryof Defence budget since the Iraq withdrawal. Militar-ily speaking, single state COIN campaigns are now ofdecreased relevance. Junior coalition partner status

had become a strategic norm for Britain in the post-Cold War world, as demonstrated in the rst GulfWar and again in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Yet Iraq


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presented an unprecedented strategic scenario for theBritish military inasmuch as it was the rst time it had

to operate as a junior partner in a COIN coalition.Coalition-based campaigns are likely to be the

norm for the foreseeable future, given the spatial andtemporal freedom granted to an open-ended Islamist

jihad and the shared conglomeration of threats fromnear and far enemies alike. Indeed, in his introduc-tion to the British Defence Green Paper(February 2010),then-Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth openly declaredthe need for the British military to plan for long-termcoalition commitments: Increasing globalisation tiesour security to that of our allies. . . . Therefore we mustincrease co-operation with our international partnersto deliver defence more efciently and effectively.18For these international partners, the real challenge toeffective coalition functioning is internal political in-

tractability on the part of all partners involved. Thereis a clear imperative to adopt appropriate govern-ment structuresdomestically (through interagencycooperation), within the coalition itself; and withinthe host nation where operations are being conducted(via simultaneous programs of strengthening gover-nance structures and economic and humanitarian as-sistance).

MYTH#7: THE BRITISH DONT TALK TOTERRORISTS

Margaret Thatcher, in characteristically deantmode, famously asserted that we dont talk to ter-rorists when asked about the possibility of nego-

tiations with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Thisquip has given rise to the key myth that dialoguewith insurgent opponents has had no role in British


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COIN practice. In fact, within 3 years of the outbreakof the Irish troubles in 1969, the British government

had undertaken direct covert negotiations with theIRA, and sanctioned indirect talks via intermediarieswith that organization. The rst secret talks with theIRA came when Labour Party leader Harold Wilson,with the permission of Prime Minister Edward Heath,attended a meeting with the leadership of the Provi-sional IRA whilst on a visit in Dublin in March 1972.Yet perhaps the most meaningful secret contact camewith the extraordinary meeting between six IRA lead-ers, who were helicoptered in by the Royal Air Force,and the Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelawin London on July 7, 1972. Consistent public claimsthat no talks were occurring belied a signicant setof back-channel messages that had been exchangedbetween the British military and intelligence ofcials

on one hand, and intermediaries and key IRA gureson the other. Ultimately, secret dialogue with the IRAleadership would establish itself as a hallmark of Brit-ish political management during the bloody height ofviolence in the 1970s.

Yet secret negotiations were in no way unique toNorthern Ireland. Rather, they were present through-out British COIN campaigns, having been conducted inprevious colonial conicts. In Malaya, for example, inDecember 1955, a back-channel message conduit wasopened with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)in the jungle-edge town of Baling on the Thai border.The MCP revealed that it wished to end its strugglewith the granting of amnesty to the MCP as well aspolitical legitimacy for the MCPs program at the next

election. Not surprisingly, the government delega-tion led by Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman laterdismissed these requests on the basis of back-channel


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information he had received from the British before-hand. As a consequence, negotiations disintegrated,

and no deal was reached.19

Yet the conduct of thismeeting in itself demonstrated a willingness to ensurea managed political end to the conict, and reveals ahistorical legacy of the British opening a back-channelconduit with insurgents in efforts to attain a negoti-ated settlement. The Malayan initiative was, of course,long before the controversies surrounding the secrettalks with the IRA in the 1970s and bargaining withthe Mahdi Army in Basra in 2007.

MYTH #8: HEARTS AND MINDS ANDMINIMUM FORCE ARE SACROSANCTELEMENTS OF THE BRITISH WAY OF COIN

The center of gravity for COIN campaigns has ha-

bitually been the population of the country involved,ensuring that plans for any military assault upon theenemy are couched in terms of protecting the civilianpopulation and preserving their trust. For this reason,the notion of minimum force has become integral to thetheoretical construct of British COIN thinking. How-ever, in practice the British have continuously devi-ated from such doctrine. A long-standing assumptionthat British COIN campaigns have traditionally restedon an effort to win civilian hearts and minds must beseen as a colonial-era myth, especially given the regu-larity with which insurgent suspects were brutallytreated during periods of detention and interrogation.

The introduction of internment without trial forIRA suspects between 1971 and 1975 revealed a dark

lineage to British COIN conduct. The ill-treatment atthe hands of the British inside internment camps wastypied by the so-called ve techniques of interro-


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gation by the security forces. These methods includedwall-standing, hooding, continuous white noise, food

denial, and sleep deprivation. Such techniques hadbeen honed in colonial counterinsurgencies in previ-ous decades, notably during the suppression of theMau Mau insurgency in Kenya between 1952 and1960. This experience has become the focus of recentcritical historiographical study exposing the regularpractice of beatings, reprisals, and death sentencesdealt to insurgents.20 Indeed, the ve techniques werelater codied in a 1965 report by the Joint IntelligenceCommittee, entitled Joint Directive on Military Inter-rogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas,which stated that a successful interrogation requiresa psychological attack upon the prisoner.21 To thisextent, an element of brutality towards prisoners,whether guilty or not, had been institutionalized in

the British Army for a considerable time even beforerecent similar allegations in Iraq emerged. Widelypublicized incidents in Iraq, such as the death in Brit-ish custody of Basra hotel clerk Baha Mousa in 2003and the subsequent court-martial of the rst-everBritish soldier convicted of war crimes in relation toMousas death, seriously undermined British effortsto ingratiate themselves with native Iraqis and theirattempts to reinforce the perceived legitimacy of theiroccupation of southern Iraq.22

The implementation of torture during detentionand interrogation in Northern Ireland left bitter lega-cies. The intelligence dividend was negligible, and thesocial and political backlash against the treatment ofdetainees proved to be a catalyst to greater violence.

The rules proscribing the use of torture were notstrictly observed during the occupation of Iraq, withthe ill-treatment of detainees becoming an all-too-


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frequent event. History has thus repeated itself in abrutal fashion; however, it has usefully served to ex-

pose the comfortable but false mantras regarding thesacrosanct nature of minimum force doctrine in Brit-ish COIN practice.

MYTH #9: THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY IS THEARCHETYPAL COIN CAMPAIGN

The British response to the 1948-1960 MalayanEmergency is widely considered to be the rst modernCOIN and is often regarded by scholars and practitio-ners alike as the archetype of a successful operation.23Yet we must question the notion of Malaya as an exem-plar of COIN success. British victory must be judgedin the context of the effects of several external factors,namely, the fortuitous economic dividend resulting

from the Korean War (as Richard Stubbs quipped,trying to organise a revolution is not easy in timesof full employment24); the misapplication of guerrillawarfare tactics by the MCP; and the utter absence ofany MCP weapons, funding, or training from outsidesources. A managed British political withdrawal, inthe context of decolonization, was always an essentialcondition for ensuring indigenous compliance withthe peace terms. A counterinsurgency campaign tak-ing 12 years to eradicate an isolated insurgent groupis not a glowing achievement and is hardly deservingof the academic salutations it has garnered.

In 1948, the British army still appeared to have aWorld War II mindset in Malaya, relying on a conven-tional approach of large sweeps through the jungle

that were detected long in advance by the guerrillas.The thick jungle of Malaya, which covered around80 percent of the entire country, rendered traditional


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army weaponry and tactics useless. The British airmonopoly meant little until the Special Air Service

began to use parachute jumps as a means of troop de-ployment, as close combat became the only means offruitful engagement with the enemy.25

It was not until May 1950, nearly 2 years into thecampaign, that a comprehensive strategy in the formof the Briggs Plan, was conceived. The essence of theplan was the insight that the insurgency could be de-feated if the terrorists were cut off from their supportbase. This could be achieved via a more coherent andsystematic resettlement campaign that removed ruralinhabitants from the base areas, leaving the insurgentsto fend for themselves and lacking a recruitment pool.Entirely new Resettlement Areas were constructed,with new huts built for squatters who were grantedthe land deeds for their plot. However, it must be re-

membered that they functioned as a tool for popula-tion control and coercion. Despite being depicted asa central tenet of the hearts and minds campaign, themovements of those re-housed in Resettlement Ar-eas were severely restricted outside the barbed wireperimeter fence. The forcible resettlement of hithertorural and isolated squatters into self-contained socialunits, where the political framework was dened bythe government, resulted in a coercive acquiescencetowards the British agenda for Malaya.26

By mid-1951, progress in clearing areas of in-surgents via the adoption of the so-called oil spotstrategy was slow, and political hopes of a militarysuccess had faded. However, the campaign was to beenergized by the appointment as joint civil-military

leader of General Sir Gerald Templer. Upon his ar-rival in Malaya, he openly committed himself to thecentral tenets of the Briggs Plan as the mainstay of


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his own tenure in ofce. However, Templer succeed-ed where Briggss own plan was oundering due to

Templer's injection of urgency into the campaign. Yetinspirational leadership has its ipside, and Templersno-nonsense approach in some quarters created a neg-ative backlash as some communities resented increas-ingly stringent food rations, curfews, and detentionsthat Templer had instigated. Malaya was to employan equal distribution of carrots and sticks. DuringTemplers tenure between 1952 and 1954, insurgentincidents fell from 500 to fewer than 100 a month.27But one of the main questions is the extent to whichTempler can personally take credit for this outcome.His bold leadership style and his realization that thereshould be an intricate marriage between normal andemergency government activities strengthened Britishcondence and helped build a more coherent COIN

campaign. John Nagl states, It is difcult to overstatethe impact that Templer . . . had on the course of theEmergency.28

Arguably, however, the opposite is true: it is easyto overstate Templers role. His high prole and blus-tering style may have made him the personal embodi-ment of success. However, Templer was, to a signi-cant extent, improving and modifying tactics alreadyestablished by Briggs. Templer has been credited withtoo much. For example, the MCPs own strategic over-haul, decided upon in October 1951, which wouldalter insurgent tactics from guerrilla attacks to politi-cal education, were not made public until December1952. The lull in insurgent violence between thesedates (from 6,000 incidents in 1951 to 3,700 in 1952)

was thus wrongly perceived as the result of Templersstrong and effective leadership, when, in fact, it result-ed from the Communists change in strategy.29


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The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM)3-24, Counterinsurgency, praised British conduct dur-

ing the Malayan Emergency for providing lessonsapplicable to combating any insurgency.30 Yet, ulti-mately, the lessons of the Malayan Emergency are ex-aggerated. Although it laid the foundations for futurecampaigns, we can witness during the Malayan Emer-gency the appearance of a protracted and slowly de-veloping strategy that allowed an increasingly isolat-ed and dwindling band of insurgents to prolong theiruprising for 12 years before they nally capitulated.By the ofcial end of the MCP uprising in 1960, theblueprint for future British counterinsurgencies hadbeen written, but its efcacy in ending the insurgencyhas been overstated, and its applicability to future in-surgencies is limited.

MYTH # 10: THE BRITISH MILITARY ARE THEULTIMATE COIN PRACTITIONERS

When analyzing the meta-historical evolution ofBritish COIN warghting in the post-World War IIera, we see a picture emerging of slow British learn-ing, a slow-acting military strategy, and a successionof decient insurgent opponents who have exploitedthe inadequacies of the British approach. Reectingon the past insurgent opponents facing the British, wecan conclude that despite engendering a perception ofan effective COIN approach, the British have actuallycome up against a set of insurgent groups organiza-tionally weak, strategically incompetent, or lacking ininternal and external support. This perhaps explains

why the arguable failure of British COIN in Iraq mustbe judged in relation to the insurgent enemy, who waswell-organized, strategically driven, tactically brutal,and well-supported from within and outside Iraq.


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Sympathetic observers have noted that during theclassical COIN period of the mid-20th century, the

British approach had yielded more success than thatof any other nation faced with internal conict. . . .Nothing like an Algeria or Vietnam tarnishes the Brit-ish record.31 The absence of a catastrophic COINfailure, however, should not obscure the drawn-outstrategic inertia that came to characterize consecu-tive British campaigns. That weakness is perhaps anoutcome more indicative of the lack of preparednessand efciency on the part of the insurgent opponentsthe British have faced; the Malayan Races LiberationArmy (MRLA), Mau Mau, and even the IRA were cer-tainly not as tactically savvy or strategically endowedas the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria orthe Vietcong in Vietnam.

The British experience of irregular conict from

Malaya to Afghanistan has demonstrated that, de-spite the highly politicized nature of COIN warfare,the efcacy of the military aspect of the counterinsur-gency remains paramount to operational and strate-gic success. If the military cannot succeed in reduc-ing insurgent violence, then no manner of politicalmeasures will arrest the worsening security situation.The level of external support insurgent groups receivehas proved itself to be a critical enabler of their suc-cess. An absence of external funding and weaponryhas stunted insurgencies and fatally undermined theirpotency, as was the case with both the MRLA in Ma-laya and the Mau Mau in Kenya. External insurgentsupport appears to be more important to the effective-ness of an insurgent group than the level of internal

support it receives among its own population, as dem-onstrated by the vibrancy of the Egyptian-backed Na-tional Liberation Front (NLF), which fought the Brit-


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ish in South Arabia (now Yemen) between 1963 and1967. A militant group without weapons is irrelevant,

yet an armed group lacking popular support is still anarmed group. Its threat to security remains.

Another striking feature about the British experi-ence is that each campaign begins with an unatteringtale in relation to intelligence capabilities. From Ma-laya to Iraq, British intelligence has failed to foreseethe outbreak of an insurgency and has been woefullyunprepared for it. There are obvious difculties in cul-tivating human intelligence (HUMINT) on insurgentgroups often drawn from narrow and closed segmentsof a society. For this reason alone, insurgencies are dif-cult to see coming. Yet British intelligence capabili-ties, at the top and on the ground, did not, and argu-ably still do not, have the capacity to anticipate theemergence of substate insurgent threats. On the bright

side, however, from these consistently inadequate ori-gins emerges an encouraging picture of British intel-ligence nally adapting to the threat and positioningitself as an indispensable counterinsurgent tool. Oncethe insurgency is recognized, the role played by theintelligence agencies, and their military intelligencecounterparts, has been integral to operational suc-cesses in every campaign.

THE VALUE OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

So what conclusions can we reach about the Brit-ish COIN experience? After the withdrawal from Iraq,the British COIN establishment stands at a crossroads.The underwhelming performance in and around

Basra contrasted with the American display of strik-ing strategic vision and tactical ability in the realmof COIN. The publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-24,


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Counterinsurgency, the rise to prominence and inu-ence of the COIN-savvyGeneral Petraeus, the incul-

cation of COIN learning at all levels of the Americanmilitary, and the ubiquity of COIN thinking in theUnited States across the academic-military divide,have all contributed to a quantum leap of Americanuency in irregular warfare. The American militaryshould no longer hold up Malaya or Northern Irelandas exemplars of COIN warfare. It can now look at An-bar province and the Surge as the new ideal case stud-ies in COIN textbooks. The Americans have learnedthe hard way in Iraq, and, like the British before them,it has been a slow and painful process. However, thecombination of British ineptitude in Basra and theeventual American moxie in central and western Iraqhas largely debunked the canard relating to Britishcompetence in COIN. No longer can we believe that

COIN is the British armys default mode.British thinking in the run-up to the campaigns

in Afghanistan and Iraq was arguably shaped by theformative experiences in Northern Ireland. They hadmolded the militarys low-intensity doctrine, versed ageneration of ofcers in the nuances of urban popula-tion pacication, and demonstrated the difculties ofcombining a coercive COIN endeavor with a campaignto win hearts and minds not only within the same city,but on the same street. The British ability in North-ern Ireland during Operation BANNER to seek andmaintain an acceptable level of violence, combinedwith the over-hyped colonial successes, especially inMalaya, ensured that British thinking on the issue ofcountering insurgencies earned respect within foreign

militaries and was exported as a rare example of howa state army can subdue a substate enemy withoutcompromising strategic goals. However, setting aside


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the matter of the British performance in Basra, its ac-tions in Afghanistan since the resurgence of the Tali-

ban in 2006-07 has done much to sully its reputation inforeign eyes. Indeed, the picture emerging from Hel-mand seems to be one of a struggling and stretchedmilitary, searching for a modest level of strategic clar-ity and operational potency.32 Afghanistan now con-tinues as the primary testing ground of new-foundAmerican condence in the realm of COIN, whileHelmand province remains the crucible in which theBritish military might salvage its reputation. Yet, after8 years into Operation HERRICK, the signs are againpointing to a slow lesson learning experience, espe-cially in exploiting the lessons from Iraq regardinginsufciency of military resources and reconstructionefforts and a too-slowly-developing strategy. We areseeing a reprise of such deciencies as the protracted

inability to reduce the strength of the Taliban and tointerdict their underground avenues of support andnance, namely, the Afghan poppy harvest and her-oin trade.

COIN is now a far more complex endeavor, giventhe harsh operational environment, the deciencies ofhost-country governance, and the rise of global instantnews media coverage. Previous lip service to heartsand minds and minimum force has now transformedinto myriad strategic initiatives that are often appliedsimultaneously: peace support, stability and recon-struction, and humanitarian relief. COIN is arguablythe medium-term future of warghting. There is thusa pressing need for continued study of insurgencies asan evolving concept, that is, in their past, present, and

potential future modes, in order to continually updatethe best means of countering them. The body of expe-rience accumulated by the British in the past 60 years


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represents a rich empirical base from which to beginsuch study, but it is only the starting point in what

must necessasrily be a never-ending process. Thesnails pace of past British military lesson learning pro-vides future strategists the opportunity to appreciatethe value of lesson transfer and the pitfalls of doctrinalinertia. The popular perception of high British COINefcacy from Malaya onwards certainly has not beenvalidated by the pattern of tactical errors displayed inthe early phases of their COIN campaigns. After thedismal performance in Iraq, the British military, andespecially their political masters, have a long way togo to rebuild a narrative of high British competence inCOIN warfare.

ENDNOTES

1. Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, Changing the Army forCounterinsurgency Operations,Military Review, November/De-cember 2005, pp. 2-15.

2. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsur-gency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, New Ed., Chicago, IL: Uni-versity of Chicago Press, 2005, p. xxii.

3. Rod Thornton, Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes

Made in the Early Stages of the British Armys Deployment toNorthern Ireland, August 1969 to March 1972,Journal of StrategicStudies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2007, pp. 73-107.

4. Lieutenant-General Sir John Kiszely, Learning AboutCounterinsurgency,Military Review, March-April 2007, pp. 6-7.

5. Theo Farrell, The Dynamics of British Military Transfor-mation, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, 2008, p. 783.

6. British Army Field Manual (FM), Countering Insurgency, Vol.1 Pt. 10, Army Code 71876, October 2009.


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7. Hew Strachan, British Counter-Insurgency from Malayato Iraq, RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 6, 2007, p. 10.

8. As a retort to the so-called COINdinistas within Ameri-can military circles who promote focusing military training on ir-regular warfare, see Gian Gentile, Freeing the Army from theCounterinsurgency Strait-Jacket, Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 58,No.3, 2010, pp. 121-122.

9. Claudia Harvey and Mark Wilkinson, The Value of Doc-trine: Assessing British Ofcers Perspectives, RUSI Journal, Vol.154, No. 6, 2009, pp. 24, 27.

10. US frustrated with UK in Basra, BBC News website,August 22, 2007, available from news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/6958395.stm.

11. Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008, New York: ThePenguin Press, 2009, p. 177.

12. Ibid., p. 277.

13. Hilary Synnott, Statebuilding in Southern Iraq, Survival,Vol. 47, No. 2, 2005, pp. 40-41.

14. Aylwin-Foster, Changing the Army for Counterinsur-gency, pp. 2-15. Also see Andrew Gareld, Succeeding in PhaseIV: British Perspectives on the US Effort to Stabilize and Recon-struct Iraq, Foreign Policy Research Institute report, September2006; and James K. Wither, Basras not Belfast: The British Army,Small Wars and Iraq, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 20, Nos.3 and 4, 2009, pp. 611-635.

15. Even the General Staffs report of British stability opera-tions in Iraq felt compelled to document U.S.-UK friction over theutility of Britains previous counterinsurgency experience. SeeStability Operations in Iraq, Army Code 71844, p. 8, para. 19.

16. Colonel Alastair Campbell, Assessing Britains Legacy:The UK Withdrawal from Iraq, RUSI Commentary, availablefrom www.rusi.org/research/studies/menap/commentary/ref:C494B9295ACCE1/.


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17. Ministry of Defence, US Commander thanks UK for con-tribution to Iraq and Afghanistan, February 6, 2009, availablefrom www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAnd-Business/UsCommanderThanksUkForContributionToIraqAndAfghan-istan.htm.

18. Defence Secretarys introduction, Adaptability and Part-nership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review, Cm 7794, Lon-don, UK: The Stationery Ofce, February 2010, p. 6.

19. For a record of the Baling talks, see The National Archives,Kew, London, p. CO 1030/29.

20. In particular, see David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged:Britains Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire, London, UK:Orion, 2006; and Caroline Elkins, Britains Gulag: The Brutal End ofEmpire in Kenya, London, UK: Jonathan Cape, 2005.

21. The National Archives, Kew, London, UK, CAB 164/1175, Joint Intelligence Committee report: Joint Directive on MilitaryInterrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas, February17, 1965.

22. Rachel Kerr, A force for good? War, crime and legitima-cy: The British army in Iraq, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 24,No. 4, 2008, p. 401.

23. John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestineto Northern Ireland, Basingstok, UK: Macmillan, 2002, p. 31. Alsosee John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.

24. Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, Singapore: Eastern UniversitiesPress, 2004, p. 126.

25. Andrew Mumford, Unnecessary or Unsung? The Utilisa-tion of Airpower in Britains Colonial Counter-Insurgency Cam-paigns, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2009, pp. 641-643.

26. John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Ma-layan Emergency, 1948-1954, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992,p. 93.


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27. Kumar Ramakrishna, Transmogrifying Malaya: The Im-pact of Sir Gerald Templer, 1952-54, Journal of Southeast AsianStudies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2001, p. 79.

28. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 89.

29. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 159-160.

30. US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counter-insurgency, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 235.

31. Thomas R. Mockaitis, The Phoenix of Counterinsurgen-cy,Journal of Conict Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2007, pp. 8, 11.

32. For a critical overview, see Warren Chin, British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 23,No. 2, 2007, pp. 201-225.


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